More than one month after typhoon Yolanda (international name Haiyan), known as the world’s biggest typhoon, struck the Philippines, authorities now estimate that over 14 million people have been affected, including four million displaced. The estimated death toll is at 6,069. The government is now on the hard road to recovery and reconstruction, allocating a total of 100 billion pesos in the 2014 budget for recovery and rehabilitation.
Disaster response put to test
Give the size, scope, and severity of Typhoon Yolanda, addressing the emergency that it caused to life and property would have been a challenge to any government. Indeed, even in a disaster-prone country like the Philippines, the magnitude of Yolanda tested the national government’s disaster management response system. Local governments – historically the first responders in disaster-prone communities in the Philippines – were so overwhelmed by the destruction and loss of lives that just following regular immediate response procedures was challenging at best, and impossible in those hardest-hit areas.
Typhoon Yolanda took the country’s disaster management system back to the drawing board, with many experts and practitioners calling for a central, stand-alone disaster management agency. Photo/Flickr user IOM 2013 (Photo by Joe Lowry)
Five days after the typhoon struck, journalists began commenting that there was a lack of clarity on who was in charge from the national government. One government official answered back, “next time the response will be perfect,” and another admitted that there was a breakdown in the “system.”
In fact, the Philippines has in place specific disaster risk reduction and management policies: the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management (National DRRM) law and its Implementing Rules were passed in 2010. The law highlights the role of local governments in disaster mitigation and preparation through the DRRM Councils at every tier of the government, including barangays (villages), municipalities, provinces, and the national government. The law states that each local government must allocate 5 percent of their national internal revenue allotment for disaster preparedness.
However, the complexity of large-scale disasters such as Typhoon Yolanda undermines existing policies and structures. In the immediate aftermath, there was confusion in some areas on which government official was in charge of managing relief. We are now witnessing an embryonic practice of post-disaster governance where the local governments primarily, and the national government secondarily, are struggling to coordinate all sectors to effectively manage the disaster. Three days passed before President Aquino declared a national state of calamity to focus relief and secure the affected areas. There was a controversial video where the secretary of the Interior and Local Government asked the mayor of Tacloban City six days after the disaster to issue a resolution allowing a national government take-over of the local government. One official said this exercise is required in the national government’s crisis management operations manual document. However, the law clearly states that national government intervention immediately takes over if there are two or more regions affected by disasters. In the case of Yolanda, there were almost four regions affected. An immediate humanitarian response, instead of a narrow focus on the danger of interagency overlap, should have been prioritized.
A stand-alone disaster management agency
Typhoon Yolanda took the country’s disaster management system back to the drawing board, with many experts and practitioners calling for a central, stand-alone disaster management agency.
Efficient coordination of tasks, immediate response, and clear decisions were needed at the onset of disaster, but what transpired instead was a series of plodding consultations during a national emergency. Given the huge devastation, the national government’s slow and cautious response seemingly followed the limited role and capacity of a coordinating council and its secretariat. The Office of the Civil Defense’s (OCD) budget has declined significantly from 1 billion pesos in 2012 to 650 million in 2013. There were accounts of shortages of tents and satellite phones in the first few days after the disaster, which the NDRRMC sourced from other agencies such as Public Works and Highways and the Philippine Navy. Having a more pronounced leader in the OCD and the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) may not complete the equation, especially in large-scale disasters. A strong leader can be effective and efficient if he or she is institutionally armed. After Yolanda, OCD and DND cannot be expected to lead in everything, including reviewing national and local government’s land use and disaster contingency plans, orchestrating emergency drills across agencies, and gearing up on needed equipment and infrastructure.
Toward recovery and rehabilitation
One of the most pressing concerns and opportunities now is in disaster recovery and rehabilitation. On December 6, President Aquino signed the appointment of former Senator Ping Lacson as Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery, with cabinet rank. Dubbed as the rehabilitation czar, Lacson will manage rehabilitation efforts, unify stakeholders’ efforts, and monitor recovery and rehabilitation efforts by the government. Many people lauded this appointment, as there will be a face to lead recovery and rehabilitation on a full-time basis, signaling the national government’s serious commitment to improving disaster management. Doing the math on damages and losses brought by Typhoon Haiyan and the cost of relief and rehabilitation leads us to invest in and improve mitigation and preparedness. Below are some investments worth pursuing.
Better information and disaster preparedness
The people of Tacloban and at nearby areas never expected the gravity of such strong winds and storm surges. An official with the DOST-Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical Services Administration (PAGASA) admitted they weren’t “able to explain” its magnitude in press briefings and information materials. The mayor of Tacloban City said more lives could have been spared if the nature of storm surges would have been described as being more like a tsunami. Some have suggested that simple illustrations be included in future storm signals advisories and weather terminologies.
Review of disaster contingency plans and quicker response
The DRRM law requires local governments to have DRRM plans that designate evacuation centers and articulate contingency protocols. There were reports of floodwaters swallowing some evacuation centers, which tragically led to drowning among children and the elderly. Local governments should seriously take into account disaster risk in designating evacuation centers. The national government should also strengthen its quick response plan in crisis situations through a system called Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis. The plan should outline the worst-case scenarios and back-up plans to ensure immediate response.
Settlement planning should better integrate DRRM informed land use, zoning, and building codes. The majority of our evacuation centers are schools, churches, and hospitals – institutional facilities that need retrofitting and improvements to withstand large-scale disasters. Given the immensity and frequency of tropical cyclones and storm surges in the Philippines, safe areas for settlements should be designated. It’s also high time for local governments to enforce no-build zones and for the national government to review and monitor compliance.
Kriszia Lorrain Enriquez is an assistant program officer for The Asia Foundation in the Philippines. She can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
Formerly the Director-General of the Department of Archaeology under the Ministry of Culture in Myanmar, Mr. Nyunt Han, Senior Researcher, Regional Centre for Archaeology and Fine Arts at the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization, conducted research and identified artifacts in the Asian Art Museum’s collection of Burmese art during his two-week professional affiliation. A specialist in archaeology in Myanmar, Mr. Han has supervised excavations in ancient cities and the conservation of many ancient monuments and mural paintings.
Asia Foundation Trustee Judith Wilbur generously established a fellowship in Asian Art in honor of her late husband and former Trustee, Brayton Wilbur, Jr. The fellowship stems from the Wilburs’ deep interest in Asian art, nurtured through their residence and travel in the region, and their commitment to the work of The Asia Foundation and the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco (AAM). The two institutions are collaborating in the program’s execution, with AAM identifying qualified fellowship recipients, and The Asia Foundation’s Asian American Exchange unit responsible for overall administration.
Last month, when the 7.2 earthquake struck the Philippine provinces of Cebu and Bohol, I was in the southern city of Zamboanga facilitating dialogues between Muslim and Christian leaders to alleviate possible religious tension following the September siege that displaced thousands and threatened the good relationship of the city’s two faith communities. It was the furthest thing from my mind that an even more devastating disaster would happen just a month later, right in Tacloban City, where I had left my wife and kids in safety (or so I thought) and in the province of Eastern Samar where I grew up playing in the gentle edges of the mighty Pacific Ocean. Typhoon Yolanda (internationally known as Haiyan) will forever change my idea of safety.
On November 8, Typhoon Yolanda (known internationally as Haiyan) struck central Philippines, particularly the eastern coasts of the islands of Leyte and Samar. Photo/Eric Aseo
At around 4 am on November 8, Friday, the day Typhoon Yolanda hit Samar and Leyte, my brother called me in Manila from Eastern Samar asking me to check the latest weather bulletin. Electricity in the province is already gone, he said; the wind was getting stronger and it was blowing low, threatening to sweep away most houses in our small town. By 6 am, I called up my son in Tacloban City who in his deadpan way said, there isn’t much rain and the wind wasn’t as strong as expected. That calmed me down, but not for long. When I called again at around 7 am, I could no longer contact them and the communication gap went on for two and a half more days. Information coming from the government and the media was bleak and sketchy.
The absence of reliable information took its toll on the victims’ families who were away when Yolanda struck. A friend working in Saudi Arabia said that in the period he’d been trying to reach his family, he couldn’t eat, he couldn’t sleep, and he couldn’t work. The social media was also replete with pleas from overseas Filipino workers for information on their families. Lesson No.1: Immediately restoring communication lines after a disaster or putting up disaster-proof communication systems would save a lot of people from worries and would keep them productive even in the face of disaster.
On the morning of November 10, Sunday, I tried my luck with military cargo planes, since all flights to Tacloban were cancelled. But I ended up helping soldiers at the Villamor Airbase explain to other waiting civilians, some of them hysterical, that flying in rescue teams and equipment first was more important than flying us home. At the base, I also had to absorb the grief of some who received early bad news from home. Lesson No. 2: Entry to and arrival points from disaster areas should have personnel who are trained to deliver clear messages and to provide psychosocial services to waiting families and arriving victims. This will prepare families for the worst and provide early interventions to victims with trauma.
After taking on those roles for a while and waiting for another half a day, I decided to take the 24-hour route by land to Tacloban. A friend on his way to see his mother offered me a ride. We had similar plans – to locate our families and pull them out of the city immediately. We traveled non-stop, stopping only in Naga City where my friend got an elated call from relatives who said they had managed to find his mom and she was fine. For 10 hours I prayed to get the same call. It was only in Calbayog City, four hours away from Tacloban on a regular day, when I finally got word from my wife. They were home and safe. That was 10:35 am, November 11, Monday.
While still in Calbayog City somebody tipped us off to load up on fuel as it was running out even in Catbalogan, another small city two hours away from Tacloban. We filled the vehicle tank full and brought another 20 liters of fuel, enough to take us in and out of Tacloban. We were warned that food and water were also in short supply in Tacloban and people were coming to Catbalogan to replenish supplies, putting pressure on the city’s own supply. Lesson No. 3: After a disaster, or even before, it makes sense to beef up the supply of food, fuel, and water in areas that will not be hit. In all likelihood, they will serve as supply points for the disaster-affected areas.
In the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda, basic services, such as access to fuel, were cut off due to the destruction. Photo/Eric Aseo
When we reached Catbalogan, we tried to gather all the information we needed to reach Tacloban safely. Some told us to use only motorcycles but sans the backpacks; it’s the fastest and safest way into the city, they said. Others warned us of overloading our vehicle with food and water; it’s an open invitation to being mobbed. A few suggested that we leave our vehicle in Catbalogan, take a motorized boat to Tacloban instead, and sneak out our families by sea. We noted all these bits of advice, but decided to continue on our journey, as planned, in our vehicle, carrying all our supplies.
At around 4 pm, exactly 24 hours after we left Manila, we crossed the 1.3 mile-long San Juanico Bridge that connects the islands of Samar and Leyte. We needed to travel 12 kilometers more to get into the heart of the city. This did not prove easy. Piles of debris obstructed parts of the road along with some cadavers. There were also vendors hawking items like milk, fuel, and shampoo, as well as an endless procession of vehicles, evacuees, and looters carrying sacks of rice, trays of eggs, and chickens. It took us eight hours to cover the 12-kilometer stretch. Once in a while a pair of policemen or soldiers would pass us seemingly unaware of the mayhem; other commuters, including rescue workers, from time to time would get off their vehicles to check the prices of looted items sold on the roadside. Lesson No. 4: Road clearing should be a priority. Roads that are not cleared delay relief and rescue, prolong the victims’ and their families’ agony, and even encourage mob rule.
At around midnight, we finally reached Tacloban City. It was drizzling and the city was in pitch-darkness. I asked to be dropped at the tent of a police colonel who headed a 30-man team and requested to wait at their outpost until daybreak. His men stopped people coming out of the city with sacks – some of which revealed items obviously taken from ransacked stores and warehouses. The policemen were kind enough to offer coffee and allow these people to take food items they would need for three days. But the policemen also warned them not to repeat what they did and asked them to tell their communities such acts are not tolerated even during disasters.
While sipping coffee with some of the policemen, two officers and a local businessman who owns a nearby warehouse came. The officers organized an eight-man team to secure a wealthy enclave of Tacloban. The businessman told us four of the five suppliers of prime commodities in the city had already gone and were not coming back any time soon. The biggest rice miller, he said, would also be leaving the following day. His story strengthened my resolve to pull out my family as soon as I could reach them.
What set me thinking, though, was the judiciousness of deploying eight policemen to secure the houses of the rich. If that pattern of deployment would continue, I thought, they won’t max out the services of the 30-man contingent. Lesson No. 5: Security managers should exercise prudence in the deployment of limited forces. In communities not badly affected by the disaster, unarmed multipliers perhaps can be organized to protect their own communities freeing up more policemen and soldiers to lead in recovery, maintain law and order, and guard crucial establishments.
At around 5:30 am, November 12, Tuesday, I left the police outpost and finally began walking toward home. Around ten meters away from the tent, I noticed more than 30 cadavers covered with mats and blankets. I pushed on, covering my nose with a handkerchief. On the right side of the Maharlika Highway, facing the town of Palo in Leyte province, most communities appeared not to have been as badly affected by the typhoon as I expected. These communities could have been sources of volunteers in the relief efforts if they were assured of the security of their homes and families. Lesson No. 6: Even typhoons as devastating as Yolanda often spare pockets of communities who can fill in the scarcity of volunteers. Relief organizations should find ways to tap these local resources.
As I walked on I met entire families, young men and women, walking toward San Juanico Bridge where buses headed to the Samar provinces were waiting. Some were students going back to their home towns. A few hopped in when a school bus sent by the city government of Calbayog stopped. Others were walking toward the Tacloban port. I later learned that two island municipalities of Samar sent motorized boats to bring their people back home. Lesson No. 7: Nearby local governments not badly affected by the disaster should ferry home temporary residents of the affected area. This will decongest the area and lessen competition for the limited food and water supply.
I arrived home at around 7 am and after five hours, I was back on the road with my wife and kids. We watched the evening news about Tacloban in Calbayog City. Cebu was hosting some of the victims and help from other countries was pouring in quickly. I finally had a chance to read and reply to text messages. Priests and ulama friends from Zamboanga City offered to pray for my family’s safety. They’re OK and out of danger now, I said. Deogracias, Alhamdullilah, they replied. Who says we’re not connected?
Eric Aseo is a program officer for The Asia Foundation in the Philippines. He can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not necessarily those of The Asia Foundation.
Less than one month after a magnitude 7.2 earthquake destroyed areas of Bohol province in the Central Visayas region of the Philippines, Typhoon Yolanda (international name Haiyan), said to be one of the most powerful storms ever to hit land, struck the same region, flattening entire towns on the islands of Leyte and Samar just north of Bohol.
According to government estimates, Yolanda has affected 13 million people in nine regions, with nearly 40 percent of those people living in Central Visayas. Among the areas affected was Bohol, still recovering from the earthquake that directly affected more than 3.2 million people. The UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported that the earthquake displaced 370,836 individuals, 80 percent of whom were still living in makeshift shelters built in open spaces near their damaged homes. This includes 50,000 children, and about 13,300 pregnant and 22,900 lactating women at high risk of acute malnutrition. Economy-wise, the effect of the earthquake was also substantial. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) estimated the damage to infrastructure and agriculture to be about $51 million. The Provincial Government of Bohol has also estimated the loss in the tourism sector to be around $1.1 million based on cancelled bookings when the earthquake struck.
While Bohol in general was spared the worst of Yolanda’s wrath, some of the same areas that were badly affected by the earthquake sustained significant damage, which further complicated relief operations. For example, the Bohol Local Development Foundation (BLDF) reported that infrastructure and homes in four municipalities (Inabanga, Getafe, Talibon, and Bien Unido) were damaged during the typhoon, further increasing the number of homeless and displaced. Several of these residents already living in temporary shelters and evacuation centers were ordered evacuated by the governor prior to Yolanda’s landfall. NDRRMC placed the total number of affected villages in Bohol at 198 directly affecting 90,752 families or about 435,604 individuals. It also placed the number of damaged houses at 295, of which 71 were totally damaged and 224 were partially damaged. The BLDF also reported that the municipalities of Antequera and Cortes experienced massive landslides as a result of heavy rains brought about by Yolanda.
In addition, the power loss caused by Typhoon Yolanda has affected relief operations to and slowed down rehabilitation work in areas that were just picking up the pieces. As of this writing, most parts of Bohol, whose main source of power comes from typhoon-ravaged Leyte province, remained without electricity. According to the NDRRMC, 43 of 49 towns remain without power. This has affected water distribution and rendered electrical water purifying machines in evacuation centres useless and the storage of important vaccines for children very difficult. The tourism industry – an important sector and a big source of employment for Bohol – has also been severely set back as more tourists cancel trips, particularly after the energy secretary said that power outages could last until December 24. “For sure there will be more guest cancellations for Christmas and New Year’s,” Cornelis de Wijn, general manager at Anda White Beach Resort in Bohol, told The Wall Street Journal. “It will (cause) a big impact on all the resort owners, because it’s our main season.”
In addition, already limited government resources for post-disaster relief now had to be spread to respond to the disasters that happened in Bohol as well as Leyte and Samar within less than a month of each other. In this context, effective local response to fill the gaps is even more critical.
It is in times of local response to disasters that the Filipino’s adaptability, spirit of bayanihan (community spirit), and damayan (helping each other) is most demonstrated. In the aftermath of the typhoon, there were numerous stories of heroism and unity arising from local responses in the severely affected provinces of Leyte and Samar. For example, the Department of Public Works and Highways has recently commended the Public Contractor’s Association for mobilizing their own heavy equipment from nearby provinces to help in the clearing operations.
In Bohol, the same local responses were evident in the aftermath of the earthquake and typhoon. After the earthquake, several organizations and individuals responded to the call for help, including the Bohol Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Incorporated (BCCI) in close partnership with the provincial government and other civil society organizations. Several informal, online coalitions were established, including the Hope for Bohol and Padayon (“continue”) Bohol. These social media networks became virtual message boards and resources for mobilization efforts. They also served as story boards for acts of heroism, kindness, and hope. Initially, pictures were posted depicting the devastation brought about by the earthquake. One could almost hear the collective gasp over pictures posted online of the severe damage on centuries-old churches – which serve both as tourist attractions and important places of worship to Boholanos. Eventually, pictures showing hope and survival became the norm.
BCCI immediately called on its members, who in their own ways were also responding to the disaster (for instance, the First Consolidated Bank was also doing relief operations), to provide help to earthquake-affected communities. As of November 12, it was able to distribute 11,081 relief packs to 55 villages in 18 towns. BCCI also facilitated Water Filtration Unit assistance to affected communities and debriefing program and activities for children.
There were also partnerships with the provincial government, national government agencies, and civil society. Among the key undertakings was the Diskwento (“discounted”) Caravan led by the Department of Trade and Industry. The Discounted Caravan is a rolling store brought to affected communities making available basic goods and necessities at discounted prices. Governor Edgar Chatto eventually designated BCCI and the Social Action Center of the Diocese of Tagbilaran as the official partners of the provincial government in accepting donations and in relief and rehabilitation. As a result, BCCI was able to mobilize help and resources from outside Bohol including from the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, chambers of commerce in other cities and provinces, the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines, Feed the Hungry Inc., Filipino United Network-USA, and The Asia Foundation.
The additional support enabled some members of the loose, virtual coalition to convene a formal meeting. For example, BCCI was able to host a merienda (light meal) and convened various organizations in Bohol involved in disaster response. The objective of the meeting was to coordinate efforts and fast-track the discussion on longer-term solutions to the effects of the earthquake and responses to future disasters in Bohol.
The same coordinated local response was evident in the preparation for Typhoon Yolanda’s arrival. Hope for Bohol’s Facebook page, for example, was replete with messages on the dangers of the coming typhoon and provided tips and disseminated emergency contact numbers.
Despite the double onslaught, Bohol is once again on the path to recovery, thanks in part to the strength of local civil society and businesses coming together. On Nov. 29, 2013, this coming together will again be seen in the first meeting of the newly minted Bohol Roads Investments Board (BRIB), a multi-stakeholder coordinating body for roads investments with support from The Asia Foundation. Hopefully, the BRIB will factor in disasters, preparedness, and quality in road infrastructure decisions. In doing so, it will put in place a mechanism and effective policy for local disaster response.
Jowil Plecerda is a program officer for The Asia Foundation’s Subnational Governance program in the Philippines. Reyna Deloso is the executive director of the Bohol Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Bohol Chamber of Commerce and Industry is a partner of The Asia Foundation in its Coordinating Road Investment initiative under the Coalitions for Change Program. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of The Asia Foundation.
As a follow-on to the program for Mr. Omara Masoudi, Director of the National Museum in 2012, the Asia Foundation arranged a one-week internship for Ms. Qudsia Zohab, Head of the Ethnography Department, at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya Museum (CSMVS) in Mumbai, India, where she studied textile conservation and restoration practices.
Asia Foundation Trustee Judith Wilbur generously established a fellowship in Asian Art in honor of her late husband and former Trustee, Brayton Wilbur, Jr. The fellowship stems from the Wilburs’ deep interest in Asian art, nurtured through their residence and travel in the region, and their commitment to the work of The Asia Foundation and the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco (AAM). The two institutions are collaborating in the program’s execution, with AAM identifying qualified fellowship recipients, and The Asia Foundation’s Asian American Exchange unit responsible for overall administration.
On October 23, 2013 The Asia Foundation’s Washington office hosted a forum on the findings of its major subnational governance study, State and Region Governments in Myanmar.
The study analyzes the functioning of state and region governments created under Myanmar’s 2008 constitution, assesses their impact on the ongoing governance, peace, and decentralization reforms, and makes recommendations on strengthening fiscal planning, capacity, and responsiveness.
Co-authors Dr. Hamish Nixon, a governance specialist, and Dr. Matthew Arnold, an Asia Foundation expert on conflict and state fragility, as well as Dr. Zaw Oo, executive director of MDRI-CESD and a senior economic adviser to Myanmar’s president, presented their perspectives on the challenges of decentralization and the opportunities it presents for progress toward inclusive and accountable democratic governance.
Dr. Arnold gave an explanation of Myanmar’s constitutional features, noting that the country’s states are primarily areas with large ethnic minority populations, while regions have a Burmese majority. Dr. Nixon highlighted the three main avenues for decentralization – administrative, fiscal, and political – and outlined key challenges including clarifying responsibilities, distributing public resources, and delegating decision-making. Dr. Zaw Oo discussed the country’s long history of hierarchical governance, and the current leadership’s commitment to decentralization reform. In his remarks he emphasized the importance of minority inclusion within existing ministries, and of delegating increased authority to sub-national levels, particularly in policy areas such as education, natural resource extraction, and rural development.
In 2012, Vietnam came second in the New Economics Foundation’s Happy Planet Index (HPI). According to the HPI, the only happier people in the world live in Costa Rica. The HPI ranks 151 countries across the globe on the basis of how many long, happy, and sustainable lives they provide for the people that live in them per unit of environmental output – a stronger emphasis on the planet than individual life satisfaction. Those countries near the top of the index seem to be largely middle income, tropical, and have a lot of beaches. Some good reasons to be cheerful but it led me to wonder: is Vietnam really that happy?
In 2010, an Associated Press-GfK poll found that 81 percent of people felt Vietnam was heading in the right direction, with 87 percent expecting the economy to be stronger in five years time. Photo/Karl Grobl.
In 2010, an Associated Press-GfK poll found that 81 percent of people felt Vietnam was heading in the right direction, with 87 percent expecting the economy to be stronger in five years time. Vietnamese were getting rapidly richer, more connected, and more mobile. Poverty had fallen quickly and consumer goods were increasingly available. The country had all the buzz of an Asian Tiger, a young, positive population going places.
However, a happy people living at one with their environment wouldn’t be the first thought that came to mind for those scanning recent international reporting on Vietnam. Vietnam’s position as the poster boy of development has begun to drift. Whether it is mass bankruptcies, corruption, pollution, or repression, the international press has overflowed with negative stories over the last 18 months: In 2011-2012, about 100,000 Vietnamese businesses went under (half the total for the last 20 years). Last year, Vietnam was listed in the bottom 10 countries in the world for air pollution. 2013 saw a further acceleration in the crackdown on bloggers and dissidents. It has become difficult to find the positive and, perhaps, uncritical reporting that dominated five years ago.
Urban anxiety certainly seems to be on the rise in Vietnam. In 2012, the consumer mood was somber. Consumer confidence dropped sharply, well down from the record-breaking levels pre-2008. Only two-thirds of urban residents surveyed thought their jobs were safe and people were saving much harder than in 2011.
The bulk of Vietnam’s population (about 70 percent) are still in the countryside, their needs and interests often glossed over, as the focus has been on the rapid changes taking place in Vietnam’s cities. Dr. Nguyen Do Anh Tuan of the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (Ipsard), a research institute attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, is trying to use the Vietnam Access to Resources Rural Household Survey (VARRHS) to judge the mood of rural Vietnam. The analysis of happiness is in its early days with data limitations – the survey only interviews heads of households – but with responses from over 2,700 rural households from 12 provinces in Vietnam there are already some interesting results.
Findings indicate that 52 percent of Vietnamese are very or quite pleased with their lives against 48 percent who say they are not. Seven percent claimed to be very pleased and 6 percent not at all pleased. Wealthier people are more likely to say they are happier than poor people. Married people are happier than single people, and older people are happier than younger people. So far, so predictable. The percentages chime with satisfied groups across the world, and the numbers saying they are happy may even be higher than in (non-equivalent) surveys in many western countries. But the factor that gave the biggest boost in the numbers of very or quite happy responses among Vietnamese rural householders is membership of the Communist Party.
IPSARD’s work appears to tally with that of UNDP and Gallup. UNDP’s 2012 Provincial Government and Public Administration Performance Index found that 78 percent of respondents rated their economic situation as being from normal to very good (a slight drop from 83 percent in 2011). Only 7 percent believed that their economic situation would be worse in five years.
Similarly, in 2012, Gallup’s Global Barometer of Hope and Happiness asked: “Compared to this year will next year be a year of economic prosperity, economic difficulty, or remain the same?” In Vietnam 37 percent said prosperity, 30 percent difficulty, and 32 percent the same. That makes a net score of plus 7 on hope for the economy. Globally that’s right on average. But it is a fairly miserable climate. Portugal, the most negative country, scored -85. Perhaps significantly, Vietnam’s score is well below the East Asia regional average of plus 14.
So, what can we conclude from these survey findings? The data, as so often in Vietnam, is thin and of varying reliability. The surveys are not directly comparable; economic prosperity does not necessarily equate to personal happiness. Overall, life satisfaction appears to be more resilient in Vietnam than news reporting would suggest. Short memories may ignore the huge advances in most people’s quality of life in recent years. But Vietnamese do appear to be less happy and less optimistic than they were.
William Taylor is The Asia Foundation’s acting country representative in Vietnam. He can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
by Jose Maria M. Mendoza and Steven Rood | May 29, 2013 | Blog
Philippine President Benigno Aquino secured big wins in the May midterm elections, which were seen as vital to his ambitious reform agenda. Aquino now marks the midpoint of his single six-year term as president, and while it might be clear that politics has yet to change in the last three years, it’s less clear the extent to which changes in governance may point to longer-term political changes.
Philippine President Benigno Aquino marks the midway point in his term since he was elected in 2010. Midterm elections this month were seen as a test to his ambitious reform agenda. Photo/Flickr user thepocnews
As early as the 2010 presidential campaign, then presidential candidate Benigno Aquino III together with his vice-presidential running mate, Mar Roxas, had governance reforms in mind when they said that it would take two presidential terms (of six years each) to transform the country from a regime of bad to good governance, to demonstrate that “Kung Walang Kurupt, Walang Mahirap” (“if there is no corruption, there will be no poverty”). The notion was that corruption was so ingrained in the system that six years would be needed just to initiate the key strategic reforms and another six years needed to institutionalize them.
Many discussions of reform list as examples the well-publicized change in the ombudsman, the arrest of former President Arroyo, and the impeachment conviction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. While these efforts required considerable political capital, Aquino was inevitably subject to criticism of the sincerity and wisdom of his good governance campaign. As Peter Koeppinger, Resident Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the Philippines, aptly put it: “Corruption is everywhere. In many public agencies, it is organized in networks, making it difficult to break up. The government needs a much more comprehensive strategy to reduce the endemic corruption.”
One of the most significant strategic reforms to which the government itself has committed so far is the Philippine Government Action Plan, entitled “Institutionalizing People Power in Governance to Ensure Direct, Immediate, and Substantial Benefits for the Poor.” The plan is anchored upon transparent, accountable, and participatory governance as a key ingredient to achieving poverty reduction and economic expansion. In this plan, the government is committed to undertake 19 initiatives: two in transparency (including disclosing budget information of all major departments and a roadmap for improving public access to information); five in citizen participation (including expanding participatory budgeting and bottom-up budgeting, establishing an empowerment fund and undertaking participatory audits); four in accountability (including the Results-Based Performance Management System); and eight in technology and innovation. Thus, the Action Plan combines both greater involvement of the citizenry in governance affairs with internal changes in how the bureaucracy operates.
Watchdog functions are not new in the Philippines. Myriad coalitions have organized to monitor the delivery of various government services and public processes. However, the collaborative implementation of the bottom-up-budgeting (BUB) between municipal governments and citizen groups, abetted by a system of national government incentives and disincentives, has the makings of real radical reform. The BUB, first introduced in the 2012 budget process and now on its second budget cycle, is the government’s new approach to the preparation of the national budget to reduce poverty and achieve the country’s MDG targets. It begins with proposals from a participatory planning process between local government officials and constituent citizen’s groups as a starting point for national government agency budgeting to achieve what the government calls “a people-centric budget.” It seeks to ensure that critical and priority local development projects are increasingly funded by the national budget and less dependent on arbitrary and capricious pork barrel spending. The approach strengthens responsiveness of national and local government programs and processes while encouraging a “me-too mentality” among local leaders for a more transparent and participatory governance. It can be argued that providing incentives for the national government, local governments, and the citizenry, as they all benefit from this new process, makes it more difficult to roll back this reform.
The rearrangement of incentives seems to be the implicit formula for other key reforms. The Performance Challenge Fund and Seal of Good Housekeeping for local governments are complementary programs that set up transparency and accountability standards for LGU and provide incentives for local governments that achieve them. These typify the governance-through-CSO-engagement approach that the current administration has undertaken in a major way. Indeed, it will go even further with the soon-to-be-released Empowerment Fund, a well-resourced private and public fund allotted to projects that strengthen CSO capacity to participate in these reforms and, in turn, build communities’ capacity to demand the continuity of reforms. The fund will be composed of counterpart contributions from both government funds and funds from local financing institutions (LFIs). The fund is seen as critical for the institutionalization of CSO engagement in governance reform. This of course would follow the logic that CSO engagement is critical to the success of citizen involvement in transforming our public institutions.
The administration thus has a strong emphasis on both the supply side (bureaucratic reform) and the demand side (citizen involvement) of the reform equation.
So, is governance in fact changing for the better? While reformers in key leadership positions who know how to use both the technical and political leverage provided by these positions, represent a significant factor that cannot be overstated, the challenge of winning over the middle-level bureaucrats is where the battle will ultimately be won. Needless to say, the challenge of institutionalizing these programs and initiatives remains.
Conscious of the tenuousness of the reform situation, Department of Budget and Management Secretary Florencio Abad has identified the task of resisting policy reversal as one half of the core agenda for the next three years (the other being achieving inclusive growth). In the end, institutionalized change remains inextricably linked to Aquino’s successor, and therefore very much in the hands of the electorate.
Jose Maria M. Mendoza is program leader for the Coalitions for Change Program, an activity under the AusAID-Asia Foundation Partnership in the Philippines, and Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative there. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual authors and not those of The Asia Foundation.
There has been some controversy about the quality of the May 2013 general elections in the Philippines, during which some 18,000 local and national positions were elected. But the fairest verdict of this exercise in electronic voting would seem to be that, like in May 2010, elections changed, but politics didn’t. As always, discussing the May elections inevitably involves talking about families and personalities but not political parties.
Manny Pacquiao’s wife Jinkee Pacquiao files her certificate of candidacy on Tuesday, October 2. Photo by Cocoy Sexcion.
When it comes to the nationally elected upper house of the legislature – the Senate – much has been made of the fact that nine of the 12 winners came from President Aquino’s slate, dubbed “Team PNoy.” It’s important to note that from the start, this was not a group of Liberal Party (LP) members – only three candidates were Liberal Party members (and of those, only one had been a Liberal Party member for more than a few months). The rest are from the LP’s coalition partners, the Nacionalista Party, Nationalist People’s Coalition, Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
In the end, the only LP winner was the newly minted member Bam Aquino, a first cousin of President Aquino with a distinguished NGO career. Other newcomers to the Senate were topnotcher Grace Poe (daughter of the late Fernando Poe Jr., defeated 2004 presidential candidate), Nancy Binay (daughter of Vice President Jejomar Binay), Sonny Angara (son of outgoing Senator Eduardo Angara), Cynthia Villar (wife of outgoing Senator Manual Villar), and JV Ejercito (son of former president, and newly elected Manila Mayor Joseph “Erap” Estrada). The pattern is obvious, and replicated throughout the archipelago for many offices – mayors and governors, members of Congress, and local council members.
In a post on this blog last year, I examined the fate of political families in Philippine history. One of those examined was the Dimaporos of Lanao del Norte, which in 2013 continued their unbroken hold on the province with husband Abdullah (the second generation of the dynasty) and wife Imelda being the two elected representatives, and their son Khalid the governor. Another was the Durano clan of Danao City in Cebu, which in 2013 continued their bewildering internecine competition as brother bested brother and nephew defeated uncle.
As witness the Durano imbroglio, being a political family is not necessarily a secure position. Some prominent political clans suffered a more crushing blow in May elections, with only one of the Villafuertes of Carmarines Sur winning a seat, and that winner defeated his grandfather, clan patriarch Luis. In the Zamboanga peninsula, the expansionist Jalosjos clan, which in 2010 spread from Zamboanga Norte to Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga Sibuguey, was rolled back to its one bastion of Dapitan City by allies of the president. Naturally, however, these allies were also established political families, such as the Hofers of Sibuguey and the Cerilles of Zamboanga del Sur. One scion of a political clan, General Santos City mayor Darlene Antonino-Custodio, lost her re-election bid to a candidate supported by a nascent political force – boxing champion and Congressman Manny Pacquiao. An example of how new political families arise (almost half of all political clans originated after the restoration of electoral democracy in 1986), Pacquiao fielded his brother in another congressional race (the brother lost) and his wife, Jinkee, for vice-governor (she won).
Given this emphasis on families not political parties, on personalities not policy, we should view with skepticism any assertion that these election results, which do indeed demonstrate the continued popularity and drawing power of President Aquino, represent a surge for general reform. The organization of Philippine politics by clans and personalities makes it harder for the president to pursue his central theme of “if there is no corruption there is no poverty.” As explained by corruption scholar Michael Johnston, elections do induce uncertainty in political families (since they are not certain to win) who are appealing to citizens on the basis of favors and personal services. The incentive to accumulate irregular resources is increased since not only do they finance bids for power but they must be accumulated while in power: “make hay while the sun shines,” as the saying goes. In this climate, where almost all politicking is conducted in this fashion, even anti-corruption efforts can be portrayed as “partisan,” as the insincere attempt by one faction to persecute another.
Reform is in fact possible in the Philippines. For example, the recent passage of tobacco tax increases in the teeth of fierce opposition of some in the industry, will allow better financing of health care for average citizens. But the more general question is, if politics is not changing, can governance patterns change in any sustainable fashion? That is the topic of next week’s post.
Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in the Philippines. He can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
Mr. Timothy Rub, Director and CEO of the Philadelphia Museum of Art, met with representatives of major museums in China, Japan and Korea on his fellowship to discuss cooperation and exchanges with the Philadelphia Museum of Art and plans for the second Director’s Forum at the Asian Art Museum in San Francisco. Referring to the museum’s significant collection of Asian art, he said he looked forward to potential collaborations and exchanges with Asian museums.
Established by the late Asia Foundation President Emeritus Ambassador Haydn Williams, the Margaret F. Williams Memorial Fellows in Asian Art Program honors his late wife, whose interest in Asian art was stimulated by their travels together on Asia Foundation visits to the region. Mrs. Williams was also a founding docent at the Asian Art Museum in San Francisco, the cooperating partner in implementing the fellowship program.
