In Afghanistan: Accelerating Development
Doug Bereuter is President of The Asia Foundation. This is an excerpt of a recent presentation he made in Berlin to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Economics and Security Committee. To read the complete text, click here.
Six years after emerging from 25 years of conflict, Afghanistan continues to face tremendous challenges to stability and growth. The increasing strength of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, based across the border in relatively safe havens in Pakistan, threatens security and reconstruction, and robust economic growth is threatened by the effects of a burgeoning drug economy and near-total dependence on foreign aid.
Despite daunting challenges, the government has made important achievements in recent years. Unfortunately, as underscored in several recent studies, these achievements may prove short-lived if significant progress is not achieved on a range of tough challenges over the next few years. Over 75 percent of adult Afghans remain illiterate and about 80 percent of women and children can neither write nor read and 70 percent survive on less than two dollars per day. Afghanistan’s poppy and opium production still represents over a third of the country’s GDP and supplies over 80 percent of the world’s heroin.
Citizen confidence in the government, high in the initial years, has eroded steadily, increasing vulnerability to the opportunism from those in political opposition and from religious and ethnic groups that feel marginalized. The credibility and legitimacy of government and, therefore, its stability, is increasingly at stake.
To accelerate positive development in Afghanistan at this juncture, at least three major constraints to improved governance performance and legitimacy need to be addressed: (1) the government needs to be perceived as credible in delivering goods and services to average Afghans; (2) nonstate actors with political weight need to be engaged in bolstering the state; and (3) legitimate economic growth opportunities need to be fostered.
Challenge 1: Making state institutions at national and sub-national level more effective and responsive
To achieve continued progress toward unity, stability, peace, and reconstruction, the national government and the international donor community must increase efforts to address the sub-national government and strengthen the reach of the unitary state envisaged in the 2004 constitution. For most Afghans, the face of government is local, and the legitimacy of the new Afghan government will depend not only on functioning central institutions but also on representative and accountable institutions at the local level. Employment opportunities, service delivery, and the provision of security commonly are identified as the greatest problems facing ordinary Afghans at the local level. Particularly at the provincial and district levels, disaffection of the population and insecurity stem in large measure from the lack of credible Afghan administrative and security institutions to address these problems. Therefore, public administration reform at sub-national levels will need to engage traditional leaders and other nonstate actors in oversight of government delivery of services at the local level.
Constitutionally mandated district, municipal, and village elections are pending as well as presidential and other elections from 2009 onwards, and there is a continued need to mediate popular expectations through elected bodies such as the parliament. Thus the strengthening of political institutions must continue, along with the capacity-building of independent media and civil society in effective oversight of and participation in political processes. These are an integral part of political reform at the sub-national government levels.
Challenge 2: Engaging nonstate actors in efforts to bolster state legitimacy
In a country like Afghanistan, where the nation state has historically been weak, non-state activities have always been crucial for organizing social and political life, as well as managing social services. Traditional Shuras and Jirgas are the prominent examples.
Formal nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also have been providing services over the past two decades, especially in emergency and relief operations. In the post-Taliban era, there has been a proliferation of NGOs as well as networks and unions of people from different walks of life, including farmers, students, and women. And, religious leaders and their constituencies continue to exert considerable social and political influence in Afghan society. Such nonstate associational forms and their collective actions are critical to social transformation. Further, limited state capacity has opened up opportunities for organized nonstate actors to engage in service delivery, and in the establishment of education, health, and basic infrastructure. Thus, during this transitional period in Afghanistan, the contributions of nonstate actors have actually enhanced the legitimacy of the state. In this context, it is important to continue to think of and support mechanisms to engage traditional and religious leaders, civil society groups, and other associations in mediating between government and the people.
Challenge 3: Pursuing legitimate economic growth
Afghanistan has serious problems caused by severe regional disparities in productivity and wealth, pervasive corruption, and the debilitating socioeconomic impact of a flourishing drug industry. Poppy eradication efforts to date have had mixed results, with security and local cooperation being major hurdles; meanwhile, potential earnings from poppy cultivation continue to be far higher than the alternative livelihood options presented by the government. Official figures estimate that the country is beleaguered by up to 50 percent unemployment, with over 75 percent of the population illiterate. Seventy percent of Afghans rely on agriculture as a means of income, and the comparative advantage of Afghan dried fruits and nuts in the world market is long lost or overtaken by competitor products (opium) and countries.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the massive influx of foreign assistance has distorted wages and the real estate market, while creating a construction and banking boom. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment in the legitimate economy is hampered by insecurity, regulatory inadequacies, minimal business infrastructure, and corruption. The cost of doing business, whether in manufacturing or trade, is high owing to these factors. The lack of an enabling policy and regulatory framework hinders strategically-focused growth opportunities and frustrates potential investors in cross-border trade.
