To help facilitate national reconciliation by ensuring that the voices of Thai citizens are represented during this time of political turmoil, The Asia Foundation conducted a nationwide opinion poll that gauges the national mood toward election reform, participation in politics, amending the Constitution, and more. Today, the results of that poll, Constitutional Reform and Democracy in Thailand: A National Survey of the Thai People, were released. The main launch event was streamed live online on the Prachatouch web site.

The survey found that the Thai electorate is pessimistic about the overall direction of the country, with less than a third saying the country is moving in the right direction. An overwhelming majority (84 percent) believes that a new or revised Constitution should be ratified through a referendum.

We presented the survey findings on Wednesday to a gathering of civil society, politicians, diplomats, academics, and journalists. Keen attention was paid by the audience in particular to the Thai electorate’s views on appointing representatives in government. The 2007 Constitution changed the Senate from a wholly-elected to a partially-appointed body. Several proposals have been put forward for the Senate; including keeping the current mixed structure, going back to a wholly-elected senate as per the 1997 Constitution, or eliminating the Senate entirely. A clear majority (63 percent) of those interviewed said they prefer the senate election system described in the 1997 Constitution, while only a quarter (25 percent) support the current partially appointed senate arrangement. On Wednesday, special guest speaker, Surichai Wun’Gaeo, Associate Professor and Director of Social Research Institute at Chulalongkorn University, said, “It is clear from the results of the survey that Thai voters prefer elected representatives to appointed ones. This refutes the argument put forth by certain groups that a partially-appointed representative system is more suitable for the country on the pretext that Thais are not ready for full-fledged democracy.”

There was additional focus on survey results highlighting a lack of trust among Thai people. A majority (62 percent) of the people surveyed said that most people cannot be trusted. “We have witnessed a marked decline in societal trust among Thais in recent years, and this worrying trend is a spinoff of the ongoing political unrest,” said Dr. Thawilwadee Bureekul, director of the research and development department of King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI). “We need to act fast to restore political normalcy before the country suffers a complete breakdown of social cohesion.”

The Foundation’s survey also asked respondents their views on vote buying, influences on them in the voting process, their allegiance to political parties, their economic well-being, their level of trust in different institutions, and more.

Read the Reuters wire story, “Thai lawmakers debate constitution change to end deadlock,” which covered Prime Minister Abhisit’s request and included the Foundation’s poll findings. On the Straits Times website, Nirmal Ghosh blogs about “What Thais want” and incorporates our survey results and quotes Foundation spokespeople James Klein and Tim Meisburger. In Thursday’s Bangkok Post, the Foundation’s poll findings are cited in “‘Self-serving’ charter changes draw fire.”

The full survey is available in English and in Thai on our website.

James Klein is The Asia Foundation’s Country Representative in Thailand.

At first glance, the lead-up to Thailand’s July 3 national parliamentary election seems little different from previous electoral countdowns. The campaign period has been fairly low-key, with political leaders occupied for the most part in defining their individual campaign personas and fairly measured in their comments on the character and record of opponents. Only now, in the closing days of the campaign, have reciprocal criticisms borne a sharper edge.

Posters fill Bangkok's streets in the lead up to the election on July 3. Above, a poster in central Bangkok depicts a political candidate as a monkey to urge voters to vote "no" on the ballot. Photo by Arpaporn Winijkulchai.

The streets and sidewalks of Bangkok are, as in other campaign seasons, reduced to narrow corridors of colorful campaign posters in which national political leaders and constituency candidates strike poses and expressions that range from effortlessly poised to deliberately irreverent. Some posters feature the clever slogans of candidates that challenge the political mainstream, including: “Politics are like Pampers diapers – the more you change them, the better they are”; “When politicians use the word ‘honest’ how can anyone be happy?” and “If you love Thailand, then wrong must be wrong and right must be right.” Others feature less-than-subtle appeals by proponents of the “no” vote, urging voters to exercise the formal ballot option of rejecting all political candidates – the latter depicted as a menagerie of drooling dogs, banana-wielding apes, and vacant-eyed buffalos.

But while the campaign might appear rather subdued, one has only to digest the daily editorial sections of national newspapers, visit the Facebook and Twitter pages of contesting parties or the plethora of election-related social media sites, engage Bangkok taxi drivers in the savvy political analyses that they revel in, or mark the thoughtful reflections of Thai friends and colleagues to appreciate that this election is different, and one of profound significance to the political future of Thailand.

This election follows five years of political tension and tumult, a period whose legacy includes a succession of disputed parliamentary elections, judicial dissolution of established political parties and individual politicians, military intervention, blockades of airports and government buildings, and large-scale street demonstrations. The crisis culminated in an angry wave of violence and bloodshed in the streets of Bangkok in May 2010, traumatizing a nation that had not experienced political violence on such scale for nearly two decades. In addition to fueling public apprehension of further violence, the political crisis has diverted the attention of government and political leaders from critical issues. These include national economic recovery, regional leadership and competitiveness, resolution of the bitter communal conflict in the southern border provinces, and the heated border dispute with Cambodia over the management of the Preah Vihear temple site – each of which have barely figured in campaign discourse.

While 40 political parties are contesting the election, the key electoral race is that waged between the incumbent Democrat and opposition Pheu Thai parties. The Democrats have held power since December 2008 through a coalition arrangement with several smaller political parties. As proxy for exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Pheu Thai succeeds several previous Thaksin parties that were dissolved by the courts. The two parties occupy very different places in the national political landscape. The Democrats, led by Oxford-educated Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, have historical ties to elite interest groups that have tended to prefer guided democracy over hands-on engagement with the population at large. Pheu Thai commands a traditional base of support among rural farmers and urban wage earners, many of whom continue to embrace Thaksin – notwithstanding the controversies that now surround him – as the first national political leader to genuinely identify and engage with their needs. Pheu Thai supporters have extended a similar welcome to Thaksin’s youngest sister, business executive and political initiate Yingluck Shinawatra, as the party’s lead candidate for prime minister.

The respective Democrat and Pheu Thai campaign rhetoric is predictably divided on certain issues, including the parties’ approaches to national economic management and political reconciliation following the May 2010 political violence. The Democrats cite the national economic recovery as evidence of their able stewardship of the economy, while Pheu Thai insists that the economic vision, leadership, and empathy of its rivals do not extend beyond urban elites. The Democrats likewise point to the institutional steps taken to understand and determine responsibility for the May 2010 violence, while Pheu Thai insists that the sum of their efforts amounts to nothing more than window dressing. Beyond these and other strident differences, the lines separating the rival parties have converged in nearly identical populist overtures to ordinary citizens. These appeals to the working class place Pheu Thai on familiar terrain, while the Democrats adjust to a strategy borrowed from Thaksin’s grassroots playbook and bureaucrats struggle to calculate how the nation will bear the expense of implementing whichever of the rival populist undertakings prevails at the ballot box.

Independent local public opinion polls conducted over the course of the election campaign have consistently placed Pheu Thai ahead of the Democrats. The polls acknowledge that a significant percentage of the voting population remains undecided, but stop short of projecting whether one or other party stands within reach of an outright majority of 251 or more seats on Election Day. Tradition holds that the party that wins the most seats, short of a full majority, has first right to form a coalition government through alliance with smaller political parties. While speculation abounds – and, in the closing days of the campaign, includes increasing talk of an outright Pheu Thai victory – the most widely held view among election watchers has been that the next government will be determined through a coalition arrangement. In reflecting on prospective Democrat or Pheu Thai coalitions, one can imagine the combination of historical considerations, unusual precedents, and risk assessments that must weigh in the calculus of small parties that are positioned to play a determining role in the final outcome.

Speculation was further stirred by the recent remarks of the senior army commander who, after asserting that the military would not interfere in the election, cryptically added that voters would do well to vote for “good candidates and parties” and to avoid a repeat of recent elections. The remarks have drawn criticism from some quarters and prompted debate on the prospect of blanket amnesties that Pheu Thai seemed previously ready to discuss but from which it has recently distanced itself. Observers have also asked whether the added comments indicate that military influence over electoral politics will remain a significant factor or thinly-veiled threat in post-election settlement. Will the election results stand as an expression of popular will, regardless of the outcome? Have understandings and agreements already been struck among key stakeholders that will guide the formation of the next government?

Taking stock of the combination of change and continuity in the election environment, it is arguable that the factor that most distinguishes the 2011 election campaign and the broader governance environment from past experience is a sharpening of the political understanding, values, and expectations of the Thai people. The Asia Foundation’s 2010 national public perception survey found that 93 percent of respondents of legal voting age maintained that democracy is the best form of government, while 59 percent observed that the optimal democratic government is one that is most representative of the citizenry. At the same time, respondents held little confidence in the integrity of elected Members of Parliament; believed that elected officials care little for ordinary citizens; conveyed a low sense of individual and collective political efficacy; and called for a process of national reconciliation as the route back from the brink of political chaos. By the standard of public values and expectations of this kind – from those that animate conversations in rural tea shops to those that flood the internet – campaign rhetoric rings hollow. Clearly, Thai voters face difficult choices in weighing the respective strengths and weaknesses of rival political parties and candidates that take the current electoral stage clothed in a combination of assets and liabilities, virtues and vices, and certainties and question marks. However, there is a strong sense in this election campaign that voters are clear in their understanding that Thailand’s future political settlement is not a one-off choice between old and new political orders, between rival political parties, or between traditional elite-guided democracy and a more broadly inclusive model of governance that takes greater account of citizen views and expectations.

The international community joins the people of Thailand in their hope for a free, fair, and credible election; a spirit of thoughtful dialogue, sensitivity, and compromise among all stakeholders as the results are confirmed; and trust and confidence in the will of the electorate.

Kim McQuay is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Thailand. He can be reached at kmcquay@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

On December 16 in Bangkok, The Asia Foundation released the results of its first in-person public perception survey conducted in Thailand’s three southern border provinces. Since 2004, the provinces of Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani have been the locus of an indigenous separatist movement and communal conflict that has shaken a tradition of peaceful coexistence between the majority Malay-Muslim and minority Buddhist communities of the Deep South.

The conflict has claimed over 4,000 lives, left thousands more injured, and exposed residents of the southern border provinces to a persistent environment of tension, insecurity, and uncertainty.

A variety of peace initiatives have been undertaken in an effort to resolve a conflict whose complexities defy easy understanding or clear practical solution. While government agencies and various interest groups have taken modest good-faith efforts to canvass the views and expectations of ordinary citizens of the Deep South, many southerners have been reluctant to speak candidly in formal settings. Their hesitation reflects a combination of traditional norms, security concerns, and lack of confidence in the sincerity of government efforts to understand the unique cultural identity of the Pattani-Malay community. As a result, while there has been abundant speculation on citizen views and expectations in the southern border provinces, little concrete information has been available from empirical research.

In 2009, the Foundation conducted its first national public perception study of the Thai electorate, which adapted core elements of Foundation surveys conducted in other Asian countries for the Thailand context, with a focus on constitutional reform and democracy. While we had planned to conduct the National Survey in all provinces, security concerns and the absence of professionally trained surveyors equipped to administer the survey in the Pattani-Malay dialect resulted in the three southern border provinces being left out. In response, we worked with local technical partner MIAdvisory to recruit and train a team of surveyors from the Deep South. In July and August 2010, this team conducted face-to-face interviews with 750 male and female citizens in Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani. With support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Survey of the Thai Electorate in Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani combined a set of questions drawn from the 2009 National Survey and a second block of questions that explored citizen views on the southern conflict, the factors that fuel it, the present state of governance in and future political options for the Deep South, and the cultural and other factors that distinguish the Pattani-Malay community.

As reflected in the more detailed analysis of the survey results presented in a separate blog piece by our Regional Director for Conflict and Governance Thomas Parks, the Southern Survey report captures the nuanced views of Malay-Muslim majority and minority Buddhist communities of the Deep South on national issues, the southern conflict, and prospects for peace. The survey findings also illuminate similarities and divergences of view between citizens nationally and residents of the Deep South. On certain issues, southern and national views are closely aligned, while on others, fine-grained distinctions separate seemingly like views. Southerners expressed greater optimism for the future than their national compatriots on certain issues, while on others striking variations separate southern views from broader national perspectives. For example, when asked to identify the biggest problem facing Thailand in 2009, 60 percent of citizens nationally pointed to the bad economy, while just 23 percent of southerners cited economic malaise. Twenty percent of Deep South respondents cited the southern conflict as the biggest problem, versus 3 percent nationally. These and other differences underline the profound effects of the southern conflict on personal security, confidence in the capacity, independence, and integrity of public institutions, and expectations for the future. The survey canvasses factors that contribute to the southern conflict, priority reform initiatives, and potential steps to mitigate the conflict. Those latter prospects include political decentralization, efforts to raise confidence among members of the Pattani-Malay community that their unique cultural heritage, identity, and values are recognized and respected by the government, and other steps toward peace and reconciliation that involve better communication, improved understanding, and reciprocal, respectful compromise.

As a follow-up to the formal launch of the Southern Survey in Bangkok, our program staff members here look forward to discussing the practical program and policy implications of the survey findings with local partner organizations in government, civil society, grassroots media, and other stakeholder groups, including outreach to communities in the Deep South. With national elections anticipated within the next year or two, we hope that the Southern Survey results, together with those of the Foundation’s second national perception survey covering all 26 provinces (scheduled for release in early 2011), will provide insights on the views and expectations of the Thai electorate of interest to lawmakers, political leaders, government officials, academics, international observers, and other stakeholders. We welcome reader feedback on our survey research.

Kim McQuay is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Thailand. He can be reached at kmcquay@asiafound.org.

Since Thailand’s color politics began pitting the People’s Alliance for Democracy’s (PAD) “Yellow-Shirt” movement against the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship’s (UDD) “Red-Shirt” movement, political watchers have insisted that the Thai people are bitterly divided in their loyalties to rival political factions.

The view holds that an old-guard elite preference for guided democracy has collided with a populist call from marginalized farmers and wage earners to return Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to power. The Yellow-Shirt occupation of Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport in 2008, and the escalating Red-Shirt demonstrations and eventual security force intervention in Bangkok in May 2010 that left more than 90 dead, hundreds injured, and millions of dollars in property damage, have added fuel to the argument. Such unrest stands as stark reminders of the power of partisan politics to compromise public security, disrupt commerce, and divert government attention from the day-to-day affairs of state.

But, to what extent has Thailand genuinely become a polarized society?

Earlier this week in Bangkok, The Asia Foundation released its second national public perception survey of the Thai electorate. The survey captures first-hand responses from face-to-face interviews with a broad and nationally representative sample of 1,500 individuals conducted between September 17 and October 23, 2010. It revisited the core themes of democracy and governance explored in the Foundation’s first survey of the Thai electorate, in 2009, and added a new set of questions focused on the May 2010 demonstrations, color politics, and the prospect of national political reconciliation.

The survey results tell a mixed story of positive outlook and lingering concern. Fifty-four percent of respondents said that Thailand is going in the wrong direction, down from 58 percent in 2009. Asked to identify the biggest problem facing Thailand, 42 percent of respondents cited political conflict, nearly doubling from 2009. This concern underscores how profoundly the most recent political violence has registered in the public psyche. At the same time, economic problems dropped from 60 percent in 2009 to 35 percent in 2010, reflecting Thailand’s impressive recovery from the global economic recession.

The vast majority of Thais surveyed said they have no color affiliation. Only 5 percent of respondents identified themselves as strongly Yellow and 7 percent as strongly Red, while another 5 and 7 percent, respectively, identified as leaning slightly Yellow or Red. The combined color loyalties left a substantial majority of 76 percent who claimed no color allegiance. While the survey results reflect sharp divisions of opinion among Yellow and Red supporters on certain issues, they also reflect a striking diversity of opinion or factionalism within the two color movements.

Forty-nine survey questions serve as a base of analysis of political polarization. In 47 percent of cases, the majority of Red and Yellow sympathizers were closely aligned with the majority of respondents that professed no color affiliation. For example, 93 percent of respondents said that democracy is the best form of government, while 59 percent said that the optimal democratic government is one that is most representative of the polity rather than the best educated. A resounding 97 percent of respondents said that Thais have more values that unite than divide them. Reds and Yellows further agreed with the majority that double standards exist in the judicial process, that reconciliation efforts must be initiated before elections are held, that the presence of election observers would raise confidence in the integrity of the upcoming national elections, and that decentralization would help reduce conflict between urban and rural society, colors, and the persistent communal conflict in the Deep South. While there was no strong consensus in apportioning blame for the deaths that occurred during the May 2010 demonstrations – with 37 percent faulting government, 40 percent blaming the demonstrators, 4 percent holding both sides responsible, and 19 percent declining to comment – there was a shared apprehension that further political violence was bound to occur in the year ahead.

The Foundation’s March 28 survey launch featured analysis on the survey findings by a panel of three distinguished Thai academics and political commentators:  Assistant Professor Dr. Nongyao Nawarat of the Faculty of Education of Chiang Mai University; Associate Professor Dr. Phichai Rattanadulok Na Phuket, Deputy Dean of the School of Social and Environmental Development of the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA); and Mr. Kavi Chongkittatavorn, columnist with The Nation. Three striking views emerged. The panelists emphasized the uniformity of support for democracy, and for the resolution of the political crisis among Red and Yellow supporters, and that the majority of survey respondents professed no political loyalties. Calling for more nuanced and responsible reporting, the panelists criticized the Thai print and broadcast media for failing to acknowledge these commonly held views, and appealed to editors and reporters to assume a more responsible role in shaping an environment for consensus and reconciliation. The panelists said that Thailand is experiencing a profound social and political transformation that holds little scope for any single view to dominate, with the future of Thai politics best shaped by good faith negotiations and compromise on a level playing field.

As Thailand awaits the announcement of a national election date in a few weeks, we hope that these and other perspectives drawn from our national survey findings and the broader national mood will serve as potent messages to candidates and political parties on the value of connecting with the Thai people and demonstrating by action and example that the expectations and aspirations of the population at large are heard and valued.

Kim McQuay is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Thailand. He can be reached at kmcquay@asiafound.org.

For close to two decades, I have worked in Asia and Africa on programs that support elections and democracy, and nowhere but Thailand have I heard democracy itself disparaged so frequently. It is common in Bangkok to hear prominent academics question whether the average Thai is educated enough for democracy, while pundits in the media portray rural villagers as simpletons easily influenced by local strongmen, or suggest their votes or loyalty can be bought for a pittance. Even politicians whose electoral prospects seemingly depend on the goodwill of the people often describe the masses almost as a commodity that can be bought, sold, or traded. Skeptics doubt that the people of Thailand are ready for democracy, or suggest that democracy is a western import and that only something they call “Thai-style democracy” can work in Thailand.

But when one looks at the facts, one sees this is simply not true. Although Thailand may no longer be the most democratic country in Southeast Asia (that honor probably belongs to Indonesia), The Asia Foundation’s recent national survey of the Thai people seems to reveal that ordinary people in Thailand overwhelmingly (95 percent) believe democracy is the best form of government. In addition, when compared to data from similar polls in the Asia-Pacific region, the Thais have a deeper understanding of the meaning of democracy than almost any other people in Asia. And this is not just affection for a fuzzy concept they can barely comprehend. For example, more than 90 percent of Thais could name some characteristic of a democracy, compared to just 55 percent in Cambodia in 2002, or less than 50 percent in Indonesia in 2003.

I would argue that Thais also have realistic expectations for what democracy can accomplish. They recognize there will be more open political conflict in a democracy, but still prefer it to autocratic forms of government. Although the politically powerful in Thailand often view ordinary Thais as unthinking pawns in their political games, from the survey data, this perception appears to be incorrect. Thais are thinking, and tell us that their voting choice is not influenced by local leaders or religious leaders or cash or gifts. Instead, they say they rationally evaluate candidates and parties and make their choice based on track record or experience. I believe this is a sign of the much deeper and more profound political transformation Thailand is currently experiencing. Like generals who prepare to fight the next war as if it were the last war, Thai politicians often seem to follow a game plan prepared in the 1960s or 70s, failing to realize that the Thai people have changed.

This phenomenon is not unique to Thailand, and may in fact be a normal part of a democratic transition. The difference between conventional political wisdom and reality has been exploited by savvy politicians across Asia (Joseph Estrada in the Philippines, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Indonesia, and even Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand are a few examples). If the old guard is still playing the game by the old rules, never realizing that the rules of the game have changed, it may surprise them – but should not surprise us – when they lose elections.

Another common misperception in Thailand is that the country is completely polarized, with the red camp on one side and the yellow on the other, a wide gulf separating the two. It is not that simple. Survey findings appear to show about 15 percent of the population call themselves dedicated, loyal members of the red camp, with roughly another 15 percent identifying themselves in the yellow. There is an enormous number (70 percent) that fall somewhere in the middle. That is not to say that those in the middle do not have political leanings or preferences, but as a group they are more like each other than the outliers. This middle group might be viewed as independents, in the sense that based on varying appeals or circumstances, they might be induced to vote either way.

Instead of saying the country is polarized, we might say it is increasingly politicized. Traditional political structures in Thailand were based around the patron/client relationship at the local level with an almost feudal hierarchy above. Now that structure seems to be breaking down. Although the red and yellow movements were originally Thaksinites versus anti-Thaksinites, both movements (while retaining their founding raison d’être) are increasingly ideological. The reds stand for populism, electoral democracy, and majority rule; while the yellows support constitutional monarchy, with strong protection for minority rights, and independent institutions to control corruption.

Although often considered destabilizing, the recent emergence of the red and yellow movements in Thailand can be viewed as a positive step in the country’s democratic transition. Most existing political parties in Thailand were created or evolved out of pre-existing powerful and entrenched interest groups. At the local level, their power remained embedded in traditional patron/client relationships, with political competition primarily inter-elite. In contrast, the red and yellow movements are ordinary people who have joined together to advocate for their interests in the political sphere, which is the very definition of a modern democratic political party, and as such I suspect they are another indicator of democratic development in Thailand.

If my supposition is correct, this transition could have profound effect on political competition in Thailand. In the past, particular families formed political dynasties in some areas and provinces, and in every election could reasonably expect their candidates to be elected based primarily on feudal rather than party loyalty. Consequently, candidates could, and were expected to, change parties based on who offered the most, which increased both their personal wealth and their ability to dole out patronage in their constituency. As voters become increasingly politicized and ideological, the influence of feudal loyalty will wane. In the next election, politicians in areas strongly associated with one color or another who join a party aligned with the predominant color are likely to be returned, but those who shift to a party of the other color in the confident assumption that family loyalty will see them through are likely, in my opinion, to be disappointed.

So what does this snapshot of the Thai electorate mean for parties and candidates? In semi-democracies, political competition is primarily between elites – while in more established democracies public opinion matters, and candidates know it, and we often speak of candidates or parties as “poll-driven.” Thailand, I think, is between these two states; opinion matters to some degree, but politicians remain unsure as to exactly how much. If opinion does matter more now than in the recent past, then our survey can be used – as surveys and polls are in established democracies – to outline and define a winning electoral strategy.

The Thai people long to participate in politics, but right now feel left out of the process. Just one in five says they have some influence on national decision-making, while 80 percent say they have little or no influence. These are almost the lowest findings we have ever recorded for political efficacy in Asia. And, of particular concern for incumbents, 64 percent don’t think their MP addresses the major problems of the constituency in Parliament. These findings clearly suggest that both challengers and incumbents can increase their chances for electoral success by following these simple suggestions: meet often with voters; listen to their problems and concerns; and then explain to them how you will address those concerns in Parliament.

In striking contrast to the current plan to have constitutional amendments drafted by Parliament alone, two-thirds of the Thai public say they want public participation in drafting amendments; and 84 percent say any amendments should be ratified in a referendum rather than by Parliament. Although appointed Senators were introduced with the 2007 Constitution, and there have been proposals to appoint some MPs, the Thai people as a whole overwhelmingly prefer elections for MPs and Senators rather than appointments. Thais also express strong support for political decentralization that enhances participation and democracy. Currently, only Bangkok has an elected governor, and the survey shows that the people in Bangkok like their elected governor, and that the people in other provinces would like to have one too.

The political preferences outlined above are key political pivots that can be used to move the majority in the middle, and some people in both color wings. Support for these issues, while absent from the platforms of any political party, is very deep across all regions, and equally prevalent in those leaning yellow or red. It is very clear that if a political party were to campaign on a platform that emphasized increased public participation in the political process and the direct election of provincial governors, they would be hard to beat in the next election. After all, what politician would not benefit from supporting the people’s right to vote, when that vote will determine their own political future? But, while the people of Thailand increasingly embrace democracy, it remains unclear if the formal political parties have evolved enough to recognize that, in a modern democracy, public opinion matters.

Tim Meisburger is The Asia Foundation’s Regional Director for Elections and Political Processes based in Bangkok. He can be reached at tmeisburger@asiafound.org.

This viewpoint holds that one color is doing whatever is necessary to keep former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from returning to power and the other is working equally hard to have him pardoned to return to power again; one is supported by the traditional ruling elite and the other the disaffected rural masses; one is intent on thwarting any democratic growth to ensure the continuation of elite power and one is fighting for truth, justice, and democracy.

Conducted by The Asia Foundation’s office in Thailand, our second national public perception survey of the Thai electorate covers crucial governance and political issues, and also offers an opportunity to test the degree to which Thailand has become polarized.

Protestors gather in central Bangkok last year.

Does the data support the contention that Thai society is divided along color lines? Among respondents, to what degree were the views of political activists and those professing loyalty to the Yellows or the Reds polarized? If polarized, to what degree were their views a reflection of a polarized Thai society?

Slated for release on March 28, in Bangkok, 2010 National Survey of the Thai Electorate: Exploring National Consensus and Color Polarization captures responses from 1,500 Thai citizens interviewed between September 17 and Oct. 23, 2010. In addition to the complete survey report, which will be available on the Foundation’s website, next week’s In Asia will include insight and analysis on survey findings from Foundation experts.

In 1947, Winston Churchill said “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all others that have been tried.” When Churchill made this remark, Thailand was in the throes of developing a strong dictatorial state headed by the military. But after six decades of impressive economic advancement and social mobility, it should not be surprising that an overwhelming majority of Thai people now agree with Mr. Churchill: 93 percent of those surveyed in a newly released poll of the Thai electorate by The Asia Foundation responded that democracy is the best form of government. Inherent in any democratic society is a people’s ability to express themselves freely. The survey indicates that 91 percent of Thais believe they can freely express their political opinion, and an overwhelming 97 percent feel that they are united by common values.

Such findings should perhaps not come as a surprise when one looks at Thailand over the span of more than six decades since Churchill made his now-famous statement. Many Thais have experienced significant economic advancement and social mobility, particularly over the past 30 years. In 1978, when I first went to Thailand, the average Thai earned $540 per year. In 2010, Thailand’s per-capita income was $4,800, a 9-fold increase in just over three decades. Compulsory education in the late 1970s was four years. With rapid economic growth came educational attainment, and today, compulsory education is 12 years. This, coupled with the revolution in information technology, has led to the creation of a more aware citizenry, particularly in rural areas. Consequently, Thais have become understandably more demanding of their rights and want a greater say in what they believe their government should or should not do.

But politics is complicated in Thailand, especially since the removal by military coup of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006. Since his removal, the ensuing political struggle in Thailand has been characterized as a nation divided between the anti-government Red-Shirt movement, which is said to be backed mainly by the rural working poor and lower middle class, and the Yellow-Shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which is said to draw its support from the urban middle class. However, the Foundation’s survey suggests that Thais are not as politically divided as the media and pundits believe. Perhaps the most surprising statistic in the survey is that 76 percent of Thais professed being neither Red nor Yellow. If the country is divided, it is divided evenly among a small percentage of the population – 12 percent identified themselves as Red and 12 percent identified themselves as Yellow. In essence, three out of every four Thais purport themselves to be “colorless.”

If Thailand is not divided, it is most definitely at a political impasse. Perhaps a more apt description of Thailand’s political difficulties is the failure of democratic institutions to bridge the differences between a new capitalist class that has won the backing of the rural poor with populist policies, and an urban, established elite that is seeking to maintain its traditional claim on power. While a military coup does not represent the best way to resolve the country’s political problems, one cannot necessarily rule out the military taking control over the country yet again. However, the military might think twice – survey findings indicate that 76 percent of Thais reject “a strong, unelected leader even when democracy may not be working.”

It is expected that Thailand’s current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva will dissolve parliament in early May, and that elections will be held approximately 45 days after parliament’s dissolution. At this juncture, it appears that neither of Thailand’s two major political parties, Abhisit’s Democrat Party or the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party, will receive a parliamentary majority. Consequently, it will be the country’s minor political parties that will play a crucial role in forming the next government. Such parties are led by opportunistic politicians, and who they support may depend on which major political party can offer the best deal. However, minor political parties may elect to continue supporting the Democrat Party out of concern that to do otherwise would irritate the military and other members of Thailand’s establishment.

So, what happens if in the next election the major party that receives the second largest number of votes is capable of cobbling together a coalition to form a government?  Is Thailand back to square one with major protests by either Reds or Yellows crying foul and the great majority of Thais remaining captive to the voices on the margins who have been most vocal?  The survey found that while 71 percent of the Thai electorate was interested in politics, only 25 percent felt it had a lot or some influence over national government decisions.

But in order for democracy to strengthen, there needs to be political reform that makes Thai people feel they have ownership in the affairs of the nation and a genuine stake in the political, economic, and social life of their country. Decentralization was a key focus in the survey: 61 percent say it would improve governance and mitigate tension and conflict. However, for political reform to evolve in Thailand, it must constructively address the inequities, injustice, and double standards of a political system that an increasing number of Thais find unacceptable.

John J. Brandon, who lived in Thailand for three years (1978-1981) and continues to travel there regularly, is The Asia Foundation’s director of International Relations Programs in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at jbrandon@asiafound-dc.org.

Thailand’s political landscape throughout much of the 20th century was populated by numerous regional or personality-based parties, and characterized by weak coalition governments. Alliances and coalitions were made and broken easily, as parties sought the best deal for their constituents and members. In contrast, the 21st century has been characterized by what seems to be an increasingly polarized electorate, and the rapid emergence of a de facto two-party system.

Supporters of Pheu Thai Party leader Yingluck Shinawatra. Photo by Chandler Vandergrift.

Over the last decade, the potential influence of smaller regional parties has declined, while the total percentage of seats won by the two biggest parties has steadily increased, as the chart below illustrates.

Thailand has a 500-seat legislature and a mixed electoral system, with typically 400 seats elected from geographical constituencies, and 100 elected through proportional representation from party lists. In the 2011 election, there were 375 constituency seats and 125 seats allocated from party lists. The two largest parties for each of the four elections since 2001 were the Democrat Party and Thai Rak Thai (2001, 2005), or its successors the People Power Party (2007) and Pheu Thai (2011). The blue line represents the percentage of seats won by these two parties through the party list vote, and the red line the percentage of constituency seats won.

Several influences may have contributed to this trend. In political theory, Duverger’s Law suggests that majoritarian election systems in general contribute to the emergence of two-party systems, and since Thailand’s mixed system is predominantly majoritarian, this may have been a contributing factor, but perhaps not the most significant. Based on survey research conducted by The Asia Foundation in 2009 and 2010, we found that much of this trend can be attributed to an evolving political conscientiousness in the Thai electorate, and indicates a society in transition from a traditional patron/client or feudal political understanding to a more modern and ideological political consciousness.

In the traditional system, voters’ ties to political leaders were personal and characterized by the patron/client compact. Small parties centered on local notables were the norm – representing the traditional feudal elite, and voters dutifully followed their patrons as they changed parties and coalitions. But around the turn of the century this compact began to break down. First, Thaksin Shinawatra realized he could bypass the traditional feudal hierarchy and use mass media to appeal directly to the people, and offer them a better deal than they could get from their local patron. In effect, Thaksin became a sort of super patron, and in some sense mimicking or usurping the role played by the monarchy in the feudal system.

Although Thaksin’s populism sparked the transition, it was the opposition to Thaksin that has contributed most to the development of the two-party system. The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) was an umbrella group for opponents of Thaksin from any party, and over time, this group developed a coherent and unifying ideology centered on support for the monarchy, clean government (counter-corruption), and support for participatory rather than electoral democracy. This became the very successful “Yellow Movement.” In response to this success, Thaksin’s supporters set up the “Red Movement,” which over time developed its own ideology centered on opposition to double standards and support for popular or electoral democracy.

These two ideological movements have dominated political discourse in the last five years, and as the Thai political landscape has colorized, increasing numbers of voters have switched their primary political allegiance from a local patron to an ideology. This has forced the main parties, both of which were primarily traditional patronage machines, to adopt an ideology and become more modern, ideology-based parties. Smaller regional and patron-based parties have fewer and fewer adherents as voters increasingly choose a national party representing their ideological position.

Although the last decade has been fraught with political turmoil, the turmoil itself is a symptom of a broader societal transformation that has positive implications for the future of Thailand. The evolution of a feudal or patron/client society into an ideology-based society is a transition that has occurred in every patronage-based politics into an established democracy. The fact that this transition was driven from the grassroots up, from the movements to the parties, is an indication of the emerging political consciousness and maturation of the Thai people.

Tim Meisburger is a Democracy Fellow at USAID on sabbatical leave from The Asia Foundation, where he is director for Elections and Political Processes. He can be reached at tmeisburger@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation or USAID.