The current visit of Afghan President Karzai to Washington, D.C., accompanied by many of his ministers and high-level officials, is being greeted on both sides as an opportunity – indeed a necessity – to open a new page in the relations of two strategic partners in need of each other’s support and trust. There is bitterness on both sides even while there is an overwhelming hope to move forward and cease accusations and counter-accusations that have taken place ever since then-U.S. presidential candidate Obama visited Afghanistan in October 2008, and called upon President Karzai to get out of his bunker and face reality.

Negative feelings now overshadow all aspects of relations between the two governments. The relationship was darkly clouded by Afghanistan’s recent presidential elections and the harsh words, pressuring, and legal and political maneuvering that have accumulated through the actions (and inactions) of many individuals and institutions since then.

Whether the international community set itself up for failure in the election context more than two years ago, is a good, but rarely voiced question. Should we avoid critical analysis of past mistakes? It is my hope we can learn from past mistakes.

In the age of televised politics, where image always trumps reality, there is no doubt that visible signs of renewed unity will be prominently on display this week. Yet, when the visitors return home to Afghanistan and the TV cameras are switched off, reality will come back to the fore and problems will have to be faced.

History shows that, in politics, polite smiles, gracious statements, high-level commitments, and A-list dinners and receptions undoubtedly serve as very important functions of resetting a framework when it has gone wrong. In this case, it may be the only way of moving past the disappointing results of the last year and a half. Yet, history also shows good wishes and hopes cannot wholly reorder reality. Policies being discussed and implemented at this juncture need to be carefully reviewed – even more so than the roles of particular individuals responsible for creating obstacles to the reconciliation process.

If we are willing to see clearly, current reality in Afghanistan is one of déjà vu. There are uncanny similarities today to the failure of the three major modernization efforts that took place in Afghanistan: during the 1920s, the 1960s-70s and the 1980s. These failures should remind us of why we are facing such serious challenges today. The lessons so far forgotten are fairly simple:

• Focus and prioritize modernization efforts and do not overload the agenda in relation to the strength and the scope of the coalition that has to implement it (King Amanullah).

• Don’t exclude potential spoilers, losers, and rebels from the political arena (President Daoud).

• If a militant opposition develops, do not let foreign military forces lead the war against them (Soviet Union).

A consensus on a comprehensive set of strategies should address all three of these lessons at the same time. Occasionally, promising bits and pieces appear – but, they don’t yet seem to add up to a truly comprehensive strategy; it is more fits and starts. For example, on the positive side – the potential peace jirga and reconciliation efforts on the part of the Afghans aim to bring about an inclusive political settlement, and for that, U.S. support will be crucial. But the recent military operation in Marja, while it did result in recapturing territory, it also caused some anger and alienation. The announced operation in Kandahar might seem necessary from a strictly military point of view. Yet, whether it will help “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its safe havens” or actually “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” our own peace building efforts is an unknown. The Taliban – some of them at least – seem to think that instead of waiting, they should announce their own offensive and thus help in disrupting and dismantling our PR efforts.

So, we should hope that the Washington visit will focus equally on substance as it will surely focus on the image. Without it, we will soon ask ourselves: why did we fail again?

Zoran Milovic is The Asia Foundation’s Deputy Country Representative in Afghanistan. He can be reached a zmilovic@asiafound.org.

President Barack Obama’s visit to Indonesia next week [Note from editor: President Obama's trip has been delayed to June 2010] is not just a return to a childhood home, but an opportunity for the United States and Indonesia to signal that their relationship – as with childhood friends who may have drifted apart in adolescence – is now emerging into a mature partnership.

Relations have not always been smooth between Indonesia and the U.S. – the Sukarno years were fraught with disagreements and constant tensions, and under Suharto’s New Order, the U.S. always felt some ambivalence in engaging with an authoritarian regime. But as an American child growing up in Indonesia in the 1970s and ‘80s, the people-to-people relationship in Indonesia seemed to me almost familial. Indonesians loved America – and enthusiastically and voraciously consumed American products, from KFC to Levi’s to Hollywood films. The “American dream” for Indonesians was to send their kids to university in the U.S., and middle-class parents scrimped and saved to that end.

But over the past decade, sentiments seem to have shifted from enthusiasm to cynicism, for a variety of reasons. For example, in 1997, more than 13,000 Indonesians attended American universities. Today, in 2010, just over 7,000 do, with well-heeled Indonesians more often opting to send their kids to Australia or the United Kingdom. In general, Indonesians over the past decade held a cynical and distrustful view of the U.S, and U.S. foreign policy actions were more often than not met with a critical rather than a forgiving gaze.

Over the past eight years, many Indonesians felt that the U.S. government took a monolithic approach to Islam that not only linked Islam to terrorism but also did not differentiate amongst the variety of beliefs and practices in the Muslim world. Many Indonesians took great offense at the stringent visa restrictions that were applied post 9/11, as well as the difficulties encountered in the immigration process by those who were able to get visas. Indeed, these seemingly small irritations often caused more ill-will than the higher-order policy stances, like U.S. policy on Palestine and Israel and the invasion of Iraq, that were commonly cited as the main causes of bad relations.

These developments disrupted what should have been a blossoming relationship after 1998 when Suharto’s authoritarian New Order fell and Indonesia undertook – with remarkable success – deep-seated reforms of its state institutions and a relatively rapid transition to democracy. Indonesia’s civil society groups matured into sophisticated advocates of civil liberties; the press became one of the freest in the region; and Indonesia’s Muslim organizations monitored the validity of three national elections and nearly 500 direct elections of governors, mayors, and district heads. This metamorphosis of Indonesia into the world’s third largest democracy should have strengthened ties with the U.S. Instead, in 2003, people-to-people relations deteriorated to the lowest point in recent memory, with only 15 percent of Indonesians expressing positive views of the U.S., according to a Pew Research Center survey.

Tsunami assistance in 2004 helped soften the relationship, but dramatic positive sentiment toward the U.S. wasn’t again perceived on the ground in Jakarta until President Obama’s campaign for presidency. When he won, celebrations across the city matched, and in some cases surpassed, those anywhere in the world. The reasons for the change in attitude are in part personal – the fact that Obama spent part of his childhood in Indonesia makes Indonesians particularly affectionate toward him. But they are also policy related; the Obama administration has skillfully and effectively treated Indonesia with respect, avoiding invoking Indonesia as a model “moderate” Muslim nation – an approach that backfired on the Bush administration. Instead, the Obama administration appears to be focused on Indonesia’s own policy priorities: food security, education, and climate change, among other things.

Thus, President Obama’s visit to Indonesia has huge potential to signal a return to the kind of close relationship that befits the world’s second and third largest democracies. Indeed, the much-vaunted “Comprehensive Partnership” that is due to be signed by Presidents Obama and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono next week is in fact a true partnership in the sense that it reflects the shared priorities of both countries. While the precise nature and content of the agreement won’t be unveiled to the public until next week, key pillars under discussion include education, trade and business relations, security, climate change, and democratic institutions.

If, as we can expect, the foundation is set next week for substantive collaboration between the U.S. and Indonesia in some of these areas, the relationship will not only have thawed symbolically but will have matured to the point where these two nations have the potential to join forces to achieve greater impact globally on issues that concern us all. This is a huge achievement given the state of relations only a few years ago – and is a tribute in part to Obama himself, to the skill of his administration and committed U.S. Embassy and Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials in Jakarta, and to the deep-seated admiration and friendship that Indonesians once felt, and could perhaps feel again, for the American people. It will signify a relationship of adults, of two mature and strong democracies, that has transcended childhood friendship and adolescent ruptures.

Robin Bush is The Asia Foundation’s Country Representative in Indonesia. She can be reached at rbush@tafindo.org.

I was honored to represent The Asia Foundation at the seventh U.S.-Islamic World Forum co-hosted by the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the State of Qatar in Doha last month. The Saban Center has convened the forum for seven years, shaping an event that is duly recognized and anticipated as the premier gathering of American and Muslim leaders for discussion of critical issues and partnership opportunities.

This year, the three-day forum focused on President Barack Obama’s call – in his historic Cairo University address last June – for  a “new beginning” in relations between the United States and Muslims worldwide, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. Speakers, panelists, and participants were invited to explore what has changed in the eight months since Obama’s Cairo address – in  particular, whether the call for change has been reflected in substantive policy recommendations and program initiatives that advance U.S.-Muslim relations.

U.S. Senator John Kerry speaks with Foreign Minister of Qatar Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassem Bin Jabor Al-Thani at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum. Photo by Ralph Alswang.

There were a few moments in which friendly exchanges yielded to pointed comments, stern expressions, or awkward silence. These occasional tensions reflected the mix of optimism, expectation, and impatience that has followed the President’s call for change. While hard questions were raised on Afghanistan, and other tough issues were scrutinized and debated, it was clear that Arab and Muslim nations are still looking to a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the ultimate yardstick of American resolve to turn noble pledge into decisive action. Participants set the bar high, but signaled every confidence that President Obama is sincere in his commitment.

The keynote speeches and panel session remarks of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassem Bin Jabor Al-Thani, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Malaysian opposition leader and parliamentarian Anwar Ibrahim, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry drew common threads of urgency, resolve, and practical realism on the challenge of reversing reciprocal misperceptions. Secretary Clinton and Senator Kerry underlined positive steps taken to advance the Cairo commitment in recent months. These include:  investments and exchange opportunities in business, education, public health, science and technology; the economic and political empowerment of women and youth; new policy guidelines for U.S. military operations and development initiatives in Afghanistan; American efforts to think and talk differently about Islam; and acknowledgment of the need for deeper mutual understanding. Participants seemed to appreciate the candor with which senior American officials acknowledged areas of slow progress and the many challenges that remain. Arab and Muslim leaders in turn recognized their shared obligation to address extremism and combat prejudice, and affirmed their readiness to support the Middle East peace process in a manner inspired by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities Farah Pandith delivers a talk during the Forum. Photo by Ralph Alswang.

The program agenda devoted over six hours to five concurrent working groups. They focused on: the role of religious leaders and religious communities in diplomacy; democracy and Islamic parties – opportunities and challenges; scientific, intellectual, and governance cooperation on emerging environmental challenges; and new media to further global engagement. The fifth group, to which I was assigned, was tasked to focus on transformative partnerships in U.S.-Muslim world relations – empowering networks for community development and social change.

Ably facilitated by Professor Peter Mandaville of George Mason University, our group featured a striking mix around the table, including a renowned British facilitator of interfaith and intercultural understanding; a former Pakistani rock star turned nasheed artist and philanthropist; an American Internet pioneer and political strategist; a Senegalese NGO leader; the director of an American inner-city Muslim action network and social justice campaigner; a senior African-American imam; a Pakistani law professor and youth activist; a fearless champion of women’s rights from Somalia; an extraordinarily charismatic Egyptian activist and preacher; and representatives of several private international foundations and philanthropic associations.

Working together, we came up with a core set of values and guiding principles that lie at the core of successful partnerships for community development and social change in a variety of contexts, from Harlem, through Cairo and Lahore, to the remote reaches of West Africa. Reflecting on lessons learned from our very diverse experiences, we developed illustrative project activities and advocacy initiatives that would give voice to the economic and political aspirations of youth and stimulate the exchange of knowledge between community development activists in industrialized nations and their counterparts in the developing world. In some cases, the examples and experiences tabled were expressly rooted in the common values and experiences of Muslim communities worldwide. In others, the unique Muslim dimension was part of the broader universe of development challenges facing women, youth, the poor, and other marginalized communities everywhere, which resonate across continents, borders, cultures, faiths, and ethnic identities.

As a prelude to the Doha Forum, an Asia Foundation colleague and I spent most of January in Afghanistan on a program strategy mission that we hope will further link Afghan partners with counterparts in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and other Muslim- majority countries in which we work. The Doha Forum experience affirms the benefits of looking at these issues from a global perspective. Later this month, the Foundation and USAID are co-hosting a regional conference on the role of leaders of influence in national development efforts in Dhaka, Bangladesh (March 21-24). Religious leaders of all faiths will share their experiences in promoting development in the 14 Asian countries represented in the conference, and add their collective knowledge and insights to the refinement of the Bangladesh Leaders of Influence program. As we prepare for Dhaka, our experiences in Doha remind us how important it is to look beyond Asia for additional opportunities to link Asian religious and secular leaders with counterparts in Arab nations, Africa, Europe, and North America.

The U.S.-Islamic World Forum delivers a potent mix of formal diplomatic dialogue alongside the broader, more informal discourse needed to sow seeds of common understanding. While there was little new or especially striking in the expectations underlined by participants, nor in the occasional impatience voiced in the plenary proceeding and during informal tea breaks, something truly remarkable occurred in the rich discussions and networking among participants over the three-day gathering.

Kim McQuay is The Asia Foundation’s Regional Director for Law and Governance, based in Bangkok. He can be reached at kmcquay@asiafound.org.

The International Violence against Women Act of 2010 originally introduced by now-Vice President Joseph Biden, was recently re-introduced in both houses of the 111th Congress after failing to come to a vote in the previous Congressional session. On February 4, Senators Kerry (D-MA), Boxer (D-CA), Collins (R-ME), and Snowe (R-ME); and Representatives Delahunt (D-MA), Poe (R-TX), and Schakowsky (D-IL) re-introduced this ground-breaking legislation in a seemingly anachronistic display of bipartisanship. The House bill (H.R. 4594) currently names 37 co-sponsors, the Senate bill 25. Both are now being reviewed by their respective foreign affairs committees, while the House bill is also being considered by the House Committee on Armed Services.

According to the United Nations, approximately one out of every three women in the world has been beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused in her lifetime, usually by someone she knows. A World Bank study shows that women from 15 to 44-years-old are at greater risk of rape and domestic violence than of cancer, motor vehicle accidents, war, or malaria. The World Health Organization reports that, in some countries, up to 71 percent of women have been victims of physical, and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner at some stage in their lives. The bills on Capitol Hill would direct U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance toward the goal of eliminating this global crisis of violence against women and girls.

In addition to the physical and psychological trauma associated with violence against women and girls, there are significant economic costs to individuals, communities, and countries. For example, a survey conducted by The International Center for Research on Women in India, shows that women there are missing, on average, seven paid workdays after each incident of violence. That and the cost of medical treatment often required for injuries, and legal expenses, clearly poses a serious economic burden to households. The public sector, (and therefore society), likewise contributes a significant portion of a country’s GDP to deal with violence against women and girls through the criminal justice system, medical care, and social services.

The Act aims to address this problem through the development of a five-year, comprehensive international strategy.  The strategy will focus on a specific set of 5-20  countries that have severe levels of violence against women and girls, and are geographically, ethnically, and culturally diverse from each other. For each country, it will include a combination of the two most-needed of the five following areas: health and survivor services, legal and judicial protections, change in public attitudes through communication and organizing, access to economic opportunities, and education and literacy.

To implement the strategies identified for each country, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator, in coordination with the Ambassador-at-large for Global Women’s Issues (presently Melanne Verveer) and USAID Director of Women’s Global Development would provide assistance to NGOs, multilateral institutions, and foreign governments to carry out the program activities. In order for funds to be provided to NGOs for this work, they must have an expertise in women’s empowerment, prevention of violence against women, or be in partnership with organizations that have the expertise, and they would need proven capabilities in one of the five program areas. This legislation would also authorize grants for women’s NGOs and community-based organizations, amounting to at least 10 percent of funds allotted to each country selected.

The Act would also call for other initiatives to respond to and prevent violence against women and girls. These efforts would be related to U.S. accountability, training for foreign military, police forces, and judicial officials; and violence against women and girls in humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, conflict, and post-conflict operations. Through these measures, this legislation would integrate issues of gender and violence into foreign assistance more directly than any other previous U.S. effort.

Violence against women and girls is a serious problem in the U.S., as well as in many other countries, developed and developing. World Bank data shows that in the U.S., domestic violence is the leading cause of injury among women of reproductive age, and over 600 women a day are raped or sexually assaulted. Violence against women and girls is a problem of devastating magnitude in all countries. The adoption of International Violence Against Women Act of 2010 as U.S. policy would be a step forward toward securing the right of all people to live their lives free from violence.

Carol Yost is Director of The Asia Foundation’s Women’s Empowerment Program and Barbara Rodriguez is a Program Officer for the Women’s Empowerment Program. They can be reached at cyost@asiafound-dc.org and brodriguez@asiafound-dc.org, respectively.

In an interview with Bloomberg Business Week last Thursday, President Obama stated that he would like to complete pending trade agreements with South Korea, Columbia, and Panama, but there’s a catch. Although his State of the Union Address provided a potentially powerful strategic rationale for passing these free trade agreements (FTAs) as part of the administration’s effort to double exports over the next five years, the president’s statement in his interview with Bloomberg was actually a step backwards. By adding that “with respect to South Korea, there is some concern that, although the deal was good for our telecommunications and our finance system, that our auto exports to South Korea are still subjected to a lot of nontariff barriers,” the president offered a tactical explanation why his administration has chosen NOT to move forward with the agreement rather than making strategic arguments for why the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA is in the national interest.

Read the full piece originally published on the Council on Foreign Relations blog Asia Unbound.

Scott Snyder directs The Asia Foundation’s Center for U.S.-Korea Policy. He can be reached at ssnyder@asiafound-dc.org.

Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ three-day visit to New Delhi last month not only bolstered India’s role in promoting security and stability in Afghanistan and the region, but also boosted bilateral defence cooperation and trade. His visit helps pave the way for President Barack Obama, who is expected to visit India this summer, and helps answer an important question the two countries have asked each other since India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington last year: Do we take a “strategic pause” to heal some rising negativity brewing in the relationship, or do we look for the “next big idea” to keep up the momentum?

In a clear push for closer bilateral military cooperation in the face of what Secretary Gates called the “greatest common challenge of terrorism,”Gates’ visit highlighted the potential influence the defence sector can have on future bilateral relations. When the two nations signed the first formal Defence Agreement in 2005, much progress was made. However, both sides still need to work through roadblocks that plague India’s acquisition of U.S. defence technology: concerns over the U.S. as a reliable supplier, the United States’ adversity to releasing certain technology, and worry over the transferability of specifications to less-trusted, third end-users. In addition, three agreements Gates pushed India to sign during his visit didn’t happen. The Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), and the Geospatial Agreement are each required under U.S. domestic laws in order to transfer sensitive defence technology.

The signing of the End-User Monitoring Agreement last year was a landmark achievement for India-U.S. relations. However, during Secretary Gates’ visit, India’s Defence Minister Shri Antony conveyed some of India’s lingering concerns, such as the United States’ denial of export licenses for various defence-related requirements of the Armed Forces, and its continuing inclusion of some Indian Defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and Defence Research and Development Organisation labs on the U.S. government’s Entity list (a list of parties whose presence in a transaction can trigger a license requirement under the Export Administration Regulations). While such restrictions are anomalous in the current context, President Obama’s on-going, comprehensive reform of U.S. export control regulations could help facilitate the supply of defence technology and equipment to India.

Defence acquisition is a complex matter and one on which India will keep its options open. Increasing requirements to fulfil India’s power needs beyond its borders suggests that the U.S. will remain a preferred partner. It is certain that future weaponry, especially for the Air Force and Navy, will increasingly rely on unmanned vehicles and greater use of laser technology, an area where the U.S. is the world leader. The scenario of contending with two adversaries at the same time has already been painted by the Army Chief. A significant increase in the four-fold difference between Chinese and Indian military prowess can be expected, coupled with the intensification of China’s nuclear and missile nexus with Pakistan. The expected completion of Chinese base facilities at Sittwe (Burma), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Gwadar (Pakistan) will affect the military balance on the seas and in space. India will have to cope with this dangerously-evolving scenario.

India has reiterated that defence trade relations must move from a purely buyer-seller relationship to a more comprehensive relationship covering the transfer of technology and co-production. Reports indicate that 15 percent of Indian military equipment is state-of-the-art, 35 percent mature, and 50 percent obsolete. India currently procures approximately 70 percent of its equipment needs from abroad, but aims to reverse this balance to manufacture 70 percent or more of its defence equipment at home. This is a major opportunity to build an industrial infrastructure that will be able to quantitatively, technologically, and qualitatively support the requirements of India’s Armed Forces in terms of weapons, systems, platforms, upgradation, and overhaul.

For this to happen, the share of India’s private sector will need to increase far beyond the 14 percent at present (with foreign sources taking 70 percent and the remainder going to Defence PSUs and the Indian Ordnance Factories, and only $14 million in foreign direct investment, even with 100 percent entry permitted). Unless the foreign direct investment cap increases substantially, the resulting exclusion of India’s resurgent private sector will be detrimental to its national security needs.

By 2022, India is expected to purchase $100 billion worth of military equipment and another $9.7 billion to be spent by 2016 on homeland security. India must capitalise on this opportunity by leapfrogging its technology sector to a higher level. Russia still provides 80 percent of India’s military hardware but in the last three years, India purchased over $3 billion worth of U.S. military equipment and is moving toward completing the largest defence transaction yet (about $2.5 billion), with the purchase of 10 strategic lift aircrafts.

Does increasing the purchase of defence equipment lead to a more solid India-U.S. alliance? There remains a gap between how India and the U.S. view and understand their strategic partnership. There are many ways to cut the “strategic cake:” by time, by space, by criteria, and by issues. There is a pressing need for both sides to bring greater clarity to the discussion to further strengthen this relationship.

Rajendra Abhyankar, former Indian Ambassador, is currently an Advisor with The Asia Foundation in India. He can be reached at rabhyankar@asiafound.org.

We welcome President Barack Obama with open arms, not just out of customary habit among friends. South Koreans share the world’s interest in President Obama’s global activities because he embodies a new path for the United States in international relations as well as in ties with old allies like us.

Quality of life has been fundamentally transformed and revolutionized through the innovations spawned from the information revolution.

At every momentous turn in history we cannot help but ask if traditional beliefs and values like freedom, equality and justice will continue to have the same significance and validity in the new age.

America is no longer the world’s single superpower, amid declining military and political influence in world affairs. Moreover, it lost face in the aftermath of the Wall Street-sparked financial meltdown.

The nation faces a crossroads at which it must define its new role in a diversified global environment. And President Obama happens to be the man standing at the door to a new future for America and the world, holding the key.

The U.S. is a melting pot of various ethnic groups and cultures. It is the world’s first federal republic run by democratic procedure. The world has watched its trials and experiments during its turbulent journey over the last two centuries.

The first African-American president has meaning beyond politics, as it serves as a reassurance of the American dream. Americans undoubtedly have regained their pride and confidence through their choice in last year’s election.

President Obama’s platform for global peace and prosperity has been gathering support throughout the world. He has put his foot down on urgent issues such as climate change and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and drawn attention to other important problems such as the intensifying wealth gap both among and within countries. Obama has traveled the world campaigning for cooperation on these issues.

His pronounced stance has reinforced American leadership on the global stage and will likely mean positive progress for future Korea-U.S. relations.

The three East Asian countries President Obama is currently visiting are economies that have grown at a staggering speed, accompanying rising status and influence in the global community, becoming the envy of other parts of the world.

Read the full piece originally published in JoongAng Ilbo on November 17.

Dr. Lee Hong-koo is a trustee of The Asia Foundation, a former prime minister, and a former ambassador to the United States. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University.

With Hamid Karzai declared the winner of Afghanistan’s highly controversial presidential election, President Obama’s decision regarding future U.S. policy toward that country is considered imminent. As part of his deliberations, Mr. Obama has received the assessment of his military commanders, the advice of his top civilian leaders, and the views of NATO allies, among others.

Now there is one more piece of information that should be added to this mix, namely what the Afghan people are thinking.

A recent survey directed by The Asia Foundation (and available at asiafoundation.org) is a snapshot of public opinion in Afghanistan. It shows a nation in conflict – and conflicted – about the direction it is heading.

Trained Afghan pollsters interviewed 6,400 Afghans, almost equally divided between male and female, in all 34 of the country’s provinces, just before the Aug. 20 presidential election. It is the fifth public opinion poll conducted by the Foundation since 2004 and therefore provides a valuable perspective on the trends in the national mood of Afghans over time.

The survey indicates that, in many parts of the country, there is a perception of some improvement. There is a small increase over the 2008 survey (from 38 to 42 percent) in the number of Afghans who think their country is moving in the right direction and a small decrease (from 32 to 29 percent) in those who think it is moving in the wrong direction.

The principal reason for this optimism appears to be a growing sense that security is getting better (up from 31 percent in 2006 to 44 percent in 2009). Other reasons include reconstruction and rebuilding and the opening of schools for girls. Understandably, these positive features are not present in the eastern and southern areas along the Pakistan border where the Taliban insurgency is the most pervasive.

Despite these glimmers of hope, insecurity remains the most important reason for Afghan pessimism, cited by 42 percent of those polled. Almost 20 percent say they or someone in their family have been victims of violence or crime the past year. Nearly 1 in 10 of these victims report that this was due to the actions of militias and insurgents or foreign forces. The latter includes air strikes and ground actions by U.S. and NATO forces that have resulted in civilian casualties and generated a strong backlash among the Afghan people.

Read the full piece originally published in The New York Times on November 12.

Asia Foundation trustee Karl Inderfurth is the former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs and trustee Ted Eliot is a former Ambassador to Afghanistan.

This week Barack Obama will make his first trip to Asia as President of the United States. In addition to paying state visits to China, Japan, and South Korea, President Obama will meet with 20 national leaders in Singapore to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Although member countries vary in economic clout individually, APEC economies collectively represent 55 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, 45 percent of global trade, and 40 percent of the world’s population.

When APEC was founded in 1989, the ostensible purpose of the grouping was to liberalize trade and investment and promote commercial links among member countries. APEC, however, poses no binding obligations and has no enforcement mechanism. APEC relies primarily on consultation and persuasion. Trying to make such agreements binding would be a non-starter given the diversity in size of APEC member economies and levels of political and economic development. Nonetheless, despite experiencing two financial crises in the past decade, APEC has been relatively outward-looking in its trade and investment policies. In fact, APEC has experienced a five-fold increase in trade since 1989. This increase has contributed to Asia forging a stronger regional identity than existed two decades ago.

But APEC has its critics. Many argue that since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, APEC has accomplished little in the past decade and is just “a talk shop.” In the past decade, APEC summit agendas seem preoccupied with other non-economic issues – in 1999 it was the crisis in East Timor; then the confusion over who won the 2000 U.S. presidential election; the 9-11 attacks in 2001; and, in ensuing years, security issues have dominated talks, with less discussion on how to liberalize trade, investment, and services. Perhaps this bears the question: Is APEC relevant? Would member countries have experienced strong economic growth through a significant expansion of trade and investment if APEC had not existed?

At the 1994 APEC meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, member countries agreed to an open trade and investment region in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and by 2020 for developing economies. However, the Bogor declaration is an aspiration, not a binding agreement. While the goals embodied in the Bogor declaration (trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation) may not be fully reached next year, the spirit of this declaration has resonated strongly. Tariffs among APEC member countries have been reduced since 1989 from an average of 17 percent to 5.5 percent. The APEC meeting in Bogor helped spur the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the creation of its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). All of this helped fast-growing economies like China and Vietnam gain accession to the WTO and promoted cooperation on a range of economic policy issues important to the Asia-Pacific region.

But during tough economic times, countries – be they developed or developing – tend to revert toward protectionism despite the rhetoric of continued commitment to free-market principles. Earlier this year when the U.S. House of Representatives inserted “Buy American” provisions into the $789 billion stimulus package, the Obama administration got the Senate to agree that provisions would not be administered in ways that are “inconsistent with international obligations.” Indonesia, a developing nation that aspires to have a greater voice in global affairs and is a member of the G-20, has imposed import restrictions on over 500 products, demanding special licenses and new fees on imports. As President Obama prepares to journey to Asia, trade friction between the U.S. and China has escalated, with the U.S. imposing high countervailing duties on Chinese-made oil well pipes and automobile tires. China has responded by launching anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations on imports of American poultry and auto parts. Trade friction between the U.S. and China will not be resolved at APEC.

APEC is considering the prospects and options to develop a Free Trade Area for the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which would include all 21 member economies. The development of such an agreement, especially an agreement that includes such sensitive areas as steel, petrochemicals, textiles, and footwear, will take many years and negotiations will be arduous.

Looking ahead, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC Leaders meeting in the U.S. How much will the American economy have rebounded in two years? Protectionist sentiment appears to be on the rise, but the APEC economies of the Asia-Pacific are of intrinsic importance to the United States. The fact that President Obama is spending more than a week in Asia underscores the administration’s conviction that Asia is crucial to American interests. The biggest contribution the Obama administration can make this week and when it hosts the APEC meeting two years from now is to restore the health of the U.S. economy by increasing our productivity and competiveness while remaining open to trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world.

John J. Brandon is The Asia Foundation’s Director of International Relations Programs in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at jbrandon@asiafound-dc.org.