The Asia Foundation’s new study, “The Contested Corners of Asia,” highlights the growing importance of conflicts that occur within rather than between countries. In recent years, subnational conflicts between national governments and local rebel groups have killed more people than all other forms of conflict in Asia. Typically located in remote border areas far from the capital city, and often intensified by ethnic or religious differences, these confrontations often continue for many decades.

Subnational conflicts arise largely because people in one part of a country feel aggrieved at how they are treated by the national government. Where the benefits of development are spread unevenly, grievances at inequalities can grow even during periods of fast economic growth. Chandler Vandergrift

The research highlights that subnational conflicts do not necessarily diminish as countries develop. They affect middle-income countries such as Thailand as well as poorer countries like Laos or Nepal. This creates a dilemma for international development agencies. While some organizations are now focusing resources on peacebuilding, mainstream development approaches continue to focus on economic growth, infrastructure, and improved public services. There is evidence in this study that these traditional development efforts may not be helping to solve these long-lasting violent disputes and may in fact contribute to regional inequalities that fuel the subnational conflict. In fact, the new study finds that supporting sustainable peace requires a different approach to development.

Our findings show that subnational conflicts arise largely because people in one part of a country feel aggrieved at how they are treated by the national government. Where the benefits of development are spread unevenly, grievances at inequalities can grow even during periods of fast economic growth. Lack of access to political decision-making and limited recognition of minority cultures or religion are often main causes of tensions that lead to violence. The long-running conflict in Southern Thailand presents an example of this.

Thailand’s southernmost provinces near the border with Malaysia have a long history of both violent and peaceful resistance against a highly centralized state. A series of dramatic incidents in 2004, including coordinated raids on army posts and the deaths of dozens of protesters, spurred a violent insurrection that to date has taken over 5,000 lives.

The conflict pits self-appointed representatives of a minority group against the Thai government. The majority of people in the area are Malay by culture and Muslim by faith, and while their population is greater in the region, they make up only a small minority (1-2%) at the national level. While our study found that most people in the area do not support the use of violence and wish to remain part of Thailand, widespread resentment persists.

Some moderations of government policy over time, such as relaxing assimilation policies and allowing independent local schools, have failed to address people’s concerns. Although the South has benefitted from rapid economic growth and development along with the rest of Thailand in recent decades, the rewards have been spread unevenly and inequalities have increased. Many people in the area feel that they are effectively second-class citizens.

As is so often the case, the spread of democracy has had a mixed impact. With no special mechanisms to ensure minority representation and weak local government, the conflict-affected area is insignificant at the national level. Fractious party politics have also fuelled ground-level tensions.

The Thai government has on several occasions tried to open negotiations to end the conflict. In early 2013, preliminary talks between government and rebel representatives chaired by Malaysia attracted widespread media attention and showed that both sides are interested in finding a peaceful solution. Yet neither side has brought any concrete offers to the table so far and a negotiated agreement or even a meaningful ceasefire remains some way off. The next round of talks, scheduled for June 13, is unlikely to significantly change the situation.

Our research shows that development organizations working to address these conflicts need to prioritize goals that are distinct from mainstream development approaches. Effective approaches will require an understanding of states from a political perspective and of how subnational tensions can be inadvertently exacerbated by a lack of concern for peripheral groups. Statistics need to be disaggregated to show the differences between regions and groups within countries, while overall objectives need to consider how conflict-prone areas are governed as well as simply supporting overall national development objectives.

As the peacebuilding agendas of international development organizations tend to focus on fragile states, typically playing a nominal role in subnational conflict areas, they should know that they will only make a lasting impact by supporting domestic institutions, rather than by acting alone. They also need to remain neutral while at the same time securing government approval to operate. In this complex setting, their staff must understand rapidly changing political dynamics and build strong relationships with local organizations.

In Southern Thailand, small amounts of international assistance – rather than the multi-million dollar aid projects often funded in other countries – have backed valuable domestic initiatives. Research shows that international aid agencies have gradually learned how to engage over time, strengthening Thai organizations, offering technical experience, or facilitating new approaches rather than simply transferring resources.

For example, UNICEF has promoted local efforts to explore language policies in schools, recognizing the minority Malay dialect as well as Thai. The Asia Foundation has backed high-level debate on decentralization options for the Deep South, while other agencies have supported peaceful local activism and research that present non-violent ways to address common grievances. International experience can also support more direct peacebuilding efforts, explaining pitfalls that have held up negotiations elsewhere. Supporting initiatives such as public information campaigns, debate on how former combatants’ needs can be incorporated into peace agendas, and civil society engagement in debate over what institutional transformations will help cement peace, can also support government aims.

In Thailand and other subnational conflict areas, agencies that forsake a traditional development agenda and instead aim to support domestic efforts to tackle the root causes of violence can play a useful supporting role in promoting peace. From the perspective of governments trying to cope with conflict, rather than being a threat to sovereignty, they offer many opportunities to explore policy options. They also present civil society groups with ways to seek peaceful routes to transforming national or local institutions.

The debate over what follows the 2015 Millennium Development Goals needs to stress tackling inequalities. If a goal is enduring peace, then it is crucial to avoid well-intentioned but short-sighted development approaches that aim to only help nations reach global targets but may also unwittingly stoke subnational unrest. Support for both statebuilding and democracy needs special measures to integrate the needs of minorities and countries’ peripheral areas. At a time when development approaches are being reconsidered globally, a closer look at subnational conflicts provides important lessons about how to support lasting peace.

Dr. Adam Burke is co-author of “The Contested Corners of Asia: The Case of Southern Thailand” and is researcher and advisor for the Policy Practice. He can be reached at adam.burke@thepolicypractice.com. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Aceh – Indonesia’s western-most province which endured three decades of a secessionist civil war that left at least 15,000 dead – is frequently cited as the best recent example in Asia of a successful peace process. However, eight years after the Helsinki accord brought an end to the conflict, new forms of localized violence are now emerging. Aceh’s experience shows how conflicts can evolve rather than disappear, even with successful peace processes, and how a lack of sufficient early focus on building strong state institutions can lead to new problems. As the Philippines and Thailand embark on peace processes to end long-running subnational conflicts inside their borders, lessons from the successful – and the not-so-successful – efforts to support peace in Aceh will have increasing relevance.

Traffic in Banda Aceh, the provincial capital and largest city in the province of Aceh, Indonesia. Aceh is frequently cited as the best recent example in Asia of a successful peace process. Photo/Flickr user ILATeam

A new study by The Asia Foundation, “The Contested Corners of Asia,” shows how supporting war-to-peace transitions requires a focus on two things: building the confidence of formerly warring parties in the nascent peace and strengthening institutions to secure peaceful development. Confidence can be enhanced by a range of actions, including the timely delivery of assistance to former combatants and conflict-hit communities. Reforming institutions requires deeper – and often more challenging – efforts to develop the ability of the state to deliver services, ensure security, and promote equitable growth.

Typically the focus of international development agencies on these two goals changes over time. In the early peace agreement years, confidence-building is viewed as being most important. Quick wins, such as providing a tangible peace dividend in conflict-affected areas, are often prioritized over building institutions. Reinsertion and reintegration programs can help buy the commitment of former belligerents to peace. To ensure rapid delivery, aid is often channeled through ad-hoc, short-term government bodies, such as newly created peace agencies. Building the capacity and performance of regular government line ministries is viewed as a longer-term endeavor, to be commenced after initial confidence-building work has finished.

The case of Aceh – one of three subnational conflict areas researched in the new study – shows both the pros and cons of this sequencing. After the peace accord was signed in 2005, following international practice, the donors in Aceh and the Indonesian government focused primarily on providing rapid support to the three groups mentioned in the peace agreement as requiring assistance: former rebel combatants, released political prisoners, and conflict victims. Between 2005 and 2009, around $365 million was spent on peacebuilding in Aceh, with almost equal shares contributed by the national and local government and by international donors. Most of this money went to programs that provided benefits to conflict-affected individuals. Existing state structures, which were widely seen as weak, were avoided, with donors instead focusing on building the capacity of a new temporary reintegration agency, known as BRA (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh).

No doubt, these funds played a significant role in supporting peace, and allowed rebel leaders and foot soldiers alike to see that the Indonesian government was committed to the peace accord. Rural villagers, many of whom received new houses or economic funds, saw their lives improve. Other factors, most notably strong commitment from former rebel leaders and the Indonesian government to the accord, were critical in ensuring the accord held.

However, the failure to focus on institution-building in the early years made it harder to address new challenges as the peace process matured. Over time, issues related to cementing peace and sources of conflict in the province have changed. As powers and resources have been devolved to Aceh under the peace deal, tensions between Aceh and Jakarta have largely disappeared. But new forms of contestation have emerged. With Aceh receiving increased public funds and more political autonomy, conflict between local elites within Aceh has increased. A result has been higher levels of electoral violence than in most other areas of Indonesia.

The accession of former rebel leaders to political power in the province has not improved the quality of governance in Aceh. Eighty-five percent of respondents to a 2010 Transparency International Indonesia survey said that current corruption levels were either the same as or even worse than before the peace accord. With many of Aceh’s new leaders seen as focusing on self-enrichment and satisfying their patronage base, poverty reduction and growth have continued to lag in Aceh. As inequalities within the old rebel movement have grown sharply – with former commanders widely reported to be driving Mercedes and taking overseas shopping trips while those in the village scramble for low-paid work – tensions have increased sharply. The Asia Foundation study suggests that growing distrust in local leaders has led to a series of violent incidents and a spike in crime.

Addressing these new problems requires building impartial and effective local government institutions that manage elite competition, support equitable growth, and deliver services and goods to Aceh’s population. In recent years, donors have recognized this need. But their ability to support improvements in governance is now limited. Facing significant declines in funding (international post-conflict programs now have a collective budget of under $2 million a year (less than 0.1% of the Aceh province and districts’ annual expenditures), donors have limited opportunity to support change in local government. Furthermore, as former rebel leaders have gained near-oligarchic political and economic control of Aceh, they have little short-term reason to change their illicit practices.

If donors had focused on governance issues earlier when funding was substantial and local elites were not as entrenched, it may have been possible to avoid some of the problems that have emerged in Aceh. However, supporting such institution-building is tricky, even in the best of times. We need to be humble about the limits of international agencies’ capabilities in this area. Yet focusing on these issues earlier on, and being more creative and politically engaged when thinking about how to develop governance programs, could have had a positive impact.

As peace processes develop in Mindanao and Southern Thailand, aid agencies and central governments must focus not only on short-term confidence-building activities. These are certainly important. But limiting the new forms of local conflict that can emerge after peace agreements is also vital if peace is to consolidate and this requires up-front thinking and focus on building effective institutions.

Patrick Barron is co-author of “The Contested Corners of Asia: The Case of Aceh, Indonesia,” and is a doctoral fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. He can be reached at pbarron77@gmail.com. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

The last several weeks have witnessed the unfolding of an unfortunate chain of events in Nepal with regard to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The commitment to form a TRC was part of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord, which ended a decade-long conflict between State and Maoist forces. After this long wait, the so-called TRC ordinance was earlier this year forwarded to President Ram Baran Yadav who signed it on March 14 amid a great deal of controversy.

Most problematic in the ordinance is a legal provision allowing the Commission to recommend amnesty for perpetrators of conflict-era human rights violations. In turn, the donor community has expressed its reluctance to support a TRC that does not meet international standards. Nepali conflict victims and human right activists have also challenged the TRC ordinance on similar grounds in the Supreme Court. Responding to the petitions, as reported in the Kathmandu Post, Nepal’s Interim Electoral Government Chairman (and Chief Justice) stressed that amnesty will not be recommended without perpetrators fully confessing conflict-era violations and establishing a basis for pardon. Further, despite its critical importance, the ordinance was finalized and approved by only four of Nepal’s political parties, with even officials of the National Human Right Commission claiming to have been denied access to the ordinance’s final version. These and the opinions of Nepali thought leaders portray an understanding of the fundamental purpose of a TRC that is severely circumscribed by political considerations alone.

One is left asking: How has a reconciliation-oriented mechanism managed, even prior to its inception, to cause such deep disagreements, frustrations, and tensions in society? Is it because something fundamental is missing in the understanding and discussion of Nepal’s transition through truth and reconciliation?  As the amnesty debate continues to heat up, broader questions regarding Nepal’s transitional processes need to be asked.

Could a TRC alone enable truths to emerge? A TRC provides the opportunity to establish a wider form of truth, one that emerges from a broad engagement of a society trying to better understand its past and reshape its future. South Africa’s TRC called this a societal or dialogue truth. However, the mere establishment of a TRC is unlikely to foster, by itself, an environment conducive for such truths to emerge. First, the creation of a safe and open space for stories to be told and the installment of strong social-support mechanisms for those who shared their stories, a necessary part of this process, were yet to be discussed. Second, deepening frustration among conflict victims regarding their limited participation in the formation processes of the current ordinance might further shape and reduce their future engagement with the TRC. Furthermore, as conflict victims object to amnesty, they are stating that the truth produced by TRC cannot replace the different and additional truth established in court, one of individual’s legal responsibilities to conflict-era crimes.

Could a TRC alone foster reconciliation? Nepal’s TRC drafts tended to focus on the types of reconciliation available within the immediate framework of the commission – namely, inter-personal reconciliation processes between victims and perpetrators. To this end, the different versions of the TRC bill were establishing mediation procedures to bring together victim and perpetrator. But this reconciliatory role might be undermined by language in the recent ordinance, as there are concerns that victims’ consent to these processes is not seen to be mandatory.

Alongside these interpersonal aspects, reconciliation itself is a far wider issue, and entails addressing communal and societal aspects of the aftermath of the conflict; not only the personal aspects of victims and perpetrators. Beyond inter-personal mediation processes between victims and perpetrators within the walls of TRC, reconciliation might also flourish in the rural hinterlands, where once marginalized groups now gain access to livelihood opportunities. It might also result when policy reform addresses structural injustices. Reconciliation happens when the root causes of conflict are addressed and when a different future seems possible.

Though TRCs are aimed at fostering reconciliation, they also conceal an inherent risk of becoming a source of additional mistrust and disagreement. Therefore, Nepal’s envisaged TRC will have to constantly struggle to transcend existing inequalities and injustices and ensure access, participation, and voice to diverse individuals and communities. While dialogue processes regarding the TRC ordinance have been conducted in the past, conflict victims and human rights organizations were not included in the formation processes of the latest version of the ordinance, which is now signed into effect by the president.

Furthermore, even if participation in Nepal’s TRC would be broadened, successful transition in Nepal cannot be achieved by merely establishing a TRC; this might be a necessary step towards truth and reconciliation, but it is certainly not a sufficient one. Truth, for example, would oblige strong psychosocial support mechanisms for conflict; reconciliation will require policy and land reforms to address the inequalities that drove the conflict. An effective TRC in Nepal would require additional bodies working alongside it, from prosecutions and accountability mechanisms to reparations and reform programs.

Transition processes occur at and across various layers of society, and thus require a holistic approach that deploys a wide array of mechanisms. The question is not only whether amnesties could be granted if or when the victim is willing, but also how public participation can be fostered in the process, how Nepal’s legal system can be strengthened for effective conflict-era prosecutions, how the claims of victims regarding hundreds of conflict-era proceedings (which have been withdrawn) can be addressed, and how to ensure legal and judicial impartiality. In order to ensure the transition to a durable peace in Nepal, these broader questions must be brought to the table.
 
George Varughese is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Nepal and Tamar Luster is a graduate intern with the Foundation there. They can be reached at gvarughese@asiafound.org and tamar_lus@yahoo.com, respectively. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of The Asia Foundation.

The Asia Foundation just launched a major new study on development and subnational conflict in Asia. “The Contested Corners of Asia” argues that subnational conflict is the most widespread, deadly, and enduring form of conflict in Asia, and that increasing development and expanding state capacity do not make these conflicts any easier to resolve. A product of a three-year research effort, the study involved nearly 100 researchers, leading subnational conflict experts, and Foundation program staff from 10 countries in Asia, as well as North America, Europe, and Australia.

Across Asia, more than 131 million people are living in areas affected by subnational conflicts, but the actual percentage of the national population in each case is relatively small (6.5% on average). Photo/Chandler Vandergrift

The research finds that as Asian states have become more capable and more prosperous, subnational conflicts have endured, and in some cases, increased in number and intensity. These conflicts are just as likely to be found in strong, middle-income states as they are in weak or low-income states. One important explanation for this is that these conflicts last an extraordinarily long time – 45 years on average. So, even as countries have transformed from low to middle income, the subnational conflicts continue.

Why do these conflicts last so long? Unlike large-scale civil wars, the costs of continuing the conflict are relatively low, and as such, many of these conflicts have reached a long-term equilibrium of low intensity, sporadic violence. The political calculus for national leaders usually discourages any serious reforms or compromises that would address the sources of conflict. The minority populations living in these areas are ethnically distinct, and have a long history of struggle for greater self-governance and preservation of local identity. Across Asia, more than 131 million people are living in areas affected by these protracted conflicts, but the actual percentage of the national population in each case is relatively small (6.5% on average). As a result, these areas are peripheral to national concerns, and easily overshadowed by much higher profile national issues.

Similarly, this type of low-intensity conflict generally allows armed, non-state opposition groups to continue their fight for generations, even under enormous pressure from national governments. These armed groups typically do not hold positions or control territory. Combatants blend into the population, and use guerrilla tactics that do not require significant financial or material support. Even when the national military maintains a strong presence in the area, and the government provides infrastructure and social services that exceed the national average, these conflicts continue and often get worse. The study finds that even well-established democracies have high levels of subnational conflict, and a shift from authoritarian to democratic government is unlikely to end subnational conflicts.

Over the next 20 years, subnational conflict is likely to become the most common form of armed violence on a global level. If successful states continue to have unresolved subnational conflicts, and high-intensity national civil wars become less common, then we are likely to see the rest of the developing world following in the footsteps of Asia. In a recent article in African Affairs, Scott Straus argues that conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is changing from large-scale civil wars to subnational conflicts. “Contemporary wars [in Africa] are typically small-scale, fought on state peripheries and sometimes across multiple states, and involve factionalized insurgents who typically cannot hold significant territory or capture state capitals.”

In some ways, this is progress. Large-scale civil wars are far more destructive and require massive international assistance for recovery and stabilization. However, it’s important to realize that this evolution does not mean that armed conflict is ending – it is merely changing to a new form.

Asia’s experience has shown that the process of statebuilding can instigate and entrench subnational conflicts. As states develop more capable militaries and administration, and begin to consolidate their control of outlying border regions, they are also more likely to encounter resistance in some ethnic minority areas. So, even as countries emerge from fragility and conflict at the national level, they spawn new conflicts at their peripheries. The Nepal case illustrates this new scenario. After the end of the Maoist insurgency, some regions at the periphery of the central, Kathmandu region are showing many of the early signs of brewing subnational conflict (Limbuwan/Khumbuwan, Madhesi, Magarat, and Tharuhat). In ethnically diverse states emerging from civil war, the national political settlement is bound to exclude some ethnic groups, particularly those living in peripheral regions with very few links into the national political elites circles. The exclusion of these groups can sow the seeds of deadly subnational conflict.

This study is timely. In Myanmar/Burma, for example, the international community is ramping up assistance to support the peace process, and will likely be moving this assistance into the subnational conflict areas at a significant scale over the next few years. In Southern Thailand, an area that the study focuses on extensively, the government has initiated a fledgling peace process with significant potential for international support should the process move forward. In Mindanao, another area that the report features, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) is leading to a new generation of aid programs to the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao, and an enormous opportunity for the international community to shore-up a desperately needed peace agreement.

The report provides fresh and useful insights on how foreign aid can better help to address these long-running conflicts. The case studies show that development actors can make a major contribution if they invest in better understanding of local conflict dynamics, and can strategically target their programs to address transformative issues. There are limits to what aid can do – the transition from war to durable peace must be domestically driven through more inclusive political processes, and foreign aid can only play a supporting role.

Nevertheless, our findings provide many reasons to be optimistic about the role of the development community in areas of conflict. International development actors are becoming more sophisticated in their understanding of conflict, and with some reforms that allow for greater internal space and program flexibility, there will be many opportunities for development assistance to play a key role in ending these long-running conflicts.

“The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance” was supported by funding from the State and Peacebuilding Fund, administered by the World Bank, and UK Aid.

Thomas Parks is The Asia Foundation’s regional director for Conflict and Governance based in Thailand. He can be reached at tparks@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Despite some tentative new signs that point to improved relations and potential for trade between South Asia’s biggest economies – India and Pakistan – the region remains poorly integrated economically, with intraregional trade dreadfully low, hovering at less than 5 percent of total trade. This is attributable to several key factors including protectionist trade regimes, weak connectivity, poor infrastructure, low levels of cross-border investment, the presence of non-tariff barriers, and of course the ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan.

Despite some tentative new signs that point to improved relations and potential for trade between South Asia’s biggest economies – India and Pakistan – the region remains poorly integrated economically, with intraregional trade at less than 5 percent of total trade. Photo/Flickr user Mr. Matt

A new poll of Indian public opinion, conducted by the Australian think-tank Lowy Institute for International Policy and the Australia India Institute, reveals that while Indians do want increased trade in the region, this may not necessarily include trade with Pakistan. The poll shows that 71 percent of Indians agree that India and its South Asian neighbors would benefit from free trade, and that this would make the region more peaceful. However, the data indicates that 94 percent of people in India regard Pakistan as a threat to national security, and a large majority (84 percent) considers the Indo-Pak relationship to be very weak.

Recently, there have been signs of improvement in this relationship. Last week, Pakistan’s trade minister announced that they may soon grant most favored nation (MFN) status to India. Though this is not confirmed yet, it would give India the same rights and privileges afforded by all its other trading partners. In September 2012, a new visa agreement was signed between the two countries to facilitate cross-border travel. Further, in the past year, India’s exports to Pakistan have increased by almost 15 percent, while imports from Pakistan have risen about 30 percent. Now is the time to build upon this recent momentum and rally for a boost in Indo-Pak trade.

Although both countries have a historical trust deficit and their relationship continues to be complicated, successful and mutually beneficial trade between India and Pakistan is an indispensable component of increased intraregional trade. According to the Consumer Unity Trust Society (CUTS) International, India has the potential to gain about $80 million in cheaper imports from Pakistan in about 13 categories of products. Even more notably, Pakistan stands to gain about $1.4 billion in about nine categories.

An improvement in Indo-Pak economic relations requires the building of political will to overcome historical tensions and mistrust between the two nations. It also requires including relevant stakeholders such as business owners and civil society in the conversation on regional trade. A common complaint is that there are many non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that have been hindering trade between India and Pakistan, and at the regional level. NTBs are barriers to trade other than traditional tariff barriers, such as visa restrictions or bureaucratic corruption, for example. The presence of NTBs is widely acknowledged throughout South Asia and contributes to the low percentage of intraregional trade. A study conducted by CUTS International and supported by The Asia Foundation shows that South Asian consumers are foregoing nearly $3 billion a year of aggregate minimum consumer welfare due to the presence of NTBs. This is over and above the $2 billion each year that consumers are losing out on from tariffs being imposed on their neighbors on selected product categories. These tariff and non-tariff barriers make the cost of trading with neighbors much more costly than they would otherwise be, to the extent that trading with partners outside the region is often far more cost-effective. And, the consumer is losing out.

Along with our partner organizations from Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, The Asia Foundation has identified some broad measures that, if taken, would reduce or remove these barriers to a large extent. These include: raising awareness and transparency of procedures, achieving new reforms to address legal and administrative hurdles, and regional harmonization of standards and clearance documents.

Ultimately, it is the people of South Asia who are bearing the brunt of the cost of economic non-cooperation in the region, and this must change in order for the region to grow economically and reduce poverty. On a positive note, the Lowy poll also found that 89 percent of Indians agree that ordinary people in both India and Pakistan want peace, and 72 percent identify trade and economic cooperation as a way to help bring about peace with Pakistan.

Diya Nag is a program officer in The Asia Foundation’s India office. She can be reached at dnag@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

On June 13 in Washington, D.C., Thomas Parks, report author and the Foundation’s regional director for conflict and governance, will present the findings at a panel discussion including Dr. Nat Colletta, lead report expert, USAID’s Judith Dunbar; New York University’s Dr. Bruce Jones, and The World Bank’s Ingo Wiederhofer. On June 17, Parks will participate in another panel at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco, with panelists Nils Gilman of Monitor 360, and Ben Oppenheim, a fellow at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation. The authors will continue on to London, Oslo, Tokyo, and Canberra. Read more.

This study has been co-financed by the State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) of the World Bank, and UK Aid from the UK Government.

The horrific collapse three weeks ago of an eight-story garment factory building in Savar, just outside of Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, took the lives of more than 1,100 people, and was followed just last week by a deadly fire in another garment factory that left at least eight dead.

The garment sector in Bangladesh accounts for about 80 percent of the country’s exports and employs more than 3 million people. Photo/Conor Ashleigh

The tragedies have left a nation in mourning, shining a spotlight on the lack of safety for garment sector workers in Bangladesh. These incidents have drawn international attention on the urgent need for better working conditions for workers, starting with safer, more secure buildings.

While these events may serve as an immediate eye opener for consumers and manufacturers in the west, the critical need to improve factory safety in the readymade garment sector in Bangladesh should not come as a surprise. The country has long been under scrutiny because of recurrent industrial accidents that point to poor working conditions and poor safety standards in some of the country’s factories. Voices from within (including international buyers and local factory owners) and outside of the industry (international donors and civil society) have repeatedly called for measures to be taken to improve factory safety.

The death toll of what is one of the largest industrial accidents in Bangladesh fully justifies national and international outcries and the ire of the customers and business community, demanding that strong commitments and measures are taken. However, the worst thing that could happen to the readymade sector in Bangladesh, and to the millions of workers whose livelihoods depend on exports to western countries, is to see the label “made in Bangladesh” boycotted by consumers.

After China, Bangladesh is the world’s second-largest apparel exporter. The garment sector accounts for about 80 percent of the country’s exports and employs more than 3 million people, mostly women. If it is true that cheap labor is the main driver of the sector’s growth, it is also fair to say that this growth has provided economic opportunities to millions of women who would have very few other options to escape extreme poverty. The garment sector, despite what seems like an extremely-low paying industry in western standards, has positively transformed the lives of many women in Bangladesh.

Maintaining the livelihood of the workers and their families should, however, never be to the detriment of their safety. Strong commitments need to be made and measures implemented not only to improve safety, but to make safety and decent working conditions the heart of the industry’s competitive advantage. This is not only the responsibility of the employers; it is the responsibility of each of the players in the value-chain: consumers, international buyers, leaders of the garment sector and professional associations, Bangladesh’s government, the international community, the civil society, and the workers themselves.

Consumers have an essential role to play in requesting information on the conditions in which their clothes are produced and in putting pressure on brands to better control the working conditions in the factories they are sourcing from. Western retailers are, of course, well positioned to press for reform, and to impose good working conditions as a prerequisite for their orders, before considering the price. Many world-famous brands have already called for more stringent labour safety standards. On May 8, the U.S. Department of Labor and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative convened a conference call with U.S. buyers in Bangladesh’s garment industry to discuss U.S. government engagement to improve workers’ rights and working conditions, and to review how the private sector can assist in these vital ongoing efforts.

The question now is whether these “good words” will translate into effective action with real and sustainable results.

The different parties have already put forward some suggestions and resolutions, including the need for independent safety and fire inspectors, the requirement that factories are certified by a group of engineers, and the establishment of a “Corrective Action Plan” (CAP) which the manufacturer will have to fulfill, among others. Nobel Peace Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus also suggested in an op-ed in the Dhaka Tribune on May 9, the establishment of a Garment Workers Welfare Trust and of a “good compliance label” that consumers could reference as a guarantee for labor compliance. On Monday, Bangladesh’s cabinet approved changes to the nation’s labor laws that are expected to increase the benefits for garment workers and make it easier to form trade unions.

Another recommendation is to draw from the experience of Better Factories Cambodia, a program managed by the International Labour Organization, in close collaboration with the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia (GMAC) and the country’s trade unions. The program aims to improve working conditions in Cambodia’s export garment factories and combines independent monitoring with finding solutions, through suggestions to management, training, advice, and information. In Bangladesh, the implementation of such a program would require four key elements:

• that international buyers join forces with the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) to advocate for the immediate passage of labour law amendments to lay the basis for the establishment of such a program;

• that Bangladesh’s government shows a strong political will to enforce the labour laws and a strong commitment to international labour compliance;

• that workers are more organized (which implies greater freedom of association), better informed and included in the design and implementation of the program, and;

• that the BGMEA, the government, civil society, and labour groups coordinate efforts with each other and with the international community.

Only a large mobilization of all parties can help ensure that tragedies of this kind don’t happen again. All parties need to send a clear message to factory owners that decent working conditions is a prerequisite for sourcing products from Bangladesh, or from any other country in the world. In the near future, consumers need to buy “made in Bangladesh” clothes, not “despite” the bad working conditions of some of its factories, but “because” of a clear commitment of its whole industry to meet international standards.

Sadly, it is too late for the hundreds of workers who perished in the tragedy of Savar, but what better testimony to their memory than to learn from this tragedy and use it to drive safety standards and changes in attitude that will lead to a safer, more just garment industry.

Véronique Salze-Lozac’h is The Asia Foundation’s director for Economic Development Programs based in Bangkok. She can be reached at veronique.salze-lozach@asiafoundation.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

These were the elections which many did not expect to see in Pakistan. Despite persistent and widespread rumors right up until the actual day of elections that they would be cancelled or postponed, Pakistan’s General Elections took place as scheduled on May 11. Around 50 million citizens took part in this historical event: the first time (with the new federal government expected to assume office at the beginning of June) that a successful transition from one democratically elected government to another has taken place. The turnout was the highest since 1970, as millions defied terrorist threats of polling day violence, already the bloodiest election campaign in the country’s history, and bravely waited in line to vote. Violence did disrupt elections in a few parts of the country, notably in Karachi, and contests in some polling stations will be re-run. But in the great majority of constituencies, polling took place peacefully.

According to early figures, almost 60 percent of the 86 million registered voters cast their votes in the 2013 elections, and while detailed gender disaggregated data are not yet available, female participation in the electoral process is reportedly higher than in the past. Photo/DFID

According to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), almost 60 percent of the 86 million registered voters cast their votes in the 2013 General Elections, and while detailed gender disaggregated data are not yet available, female participation in the electoral process, both as candidates and voters, is reportedly higher than in the past. Overall, the elections attracted double the number of candidates compared to 2008, and although pre-poll violence targeted some parties more than others, hampering their campaigning and throwing the “level playing field” into doubt, the issues at stake in today’s Pakistan clearly galvanized an unexpectedly large number of citizens to cast their votes. Civil society organizations supplemented official efforts to register voters, particularly women, and spearheaded voter education.

A young Pakistani voter displays the distinct ink-mark that signifies she voted.

But the greater engagement of the electorate in the polls, the large participation of younger and other first-time voters, the official recognition, among the most marginalized of groups, of transgender voters and the many debates and discussions among friends, workmates and even family members, attest to the increasing interest among the citizens of Pakistan in the political process and to more serious efforts by the political parties to reach out to them. Of course, there are still improvements that can be made to ensure that future elections are run more smoothly and engage an even greater range and diversity of Pakistan’s population. For example, more needs to be done to enable and encourage women to vote – there are still polling stations where no female votes were recorded, reports that women were actively barred in a few areas, and the number of successful female candidates remains very small.

Allegations of poll rigging have been made, and at the time of writing, a large number of cases are before the ECP. It may take time to resolve these, but the evidence of the 41,000 observers deployed throughout the country by member organizations of the Free & Fair Elections Network (FAFEN), currently being sifted and collated, will be crucial in determining just how free and fair the elections have been. But as voters proudly display the indelible ink-mark on their thumbs which prove that they have voted, and many have their individual stories to tell about how they came to vote as they did, one voice lingers vividly in the mind:  “Today I am a proud Pakistani –in spite of all the difficulties, these elections did take place, and that gives ground for hope.”

Gareth Aicken is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Pakistan and Ameena Ilahi is the deputy country representative there. They can be reached at gaicken@asiafound.org and ailahi@asiafound.org, respectively. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual authors and not those of The Asia Foundation.

In the lead up to the Philippine midterm elections on May 13, the Philippine National Police (PNP) identified 15 provinces as priority areas where there was a risk of election violence. These areas have a history of intense political contestations and recorded election-related violent incidents, which are further exacerbated by the presence of private armed groups, loose firearms, organized crime, and other threat groups. During the campaign period until the day of the elections, recorded incidents of election violence totaled 81, which involved shootings (67 of the 81 cases), explosions, ambush, grenade throwing, strafing, and harassment.

A police officer distributes pieces of paper containing verified names of voters at the Pagagawan Elementary School in Datu Montawal town, Maguindano Province on election day. MindaNews Photo by Ruby Thursday More

The PNP and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) heightened their presence in advance of elections, and also on the day of elections at polling stations and across towns in these areas to ensure peaceful, orderly, safe, and fair elections. They formed a Joint Security Coordinating Center to coordinate activities for the Secure and Fair Elections (SAFE) 2013 program. They sustained their campaign against private armed groups, intensified checkpoint operations, and strictly implemented the gun ban.

The PNP also conducted several peace caravans, a unity walk, media activities, and an information drive. Upon the orders of PNP Chief Director General, Alan Purisima, the PNP initiated peace covenants between rival parties. The Asia Foundation’s local partners were instrumental in facilitating peace covenants in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

To help strengthen the partnership between PNP and the local civil society groups in the ARMM ahead of the elections, The Asia Foundation convened top-level PNP officers with Mindanao-based NGOs in a conference to address election violence in Cotabato City in January 2013. The event was hailed as a milestone because it was the first time that civil society-PNP engagement had been this extensive in strategizing to prevent election violence in advance. Aside from a series of peace covenant signings, the PNP and civil society groups were able to identify and jointly implement feasible interventions in anticipation of election-related violence that may occur in their respective areas. Through the Foundation’s support, PNP-civil society engagements included the conduct of regional and provincial peace summits on election monitoring as well as trainings on early warning and early response which led to the formation of several ad hoc groups that were tasked to conduct preliminary and responsive actions to avert and reduce the incidents of election-related violence in close coordination with other deputized agencies of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) whose duties are to guarantee the security of the whole election proceedings.

This was followed by a Strategic Communication Workshop in February 2013 to assist the police force at the national and regional offices on how to effectively communicate the critical facets of SAFE 2013 and generate public support in safeguarding the electoral process.

Despite prevailing efforts, several issues created anxiety among both the PNP and the local partners as they worked together during the critical pre-election period. In addition to the problems related to the delay in the delivery or possible malfunctions of Precinct Count Optical Scan machines, other practical issues were cited to provoke violence during electoral contests. These included the limited capacity of the PNP to secure some areas where management of security is highly contested; technical problems in the polling process where some allies and supporters of families with rido (clan violence) meet each other in one polling precinct; and the tendency for criminality and lawlessness to ride on election hype that could eventually sabotage the election processes. The complexity of these localized conflicts combined with limited capacity in the state security apparatus accounts for the unpredictability of election-related violence incidence in ARMM, which may then be the reason for the discrepancy in the list of election hotspots provided by COMELEC during elections.

In Lanao del Sur province, for instance, where most towns are included in the list of election areas of concern due to rido, election watchdogs and security forces considered the May 13 Election Day as the most peaceful so far in the history of the province with only seven casualties involved, one of which resulted in death. It is important to recognize that while this particular achievement can be attributed to the strong presence of the civil society, security forces of the 103rd Philippine Army Brigade covering around 40 towns in the province had also acknowledged the contribution of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the success. Lanao del Sur has several areas – prominent is the Camp Bushra in Butig – that are dominated by MILF. The signing of the guidelines for mutual understanding for ceasefire-related functions on May 13 between the government and MILF peace panels held in April 2013 have certainly defined the ground movement and behavior of each parties at the onset of Election Day, especially in extreme locations where lines between civilians and combatants can seem blurred.

The leadership of the PNP and AFP are one in saying that the midterm elections were generally peaceful. Civil society groups echo similar assessment. However, we do not want to be caught off guard. As much us we Filipinos value our right of suffrage, we put greater premium on the lives of people who have every right to live in peaceful communities. With the counting of final electoral results still underway and the election period still not over until June 12, 2013, the PNP and AFP, together with civil society, remain vigilant.

Nadine Ragonjan is a program officer and Haironesah Domado is an assistant program officer for The Asia Foundation in the Philippines. They can be reached at nragonjan@asiafound.org and hyro@asiafound.org, respectively. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual authors and not those of The Asia Foundation.