In Asia: Weekly Insight and Features from Asia

Since Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil war ended in 2009, we’re now witnessing the beginning of reconstruction in the country’s battered North and East. The government is rapidly investing in roads, rail, ports, and telecommunications that help connect marginalized communities with the vibrant, growing capital of Colombo. Meanwhile, the local economy is coming to life, and small businesses – typically on the margins of the private sector – are eager to take advantage of their long pent-up demand to grow their businesses. This is welcome news for people that have endured so much, but there are of course still challenges.

After a 30-year war that has rewarded Sri Lanka's banks and enterprises for playing it safe, they are hesitant to take on risk by offering loans to small businesses. Recently, however, new initiatives are reviving trust between banks and businesses owners. Photo: Karl Grobl.

“The small and medium enterprise sector is the backbone of the Sri Lankan economy – even more so in the North and East,” Anushka Wijesinha, Research Economist at Sri Lanka’s Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) who has been studying access to credit, recently said to me. “The majority of large businesses continue to take a wait-and-see approach, but it’s the small businesses that are ready to take some risks.”

Unfortunately, as ready as the smaller businesses are to take these risks, they lack the collateral needed to do so. Micro and small business owners constantly say how difficult it is for them to even get credit to expand their business, for example. Most small businesses can’t meet banks’ collateral requirements to get a loan, even though Sri Lanka’s financial system is flush with more liquidity than ever, due to lower interest rates and government policies and programs that are meant to push credit down to the grassroots.

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Just yesterday, on November 15 in Kabul and Washington, D.C., The Asia Foundation released the results of its 2011 Survey of the Afghan People.

The annual Survey of the Afghan People is the most comprehensive and credible nationwide poll of public opinion on topics related to national mood, governance, security, and development in Afghanistan. In 2011, the survey polled over 6,300 respondents from all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.

The Asia Foundation interviewed 6,348 adult Afghans, across all 34 provinces of Afghanistan in face-to-face interviews for the 2011 Survey. Above, surveyors poll a resident in Bamyan Province.

With funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), The Asia Foundation has implemented the survey since 2004. Over this period, the survey has generated a treasure trove of data and information, and the changes over time in the views and mindset of the people of Afghanistan.

The opinions of average Afghans matter a great deal in a country that continues to face enormous challenges in governance, security, and livelihoods. Good understanding among national leaders and international “influencers” of the views of the general population are also crucial as the struggling nation attempts to define its national vision while being buffeted by the inconstant waves of international intervention and regional competition.

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In Asia’s editor, Alma Freeman, interviewed 2011 Survey of the Afghan People co-author and former Asia Foundation program director for Law, Human Rights, and Women’s Empowerment in Kabul, Najla Ayubi, for her reaction to the findings of The Asia Foundation’s 2011 Survey and what they might mean for women’s rights, peace talks, and more. Ayubi is currently the Afghanistan country director for the Open Society Foundation.

As a survey author, what surprised you most about this year’s findings?

The high support for peace and reconciliation was a very surprising and important finding in this year’s survey. It’s surprising to see that 82 percent of the people support peace and reconciliation, which has interesting implications for the peace process. I also found it surprising that 74 percent of the respondents said they have confidence in religious leaders and 70 percent of respondents say that religious leaders should be consulted on problems facing an area. Also, 46 percent say that the country is going in the right direction, and only 35 percent say it is going in the wrong direction. That’s positive news, but since last year, the percentage of people who think the country is going in the wrong direction has increased by 8 percent. In 2009, that figure was 29 percent. To me, this reveals an unstable attitude of the people on whether their country is moving in the right direction.

Women respondents report lower levels of support than men for reconciliation with armed opposition groups. What do you make of this?

Women have been marginalized by the Taliban and other armed opposition groups for decades. That’s why woman don’t have much empathy for the armed opposition groups, and are not as supportive as men for the so called peace and reconciliation process which is going on with the government. In many cases, they feel they won’t get any benefit from this type of negotiation – specifically, they worry their rights will be compromised, and for me as an Afghan woman, I’m also afraid that my rights will be compromised during these peace talks. Two of the biggest issues that affect women’s lives here are the lack of freedom of movement to work outside of the home and access to education. In the current peace talks, how this will be factored in is totally up in the air. It’s very clear that women support peace, but not the kind of approach that risks compromising their rights.

Also, women are only symbolically part of the peace talks: some women have been put in high-level positions, like at the High Peace Council or at the local, provincial level in peace talk committees, but they aren’t able to actually represent women’s voices and interests there. For example, some of the women representatives in the High Peace Council have said that in many cases when there is a peace talk trip inside of the country, they are not allowed to be part of the delegation. The male representatives say that due to the security situation, women aren’t able to come. But this makes me ask, if the security is a problem for women, why is it not a problem for men? If the men can go and be protected by security forces, then why can’t the same be done for women? It’s more of a stereotype or patriarchal thinking that women are not eligible to be in peace talks rather than anything having to do with their ability.

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Religious leaders received the highest vote of confidence and optimism of the Afghan people among local governance institutions, according to The Asia Foundation’s 2011 Survey of the Afghan People. Seventy percent of respondents say that there should be regular consultation with religious leaders about problems in their area, while 74 percent rank religious leaders as one of the three most trusted institutions. This trend is the highest since 2006, when 61 percent of respondents said there should be regular consultation with religious leaders.

In Afghanistan’s history, the only consistent, “24-7″ local governance institution available to the public has been the religious leaders, known as mullahs or imams. They are positioned in the heart of each village and community in the Masjid (mosque) which exists in every village and even in some larger houses. In fact, one cannot find a single village and community in the country where there is no Masjid. As such, religious leaders have played a critical role in all stages of an Afghan’s life – from childhood to adult. When a child is first born, her first move from the cradle is to see an imam who recites the words of Azan into the child’s ears. When a child is 2-3 years old, she starts going regularly to the Masjid to learn the Quran and other faith-related books from religious leaders. A new marriage is not complete until the imam confirms the marriage contract between the bride and groom. Religious leaders also read letters from far-flung family members for people who can’t read. Finally, an imam is the last one to speak at a funeral ceremony.

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Last week, Nepal’s political parties reached agreement on the future of 19,602 Maoist ex-combatants, breaking years of political log jam. In Asia spoke with Asia Foundation Nepal country representative, George Varughese, on the implications for political progress, reactions on the street, and how this agreement rescued the peace process from collapse.

What effect will this agreement – which some observers describe as “historic” – have on moving Nepal’s peace process forward?

This agreement is indeed historic for some important reasons. First, the Maoist party had been living with a strategic contradiction over whether to fully embrace the course of peace and a new constitution while also hewing to revolutionary rhetoric and dogma. With this agreement, the Maoist party establishment overcame this internal dilemma despite serious resistance from its radical faction. Second, given that November 21 will be the five-year anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and that the Constituent Assembly will have exceeded its original mandate of two years by one and half years by then, the original enthusiasm for negotiations, ownership over the peace process, and people’s general faith in the political process has gradually eroded. If this agreement had not taken place when it did, there was a real risk of collapse of the peace process and of the constitution drafting exercise. The November 1 agreement has rescued the process from potential collapse and rekindled hope in the average Nepali.

Agreement on the numbers for integration, norms, modality, and rehabilitation packages constituted one of the most contentious issues of the peace process. The effect will be far-reaching on both the progress of the peace process as well as on holding the parties accountable.

The latest deadline for a new constitution is up in less than a month. Does this deal bring the nation closer to a constitution?

Despite last week’s 7-point agreement, the parties are not likely to come up with a new constitution by the November 30 deadline. At best, they will have resolved the manner in which to deal with the most contentious issues in constitutional deliberations while tendering a less-than-complete draft constitution. This means the parties are likely to extend the tenure of the Constituent Assembly for another six months or so in order to have a complete draft available for debate within and outside the Assembly.

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Over the past 90 days, the peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been through the best of times and the worst of times. At the beginning of August, President Noynoy Aquino met MILF Chairman Murad; a couple of weeks later the MILF peace panel “rejected” a government draft presented to them in Kuala Lumpur; subsequent to that, the Malaysian Facilitator undertook shuttle diplomacy to arrange another meeting early in November. In the meantime, a breakaway MILF leader was expelled from the MILF; there was fighting in Western Mindanao; and considerable controversy over government casualties suffered in that conflict. This second set of occurrences demonstrates how important progress in the peace process can be, so that events do not spiral out of control as they did in 2008 when hundreds of thousands were displaced in the wake of violence following the MOA-AD debacle.

This “interesting” (in the purported Chinese curse sense of “may you live in interesting times”) period began with President Noynoy’s insistence on meeting privately with MILF Chairman Murad. President Aquino’s mother, Cory, had met when she was president with Nur Misuari, chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). While she met Misuari on his home island of Sulu, the current president’s meeting with Chairman Murad took place in Japan, one of the countries in the International Contact Group, comprised of a select number of countries and international NGOs (including The Asia Foundation) tasked with supporting peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF to end conflict in Mindanao. By all accounts the meeting went well, with the MILF professing itself convinced of President Aquino’s sincerity.

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On September 20, former president and head of Afghanistan’s peace process, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, received an urgent call while in Dubai: Taliban leaders were ready to talk peace, he was told, and he rushed back to his home in Kabul. Moments later, he was assassinated by a suicide bomber posing as the supposed Taliban negotiator.

The death of Professor Rabbani, leader of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, generated anxiety among government officials, civil society, and citizens about what this loss would mean for the nation’s long and struggling 10-year-old peace process. Many called the tragedy “a devastating blow” to the prospects of reconciliation in the country.

Against this backdrop, weeks later on October 2-3, The Asia Foundation brought together civil society members, government representatives, and community members including teachers, doctors, farmers and others, from 15 provinces for a frank, inclusive discussion about where the peace process stands and what can be done to move it forward. Certainly, the late Rabbani’s absence was not forgotten; but after discussions were underway, it was clear that participants were determined, perhaps now more than ever, to have their voices heard on how their nation finds peace and security.

In fact, this national conference was nearly six months in the making: Beginning in May last year, with the support of the European Union, The Asia Foundation started the first of six 2-day regional peace consultation workshops in Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar, Bamyan, Helmand, and Kabul, to identify the gaps in peace interventions, complement overall national peace efforts, examine the potential, greater role of civil society, strengthen the capacity of communities to engage in conflict resolution at the local level, and share experiences.

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Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s controversial off-the-cuff remarks made earlier this month on the influence of conservative Islamic groups on the Bangladesh polity, led the Indian government to announce immediately – quite contrary to diplomatic practice – his much-awaited visit to Dhaka on September 6-7. His visit was high on the agenda at the recent Dialogue on India-Bangladesh relations, sponsored by The Asia Foundation, between India’s Kunzru Centre for Defence and Research and the Center for Foreign Affairs Studies in Dhaka. At the dialogue, attended by international affairs experts on the region,  both sides agreed that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit must lay down a vision and guiding principles for the harmonious development of India-Bangladesh’s relations in the future.

Since the last visit in 1997 by Indian Prime Minister Gujral, the relationship has moved forward in a spasmodic manner with little trust built between the two countries. Indeed, most of the problems present when Bangladesh was created in 1971 still remain, such as disputed maritime boundaries and water resources, and a lack of trade concessions and facilitation. Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s January 2010 visit to New Delhi took concrete steps in finding solutions to these issues. Last year, India extended its landmark $1 billion line of credit to Bangladesh, primarily to upgrade its road and rail connectivity to India. In line with that agreement, Bangladesh has taken steps in countering anti-Indian insurgent groups along its borders. It now looks to India to meet its commitments on other outstanding issues. Only in the last few months following Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukharji’s visit have some of the projects from the credit loan started in real earnest. Only through speedy delivery of these projects will it be possible for the two sides to ward off the negativity in the relationship and encourage a more bipartisan view in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s population now stands at close to 150 million and will double in the next 50 years. At the same time, effects from climate change, such as rising sea level, threaten to flood low-lying delta land along the Meghna, Ganges, and Brahmaputra rivers, putting pressure on land and swelling economic migrants who continue to illegally enter India. According to latest census figures, India’s population is at 1.2 billion and growing. Both countries have a huge youth bulge.

Rising sea levels threaten to flood low-lying delta land along the Meghna, Ganges, and Brahmaputra rivers, putting pressure on land and swelling economic migrants who continue to leave Bangladesh for India. Photo by Srabani Roy.

To further improve the India-Bangladesh relationship, the governments will also have to address two important perceptions: that India gives too much attention to only one neighbor – Pakistan – to Bangladesh’s detriment; and second, the imperative that forward-looking relations require bipartisan support within the two countries. While in India this is not an issue, in Bangladesh it still remains elusive. The continuing feeling of neglect in the Bangladeshi psyche despite a discernable positive movement in the last two years is a matter for concern in New Delhi. Nevertheless, Indian Foreign Minister Krishna’s visit to Dhaka early this month was well received and started the process of changing this sentiment.

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Thailand’s political landscape throughout much of the 20th century was populated by numerous regional or personality-based parties, and characterized by weak coalition governments. Alliances and coalitions were made and broken easily, as parties sought the best deal for their constituents and members. In contrast, the 21st century has been characterized by what seems to be an increasingly polarized electorate, and the rapid emergence of a de facto two-party system.

Supporters of Pheu Thai Party leader Yingluck Shinawatra. Photo by Chandler Vandergrift.

Over the last decade, the potential influence of smaller regional parties has declined, while the total percentage of seats won by the two biggest parties has steadily increased, as the chart below illustrates.

Thailand has a 500-seat legislature and a mixed electoral system, with typically 400 seats elected from geographical constituencies, and 100 elected through proportional representation from party lists. In the 2011 election, there were 375 constituency seats and 125 seats allocated from party lists. The two largest parties for each of the four elections since 2001 were the Democrat Party and Thai Rak Thai (2001, 2005), or its successors the People Power Party (2007) and Pheu Thai (2011). The blue line represents the percentage of seats won by these two parties through the party list vote, and the red line the percentage of constituency seats won.

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Contrary to the predictions made by the plethora of political pundits watching Thailand’s elections that the Democrats would have difficulty holding their five current seats in Thailand’s Deep South, the Democrats instead ran away with nine out of 11 constituent seats. This has led many to ask: Can the Democrats’ win in the region be interpreted as the people’s clear desire to see the government stay the course and support the return of the Southern Boarder Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC)? Or, was the poor showing by supporters of the Pheu Thai Party, led by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, a reflection of voters’ rejection of Thaksin’s policies, which in 2004, helped to reignite Thailand’s violent conflict in the Deep South?

The political pendulum in the area has swung back and forth in recent elections, with the Democrats securing 11 of the region’s 12 seats in 2005, only to lose all but five in 2007. While its latest victory looks convincing on the surface if you look at winning constituent seats, a detailed analysis of voter count shows another story. Rather than solidly leaning toward the Democrats, vote counts revealed a tight race in a number of constituencies, with the Democrats capturing far less than half of the popular votes in most areas. For example, in constituency 2 of Yala, the Democrat candidate’s victory over the Pheu Thai incumbent was less than 300 votes. In Constituencies 3 and 4 of Narathiwat, the Democrat Party received less than 35 percent of the votes, narrowly edging out Chart Thai Patthana and Matubhum, respectively. Even in Constituency 1 of Pattani, traditionally a Democrat stronghold, Bhumjaithai and Matubhum returned strong results with the Democrat incumbent winning by less than 5,000 votes. Rather than reflecting a convergence of voters’ views and interests, the July 3 election instead highlights fractures within the communities and thus, the inherent difficulty of finding a durable solution to the long-running conflict.

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