Now, citizens and pundits alike are watching how her administration moves forward on critical issues such as public services allocation, debate around her brother’s involvement in decision-making, reconciliation, the conflict in the South, and more. In this context, The Asia Foundation’s Thailand country representative, Kim McQuay, visiting from Bangkok, will lead a breakfast discussion at the Foundation’s D.C. office tomorrow about the aftermath of the election, perceptions of the new government’s performance so far, and prospects for reconciliation in the country overall. The Foundation’s director of International Relations Programs, John Brandon, will moderate.

During Thailand’s elections, In Asia featured extensive, on-the-ground election coverage and analysis from Asia Foundation experts. Watch a slideshow that captures campaign season fervor and election-day activities, taken by Asia Foundation photographers.

Last week, Thailand made history when its parliament elected its first-ever woman Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, one month after her Pheu Thai party swept the July 3 elections. However, Prime Minister Yingluck’s ability to rise to the top of Thailand’s political echelon is not because of her political acumen. In fact, before last week she had never held political office. But she possesses an extraordinary familial political pedigree as the younger sister of the controversial former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a military coup in 2006.

Despite being a political novice, Prime Minister Yingluck led her Pheu Thai party to victory July 3. Photo by Chandler Vandergrift.

Despite being a political novice, Prime Minister Yingluck led her Pheu Thai party to victory, winning 265 of 500 seats in the House of Representatives. After its victory, Pheu Thai formed a coalition with five other parties totaling 300 seats, demonstrating a willingness to share power with smaller parties. The only other time in Thai political history that a party won an outright majority was when her brother was prime minister.

While Prime Minister Yingluck and the Pheu Thai won a decisive victory, no one should hold any illusions that the election will end five years of political instability in Thailand. Since the July 3 elections, calm seems to have settled, as every political party has called for national reconciliation. However, deep political cleavages are not far from the surface between the government and Thailand’s established elite.

The new prime minister’s older brother remains a polarizing figure – loved by the majority of the rural masses and urban wage earners and loathed by the middle class, the military, and others in the nation’s traditional political hierarchy. Thaksin, who was convicted in absentia in 2008 of corruption and abuse of power, has made it clear that he wants to return to Thailand at some point. He spends most of his time in exile in Dubai. The prospect that Thaksin could return to Thailand as a free man is anathema to the country’s political establishment. It will be interesting to see how patient Thaksin will be in returning to Thailand and how all of this will be negotiated with the elite, particularly the military who deposed him five years ago.

Given the election results, the question is not if Thaksin will return to Thailand, but if his return could spark a significant reaction by those who so vehemently disapprove of him that they take to the streets in protest? A resumption of protests, particularly by the “yellow shirts” – those who support the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) – could make it difficult for the Pheu Thai government to govern effectively. In response, the pro-Thaksin “red shirts” who overwhelmingly supported Yingluck and the Pheu Thai party could return to the streets, thereby reviving the cycle of partisan protest that has plagued the nation since 2006. Under such a scenario, Thailand’s political elite could be put in the unenviable position to choose between supporting the current elected government or the protesters.

In the campaign leading up to the election, the Pheu Thai promised many populist policies that appealed to their core supporters. One of the most popular policies was to introduce a standard daily minimum wage of 300 Thai baht ($10), which would rise to 1,000 baht ($33) per day by 2020. Although promised a cut in the corporate tax rate, businesses are concerned about the effect that a large increase in wages would have on the nation’s inflation, productivity, and competitiveness. Yingluck’s government has backed off this pledge a bit over the last few days, saying the new minimum wage would be increased only in Bangkok and Phuket, but has left unclear when the new minimum wage might be applied to the rest of the country. As the Pheu Thai’s strongest support comes from the nation’s poorest region, the Northeast, its supporters may feel Yingluck’s government is not honoring one of its most important campaign promises.

Despite the current calm, these are very challenging times for Thailand. Time will tell how Prime Minister Yingluck will handle the numerous competing interests and pressures that even the most experienced of Thai politicians would find daunting.

John J. Brandon is the director of The Asia Foundation’s International Relations Programs in Washington, D.C. From 1978-1981, he taught English in Bangkok and Songkhla, Thailand, and visits the country regularly. Brandon can be reached at jbrandon@asiafound-dc.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation. 

Thailand’s political landscape throughout much of the 20th century was populated by numerous regional or personality-based parties, and characterized by weak coalition governments. Alliances and coalitions were made and broken easily, as parties sought the best deal for their constituents and members. In contrast, the 21st century has been characterized by what seems to be an increasingly polarized electorate, and the rapid emergence of a de facto two-party system.

Supporters of Pheu Thai Party leader Yingluck Shinawatra. Photo by Chandler Vandergrift.

Over the last decade, the potential influence of smaller regional parties has declined, while the total percentage of seats won by the two biggest parties has steadily increased, as the chart below illustrates.

Thailand has a 500-seat legislature and a mixed electoral system, with typically 400 seats elected from geographical constituencies, and 100 elected through proportional representation from party lists. In the 2011 election, there were 375 constituency seats and 125 seats allocated from party lists. The two largest parties for each of the four elections since 2001 were the Democrat Party and Thai Rak Thai (2001, 2005), or its successors the People Power Party (2007) and Pheu Thai (2011). The blue line represents the percentage of seats won by these two parties through the party list vote, and the red line the percentage of constituency seats won.

Several influences may have contributed to this trend. In political theory, Duverger’s Law suggests that majoritarian election systems in general contribute to the emergence of two-party systems, and since Thailand’s mixed system is predominantly majoritarian, this may have been a contributing factor, but perhaps not the most significant. Based on survey research conducted by The Asia Foundation in 2009 and 2010, we found that much of this trend can be attributed to an evolving political conscientiousness in the Thai electorate, and indicates a society in transition from a traditional patron/client or feudal political understanding to a more modern and ideological political consciousness.

In the traditional system, voters’ ties to political leaders were personal and characterized by the patron/client compact. Small parties centered on local notables were the norm – representing the traditional feudal elite, and voters dutifully followed their patrons as they changed parties and coalitions. But around the turn of the century this compact began to break down. First, Thaksin Shinawatra realized he could bypass the traditional feudal hierarchy and use mass media to appeal directly to the people, and offer them a better deal than they could get from their local patron. In effect, Thaksin became a sort of super patron, and in some sense mimicking or usurping the role played by the monarchy in the feudal system.

Although Thaksin’s populism sparked the transition, it was the opposition to Thaksin that has contributed most to the development of the two-party system. The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) was an umbrella group for opponents of Thaksin from any party, and over time, this group developed a coherent and unifying ideology centered on support for the monarchy, clean government (counter-corruption), and support for participatory rather than electoral democracy. This became the very successful “Yellow Movement.” In response to this success, Thaksin’s supporters set up the “Red Movement,” which over time developed its own ideology centered on opposition to double standards and support for popular or electoral democracy.

These two ideological movements have dominated political discourse in the last five years, and as the Thai political landscape has colorized, increasing numbers of voters have switched their primary political allegiance from a local patron to an ideology. This has forced the main parties, both of which were primarily traditional patronage machines, to adopt an ideology and become more modern, ideology-based parties. Smaller regional and patron-based parties have fewer and fewer adherents as voters increasingly choose a national party representing their ideological position.

Although the last decade has been fraught with political turmoil, the turmoil itself is a symptom of a broader societal transformation that has positive implications for the future of Thailand. The evolution of a feudal or patron/client society into an ideology-based society is a transition that has occurred in every patronage-based politics into an established democracy. The fact that this transition was driven from the grassroots up, from the movements to the parties, is an indication of the emerging political consciousness and maturation of the Thai people.

Tim Meisburger is a Democracy Fellow at USAID on sabbatical leave from The Asia Foundation, where he is director for Elections and Political Processes. He can be reached at tmeisburger@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation or USAID.

Contrary to the predictions made by the plethora of political pundits watching Thailand’s elections that the Democrats would have difficulty holding their five current seats in Thailand’s Deep South, the Democrats instead ran away with nine out of 11 constituent seats. This has led many to ask: Can the Democrats’ win in the region be interpreted as the people’s clear desire to see the government stay the course and support the return of the Southern Boarder Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC)? Or, was the poor showing by supporters of the Pheu Thai Party, led by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, a reflection of voters’ rejection of Thaksin’s policies, which in 2004, helped to reignite Thailand’s violent conflict in the Deep South?

The political pendulum in the area has swung back and forth in recent elections, with the Democrats securing 11 of the region’s 12 seats in 2005, only to lose all but five in 2007. While its latest victory looks convincing on the surface if you look at winning constituent seats, a detailed analysis of voter count shows another story. Rather than solidly leaning toward the Democrats, vote counts revealed a tight race in a number of constituencies, with the Democrats capturing far less than half of the popular votes in most areas. For example, in constituency 2 of Yala, the Democrat candidate’s victory over the Pheu Thai incumbent was less than 300 votes. In Constituencies 3 and 4 of Narathiwat, the Democrat Party received less than 35 percent of the votes, narrowly edging out Chart Thai Patthana and Matubhum, respectively. Even in Constituency 1 of Pattani, traditionally a Democrat stronghold, Bhumjaithai and Matubhum returned strong results with the Democrat incumbent winning by less than 5,000 votes. Rather than reflecting a convergence of voters’ views and interests, the July 3 election instead highlights fractures within the communities and thus, the inherent difficulty of finding a durable solution to the long-running conflict.

Based on the very close popular vote, the results might not be interpreted as a clear mandate for the Democrats. Conversely, the poor showing across the board by Pheu Thai supporters could be viewed as citizens sending a message to the incoming government that southern voters are not interested in a return to the party’s hard-line policies.

While most party platforms focused on decentralization and the formation of a special administrative region such as Pheu Thai’s “Pattani Metropolitan Administration” plan, the Democrats promoted SBPAC’s role as the lead government agency in the area. According to The Asia Foundation’s 2010 Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand Survey, 89 percent of respondents felt that SBPAC had a high or neither high nor low level of integrity; 67 percent wanted greater decentralization; 71 percent preferred to elect their own governor; 51 percent rejected the idea of consolidating the three provinces; and only 23 percent responded that separatism was the answer to the conflict. Voters have demonstrated support for the continuation of SBPAC and civilian control over the military in the area, while there continues to be bit of a split in terms of what form they would like to see decentralization take. Moreover, with more than 77 percent of eligible voters in the South participating in the election (higher than the national average of 75 percent), the majority of southern residents clearly indicated that they reject the notion of separatism and acknowledge the legitimacy of the Thai State. The incoming administration should take heed of this in developing its southern policies.

Regardless of the party in power, the Thai government needs to truly understand that the Deep South is by no means a homogenous society, and would be wise to carefully listen to the diverse voices of its southern residents if they are to successfully come up with a resolution that will satisfy the desires of constituents there.

Pauline Tweedie is The Asia Foundation’s deputy country representative in Thailand. She can be reached at ptweedie@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

At a polling station in Chiang Mai province, election officials were busy counting votes just moments after the polls closed for Thailand’s July 3 general election. As counting continued, each ballot was placed aside in a pile, visible to the large crowd observing.

An election official calls out vote counts to the crowd observing. Photo by Pauline Tweedie.

“You miscounted these ballots. There are two ‘no vote’ ballots here, so how come there is only one marked on the board?” a man bellowed from the crowd of bystanders outside the polling station there to witness the vote counting. His complaint was echoed by others in the crowd as they demanded the ballots that had been marked be recounted again. “Don’t worry. We’re doing our jobs,” one poll officer assured the crowd. “We citizens are doing our jobs as well,” replied the man.

An increasingly active and alert Thai public took part in this historic election on July 3 – one that would determine the fate of the country for months and years to come. “All we want is a peaceful resolution so we as a country can move on. People are just fed up with one political crisis over another,” said one voter after casting his vote at a polling center in the outskirts of Bangkok. His sentiment echoes that of many Thais, with the hope that this election would pave the way for a much-needed reconciliation among the conflicting sides.

The Election Commission of Thailand reported a 75 percent voter turnout this year, just slightly higher than the last general election in 2007. As voters filled polling stations across the country, a team of my colleagues from The Asia Foundation spent the day observing the election as members of the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) international observation mission, as local observers, and as polling officials in their home districts in Bangkok, Samut Prakarn, Korat, and Chiang Mai provinces. It was reassuring to see such enthusiasm among the electorate – citizen bystanders at nearly every polling station played an active role in witnessing the entire process – from sealing the ballot boxes at exactly 8 a.m., to the moment the ballot boxes were opened and counted before the public. Throughout the day irregularities were pointed out as people questioned operating procedures within the polling stations or called out when a polling official marked the wrong line.

Things seemed to have gone relatively smoothly on voting day itself, though some maneuvering behind the scenes was undeniable. In addition to official party agents assigned to observe individual polling stations, vote canvassers were overtly mulling around some stations. They kept a close watch as voters entered and exited the polling stations and were within eyesight of the exit polling areas, usually set up within 300 meters of the polling station. This was evidently an intimidation factor among some local voters, which potentially tainted some of the exit poll results in these areas. Furthermore, in the days leading up to the election, numerous reports emerged of vote buying, manipulation, and mass mobilization of canvassers in provinces all over the country, from the upper North, areas of the Northeast, to the lower South. Parties desperate to hold onto their constituencies offered voters a minimum average of 300 THB ($10) per head to secure votes. Other forms of manipulation included mobilizing influential religious leaders, village heads, and local government officials to round up voters to secure votes for a particular political party. This has been common practice in Thailand for decades and will continue as long as money politics remains so strongly embedded in a flawed democracy.

Though high voter turnout and vigilant citizen observers on election day are promising signs, it is time the Thai electorate realize that true democracy does not only mean being vigilant on election day. A citizen’s duty in upholding democracy does not end with the marking of a ballot at a polling station. Instead, citizens must realize that their role as critical observers continues long beyond election day. It is up to every citizen here to become true guardians of democracy to ensure that in the months and years to come those put to power on July 3 exercise that power selflessly and with the utmost integrity.

Wadee Deeprawat is a program research officer in The Asia Foundation’s Thailand office. She can be reached at wadee@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Having served as a short-term international observer for the general election in Thailand earlier this month on July 3, I unfortunately became somewhat of an expert in the dark arts of vote buying.

As one of 60 observers from the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) deployed around the country, I spent eight days in Chonburi province in the lead-up to election day. Located just a little east of Bangkok, Chonburi is home to Kamnan Poh, the notorious godfather who once declared, “I used to have enemies in Chonburi, but they all died.” Though Kamnan Poh is currently in hiding – wanted on corruption charges – there is no denying the continued influence of his clan: one of his sons is head of the provincial administration, the other is mayor of the tourist resort town, Pattaya. Just two months before this election, the family set up a new political party called the Palang Chon (or Power of Chonburi) party. They pulled off a staggering victory, winning six out of Chonburi’s eight constituency seats and one party list candidacy, and thereby becoming a key member of the new coalition government.

An election official watches over a ballot box as voters fill out their ballots. Photo by Pauline Tweedie.

In the days following the election, however, Thailand’s Election Commission has been deluged with over 1,920 complaints of vote buying and other electoral irregularities. Judging from the variety of vote-buying methods I came across in Chonburi, the large number of cases nationwide is not surprising.

In its most elemental form, vote buying taps into local lines of patronage. Kamnan Poh and his family have been prominent in the province for over three decades and many people are loyal to them. “If they win, it will mean having people from our home in parliament and we know they won’t forget to look after us,” one local told me. He also expected his voter loyalty to be repaid in kind: “If they win big in our area, I’m sure there will be a big party to celebrate and definitely some cash handed out, too. …”

Votes can also be bought with hard cash, paid in advance. The current rate in Chonburi starts at 300 baht (around $10) and goes up to as much as 3,000 baht ($100). In Thailand, this practice is as old as the electoral process itself and reaches a crescendo the night before an election or, as Thais call it, kheun maa hawn (the night of the howling dogs).

Another way for a party to increase its odds of winning is to conduct reverse vote buying. By purchasing the ID cards of voters who are confirmed supporters of a particular party, the buyer can count one less vote for its rivals, as citizens without a valid ID card are not allowed to vote.

The challenge with vote buying, though, is to ensure that voters who take your money will definitely vote for you once they’re inside the privacy of the polling booth. In previous elections, voters have been asked to photograph their marked ballots using mobile phone cameras but phones are now banned in polling stations. One method currently in use in Chonburi is to obtain a copy of the voter’s house registration certificate; many villagers I spoke with are unconvinced of the secrecy of their ballot and are afraid that canvassers can use their house registration to check who they voted for.

The most cost-effective method for getting votes seems to be through intimidation. On election day, we kept an eye out for people loitering around the polling booth who might be there to threaten voters. By being present at the booth, party representatives send a clear message: don’t forget to vote for us, we’re watching you.

Further assurance that vote-buying efforts will pay off comes from being able to influence or control the local Election Commissions. In one Chonburi district, a former committee member told me that only two out of nine members could be described as neutral. It also helps to have friends in the police force; I heard about three villagers who tried to report a vote-buying incident only to be warned against acting as witnesses by their local policemen.

With Thailand’s central Election Commission currently investigating hundreds of electoral fraud cases and all eyes focused on accusations against Pheu Thai, the winning party, numerous politicians involved in vote buying will inevitably slip through the net. Chonburi is a prime case study in how electoral systems can be effectively subverted by local power brokers. A lawyer I met there gave me a succinct synopsis of the process: “It’s what happens when gangsters become politicians.”

*The author is a writer for The Asia Foundation in Thailand. Due to privacy concerns around election monitoring, the author’s real name has been left out. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

At first glance, the lead-up to Thailand’s July 3 national parliamentary election seems little different from previous electoral countdowns. The campaign period has been fairly low-key, with political leaders occupied for the most part in defining their individual campaign personas and fairly measured in their comments on the character and record of opponents. Only now, in the closing days of the campaign, have reciprocal criticisms borne a sharper edge.

Posters fill Bangkok's streets in the lead up to the election on July 3. Above, a poster in central Bangkok depicts a political candidate as a monkey to urge voters to vote "no" on the ballot. Photo by Arpaporn Winijkulchai.

The streets and sidewalks of Bangkok are, as in other campaign seasons, reduced to narrow corridors of colorful campaign posters in which national political leaders and constituency candidates strike poses and expressions that range from effortlessly poised to deliberately irreverent. Some posters feature the clever slogans of candidates that challenge the political mainstream, including: “Politics are like Pampers diapers – the more you change them, the better they are”; “When politicians use the word ‘honest’ how can anyone be happy?” and “If you love Thailand, then wrong must be wrong and right must be right.” Others feature less-than-subtle appeals by proponents of the “no” vote, urging voters to exercise the formal ballot option of rejecting all political candidates – the latter depicted as a menagerie of drooling dogs, banana-wielding apes, and vacant-eyed buffalos.

But while the campaign might appear rather subdued, one has only to digest the daily editorial sections of national newspapers, visit the Facebook and Twitter pages of contesting parties or the plethora of election-related social media sites, engage Bangkok taxi drivers in the savvy political analyses that they revel in, or mark the thoughtful reflections of Thai friends and colleagues to appreciate that this election is different, and one of profound significance to the political future of Thailand.

This election follows five years of political tension and tumult, a period whose legacy includes a succession of disputed parliamentary elections, judicial dissolution of established political parties and individual politicians, military intervention, blockades of airports and government buildings, and large-scale street demonstrations. The crisis culminated in an angry wave of violence and bloodshed in the streets of Bangkok in May 2010, traumatizing a nation that had not experienced political violence on such scale for nearly two decades. In addition to fueling public apprehension of further violence, the political crisis has diverted the attention of government and political leaders from critical issues. These include national economic recovery, regional leadership and competitiveness, resolution of the bitter communal conflict in the southern border provinces, and the heated border dispute with Cambodia over the management of the Preah Vihear temple site – each of which have barely figured in campaign discourse.

While 40 political parties are contesting the election, the key electoral race is that waged between the incumbent Democrat and opposition Pheu Thai parties. The Democrats have held power since December 2008 through a coalition arrangement with several smaller political parties. As proxy for exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Pheu Thai succeeds several previous Thaksin parties that were dissolved by the courts. The two parties occupy very different places in the national political landscape. The Democrats, led by Oxford-educated Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, have historical ties to elite interest groups that have tended to prefer guided democracy over hands-on engagement with the population at large. Pheu Thai commands a traditional base of support among rural farmers and urban wage earners, many of whom continue to embrace Thaksin – notwithstanding the controversies that now surround him – as the first national political leader to genuinely identify and engage with their needs. Pheu Thai supporters have extended a similar welcome to Thaksin’s youngest sister, business executive and political initiate Yingluck Shinawatra, as the party’s lead candidate for prime minister.

The respective Democrat and Pheu Thai campaign rhetoric is predictably divided on certain issues, including the parties’ approaches to national economic management and political reconciliation following the May 2010 political violence. The Democrats cite the national economic recovery as evidence of their able stewardship of the economy, while Pheu Thai insists that the economic vision, leadership, and empathy of its rivals do not extend beyond urban elites. The Democrats likewise point to the institutional steps taken to understand and determine responsibility for the May 2010 violence, while Pheu Thai insists that the sum of their efforts amounts to nothing more than window dressing. Beyond these and other strident differences, the lines separating the rival parties have converged in nearly identical populist overtures to ordinary citizens. These appeals to the working class place Pheu Thai on familiar terrain, while the Democrats adjust to a strategy borrowed from Thaksin’s grassroots playbook and bureaucrats struggle to calculate how the nation will bear the expense of implementing whichever of the rival populist undertakings prevails at the ballot box.

Independent local public opinion polls conducted over the course of the election campaign have consistently placed Pheu Thai ahead of the Democrats. The polls acknowledge that a significant percentage of the voting population remains undecided, but stop short of projecting whether one or other party stands within reach of an outright majority of 251 or more seats on Election Day. Tradition holds that the party that wins the most seats, short of a full majority, has first right to form a coalition government through alliance with smaller political parties. While speculation abounds – and, in the closing days of the campaign, includes increasing talk of an outright Pheu Thai victory – the most widely held view among election watchers has been that the next government will be determined through a coalition arrangement. In reflecting on prospective Democrat or Pheu Thai coalitions, one can imagine the combination of historical considerations, unusual precedents, and risk assessments that must weigh in the calculus of small parties that are positioned to play a determining role in the final outcome.

Speculation was further stirred by the recent remarks of the senior army commander who, after asserting that the military would not interfere in the election, cryptically added that voters would do well to vote for “good candidates and parties” and to avoid a repeat of recent elections. The remarks have drawn criticism from some quarters and prompted debate on the prospect of blanket amnesties that Pheu Thai seemed previously ready to discuss but from which it has recently distanced itself. Observers have also asked whether the added comments indicate that military influence over electoral politics will remain a significant factor or thinly-veiled threat in post-election settlement. Will the election results stand as an expression of popular will, regardless of the outcome? Have understandings and agreements already been struck among key stakeholders that will guide the formation of the next government?

Taking stock of the combination of change and continuity in the election environment, it is arguable that the factor that most distinguishes the 2011 election campaign and the broader governance environment from past experience is a sharpening of the political understanding, values, and expectations of the Thai people. The Asia Foundation’s 2010 national public perception survey found that 93 percent of respondents of legal voting age maintained that democracy is the best form of government, while 59 percent observed that the optimal democratic government is one that is most representative of the citizenry. At the same time, respondents held little confidence in the integrity of elected Members of Parliament; believed that elected officials care little for ordinary citizens; conveyed a low sense of individual and collective political efficacy; and called for a process of national reconciliation as the route back from the brink of political chaos. By the standard of public values and expectations of this kind – from those that animate conversations in rural tea shops to those that flood the internet – campaign rhetoric rings hollow. Clearly, Thai voters face difficult choices in weighing the respective strengths and weaknesses of rival political parties and candidates that take the current electoral stage clothed in a combination of assets and liabilities, virtues and vices, and certainties and question marks. However, there is a strong sense in this election campaign that voters are clear in their understanding that Thailand’s future political settlement is not a one-off choice between old and new political orders, between rival political parties, or between traditional elite-guided democracy and a more broadly inclusive model of governance that takes greater account of citizen views and expectations.

The international community joins the people of Thailand in their hope for a free, fair, and credible election; a spirit of thoughtful dialogue, sensitivity, and compromise among all stakeholders as the results are confirmed; and trust and confidence in the will of the electorate.

Kim McQuay is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Thailand. He can be reached at kmcquay@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Between March and May 2010, Thailand experienced its worst political violence in decades. Since then, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has insisted that he and his government are committed to national reconciliation. Shortly afterward, a truth and reconciliation commission was established to investigate the military crackdown that culminated in May, leaving 91 dead and more than 2,000 injured.

Violent protests in Bangkok ended with a deadly government crackdown on May 19, 2010. Soon after, Prime Minister Vejjajiva established a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate the crackdown. So far, no one has been indicted or convicted of any crime. Photo by Roland Dobbins.

This commission is chaired by Kanit na Nakorn, a former Attorney General. Kanit has experience in heading such commissions in the past. He was put in charge of investigating the violence and unrest in Bangkok during the “Black May” of 1992 when 52 people died and 3,500 were arrested, of whom many claimed to have been tortured. In 2003, Kanit led the investigation of the more than 2,500 extra-judicial killings of suspected drug traffickers in the Thai government’s war on drugs. In neither of these investigations was anyone indicted or convicted of committing any crimes. As nothing came of these investigations, it is highly likely that no one will be charged with crimes for those murdered or injured in 2010.

On July 3, millions of Thais will cast their votes for the candidate they wish to lead their country. Polls indicate that neither major political party, Democrat or the Pheu Thai (“for Thais”), will win a majority. Although Pheu Thai leads in opinion polls, the polls suggest that a significant percentage of the Thai electorate remains undecided with the election just days away. Consequently, minor parties will likely once again play a crucial role in determining which party forms the next government.

Before dissolving parliament, the Abhisit government held a 16-hour, marathon meeting to put into place a series of populist spending measures ahead of the election – from a new mortgage subsidy scheme for first-time home buyers, through low-interest loans for workers in the informal sector, to transportation and utility subsidies, among others. Abhisit’s government is hoping such programs will resonate with people in the Central Plains and the lower part of the northern region to complement their traditional support from the South and the upper middle class in Bangkok. Nonetheless, such measures are unlikely to enable the Abhisit government to win an outright majority.

The leader of the Pheu Thai party, Yingluck Shinawatra, is a political newcomer and youngest sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, who is simultaneously the country’s most divisive and most popular political figure. Thaksin has remained in self-imposed exile since 2008, after having been found guilty in absentia of corruption and abuse of power. Although a political novice, Yingluck has been using her charm and sex-appeal (the latter being a first in Thai electoral politics) to strengthen Pheu Thai support in northeastern and northern strongholds, and is campaigning nationwide, promising credit cards for farmers, debt relief, and better health care. Yingluck’s campaign promises of lowering corporate taxes and building a high-speed rail network also resonate with elements of the Thai business community. But what makes Yingluck formidable is that her brother remains a key figure behind the election; and because of the former prime minister’s significant financial resources, he has the power to dictate who can lead the party. The party’s election slogan is “Thaksin Thinks, Pheu Thai Does.”

If the Pheu Thai wins enough seats to form the next government, Yingluck will become Thailand’s first-ever woman prime minister. But more significantly, Thaksin may have out-maneuvered the country’s military, bureaucracy, and other traditional elites. It would allow him to wield power from behind the scenes without having to be held accountable to a nation’s populace. Thaksin, through Yingluck and the Pheu Thai, will attempt to lure the country’s minor political parties with all kinds of financial incentives in order to form a government. However, minor political parties may shun these incentives – not because they would not appreciate them, but out of concern that aligning with the Pheu Thai would irritate the military and other members of Thailand’s political establishment.

Whoever loses the July 3 elections is likely to cry foul. The election will not resolve Thailand’s five-year political impasse. Instead, it is likely to serve as a prelude to another round of turmoil. Under this scenario, about the only thing all Thais will be able to claim, be they red, yellow, or colorless, is that truth and reconciliation have not been achieved.

John J. Brandon is the director of The Asia Foundation’s International Relations Programs in Washington, D.C. From 1978- 1981, he taught English in Bangkok and Songkhla, Thailand, and visits the country regularly. Brandon can be reached at jbrandon@asiafound-dc.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Thai elections can be challenging to follow for even the most ardent political watchers. On July 3, Thai voters will head to the polls for the 26th time since the country became a Constitutional Monarchy in 1932. This means that, over the past 79 years, Thais on average have cast their ballot every three years. Not only have Thais gone to the polls often, they have done so under 17 different constitutions, most recently in 2007. They’ve also experienced 18 actual or attempted military coups, the most recent of which was in 2006.

Voters check their names before entering the polling station at Ban Bang-kapi School during advance voting on June 26. Photo by Arpaporn Winijkulchai.

In addition, Thailand’s House of Representatives has 500 seats based on a mixed-member proportional representation system:  this means 375 representatives are directly elected based on constituencies, while 125 are elected from nation-wide party lists. On Sunday, voters will be asked to cast two ballots for Thailand’s House of Representatives: first to select their constituent representative; and second for the party lists. There are 40 registered parties, with a total of 3,735 candidates vying for 500 seats. 1,410 candidates are registered in the party list category, while 2,325 are competing for constituency votes.

That’s the mechanics; now let’s have a look at the political parties. Although there are 40 parties registered for Sunday’s election, the two main competing parties are the Pheu Thai Party and the Democrat Party. The Pheu Thai Party is the third incarnation of a Thai political party originally founded by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2008 following the dissolution of its predecessor, the People’s Power Party (PPP), by the Constitutional Court of Thailand for electoral fraud. The PPP was itself a replacement for Thaksin’s original Thai Rak Thai party, which the Constitutional Court dissolved in May 2007, also for violation of electoral laws.

On May 16, Thaksin’s youngest sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was nominated as the head of Pheu Thai’s national party list, and as such is the direct contender for prime minister against the current incumbent Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat Party. Founded in 1946, the Democrat Party is Thailand’s oldest active political party and head of the current six-party ruling coalition, with Prime Minister Abhisit as its leader. If neither party wins an outright majority on Sunday, the smaller parties will play an important role in forming the next government, just as they have in the current coalition government, which is made up of the Democrat Party, Bhumjaithai Party, Chart Thai Pattana Party, Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana Party, Social Action Party, and Matubhum Party.

The Bhumjaithai and Chart Thai Pattana Parties were founded in November 2008 and April 2008, respectively, as both of their predecessors, the Neutral Democratic Party and Chart Thai Party, were dissolved by the Constitutional Court for electoral violations, together with the PPP. The Bhumjaithai Party also picked up additional representatives from the Friends of Newin Group, a faction within the PPP that shifted loyalties to the newly-formed Bhumjaithai in the wake of the PPP’s disbandment. Likewise, the Matubhum Party was a faction within the Puea Pandin Party, which split to join the new coalition and is now running as its own independent party. While some parties are fracturing, others are consolidating, including the new Chart Pattana Puea Pandin, a partnership of Ruam Chart Pattana and the Puea Pandin Parties.

Needless to say, politics are never dull in Thailand and although voters will have their say on Sunday, political pundits will have plenty to watch as the next Thai election journey begins.

Pauline Tweedie is The Asia Foundation’s deputy country representative in Thailand. She can be reached at ptweedie@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.