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**THE ASIA FOUNDATION'S**  
**CENTER FOR U.S.-KOREA POLICY**

**OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-ROK**  
**ALLIANCE COOPERATION:**  
**NEW ISSUES ON THE AGENDA**

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**Scott Snyder** (Moderator)

Senior Associate and Center Director, The Asia Foundation

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## PROCEEDINGS

RICHARD BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, why don't we go ahead and get started. My name is Richard Bush. I'm the Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings. And it's my great pleasure to welcome you all here for this program, which we're doing in collaboration with the Asia Foundation.

The theme is "Opportunities for U.S.-Korea Alliance Cooperation: New Issues on the Agenda." Actually, the opportunity to do this program was a gift to us, and we're grateful to Scott Snyder of the Asia Foundation for making it possible.

The key words in the title are "new issues on the agenda." If you go back to the joint vision statement that President Obama and President Myung-bak here in Washington on June 16<sup>th</sup>, in paragraph 6 and paragraph 9, there are references to a number of issues that you don't normally think of when you hear the word "Alliance." And that's what we're going to focus on today.

But I think it is new territory, very interesting territory. And I'm sure this project will make a contribution to how the two countries move forward in these new areas.

With that, I'd like to turn the mike over to Scott Snyder, who's the sort of director of this project, and a good colleague from next door. Scott?

SCOTT SNYDER: I just want to welcome everyone here. And most importantly, I want to thank Richard and the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies here at Brookings for agreeing to work with us at the Foundation's Center for U.S.-Korea Policy to put this together. This is really our Center's first major public event that we've co-sponsored in Washington. And I think it would have been impossible for us to try to put it together by ourselves.

Richard has already essentially introduced the theme of this project that the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy is pursuing, on expanding the alliance. In fact, it is based on the new areas of functional and global cooperation that were mentioned in the Joint Vision Statements that occurred last June.

My own feeling is that the agenda for today's program is a testimony to the considerable potential for deeper and broader cooperation in the U.S.-Korea relationship. And the topics today -- pandemics, counter-terrorism, and space -- clearly aren't topics that are usually associated with the U.S.-Korea relationship. And so, while the traditional topics -- deterrence, focus on North Korea -- remain essential, I'm looking forward, with my colleagues, to

broadening the agenda for the alliance. And I think that this is a first step in that direction.

So I want to thank all of you for coming, and also thank-you to our paper presenters and panelists for making this possible. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you, Scott. I think we should jump right in. You have the bios of the presenters. The order of the presentations is going to go from the very small -- germs—to the very big -- the cosmos -- with terrorists in between. To talk about germs is my good friend, Jim Schoff.

JAMES SCHOFF: I washed my hands before I came. I'm going to stand up here, actually.

MR. SCHOFF: Thank you very much, Richard and Scott. And it's a great pleasure to be here. I'm grateful for the opportunity to be a part of this project.

This project is still unfolding. We've started our papers, and we all have complete drafts, but we'll be meeting also tomorrow to discuss everyone's papers and how we take it forward. So I see today's presentation, in a way, as almost an interim report on the research, and the progress that we've made so far.

When the late Dr. Lee Jong-wook was Director General of the World Health Organization, he warned, in 2005, that it was -- quote—"Only a matter of time before an avian flu virus, most likely H5N1, acquires the ability to be transmitted from human to human, sparking the outbreak of human pandemic influenza. We don't know when this will happen, but we know that it will happen. And now is the time to build consensus."

I don't think that Dr. Lee would have been surprised that his prediction came true -- within four years. But he probably would be surprised that the new strain would erupt first in the Western Hemisphere, and combine components of avian, swine and human viruses. But as others have observed, that's the challenge of flu management and prevention. Today's issue may not be tomorrow's.

Fortunately, this new H1N1, or swine flu, virus that we're dealing with today is not as damaging as some initially feared. But it is a reminder of how quickly these kinds of threats can spread, and how valuable international cooperation can be in defense.

And there's a unique bilateral U.S.-Korea role, I think, that could be particularly useful in this regard. And I'll get to that in a minute.

But first let's take a look at some of the global and regional developments on pandemic preparation over the last decade.

The intermittent avian flu outbreaks of the late 1990s and early 2000s prompted a variety of initiatives and greater multilateral cooperation. SARS in 2002-2003 was another factor. The mortality rates for these diseases appeared to be quite high -- about 10 percent for SARS, and as high as 60 percent for avian flu. Now, that's hard to gauge because there has not been sustained human-to-human transmission yet. And if it makes that mutation, it will probably not be as deadly as all that.

But we're still talking about something that is probably much higher than swine flu that we're experiencing, which is maybe .5 percent on the high end. Seasonal flu is less than .1 percent. And just for reference, the Spanish flu -- the great flu of 1918 -- was about 2.5 percent.

So even a 5 percent or 10 percent mortality rate would overwhelm the health care infrastructure of almost every country. And it would be particularly devastating to the developing world.

The WHO created the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network -- GOARN. And there are a lot of twisted acronyms in this whole flu issue. There are some real doozies later on.

They created this in 2000 to serve as a technical clearinghouse for rapid identification and response. The U.S. CDC and the Korean Center for Disease Control, and the Korean National Institute for Health are partner institutes in this network, along with those of many other countries, including Japan, China and Australia.

A UN System Influenza Coordination Office was created in 2005, with a Senior Coordinator seconded from the WHO at the level of Assistant Secretary General. And the team developed a concept of operations for the UN System in an influenza pandemic in September 2008.

And throughout that time it worked with individual countries and with regional forums to increase funding, stimulate research and improve global reporting, interagency coordination, and the UN System's own preparedness. And there were regional initiatives, as well. ASEAN set up their own Technical Working Group for Pandemic Preparedness and Response to support some of the initiatives that they wanted to take on.

Now, ironically, the very last line of the UN's ConOps -- or "concept of operations" -- says -- quote—"It is anticipated that this ConOps will continue to be tested through simulation exercise at global, regional and country levels during 2009." The swine flu essentially did just that -- in a very real way.

Pandemic flu is a uniquely global and yet intensely local health challenge. Officials for the current pandemic we're facing now -- the first one in 41 years -- officials in Mexico and the United States first detected a new strain after linking late-season flu cases in April. And despite extensive global efforts to prevent its spread, within months the number grew to over 300,000 cases, affecting more than 190 countries. Local schools in Incheon quite literally were closed in September because people got sick in California in May.

And the inability to contain a new flu strain once it's transmittable from human to human is a sobering reality. Now we will still try, and there are still efforts globally and as alliance partners, to identify an outbreak quickly and try to prevent an epidemic. And it can work, depending on how transmittable it is, but there are times when this will just simply not be possible.

Now, despite this important global dimension of identifying and limiting spread, and getting vaccines and medicine where they're supposed to go, it's primarily a local response issue: local hospitals responding to local needs. This is not a disaster where the world mobilizes to assist an affected country, like an earthquake or a tsunami, because everyone's going through it at the same time. And the response is local, state and national.

But the international community is investing and preparing. And although we did not contain the H1N1 virus, the world did respond with unprecedented speed, and it quickly coordinated its surveillance, early mitigation and treatment plans -- thanks to a lot of the planning that had been done before.

There was some panic but not too much, for all the hype. Leaders went out of their way to dispel fears that pork, for example -- pork consumption could cause swine flu. There's a great photograph of Prime Minister Han Seung-Soo eating barbecued samgyeopsal to try to prove, just a few days after the outbreak, to prove that it was all fine.

And this is not insignificant. Because even though tougher inspection regulations were placed on Korean imports of U.S. pork -- and Korea is America's sixth largest export market -- these imports continued. And the restrictions were lifted in mid-August. So that's another aspect of cooperation, in terms of handling our response, and handling the mitigating effects -- border control, trade, et cetera.

Another effective example of global mobilization is the relatively quick development, production and distribution of vaccines. Although health policy officials strive for development and mass production within five months, accomplishing this for a brand-new strain, to the tune of about 3 billion doses is still quite a feat -- and involved researchers in several countries. In fact, a Korean research team at Chungnam National University was among the first to develop a human vaccine derived from samples provided by the United States.

Korea has made a major push into flu vaccine production capability. And its first plant came online only last year, just in time. So it's now a player in this field. And it's only the second vaccine producer of this kind in Asia, alongside Japan.

Despite its strengths, however, the global health infrastructure is still thin. It relies heavily on contributions from individual states. The WHO's annual budget is about \$4.5 billion, which sounds like a lot, but it's about equivalent to the Johns Hopkins medical system. And the WHO operates all around the world, addressing a wide range of illnesses, including malaria, AIDS, polio, and many others that do not get the same media attention as swine flu.

There are regional initiatives like ASEAN, ASEAN+3, that can help consolidate and strengthen those members' voices on the global stage, but the heavy lifting is still done by individual states -- most often in partnership with key allies.

And in this area, U.S.-Korea cooperation is among the more important, not only because their wealth and technical capacity helps address problems in the short term, but also because it enhances the allies' ability to tackle larger challenges in the long term. I think this partnership has great untapped potential.

The two countries' top health policy officials signed a Health and Medical Sciences Cooperation Agreement in July, renewing a previous agreement, which could boost joint research projects and scientific exchanges if properly implemented. And they also pledged to coordinate their activities with global and regional health bodies. And these initiatives resonate with Seoul's "Global Korea" foreign policy vision, engages proactively with the international community, and they also flow naturally from the U.S.-Korea joint vision for the alliance announced by the two Presidents in June.

And this is the right direction, I think, for the alliance. But it cannot reach its full potential without sustained support by both governments.

The new Health Sciences Agreement, for example, requires identification of an appropriate entity to oversee practical implementation. But this should be done at a high enough bureaucratic level to provide the leadership and the cross-agency communication necessary to fulfill the agreement's promise. And the allies should also use this opportunity, I think, to facilitate bilateral and multilateral interagency cooperation.

Right now, our pandemic disease cooperation is centered around the relationships of the State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We have an Influenza-Pandemic Flu Action Group housed in the State Department which is interagency, multi-agency focused. The East Asia-Pacific Affairs is a key player in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Of course, they communicate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But the real lead on this in Korea is the Ministry of Health and Welfare, their Office of the Director General for Health Policy, and also the Prime Minister's Office, which is really their interagency coordination.

So our interagency coordination is done out of State Department on the international end. For them it's really more primarily a domestic issue done in the Prime Minister's Office.

The research institute relationships are also quite strong. KCDC and CDC, NIH-KNIH. But these are all kind of single pipelines that connect each to their own counterparts in the other country, and they communicate with each other -- when necessary. It's episodic. It's responsive to, you know, "There's an American sick in Seoul." So then people get contacted there. Or "We have a virus here and we'll share it with you to help develop the vaccine." It's not particularly proactive.

We're doing a lot of other things that connect to this issue, for example USAID, part of our overseas aid program, we have a program in Vietnam which is a model village -- a model flu village, or avian flu model village -- where they have invested to try to improve identification of poultry, and tracking where they go, and making sure that the poultry are well taken care of. And they're training local health professionals there.

But that's not necessarily connected to some of the work that Korea is doing in their overseas development aid, which they are trying to promote a much larger initiative there. The U.S. Army-Pacific has recently an Asia-Pacific military medicine conference with 18 countries participating in Seoul. And avian flu and pandemic flu was a part of that connection.

But what's going on in PAC-COM, what's going on in the Army, what's going on in USAID, what's going on in CDC and KCDC are not

necessarily connected to each other as part of a comprehensive plan. And I think this is the future of allied interaction. It's multi-agency oriented.

I don't want to take up too much time, but let me just mention -- I've tried to list a few of the things that the U.S. and ROK can focus on improving their cooperative activities in this area. Because when an outbreak occurs, immigration, customs, transportation policies must be coordination. Force protection for the allies is another key issue here. And how we vaccinate and treat our own soldiers in the field, who live together and work together and train together, is almost a perfect microcosm for managing this problem on a broader scale.

We also have issues of if there's a flu outbreak in Korea -- as they've had some avian flu amongst their poultry populations -- how does that affect U.S. bases there, their spouses, workers on the base and quarantine issues? There's a whole range of issues to discuss there, as well.

I think, going forward, we want to focus in particular on the development-aid side of cooperation, helping to build capacity and health care infrastructure in the lesser-developed countries. It's a unique role that I think we can play. Joint research is critical. And there's a great example of a U.S.-Korea international tuberculosis research center that has been set up in Korea, with budgets of about a million dollars a year, supported by each country and other countries, and they're working on drug-resistant TB. They've made some, actually, very good progress in that regard.

You know, getting doctors with doctors, scientists with scientists, and soldiers with soldiers, and business -- corporate tie-ups in this area are all a component of how we can improve our coordination.

The last image I just wanted to put up here is a look at kind of all the different players involved in dealing with a pandemic flu. And there are some that you would not necessarily think of right off the bat. I mean, Pacific Command has their own pandemic influenza fusion working group which works with all of the military components, and also with the homeland agency, Department of Homeland Security here in the United States. They have an annual exercise called "Exercise Lightning Rescue," which is an annual event that incorporates the military, NGOs, local emergency response teams and other agencies in a simulated response to a pandemic.

In Korea, they do -- most led by the KCDC -- they do some similar events, as well. And these lessons are then shared, can be shared back through the PAC-COM relationship with the ROK military, and also shared through the embassy and with the Health and Welfare Ministry.

So they use this not only to fight pandemics, but it's also useful to combat, potentially, bioterrorism. And you may have seen a note recently that North Korea possesses about 13 types of biological weapons, so it's useful also in preparation for those situations.

But the connections with the UN System, connecting all these different players together, is also useful cooperation if you're dealing with sudden-change scenarios in North Korea, because you're dealing with health and humanitarian response and security and agriculture and a wide variety of things.

So what I would -- at this point, I still don't have it figured out in terms of how exactly you effectively coordinate this kind of interaction. There are some key relationships -- State and the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office with the UN System. But you don't want to create new bureaucracy in this regard, but I think a less reactive, more proactive, coordination at the top, understanding how these different pieces fit together, is one constructive way forward. With that, I'll stop.

MR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Jim. We now turn to counter-terrorism, and are pleased to have Kevin Shepard of Kyungnam University. Kevin?

KEVIN SHEPARD: So, I'll also use the podium, but only because my notes are on the computer. I don't have a PowerPoint today.

I want to start by thanking Scott and Richard and the Asia Foundation and the Brookings Institution. I'm happy to be here. I look forward to some interesting discussion today.

I've been asked to look into counter-terrorism cooperation and, in particular, how the alliance can be strengthened through this type of cooperation. So I want to open with a conclusion.

I believe that in order to enhance security in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. and ROK governments should advocate for and take part in effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, transparency, and we should work closely to address global challenges of terrorism and the related issues of WMDs, piracy, organized crime and narcotics.

Now, the reason I think this vision should be pursued is because I think it will help to ensure continued growth and health of the alliance. But the

reason that it may sound familiar is because it's taken right from the joint vision statement that Richard mentioned earlier.

But it sounds good, right? We've got common alliance goals, strategic cooperation, shared vision, allied partnership. You know, but there are several underlying issues that I believe need to be addressed first before we can move on any of these to strengthen the alliance.

And one thing that has stood out throughout my talks with colleagues, especially in Korea -- be they liberal or conservative -- is that many people have concerns about U.S. commitment to the alliance. This is especially in light of a growing divide in perspectives on national interests.

There's also considerable concern about the unequal roles that Washington and Seoul play in this alliance, and concerns on how to boost Korea's position to be a more equal partner.

If you remember one thing from my presentation when you leave here today, I hope it is this. At present, Korea has the capacity -- and apparently the determination -- to advance counter-terrorism cooperative efforts in a way that gives the U.S. greater incentive to remain committed to the alliance, and also to boost South Korea's efforts to create a more equal partnership. So I'll start by a quick review of where we stand today.

Now, President Myung-Bok has expressed the desire to further cooperation with the U.S. He promised in his inaugural speech, February 25, 2008, to shift from ideological policies to pragmatism, to increase South Korea's role in international cooperation efforts, and to repair relations with the U.S.

Two months later, when President Lee sat down with President Bush, the two discussed expanding the U.S.-ROK alliance to further strengthen cooperation on a range of non-traditional security issues related to the U.S. war on terror. These included nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global coalition against terrorism, peace-keeping operations, countering transnational crime, and advocating human rights and democracy.

Of course while the current ROK administration does seek to further coordinate with the United States and to further expand efforts to participate in regional and global cooperative efforts, this in itself does not drive Seoul's counter-terrorism efforts. South Korea has not been immune to the threat of terrorism in the years leading up to now, but nor has it been remiss in building its own robust counter-terrorism strategies and capabilities.

As you know, South Korea has hosted a number of internationally high-profile events, going back to the '88 Olympics, 2002 World Cup, 2005 APEC Forum. Of all of these, and other international events, South Korea has cooperated with the United States and other countries and has avoided incident at each of them.

In addition, South Korean authorities have preempted some more recent terrorist activity. South Korean National Police Agency arrested suspected smugglers with links to the Taliban insurgents, and that was only in July of this year. That was the latest in ongoing efforts that have led to the arrest of 76 foreigners suspected of participating in or supporting terrorist activities in South Korea over the last five years.

In addition, South Korea has taken significant legislative steps. Following September 11<sup>th</sup>, they've signed the International Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. South Korea has enacted the Financial Transaction Reports Act, as well as Proceeds of Crime Act. It also created the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit to track suspicious transactions. In fact, in 2002, South Korean lawmakers went as far as to introduce a terrorism prevention bill that was so aggressive, Amnesty International expressed concern.

In 2003 South Korean Customs Service joined the U.S. Container Security Initiative. And just this year, Seoul was pledged to fully participate in PSI.

So, Seoul's cooperation on counter-terrorism is not just a Johnny-come-lately. It's been year on year progressing ever since -- well, specifically since September 11<sup>th</sup>.

And it does continue to grow. This year, another anti-terrorism bill was submitted to the National Assembly in South Korea, and this would change the criminal code to allow the confiscation of funds, including real estate, stock market holdings, and other profits gained through illegal activity suspected of being related to terrorism.

South Korea has also joined the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, in the APG. This is an OECD effort. In 2006, the APG became an affiliate member of the Financial Action Task Force, and at that time South Korea became an FATF observer, and has begun the process to become a full member.

Of course, South Korea has also offered military support for the U.S. war on terror. By the end of 2002, South Korea dispatched over 100 mobile medical units, an LST landing ship, four C-130 transport aircraft, and additional military equipment for the Afghan army. It also promised \$40 million in

reconstruction aid, 500 non-combat engineers, and 100 additional medical personnel to follow the end of hostilities.

By 2003, South Korea agreed to dispatch troops to Iraq. The Zaytun Unit grew to more than 13,800 soldiers per year, the last of which were pulled out in December 2008. It's also committed about \$200 million in reconstruction aid there.

Now, one problem with this military support, though, is that -- as was highlighted in a report commissioned by the U.S. government, and I'll quote Dr. Jeffrey Simon -- Dr. Simon found that, "The widespread problem of interoperability between U.S. Pacific Command and its Theater Security Cooperation Partners is of particular concern. All Partner armed forces, regardless of their level of modernization and professionalism, see themselves falling further and further behind U.S. military capabilities, and therefore less able to interact with U.S. armed forces. This means that the U.S. forces needed to rely more on their own releasability than on military cooperation with South Korea."

This report, in part, led to Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Don agreeing on the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces-Korea.

South Korea is also working with ASEAN, as well as bilaterally with the U.S., China, Japan, Australia and other regional partners. It's been a vocal advocate in international counter-terrorism and terrorism-prevention efforts on a global level, as well. South Korea is a member of seven international conventions on counter-terrorism, and is currently discussing ratification of another five.

So these efforts, and President Lee's vision for South Korea's role as a diplomatic middle-power state in the region, provide an impetus for counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S., within the framework of regional and international multilateral cooperative efforts.

So are there challenges to cooperation? Well, if there weren't, we wouldn't be here. The two biggest obstacles that I see -- one, the Lee administration has been mired in domestic political relations difficulties. It has spent considerable political capital trying to dig itself out of this hole. Now, at the moment, the percentage of South Koreans with favorable opinions of the U.S. has risen from less than half in 2003, to 78 percent in 2009. This has not, however, translated into approval for the U.S.-led efforts against terrorism. That stands at 23 percent.

So while President Lee has declared that " -- the politicization of alliance relations shall be behind us," that's proven to be out of his control. And

any support that South Korea offers to U.S. campaigns must take into account public consensus.

Another critical variable in the realm of cooperation between Seoul and Washington is, and will continue to be, Pyongyang. The large majority of counter-terrorism cooperation is not aimed at or driven by North Korea, but the military nature of many of the cooperative efforts means that North Korea has, and will continue, to voice concerns.

Now, South Korean public support for U.S.-ROK relations is generally a reflection of the state of inter-Korean relations. So if inter-Korean relations and cooperation improve in the future, Seoul will take into consideration the response from Pyongyang when cooperating with the United States. And both Seoul and Washington need to recognize this and take it into account.

So that covers where we are now.

I'd like to propose some opportunities for counter-terrorism cooperation that would allow South Korea to maintain a more equal and more self-determinate position in the alliance with the United States.

The first is in cyber-terrorism. Now, South Korea has already presented a concept paper to the ARF on establishing a virtual working group to "enhance the response capacity against cyber-terrorist threats." And it's urged other participants to join the ARF virtual meeting of experts on cyber-security. South Korea will be leading the meeting in conjunction with the Philippines during its first years. The South Korea cyber-expertise should continue to pave the way for its leadership in regional and bilateral counter-cyber-terrorism cooperation.

The second area is in intelligence sharing. In the war on terror, execution of missions requires a higher level of intelligence. And this, in turn, requires Washington to depend more on intelligence from foreign liaison services.

Now, South Korean intelligence-gathering capabilities continue to grow, and if information-sharing within structures such as PSI and CSI continue, then both the U.S. and South Korea can benefit from broadened access to information, as well as training opportunities for both countries.

Additionally, the FBI has, over the past few years, been working toward building what they call a "server in the sky." And this is an international information consortium that shares biometric data, especially on those seeking international travel. And South Korea has already upgraded requirements for South Korean residents, and it's begun issuing electronic passports, and agreed to share some information with the United States. So the U.S. push for global

biometric information sharing is yet another realm in which South Korea can participate.

Now, South Korea, as I mentioned, has recently arrested a number of foreign visitors on charges of terrorism-related activities. It stands to reason that this cooperation would not only be to bolster the alliance, but also to improve security at South Korean entry points. It could also boost South Korean and U.S. cooperation with the U.S. Defense Department's Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System. Currently, I think there about 50 nations that are contributing to that.

As far as military cooperation, military cooperative efforts should continue in the future. But it would be beneficial for South Korea to focus its military investments less on conventional force power and more on state-of-the-art technological advances. Upgrading technological cooperation and broadened interoperability capacity will facilitate future cooperation, not only with the U.S., but with other multilateral efforts. Currently the lack of these capabilities means continued reliance on U.S. assets, and the inability for South Korea to fully participate as an equal partner on U.S.-led international efforts.

Additionally, South Korean military training and preparedness regarding CBR warfare offers an opportunity for further U.S.-ROK counter-terrorism cooperation. And in May 2009, at the ASEAN Regional Forum ISM on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime, the United States announced that it wished to lead regional bioterrorism-related works. But it said that it's seeking a regional partner with which to coordinate efforts.

Now, South Korea's advanced pharmaceutical industry and concurrent safeguards, as well as the military's extensive training in preparedness, means that Seoul's in a good position to go ahead with such efforts with the United States.

Regarding regional diplomatic leadership, ASEAN members have stated that -- they've recognized the underlying causes of terrorism include socioeconomic matters and marginalization and alienation of certain groups within society. ASEAN has agreed that community outreach programs, public education, public awareness and the protection of human rights were vital in removing the incentive for disenfranchised youth to migrate toward extremists groups.

So, President Lee's objective of pursuing South Korea's middle-power status as an example for others in the region plays an important role both in South Korean and U.S., as well as ASEAN, interests. Seoul should continue down this path, and it would strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Now, one thing that could significantly boost South Korea's image as this benevolent power and role-model for other emerging states would be that Seoul has stated a goal of tripling overseas development aid by 2015. I think this would go a long way toward bolstering South Korea's diplomatic, social and political efforts, to ensure that environments conducive to terrorism are eliminated.

Along a similar line is capacity and awareness building. South Korea currently hosts training sessions for security forces throughout the region. Topics have included physical security, cyber security, counter-terrorism, cooperative investigation and intelligence sharing. The efforts South Korea has taken to improve the level of security throughout the region, as well as health care training in Afghanistan or Iraq have considerably contributed to the U.S. war on terror.

Continuing to provide this and other training and capacity-building opportunities, not only increases capacity, but it builds alliances and increase awareness. In February 2008, the U.S. proposed the establishment of an ASEAN regional forum workplan for counter-terrorism and transnational crime, and this was in order to facilitate capacity-building in the region. This is a good way that South Korea can continue to play a leading role, by coordinating training and capacity-building workshops in conjunction with other ASEAN members, in support of the U.S. initiative for more multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation.

Of course, capacity-building does not have to mean U.S. and ROK coordination on efforts in other countries. There is room for counter-terrorism cooperation within the alliance. Continued joint military training improves preventive and response capabilities of both countries. Ongoing annual training, the Ulchi Freedom Guardian -- this ensures that developing communications and intelligence capacities are fully utilized to enhance U.S.-ROK military prowess.

But the military is not the only realm in which the U.S. and the ROK can exchange information. For example, the mutual evaluations by the AFATF showed that not only were there area for improvement in financial management and oversight in both countries, but it seemed that where one was lacking, the other excelled. So, for example, the United States was cited for needing to strengthen customer identification requirements, but the report on South Korea stated that customer identification and verification representatives a strength in the Korean preventative measures.

Now, the reports also recommended that South Korea further strengthen its counter-terrorist financing system, which just came online in December 2008, as well as its anti-money-laundering standards. Whereas, on the

other hand, the U.S. report stated it had effective regulatory and supervisory framework for monitoring compliance with the AML and CFT measures.

Opportunities like this abound to further strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, by working together, both within and outside bilateral relations to jointly increase capacity and move together toward realizing common national interests.

So, to wrap up, as long as South Korea continues to broaden and strengthen its capabilities in ways that also support U.S. efforts to fight terrorism, it will not only further solidify relations with Washington, but by participating in international efforts, it can continue to reinforce its image as a powerful player in the international community, and a source of stability in the Northeast Asian region.

Currently, President Obama's foreign policy of diplomacy of listening provides an opportunity for South Korea to assert itself, and to dictate to Washington cooperative schemes in areas in which it is relatively stronger. So with concurrent issues of lingering doubt as to the commitment of the U.S., and the South Korean public and government demand for more equal recognition within the alliance, it is essential that Washington and Seoul find new avenues for expanded cooperation.

In today's world, counter-terrorism cooperation is one vital realm in which just such cooperation can be found. And South Korea's initiatives in Asia, setting a new benchmark for cooperation and coordination -- not only with Washington, but also with regional allies -- serves an integral part in the war on terror. So with South Korea taking the lead in initiatives and coordination with ASEAN, the UN, the U.S. and other parties, Seoul and Washington can build a stronger, more balanced, and more effective alliance, as well as more effectively execute the war on terror. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Kevin. We now turn to Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School to talk about space cooperation.

DR. MOLTZ: Thank you very much. I'd like to thank Scott Snyder for including me in this program, and also Richard and the Brookings Institution for hosting it. I should caveat -- these are my own remarks, not those of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.

Just a few years ago, I think it's fair to say that this would not have been a very interesting topic. But we've seen two major changes recently.

First, the rise of South Korean capabilities in space. And I've pictured here, Yi So-yeon, the first Korean astronaut, who flew to the

International Space Station in April of 2008. And I was fortunate to have the opportunity to meet her at a dinner at the NASA Ames Research Center this past summer. It was a very interesting discussion.

The second major change, though, has been a rise in the threat environment in space. And I think we only need point to the Chinese anti-satellite test in January of 2007 to understand that space assets are at risk, and there are reasons to worry about the future.

And so now I think it's fair to say that space cooperation is both an appropriate and, I will argue, an important topic to consider within the framework of the U.S.-ROK relationship.

During most of the Cold War, the U.S. had to stand alone against any major threats in space. And if you'll forgive my Star Trek analogy on the slide here, you know we had the Russian threat yet we managed to survive the Cold War intact and, arguably, prevail. Certainly in space we still have the major contingent of forces, in terms of all of the assets that we have in the civilian science and also military realm.

But now we're beginning to worry about the Chinese, and the possibility of a new conflict or competition in space. And there's a typical tendency to think in purely national terms and that the United States again has to go it alone in this lonely struggle.

But I think that what we are seeing now with the rise of capabilities among a number of our allies suggests that there's a new approach that's possible. And we need to begin to think out of the box--we need to begin to think how do we work with our allies and begin to draw on their capabilities and bring them into a kind of network. And I think South Korea is a very good test case to consider these issues.

So this morning what I'd like to do is to kind of investigate some of these prospects in the U.S.-ROK relationship regarding space, and discuss why I think this makes good sense. My plan here is to first give you a slight overview of these issues -- including some of the disputes the U.S. has had with South Korea over issues like the MCTR -- and then I want to look at the recent motivations for South Korea's rise in interest in space activity, and why U.S. policy is beginning to change a little bit and, I think, is becoming more accommodative of a new relationship. And then finally I'll talk a little bit about the possible role of space within the alliance.

Now if you go back to the history of the Korean space program, I think it's fair to say that South Korea really has been a latecomer to space, even

within Asia. This is not terribly surprising. There was World War II, then the Korean War, then the struggle to rebuild the country and its economy and to develop a stable democracy. So it really wasn't until even the 1970s that anything remotely related to space became possible. At that time, the South was actually more interested in missile capability, since it was concerned with North Korean missiles. And so it managed to acquire Nike-Hercules technology from the United States in order to use it against the North, but the quid pro quo of that deal was that, in 1979, South Korea had to limit itself to missiles no longer than 180 kilometers in range. Obviously, this was not going to make a very successful space launch vehicle. So this was a dampening factor.

Now, in the mid-1980s, as a result of reforms and acceleration in the economy, there was an effort to begin to develop satellites. And this was a standard kind of import-substitution model, South Korea beginning to reach out to a number of countries, and began also to develop a research program. In 1985 there was a 10-year plan issued for space. And in 1989, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute -- or KARI -- was formed.

The first successful launch of a Korean cooperative satellite -- this one was built with the United Kingdom -- was in 1992. This was the KITSAT-I. The satellite is pictured here. It had a 4-kilometer range resolution imaging capability, store and forward communications, and also a solar radiation detector. So this was testing a number of technologies and helping to build capability.

After this period, we saw an acceleration of South Korea's interest due to a number of factors. I think there's no question that the evolving North Korean missile and also nuclear activities were one major concern. South Korea needed the capability, or wanted the capability, to have an independent monitoring ability over the North, rather than having to rely exclusively on the United States.

In addition, I think as South Korea's neighbors began to ramp up their space programs, Seoul recognized that there was prestige value in space activity. They needed to be part of this competition, and they also could use this to rally interest in science and technology education at home.

A convenient factor was that there was a lot of technology to be had. Russia, Ukraine and a number of other providers were eager, by the 1990s, to sell technology, and so this was a good match.

Seoul wanted to cooperate with the United States, but the United States still had very little interest in pushing a South Korean space program -- partly because of concerns about missile proliferation, and also more general concerns about export controls.

During the 1990s, South Korea began developing much more sophisticated satellites and also space applications for a variety of uses, but particularly remote sensing. In 1999 the KOMPSAT-I, the first significant remote-sensing satellite was launched. It had a several meter resolution, and began to develop the capacity of South Korea to build this kind of satellite.

South Korea remained interested in launch technology and so in 2001, after a series of negotiations, it joined the Missile Technology Control Regime, and said that it would not develop long-range military missiles.

The U.S. was approached for assistance in space-launch technology, but for a variety of reasons, both export-control related, and also because of a Commerce Department policy not to aid in the development of foreign competitors to U.S. launch services, the U.S. passed on this idea, and Seoul turned to Russia. Russia was very willing to move forward. It reached a deal to provide the first stage of an Angara rocket, and it also agreed, for \$24 million, to train a South Korean astronaut and to bring that person to the International Space Station.

In 2006, we saw the fruition of some of these efforts in remote sensing. And there's a picture here -- it's, unfortunately, not quite big enough for you to see, but that's the Las Vegas strip, downtown. And if this were blown up you could see that it's actually a pretty good image. This is a 1-meter resolution image, and South Korea continues to improve on that capability.

Now, more recently we've seen a number of very significant milestones passed by South Korea. I mentioned the flight of Yi So-Yeon to the International Space Station. And in 2008 there were a number of developments in regard to the United States. In early 2008 there was an agreement signed between the NASA Ames Research Center and the Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology -- or KAIST -- to begin cooperation on small satellites. And currently there are two scientists from KAIST that are in residence at the NASA Ames Research Center. In August of 2008, the two parent organizations, KARI and NASA, formed an umbrella agreement to facilitate more routinized cooperation and a series of exchanges that will, hopefully, identify new possible areas for cooperation.

In June of this year, the NARO space facility that was built partly with Russian assistance was opened. And, obviously, we had the failed launch of the first Korean KSLV-I, or NARO-I launcher in August. This was a three-stage rocket. The first stage was the Russian stage, that stage worked fine. The second stage was a Korean solid-fuel stage. It worked fine, as well. Unfortunately, the fairing between the second stage and the third stage (a small science and

technology satellite) did not release properly, and the satellite began to tumble and it was not able to maintain orbit. So this was a failure.

But, again, this is something that happens in early rocket programs, and we expect to see progress by the next launch, which will be in May of 2010.

In the military sector, South Korea is also becoming increasingly skilled. There is a fear of falling behind regional rivals, and there's also a desire to gain more capability against the North. And the main focus has been on high-resolution satellite remote sensing. The KOMPSAT program that I mentioned is becoming much more capable, and South Korea is also going to develop an infrared imaging capability by 2012.

In the military communications sector, we are seeing also significant advances. There are a series of ground stations that have been put into place, and Seoul has begun to rely on these more and more for its military communications, particularly as it sends forces into the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan.

Money is a problem, however. South Korea does not have a significant budget for space. It is slowly increasing that budget, but with some of the financial difficulties recently, South Korea will not be able to deploy a whole range of military capabilities. And, indeed, it has no plans to deploy any kind of space defenses or offensive systems at this point in time. It does have certain missile defense interceptors that travel into space, but certainly they don't remain there. And Seoul supports a variety of UN mechanisms, including the PAROS (or prevention of an arms race in outer space) resolution, and also the European proposal for new rules of the road for space.

In terms of its international cooperation today, Seoul is actually fairly tied in with the international community. Some of this has been for technology acquisition, but others have been to develop its broader capacity and also its cooperative network.

In space science we see that Seoul is one of the few countries that's actually cooperated with two organizations: one, the Asian-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications group that is headed by China, and another the Asian-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, which is led by Japan. South Korea is one of the few countries that has participated in both of those groups.

In terms of satellite development, as I've mentioned, South Korea has worked with the United States, France, Israel, the United Kingdom and a

variety of other countries, but it's now increasingly working on its own. It's developed its own capabilities, and it is becoming more independent.

Now, even if the NARO facility is eventually successfully, and if the heavy launch booster that's planned for 2015, the KSLV-II, or maybe the NARO-II, if it will be called that, is developed, Seoul will not be able to rely solely on that facility, because it is not geographically well located for a number of different launch insertions. And so it's likely to continue to work with a variety of other countries -- the United States, France, Russia, maybe even Japan -- to launch certain types of missions. So where does that leave us with the United States?

Again, I think, ironically, this is one of the weakest links in this chain. And besides the commercial area, there's a lot of room for work here and for progress.

I think it's fair to say that NASA is beginning to move forward with Seoul. The agreement with KARI has made exchanges possible. These are ongoing. There are a series of working groups that are trying to identify joint projects. And I think this is very good progress. But it's slow and it has not developed any significant missions yet.

But there are areas, I think, that are very promising. Earth monitoring and climate change is one of them. Disaster warning within Northeast Asia is another. Human space flight is an area where the United States really could do a lot for South Korea. South Korea has a very limited capability. It has not been able to invest enough in this program. If the United States were to offer an International Space Station mission, I think Seoul would be very interested. Deep-space missions and micro-sats are another possibility.

In the military sector, I think this is an area where even more thinking needs to be done on the United States side. Again, we tend to think of our responses as being in a very narrow, national-security box that should be protected from other countries. But when you look at possible risks out there in the region, with China and possibly other countries' developing anti-space capabilities, I think it's fair to say that beginning to work with allies who have a capacity and could be used to build redundant capability, and also to reduce single-point failures in any of our constellations, would be a great advantage for both partners.

In this regard, the U.S. Operationally Responsive Space Office made a statement in early 2009 -- its Director, Peter Wegner -- saying that the United States is now interested in looking toward allies for joint military programs, something that we have not done much of the past.

And so I think this is a signal that the interest is there on the United States side, and we need to begin to investigate possibilities of linking our space network with countries like South Korea, and beginning to cooperate in ways that we never have done before. One area might be in the area of training young officers to work with their U.S. counterparts so that they develop these contacts and they have the capacity for interoperability, not only in crisis but also in non-crisis situations so that joint monitoring is an ongoing process.

In addition, having an allied network would be a deterrent to possible attackers. One of the key points is, if you make a constellation multinational, then any potential rival is going to know that if they try to take out one or more of your satellites, they're going to be taking on a much larger coalition. And that, again, may act as a deterrent.

To wrap up, I think that we are on the cusp of a major shift in thinking regarding space. It's just starting but, I think, more and more, as we see that some of the risks that we face in orbit are going to be multinational in character, they may also require a multinational solution.

One of the advantages is that Seoul – and also Tokyo and a variety of NATO allies -- have increasingly robust capabilities in space. I think there are a variety of areas where we could begin to work, even in the near term.

Now, there are going to be some obstacles. Again, there are national security concerns, there are political issues, particularly, within some South Korean circles about working with the United States. But I think in space it's clear that the United States is a leader, and I think Seoul is very interested in trying to build those ties.

We'll have to develop a plan for engagement. We will have to hold a series of meetings. And this is going to take time. But I think despite these short-term costs, the long-term payoff is likely to be very significant. It will lower costs for all of these systems writ-large. Each country will have access to greater capability and to surge capacity in a crisis. And it's also likely to lead to enhanced security for all members of this coalition.

So, in many respects, I think joining together for the United States and South Korea may be a very important test case for the alliance as it moves into the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. And my hope is that by encouraging this space element we may collectively come out stronger for it. Thanks very much.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Clay. Thanks also to Jim and Kevin. I think you've all offered us some very rich material. To offer some comments, I'd like to call on my colleague here at Brookings, Dr. Sheen Seongho. Dr. Sheen?

SEONGHO SHEEN: Thank you, Richard. First of all, I have to really acknowledge the effort made by all these authors, to try to make a very convincing case in all these very all-traditional areas of alliance management, that these issues are important for deepening and broadening the U.S.-ROK alliance.

And, for me, reading -- because simply, these three issues are not very traditional areas of alliance for the two countries and their national security interests, but these are more and more increasingly important for the future. And so that's the very challenge of this, I think of all these three authors.

Today, given this time limit, rather than making a specific comment on each of these papers, I'd like to raise more general questions or comments on all these three papers. And that, especially, in terms of three questions or comments.

At the end of the day, how does it matter? Or why does it matter to the alliance? In other words, yes, cooperation in space or dealing with pandemics, or counter-terrorism all sounds good. But at the end of day, you have to be able to persuade the decision-makers or public on both sides that working very closely in these very non-traditional areas has to do with the national security interests of these two countries.

So, of course, they, in each of these papers the authors say definitely there is a good reason to do so, and in doing so, they also raise up many different proposals and areas of possible collaboration or deepening cooperation between the two countries. In a nutshell, how would you say this is important for the national security or alliance management in, just let's say one sentence, what's the most important element of each of these fields that can contribute to the alliance, enhancing alliance or national security interests of these countries?

And that same question, in a way, the "so what?" question, or the why does it matter question, can be asked on the other end. In other words, yes, it could be important to have a broader or more cooperation in this area to enhance the alliance, yet at the same time, what's the specific benefit of having an alliance in solving these problems -- let's say, for example, pandemics. What does it have to do with the alliance?

As James pointed out, there is an international effort, by the United Nations or WHO, and maybe you don't need the alliance to tackle this issue.

Maybe even between those countries, without having a specific alliance relationship, still they can come up with some kind of cooperative mechanism. But you say there is a big advantage having this alliance relationship in tackling those kinds of issues.

So in both ways, does it really matter to the alliance? Or does the alliance matter in tackling these issues? That question is one, I think, very basic question for each of these authors. And they do provide certain answers to these questions, but I'd like to hear more, in just one sentence, why it really matters for this alliance management.

Second question has to do with answering those questions. We have to also think about who has more interest between the U.S. and South Korea in each of these areas? Because the problem today the alliance faces is that between these two countries, they do have a different priority in their national security interests -- as opposed to, let's say, the Cold War era. The Cold War, in the good old days, we didn't have much alliance management problems, because both governments and countries showed clear common interests or threat -- right? But this changing security environment in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, it's quite natural and unfortunately these two countries tend to see different security priorities.

And when it comes to all these three issues, obviously I don't think these two countries have exactly the same priorities from their own national security interests. For example, the counter-terrorism issue, it's quite obvious that the United States has much more stake and interest, whereas South Korea, in general, terrorism could be a threat for South Korea and, yes, indeed, we had a case that South Korea has been a subject of terrorism. But the fact of the matter is, if you ask the South Korean general public, obviously in Northeast Asia, terrorism is not on the major national security agenda.

So how do you make a convincing case for the South Korean government, that working closely with the United States in counter-terrorism efforts goes into the South Korea's national security interests?

And, vice versa, in case of space. Suddenly space technology and all these projects have become a kind of national agenda for South Korea, whereas in the United States, they didn't pay much attention in working with South Korea in those areas. So the bad news is that it happened to be that Russia that has become an important partner for South Korea's space project.

I couldn't agree more with Dr. Moltz about the lost opportunity. Had it been the U.S., American, satellite or rocket in which the first Korean astronaut went into space, the publicity, I mean, for South Korea it was such a big deal. Every day there was huge coverage about all those events.

So it could have provided such opportunity for the alliance, deepening in trust and the spirit of all this good will and cooperation towards each other, rather than more practical issues of space security and all that.

So in this case, definitely there's a different priority in each of these. In case of pandemics, maybe on both sides the decision-makers or public, they don't really appreciate the merit of having a close alliance, collaboration, in tackling the global challenge.

So that's the second question. Who has more incentive? Who needs to do more in what area? And that leads to my final, third, question.

Then obviously each of these authors provide certain suggestions and proposals that the two countries can work together. But in your opinion, what's the most important first or next step that can be taken by both governments in promoting cooperation in each of these areas, in your mind? I mean, if not, if you cannot say just one, maybe two or three at the moment.

And that does, of course, relate to my previous question about who needs to do more? Obviously, in the case of South Korea, in terms of counter-terrorism, maybe there is a specific measure that the U.S. really wants to have on board. One obvious answer could be if you have South Korea sending a thousand troops to Afghanistan, that could be the best thing that happens in the alliance management. And in that sense, I note that it is quite ironic that under this current Lee Myung-bak administration -- which is regarded as pro-American alliance, more so than the previous administration -- they cannot send any soldiers to Afghanistan or Iraq. It was the previous administration who sent all these troops to those two countries. And there is all these reasons as Kevin rightly pointed out. There is a lack of political capital; the issue of President Lee has at the moment.

But other than that, what could be other important measures that South Korea can take in terms of counter-terrorism efforts? Same goes for, maybe the space effort. Obviously, South Korea wants, U.S. support and help in terms of technology but still what could be the most important area of cooperation that South Korea is seeking or the U.S. can provide? That's my third question.

And let me finish my commenting with just two more points. One is that even though, given this time limit, these three authors didn't say much in their presentations, if you read their papers, I found that the one common suggestion in all these three papers is that there's room for kind of a regional or multilateral cooperation in each of these fields. So it's not just a bilateral alliance issue, right? Each of you suggested there is room even for Japan, in each of the space, or pandemic, or the counter-terrorism efforts -- simply because it's the less

sensitive area in terms of Korea-Japan relations. Or you even further say there could be regional or global multilateral efforts that can come out from this bilateral alliance collaboration.

So that, I think, is one very important aspect of each of these non-traditional areas that provides another opportunity for this U.S.-ROK bilateral alliance.

And the second -- why are we talking about all these non-traditional areas at the moment at all?

One key reason is, of course, as all the authors acknowledge the growing capability of South Korea. Whether you call it "middle-power," or "facilitator," South Korea definitely has grown in terms of its human resources, money, financial resources, and technology. So that's why we are discussing all these non-traditional issues in talking about alliance management.

And that provides important potential for the deepening and broadening the alliance basis of this U.S.-ROK alliance. And in that sense, I do really appreciate the effort to shed important light in those areas.

And on that note, let me stop here. I look forward to the response. Thank you very much.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Seongho, for your comments. I would like to invite Scott Snyder to come up and chair the proceedings. So please keep in mind that there are things to eat and drink back there. They're already paid for. Scott?

MR. SNYDER: Okay, well I do think that we want to invite questions from the audience. We have about an hour, I think. And we will want to turn to the presenters to answer some of the questions that Seongho raised. I think that he really did an excellent job of providing a critique that would tie together the respective presentations. We'll open the floor. Yes?

QUESTION: There have been several mentions of interoperability. That's really getting into the nuts and bolts. I wonder if each of the three speakers, in their respective areas, could give a couple of very practical examples of interoperability?

MR. SNYDER: Who wants to start? Clay?

DR. MOLTZ: Yes, in the space field I'd say that there is a lot of room for improvement. I think it's a critical question, but it's not something that we've really made much progress on. We obviously have a variety of cooperative

communications networks that we've built for ground, air and sea forces -- not as much in the space area. South Korea has not had the capability until very recently. And it's also not an area where the United States has felt very comfortable sort of getting into that whole field.

So this is going to have to take a higher-level decision. I again have been encouraged by the Operationally Responsive Space Office in the Pentagon, by their comments. And I think that this process is slowly working its way forward. But there are also going to be some export-control issues having to do with building systems that are going to be able to work together. And we're going to have make a decision that this is a strategic interest of the United States, to begin to share some of these capabilities and make sure that allies are on the same frequencies, have the same kinds of technologies -- and, to some degree, going forward, that we begin to build satellites that are compatible. And that's going to be part of building a constellation that's going to be integrated. But I think that the logic is there. I think we're still waiting to see, the political will to move this forward. But it's starting.

DR. SHEPARD: All right, I'll try next. Interoperability regarding counter-terrorism. I think the easiest place to start is with military operations. And I think training on the peninsula with the USFK is a fairly obvious example of how the U.S. and South Korean militaries operate together.

It's not only been on the peninsula, however. There's anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. The training and the non-combat roles that South Korea has played in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of the U.S. war on terror.

There have been through ASEAN U.S. proposals that have been followed up by South Korean leadership. One in particular that comes to mind is a program that ran until last year in the Philippines, training the military and the police for counter-terrorism and terrorism-reaction forces.

So I think there's considerable room for improvement and growth. I mentioned that South Korea has a strong CBR program. I think it would be wise for the U.S. and South Korea to work more on regional training and capacity-building on CBR. And there are a number of other possibilities.

I was going to link it with my response to Seongho, that I think one of the most, one of the first things that needs to be done is to build cooperate efforts through ASEAN. I think that's one area that would also, you know, regard interoperability of the two. So I'll stop there.

MR. SNYDER: Perhaps a little less applicable on the pandemic flu side, but it's still there, I think. First of all, the fact that you have a CDC and

KCDC, and an NIH and a KNIH is terrific for the relationship. And even when they don't use the same acronyms, there are still some good parallel institutions and high levels of technical capacity in both surveillance and also treatment and vaccine development. Virus sharing I think has been very effective in terms of interoperability.

Force protection is another aspect of this. And I didn't mention it in my talk, but we have what they call a CBRN Working Group amongst our two armed Forces -- chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Working Group - - that is looking at looking at detection, containment and also consequence management in these different situations -- primarily in a military context, but also it has, the biological side in particular has overlap.

A little less interoperable in the areas of overseas aid and those kinds of programs. The scale of our programs is just so vastly different. And we still approach the way we manage crisis management at home is also quite different. Our government structures are just set up differently that way.

MR. SNYDER: Okay, I neglected to ask people to identify themselves when they ask their questions. Yes? Right there.

QUESTION: I'm Sun-won Park, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution. I'm very glad to hear the presentations given by three important authors, because these three areas are really important for South Korea. The South Korean government is not yet fully prepared for these new challenges.

So during the Bush Administration and Roh Moo-hyun Administration, both countries concentrated their efforts to role-shifting from relating by South Korea and supporting by United States in defending (inaudible). So now we can expand the role, and the role of the bilateral alliance.

So especially in terms of the pandemic and biological threats, pandemic disease could be dealt by the civilian side. But when we think about the biological threat, then there is almost preparation at all. So I think that as Jim Schoff proposed, we need to build out a really flexible and comprehensive infrastructure, whereby we can cope with pandemic disease and also the biological threat. Therefore, I think you need to emphasize that side.

And in terms of counter-terrorism, South Korea is a densely, highly-populated country, so there are almost 10 metropolitan, which has more than 1 million population. So therefore we need to learn a lot about the homeland security from the United States. And we need to have this information and working relationship on counter-terrorism, especially our country houses more than 100,000 Southwest Asian nationals. And therefore we have -- they want,

some people use South Korea as a nationality-laundering place, which could be a threat to U.S. security. Therefore, close cooperation is most important.

In terms of space cooperation, I think Korea has been a very tricky partner, because South Korea wants to enhance its missile ranges and capabilities. So they could not work with South Korean government in the space launching site.

However, when we look into the satellite site, the interoperability is very much important. Therefore, as Dr. Moltz suggested, that South Korea and the United States will open a new chapter in enhancing the cooperation in satellites, rather than launching sector.

So these all three papers are really important. And this could be the first job done for the future (inaudible) alliance study. I don't have any questions, but I want you to emphasize the importance and significance (inaudible) provided and (inaudible).

MR. SCHOFF: Well, it's actually a good segue, I think, to address some of the issues that Seongho raised, because they're excellent questions and they get at the heart of why we're doing this. And it's good to be -- not skeptical necessarily, but critical in terms of what's really useful and really valuable.

And the issue of, "is the alliance good for the issue, and is the issue good for the alliance?" -- and I think the answer is "yes" to both of those, but they are to different degrees.

On the pandemic flu side, the money that we have, the skills and the capacity that we have as countries are not unique to our two countries, but it is among an elite group of countries in this area. And so it's really being part of a core group that can play quite an important role. And if we saw the benefit of that in the preparations leading up to over the 2000s, that helped us deal with this current threat -- and as I showed before, it's really avian flu that we're worried about. So that need is still there and will continue to be there.

So the need is constant. We have unique tools to bring to the table as part of a core group. It won't always be bilateral in that context, but there are bilateral components.

But the issue is good for the alliance in the context, I think, of fostering interagency cooperation and this flexibility that Dr. Park mentions. Whether we're going to be dealing with North Korean collapse scenarios, or effects of climate change, or other kinds of calamities, our ability to respond is still somewhat unique in the context of the assets that we have in the alliance and the relationships that we've developed.

And I think it also, in the context of the regional or multilateral component, it becomes a useful vehicle to foster theater security cooperation, even if it's in this non-traditional type, and it's a way of bringing U.S., Japan and Korea together on issues, with Australia, perhaps, but also to get China involved and to build connections in that regard. Thinking about national security issues, even if they're not involving military per se, there's still something that is affecting nations' national security.

So that addresses at least one of the key issues. But the other ones, we can perhaps talk about later on, as well.

MR. SNYDER: Since Jim has already responded to Seongho's "so what?" question, why don't we ask the other -- Kevin and Clay -- to also do that. And then I'll go back to the floor.

DR. SHEPARD: All right. Before I get to that, to respond, or to add to the last comment, when we looked at, when we spoke about pandemic disease, and Jim talked about bio-threats.

And one thing that popped to mind was that while these are, you know, interesting and new areas of cooperation, they are far from being unrelated. Because one thing that I came across on a pretty regular basis when preparing for this paper was the threat of bioterrorism. And you mentioned that, you know, South Korea is not prepared for this. I'm not a South Korea military expert, but with the long-term awareness of North Korean biological weapons testing, I find it hard to believe that the South Korean military hasn't taken some steps to prepare for that.

I think one area where we need to see more cooperation is not just between the militaries of the U.S. and Korea and the civilian side of the U.S. and Korea, but we need to see more cooperation between the civilian and military sides and have those four components working together. I'm sure that we've got some biological preparations in both militaries that we need to civilianize. And I think that's one area where we can work for both bioterrorist issues and pandemic disease.

But just really quickly to get to Seongho: why does it matter? As I said, I think it allows South Korea to play a more leading role in counter-terrorism cooperation, allow South Korea to play a more leading role especially in the region. And it also eases concerns of U.S. commitment by playing a larger role in an issue that's so important to the U.S. at the moment. For the U.S., obviously it allows for more burden sharing. The U.S. is spread pretty thin and the more allied support it can get the better. But also over the last eight years, the U.S. burnt a lot of bridges diplomatically. And one thing that South Korea playing a larger role in

the region does is it allows them to get into areas and to work with governments that may not be as cooperative with the United States as they would be willing to be with Seoul.

So who has more interest? I think a better question is on what level are these interests at? I think it plays -- counterterrorism plays an interest -- is interesting to both countries if you would. The U.S. obviously has this on the global level: counterterrorism, antiterrorism, counter-proliferation. For many of these interests, South Korean support plays a role, but as you know, Lee Myung-bak has talked about expanding the regional influence and the regional role and the global role. And I think working with the U.S. on counter-terror issues plays an important part in that particular sector of South Korea national interests. So like I said, if you ask South Koreans on the street what they thought about counterterrorism, they would tell you that it's not, you know, it's not one of the big interests of the nation. If you ask that same South Korean on the street what they thought about South Korea expanding their role -- expanding in Asia and taking a more leading role, I think you'd get a different response. And I think that the two countries can work together on this issue despite the fact that they might not be pursuing the same national interests. I'll stop there.

DR. MOLTZ: I'd just like to first of all follow up on this question about satellites because I think it does raise a number of interesting components to the space side, and I think working on satellites together could be a good starting point. Also the International Space Station is really a very open opportunity that the United States could begin to offer, both space in terms of research technology for South Korea to put on the International Space Station and in the future astronaut potential.

One of the things that I think the United States needs to think about carefully is that as we've looked at emerging -- particularly passive military capabilities, communications, and also reconnaissance, we've tended to look at allied development of these systems as a waste of money primarily because we figure well, we provide a lot of this data to them anyway, so why do they need their own capabilities? But, of course, there are lots of reasons why countries want to be independent. They do this not only because of national security concerns, but also because of reasons of technological development, technological independence, regional prestige, and domestic science and technology education, so there are reasons why these countries want to do this that are not in any way hostile to the alliance.

I think we need to think of ways of turning these assets into a "positive" for the United States. And as I look at some of the capacities that are being built in South Korea in increasing sophistication of some of their satellites, I

think what we should recognize is that they represent a capacity that we could begin to use as well if we begin to plan for that.

The “why” question that Dr. Sheen raises I think is a good one, and I think his point is well taken about this missed opportunity for the United States in terms of the human space flight field. And it’s very symbolic that Russia stepped in and Russia got all the credit for that with the South Korean population, and that was a loss for the United States. And so we need to be a little more forward leaning: how do we get the United States back into this picture? I think there are lots of ways we can do it, but we need to think about this public relations issue and not see ourselves replaced by Russia or certainly by China. So this is an issue for the United States. And then again, as I’ve mentioned, I think there are broader national security reasons why integrating some of our capabilities makes sense.

A final point picks off of one of Kevin’s very good points--we want to be able to also tie-in to some of the capabilities politically that South Korea has with other countries. I just got back from China and I was at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics -- notably I saw that there are a number of South Korean graduate students. I was surprised. So there’s already a connection that the United States certainly lacks. And in a variety of areas, China is a very important player here, and we want to be, wary of some of their military dominance, but we also don’t want to demonize China. We want to try to bring them into a broader network of space security, space situational awareness, space traffic management, monitoring of radiation from space, and also remote sensing of climate change and disaster problems. All of these things will require some Chinese participation, and South Korea may have a role there as a bridge, because it is one of the few countries that the United States is friendly with that has worked with this cooperative organization that China has in regard to space.

QUESTION: Hi. My name’s Chris Kim from HRNK. This is a question specific to Dr. Shepard. Because you do come from a North Korea background, I wanted to know if you could comment. In the context of the U.S.-ROK Alliance especially, you’ve been focusing a lot on regional security, Asia regional security.

One of the topics I wanted to hear your comments on is the human security aspects, not only to domestic problems that we know so well of domestically within North Korea, but the contentious state of the Sino-North Korea border as we’ve seen with the journalists who were abducted earlier this year, as well as the impending costs for South Korea for accepting North Korean defectors who leave North Korea and have to be brought to South Korea. More specifically, I’m really interested in hearing your comments in the context of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, what are the prospects and also the necessary developments

and changes in the current status of the U.S.-ROK Alliance to address the North Korea issue, taking into account four of the new developments from this year. One is the obviously last week strong showing of support between North Korea and China to return to normalization of relations, not only within the six-party talks, but individually with the North Korea-Chinese relations, also taking into account the overflow of North Korean defectors moving outside of Northeast Asia and into Southeast Asia into Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. The U.S. government's support of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2008 by accepting North Korean defectors from the U.S. Embassy in Thailand directly from Thailand into the United States as refugees. And also the appointment of Bob King who is expected to be the next Special Envoy to North Korea.

So if you could just give your comments on the prospects and necessary developments, and also any changes in the current U.S.-ROK Alliance, it would be greatly appreciated.

DR. SHEPARD: All right, I'm not sure I'll be able to tie that in with counterterrorism cooperation, but I'll try to hit all these points.

First, prospects for changes in the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in regards to North Korean refugees, I wouldn't expect any major changes. The appointment of a Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights isn't a new thing. Now it's been vacant since Obama took office, so this is a step toward showing support for human rights efforts and concern about North Korean human rights, but, you know, it's not a new position.

The overflow of defectors in Southeast Asia I think will increase pressure on the U.S. and on South Korea to raise the issue more, but most of those, the large majority of those refugees, as you know, are still coming through China. And so if you're going to put pressure on anyone for human rights treatment, human rights for defectors, then it's still going to have to be focused in Beijing. Support by the U.S. by accepting refugees directly from let's say Thailand, I would like to have seen a lot more support. It's been nominal almost. You know, the U.S. government has signed or passed a human rights act, but done very little to move on it afterwards.

Border -- six-party talks and North Korea-China relations? I think those will always be hand-in-hand because it's China. It's through China that we're going to convince North Korea to return to six-party talks. Unfortunately for the human rights efforts, I believe that the better those talks go, the less discussion there will be about North Korean human rights. Now, Obama has shown an interest and the Lee Myung-Bak Administration has taken a much tougher stance toward North Korea, which I think will allow more room for NGOs to work. But as six-party talks go, I think the U.S. and South Korean

governments are going to continue to prioritize denuclearization. I'd hate to see the human rights issue fall by the wayside, but it wouldn't entirely surprise me.

MR. SNYDER: Actually, as part of this overall project, we do have an individual who's working on the human rights question and he's here. Peter Beck. I don't know if you want to say just a couple of sentences about some of your conclusions on this?

PETER BECK: Yes, I'll be presenting in our closed-door meeting tomorrow on the very issues that you raised. And basically, when we look at the different issue areas, I think the area where there's the least amount of cooperation arguably is on human rights, that despite the fact that we will soon have a full-time human rights envoy. Our envoys have never really had a dialogue with each other, and there's really no coordination taking place between the U.S. and South Korea on human rights in North Korea. And I think -- I'll outline about seven different steps that they can take, including reviving the trilateral cooperation and oversight group in having human rights component to it, but also creating an organization, modeled after Kito if you will, of helping to resettle refugees, to coordinate efforts to make it easier for refugees to reach the United States and other countries given that South Korea has a much better capability of screening these individuals. So I think you've pointed out some very important issues that I hope in the months ahead that our two governments can work on better.

MR. SNYDER: There's a question in the back. He's been very patient.

QUESTION: My name is Tong Kim with SAIS. I am also a visiting professor with Kyungnam University as well where you come from. All right, I have one comment to make and also question.

I think all these three areas that Professor Sheen called the nontraditional areas of cooperation between -- in the context of U.S.-ROK Alliance. That said, but it you applied a new concept to strategic alliance as abdicated and explained to a lot of times by the Myung-bak Administration, these are very areas where South Korean government wants to move into, especially two areas. I think that Kevin also mentioned that Lee Myung-bak's interest in broadening its roles in regional and global areas precisely with all this. By the way, I just had a casual chat with General (inaudible) and he is very pleased with the state of relationship, especially in terms of military-to-military adulations between the U.S. and South Korea. He thinks it's superb. And again, he was interested in the implementation of the new areas of cooperation in the context of strategic alliance that is covering pandemics or terrorism. So in a sense, he is particularly interested in saying whether South Korea government will be able to

send some troops to Afghanistan because, and he is very appreciative of the fact that South Korean can still keep troops in Iraq, but he is hoping something will happen to end relations to Afghanistan as well.

That said, the two areas I have less problem, but I do have some problem as discussed here in terms with what can be done in space between the two countries? If you say -- this is one area I didn't think the South Korean government really had in mind when they first launched the idea of a strategic alliance, but I think it could have been -- but I think it a good area to do if they would mean to move into peaceful use of space, like you said, of the weather and all kinds of stuff that you mentioned. But when it comes to question of military cooperation, using reconnaissance and intelligence gathering and so forth, and if you increase cooperation in this area between the United States and South Korea, excluding as you said you would welcome China to come aboard with peaceful efforts but in the area of military cooperation, I think in a sense this is good for South Korea to have Russian assistance in this area. What I'm getting at is I don't think anybody really want to see another confrontation between one bloc with another or bipolar competition between China or the United States. In other words, when you have military objectives, you always foresee some kind of potential or premise of potential adversaries. So who adversaries would be other than North Korea, everybody's adversary as far as the West is concerned, but we're not actually treating China as potential -- there is a potential hostility -- hostile relations in the future as international relations develop. So my question is, would the cooperation in the area of space security or military areas of space programs is going to trigger another round of arms race -- this time arms race in space?

DR. MOLTZ: I guess that's directed at me. I think, there are a couple of issues that we need to get on the table. Certainly China did test an anti-satellite weapon in January in 2007. It was a very provocative act. I think it was a very dangerous act. It created a great deal of space debris, increasing the debris field by about 20 percent. So that was something that really shouldn't have happened, and it certainly leads one to pause when one thinks of the direction perhaps of the Chinese space program.

The PLA has a very significant role in the Chinese space program. That said, I would agree with the point we don't want to start a new arms race. I think the Chinese are not interested in an arms race. I don't think the U.S. is either. But what I'm suggesting is that through the steady buildup of an alliance network of space assets, it will make it less likely that the United States needs to go into, if you will, a defensive mode about many of its space assets because it will have redundant capabilities. And, one of the advantages of working at this in a multilateral framework is that we will be able to make it much less critical if any single element is eliminated because we will have surge capacity into other

countries' networks and satellites. So I don't see this necessarily as leading to some sort of arms race with China. In addition, again, it depends on what the framework is. It depends on what our other policies are in regard to the Chinese space program and in regard to questions like rules of the road or some sort of arms control considerations. There's no question that the Administration is considering certain ideas in regard to China, new overtures, but the United States is also in the process of undergoing a major reassessment of all of its space programs. Unfortunately, it's taking a long time. We don't have many of the results yet. So until that happens, the United States has not moved forward with any new ideas. There is going to be, of course, the summit with President Obama going to China in November. There may or may not be elements regarding space security on that agenda, but I think that there is certainly thinking going on about: how do you engage China and not end up in a situation like an arms race? I don't think building a lot of capacity, again, necessarily means it has to be pointed at anyone else. It's a defensive capability, not an offensive capability, and I think it's something that simply makes sense. Over time, as I mentioned, there are other areas that we would broaden into: space situation awareness, traffic management, more monitoring of debris, all of these things would include China as well. So I think strengthening the ROK relationship in this area is not necessarily a dangerous thing.

QUESTION: Gordon Flake with the Mansfield Foundation. First, let me congratulate the Center on this project. It's a novel idea to actually read a joint vision statement, and I think it's inspired to take it a step further and actually hold the two governments to account for all these lofty promises.

I thought the three papers were insightful and very useful in kind of laying out each of these issues, nontraditional though they may be. But the overarching question I have is that there's -- no matter what -- whenever you discuss issues like this that aren't at the core of the bilateral relationship, you run into this question of the tension between bilateral versus trilateral versus sub-regional versus regional and global. And so what I'd like the three presenters to do if you wouldn't mind is kind of focus back on your presentations and help us understand those core issues that are most relevant to the bilateral relationship because I find myself in listening to your presentations wondering, wouldn't some of these things you're talking about be done more effectively on a trilateral basis, including Japan? Wouldn't some of these things be done more effectively on a broader regional basis, not bilateral? Isn't bilateral redundant? And so if you would address that tension between, you know, the bilateral nature of the issues you're talking about and how that fits into the broader regional or even global debate.

MR. SCHOFF: Let me start out a little bit. I mean it's a great point. And pandemic at least, then perhaps some of the others as well, is a perfect

candidate for broader trilateral, multilateral, regional cooperation. I think there's also, in addition to the tension that you mentioned between bilateral and multilateral, there's just that tension between everybody being really busy and having all their jobs to do anyway. And so when someone at the Health and Human Services dealing with Asia on health policy has an issue to talk about with Korea, they'll talk to Korea. They know who to talk to and they know how to get in touch with them. And when there's an issue that's broader regional, there's a regional forum or there's any number of different kinds of workshops and seminars and things. When it's military, they'll get in touch with the military person and this and that. So that's the kind of episodic or responsive aspect of that. But even when you have trilateral meetings, most of the trilateral meetings consist of a series of bilateral meetings in addition to then kind of a plenary session. So ultimately, it's always harder as soon as you add one more person to the mix, whether it's organizing a conference -- and I know this from trying to do trilateral projects and other things -- it gets exponentially more complicated. And there's an extra level of dumbing-down to some extent what is possible and agreeable amongst everyone together. But you still need to have that to help coordinate the efforts of different partners, plus sharing lessons learned. Some countries have more skill in a particular area. There might be the USAID model project in Vietnam, but someone else might be doing a project in Thailand or elsewhere. So that forum -- I think you still need both and there are just things that you can get done more effectively at a bilateral level.

That said, I do think if I'm going to pick, is the alliance good for the issue or is the issue good for the alliance? If I have to pick one of those, say on pandemic cooperation, what is it really all about? I'm ultimately going to say the issue is good for the alliance because yes, there are all these good things that can be done, that we can leverage some of our capacities that are fairly unique to our countries, and build a core group of response capabilities, but ultimately I see it personally as a vehicle for improving and strengthening in a continuous way our ability to cooperate, the number of human relationships that we have as people transition in and out, and ultimately I come away with that's a good thing. And it's a good thing to do with Japan. It's a good thing to do with Australia. But the lack of regional security architecture in the region, it's this old wheels-to-webs idea in a way that Admiral Blair talked about years ago, about building on alliances and then building more webs of connections, interconnections, amongst different players within the region.

DR. SHEPARD: What he said. Of course, counterterrorism activities and counterterrorism efforts are -- they've already gone well past bilateral. The U.S. war on terror is global, and the U.S. is asking for help from every country that it can. So certainly Korea's input and Korea's efforts to support counterterrorism -- it's part of a multilateral, a regional, and a global multilateral effort. Some issues are bilateral -- military. Military is used for

guarding counterterrorism and will remain. You know, there are many issues on the Peninsula, joint training, exchanges. Those will remain bilateral, and that will help to alleviate some of the concerns in Korea as we have the return of full-time operational control and the shift towards strategic flexibility. Engaging in counterterrorism efforts will help ease some concerns, that these are moves toward the U.S. pulling out. Also, there have been some trilateral and multilateral discussions in the region, but the way this would play into the alliance and the bilateral alliance is that basically I envision the U.S. supporting South Korea's role, leading role, in regional efforts. And so this supports U.S. national interests regarding the war on terror. It supports U.S. national interests on maintaining the alliance. And it supports South Korea's national interests on expansion. And so it's through this win-win, not necessarily a bilateral push towards a common interest, but rather a bilateral understanding and support for each other's interests especially in the region, but also globally. I think that's how it can help. This multilateral effort can help specifically with the bilateral alliance.

DR. MOLTZ: Thanks, Gordon, for that question, and I'd also like to tie it into Dr. Gim's earlier question because one of the things that I've been working on for about the last year and a half is a broader project looking at Asia's emerging space programs. And one of the things that struck me when I began to get into this research and I did a series of interviews in South Korea, is how very limited the official U.S. relationship is with South Korea in regard to space. And particularly looking at NASA, it's just mind boggling that the agreement between NASA and KARI was not signed until 2008. You go back and look at Japan-- we've been working with Japan since the 1960s. You look at France. You look at Germany. You look at India. We've flown joint missions with India recently. And Russia, of course. We built the International Space Station with Russia. So, there's a long way to go in the civilian side of space to bring the relationship up to the normal level. And I think that that's one of the reasons why the bilateral side is so important in regard to South Korea today because so far in regard to space, South Korea has been very much a junior partner or a partner we have not even considered. And now suddenly we recognize that South Korea has this capability. They are investing heavily in space, and we have an interest in working with them. So I think that it is important to bring them into, if you will, the NASA space family and also begin to look at South Korea as a partner, not just a smaller ally, because they have a serious capability and we can also benefit from that capability.

QUESTION: Thank you. I'm in the global Economy and Development Program at Brookings. I fully agree that we need to strengthen the three areas that you mentioned. But I think that in addition to the three areas, development cooperation may be one important area to more cooperate between the U.S. and Korea. As you know, Korea was to play a larger role in the global development issue. Korea will host next year a G-20 summit and host a high-

level forum on aid effectiveness in 2011. The Korean government wanted to take today's opportunities to play a larger role in global development. Well, so, and also security -- global security quite relates to development issue. So I think we could explore the possible triangular cooperation between U.S., Korea, and third country such as Afghanistan for poverty reduction, et cetera. So I would like to hear your views on that issue. Thank you.

MR. SCHOFF: Just quickly and I -- that is actually yet another issue on our -- as a part of our project. And although that paper writer is not here today, although he's actually with the Asia Foundation. But you're absolutely right that development cooperation I think is another important area. In the area of pandemic flu, for example, South Korea's budget and experience in overseas aid is still quite low, although it does want to increase. And I think the Foreign Ministry's talking about a 20 percent budget increase; they've asked for at least going into this next year. And the aid budget is supposed to get up to quite a high percentage of gross national income compared to a number of other countries if they get to that point. And Korea has experience with avian flu outbreaks amongst its poultry population and a mass culling of infected birds. This is an experience that the United States doesn't necessarily have in the same way. So they can bring something to the table in that regard in various projects in the region, but there's still a long way to go in terms of building up a parody or a -- in that area. But I think it's definitely an area that we want to go

MR. SNYDER: Okay. There's a question in the back.

QUESTION: I'm Jim Delaney from the Institute for Defense Analyses, and I'd like to ask if any of the speakers or anybody here in the audience knows whether either government, including our Embassy in Seoul and the Korean Embassy here, has begun to kind of reorganize itself to implement the statement at the summit by Obama and President Lee about expanding the alliance to include these nontraditional challenges, because as someone who has served, spent much of my time in U.S. embassies abroad, unless you make this a priority and kind of reorganize your relationship with the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and so forth, I don't know how you add any of these things, you know, beyond the kind of academic and -- I'm not calling this, you know, simply an academic discussion. This is something that Scott Snyder and I have discussed a couple of times. But how do you -- how are both governments going about making happen what was agreed to at the summit?

DR. MOLTZ: If I just might jump in on the space side, although it was not a main focus. One of the interesting things that I've learned in my project is that the only NASA representative for all of Asia is based in Tokyo, and he serves Korea as well but he has to do so by commuting. If there really is a serious

commitment to building this relationship, it seems that we should put a NASA representative in Seoul.

MR. SCHOFF: And this gets a little bit also to some of those earlier questions about what's the most important next step, if what we're talking about is something that we really want to see get to a higher level. In many -- right now, to answer your question, Jim, I don't know of anything specific, for example, in the pandemic flu area that there is an additional initiative beyond the working group that's in the State Department, between liaising with the embassy, between the work at the Health and Human Services, and the relationships that we have. That's why I think what's important is, without adding an extra layer of bureaucracy or launching some big initiative, is simply choosing at a higher level than a desk level necessarily. Getting up to the Assistant Secretary or even the Under Secretary level and saying, these are a couple of issues that we want to emphasize the integration or the -- and the communication amongst these different components that are cooperating on this issue.

I think pandemic is a good candidate for that because of the potential critical need if there really is an avian flu outbreak that we're seeing similar to the swine flu, but also because of what it can do for the alliance. Now we might not be able to pick all of these issues that are all being covered in the project. There's nine or ten of them I think in the project. But to say this alliance relationship is poor -- we did it to some extent with Japan back in the common agenda era in the '90s, and there was this overlay, almost like a transparency that they kind of laid over all the existing things that were already going on in the environment, and in science and technology, and in security cooperation, and they put this common agenda over it. There's some value to that exercise, although I think ultimately it fizzled out because people felt that bureaucratically all that was happening was people were justifying budgets of things by putting "common agenda" on them and there wasn't the real substance behind it in every case. But that said there are also some -- I think you can look at the relationship today with Japan and see some benefits from that exercise at that time. I think you have an even more willing partner and more capable partner in many regards in Korea because you don't have the limitations on the security side in the same way that you have in Japan so you can blend that more effectively together.

But, you know, I think you're absolutely right to raise that question, but the trick is how to do it without, you know, creating some big new bureaucracy that has to be led and funded from a top-down approach.

MR. SNYDER: As a moderator, I'm trying to keep my -- restrain myself, but -- I mean, I will say that the broader purpose of this particular project is precisely to raise some of those kinds of questions. And my understanding is that at this stage there is some follow-on, particularly focused within the

Department of Defense, in terms of thinking about some aspects of implementation of the joint vision statement. It shouldn't be surprising that there's also a lot of bureaucratic resistance in certain portions of one government or the other to really taking these issues seriously as action items. And so one of the reasons why we've commissioned all these papers is precisely to help think through, well what are the implications in terms of operationalizing expanded pipelines for cooperation on these issues. And so I'm hopeful that some of the conclusions and recommendations that are in, you know, this whole set of papers can be, you know, funneled in in ways that will help people to think through, okay, well these are -- this is the new way of organizing that is going to be necessary in order to effectively address, you know, the whole range of issues.

DR. SHEPARD: Well, I was just going to add that -- now I don't know if there have been any structural changes in the Embassy in Seoul. I know that Ambassador Stephens has given several speeches since June that reflected the goals that were set out, so it's gotten at least to that level. As far as the issue that I was looking at, counterterrorism, especially on the military side, these aren't changes that happened after the joint vision came out, but that have been ongoing. Things like inner-operability in the transformation, South Korea joining the PSI, South Korea participating in anti-piracy, things like these nontraditional military threats. South Korea is branching out and is cooperating more fully in these, not I think as a result of the statement, but it does reflect that some of the things that are in the statement regarding nontraditional threats are being addressed. Banking issues and financing, those are things that had already been undertaken by the South Korean government and continue to show that South Korea is moving in a direction to more fully cooperate on this broader range of issues. So I think a lot of the things that we saw in the joint vision, rather than being new goals that were set forth or just stating the goals that the two governments had already agreed to move toward.

QUESTION: Is cyber security part of this counterterrorism effort?

DR. SHEPARD: Yes, it is.

QUESTION: Clarence Smith from Center for International Trade and Security, and I'd like to direct my question towards Dr. Moltz. You'd mentioned that there were export control issues that were a possible impediment towards cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea over space. I was wondering if you could expound a little bit on what those obstacles currently are today in light of the fact that South Korea is enhancing its domestic space capability and the fact that it has alternative countries that it's able to cooperate with?

DR. MOLTZ: As you probably know, in 1999 the United States after the Cox Committee decided to place all space items on the list of controlled munitions, regardless of whether they had a specific military component or not. As a result of that, any transaction with any country, including South Korea, has to go through a very rigorous export control procedure. This has been a serious impediment for countries even like Canada that want to work with us. Now from my own perspective, and I think certainly from the perspective of many people in the U.S. industry, the good news is that there is legislation now pending in the Congress -- it's passed the House; it's waiting approval in the Senate -- that would move the control of these items from the State Department to the Commerce Department. It would also scrub the munitions list again regarding space. So I think that will -- assuming it passes -- will greatly improve and facilitate cooperation, particularly in areas such as space science where there are a lot of things that we could be doing with South Korea that we aren't today.

The second issue, though, frankly, is cost. Many of the U.S. technologies are more expensive than Russian technologies, for example, and so that has been a motivating factor for South Korea. At the same time, my strong impression from having interviewed a number of people in South Korea is that they really would prefer to work with the United States. So if we are able to overcome some of these hurdles and actually get some high-level buy-in for a more open relationship in a variety of space technologies, particularly with our allies, I think that would really smooth things and make this potential relationship I've outlined move much more quickly.

MR. SNYDER: They are winding down. I don't know if we have one last question. It's your second question.

QUESTION: It's a concluding comment sort of. Moving on to the next step, I would hope and I think it would be possible that at the upcoming summit meeting when Obama goes to Seoul next month, they -- in a follow up to joint vision statement, they possibly issue a joint statement including some of the areas you just discussed. And I don't think restructuring of the embassies either here or there would be much impact on it because traditional means of diplomacy. We used to rely heavily on embassies abroad. That has changed. Everything is decided here in Washington a lot more than in the past, and let me give you an example. When James T. Laney was Ambassador to South Korea, he didn't even know, he was not even consulted on whether or not we should attack North Korea. That was in 1994. So that being the trend, I just would hope that next summit would put general statements on very broad areas and including space because as I said before, I don't think, you know, Barack Obama had any idea about the space cooperation when they pursued the strategic alliance which is wholly supported by DOD here and also accepted by State and it's a done deal

now. So that's the general direction and I hope something along this line comes up next month.

MR. SNYDER: Unless there's any other actual final question, I'll just turn to our panel for any concluding comments. It doesn't look -- it looks -- so, Jim, do you want to start?

MR. SCHOFF: Well, not too much more to add except that if I think about -- if the future -- if the G-20 is the future for international collaboration and coordination on a wide range of issues from the economy to the environment and security to some extent, it can get awfully confusing awfully fast if we don't have very strong relationships with a few core countries within that group. It doesn't necessarily have to be equal relationships with everybody in there, but building caucuses within the G-20 on certain issues that are well informed, that our interests and our goals are aligned, I think that it is an agenda-setting power that we have and a harmonizing power in terms of standards and approaches; that will serve us well, and I think Korea's a perfect partner in that regard.

DR. SHEPARD: The only thing that I would add, I would touch on what Dong Gim's final statement there. We've got for not just counterterrorism, but for all of these issues and other issues that will come now that we have Lee Myung-Bak's diplomacy of listening, at the same time we have a diplomatic structure that makes these decisions more and more often in Washington rather than in our embassies abroad. And I think one of the important things that we need to do if we're going to strengthen this alliance is to change that. It needs to be much more in all of these areas about not what South Korea can contribute to the U.S. national interests in this alliance, but Washington needs to become much more concerned about how we can boost South Korea's role in this alliance, and how we can answer the concerns that are being raised in Seoul. So I would hope to see some of these lines of communication and decision-making power returned to Seoul. So I think that was a very good point, and hopefully in all of these areas we'll see, you know, a more equal partnership in the future.

DR. MOLTZ: Looking at space from the U.S. perspective, I think one of the things that we need to be more concerned with is sort of the emerging geography of relationships. And I think one of the problems, getting back to the export control issue, is that it has tended to isolate us from even a number of partners that are in our camp. We need to begin to remediate that, and we need to begin to ask: do we want to see a world where, for example, Seoul is more closely allied with Russia on space? I don't think that's a world that we want to see in the future. And I think there are lots of reasons now for us to reconsider that. Seoul is interested, and so bringing this issue up to a top-level issue for the U.S.-ROK

relationship is one that is in U.S. interests. I also think it will help broaden more general space security within Northeast Asia.

MR. SNYDER: Okay. I'd like to just bring this to a close by saying that this is just three topics among ten that we're addressing as part of a larger project. And I'm gratified that during the course of the question and answer, at least two if not three additional topics that we have papers on have been raised as topics for consideration. Those papers are going to be released at two other events, one of which is going to occur next month in Seoul, and the third of which is going to be back here at Brookings in December. And so for those of you who already had some burning questions on some of those other issues, I'm hoping that you will come back in December where we may be featuring some of the topics that were raised here.

And so with that final promotional advertising for our future activities, I'd like to thank everybody for coming. I'd like to thank CNAPS and Richard for hosting, and I'd like to thank the panelists and audience for what I think was a very rich discussion. Thank you.

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