The Asia Foundation

AFGHANISTAN IN 2012

A Survey of the Afghan People



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Preface

The Asia Foundation is pleased to present the results of its eighth annual opinion survey of the Afghan people. In June 2012 a team of Afghan pollsters—both men and women—fanned out across the country, often traveling long distances in difficult conditions, to gather first-hand opinions from 6,290 Afghan adults in all 34 provinces on a wide range of topics that are critical to the future of Afghanistan. *Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People* provides insights into Afghans' views on such issues as security, national reconciliation, the economy, development and essential services, the quality of governance and political participation, corruption, justice, women's issues and gender equality, and the media. *A Survey of the Afghan People* is the broadest and most comprehensive public opinion poll in Afghanistan. The full survey questionnaire is provided as an annex at the end of this report.

Not only does this survey document Afghans' assessment of the current situation in their country along these important dimensions, it has also established a statistically valid, long-term barometer of how people perceive changes over time. The survey is intended to serve as a useful tool for Afghan government leaders as they shape important policies and initiatives. It can also be used by the international community to guide its engagement and support in Afghanistan, and by nongovernmental organizations as they help meet people's needs at the local level.

The 2012 survey report was written by a team of six Afghan researchers and social science experts who are particularly well positioned to analyze the data, identify trends, and offer key insights. Again this year, the Foundation benefited from technical support provided by the Nepal-based Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA), as well as from its valued, longstanding partnerships with the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ASCOR) and the Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan (CSO).

A Survey of the Afghan People reveals that public optimism about the overall direction of Afghanistan is currently at its highest point since 2006; just over half of Afghans think the country is moving in the right direction, up from previous years. Many people report they are feeling safer in their communities, and crime and violence has reportedly decreased. Support for peace and reconciliation is very high. Over time, Afghans are reporting improvements in a wide range of areas that affect their day-to-day lives, and they are generally satisfied with government performance, from the central to local level. However, in the face of these positive developments, many significant challenges remain. Afghans remain deeply concerned about job creation and the economy, as well as corruption. Security improvements have been uneven across the country, and many Afghans are still afraid to engage in basic public activities that people in other countries take for granted. There is a rising sense of powerlessness to influence government decisions through political participation, and although there is broad support for women's rights in several spheres, Afghans are divided on key issues related to women's political participation.

These findings are particularly important and relevant in the transition period leading up to 2014, when the Afghan government will take over leadership and management of security from NATO-led forces and take full responsibility for development in the country. The Asia Foundation offers this survey as a catalyst and input for dialogue among Afghan leaders and their development partners in their mutual efforts to build a stable, prosperous society through responsive and accountable governance.

David D. Arnold
President, The Asia Foundation
October 2012

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1 Executive Summary

1.1 Key Findings

Just over half of respondents (52%) say Afghanistan is moving in the right direction, up from 46% in 2011. It is important to note, however, that as in other years some of the originally identified survey sampling points had to be replaced in 2012 for security reasons, thus respondents living in highly insecure areas (who might be more pessimistic about the overall direction of the country) are likely to be underrepresented.

The most commonly cited reasons for optimism are good security (41%) and reconstruction/rebuilding (35%), followed by the opening of schools for girls (14%), improvement in the education system (13%), and having an active Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) (13%). Insecurity (39%) is the most commonly cited reason for pessimism. Security thus remains the most significant factor in shaping Afghans' assessment of progress in the country.

People surveyed identify insecurity (including attacks, violence, and terrorism) (28%), unemployment (27%) and corruption (25%) as the three biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole. Insecurity is more frequently cited in the West (37%), Central/Hazarajat (36%) and the South East (35%) than in other regions. Numerous respondents in the Central/Kabul (40%), Central/Hazarajat (33%), North West (31%) and North East (30%) regions identify unemployment as the biggest problem, and in Central/Kabul, the North West and North East, it was cited more frequently than any other problem.

Unemployment is also identified as one of the biggest problems at the local level, cited by 29% of respondents. Other critical local-level problems include lack of electricity (25%), roads (20%) and drinking water (18%).

Nearly half (48%) of those surveyed report fearing for their personal safety or for that of their families, with 15% reporting that they are often fearful and 33% reporting that they are sometimes fearful. However, the overall proportion of people with fears about safety dropped eight percentage points this year, from 56% in 2011. The percentage of Afghans surveyed who rarely or never fear for their personal/family safety has also increased in nearly all regions, with the highest level in Central/Hazarajat (84%). The exception is the West, where it dropped from 38% in 2011 to 34% in 2012.

There has been a drop in the proportion of respondents who have experienced violence or crime in the past year (from 22% in 2011 to 16% in 2012), with decreases in all regions except Central/Kabul and the South West. Significant declines were seen in the North East (from 23% to 11%), East (26% to 18%), West (24% to 16%), North West (15% to 9%) and Central/Hazarajat (7% to 1%). People in rural (18%) areas were more likely than people in urban (10%) areas to have experienced violence or crime this year.

The most common form of crime experienced by Afghans surveyed is physical attacks/beatings (29%). Nine percent reported being a victim of a suicide attack, a figure which is at its highest since 2007, representing a notable increase. Among those who experienced violence or crime, more men (55%) than women (48%) said they reported it to the authorities. Relatively more people in rural areas say they report crime or violence (54%) than do their urban (41%) counterparts.

More than half of respondents say they have no fear participating in resolving problems in their community (57%) and encountering an ANA (55%) or ANP (51%) officer. However, 54% report having some level of fear to vote in a national election, and 69% have some level of fear participating in a peaceful demonstration, including 28% who say they would have a lot of fear. Nearly one quarter (23%) said they would have a lot of fear to run for public office.

Survey findings show that Afghans' support for peace and reconciliation remain very high in 2012, as it has been in previous years. A large majority of respondents (81%) agree with the government's national reconciliation and negotiation efforts, with 38% strongly in favor. Although majority within all ethnic groups are in favor of the government's reconciliation efforts and negotiation with the armed opposition, a relatively higher number of Pashtuns (85%) and Uzbeks (84%) are supportive of this endeavor. Support is relatively higher in the East (91%), North East (86%) and South West (84%).

A majority of respondents say they have no sympathy at all (63%) with armed opposition groups in Afghanistan, while 10% say they have a lot of sympathy and 20% say they have some level of sympathy. Over time, there has been a decline in the number of people who sympathize (either a lot or little) with these armed opposition groups that use violence. While the 2012 figures are fairly similar to 2011, there has been a noticeable decline from 2011 to 2012 in the proportion of Afghans with no sympathy for armed opposition groups in a few regions, including Central/Kabul (74% to 70%), the West (60% to 56%) and the South West (61% to 55%). Among those who express a high level of sympathy toward the armed opposition groups, 34% say it is because these groups are Afghans, while a similar proportion (33%) says it is because they are Muslims.

Over half of respondents (53%) reported that their families are more prosperous today than they were during the Taliban era. Fewer than one third (31%) say they are less prosperous. A higher proportion of urban residents (66%) than rural residents (49%) report that their families are more prosperous today, and more rural residents (34%) than urban residents (22%) say that they are less prosperous.

Half of all respondents (50%) say their household financial wellbeing has improved during the past year, and half (51%) say that access to schools has improved. When asked about their household health and quality of their diet, roughly equal percentages say they have improved (42% and 41%, respectively) or stayed the same (46% for each). More than half of respondents (51%) say the availability of products in the market and the condition of their house/dwelling has stayed the same, and 14% say it is worse. Sizeable numbers of Afghans report that their electricity supply (32%) and employment opportunities (28%) have gotten worse over the past year.

More than two thirds (70%) of respondents say the employment situation in their local area is quite bad or very bad, suggesting that the government's efforts to improve job availability have not yet borne fruit. Sixty-two percent are dissatisfied with the supply of electricity in their local area. At the same time, more than three quarters of respondents (77%) report that availability of education is quite good or very good in their local area, followed by clean drinking water (76%), the security situation (74%) and freedom of movement (72%). Comparison of 2007 to 2012 data shows that, with the exception of the availability of jobs, the availability of the rest of the services has generally improved since 2007/2008, with some fluctuation in between. The greatest perceived improvement has been in the area of clean drinking water, for which satisfaction rose 14 percentage points from 2008 to 2012.

More than half of those surveyed are aware of development projects related to education (53%) and reconstruction/building of roads and bridges (50%). Afghans have also noticed projects to improve the drinking water supply (43%), deliver healthcare (38%), build mosques (29%) and improve the electricity supply (22%). Generally, awareness about development projects is higher in the East, South West and South East than in the Central/Hazarajat, Central/Kabul and North East regions.

Among those who indicated awareness of such development projects, more than one third (35%) say the United States has provided the most aid in their local area. Respondents also identified Germany (9%), Japan (9%), Australia (5%), India (4%), Turkey (3%), and Sweden (3%), and other aid providers to a lesser degree. Germany was identified by a relatively higher proportion of people in the North East (30%), and a relatively high proportion of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (21%) and East (15%) regions identified Japan. Australia was named by a higher proportion of people in the Central/Hazarajat (10%) and Central/Kabul (8%) regions. India was more frequently identified in the East (7%), South West (7%) and South East (6%). The United Kingdom was identified most often in the South West (6%), but named infrequently in other regions. Likewise, 10% of respondents in the South West identify Canada as a major aid provider.

Regarding public confidence in public institutions and other important bodies, respondents continue to express the highest levels of confidence in the Afghan National Army (ANA) (with 93% of respondents saying they have a fair amount or a great deal of confidence) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) (with 82% of respondents expressing some level of confidence in them). However, while public confidence in the ANA has been modestly rising over time (from 87% in 2006 to 93% in 2012), public confidence in the ANP has slightly decreased over time (from 86% in 2006 to 82% in 2012). There is some evidence that people's confidence in these two bodies is correlated with their level of fear when encountering ANP and ANA officers. Electronic media (e.g., radio, television) is the third most trusted institution (75%), followed by religious leaders (74%). Institutions with the lowest levels of public confidence include national and international nongovernmental institutions (NGOs) (54% and 53%, respectively), the government justice system (50%), political parties (46%) and local militias (39%).

Three quarters (75%) of respondents give central government performance a positive assessment, including 15% who say it is doing a very good job and 60% who say it is doing a somewhat good job. Over time, an increasing number of people report satisfaction with the way the central government is carrying out its responsibilities. In several substantive areas, Afghans' positive assessment of government performance is at its highest point since 2010, including in education (89%), security provision (70%) and maintaining relations with neighboring countries (55%).

The most frequently cited achievements of central government are a better education system (28%), establishing peace and security (24%) and reconstruction (21%), with some variation across regions.

The most frequently reported failings of central government are administrative corruption (32%), insecurity (23%) and lack of job opportunities (18%). Twelve percent of respondents identified suicide attacks, followed by weak government (9%), failure to remove the Taliban (8%), a weak economy (8%), removing drugs (7%), a bad education system (5%) and injustice (5%).

A high proportion of respondents say they think their provincial government is doing a good job, with particularly highly positive assessments in the Central/Hazarajat (88%), North East (88%), West (86%) and North West (83%) regions. While still quite high, respondents positive assessment of the performance of provincial government in the South West (71%) and South East (73%) is lower than in other regions.

More than seven out of 10 respondents (72%) say the Afghan Parliament is addressing the problems of ordinary Afghans. Just over half (59%) say they think that their own members of parliament (MPs) are addressing the major problems of their constituency. The same proportion (59%) say their provincial council (PC) members are addressing the major problems of their community. Less than one fifth of respondents (18%) reported contacting their MP for help with a problem, with men (22%) more likely to have done so than women (14%). Twenty-two percent reported contacting a PC member for assistance, with twice as many men doing so than women.

Respondents received a brief explanation about the role of the recently formed community development councils (CDCs), and about half of respondents (48%) say they are aware of a CDC in their area, while nearly the same proportion (49%) is not. Awareness of CDCs is noticeably higher among men (53%) than women (43%).

The majority of Afghans surveyed say they think corruption is a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government. More than half of respondents say corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood (52%), in their daily life (56%) and in their local authorities (60%). More than two thirds say that corruption is a major problem in their provincial government (70%) and in Afghanistan as a whole (79%). Perceptions that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole and at the provincial level are at their highest points since 2006, and perceptions that corruption is a major problem at the level of local authorities and the neighborhood, too, have been steadily rising.

Regarding different forms of corruption, nearly half (47%) of respondents say that they are most affected by administrative corruption, followed by bribes (17%), moral corruption (14%), court corruption (9%), police corruption (8%) and corruption in the education system (4%). Around one third of respondents reported encountering corruption (bribery) when seeking public healthcare services (36%), applying for jobs (34%), interacting with the judiciary/courts (34%), receiving official documents (32%) and dealing with the ANP (31%). The lowest reported experience with bribery is with the ANA (18%).

Forty-three percent of Afghans surveyed say the government is doing about right in fighting corruption, while 40% say it is not doing enough to fight corruption.

About one quarter (24%) of respondents say they feel safer to express their opinions this year than last year. One sixth (16%) feel less safe, and more than half (56%) say they feel as safe as they did one year ago. More than one third of respondents in Central/Hazarajat (34%) say people feel safer expressing their opinions today than they did a year ago, but only 18% in the North West think so.

This year, respondents identify a more diverse range of reasons for why freedom of expression has improved. Half (50%) attribute it to good security conditions in their area, more than one third (39%) say it is due to the legal guarantee of freedom of speech, and 13% attribute it to peace and democracy and the presence of the ANP and ANA. Smaller percentages identified good government, unity among people, better education, removal of the Taliban, freedom of the press and respect for human rights as reasons why people now feel safer expressing their opinions.

More than half (52%) of respondents say they feel they can influence government decisions by participating in political processes, including 14% who say they can have a lot of influence and 38% who say they can have some influence. However, 24% feel that they have no influence at all.

More than two fifths of respondents (43%) say religious leaders consider the public interest more than personal interests when making decisions and policies, and a similar proportion (42%) say the same about government employees. Afghans are the most skeptical about the ability of court officials (28%), international NGO staff (27%), donor institutions (27%) and national NGO staff (24%) to serve the public interest rather than their own interests.

About two thirds of respondents (64%) say they think it is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public, including 20% who strongly agree. The highest proportion of people who think it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the government are from the Central/Hazarajat (70%) region, and the highest percentage of respondents who disagree are from the South East (41%).

Eighty percent of respondents agree that the government should allow peaceful opposition, and 83% agree that everyone should have equal rights under law, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion.

When asked an open-ended question about what personal benefits they believe they will gain from democracy in Afghanistan, 30% said peace, 29% said freedom and 20% said good security. Other popular responses were rights and law (15%), Islamic democracy (14%), less corruption (13%), a government of the people (12%) and more job opportunities (12%).

More than two thirds (69%) of Afghans surveyed say that religious leaders should be consulted on local problems, while just over a quarter (28%) say that politics and religion should not mix.

A majority of respondents (58%) say they think the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair, while more than one third (37%) say they were not. There is large difference between rural and urban respondents; sixty-one percent of rural respondents say that the past parliamentary elections were free and fair, while just under half of urban respondents (45%) say they were.

More than four fifths of respondents (84%) say they think Afghans should choose their leaders through regular, open and honest elections rather than adopt other methods for choosing the country's leaders. Seventy-two percent of Afghans surveyed agree that the president should be limited to serving no more than two terms in office.

One fourth of respondents (25%) say political parties mostly serve the interest of the country as a whole, while 18% say they serve the interests of broad layers of society. Sizeable numbers say political parties serve group/personal interests (16%), regional interests (15%) and ethnic interests (15%).

Respondents were asked which statement they agree with more: "Members of parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the president does not agree" or, "Since the president represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what parliament thinks." More than two thirds of respondents (70%) agree with the first statement.

In 2012, fewer than one fifth of respondents (19%) reported referring a personal or community dispute to a third party for assistance. More rural respondents (20%) report taking their disputes for resolution than their urban counterparts (14%). Twenty-one percent of men report taking their dispute to be resolved, compared to 16% of women. Higher proportions of people accessed formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms in the South East (27%), South West (24%) and West (23%) regions. Very few people in the Central/Hazarajat (7%) region say they sought assistance with a dispute.

The most common type of dispute by far is over land (22%). Among those who sought assistance with their disputes, most approached a local shura or jirga for resolution (59%). A substantial proportion took their dispute to a local malik/khan (30%), a sub-national government institution such as the district authority (25%), mullah (25%), friends and family (25%), other government agencies (15%), community development council (15%), and provincial governor/authorities (13%). Nearly one quarter of respondents say they approached the ANP (22%), while 11% say they approached the ANA.

When asked to assess the state courts, more than two thirds of respondents (68%) say they believe that state courts are fair and trusted, including 21% who strongly agree with this statement. More than half of respondents (55%) say that state courts follow the local norms and values of the Afghan people. A majority says that state courts treat men and women equally (59%) and are effective at delivering justice (56%). However, fewer than half of respondents (42%) say they think state courts resolve cases in a timely, prompt manner.

More than four fifths (86%) of respondents say they agree that local shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted. Around three quarters agree that local shuras/jirgas follow local norms and values (74%) and are effective at delivering justice (75%). Just under three quarters say that local shuras/jirgas resolve cases promptly (70%). The survey also shows that a significant majority of respondents (70%) think that the local shuras/jirgas should include women as members.

Almost one third of respondents (29%) identify lack of education and/or illiteracy as the biggest problem faced by women. Ten percent cite the lack of rights/women's rights, 8% say domestic violence, 6% say forced marriage/dowry, 5% say general healthcare and 4% say poverty. Since 2006, lack of education and illiteracy have consistently been identified as the biggest problem for women in Afghanistan, these figures have been stable since 2007 (29% in 2007, 28% in 2008, 30% in 2009, 31% in 2010 and 25% in 2011) with a small drop in 2011 and rose back in 2012.

Nearly nine in 10 respondents (87%) agree that women and men should have equal educational opportunities, including 48% who strongly agree. Two thirds of Afghans surveyed say they think women should be allowed to work outside the home. Survey findings reveal a substantial difference between men and women's attitudes in this regard. Four fifths of female respondents (80%) say women should be allowed to work outside the home compared to just over half (55%) of men who say so. Significantly more urban respondents agree (81%) than their rural counterparts (61%).

More than half (53%) of respondents say women should decide for themselves when it comes to voting. Twenty-six percent say that men should advise women on how to vote, and 20% say women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men.

Forty-five percent of respondents say that men and women should have equal representation in political leadership positions. Forty-three percent say that leadership positions should be mostly for men, while 11% say that leadership positions should be mostly for women. There is a discrepancy between the opinions of male and female respondents on this issue: 56% of women, say there should be equal representation in political leadership, while 37% of men say this. More than half of men (53%) say that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, while 14% of female respondents say that leadership positions should be mostly for women.

The survey reveals that more than four fifths (80%) of Afghan households own a functioning radio in their households, with a higher level in rural (83%) than urban (73%) areas. A higher proportion of urban residents report owning other communication technologies. While almost three quarters (71%) of Afghans surveyed own mobile phones, 94% people in urban areas own one compared to 63% in rural areas. More than half of respondents (52%) say they own a TV set, but there is a large difference in ownership between urban residents (92%) and rural residents (40%). A small percentage of Afghans reported having computers in their households (12%), with many more in urban households (34%) than rural households (5%). Fixed phone line ownership remains low in Afghanistan (3%), but four times as many urban residents report (8%) owning fixed land line phones compared to their rural counterparts (2%).

Ownership of all forms of communication technology, with the exception of radio, has been rising steadily since 2007, but radio continues to be the leading form of communication technology in Afghanistan, according to survey findings. Mobile phone ownership has seen a large increase over time, from 42% in 2007 to 71% in 2012. TV ownership has gone from 37% in 2007 to 52% in 2012. Computer ownership is still low, but has been rising steadily since its 2008 level of 5%.

While more than three quarters of respondents (77%) say they listen to the radio, more men (83%) report listening to the radio than women (69%). Radio listenership is higher in rural areas (80%) compared to urban areas (65%). In 2012, half of respondents say they watch television, and slightly more women (54%) watch television than men (47%). A disproportionately higher number of people in urban areas (91%) watch television than people in rural (38%) areas.

Forty-three percent of respondents say that radio is their main source of information. The use of television as a primary source of news and information increased from 28% in 2011 to 38% in 2012. Fourteen percent of respondents get news and information from their friends and family and one in 25 (4%) receives news and information through religious leaders or the mosque. Around 1% of Afghans gets news and information through newspapers/magazines, and less than 1% from the internet.

1.2 Summary

In 2012 a majority of Afghans surveyed say they believe things in Afghanistan are moving in the right direction. This is up from previous years. The Central/Hazarajat, South West, East, North East, North West and South East regions are the most optimistic.

The feelings of Afghans about whether the country is moving in the right direction continue to be heavily influenced by their perceptions of the security situation. Among those who are optimistic, improved security was the most frequently cited reason, followed by reconstruction and rebuilding. Likewise, those who are more pessimistic about the direction of the country most often attribute their pessimism to concerns about insecurity.

Out of a wide range of issues mentioned, insecurity (including attacks, violence and terrorism) was identified by the largest proportion of respondents as the biggest problem facing Afghanistan today, and it has consistently held this ranking since 2007. People living in the West, Central/Hazarajat, and South East regions were more likely to cite insecurity than people in other regions.

While many Afghans still say that they often or sometimes fear for their personal or family safety, the overall proportion of people surveyed who say they have fears about safety dropped eight percentage points this year from 2011. The percentage of respondents who report rarely fearing for the safety and security of themselves and their families shows an upward trend from 2008 through 2012, and the percentage of those who say they never fear for their personal or family safety and security has increased in 2012 compared to the past two years. The percentage of respondents who rarely or never fear for their personal or family safety has increased in nearly all regions. People in the Central/Hazarajat region report the lowest level of fear about personal and family safety in 2012, but the North East, South East, South West and North West regions saw the largest increase over 2011 in the proportion of people who rarely or never fear for their safety. The proportion of respondents in the West who say they feel safe dropped slightly this year.

Overall satisfaction with local security conditions has steadily increased since 2008, and satisfaction with freedom of movement has increased since 2010. A high proportion of people currently rate their local security situation and freedom of movement as "quite good" or "very good," and people surveyed in the Central/Hazarajat, North East, North West and Central/Kabul regions are even more satisfied with their security conditions than people in other regions.

Survey findings show that overall, fewer Afghans say they experienced violence or crime over the past year than in 2011, with particularly notable declines in violence and crime in the North East, East, West, North West and Central/Hazarajat regions. In most regions, the reported experience with crime and violence is at

its lowest point since 2008. The most common form of crime experienced was physical attacks or beatings, occurring mostly between neighbors or within the family. However, the proportion of Afghans who reported direct experience with suicide attacks, while still not very high compared to other types of crime, increased in 2012 and is at its highest point since 2007. Suicide attacks reportedly affected a greater proportion of Afghans in the North West and South West than other regions. Respondents in rural areas were more likely than those in urban areas to report having experienced violence or crime this year. Many crimes and forms of violence continue to go unreported, but those who did report it most often approached the ANP or local shuras/elders. Men were more likely to report crime than women, and people living in rural areas were more likely to report the crimes than people in urban areas. For the first time in this survey, the Taliban were the most frequently cited cause of crime in the country, followed closely by unemployment.

Despite these perceived improvements in the security situation, a large number of Afghans surveyed continue to report that they would have some level of fear participating in various hypothetical situations. A slight majority say they are not afraid to get involved in resolving problems in their community or encounter the ANA or ANP. However, a large proportion of people say they are afraid (whether somewhat, or very) to encounter international forces or travel around the country, and well over half are afraid to participate in a peaceful demonstration or run for public office. Around half of respondents have fear when voting in a national election. Generally, levels of fear to participate in these types of public activities are highest in the South West, the East, the South East and the West. Women are more afraid than men in all of these situations, with the exception of encounters with the ANP, for which fear is equal among men and women. Levels of fear to engage in these various activities are lower in 2012 than in 2010, but still higher than in the four previous years.

There has been no notable increase in the proportion of respondents who say they feel safer today than they did a year ago in expressing their opinions; most report feeling as safe as they did last year. Relatively more respondents in Central/Hazarajat region say they feel safer expressing their opinions today, and relatively fewer people in the North West say they feel safer than they did a year ago. Among those who feel safer expressing their opinions, many attribute it to good security conditions in their area and to the legal guarantee of freedom of speech, and those who feel people are hesitant to express their opinions consistently attribute it to poor security conditions.

A very high proportion of respondents continue to express confidence in the two main national institutions responsible for security: the ANA and the ANP, with a slightly higher level of confidence in the ANA in 2012. Public confidence in the ANA has been modestly rising over time, while public confidence in the ANP has slightly declined. Some Afghans who say they are optimistic about the overall direction of the country cite the existence of an active ANA and ANP as a reason for their optimism. People's assessment of the operational capacity of the ANA and ANP across a number of dimensions is generally quite positive, and even more so for the ANA. The area where a notable proportion of respondents have some level of doubt is in the ability of the ANA and ANP to operate without the support of foreign troops. These perceptions of Afghanistan's security institutions have been consistent over time.

The survey shows that Afghans' support for peace and reconciliation remains very high, with a large majority across all ethnic groups and in all regions in agreement with the government's efforts in the area of national

reconciliation and negotiation with armed opposition groups. The level of support from people in the Central/Hazarajat region notably increased from 2011 to 2012. Over time, there has been an overall decline in the number of people who sympathize (either a lot or little) with armed opposition groups; well over half of respondents have no sympathy at all for them. However, in 2012 there was a slight increase in sympathy among people surveyed in select regions, including Central/Kabul, the West and the South West. Overall, respondents are quite supportive of the government's efforts to provide material assistance to those who lay down arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society. The consistent high level of support for the government's efforts in the area of reconciliation and reintegration suggests that an overwhelming proportion of the Afghan respondents want a political solution to the conflict in the country, rather than merely a military one.

A slight majority of Afghans surveyed say that their families are more prosperous today than they were during the Taliban era, but the proportion is noticeably higher than in 2010 and 2011. A higher proportion of urban dwellers than rural dwellers consider themselves more prosperous, as do a higher proportion of people in the Central/Hazarajat and Central/Kabul regions relative to other regions, suggesting that the distribution of prosperity in the post-Taliban period has been uneven. Interestingly, more women than men say they are more prosperous today than they were under the Taliban.

Two areas in which most Afghans report improvements over the past year include overall household financial wellbeing and access to schools. Conversely, sizeable numbers of respondents say that their electricity supply and employment opportunities have deteriorated over the past year: in each of these areas, more respondents say it is getting worse than say it's improving. Unemployment and electricity are also most frequently cited by respondents as the biggest local-level problem they face, and lack of job opportunities is often mentioned as the biggest failing of central government. In the Central/Kabul, North West and North East regions unemployment was the issue most frequently cited as the biggest problem facing Afghanistan today.

However, it is apparent that Afghans who were surveyed are seeing improvements over time in a range of other areas that affect their day-to-day lives. Each year, an increasing number of Afghans report an improvement over the previous year in their schools, financial wellbeing, health, diet, products available in the market, house/dwelling and employment opportunities. Electricity supply is the one area where perceptions of improvements have been relatively flat.

Respondents' level of satisfaction with many basic services in their local area has improved since 2007/2008, with some fluctuation in between. People consistently give the availability of education high marks. Education is also the most frequently cited accomplishment of the central government, and people who are optimistic about the overall direction of the country fairly often identify the opening of schools for girls and improvement in the education system as reasons for optimism. Satisfaction with clean drinking water is also high and has risen by 14 percentage points over the past four years. The proportion of people who rank their local clinics/hospitals, availability of medicine, water for irrigation and even electricity as "quite good" or "very good" is lower overall, but it has increased over time. Respondents are consistently least satisfied with the availability of jobs.

Regarding development efforts in the country, the survey reveals that the types of projects most visible to ordinary Afghans are related to education and reconstruction/building of roads and bridges. Respondents

also commonly cite education and reconstruction/rebuilding as the most important accomplishments of the central government. Afghans are also aware (to a lesser degree) of projects to improve the drinking water supply, deliver healthcare, build mosques and improve the electricity supply. Based on public awareness, such development projects appear to be more numerous and visible in the East, South West and South East regions.

Afghans are more likely to attribute most types of development projects primarily to the efforts of the Afghan government than to foreign donor agencies, with the exception of projects involving de-mining and humanitarian aid. Respondents most frequently identify the United States as the largest provider of aid in their local area, but in select regions sizeable numbers also identify other donors, such as Germany (the North East), Japan (Central/Hazarajat and the East), Australia (Central/Hazarajat and Central/Kabul) and Canada (South West).

When asked to state their level of confidence in various public institutions and other important bodies, Afghans consistently rate several institutions (for example, the ANA, the ANP, religious leaders, the media and shuras/jirgas) higher than they rate several key governance bodies, although confidence in many of these bodies is modestly rising over time. In 2012, respondents have slightly more confidence in provincial government than they do in parliament, the public administration, municipalities and government ministers. Institutions with the lowest levels of public confidence include national and international NGOs, the judiciary, political parties and local militias.

Despite the fact that many Afghans express more limited confidence in some of these government institutions, overall they say they are quite pleased with their current performance. A high proportion of Afghans surveyed give central government performance a positive assessment, and over time an increasing number of people report satisfaction with the way the central government is carrying out its responsibilities. Regions with a notably lower-than-average proportion of respondents providing a positive assessment of government include the South East and West. In several substantive areas, Afghans' positive assessment of government performance is at its highest point since 2010, including education, security provision and maintaining relations with neighboring countries. Positive public opinion about Afghanistan's relations with the international community also rose from 2011 to 2012. However, today more than half of Afghans surveyed say that the government is doing a poor job of fighting corruption, creating jobs and reviving/developing the economy.

An even higher proportion of respondents say their provincial government is doing a good job, with particularly positive assessments in the Central/Hazarajat, North East, West and North West regions. Assessment of provincial government performance has gradually improved in most regions from 2009 to 2011, with the exceptions of the East and South East.

Well over half of those surveyed in urban areas gave a positive assessment of the performance of municipal authorities, with particularly favorable assessments in the South East and North East regions. Satisfaction with municipal authorities in 2012 is higher than in any previous year. While the overall satisfaction level rose marginally from 2011 to 2012, in several regions satisfaction increased dramatically, including the North East, North West and South East. Conversely, the level of satisfaction with municipal authorities declined sharply in Central/Kabul, and to a more moderate degree in the South West. A similar proportion of people in rural areas provide a positive assessment of their district authorities' performance, and district authorities receive

particularly high marks in Central/Hazarajat and the North East. While the overall satisfaction level with district authorities slightly increased in 2012, there are apparent decreases in many regions; the average was pulled up by sizeable increases in satisfaction in the South East and Central/Hazarajat.

A high proportion of Afghans surveyed say the parliament is addressing the problems of the Afghan people, but smaller proportions (although still a majority) say that their own MPs and provincial council members are addressing the major problems of their constituencies. Only a small proportion of Afghans report contacting their MPs or provincial council members for assistance, and men are more likely to do so than women. Regarding the recently formed CDCs, survey findings show equal proportions of Afghans are aware and unaware of them, and men are noticeably more aware than women. Among those who are aware of the CDCs, satisfaction with CDC performance is high.

Afghans surveyed say they are very concerned about corruption; over the past three years, respondents have ranked corruption among the top three problems facing Afghanistan today, and this year administrative corruption was the most frequently mentioned failing of central government. A majority say corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood, in their daily life and in their local authorities, and this proportion is rising over time. An even larger number of Afghans say that corruption is a major problem at the level of their provincial government and in Afghanistan as a whole, and in 2012 such perceptions are at their highest point yet. A sizeable number of respondents reported paying a bribe last year when seeking public healthcare services, applying for a job, dealing with the judiciary/courts, obtaining official documents and when dealing with the ANP. Although reported bribery is slightly lower this year than in 2011, it is still higher than in 2010 and previous years. People appear to be more concerned about and affected by administrative corruption than other forms of corruption. Somewhat surprisingly given these findings, a good number of Afghans surveyed say the government is making about the right level of effort to fight corruption. However, an equal proportion say it is not doing enough.

The overall proportion of respondents who say they can have some or a lot of influence over government policies and decisions by participating in political processes (defined as personal efficacy in this survey) has gradually and steadily declined since 2008. The highest perceived level of personal efficacy is in the East, and the lowest is in Central/Kabul.

Support for equal rights for all Afghans and for peaceful opposition (while quite high today) was at an even higher point in 2006, and reached its lowest point in 2009. Support for these concepts in 2012 is slightly higher than 2009. The proportion of people surveyed who say they think it is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public, which rose from 2009-2011, dropped in 2012. The highest proportion of people who say it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the government are from the Central/Hazarajat region, and the highest proportion who disagree are from the South East. When asked about the potential benefits of democracy, respondents consistently cite such abstract principles as peace and freedom. This year, however, there was increased emphasis on the more practical benefits of democracy, such as good security and job opportunities.

A majority of respondents say that the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair, but urbanites are more

skeptical than their rural counterparts. Those who say they are skeptical about the 2012 election are most likely to attribute it to electoral fraud. Confidence in the Independent Elections Commission is at its highest point since 2008, up slightly from 2011, and it is fairly widely recognized by respondents as the institution responsible for elections in Afghanistan. While over half of Afghans surveyed were able to correctly identify the date of the next presidential election (2014), there are still large numbers of people who are unaware of the actual date, pointing to a need for ongoing civic and electoral education.

There is strong support among respondents for several basic democratic concepts, including voting their own mind at the ballot box (rather than basing one's vote on what the community thinks); choosing their leaders through regular, open and honest elections (rather than adopting other methods); limiting the president to no more than two terms in office; and having parliament (as a representative body) make laws for the country, even if the president doesn't agree.

However, respondents are a bit more divided on other issues related to democracy, including the question of whether it is a good and necessary thing to have many political parties in Afghanistan (and indeed, they consistently rank political parties as one of the least trusted institutions), and whether the president, as the top elected official, should be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong.

Afghans who were surveyed are supportive of regular consultation with religious leaders on the problems facing a community, consistent with the high level of confidence that they have in their religious leaders and the relatively high proportion of people who think religious leaders consider the public interest more than personal interests when making decisions and policies. In 2012, the proportion of respondents who say religious leaders should be consulted on local problems was about equal to 2011 and slightly higher than in several previous years.

When faced with a problem or dispute that they are not able to resolve on their own, respondents say they refer their problems to a wide range of institutions for resolution, but most often to the local shura/jirga. Over time, disputes over land have regularly been the most common problem for which communities seek dispute resolution, although infrastructure-related disputes (particularly related to water and electricity) are also common, and were particularly common in the Central/Hazarajat region in 2012. The survey reveals an overall modest upward trend in people's use of state courts for dispute resolution (particularly in urban areas), indicating that these courts may be becoming more accessible to people and that the reach of the state is expanding.

Shuras/jirgas continue to be the most trusted, accessible conflict resolution mechanisms for most Afghans surveyed, particularly in rural areas. When asked to rate shuras/jirgas and state courts along several dimensions, people consistently give shuras/jirgas a more positive assessment. While a majority agree with most positive statements provided for both of these institutions, a higher proportion say that shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted, follow local norms and values, are effective at delivering justice and resolve cases promptly. Fewer than half of respondents say they think state courts resolve cases in a timely manner. There was a discernible sharp increase in 2012 in the proportion of people who say they believe that state courts are fair and trusted, and also an increase in the proportion of people who say shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted, but a slight decline in positive perceptions for both institutions across all other dimensions from 2011 to 2012.

People report overall higher satisfaction levels with the final outcome of shura/jirga proceedings than with state court processes.

Since 2006, lack of education and illiteracy have consistently been identified by both men and women as the biggest problem facing Afghan women, these figures are steady and stable since 2007 with a small drop in 2011 and rose back in 2012, with a slight increase in 2012. The second most commonly cited challenge is job opportunities. Other issues of concern include rights, domestic violence, forced marriage/dowry, healthcare and poverty. Women were more likely than men to identify job opportunities as a critical issue facing Afghan women, and people in the North East and North West regions are particularly concerned about this issue. The Directorate of Women's Affairs is by far the institution most frequently named by Afghans in the survey as a place where women can go for assistance with their problems, and in 2012 it was identified at twice the rate as in 2011. However, a large majority of survey respondents were not able to name an institution that helps women.

A large majority of respondents say that women and men should have equal opportunities in education. A smaller but still sizeable majority say women should be allowed to work outside the home, although women are much more likely to agree than men, and urban dwellers are much more likely to agree than people in rural areas. Afghans are more divided on the issue of women's political participation. While just over half say that women should decide for themselves how to vote, many say that men should play some role in advising or influencing women's choices at the ballot box. Public opinion is similarly divided on the question of gender balance in political leadership. Nearly equal proportions of Afghans surveyed say that men and women should be equally represented in political leadership positions, and that such leadership positions should be mostly for men. Women respondents feel more strongly about equal representation than their male counterparts. A sizeable majority of respondents say that the local shuras/jirgas should include women as members.

The survey shows that over time, there has been a slow but steady decline in the percentage of Afghans who say women should be allowed to work outside the home and who say women and men should be equally represented in political leadership positions.

Afghans surveyed have a high level of trust in electronic media (e.g., radio, television); it ranks among the top three most trusted institutions in the country. Radio ownership and listenership is high, particularly in rural areas, and radio is most Afghans' main source of news and information. However, ownership and use of other forms of communication technology, including mobile phones and television, has been rising steadily since 2007. Television is now approaching radio as a primary source of news and information. Proliferation of mobile phones and television has been more rapid in urban areas due to a more steady electricity supply. Computer ownership is still quite low but rising, and is largely limited to urban households. Very few Afghans get their news and information from the internet, newspapers, and magazines, but friends, family members, and religious leaders/mosques continue to be additional important sources of news and information for some.

1.3 Restrictions on survey field work and replacement of sampling points for security reasons

As was the case in previous years, in 2012 there were restrictions on the movement of survey researchers due to security, logistical challenges, and natural disasters that made it impossible for them to reach some of

the districts identified through the random sampling process. In 2012, 323 of the 1,055 sampling points had to be replaced with other sampling points in the same region through random sampling method. Insecurity and frequent fighting in some provinces caused 168 sampling points (or 16%) to be replaced (accounting for just over half of the total replacements). This was the same percentage as in 2010 (16%). Restrictions on the movement of survey researchers due to security concerns considerably increased in 2012. In 2010, 16% of the sampling points were replaced, compared to 11% in 2011. It is worth noting that this year each sample point consists of 6 respondents while the number of respondents in previous years were 8 or 10 per sample point.

Replacement of sampling points due to security problems (Appendix 2: Methodology) COMPARISON OF 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012.



Fig 1.1

Replacement of sampling points due to various problems (Appendix 2: Methodology) BY VARIOUS REASONS

Total Sampling Points 1,055	Count (%)	Versus total replacement (%)	Versus all sample points (%)
Security	168	52	16
Transportation problems	43	13	4
Village was not found	42	13	4
Remoteness	26	8	2
Weather	24	7	2
Surveyors were not allowed	10	3	1
Other	10	3	1
Total replacement	323		31

The replacement of 168 out of 1,055 sampling points for security reasons means that some areas with high levels of insecurity could not be accessed by the field survey team. This, in turn, means that the opinions of those living in insecure areas are likely to be underrepresented in survey findings. This year, the total number of sampling points is 25% higher than in 2011, 2010 and 2009. This is at ACSOR's recommendation to spread sampling points more widely and decrease the margin of error.

The deterioration of the security situation in the country began to have a significant impact on the survey fieldwork beginning in 2009. In 2007, only 11 of the 626 sampling points had to be replaced because the areas were inaccessible due to security problems (i.e., 2% of all sampling points). Nine of the 11 replacements were made in just two regions: the South East and South West. The situation was similar in 2008, when 18 of the 659 sampling points were replaced due to security problems (i.e., 3% of all sampling points). These replacements were again mainly concentrated in the South East and South West. The other replacements

were distributed among seven of the eight regions (with no replacements in the North West).

However, in 2009 the number of security-related replacements of survey sampling points increased fourfold, from 3% in 2008 to 12% in 2009. One hundred and two of the 823 random sampling points were inaccessible to survey researchers due to insecurity, and replacements were required in all regions. In addition, the number of insecure areas that could not be accessed tripled in the South East and the South West, and rose even more dramatically in all other regions.

In 2010, the situation deteriorated further. One hundred and thirty eight of the 825 random sampling points were inaccessible to survey researchers due to security problems (16% of all sampling points). Again the number of replacements rose significantly in most regions. The regions most affected were the South East, South West, and the East. The Central/Hazarajat region was the only region where no replacements were made due to security problems.

In 2011, the situation improved somewhat. Ninety-five of the 876 sampling points had to be replaced due to security reasons (11% of all sampling points). The regions most severely affected were the South East (23 replacements), East (20 replacements), Central/Kabul (17 replacements) and North West (16 replacements). Eight replacements were made in the South West, seven in the North East and four in the West. As was the case in 2010, in 2011 no replacements were made for security reasons in the Central/Hazarajat region.

In 2012, the security situation deteriorated to the 2010 level. Many of those regions that had been relatively calm and peaceful were affected by insecurity this year. As noted above, out of 1,055 total sample points, 168 sampling points had to be replaced for security reasons (16% of all sampling points). The regions most significantly affected were the East (35 replacements) and West (33 replacements). This represents a substantial increase in the number of replacements for the West, which (other than Central/Hazarajat) was the lowest last year (four replacements). This year, Central/Kabul and the South East had 29 replacements each, with three to 14 replacements in the remaining regions. The fewest replacements were made in Central Hazarajat (three replacements), a region that did not require replacements for the past two years. The provinces with the highest number of replacements for security reasons are in the Central/Kabul region (Logar, 17 replacements), the East (Kunar, 15 replacements, and Laghman, 10 replacements) and the South East (Ghazni, 13 replacements).

Actual number of replacements of sampling points due to security problems (See Appendix 2: Methodology) ALL AND BY REGION COMPARISON OF 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

Year	No. of sample points replaced for security reasons (%)	Total no. of sample points (%)	Centra/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
2007	11	-	1	0	6	3	1	0	0	0
2008	18	-	1	2	6	5	2	1	1	0
2009	102	882	13	14	18	17	14	11	2	13
2010	138	885	10	21	28	24	12	23	0	20
2011	95	876	17	20	20	8	4	7	0	16
2012	168	1055	29	35	29	14	33	13	3	12

Actual number of replacements of sampling points due to various problems (See Appendix 2: Methodology) BY REGION

Number of sampling points replaced for various reasons	Security (%)	Transportation problems (%)	Village was not found (%)	Remoteness (%)	Weather (%)	Surveyors were not allowed (%)	Other (%)
Central/Kabul	29	6	9	0	0	5	7
East	35	3	3	1	1	0	0
South East	29	0	1	0	0	1	0
South West	14	0	1	0	0	0	0
West	33	7	9	0	6	2	0
North East	13	17	12	11	9	0	0
Central/Hazarajat	3	2	2	6	0	0	1
North West	12	8	5	8	8	2	2
Total	168	43	42	26	24	10	10

As was also the case last year, female surveyors could not be deployed in Paktika province due to the worsening security situation. Because women were barred from conducting interviews, no female respondents were included in the sample in this province. However, this year in Zabul province (a second province where no female surveyors were able to be deployed in 2011), 5% of respondents are women.

The decline in the number of women respondents since 2007, when half of the respondents were women, has leveled off. In 2012, 44% of the respondents are women, while 56% of the respondents are men, representing a 12 percentage point gender gap and a 6 percentage point decrease in women representation's in the survey since 2007. This gap may be reflected in the survey results.

Percentage of male and female respondents in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012



Fig 1.2

2 National Mood

2.1 Direction of the country

In 2012 the survey sought Afghan citizens' assessment of the overall situation in their country. Respondents were asked whether they think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction. Over half of respondents (52%) say things in the country are moving in the right direction, while 31% say things are moving in the wrong direction. A sizeable proportion of people (15%) have mixed opinions (i.e., they feel that while some things are moving in the right direction, others are moving in the wrong direction).

Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? (Q-2, base-6290)



Fig. 2.1

When broken down by regions, a majority of people in the Central/Hazarajat (71%), South West (61%), East and North East (55% each), North West (54%) and South East (53%) regions say that the country is moving in the right direction, compared to fewer than half of the respondents in the West (45%) who say that the country is moving in the right direction.

In other regions, the largest proportion of respondents in the Central/Kabul region (40%) say that things in the country are going in the wrong direction, although a slightly higher proportion (43%) of people in Central/Kabul say it is going in the right direction.

Interestingly, the proportion of respondents saying that the country is moving in the right direction has increased over the past year (from 46% in 2011 to 52% in 2012) and the proportion of those who say the country is moving in the right direction in 2012 (52%) is at its highest level since 2006 (44%). The proportion of those who say that the country is moving in the wrong direction fell slightly in 2012 (from 35% in 2011 to 31% in 2012), as did the proportion of those who report mixed views about their country's direction (from 17% in 2011 to 15% in 2012).

It should be noted, however, that some survey sampling points in highly insecure areas had to be replaced for 2012, as in other years (*see Chapter 1, 1.3 Restriction on survey field work and replacement of sampling points for security reasons).* Positive and negative perceptions about the country's overall direction are clearly influenced by perceptions of (in)security (*see below, 2.2 Reasons for optimism and 2.3 Reasons for pessimism*).

Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? (Q-2) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 2.2

2.2 Reasons for optimism

Respondents who say that the country is moving in the right direction (52% of all respondents) were asked to provide two reasons why they hold this view. The most commonly cited reasons are good security (41%) and reconstruction/rebuilding (35%), followed by the opening of schools for girls (14%), improvement in the education system (13%) and having an active ANA and ANP (13%). Other reasons for optimism include economic revival (8%), road reconstruction (8%) and peace (or the end of war) (7%).

Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Q-3a&b combined, Base 3257: Those saying right direction)



Fig. 2.3

This year, more respondents in urban (49%) areas than rural (39%) areas cite good security. Similarly, more urban dwellers (39%) than rural residents (34%) cite reconstruction/rebuilding as a reason for saying the country is moving in the right direction, and urban dwellers (18%) were more likely than rural residents (12%) to identify that schools for girls have opened. However, more rural dwellers (15%) than urban residents (7%) cite having an active ANA and ANP as a reason for optimism.

Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Q-3a&b combined, Base 3257: Those saying right direction) BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 2.4

Good security was more often cited by Uzbeks (51%), Tajiks (45%) and Hazaras (42%) than Pashtuns (36%) as a reason for optimism. More Uzbek respondents (48%) cite evidence of reconstruction/rebuilding as a reason that the country is moving in the right direction, compared to other ethnic groups (41%), Tajiks (38%), Pashtuns (31%) and Hazara (30%).

More respondents in the North West (55%), Central/Hazarajat (51%) and North East (47%) regions say that the country is moving in the right direction due to good security than respondents in the Central/Kabul (41%), East (40%), South West (38%), West (34%) and South East (21%) regions. It is interesting to note that these first three regions also record the highest levels of satisfaction with government security services (North East at 91%, Central/Hazarajat at 82%, and North West at 75%) (*see Chapter 7, 7.3 Satisfaction with central government performance in policy and service delivery).* The fact that only 21% of respondents in the South East region cited good security as a reason for optimism suggests that the impact of such services may not yet be reaching all parts of the country.

Reconstruction and rebuilding was more frequently cited as a reason for optimism in the North (47%), North East (42%) and Central/Kabul (38%). People in these three regions also frequently mentioned reconstruction and rebuilding as the most important achievement of the central government (*See Chapter 7, 7.4 important achievements and failings of the central government*).

The sizeable proportion of respondents in some regions (South East, 22%, East, 16%, and West, 15%) citing improvement in the education system as a reason for optimism is consistent with the finding that a large majority of people are satisfied with the availability of education for children *(See Chapter 6, 6.1, Services and facilities available in local areas).* In these three regions, a relatively high percentage of respondents cited an improved education system as the most important achievement of government (*see Chapter 7, 7.4 Important achievements and failings of the central government*).

Overall, Afghans appear to perceive a link between the direction of progress in the country and the ability of government to provide essential services and support development.

Table 2.1: Reasons given by those saying things are moving in the right direction (Q-3a&b combined, Base 3257) BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Good security	41	41	40	21	38	34	47	51	55
Reconstruction/rebuilding	35	38	31	25	27	33	42	28	47
Schools for girls have opened	14	18	7	17	13	16	15	17	7
Having active ANA and ANP	13	9	23	19	27	9	6	2	9
Improvement in education system	13	12	16	22	11	15	12	7	11
Economic revival	8	9	10	5	6	11	10	16	5
Road reconstruction	8	8	6	16	8	5	7	1	6
Peace/end of the war	7	7	5	9	5	6	9	11	9

Since 2006, good security and reconstruction/rebuilding have been consistently identified as the two main reasons why Afghans say that their country is moving in the right direction. The proportion of respondents citing good security increased slightly from 39% in 2011 to 41% in 2012. However, the percentage of respondents citing reconstruction and rebuilding declined from 40% in 2011 to 35% in 2012. There was also a slight decrease in those citing general improvements in the education system, from 16% in 2011 to 13% in 2012. The proportion of respondents who point to the opening of schools for girls as a reason for saying the country is moving in the right direction increased to 14% in 2012 from 10% in 2011.

The significance of democracy and elections as a factor for optimism has fluctuated considerably since 2006. In 2012, only 4% of respondents identified it as a reason for saying the country is moving in the right direction, compared to 7% in 2010, when the survey was conducted just before the parliamentary elections. The low level of reference to democracy and elections as a cause for optimism in 2011 and 2012 may reflect the controversy that surrounded the 2010 parliamentary elections, which were marred by accusations that they were not free and fair. A similar drop in responses referring to democracy and elections as a reason for optimism was recorded in 2009 (1%), when the survey was conducted in the run up to the presidential and provincial elections amidst accusations of fraud in electoral registration.

Table 2.2: Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Q-3a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Good security	31	34	39	44	38	39	41
Reconstruction/rebuilding	21	39	32	36	35	40	35
Schools for girls have opened	16	19	19	21	15	10	14
Improvement in education system	-	-	-	-	10	16	13
Economic revival	7	9	5	6	10	8	8
Peace/end of the war	29	16	21	9	12	7	7
Good government	9	9	9	12	10	9	5
Democracy/elections	10	9	7	1	7	3	4

2.3 Reasons for pessimism

Respondents who say that things are moving in the wrong direction (31% of all respondents) were also asked to provide their two main reasons for holding this view. About 39% of them say insecurity, making it by far the most important reason for pessimism and indicating that security remains a major concern for the Afghan people and a significant factor in shaping their assessment of progress in the country. About one in five (18%) identify unemployment as a reason for their pessimism, followed by corruption (14%), bad government (11%), suicide attacks (11%), a bad economy (10%), and administrative corruption (10%).

Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction? (Q-4a&b combined, Base 1959: Those saying wrong direction)



Fig. 2.5

Insecurity is a major concern for all ethnic groups. However, more Pashtuns (44%) give this reason for their pessimism than Hazaras (40%), Uzbeks (37%) and Tajiks (34%).

There are regional differences in reasons for pessimism about the direction of the country. Although insecurity has decreased in Afghanistan overall and in many regions of the country as well, it still remains the most commonly cited reason among respondents in all regions for why they think the country is moving in the wrong direction. Insecurity was identified by the highest proportion of respondents in the South West (52%), North West (47%) and South East (40%), and by lower still significant proportions of respondents in other regions, ranging from 22-39%.

In nearly every region, unemployment is the second most often cited reason among those who see things moving in the wrong direction in the country. Unemployment is most often cited in the Central/Kabul (23%), North West (22%), North East (20%) and East (15%) regions, although people in the East are equally pessimistic due to suicide attacks (15%). Corruption remains a significant cause for pessimism for over one in five respondents in the West (23%) and is thus a more commonly cited reason than unemployment.

Table 2.3: Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction? (Q-4a&b combined, base 1659) BY [1]REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Insecurity	39	38	37	40	52	39	22	47
Unemployment	18	23	15	9	10	13	20	22
Corruption	14	15	12	14	8	23	12	14
Bad government	11	12	6	8	10	13	16	10
Suicide attacks	11	15	15	9	4	7	14	9
Bad economy	10	13	9	7	5	11	15	6
Administrative corruption	10	10	8	8	10	13	11	10
Presence of Taliban	6	4	8	8	8	7	4	9
No reconstruction has happened	6	3	5	8	9	6	8	11

Although the proportion of Afghans who attribute their pessimism about the direction of the country to the issue of insecurity declined in 2012, it has been the leading reason for pessimism every year since 2007. In 2012, it dropped to 39% from 45% in 2011. The proportion of respondents citing unemployment increased from 13% in 2011 to 18% in 2012.

The proportion of respondents citing general corruption, which was at its highest in 2010 (27%), was 16% in 2011 and dropped slightly to 14% in 2012. This drop is reflected across all regions except the West, where the figure almost doubled from 13% in 2011 to 23% in 2012. The proportion of people citing administrative corruption (i.e., a more specific form of corruption) increased from 4% in 2011 to 10% in 2012. The relatively prominent ranking of corruption (both general and administrative) as a reason for pessimism is consistent with the finding that the proportion of respondents who identify corruption as a major problem in various facets of life and levels of government continues to rise, for the most part (*see Chapter 8, 8.1 Corruption – major or minor problem*).

There has been a decline in the proportion of respondents who say they think Afghanistan is moving in the wrong direction due to bad government. In 2012, among those who say the country is moving in the wrong direction, 11% cite bad government, which is less than half the level it was in 2009 (25%). Likewise, there has been a decline in the proportion of respondents who attribute their pessimism to a bad economy. In 2012, among those who say the country is moving in the wrong direction, 10% attributed it to a bad economy compared to 27% in 2006. A similar trend is discernible for pessimism due to a lack of reconstruction. In 2006, 22% of people surveyed pointed to lack of reconstruction as the reason why they thought the country was headed in the wrong direction, while in 2012, only 6% attributed their pessimism to this particular factor.

1 Central Hazarajat has not been included in this more detailed analysis due to a small sample size.

Table 2.4: Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction? (Q-4a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Insecurity	6	48	50	42	44	45	39
Unemployment	21	15	15	15	16	13	18
Corruption	-	13	19	17	27	16	14
Bad government	22	15	12	25	18	15	11
Bad economy	27	12	17	11	8	10	10
Administrative corruption	2	15	9	10	-	4	10
No reconstruction	22	8	7	6	4	4	6

2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level

The survey endeavored to identify public perceptions of the biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole. The people of Afghanistan identify insecurity (28%), unemployment (27%) and corruption (25%) to be the biggest problems today. Other major problems identified include a poor economy (11%), lack of education (10%), poverty (9%), suicide attacks (9%), the presence of the Taliban (8%), drug smuggling (6%) and interference of Pakistan (6%).

In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-6a&b combined, Base 6290)



Fig. 2.6

More Hazara (36%) and Tajik (31%) respondents than Uzbeks (27%), other ethnic groups (26%) and Pashtuns (21%) identify unemployment as the biggest problem in Afghanistan.

Insecurity is more frequently cited in the West (37%), Central/Hazarajat (36%) and the South East (35%) than in other regions. Numerous respondents in the Central/Kabul (40%), Central/Hazarajat (33%), North West (31%) and North East (30%) regions identify unemployment as the biggest problem, and in Central/Kabul, the North West and North East it was cited more frequently than any other problem. In the East, corruption was identified as the biggest problem by the largest proportion of respondents (30%), and by just over a quarter of respondents in the South West (27%), West (27%) and North East (27%). These results largely reflect the reasons for pessimism given by respondents in these regions who said that the country is moving in the wrong direction (*see above, 2.3 Reasons for pessimism*).

Table 2.5: In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-6a&b combined, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Insecurity	28	30	27	35	19	37	17	36	25
Unemployment	27	40	19	14	15	20	30	33	31
Corruption	25	22	30	26	27	27	27	13	21
Poor economy	11	15	9	9	9	10	10	18	9
Education	10	8	9	9	10	9	10	10	14
Poverty	9	11	5	7	3	9	12	14	13
Suicide attacks	9	7	10	9	9	10	11	2	12
Presence of Taliban	8	5	8	10	8	13	9	8	9
Interference of foreign countries	5	4	8	7	10	3	6	1	3

Since 2006, insecurity and unemployment have consistently been identified as the biggest problems for the country as a whole. However, the proportion of respondents identifying insecurity as the biggest problem in Afghanistan dropped sharply from 2011 (38%) to 2012 (28%). The proportion of respondents who identify unemployment, the second most frequently cited reason, has stayed relatively consistent over the years, with small variations. The proportion of respondents citing corruption, the third most important problem in 2012, increased from 21% in 2011 to 25% in 2012 and this response has (except for 2010, where it spiked) shown a gradual upward trend from 2008.

Table 2.6: In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-6a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Insecurity	27	46	36	36	37	38	28
Unemployment	32	27	31	35	28	23	27
Corruption	19	16	14	17	27	21	25
Poor economy	24	19	17	20	11	10	11
Education	10	11	9	11	11	10	10
Poverty	13	5	8	11	10	12	9

2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level

Afghans were also asked to provide their views on the biggest problems facing the country at the local level. Some (but not all) of these local problems are the same as those that were identified by respondents as the most pressing national-level problems.

The survey data indicates that unemployment (cited by 29% of respondents), lack of electricity (25%) and lack of roads (20%) tend to be the three main local-level problems. They are followed by lack of water supply (15%), lack of education/schools/literacy (15%) and lack of healthcare/clinics/hospitals (12%). Insecurity (cited by 10% of respondents) does not emerge as prominently as other local problems, but as noted in the analysis below, remains a significant local problem in certain areas of the country.

Unemployment is identified as one of the biggest problems at both the national and local level. Twenty-seven percent of respondents identify unemployment as the biggest problem at the national level, and an even higher proportion (29%) does so at the local level.

What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-7a&b combined, Base 6290)



Fig. 2.7

The local problem most often cited by respondents in rural areas is unemployment (31%), followed by electricity (27%). In contrast, in urban areas, roads (32%) are identified as the biggest local problem, followed by unemployment (23%). Importantly, the lack of education/ schools/literacy is cited by rural respondents (17%) at more than double the rate of respondents in urban (8%) areas as the biggest local problem, suggesting that government and international community-led education efforts tend to focus more on cities and provincial centers than villages and rural areas. Three times more respondents in rural areas (12%) than urban areas (4%) cite insecurity as a major local problem. This is consistent with the much higher proportion of rural respondents who say they have experienced violence (18%) compared to urban (10%) respondents (*see Chapter 3, 3.2 Experience of crime and violence*).

The biggest local problems identified by respondents vary by region. Lack of employment opportunities was cited most frequently in the Central/Hazarajat (42%) region, while lack of electricity was most frequently cited as the most important local problem in the East (32%). Drinking water is most often cited in the North West (30%) region as the biggest local problem.

While overall 20% of respondents cite roads as the biggest local problem, about one third of the respondents in the Central/Kabul (30%) and one quarter in the North East (25%) and North West (25%) identify roads; in fact, roads rank as the most frequently cited local problem in the Central/Kabul region. Out of all the regions, relatively more people in Central/Hazarajat (25%) expressed concern about education/schools/literacy. Pollution ranks as the fifth most commonly-cited local problem in the Central/Kabul (13%) region, but it was mentioned by very few respondents in other regions. Lack of healthcare/clinics/hospitals ranks fairly low relative to other issues, as does insecurity/attacks/violence. Healthcare/clinics/hospitals was mentioned

by a range of 8% of respondents in the East and West to 18% in the North East. Only 2% of respondents in Central/Hazarajat and the North East rated insecurity/attacks/violence as their most pressing local issue, but 17% in the East cited this concern.

Table 2.7: What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-7a&b combined, Base 6290) BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Unemployment	29	25	32	33	20	27	37	42	31
Electricity	25	22	32	18	30	21	30	15	29
Roads	20	30	9	12	11	13	25	14	25
Drinking water	18	17	15	9	9	19	20	19	30
Education/schools/literacy	15	12	14	16	13	18	11	25	18
Healthcare/clinics/hospitals	12	12	8	14	14	8	18	11	13
Insecurity/attacks/violence	10	10	17	15	10	15	2	2	7

There has been only minor fluctuation over the past years in the public opinion about local problems, with unemployment and electricity consistently holding the first and second positions as the biggest local problems. Interestingly, although education and drinking water continue to rank among the top local problems, respondents continue to record the highest levels of satisfaction with these local services (more than three quarters of respondents rate them as very good or quite good) (see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).

Table 2.8: What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-7a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Unemployment	34	26	28	26	26	28	29
Electricity	25	27	30	26	28	23	25
Roads	14	19	18	24	24	15	20
Drinking water	18	21	22	22	22	20	18
Education/schools/literacy	14	21	14	15	16	14	15
Healthcare/clinics/hospitals	15	17	15	20	17	12	12
Insecurity	8	15	14	13	13	14	10

3. Security

3.1 Fear for safety

The 2012 survey attempted to ascertain the perceptions of safety and security of the people of Afghanistan for themselves and for their families. Slightly less than half (48%) of those surveyed report fearing for their personal safety or for that of their families, with 15% reporting that they are often fearful and 33% reporting that they are sometimes fearful. Slightly over half (51%) of respondents reported infrequent or no fear for their personal safety or for that of their families. Twenty-three percent rarely fear for their safety, and 28% never fear for their safety.

The proportion of respondents who say that they often or sometimes fear for their safety in 2012 (48%) is lower than in 2011 (56%), 2010 (54%), 2009 (51%), and 2007 (49%) and equal to 2008 (48%), but still higher than in 2006 (40%).

A detailed longitudinal examination of the data reveals an interesting trend. The percentage of Afghans who report rarely fearing for the safety and security of themselves and their families shows an upward trend from 2008 through 2012, and the percentage of those who say they never fear for their personal or family safety and security has increased in 2012 compared to the past two years. Conversely, the percentage of respondents who say they are often or sometimes fearful about safety and security has dropped in 2012 compared to 2009-2011 levels.

The fact that fewer people fear for their personal and family safety and security in 2012 compared to previous years is a positive development and is consistent with perceptions of improvements in the security situation *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas)*. These data suggest that the safety and security situation in Afghanistan in 2012 is not as bad as it was in 2009, 2010 and 2011 and that the situation in 2012 is similar to what prevailed in 2008.

How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? (Q-16, Base 6290) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 3.1

The percentage of Afghans who rarely or never fear for their personal and family safety and security has increased in nearly all regions since 2011, with the highest level in Central/Hazarajat (84%), followed by other regions. The exception is the West, where it dropped from 38% in 2011 to 34% in 2012. The largest increase in the proportion of respondents who report never or rarely having fear about safety and security is in the North East (from 54% in 2011 to 71% in 2012), followed by the South East (from 32% in 2011 to 48% in 2012), South West (from 40% in 2011 to 48% in 2012) and North West (from 47% in 2011 to 55% in 2012) regions.

Across the regions, the percentage of those reporting rarely or never fearing for their personal and family safety is lower than what was registered in 2006, with the exceptions of Central/Hazarajat (84%), the North East (71%) and the South West (48%). The increase in these two regions reflects a substantive improvement in the security situation where now nine out of 10 respondents (Central/Hazarajat, 90%, and North East, 91%) say the security situation is very good or quite good in their areas *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).*

Table 3.1: How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? (Q-16) COMBINATION OF RARELY AND NEVER FEAR BY REGION, COMPARISON OF 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	60	50	51	48	46	44	51
Central/Kabul	68	52	51	54	51	46	50
East	52	51	54	54	48	38	39
South East	61	38	36	34	39	32	48
South West	45	39	34	37	47	40	48
West	52	33	37	37	32	38	34
North East	61	60	70	56	36	54	71
Central/Hazarajat	82	66	76	64	78	78	84
North West	64	67	62	59	59	47	55

On the other hand, a high proportion of respondents report often or sometimes fearing for their safety in the West (65%), East (61%), South West (52%), South East (52%) and Central/Kabul (50%) regions. The factors that influence these perceptions may differ among regions. The East and West, which record the highest proportion of respondents who report fearing for their safety, also record the highest proportion of respondents (West, 38%, and East, 35%) who judge the security situation in their local area to be very bad or quite bad *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).* Respondents' direct experience of crime and violence is also higher in many of the regions that report high levels of fear for safety, including the South West (32%) and South East (29%) *(see below,* 3.2 *Experience of crime and violence).*

How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? (Q-16, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 3.2

There are also differences between ethnic groups. More Pashtun (56%) respondents report often or sometimes fearing for their safety than their Hazara (37%), Uzbek (43%) and Tajik (45%) counterparts. It is worth mentioning that the proportion of Uzbek respondents who report often or sometimes fearing for their safety dropped significantly from 64% in 2011 to 43% in 2012.

3.2 Experience of crime and violence

The survey also sought to uncover people's actual experience of violence and crime by asking whether they, or anyone in their family, have been a victim of violence or some criminal act in their home or community in the past year. Along with a decline in the proportion of people who report that they sometimes or often fear for their safety (from 56% in 2011 to 48% in 2012), there has been a drop in the proportion of those who have experienced violence or crime in the past year (from 22% in 2011 to 16% in 2012).

The proportion of respondents who say they have experienced violence or crime is higher in rural (18%) than in urban (10%) areas. This is consistent with the higher percentage of people reporting insecurity as a major local problem in rural (12%) than in urban areas (4%) *(see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level)*.

There has been a marked decline in the proportion of respondents reporting that they have directly experienced violence or crime in all regions except Central/Kabul and South West as compared to 2011, reaching the lowest levels recorded in most regions since 2008. The decline is particularly significant in the North East (11% in 2012 compared to 23% in 2011), East (18% in 2012 compared to 26% in 2011), West (16% in 2012 compared to 24% in 2011), North West (9% in 2012 compared to 15% in 2011) and Central/Hazarajat (1% in 2012 compared to 7% in 2011). The exception to this positive trend is the South West region, where respondents' direct experience with violence or crime has increased very slightly from 31% in 2011 to 32% in 2012. In the South East, though lower than the previous two years, it remains high at 29%.

Table 3.2: Proportion of those who report that they or anyone in their family have been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in their home or community in the past year (Q-17) ALL AND BY REGION, COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	16	17	17	22	16
Central/Kabul	13	12	11	11	12
East	19	22	18	26	18
South East	21	26	34	38	29
South West	22	25	25	31	32
West	17	25	21	24	16
North East	15	12	20	23	11
Central /Hazarajat	4	10	2	7	1
North West	11	6	6	15	9

The proportion of Pashtun respondents who were victims of crime or violence in the past year is two times higher than that of other ethnic groups.

Table 3.3: Proportion of those who report that they or anyone in their family have been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in their home or community in the past year (Q-17) BY ETHNICITY

	Pashtun (%)	Tajik (%)	Uzbek (%)	Hazara (%)	Other (%)
Yes	24	11	11	12	10
No	76	88	87	88	90

Respondents who report having been a victim of violence or crime in the past year (16% of all respondents) were asked about the kinds of violence or crime they or someone in their family had experienced. The most common form of violence or crime cited is physical attack or beating (29%) followed by racketeering/extortion (14%), theft of livestock (10%), suicide attacks (9%), pick-pocketing (8%) and burglary/looting (8%). Around one in 15 victims of violence report violence resulting from the actions of foreign forces (6%).

There is no large difference between those who were victims of physical attacks or beatings in rural (29%) and urban (27%) areas in 2012 compared to 2011 (37% in rural and 29% in urban areas). This is also true for racketeering/extortion and actions of foreign forces. However, almost three times more respondents in rural (11%) areas report being victims of livestock theft than those in urban areas (4%); this is true for burglary/looting as well. Twice as many people in urban areas, compared to rural areas, report being victims of suicide attacks (15% versus 8%) and pick-pocketing (13% versus 7%).

What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-18a, Base 1015) (Percentage based on multiple responses) BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 3.3

In 2012, among those respondents who were victims of crime or violence, 9% reported being victims of a suicide attack, a figure which is at its highest since 2007, representing a notable increase. This is consistent with the perception of suicide attacks being one of the biggest problems at the national level *(see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level)* and constitutes one of the important reasons for pessimism about the overall direction of the country *(see Chapter 2, 2.3 Reasons for pessimism)*. The incidence of suicide attacks figures as the fourth highest important factor for perceiving the central government as having failed *(see Chapter 7, 7.4 Important achievements and failings of the central government)*.

Table 3.4: What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-18a)(Only suicide attacks) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012[2]

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Suicide Attacks	*	1	*	1	*	9

There is also variation among regions in relation to victimization from suicide attacks. The highest proportion of respondents who were victims of suicide attacks is in the North West (14%) followed by the South West (12%), Central/Kabul (8%), South East (8%) and North East (8%) regions, while respondents from the Central/Hazarajat region reported no direct experience with suicide attacks.

2 * indicates a percentage more than zero and less than 1%.

What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-18a)(Only suicide attacks) BY REGION



Fig. 3.4

Respondents' reported experience with suicide attacks was significantly higher in 2012 across all regions, with the exception of Central/Hazarajat, where no respondents reported being victimized by this form of violence (a level that has held steady since 2008). The percentage of respondents who were victims of suicide attacks in the past year (9% of those who were victims of a crime or violence) saw the greatest increase in the North West since 2008 (from zero percent in 2008 and 2% in 2010 to 14% in 2012), followed by the South West (from zero percent during the two previous years to 12% in 2012). The percentage of people who experienced suicide attacks in the Central/Kabul (8%) region is as high as it was in 2010.

Table 3.5: What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-18a)(Only suicide attacks) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012, ALL AND BY REGION

	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	1	*	1	*	9
Central/Kabul	0	1	10	2	8
East	4	*	0	*	7
South East	1	0	1	*	8
South West	0	1	0	0	12
West	1	0	3	1	6
North East	0	0	0	0	8
Central /Hazarajat	0	0	0	0	0
North West	0	0	2	0	14

The incidence of victimization from militants/insurgents actions in 2012 has continued at the same level as that of 2011 (4%). While this is half of what it was in 2008 (8%), 2009 (9%) and 2010 (9%), it is still slightly higher than its 2007 (3%) level.

Table 3.6: What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-18a) (Only militants/insurgents actions) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Militants/Insurgents actions	3	8	9	9	4	4

The incidence of victimization from militants/insurgents actions has remained the same in the Central/Kabul region in 2011 (6%) and 2012 (6%). However, the incidence from militants/insurgents actions decreased in almost all other regions in 2012 as compared to 2011 and 2010, except for the South West (4% in 2012 compared to 1% in 2011).

Table 3.7: What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-18a) (Militants/insurgents actions only) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2010, 2011 AND 2012 ALL AND BY REGION

Militant/Insurgents actions	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	9	4	4
Central/Kabul	15	6	6
East	8	8	7
South East	4	5	3
South West	9	1	4
West	9	3	0
North East	12	5	3
North West	21	0	1

The overall percentage of respondents who reported being victims of foreign forces' actions declined in 2012 (6%) compared to 2011 (8%). This trend is evident in nearly all of the regions, and especially so in the South West (from 27% in 2011 to 13% in 2012) and the South East (from 9% in 2011 to 4% in 2012). In contrast, the percentage of Afghans in the North East who reported being victimized by foreign forces' actions is three times higher in 2012 (7%) than in 2011 (2%). Responses from the East show no change in this regard between 2011 and 2012 (both 5%), but the percentage has dropped from 2010, when it was 19% there.

Table 3.8: What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Q-18a) (Foreign forces actions only) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2010, 2011 AND 2012 ALL AND BY REGION

	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	6	8	6
Central/Kabul	5	4	3
East	19	5	5
South East	2	9	4
South West	11	27	13
West	3	2	1
North East	1	2	7
North West	0	2	1

The respondents who say they were victims of a physical attack or beating (29% of victims of crime or violence and 5% of all respondents) were asked in a follow-up question about the kind of physical attack or beating they or their family member experienced. Thirty-eight percent report that the incident involved their neighbors, while 24% say it was a case of domestic violence (i.e., it occurred within the family). Similar percentages reported that the attack or beating was associated with a relative (17%) and with someone else (18%). There are large differences between male and female respondents who were victims of physical attacks or beatings, in terms of the type of case involved. Twice as many women (38%) as men (16%) report being victims when the case was domestic violence. Conversely, in cases involving a relative, the proportion of male (20%) respondents is twice that of female (11%) respondents. A higher proportion of men (42%) than women (31%) reported experience with cases involving a neighbor. This is also true for cases involving someone else, where more men (21%) reported being victims than women (15%).

(Filtered, ask if answered "1" in Q 18a) What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year (whether it was a case of domestic violence, a case with neighbor, a case with relative or a case with someone else)? (Q-18b, Base 292) (Percentage based on multiple responses) ALL AND BY GENDER



Fig. 3.5

3.3 Attitude toward reporting crime

Those respondents who have been victims of violence or crime (16% of all respondents) were asked a follow-up question about whether they reported the crime to any authority. More than half (52%) of the victims say that they reported the crime, while more than a third (36%) say they did not. Although when looking at survey responses the level of crime or violence has been fairly constant across the years, the level of reporting crime or violence has been declining since 2006 (70% in 2006, 62% in 2007, 61% in 2008, 61% in 2009, 53% in 2010, 58% in 2011 and 52% in 2012). The only year when this trend is not observed was 2011, where 58% reported doing so. The decline in reporting crime or violence to an authority might be due to a decrease of citizen confidence in conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms/institutions *(see Chapter 7, 7.1 Level of confidence in public institutions)*. There has also been an increase among those who were unwilling to respond to this question, from 8% in 2011 to 12% in 2012.

Table 3.9: You said that you've been a victim of violence or criminal act in the past year. Did you report it to any authority? (Q-19) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Yes	70	62	61	61	53	58	52
No	28	36	30	34	31	34	36
Don't know	*	1	8	5	15	8	12

Among those who did report violence or crime, more men (55%) than women (48%) said they reported violence or crime to some authority. Relatively more people in rural areas say they report crime or violence (54%) than do their urban (41%) counterparts.

You said that you've been a victim of violence or criminal act in the past year. Did you report it to any authority? (Q-19, Base 1015) ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 3.6

Reporting rates also vary across the regions. Those who say they reported the crime to authorities is relatively high in the East (64%), South East (59%), West (56%), North West (53%) and North East (52%) as compared to the South West (47%) and Central/Kabul (44%) regions. In these last two regions the level of those who said they didn't know is also higher than in the other regions.

You said that you've been a victim of violence or criminal act in the past year. Did you report it to any authority? (Q-19, Base 1015) BY REGION



Fig. 3.7

The respondents who say that they reported violence or crime (52% of victims, and 8% of all respondents) were asked to which agency or institution they reported it. Multiple responses were possible for this question. Respondents most often reported crime to the Afghan National Police (ANP) (44%). This may be both because of the mandate of the police force and the high level of confidence respondents say they have in the efficiency of the ANP in arresting those who have committed crimes (*see below, 3.5 Perceptions of the Afghan National Police*). Respondents also reported crime to other government agencies, including the district governor/woleswal (22%), the Afghan National Army (ANA) (18%), provincial authority (6%), public prosecutor (5%) and courts (5%). A large proportion reported the crime to informal or traditional institutions such as shuras/elders (32%), tribal leaders/maliks (22%) and mullahs (12%). The reporting rates of crime or violence to informal institutions are higher in 2012 compared to 2011, and reporting rates to tribal leaders/maliks and mullahs have doubled.

Victims in urban areas are more likely to report a crime or violence to government institutions such as the ANP (55% in urban areas compared to 42% in rural areas). This may be because this institution is more often present in urban settings, and is therefore more accessible to urban residents. Rural residents are more likely to report crime to shuras/elders (34% in rural areas compared to 18% in urban areas) and mullahs (13% in rural areas compared to 7% in urban areas). This is consistent with the finding that local shuras and jirgas still remain the most trusted and accessible conflict resolution mechanisms for Afghans, particularly in rural areas (*see Chapter 10, 10.3 Perceptions of local shuras and jirgas*).

To what agency or institution did you report the crime? (Q-20, Base 532) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 3.8

There are sizeable regional variations in the proportion of respondents reporting violence and crime to various types of authorities. Over half of respondents in the South West (58%) region, followed by the South East (49%), North East (47%) and East (43%) regions, reported a crime to the ANP, compared to less than a third in the Central/Kabul (30%) and West (31%) regions.

The highest proportion of respondents who reported a crime to the ANA is in the South West (27%) and East (27%) regions. This may be because of greater presence of the ANA in these regions for military operations and stabilization purposes.

Nearly half of the respondents in the East (48%), as well as significant percentages in the North West (39%), South East (37%), South West (33%) and Central/Kabul (26%) regions reported a crime to a shura/elder. About half of the respondents in the East (48%) and South West (48%) regions reported a crime to tribal leaders/maliks. More than one quarter reported a crime to a mullah in the East (28%) region, and a fifth in the South West (20%) region.

Table 3.10: To what agency or institution did you report the crime? (Q-20, Base 532) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Afghan National Police	44	30	43	49	58	31	47	39
Shuras/elders	32	26	48	37	33	17	19	39
District governor/ woleswal	22	16	37	31	26	10	2	15
Tribal leader/malik	22	11	48	14	48	7	9	0
Afghan National Army	18	19	27	18	27	6	11	3
Mullahs	12	4	28	10	20	10	0	11
Provincial authority	6	8	10	10	3	4	6	0
Public prosecutor	5	1	5	12	6	1	2	2
Court	5	1	9	9	3	2	0	15

The proportion of respondents who reported a crime to a district governor/woleswal is highest in the East (37%), the South East (31%) and the South West (26%) regions and lowest in the North East (2%).

Reporting of crime or violence to the district governor/woleswal has increased fivefold in the South West (from 5% in 2011 to 26% in 2012), tripled in the South East (from 11% in 2011 to 31% in 2012) and more than doubled in the East (from 14% in 2011 to 37% in 2012) regions. This could be because the security situation has improved in these regions in 2012 compared to 2011, which facilitates Afghans' increased contact with and access to the district administrative office *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas)*. Conversely, reporting to the district governor/woleswal declined steeply in the North East (from 11% in 2011 to 2% in 2012) region.

Table 3.11: To what agency or institution did you report the crime? (Q-20, Base 532, Only those victims reported to district governor/woleswal) ALL AND BY REGION

	Only victims reported to woleswal	
	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	12	16
Central/Kabul	18	16
East	14	37
South East	11	31
South West	5	26
West	15	10
North East	11	2
North West	12	15

Those who were victims of crime or violence but did not report it to an authority (36% of victims and 6% of all respondents) were asked to provide the reasons for not reporting the crime. Again, multiple responses were possible. More than a quarter (28%) said they did not report the crime because it was not serious. Around one fifth (18%) felt that reporting it would make no difference. However, about one in six respondents (15%) said that they were afraid of retaliation and around one in 10 (11%) said they had lack of trust in government officials. The same proportion of people (11%) said they lacked evidence for their case. Just under one out of 10 people did not report the crime or violence because they did not know where to report (9%), and the same number (9%) were not able to articulate the reason for their decision not to report it.

Why didn't you report the crime? (Q-21, Base 361)



Fig. 3.9

All respondents, regardless of whether they personally experienced crime, were asked the hypothetical question: "If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?" More than half of respondents (59%) say that they would have some level of confidence (16% say a great deal of confidence, and 43% say a fair amount of confidence). However, 25% say they would not have very much confidence, and 14% say they would have no confidence at all.

The confidence level in law enforcing organizations and judicial systems is higher in rural (61%) compared to urban (52%) areas. This varies among the regions, but overall the level of confidence is higher than a simple majority in all regions. The highest confidence level is recorded in the North East (69%) and Central/Hazarajat (67%) regions.

If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party? (Q-22, Base ALL Respondents, 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 3.10

In comparison to 2011, the level of confidence in government law enforcement agencies/institutions increased in 2012 in most of the regions. However, some regions, where the level of confidence in government law enforcement agencies/institutions increased in 2011 compared to 2010, register a decline in 2012, such as the East (from 58% in 2010 to 66% in 2011 and 61% in 2012). The only region where the figures have declined since 2010 is the North West (from 68% in 2010 to 61% in 2011 and 59% in 2012). The other regions recorded a rise in the level of confidence in government law enforcement agencies to punish those who commit crimes.

Table 3.12: If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party? (Q-22) COMPARISON OF 2010, 2011 AND 2012 BY REGION

	A level of confidence		
	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Central/Kabul	56	49	51
East	58	66	61
South East	50	49	54
South West	49	61	63
West	55	58	58
North East	62	69	70
Central/Hazarajat	53	63	67
North West	68	61	59

The survey also attempted to explore people's perception of the biggest causes of crime in the country. For the first time, the Taliban were most frequently mentioned as the biggest cause of crime, by 17% of respondents. This is followed by unemployment (16%), corruption (11%), Pakistan's interference (7%) and terrorism (7%). More women (19%) say they believe that Taliban are the biggest cause of crimes, compared to men (15%).

People's views on this topic differ widely across the regions. The Taliban as a major cause of crime is cited most frequently in the Central/Hazarajat (23%) region and the West (21%), followed by the North West (19%) and South East (19%) regions, while Central/Kabul (12%) recorded the lowest. Unemployment is frequently identified in the Central/Hazarajat (21%), North West (19%), and Central/Kabul (19%) regions, whereas corruption is most often mentioned in Central/Hazarajat (15%). Interference of Pakistan is cited by one out of 10 respondents in the East (10%), but by a lower percentage in all other regions. Among those who see terrorism as the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan, the highest proportion is found in the South West (11%).

Table 3.13: What is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (Q-23, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Taliban	17	12	16	19	15	21	16	23	19
Unemployment	16	19	13	10	11	15	17	21	19
Corruption	11	12	9	9	11	13	9	15	9
Pakistan Interference	7	8	10	7	8	4	7	1	5
Terrorism	7	5	9	8	11	8	7	5	6
Illiteracy	6	5	6	7	7	7	5	7	6
Insecurity	5	6	5	6	4	4	3	2	5
Poverty	5	6	7	4	4	5	7	5	4
Drugs	4	4	4	3	5	6	3	7	4

3.4 Fear to participate in various activities

The respondents were asked about the level of fear they have when participating in various public activities. More than half of the respondents (57%) say that they would have no fear participating in resolving problems in their community, and this is also true for their encounters with the ANA (55%) and ANP (51%). While 45% of respondents say they would have no fear voting in a national election, 54% reported some level of fear to do so, including 19% who say they have a lot of fear. Fewer than one third of respondents (29%) say they would have no fear participating in a peaceful demonstration, while more than two thirds (69%) feel some level of fear, including 28% who say they would have a lot of fear. Only a third of respondents (33%) have no fear to run for public office, while more than one fifth (23%) said they would have a lot of fear participating in this activity. The proportion of respondents who say they would not be afraid to travel from one part of the country to another is the lowest among all of the public activities explored in this question (at 24%), while 74% say they feel some level of fear to do so.

Only 20% of respondents say they would have no fear when encountering international forces, while more than three quarters (78%) say they would have some level of fear, including 35% who say they would have a lot of fear. A high level of fear when encountering international forces could be due to night raids as well as the international forces' relatively large presence in military operations.

Table 3.14: Public's level of fear to participate in various activities (Q-28a-h, Base 6290)

	No fear (%)	Some fear (%)	A lot of fear (%)
Participating in resolving problems in your community	57	34	8
Voting in a national election	45	35	19
Participating in a peaceful demonstration	29	41	28
Running for a public office	33	40	23
Encountering ANP officers	51	33	15
Encountering ANA officers	55	31	14
Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	24	47	27
Encountering international forces	20	43	35

Fear of participating in all of these activities is higher among women than men, except for encounters with the ANP, for which fear is equal. More women (47%) fear participating in resolving their community problems compared to men (38%). Three quarters of women (75%) are afraid to participate in a peaceful demonstration compared to two thirds of their male counterparts (64%). The survey also reveals notably higher levels of fear among women than men to run for public office (67% of women compared to 60% of men), face an ANA officer (48% compared to 42%), travel from one part of the country to another (77% compared to 72%) and encounter international forces (81% compared to 75%).

Table 3.15: Public's level of fear to participate in various activities (Q-28a-h, Base 6290, combination of some and a lot of fear) ALL AND BY GENDER

	All (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Participating in resolving problems in your community	42	38	47
Voting in a national election	54	54	56
Participating in a peaceful demonstration	69	64	75
Running for a public office	63	60	67
Encountering ANP officers	48	48	48
Encountering ANA officers	45	42	48
Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	73	72	77
Encountering international forces	78	75	81

Generally, levels of fear to participate in all forms of public activities are highest in the South West, the East, the South East and the West. These are also the regions where insecurity is most often identified as a major local problem (see Chapter2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level), and where most respondents say that the security situation is bad in their local area (see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).

Table 3.16: Public's level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to participate in various activities (Q-28a-h, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Participating in resolving problems in your community	42	31	55	49	67	51	29	25	36
Voting in a national election	54	42	63	66	76	66	41	42	50
Participating in a peaceful demonstration	69	64	73	77	80	68	60	48	67
Running for public office	63	48	75	72	77	41	53	45	70
Encountering ANP officers	48	42	50	53	63	62	38	44	42
Encountering ANA officers	45	38	43	45	58	59	35	46	41
Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	74	77	72	80	81	80	63	64	73
Encountering international forces	78	73	82	82	89	81	80	48	77

Comparison of the results of the 2012 survey with those of previous years reveals that the proportion of people who say they are afraid to participate in public activities is lower compared to 2010 results, but still higher than previous subsequent years.

Table 3.17: Public's level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to participate in various activities (Q-28a-h) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Participating in resolving problems in your community	32	38	39	40	46	41	42
Voting in a national election	41	44	45	51	60	57	54
Participating in a peaceful demonstration	61	61	61	61	67	66	69
Running for a public office	50	56	55	58	64	63	63
Encountering ANP officers	-	49	49	50	52	48	48
Encountering ANA officers	-	-	-	-	-	44	45
Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	-	-	-	-	74	75	74
Encountering international forces	-	-	-	-	-	76	78

There are clear differences across ethnic communities when it comes to fear in participating in public activities. A relatively high level of fear is registered among Pashtuns, while Hazaras are the least afraid. The only public activity in which the level of fear is almost equal among all ethnic groups is when travelling from one part of the country to another, an activity for which all communities in Afghanistan register high levels of fear.

Table 3.18: Public's level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to participate in various activities (Q-28a-h, Base 6290) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY

	All (%)	Pashtun (%)	Tajik (%)	Uzbek (%)	Hazara (%)	Other (%)
Participating in resolving problems in your community	42	54	35	35	26	44
Voting in a national election	54	66	47	47	39	58
Participating in a peaceful demonstration	69	75	64	62	62	69
Running for a public office	63	71	55	65	54	70
Encountering ANP officers	48	65	43	41	43	47
Encountering ANA officers	45	50	41	36	40	43
Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	74	76	74	72	76	76
Encountering international forces	78	83	77	79	69	73

3.5 Perceptions of the Afghan National Police

The institution in Afghanistan that is principally responsible for ensuring security as well as fighting crime and violence is the Afghan National Police. The survey attempted to assess public perceptions of the ANP regarding such dimensions as honesty, fairness, professionalism, efficiency in arresting criminals and capacity to act without the assistance of foreign troops. A series of statements about the ANP was read out to respondents and they were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statements.

The Afghan public's assessment of the ANP is mostly positive. More than four out of five respondents agree that the ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people (85%) and a similar proportion of respondents say the ANP helps improve security (81%). Three quarters of respondents (75%) say that the ANP is efficient in arresting those who have committed crimes so they can be brought to justice. Around two thirds of respondents (67%) say that the ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself. Around three quarters (74%) of respondents feel that the ANP is professional and well trained.

Table 3.19: Public agreement and disagreement with statements about the ANP (Q-44a-e, Base 6290)

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree somewhat (%)	Disagree somewhat (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people	44	41	11	3
ANP is professional and well trained	32	42	20	5
ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	31	36	23	9
ANP helps improve security	40	41	15	4
ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice	32	43	18	6

Overall, public perceptions of the operational capacity of the ANP have been consistent over time.

Table 3.20: Public agreement (strongly agree and agree somewhat) with statements about the ANP (Q-44a, and c-e) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	Agree (%) (Strongly agree & agree somewhat)					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people	86	80	83	84	85	85
ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	77	69	70	69	65	67
ANP helps improve security	86	80	82	77	82	81
ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice	-	73	71	70	75	75

Perceptions of the operational capacity of the ANP are similar across all ethnic groups, except for the Pashtun, who have significantly less positive opinions of the ANP across most dimensions.

Table 3.21: Public agreement and disagreement with statements about the ANP (Q-44a-e, Base 6290) BY ETHNICITY

	Agree (%) (Strongly agree and agree somewhat)				
	Pashtun	Tajik	Uzbek	Hazara	Other
ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people	82	88	95	90	86
ANP is professional and well-trained	67	79	88	75	74
ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	64	68	66	78	65
ANP helps improve security	74	85	92	83	84
ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice	69	78	88	76	73

3.6 Perceptions of the Afghan National Army

The survey also sought to measure public perceptions of another significant security force, the Afghan National Army. A similar series of statements about the ANA were read to respondents and they were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree.

Overall, the public has an even more positive assessment of the ANA than it does of the ANP. Nine out of 10 respondents (93%) agree that the ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people, compared to eight out of 10 (86%) who feel this is true for the ANP. A similarly high proportion agrees that the ANA is helping to improve the security situation in the country (87%), compared to 81% for the ANP. Eight out of 10 respondents (82%) agree that the ANA is professional and well-trained, compared to around three quarters who think it is true of ANP (74%). However, as with the ANP, a high proportion of respondents also think that the ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself (65%).

Table 3.22: Public agreement and disagreement with statements about the ANA (Q-43a-d, Base 6290)

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree somewhat (%)	Disagree somewhat (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people	59	34	5	1
ANA is professional and well-trained	47	35	14	3
ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	30	35	23	11
ANA helps improve security	54	33	10	2

There have been no major differences since 2007 in the levels of public agreement on these various statements about the ANA. As compared to the previous year, in 2012 a slightly higher proportion of respondents (65%) agree that the ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself (this figure was 60% in 2011).

Table 3.23: Public agreement (strongly agree and agree somewhat) with statements about the ANA (Q-43a, c and d) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	Agree (%) (Strongly agree & agree somewhat)					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people	90	89	91	92	92	93
ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	77	69	69	69	60	65
ANA helps improve security	89	86	87	86	88	87

Perceptions of respondents about the ANA are similar across all ethnic groups, with the exception of the Pashtuns, who hold less positive opinions of the ANA across most dimensions.

Table 3.24: Public agreement (strongly agree and agree somewhat) with statements about the ANA (Q-43a-d, Base 6290) BY ETHNICITY

	Agree (%) (Strongly agree and agree somewhat)				
	Pashtun	Tajik	Uzbek	Hazara	Other
ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people	91	95	97	96	92
ANA is professional and well-trained	77	87	92	79	84
ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself	60	68	65	69	69
ANA helps improve security	82	91	95	84	90

4. Reconciliation and Reintegration

4.1 Perceptions of the government's reconciliation efforts

The survey asked Afghan citizens whether they support the government's peace, reconciliation, and negotiation efforts with armed opposition groups. Afghans' support for peace and reconciliation remains very high in 2012, as it has been in previous years. A large majority of respondents (81%) say they are in agreement with the government's national reconciliation and negotiation efforts, with 38% strongly in favor and 44% somewhat in favor. The level of support for reconciliation and negotiation with armed opposition groups has been relatively stable over the last three years, with some minor variations. The constant high level of support for the government's efforts suggests that an overwhelming proportion of the Afghan public wants a political solution to the conflict in the country, rather than a military one.

Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with the government's reconciliation efforts and negotiations with the armed opposition? (Q-60) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 4.1

Although a large majority within all ethnic groups are in favor of the government's reconciliation efforts and negotiation with the armed opposition, a relatively higher number of Pashtuns (85%), Uzbeks (84%) and other ethnic groups (80%) support the government's endeavor than do the Tajiks (79%) and Hazaras (73%).

There is variation among regions with regard to the government's reconciliation and negotiation efforts. Support for this endeavor is relatively higher in the East (91%, including 50% who strongly support the effort), North East (86%, including 40% who strongly support), South West (84%, including 41% who strongly support), North West (81%, including 34% who strongly support) and South East (80%, including 35% who strongly support). Some of these regions (East, South East, West, and South West) are where insecurity is most often identified as a major local problem (*see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level*), and where most respondents say that the security situation is bad in their local area *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas)*. Overall support for the government-led reconciliation and negotiation efforts is also high in the West (75%), but only 28% of these respondents express strong support. Support for reconciliation with armed groups shows an increase in the Central/Hazarajat (75%) region, where it was 63% in 2011. In this region in 2011, 36% disagreed somewhat or strongly with the government's efforts; the figure dropped to 25% in 2012.

Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with the government's reconciliation efforts and negotiations with the armed opposition? (Q-60, 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 4.2

When respondents were asked whether they think the government's peace, reconciliation, and negotiation efforts will help stabilize the country, there was a high level of concurrence with the statement. Nationally, 71% of respondents say the government's peace and reconciliation efforts will stabilize the country, and 25% say they will not. The figures for 2012 are very similar to those recorded in 2010 and 2011.

There is variation among ethnic groups' responses to this question, with relatively more Pashtuns (77%) and Uzbeks (74%) than Tajiks (69%), other ethnic groups (66%) and Hazaras (61%) agreeing with the statement.

The majority of respondents in all regions are of the opinion that the government's peace and negotiations efforts will help stabilize the country. The proportion of those who say so is higher in the East (82%), North East (76%), South East (72%), North West (72%) and South West (74%) than in the Central/Kabul (69%), West (64%) and Central/Hazarajat (56%) regions.

Do you think the Afghan government's reconciliation efforts and negotiations will help stabilize the country? (Q-61, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 4.3

In a series of questions about the government's peace and reconciliation efforts, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree that anti-government elements who lay down their arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should be provided with government assistance, jobs and housing. Almost four out of five respondents (78%) agree, including 38% who strongly agree. Twenty-two percent disagree with this approach to reintegration. The percentages of respondents who strongly agree or agree somewhat with the government providing support to those who are willing to lay down arms and reintegrate into society have been relatively consistent since 2009.

Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree that those anti-government elements who lay down arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should be provided with government assistance, jobs and housing? (Q-62) COMPARISON 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 4.4

Among different ethnic groups, support for government assistance to former armed opposition group members who choose to reintegrate is highest among Pashtuns (82%, including 42% who strongly agree), followed by Uzbeks (81%, including 43% who strongly agree), other ethnic groups (76%, including 36% who strongly agree) and Tajiks (75%, including 35% who strongly agree), with the lowest level of support among Hazaras (70%, including 24% who strongly agree).

Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree that those anti-government elements that lay down arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should be provided government assistance, jobs and housing? (Q 62, Base 6290) BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 4.5

Strong support for government assistance to opposition groups that choose to lay down arms and reintegrate can be found in regions where there are relatively higher numbers of Pashtuns and Uzbeks (i.e., those ethnic groups who tend to have stronger support for this type of government assistance). Support for the statement is relatively high in the East (91%, including 53% who strongly agree), North East (80%, including 42% who strongly agree), North West (79%, including 37% who strongly agree), South West (77%, including 39% who strongly agree) and South East (75%, including 31% who strongly agree). With the exception of the North East, these are also the regions that record the highest levels of sympathy for armed opposition groups (see following section, 4.3 Sympathy with armed opposition groups).

Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree that those anti-government elements that lay down arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should be provided government assistance, jobs and housing? (Q 62, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 4.6

4.2 Reasons why armed opposition groups fight the Afghan government

When respondents were asked their opinion on the reason why these armed groups are fighting against the Afghan government, responses varied. The most common reason cited is the presence of foreign troops and the international community in Afghanistan (21%). Others (16%) think that these groups want to gain power. Respondents also cite illiteracy (9%) as a reason, with almost the same proportion saying the groups are fighting because they are supported by Pakistan (8%). Five percent attribute it to corruption in the government.

In your opinion, what is the reason that the armed anti-government groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (Q-63, Base 6290)



Fig. 4.7

Variations emerge across different ethnic communities' responses to this question. Relatively more Uzbek (24%), Pashtun (23%), other ethnic groups (22%) and Tajik (20%) than Hazara (16%) respondents say that armed opposition groups fight against the Afghan government because of the presence of foreign troops and the international community. In contrast, more Hazaras (22%) say that armed opposition groups fight against the Afghan government to gain power than Uzbeks (16%), Pashtuns (16%), Tajiks (15%) and other ethnic groups (15%).

Differing views among ethnic communities shape regional variations as well. Relatively more respondents in North West (27%), South East (26%), East (23%), South West (22%), West (21%) and Central/Kabul (20%) say that armed opposition groups fight against the Afghan government because of the presence of foreign troops/international community than in the North East (16%) and Central/Hazarajat (9%) regions. The most common response in the Central/Hazarajat (22%), East (19%), South East (17%) and North West (17%) regions is that armed opposition groups fight against the Afghan government to gain power.

Table 4.1: In your opinion, what is the reason that the armed anti-government groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (Q-63, Base 6290) All AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat %	North West %
Presence of foreign troops/ international community	21	20	23	26	22	21	16	9	27
To gain power	16	16	19	17	15	14	16	22	17
Unemployment/poverty	9	5	2	4	2	5	4	4	3
They are supported by Pakistan	8	8	7	10	18	4	7	4	6
Don't know	7	6	4	5	5	10	7	12	8
Too much corruption in the government	5	6	3	4	2	6	6	7	6

4.3 Sympathy for armed opposition groups

In order to ascertain the public's orientation toward anti-government armed groups, respondents were asked: "Thinking about the reasons the armed opposition used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or no sympathy at all for these anti-government groups?" A majority of respondents say they have no sympathy at all (63%), while 10% say they have a lot of sympathy and 20% say they have some level of sympathy for these groups.

Examination of responses to this question over the past four years reveals a distinct trend. There has been a decline in the number of people who sympathize a lot or little with these armed opposition groups that use violence, and there has been an increase among those who have no sympathy at all for them. The figures for 2012 are similar to 2011, with slight variations.

Thinking about the reasons the armed opposition used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or no sympathy at all for these anti-government groups? (Q-64a) COMPARISON 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 4.8

There are notable differences between urban and rural residents' views on this issue. While only 5% of urban residents have a lot of sympathy for anti-government groups, 12% of rural residents say they have a lot of sympathy for them.

There are differences among ethnic communities as well. Among Pashtuns, 16% have a lot of sympathy for anti-government groups that use violence, while 23% report some level of support for these groups. The corresponding figures for Tajiks (5% say a lot of sympathy, and 19% some sympathy), Uzbeks (9% say a lot of sympathy, and 19% some sympathy) and Hazaras (3% say a lot of sympathy, and 12% some sympathy) are much lower.

Thinking about the reasons the armed opposition used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or no sympathy at all for these armed opposition groups? (Q-64a, Base 6290) BY ETHNICITY & SETTLEMENT



Fig. 4.9

There are regional variations in regard to sympathy for anti-government armed groups. A majority of respondents in all regions say they have no sympathy for these groups, in the following proportions: Central/Hazarajat (88%), Central/Kabul (70%), North East (70%), North West (62%), South East (60%), East (57%), West (56%) and South West (55%). However, more than a third of respondents in the South West (42%),

East (39%) South East (36%), and West (33%) regions, and a slightly lower proportion in the North West (27%), say they have some level of sympathy (either a lot or a little) with armed opposition groups that espouse violence.

However, lack of sympathy with armed opposition groups has risen and fallen in different regions between 2009 and 2012. A steady rise over time in the proportion of Afghans who feel no sympathy with these groups has been evident in Central/Hazarajat (from 33% in 2009 to 88% in 2012), where the percentage has more than doubled, the North East (from 42% in 2009 to 70% in 2012) and the South East (from 27% in 2009 to 60% in 2012). The number of Afghans in the East with no sympathy for armed opposition groups has remained almost the same over the last three years (53% in 2010, 56% in 2011 and 57% in 2012); however, it is still well above its lowest level of 31% in 2009). The same trend is true for the North West (26% in 2009, and 61-62% for the three following years).

There is a noticeable decline in 2012 in the proportion of Afghans with no sympathy for armed opposition groups in the Central/Kabul region (from 74% in 2011 to 70% in 2012), although today's level is still much higher than the lowest level of 49% in 2009. This is also true in the West (from 60% in 2011 to 56% in 2012, but still far above the 2009 level of 30%) and South West (from 61% in 2011 to 55% in 2012, but still higher than the figure of 38% for 2009).

Table 4.2: Thinking about the reasons the armed opposition used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for these armed opposition groups? (Q-64a) NO SYMPATHY AT ALL RESPONSES, BY REGION, COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Central/ Kabul	49	62	74	70
East	31	53	56	57
South East	27	46	50	60
South West	38	45	61	55
West	30	41	60	56
North East	42	63	66	70
Central/Hazarajat	33	79	80	88
North West	26	62	61	62

As noted in the preceding section, 10% of respondents say that they have a lot of sympathy toward the armed opposition groups; these people were subsequently asked why they have a lot of sympathy. One third (34%) say they have this opinion because the armed opposition groups are Afghans, while an almost similar proportion (33%) says it is because they are Muslims. A smaller proportion (7%) says that they think these groups will bring peace to the country. Smaller percentages (5%, respectively) say they are highly sympathetic toward the armed opposition groups because they think armed opposition groups are fighting a holy war (jihad), or because they fight against foreign forces.

You said that you have a lot of sympathy for the armed opposition groups. Why do you say that? (Q-64b, Base 647)



4.10

The 20% of respondents who say that they have a little (as opposed to a lot of) sympathy with armed opposition groups were asked the same follow-up question. Over one third (36%) say they sympathize with the armed groups because they are Afghans, and 23% say it is because they are Muslims.

The survey also asked those who said they have no sympathy at all for the armed opposition groups (63% of all respondents) to provide their reasons. The most common reason, cited by about one third of respondents (31%), is that armed opposition groups are killing innocent people. Around one in eight (13%) say they have no sympathy because these groups do not want peace and security. Another 10% say that these groups are oppressors, while 6% say they have no sympathy for armed opposition groups because they work for Pakistan.

You said that you have no sympathy for the armed opposition groups. Why do you say that? (Q-64d, Base 3992)



Fig. 4.11

Similarly, the most common reason why respondents in all regions, ranging from 44% in Central/Hazarajat to 25% in Central/Kabul, say they are not sympathetic toward armed opposition groups is because they kill innocent people. However, sizeable numbers of respondents in the North West (19%), North East (17%) and Central/Hazarajat (16%) regions say they think such groups do not want peace and security. A sizable number of people in the Central/Kabul (13%) and West (13%) regions say they have no sympathy for the armed groups because they are oppressors. Interestingly, 12% of respondents who have no sympathy in the South West say they think that the armed opposition groups work for Pakistan.

Table 4.3: You said that you have no sympathy at all for the armed opposition groups. Why do you say that? (Q 64d, Base 3992) All AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Killing innocent people	31	25	33	29	36	39	28	44	30
They don›t want peace and security	13	12	10	12	9	10	17	16	19
They are oppressors	10	13	9	8	9	13	9	6	8
They are against the government	4	4	3	6	3	4	6	2	4
They work for Pakistan	6	7	5	5	12	3	6	0	6
Don›t know	3	2	4	1	2	6	4	2	3

5. Economy

5.1 Economic prosperity

The 2012 survey attempted to measure the perceptions of Afghan citizens about their level of economic prosperity. Respondents were asked to compare their current economic situation with their circumstances under the Taliban government (1996-2001). More than half of respondents (53%) reported that their families are more prosperous today than they were during the Taliban era. Less than a third (31%) say that they are now less prosperous. Around one in 10 respondents (11%) say that their level of economic prosperity is the same as was under the Taliban regime, while the remainder (4%) report being absent during Taliban rule.

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-13, Base 6290)



Fig. 5.1

More women (59%) then men (48%) say that their families are more prosperous today than under the Taliban administration. Meanwhile, more men (34%) say that they are less prosperous today than they were under the Taliban government, compared to over a quarter of women (28%) who hold this view. More male respondents (13%) than female respondents (8%) say that their level of economic prosperity is the same as was under the Taliban era

There are differences among urban and rural respondents in regard to this question. A higher proportion of urban residents (66%) report that their families are more prosperous today than they were under the Taliban rule, compared to rural residents (49%). A little over one third of respondents in rural areas (34%) are of the opinion that they are less prosperous today than they were under the Taliban government, compared to less than a quarter (22%) of urban residents who hold this opinion.

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-13, Base 6290) BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 5.2

There is variation among ethnic groups' assessment of their current prosperity compared to the Taliban period. More than half of Hazaras (61%), Tajiks (58%), other ethnic groups (56%), and Uzbeks (50%) say that their families are more prosperous today than under the Taliban regime. Among the Pashtuns, only 46% hold this view.

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-13, Base 6290) BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 5.3

More than two thirds of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (69%) and Central/Kabul (64%) regions, and around half of those in the North West (54%), North East (51%), East (48%) and West (47%) regions, say their families are more prosperous today than under the Taliban administration. This is true for only 44% in the South West and 43% in the South East. Respondents who say their families are less prosperous today than during the Taliban era are mostly found in the East (40%), South West (38%) and North East (35%).

Table 5.1: If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-13, Base 6290) All AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South Western (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
More prosperous	53	64	48	43	44	47	51	69	54
Less prosperous	31	22	40	34	38	30	35	26	33
About as prosperous	11	8	8	14	13	15	12	3	11
Absent during Taliban rule (vol.)	4	5	4	8	3	8	2	1	2

Analysis of the longitudinal trend of responses to this question shows that "more prosperous" has consistently been the most frequently mentioned response, followed by "less prosperous," and then in turn by "about as prosperous." The actual percentages in these three categories have tended to fluctuate.

Table 5.2: If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-13) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
More prosperous	54	49	39	54	41	44	53
Less prosperous	26	28	36	24	36	34	31
About as prosperous	12	14	16	14	16	16	11
Absent during Taliban rule	7	8	7	6	5	5	4

Among several factors that influence these fluctuating perceptions, the most important is likely the ability of the government to improve the availability of basic facilities and public services (See Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas). Survey findings also show that people perceive the Afghan government to be the primary agency responsible for development projects. (See Chapter 6, 6.2 Awareness of development programs).

However, public perception of the inability of the government and/or the market to generate employment is most likely to be a significant contributing factor to people's negative opinion about their current wellbeing. The majority of respondents rate the government's performance poorly in reviving/developing the economy, with more than half (54%) judging it to be quite bad or very bad, and more than two thirds (68%) saying the government has performed quite badly or very badly regarding the creation of job opportunities (*see Chapter 7, 7.3 Satisfaction with government performance*). In addition, unemployment has consistently been identified as one of the biggest problems at both the national and local levels (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problem: National level and 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problem: Local level*). Indeed, in 2012 nearly a third of respondents (28%) say that

employment opportunities in their area have gotten worse over the last year and 50% say there has been no positive change (*see next section, 5.2 Economic situation of Afghan households*).

5.2 Economic situation of Afghan households

This year, as in previous years, the survey attempted to gain a more detailed assessment of the economic condition of Afghan households by comparing their situation today with their situation one year ago in terms of financial and physical wellbeing, as well as their access to basic services and amenities. Half of all respondents (50%) identify improvements in the financial wellbeing of their household during the past year, while just over half say that access to schools (51%) has improved. When asked about their household health and quality of their diet, nearly equal percentages say it has gotten better (42% and 41%, respectively) or stayed the same (46% for each).

However, over half of respondents (51%) say they think that the situation of availability of products in the market and the physical conditions of their house/dwelling has stayed the same, and an additional 14% say it has gotten worse in each of these areas. Sizeable numbers of Afghans report that their electricity supply (32%) and employment opportunities (28%) have gotten worse over the past year.

Table 5.3: Compared to one year ago, would you say that situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? (Q-14a-h, Base 6290)

	Better (%)	The same (%)	Worse (%)
Access to schools	51	40	9
Financial wellbeing of your household	50	43	7
Health wellbeing of your family members	42	46	12
Quality of your food diet	41	46	12
Availability of products in the market	34	51	14
Physical conditions of your house/dwelling	33	51	14
Electricity supply	24	42	32
Employment opportunities	21	50	28

On the other hand, the sense of increased financial wellbeing is not shared evenly among regions. More than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul (54%), South East (53%), Central/Hazarajat (52%) and South West (51%) regions report an improvement in their financial wellbeing in the past year, with just less than half in the North East (49%), North West (49%) and West (47%) expressing this view. The lowest proportion of respondents who believe their situation has improved can be found in the East (41%). Most respondents in the East (54%) say their financial wellbeing remained the same over the past year. Nearly one in 11 respondents in the West and North West (9% each) report that their financial wellbeing worsened in the past one year, and this is also true for the Central/Kabul (8%) and South West (7%) regions.

Table 5.4: Compared to one year ago, would you say that situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? Financial wellbeing (Q-14a, Base 6290) BY ALL AND REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Better	50	54	41	53	51	47	49	52	49
The same	43	38	54	42	42	44	47	41	42
Worse	7	8	5	4	7	9	5	6	9

As noted above, a majority of respondents (51%) say their access to schools has improved over the past year, which is consistent with the high level of satisfaction regarding the availability of education for children (77% of respondents say it is quite good or very good in their local area) (*see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas*). It is also consistent with the finding that the majority of respondents (53%) are aware of development programs focused on education (*see Chapter 6, 6.3 Knowledge of development programs*).

However, there are sizeable variations across the regions in term of views on improvements in access to schools. A majority of respondents in the North East (63%) say access to schools has gotten better compared to one year ago, followed by the Central/Kabul (52%), East and North West (both 51%), South (48%), Central/Hazarajat (47%), South East (46%) and West (41%) regions.

Table 5.5: Compared to one year ago, would you say that situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? Access to schools (Q-14h, Base 6290) All AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Better	51	52	51	46	48	41	63	47	51
The same	40	39	34	41	37	49	33	50	42
Worse	9	8	14	12	14	9	4	2	7

When respondents were asked about improvement in the electricity supply, 41% in Central/Kabul said it has gotten better, followed by the North East and Central/Hazarajat (both 31%), the North West (30%) and the West (19%). In the South East (8%) and East and South West (both 7%) regions, only a very small number held this view. A majority of respondents in the East (55%) say that the electricity supply has gotten worse, followed by the South West (44%) and South East (41%).

Table 5.6: Compared to one year ago, would you say that situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? Electric supply (Q-14g, Base 6290) All AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Better	24	41	7	8	7	19	31	31	30
The same	42	35	36	50	46	50	39	60	41
Worse	32	23	55	41	44	29	29	8	28

Out of all services and facilities examined in the survey, the fewest respondents report improvement in employment opportunities. Just over one in five (21%) respondents say that employment opportunities have improved compared to last year, whereas more than a third of respondents (28%) say that employment opportunities in their area have gotten worse, and 50% are of the opinion that there has been no change. These findings are consistent with respondents' views on local services and amenities, where the lowest levels of satisfaction relate to the availability of jobs (see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas). Afghans' assessment of the employment situation is also consistent with their identification of unemployment as one of the biggest problems at both the national and local levels (see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problem: National level and 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problem: Local level).

However, when this question is examined longitudinally, a distinct and positive pattern emerges. Each year, an increasing number of Afghans report an improvement in their household situation over the previous year in all dimensions, including employment opportunities. The only area where improvements are not as notable is the supply of electricity, where perceptions of improvements have been relatively flat.

Table 5.7: Percentage of people whose situation has gotten better compared to one year ago in various domains (Q-14a-h) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Access to schools	40	42	46	51
Financial wellbeing of your household	31	42	43	50
Electric supply	23	23	22	24
Health wellbeing of your family members	32	35	38	42
Quality of your food diet	23	33	35	41
Availability of products in the market	19	27	30	34
Physical conditions of your house/dwelling	20	25	31	33
Employment opportunities	11	17	19	21

5.3 Availability of means of transportation

The survey also tried to assess people's economic wellbeing by examining their ownership of private means of transport. First, they were asked whether they possess a bicycle in functioning order in their household.

Over half of respondents (53%) say they own a bicycle, and just under half say they do not (47%). A majority of households own bicycles in the South West (78%), South East and East (67% each), Central/Kabul (54%) and West (52%) regions. Relatively fewer people own bicycles in the North West (42%) and North East (32%) regions. Bicycle ownership is lowest in the Central/Hazarajat (13%) region, perhaps because the terrain is mountainous and therefore inappropriate for bicycle use.

Respondents were further asked whether their household possesses a motorcycle in functioning order. Just over two fifths of respondents (41%) reported having a motorcycle at their house. A higher proportion of people in rural areas (44%) own motorcycles than in urban areas (31%).

Thirty percent of those in the lowest earning group (less than 2,000Afs per month) own motorcycles, compared to 41% of mid-level income earners (3,000 to 5,000Afs per month) and 49% of high income earners (10,000Afs or beyond per month).

When asked about car ownership, only one fifth (20%) of respondents report owning a car. Slightly more respondents from urban areas (32%) than from rural areas (17%) report that their household owns a car.

Relative to other regions, more respondents in the South West (35%) and South East (31%) say they possess cars. Car ownership in the Central/Hazarajat (7%) and North West (6%) regions is quite low. As would be expected, higher level income groups are more likely to own cars. Thirty six percent of respondents in the highest income group own cars, compared to only 9% of those in the lowest income group (less than 2,000Afs per month).

Do you own any of the following here in your household in functioning order...Bicycle, motorcycle and car? (Q-1e, f and h, Base 6290)



Fig. 5.4

5.4 Main source of energy for cooking and heating

The availability of energy for domestic use in Afghanistan is an important issue, and one that has a relationship with both livelihood and environmental concerns, including deforestation and degradation. When respondents were asked about their main source of energy for cooking, 46% mention firewood. Many more respondents (54%) in rural areas report using firewood than in urban (18%) areas. The second most commonly used source of energy for cooking is bottled gas/LPG (24%), which is reported to be used more in urban areas (64%) compared to rural areas (12%). The third most commonly used cooking fuel cited is animal dung/manure (16%), which is used almost exclusively in rural areas (20%, compared to 3% in urban areas).

There is regional variation in the use of different sources of energy for cooking. Firewood is cited as the main source of energy for cooking in the South East (61%), North East (58%), East (57%), South West (50%), North West (45%) and West (40%). Bottled gas/LPG is reported to be the main source of cooking fuel in the Central/Kabul region (52%), and it is also reported to be used by around one forth of respondents in the West (26%), one fifth in the South East (22%) and one sixth in the North West (17%). Animal dung/manure is reported as the second most commonly used source of energy for cooking in the Central/Hazarajat (22%), North West (22%), East (22%) and West (20%) regions.

What is your main source of energy for cooking, what do you cook on most? (Q-15a, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 5.5

When asked about the main source of household heating, respondents once again primarily say it is firewood. At an aggregate level, firewood is the most commonly used source of energy for heating (33%). However, firewood is cited as a primary source more often in urban (47%) than rural (29%) areas. The second most commonly used heat source reported by respondents is animal dung/manure (21%), which is used more often in rural (27%) than in urban (3%) areas. The third most commonly used source of energy for heating cited is bottled gas/LPG (12%), which is used almost equally in urban (15%) and rural (11%) areas. Charcoal and grass/other biomass as sources of energy for heating come in fourth and fifth, respectively.

Table 5.8: The main source of energy for heating and cooking (Q-15a & Q-15b. Base 6290) ALL AND BY SETTLMENT

	All		Rural		Urban	
	Heating (%)	Cooking (%)	Heating (%)	Cooking (%)	Heating (%)	Cooking (%)
Firewood	33	46	29	54	47	18
Animal dung/manure	21	16	27	20	3	3
Bottled Gas/LPG	12	24	11	12	15	64
Charcoal	11	2	11	2	13	1
Grass or other biomass	10	6	12	7	1	2
Coal	7	2	7	3	9	1
Electricity	5	4	3	2	12	11
Kerosene	1	*	1	*	*	1
Diesel	*	*	*	*	*	*

Looking into regional variations, firewood is said to be used most often by respondents in Central/Kabul and the South East (46% each), followed by the East (35%) and South West (32%) regions. Relatively fewer people say they use firewood in the North East (27%), West (22%), North East (21%) and Central/Hazarajat (18%).

Animal dung/manure is reported to be used as a main heating source by sizeable numbers of people in the Central/Hazarajat (43%), North East (35%), West (29%) and North West (26%) regions.

While the use of grass or other biomass as a main source of energy for heating was cited by one third (31%) of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region, it was mentioned by only a small proportion of respondents in Central/Kabul (4%) and by only around 10% of respondents In other regions.

Table 5.9: What do you heat your house with most, what is your main source of energy for heating? (Q-15a, Base 6290) BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Firewood	33	46	35	46	32	22	27	18	21
Animal dung/manure	21	11	15	22	9	29	35	43	26
Bottled Gas/LPG	12	16	16	12	15	9	5	2	8
Charcoal	11	10	15	5	20	10	7	1	15
Grass or other biomass	10	4	12	10	10	12	8	31	12

6. Development and Service Delivery

6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas

The 2012 survey attempted to assess the current condition of different forms of basic infrastructure and essential public services available to citizens in their local area by asking them to rate them, from "very good" to "very bad."

People are least satisfied with the availability of jobs. More than two thirds (70%) of respondents say the employment situation in their local area is quite bad or very bad, suggesting that the government's efforts to improve job availability have not yet been fruitful. Unemployment remains one of the major issues of public concern in Afghanistan, both at the national and local level (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level and 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problems: Local level*). In addition, almost two thirds (62%) express dissatisfaction with the supply of electricity in their local area.

Table 6.1: Present condition of basic infrastructure and services in localities (Q-8a-i, Base 6290)

	Very good and quite good (%)	Very bad and quite bad (%)
Availability of education for children	77	22
Availability of clean drinking water	76	24
Security situation	74	25
Freedom of movement – the ability to move safely in your area or district	72	27
Availability of clinics and hospitals	58	42
Availability of medicine	53	46
Availability of water for irrigation	52	44
Supply of electricity	36	62
Availability of jobs	29	70

Among all categories, the highest level of citizen satisfaction is found with education services for children. More than three quarters of respondents (77%) report that availability of education is quite good or very good in their local area. The second and third highest proportions of respondents rate the availability of clean drinking water (76%) and the security situation (74%) as quite good or very good. Almost three quarters of respondents (72%) say their freedom of movement is quite good or very good within their area or district. Over half of respondents (58%) report satisfaction with the availability of clinics and hospitals in their local areas, followed by the availability of medicine (53%) and availability of water for irrigation (52%).

Though overall the majority of Afghans are satisfied with availability of most of their local infrastructure and public services (with the exception of jobs and electricity, as noted above), there are important regional varia-

tions. This year more than three quarters of respondents say the availability of education for children is very good or quite good in their local area in the North East (87%), Central/Kabul (82%) and East (81%) regions, but only 54% feel the same in the South East.

Respondents in the South East (89%), East (83%), Central/Hazarajat (83%) and South West (81%) say the availability of clean drinking water is very good or quite good, whereas this is true for only 61% of people in the North West.

Water for irrigation is a critical need for Afghanistan's agricultural economy. Sixty-three percent of respondents in Central/Hazarajat and 61% in the East state that it is good or very good, while only 46% say the same in the South West.

The longitudinal data on services and amenities suggests that the state has been able to improve these services in urban areas more than in rural areas. For example, in 2012 90% of respondents in urban areas (in contrast to 73% in rural areas) report satisfaction regarding education for children. Eighty-six percent of people in urban areas (in contrast to 68% in rural areas) report satisfaction with regard to freedom of movement. Seventy-six percent of Afghans in urban areas (in contrast to 52% in rural areas) report satisfaction with availability of hospitals and clinics.

There is a particularly marked regional variation in respondents' assessment of the local security situation. A high proportion of respondents in the North East (91%), Central/Hazarajat (90%), Central/Kabul (84%) and North West (80%) regions say security is very good or quite good in their local area. This is true for only 56% in the South East, 61% of respondents in the West and South West, and 64% of respondents in the East.

The highest proportions of respondents who rate their freedom of movement and ability to move safely in their area as very good or quite good are found in the North East (87%), Central/Hazarajat (84%), Central/Kabul (83%), South East (78%) and North West (71%) regions; a lower proportion hold this view in the South West (61%) and West (61%).

Respondents' assessment of the availability of clinics and hospitals and medicine is generally positive. Nearly three quarters of respondents in Central/Hazarajat (71%), about two thirds in Central/Kabul (64%), and slightly lower proportions in the East (60%), West (59%), North East (53%), South East (53%) and North West (50%) say local availability of hospitals and clinics is very good or quite good. A majority of respondents in the Central/Kabul (66%), West (55%) East (52%) and South West (51%) regions say local availability of medicines is very good or quite good, but less than half of the population in the North West (47%), North East (46%) and South East (45%) is satisfied.

A relatively high proportion of respondents in Central/Kabul (61%), Central/Hazarajat (49%), the North West (42%), the North East (39%) and the West (34%) say their local electricity supply is very good or quite good. A relatively low proportion of respondents say this in the East (15%), South East (14%), and South West (13%). Despite the government's efforts to increase the supply of electricity from neighboring countries such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Iran, the supply situation has not improved in most of these regions. Up

to this point, more urban residents seem to be benefiting from the government's efforts in generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity than rural residents; a much higher proportion of residents in urban areas (74%) report satisfaction than residents in rural areas (25%).

Table 6.2: Proportion of those who rate local infrastructure and public services as very good or quite good (Q-8a-i, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Availability of education for children	77	82	81	74	67	69	87	77	75
Availability of clean drinking water	76	80	83	89	81	71	68	83	61
Security situation	74	84	64	56	61	61	91	90	80
Freedom of movement – the ability to move safely in your area or district	73	83	68	58	61	61	87	84	71
Availability of clinics and hospitals	58	64	60	53	56	59	54	71	50
Availability of medicine	53	64	52	45	51	55	46	66	47
Availability of water for irrigation	52	48	61	52	46	55	59	63	48
Supply of electricity	36	61	15	14	13	34	39	49	42
Availability of jobs	29	30	33	23	34	37	23	24	26

Comparison of 2007 to 2012 data shows that, with the exception of the availability of jobs, the availability of the rest of the services has generally improved since 2007/2008, with some fluctuation in between. Availability of education for children has been an area with a consistently high, and gradually rising, proportion of people reporting satisfaction (from 70% in 2008 to 77% in 2012). This is followed by clean drinking water: 62% reported satisfaction in 2008, while 76% do so in 2012 (an increase in 14 percentage points, which is the largest increase over time for the services analyzed in the survey). Satisfaction with the security situation has improved 12 percentage points since 2008 (from 62% in 2008 to 74% in 2012).

Availability of jobs and the supply of electricity are two domains where a relatively low proportion of people have reported satisfaction. In 2007, 30% of respondents reported satisfaction with the availability of jobs; 29% did so in 2012 (with even lower levels in several intervening years), which suggests this continues to remain an area where people want to see improvements. This is consistent with the proportion of respondents who identify unemployment as the biggest problem facing Afghanistan (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level*). However, there has been a slight improvement over time in the level of public satisfaction with the supply of electricity. In 2007, 31% reported satisfaction with regard to the supply of electricity, and 36% did so in 2012.

Table 6.3: Present condition of basic infrastructure and public services in localities (Q-8a-i), combination of quite good and very good responses COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Availability of education for children	72	70	67	68	73	77
Availability of clean drinking water	63	62	63	63	70	76
Security situation	66	62	64	65	69	74
Freedom of movement – the ability to move safely in your area or district	-	-	-	63	70	73
Availability of clinics and hospitals	56	51	49	46	57	58
Availability of medicine	-	49	44	43	53	53
Availability of water for irrigation	59	47	53	49	45	52
Supply of electricity	31	25	34	34	34	36
Availability of jobs	30	21	24	27	31	29

6.2 Awareness of development programs

Since the 2001 Bonn Agreement, the international community had been providing support for various emergency, humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and development needs to help ensure positive change in the lives of the people of Afghanistan. The survey attempted to measure whether Afghans are aware of these efforts by asking respondents whether they know of or have heard of a development project or program in their area or district, implemented during the past 12 months. Respondents were given a list of the kinds of development projects and programs that might be present in their area.

Nationally, more than half of the population (53%) is aware of projects related to education, including reconstruction/opening of schools and training teachers. Similarly, half of respondents (50%) say they are aware of projects related to reconstruction/building of roads and bridges. More than two fifths of respondents (43%) say they are aware of projects related to drinking water supply. Over one third (38%) say they are aware of healthcare programs, such as primary health centers and regular visits of doctors. More than one quarter of respondents (29%) say they are aware of mosque-building projects. Just under a quarter of respondents (22%) say they are aware of projects related to electricity.

Generally the level of awareness regarding various types of projects is higher in the East, South West and South East than in the Central/Hazarajat, Central/Kabul and North East regions.

Around two thirds of respondents in the East (68%), South East (60%) and South West (60%) say they are aware of projects relating to water supply for drinking, with relatively lower levels of awareness found in the North East (40%), North West (36%), West (35%), Central/Kabul (32%) and Central/Hazarajat (12%) regions. Awareness about healthcare projects is higher in the East (57%), South West (51%) and South East (45%). It is relatively lower in the West (35%), Central/Kabul (34%), North East (33%), North West (29%) and Central/Hazarajat (17%). More than one third of respondents in the East (38%), South West (36%), as well as sizeable numbers in the North West (32%), South East (31%) and West (30%), say they are aware of the projects related to building of new mosques.

Awareness of reconstruction programs in agriculture (27% overall) and water supply for irrigation (24% overall) is highest in the East (49% for agriculture, 49% for irrigation) and South West (45% for agriculture, 33% for irrigation), followed by the West (30% for agriculture, 24% for irrigation) and North West (26% for agriculture, 19% for irrigation) regions.

While more than a third of respondents are aware of electricity projects in the Central/Kabul (35%), North West (29%) and North East (28%) regions, this is true for only 17% in the East, 15% in the West, 12% in the South West, 9% in Central/Hazarajat and 7% in the South East. Three of these regions reporting relatively low levels of awareness (the East, South East, and South West) are also regions that report the lowest levels of satisfaction with the availability of the electricity supply in their local area *(see above, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).*

Awareness of security-related projects, such as those related to de-mining and demilitarization/ disarmament, is highest in the East (44% de-mining, 40% demilitarization), South West (41% de-mining, 37% demilitarization) and West (23% de-mining, 23% demilitarization).

From this data, it is possible to infer a concentration of donor-assisted development projects focused on basic infrastructure and public services in certain areas of the country, particularly the East and South West, and to some extent the South East and North West.

Table 6.4: Speaking of the past 12 months, do you know of or have you heard of any project or program in this area or district, implemented in the following fields? Percentage of yes responses (Q-9Aa-I, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGIONS

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Education (e.g., reconstruction/ opening of schools, more teachers)	53	44	73	62	60	51	50	28	52
Reconstruction/building of roads, bridges	50	47	67	57	60	44	46	45	44
Water supply for drinking	43	32	68	58	60	35	40	12	36
Healthcare (e.g., primary health centers, regular visits of doctors)	38	34	57	45	51	35	33	17	29
Building new mosques	29	29	38	31	36	30	17	3	32
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture	27	19	49	25	45	30	18	10	26
Water supply for irrigation	24	15	49	24	33	24	24	4	19
De-mining	24	17	44	25	41	23	18	5	19
Humanitarian programs (e.g., food aid, medicine, shelter, production materials)	23	15	34	21	28	24	17	17	30
Electricity supply	22	35	17	7	12	15	28	9	29
Demilitarization/disarmament	22	13	40	17	37	23	17	6	23
Reconstruction/programs in industry	14	11	29	9	27	15	6	2	14

Those respondents who said they were aware of one or more development projects or programs in their area were subsequently asked who they think is responsible for these development efforts. The data suggests that the majority of respondents think the Afghan government (rather than foreign donors) is primarily responsible for projects to support electricity (65%), education (61%), building mosques (57%), water for irrigation (53%), demilitarization/disarmament (52%), healthcare (51%) and agriculture (50%). Survey respondents also identify the Afghan government as the lead agency for projects related to industry (46%), drinking water (45%) and roads and bridges (42%), with smaller but sizeable percentages of respondents saying that these projects are led by foreign sponsors or by both the Afghan government and foreign sponsors. On the other hand, a higher proportion of respondents are of the opinion that foreign donors are mainly responsible for humanitarian programs (44%) and in de-mining (44%).

Table 6.5: Has the Afghan government or foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for providing most of the aid for the projects? (Q-9Ba-l)

	Afghan government (%)	Foreign sponsor (%)	Both (%)
Electricity supply	65	18	14
Education (e.g., reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers)	61	19	18
Building new mosques	57	10	8
Water supply for irrigation	53	26	19
Demilitarization/disarmament	52	22	23
Healthcare (e.g., primary health centers, regular visits of doctors)	51	28	19
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture	50	28	20
Reconstruction/programs in industry	46	30	21
Water supply for drinking	43	33	21
Reconstruction/building of roads, bridges	42	35	22
Humanitarian programs (e.g. food aid, medicine, shelter, production materials)	30	44	24
De-mining	30	44	25

6.3 Development programs and public awareness of foreign aid

The 2012 survey measured respondents' perceptions of which country has provided the most aid for the development projects in their area or district. Based on an open-ended question to those respondents who said they were aware of one or more development projects or programs, more than one third of respondents (35%) say the United States has provided the most aid in their local area. Respondents also identified Germany (9%), Japan (9%), Australia (5%), India (4%), Turkey (3%) and Sweden (3%). Two percent mentioned the United Kingdom/Great Britain, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Canada, France, Norway and the national solidarity program, and less than 2% mentioned a wide range of other countries and agencies. Seven percent of respondents say they do not know which country funded the development projects in their area.

Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned to have been implemented in this area or district? (Q-10, Base 5276)



Fig. 6.1

The United States is identified by survey respondents as the major donor in all regions of Afghanistan, with Germany and Japan coming in second. While Germany is identified by a relatively higher proportion of people in the North East (30%), a relatively high proportion of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (21%) and East (15%) regions identify Japan. The fourth most frequently cited donor is Australia; a relatively higher proportion of respondents identify Australia in the Central/Hazarajat (10%) and Central/Kabul (8%) regions. India is most often identified by respondents in the East (7%), South West (7%) and South East (6%). The United Kingdom is identified most often by respondents in the South West (6%), where British soldiers and the UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) have been based. Likewise, 10% of respondents in the South West identify Canada as a major aid provider; the Canadian military had a base in this region until 2011.

Table 6.6: Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned being implemented in this area or district? (Q-10, Base 5276) All AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
USA	35	36	35	40	41	41	27	40	27
Germany	9	5	6	6	2	2	30	1	10
Japan	9	10	15	6	9	7	3	21	10
Don›t know (vol.)	7	11	4	6	2	5	15	10	4
Australia	5	8	4	3	3	5	5	10	5
India	4	3	7	6	7	4	3	1	3
Turkey	3	8	1	1	1	*	2	1	7
Sweden	3	1	4	1	1	0	2	0	11
United Kingdom (Great Britain)	2	*	3	2	6	1	1	0	1
China	2	2	3	1	2	*	1	1	2
Iran	2	1	1	4	3	3	1	4	1
Saudi Arabia	2	1	2	3	4	1	1	1	1
Canada	2	1	3	2	10	*	1	1	*
France	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	3	1
Norway	2	*	2	*	0	*	1	0	9
National solidarity program	2	3	1	*	*	7	1	1	3

7. Governance

7.1 Confidence in public institutions and other important bodies

The survey measured people's confidence in select public institutions and other important bodies. Based on a pre-set list, respondents were asked to state their level of confidence in each institution to perform its job.

Survey findings indicate that the highest level of public confidence is toward the Afghan National Army (ANA), with 93% of respondents saying they have a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in this body. The second highest level of confidence is recorded for the Afghan National Police (ANP), with 82% of respondents expressing some level of confidence in them. Since 2006, these two institutions have consistently secured the highest levels of public confidence relative to other institutions and bodies. However, while public confidence in the ANA has been modestly rising over time (from 87% in 2006 to 93% in 2012), public confidence in the ANP has slightly decreased over time (from 86% in 2006 to 82% in 2012).

These findings are consistent with responses showing that a significant majority of respondents think the ANA (87%) and the ANP (85%) help improve security, and that the ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice (72%) *(see Chapter 3, 3.5 Perceptions of the ANP, and 3.6 Perceptions of the ANA)*. They are also consistent with the relatively high levels of satisfaction with the performance of government in providing security (70%); the ANA and the ANP represent the largest and most visible government security services (*see below, 7.3 Satisfaction with central government performance in policy and service delivery*). In addition, the overall higher level of public confidence in the ANA may be due to the lower level of corruption people say they encounter in this organization compared to the ANP *(see Chapter 8, 8.2 Payment of bribes)*.

Table 7.1: Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all in the following institutions? (Q-42a&b, Base 6290)

	Confidence (%) (Great deal + Fair amount)						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Afghan National Army	87	88	89	91	91	93	93
Afghan National Police	86	83	82	84	79	83	82

High levels of confidence toward these two entities may also be due to the fear that they generate. In a different portion of the survey, a question was asked about the level of fear that people have in encountering the ANA and ANP. Comparing data from these two questions, 57% of those respondents who have confidence in the ANA have no fear toward the ANA, while 42% of those who have confidence have a lot or some fear toward this body. This is also true for the ANP. More than half (56%) of those who are confident in the ANP have no fear toward this body, but 43% of those who have confidence in the ANP have a lot or some fear when encountering the ANP.

The overall high level of confidence that Afghans express in the ANA and ANP may also be a reflection of the high proportion of respondents (64%) who agree that it is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public; this orientation would seem to be particularly relevant to publicly expressed opinions about the security forces *(see Chapter 9, 9.4 Democratic spirit of the government)*.

Table 7.2: Cross-tabulation of the proportion of respondents who have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the ANA and ANP with those respondents who have no fear, some fear or a lot of fear when encountering an ANA and ANP officer (Q-42a versus 28f and 42b versus 28e)

	Confidence in ANA (%)	Confidence in ANP (%)
No Fear	57	56
A lot or some fear	42	43

In other areas, public confidence in electronic media such as radio and TV increased in 2012 (from 72% in 2011 to 75%), positioning electronic media as the institution with the third highest level of public confidence after the ANA and ANP. Though high in 2012, confidence in electronic media was even a bit higher in 2006 and 2008.

Public confidence in religious leaders remained nearly constant from 2011 to 2012 (73% compared to 74%), making religious leaders the fourth most trusted institution. This high level of confidence is consistent with respondents' belief that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted for solving local problems *(see Chapter 9, 9.7 Involvement of religious leaders)*. When compared to other bodies and institutions, religious leaders rank highest in the public's perception of serving the interests of Afghan society (rather than their own interests) when making decisions *(see Chapter 9, 9.3 Consideration of the public interest when making decisions and policies)*.

More than half of respondents reported some level of confidence in both national (54%) and international (53%) NGOs. However, this is the lowest level of confidence recorded for both institutions since 2006. Confidence in national NGOs remained stable, but the level of confidence in international NGOs is slightly lower in 2012 (53%) compared to 2011 (56%).

Around two thirds of respondents have confidence in representative bodies such as community shuras and jirgas (68%), provincial councils (66%) community development councils (66%), and parliament (62%). However, the level of confidence in the first three institutions decreased from 2011 to 2012. This reflects respondents' decreased satisfaction in the performance of these institutions *(see below, 7.5 Satisfaction with the performance of local government and 7.9 Role of community development councils)*.

With the exception of 2007, the level of confidence in public administration has been steadily rising (from 55% in 2008 to 57% in 2009, 57% in 2010, 62% in 2011 and 64% in 2012). A majority of respondents (55%) say they have confidence in government ministers, a level that has held fairly steady since 2007; this correlates with the generally high levels of satisfaction with central government performance *(See below 7.2 Satisfaction with the performance of the central government and 7.3 Satisfaction with central government performance in policy and service delivery)*. It is also consistent with the view held by 42% of Afghans surveyed who think that government em-

ployees tend to consider the public interest rather than their own interests when making decisions (*see Chapter 9, 9.4 Consideration of the public interest when making decisions and policies).*

This year, the reported level of confidence in the government justice system declined compared to 2011. Half of respondents (50%) in 2012 expressed confidence in the government justice system, compared to 55% in 2011. However, the figure is significantly higher in 2012 compared to 2006 (38%) and slightly higher than it was in the 2007-2010 period, suggesting that although confidence in this system is lower than for other institutions, public confidence in it has generally been increasing over time. Confidence in the government justice system could be relatively low due to the high level of corruption associated with it. The government justice system is the second most frequently mentioned institution to which respondents paid bribes over the past year (*see Chapter 8, 8.3 Payment of bribes*).

The same overall trend is true for local government institutions. The level of public confidence in the municipality is almost the same as it was last year, with a marginal increase (from 55% in 2011 to 56% in 2012). However, the level of confidence in 2012 (56%) is noticeably higher than 2007 (48%), suggesting an overall positive, upward trend. This finding is consistent with an increase in satisfaction with the performance of municipal authorities among urban respondents in 2012 (*see* below, 7.5 *Satisfaction with the performance of local government*).

Survey findings indicate a marginal decrease in the level of confidence in provincial councils in 2012 (66%) compared to 2011 (67%). The proportion of respondents with confidence in parliament stayed the same (62% in both 2011 and 2012).

Confidence reported in the Independent Elections Commission shows a marginal in increase in 2012 (from 59% in 2011 to 60% in 2012), but confidence is still lower this year than it was in 2009 (67%) and 2006 (65%). These previously higher levels of confidence might be due to optimism after the 2009 presidential election in 2009, and then lingering decreased optimism due to the run off after the election and the crisis of parliamentary elections in 2010.

Confidence reported in political parties decreased slightly this year (from 47% in 2011 to 46% in 2012). Political parties remain the second lowest-ranked institution in terms of public confidence, despite the establishment of new political parties and coalitions over the last two years.

In 2012, the reported level of confidence in local militias increased to 39% (up from 36% in 2011). However, local militias continue to be the body that elicits the lowest level of confidence from the public.

Table 7.3: Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all in the following institutions? (Q-42a-u, Base 6290)

	Confidence (%) (Great deal + Fair amount)						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Electronic media such as radio, TV	84	74	76	70	71	72	75
Religious leaders	-	-	-	-	-	74	73
Newspapers, print media	77	62	63	62	57	69	72
Community shuras/jirgas	-	71	69	67	66	70	68
Community development councils	-	64	65	64	61	68	66
Provincial councils	-	69	65	62	62	67	66
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	-	-	-	-	-	-	65
Provincial government	-	-	-	-	-	67	65
Provincial development committee	-	-	-	-	-	64	64
Public administration	-	61	55	57	57	62	64
Parliament	-	-	-	-	59	62	62
Independent Elections Commission	65	-	57	67	54	59	60
Municipality	-	48	42	46	46	55	56
Government ministers	-	58	51	53	54	56	55
National NGOs	57	59	62	61	55	54	54
International NGOs	57	65	64	66	54	56	53
Government justice system	38	48	46	46	48	55	50
Political parties	44	39	43	47	43	47	46
Local militias	31	33	36	37	34	36	39

7.2 Satisfaction with the performance of the central government

The survey explored Afghans' perceptions of how the national government is carrying out its responsibilities. Three quarters (75%) of respondents give a positive assessment, including 15% who say that the government is doing a very good job and 60% who say it is doing a somewhat good job. Examination of responses to this question since 2008 reveals that over time, an increasing number of people report satisfaction with the way the government is carrying out its responsibilities.

Thinking of the national government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities? (Q-45, Base 6290) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, AND 2012



Fig. 7.1

Overall, the level of satisfaction with the performance of national government has fairly steadily increased in most regions since 2008, with the exception of in the West (where it dropped from 77% in 2011 to 69% in 2012), in the East (where it dropped from a high of 86% in 2009 to 82% in 2012) and in the North West (where it dropped from a high of 84% in 2010 to 79% in 2012). Residents of the Central/Hazarajat region report the highest level of satisfaction in 2012 (84%), followed closely by the North East (83%), East (82%) and North West (79%) regions. Satisfaction with national government performance in the Central/Kabul (70%) region is at its highest point since 2008. Regions with a notably lower-than-average proportion of respondents providing a positive assessment of government include the South East (68%) and West (69%). However, public assessment of national government performance in 2012 by Afghans living in the South East is still at its highest point compared to previous years.

Table 7.4: Thinking of the national government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities? (Q-45) ALL AND BY REGION, COMPARISON BETWEN, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	Very good or somewhat good job				
	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	67	71	73	73	**75**
Central/Kabul	62	68	68	66	**70**
East	74	86	78	80	**82**
South East	56	63	65	61	**68**
South West	61	59	69	72	**73**
West	61	68	72	77	**69**
North East	79	75	76	82	**83**
Central/Hazarajat	64	61	68	77	**84**
North West	81	82	84	77	**79**

7.3 Satisfaction with central government performance in policy and service delivery

The survey sought people's opinions on national government performance in several specific areas: education, healthcare, job creation, reviving/developing the economy, relations with neighboring countries and the international community, fighting corruption and providing security.

A high proportion of people think that the government is doing either a good job or a somewhat good job in the areas of education, security and maintaining relations with neighboring countries. In several areas, Afghans' positive assessment of government's performance is at its highest point since 2010, including education (from 85% in 2010 and 2011 to 89% in 2012), security provision (from 62% in 2010 and 2011 to 70% in 2012) and maintaining relations with neighboring countries (from 57% in 2010 to 55% in 2011 and 70% in 2012). Positive public opinion about Afghanistan's relations with the international community also rose in 2012 (70%), up from 61% in 2011.

People's positive assessment of government performance in the areas of education and security corresponds with the findings that around three quarters of Afghans rate their local education, security and freedom of movement as very good or quite good *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas)*. This suggests that the public's assessment of the national government's performance is closely related to government's ability to provide basic public services at the local level.

The level of positive perceptions of government efforts to fight corruption declined (from 35% in 2011 to 31% in 2012), as did perceptions about job creation (from 36% in 2011 to 31% in 2012) and the healthcare system (from 68% in 2011 to 66% in 2012). Respondents' views on government performance in reviving/developing the economy remained stable from 2011 to 2012 (46%). Overall, more than half of respondents say that the government is doing a poor job in fighting corruption (68%), creating jobs (68%) and reviving/developing the economy (54%).

Table 7.5: Perceptions of the performance of the national government in specific areas (Q-46a-h, Base 6290) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	Very good or somewhat good job		
	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Education	85	85	**89**
Healthcare system	63	68	**66**
Security	62	62	**70**
Maintaining relations with international community	-	61	**70**
Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	57	55	**62**
Reviving/developing the economy	43	46	**46**
Creating job opportunities	33	36	**31**
Fighting corruption	29	35	**31**

There are some differences in perceptions between urban and rural respondents regarding national government performance. Compared to their rural counterparts, urban dwellers provide a more positive assessment of the performance of the national government in many areas, including education (95% positive in urban areas, 87% in rural areas), security (80% positive in urban areas, 67% in rural areas), the healthcare system (77% positive in urban areas, 62% in rural areas), maintaining relations with the international community (77% positive in urban areas, 67% in rural areas) and maintaining relations with neighboring countries (70% positive in urban areas, 60% in rural areas). However, regarding efforts to fight corruption, create job opportunities and revive/develop the economy, more than half of urban respondents say the national government has not done a good job; in these three areas, rural respondents assess the performance of national government more positively than urban respondents.

Looking at regional variances, the most positive assessments of government performance in the four top-rated areas are found in Central/Hazarajat followed by the North East, North West, Central/Kabul and East regions. Central/Hazarajat is unique in that public perceptions were quite positive in all domains, even in those areas for which perceptions in other regions were quite negative.

Table 7.6: Perceptions of the performance of the national government in specific areas (Q-46a-h, Base 6290, combination of very good and somewhat good job) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Education	89	93	88	84	79	89	93	94	90
Security	70	71	73	49	61	62	91	82	75
Maintaining relations with international community	70	77	63	66	65	61	73	74	72
Healthcare system	66	73	70	60	56	63	68	77	63
Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	62	69	57	57	61	57	62	64	65
Reviving/developing the economy	46	40	52	45	50	50	42	67	44
Fighting corruption	31	22	36	27	38	32	35	65	29
Creating job opportunities	31	25	40	28	46	37	23	55	25

7.4 Important achievements and failings of the central government

Respondents were asked to identify the most important achievements of the central government in the past two years. The achievements cited most frequently include a better education system (28%), establishing peace and security (24%) and reconstruction (21%), followed by the existence of the ANP and ANA (16%). These achievements are broadly similar to the reasons for optimism given by respondents who say that the country is moving in the right direction (*see Chapter 2, 2.2 Reasons for optimism*), suggesting that respondents believe government plays a critical role in leading positive developments in the country. These findings are also consistent with Afghans' positive assessment of the availability of education and the security situation in their local areas (*see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas*) and high levels of satisfaction with central

government performance in relation to education (which has the highest level of satisfaction) and security (which has the second highest level of satisfaction) (*see above, 7.3 Satisfaction with central government performance in policy and service delivery*).

However, around one in 15 respondents (6%) believe that there have been no important achievements of central government over the past two years. Though a sizeable number hold this opinion in 2012, fewer people do so this year than in 2011 (10%).

What, in your opinion, is the most important achievement of the central government in the past two years? (Q-56a&b, Base 6290) (Percentages based on multiple responses).



Fig. 7.2

Around one third of respondents in the Central/Kabul (32%), West (31%) and South East (29%) regions cite improvements in the education system as the most important achievement of the current government. Four out of 10 respondents in the North East (41%) and about one third in Central/Hazarajat (32%) indicate the establishment of peace and security, making it the most often-cited accomplishment in those regions. Reconstruction was frequently cited in the North West (27%), Central/Hazarajat (25%) and the North East (25%), but was cited by fewer respondents in the South West (14%) and East (14%). The ANP and ANA were named by more than one quarter of respondents in the South West and the East (both 26%), but by very few respondents in Central/Hazarajat (4%). About one in 10 respondents in the South West (10%) and Central/Hazarajat (9%) regions say they cannot identify any achievements by the national government.

Table 7.7: What in your opinion is the most important achievement of the current government in the past few years? And what is next? (Q-56a&b, Base 6290) (Percentages based on multiple responses) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Better education system	28	32	27	29	26	31	26	25	24
Establishing peace and security	24	18	21	18	23	21	41	32	28
Reconstruction	21	23	14	16	14	20	25	25	27
Having ANP and ANA	16	13	26	22	26	13	16	4	10
Building circle roads	9	12	9	9	8	7	7	1	8
Supplying water and power	6	14	2	3	2	4	3	2	4
No achievement	6	7	2	4	10	8	3	9	6

A better education system, establishing peace and security, reconstruction, and the existence of the ANP and ANA have been consistently cited as the four most important achievements of the government since 2009. Reference to the ANP and ANA has risen over time since 2009. Respondents' mention of peace and security is up in 2012 (24%) compared to 2011 (20%), but still lower than 2009 (27%). Conversely, reference to reconstruction has been declining since 2009.

Table 7.8: What in your opinion is the most important achievement of the current government in the past few years? And what is next? (Q-56a&b) (Percentages based on multiple responses) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Better education system	26	27	26	28
Establishing peace and security	27	24	20	24
Reconstruction	32	24	26	21
Having ANP and ANA	7	11	13	16
Building circle roads	2	9	10	9
Supplying water and power	3	4	5	6
No achievement	-	3	10	6
Improving economy	5	6	4	4
Freedom of speech	8	4	4	3
Having strong government	6	5	5	3
Elections	6	6	3	2
Don't know	7	8	5	4

Respondents were then asked to identify the most important failings of the central government in the past two years. The most frequently reported failings are administrative corruption (32%), insecurity (23%) and lack of job opportunities (18%). More than one in 10 respondents identified suicide attacks (12%), followed by weak government (9%), failure to remove the Taliban (8%), a weak economy (8%) and removing drugs (7%). One in 20 respondents (5%) cited a bad education system. For the first time, the same proportion of respondents (5%) cited injustice as one of the failings of the central government. Most of the issues cited as failings of the central government reflect the reasons some Afghans think the country is moving in the wrong direction (see Chapter 2, 2.3 Reasons for pessimism). This year, administrative corruption is the most frequently cited important failing of the central government. This perceived failing is consistent with corruption being the third most frequently identified major problem facing the country (see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level) and the fact that administrative corruption was identified as the form of corruption that affects Afghans the most (see Chapter 8, 8.2 The forms of corruption).

Table 7.9: What in your opinion is the most important failing of the central government in the past two years? And what is next? (Q-57a&b, Base 6290) (Percentages based on multiple responses)

	All (%)
Administrative corruption	32
Insecurity	23
Lack of job opportunities	18
Suicide attacks	12
Weak government	9
Removing the Taliban	8
Weak economy	8
Removing drugs	7
Injustice	5
Bad education system	5

There is regional variation in the identification of administrative corruption as the most important failing of the central government, with a relatively higher proportion identifying it in the North East (38%) and a relatively lower proportion identifying it in Central/Hazarajat (17%). The rest of the regions identified administrative corruption as a central government failing in nearly equal proportions.

Security issues are identified as both an achievement and a failing of the central government; this is likely due to the variation in security conditions in different parts of the country. More than a quarter of respondents identified insecurity as a failing of central government in the South East (29%), Central/Kabul (29%), West (28%), Central/Hazarajat (26%) and East (25%) regions. On the other hand, only one in eight cited security in the North East (12%), and less than one fifth did so in the South West (17%) and North West (17%) regions. These views are supported by the finding that the highest number of respondents reporting the security situation to be very bad or quite bad in their local areas are from the South East (42%), West (38%) and East (35%) regions *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas)*.

The lack of job opportunities is identified as a major central government failing by about one quarter of respondents in the Central/Kabul (24%), North West (22%), East (22%) and North East (21%) regions. Central/Kabul, North East and North West are also regions that report the lowest level of satisfaction regarding the performance of national government in creating job opportunities *(see above, 7.3 Satisfaction with central government performance in policy and service delivery)*.

A more specific security-related issue highlighted by respondents is the failure of government to prevent or stop suicide attacks; this issue was most often cited in the North West (18%), North East (14%) and Central/Kabul (12%) regions. The first two regions are where respondents report the highest level of direct experience with suicide attacks *(see Chapter 3, 3.2 Experience of crime and violence)*. These are also the two regions where concern about suicide attacks, as one of the biggest problem at national level, is highest *(see Chapter 2, 2.4 Af-*

ghanistan's biggest problems: National level). Moreover, it is also consistent with the proportion of people in these regions who identified suicide attacks as one of their reasons for pessimism about the overall direction of the country *(see Chapter 2, 2.3 Reasons for pessimism)*.

Failure to remove the Taliban is identified as a major failing of the central government by a sizeable proportion of respondents in the West (15%), Central/Hazarajat (12%) and North West (10%) regions. People in these last two regions are among the least sympathetic to armed opposition groups (*see Chapter 4, 4.3 Sympathy with armed opposition groups*).

Weak government in general is also identified by at least one in 10 respondents in all regions except Central/Hazarajat (7%) and the North West (7%), while a relatively high proportion identify injustice in the North East (9%), North West (7%) and Central/Hazarajat (6%) regions.

Table 7.10: What, in your opinion, is the most important failing of the central government in the past two years? And what is next? (Q-57a&b, Base 6290) (Percentages based on multiple responses) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Administrative corruption	32	32	31	32	30	33	38	17	31
Insecurity	23	29	25	29	17	28	12	26	17
Lack of job opportunities	18	24	22	13	13	9	21	11	22
Suicide attacks	11	12	8	9	9	9	14	5	18
Weak government	9	8	11	9	9	9	10	7	7
Removing the Taliban	8	5	7	8	5	15	5	12	10
Weak economy	8	10	5	4	4	7	9	12	11
Removing drugs	7	8	4	7	7	7	6	6	6
Injustice	5	3	5	4	3	5	9	6	7
Bad education system	5	5	8	6	5	4	4	3	6

Looking at longitudinal trends for this question, public opinion on the most important failings of the government has stayed relatively constant since 2009. However, references to administrative corruption, lack of job opportunities and suicide attacks have increased in recent years, while the percentage of respondents citing insecurity decreased in 2012 (23%) compared to 2011 (32%).

Table 7.11: What, in your opinion, is the most important failing of the central government in the past two years? And what is next? (Q-57a&b) (Percentages based on multiple responses) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Administrative corruption	29	37	25	32
Insecurity	31	30	32	23
Lack of job opportunities	20	17	14	18
Suicide attacks	*	4	11	12
Weak government	13	10	13	9
Removing Taliban	9	9	10	8
Weak economy	15	9	8	8
Removing drugs	5	6	6	7
Injustice	2	3	3	5
Bad education system	5	5	5	5
Foreign force in the country for long time	3	3	5	2
Don't know	8	8	25	4

7.5 Satisfaction with the performance of local government

Respondents were asked to assess the performance of the local government in their area, which includes provincial governments, district governments and municipalities.

Four fifths of respondents (80%) assess their provincial government positively, including 26% who say that the provincial government is doing a very good job. Positive assessment of provincial governments has been gradually rising since 2008 (from 74% in 2008 to 75% in 2009, 78% in 2010, and 80% in 2011) and leveled off in 2012 (80%).

Turning to your provincial government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-47a) COMPARISON OF 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 2011, AND 2012



Fig. 7.3

However, assessment of the performance of the provincial government varies among regions. The overall assessment of the performance of provincial government is positive in all regions; more than four fifths of respondents say their provincial government is doing a good job in the Central/Hazarajat (88%), North East (88%), West (86%) and North West (83%) regions. While still quite high, Afghans' positive assessment of the performance of provincial government in the South West (71%) and South East (73%) is lower than in other regions.

Assessment of the performance of the provincial government gradually improved in most regions from 2009 to 2011, with the exceptions of the East and South East. However, three regions experienced a slight drop in satisfaction with provincial government from 2011 to 2012, including the East (from 80% to 79%), North West (from 88% to 83%) and Central/Kabul (80% to 78%). Positive assessments of provincial government performance rose slightly from 2011 to 2012 in the West (from 82% to 86%), Central/Hazarajat (from 83% to 88%), North East (from 84% to 88%) and South East (72% to 73%) regions.

Table 7.12: Turning to your provincial government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-47a, Base 6290) COMPARISON OF 2009, 2010, 2011, AND 2012 ALL AND BY REGION

	Very good or somewhat good job			
	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	75	78	80	**79**
Central/Kabul	72	80	80	**78**
East	85	77	80	**79**
South East	76	70	72	**73**
South West	62	70	70	**71**
West	76	77	82	**86**
North East	78	78	84	**88**
Central/Hazarajat	69	74	83	**88**
North West	81	87	88	**83**

The survey also asked about the performance of municipal and district authorities. Only people living in urban areas (23% of all respondents) were asked the question pertaining to municipal authorities. About two thirds (65%) of urban respondents say that the municipal authority in their local area is doing a good job, including 11% who say it is doing a very good job. Over one third (35%) of respondents give a negative assessment of the performance of the municipality in their locality, including 10% who say that it is doing a very bad job.

The most positive assessment of the performance of municipal authorities is in the South East (88%), North East (82%), East (72%) and West (72%) regions. The lowest positive assessments of the performance of municipal authorities are in the Central/Kabul (59%) and South West (61%) regions.

[URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY] Turning to the municipal authorities, do you think that overall they are doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (47b, Base 1462) BY REGION[3]



Fig. 7.4

Among urban residents surveyed nationwide, the average level of satisfaction with the performance of municipal authorities increased marginally in 2012 (65%) compared to 2011 (63%). However, in many regions satisfaction with municipal authorities has increased dramatically from 2011 to 2012, including in the North East (from 44% to 82%), North West (from 47% to 72%) and South East (from 66% to 88%). There were smaller but nonetheless notable increases in positive assessments in the West (from 62% to 72%) and the East (from 66% to 72%).

Conversely, the level of satisfaction with municipal authorities declined sharply in Central/Kabul (from 71% in 2011 to 59% in 2012), and to a more moderate degree in the South West (from 69% in 2011 to 61% in 2012). The reasons for low satisfaction might differ in each region. The Central/Kabul region is where respondents recorded the lowest level of optimism about the country going in the right direction *(see Chapter 2, 2.1 Direction of the country)*, whereas people in the South West reported the highest level of bribe-paying to municipal officials *(see Chapter 8, 8.3 Payment of bribes)*.

3 The figures for Central/Hazarajat for 2012 are not given since the base is very small.

Table 7.13: [URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY] Turning to municipal authorities, do you think that overall they are doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? Sum of very and somewhat good job - (Q-47b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012 - ALL AND BY REGION

	Very good or somewhat good job					
	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	57	50	58	53	63	65
Central/Kabul	64	50	50	59	71	59
East	59	50	71	78	66	72
South East	48	60	71	78	66	88
South West	58	58	55	44	69	61
West	53	31	56	66	62	72
North East	67	44	62	42	44	82
North West	67	63	88	68	47	72

People living in rural areas (77% of all respondents) were asked a similar question about the performance of district authorities. Two thirds of respondents (66%) rate the performance of their district authorities positively, including 18% who say their district authorities are doing a very good job. However, a third of respondents (33%) say their district authority is doing a bad job.

There are variations in perceptions of district authorities' performance across the regions. Three quarters of respondents in Central/Hazarajat (75%) and the North East (75%) regions say district authorities in their areas are doing a good job. Central/Hazarajat is also the region where the lowest percentage of respondents says that corruption is a major problem in their district authorities *(see Chapter 8, 8.1 Corruption – minor or major problem)*. More than two thirds of respondents in the East (67%) and South East (67%) regions say their district authorities are doing a very good or somewhat good job. On the other hand, more than a third of respondents in the West (38%), South West (37%), Central/Kabul (36%) and North West (35%) regions say that their district authorities are doing very bad or somewhat bad job.

Turning to district government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q 47c, Base – 4828) BY REGION



Fig. 7.5

Respondents' positive assessments about the performance of district authorities decreased in almost all regions in 2012 compared to 2011, with the exception of the South East, where positive assessment increased from 52% to 67%, and in Central/Hazarajat, where it increased from 65% to 75%. However, the figures for both regions for 2012 are still lower than their highest recorded point in 2008.

Table 7.14: [RURAL RESIDENTS ONLY] Turning to district government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? Sum of very good and somewhat good job (Q- 45c) COMPARISON OF 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, AND 2012, ALL AND BY REGION

	Very good or somewhat good job				
	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
All	61	69	67	63	**66**
Central/Kabul	76	73	62	68	**62**
East	54	77	65	73	**67**
South East	76	60	45	52	**67**
South West	59	50	44	62	**63**
West	81	67	59	69	**61**
North East	53	76	68	74	**75**
Central/Hazarajat	85	58	71	65	**75**
North West	64	81	76	74	**65**

Overall survey findings show that Afghans are the most positive about the performance of their provincial government, followed by the national government, district authorities, and municipal authorities. However, the proportion of people who are satisfied with the performance of municipalities is at its highest point yet in 2012 (65%).

Table 7.15: Proportion of respondents who say the national government, provincial government, municipality and district authorities are doing a good job (combination of very good job and somewhat good job) (Q-45 and 47a, b & c) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
National government	80	67	71	73	73	**75**
Provincial government	80	74	75	78	80	**80**
Municipal authority	57	50	58	54	63	**65**
Local authority	-	67	69	61	68	**66**

7.6 Role of elected representative bodies

The survey examined people's perceptions of the performance of elected representative bodies in Afghanistan, including parliament and members of parliament (MPs), provincial councils (PCs) and community development councils (CDCs) that operate at the village and community level in rural areas.

To explore perceptions of the responsiveness of national level representatives to the needs of the people, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "The parliament is addressing the major problems of people in our country." More than seven out of 10 respondents (72%) agree with this statement in 2012, including 22% who strongly agree. However, just under one third of respondents (27%) disagree, including 7% who disagree strongly.

Do you agree or disagree with the statement: "The parliament is addressing the major problems of people in our country"? (Q-52a) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 7.6

A higher proportion of respondents in rural (74%) areas compared to urban (67%) areas agree that the parliament is addressing the major problems of the country. Levels of agreement are particularly high in the Central/Hazarajat (89%), North East (81%) and North West (75%) regions. The highest level of disagreement with the statement is in Central/Kabul (34%), East (30%), West (30%), South East (29%) and South West (27%) regions.

Table 7.16: Do you agree or disagree with the statement: "The parliament is addressing the major problems of people in our country"? (Q-52a, Base 6290) BY REGION

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree somewhat (%)	Disagree somewhat (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
Central/Kabul	15	49	22	12
East	24	46	21	9
South East	25	45	20	9
South West	20	52	19	7
West	21	48	23	8
North East	32	49	14	3
Central/Hazarajat	27	62	7	3
North West	24	51	22	2

The majority of respondents (59%) also agree with the statement: "My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in the parliament," including about one in five (17%) who strongly agree. However, two

fifths of respondents (39%) disagree with this statement. Levels of satisfaction with the performance of MPs in addressing the major problems of their constituencies have stayed stable since 2011.

Do you agree or disagree with the statement: "My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in the parliament"? (Q-52b, Base 6290)



Fig. 7.7

The highest levels of agreement with this statement are recorded in the North East (71%), East (62%) and North West (62%) regions. The lowest support for this statement is recorded in Central/Kabul, where 44% of respondents disagree.

Do you agree or disagree with the statement: "My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in the parliament"? (Q-52b, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 7.8

The majority of respondents (59%) say they agree with the statement: "My provincial council member is addressing the major problems of my community," including 17% who strongly agree. However, more than one third (39%) disagree with this statement.

Do you agree or disagree with the statement, "My provincial council member is addressing the major problems of my community"? (Q-52c, Base-6290)



Fig. 7.9

The highest levels of agreement are in Central/Hazarajat (83%) and the North East (68%), which are also the regions that report the highest levels of satisfaction with the responsiveness of parliament and their MPs. However, more than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul (51%) region and 38% in the South East, East, South West, West and North West regions disagree with the statement.

Do you agree or disagree with the statement, "My provincial council member is addressing the major problems of my community"? (Q-52c, Base-6290) BY REGION



Fig. 7.10

7.7 Contact with members of parliament

The survey sought to examine in greater detail people's perceptions of the responsiveness of members of parliament by looking at their involvement in resolving local problems experienced by individuals and communities. The survey posed a question to all respondents: "Have you ever contacted your MP for help in solving any of your personal or local problems?" Less than one fifth of respondents (18%) reported ever having contacted their MP for help of this kind, with men (22%) more likely to have done so than women (14%). Contact with MPs is higher among Pashtuns (23%) compared to their counterparts in Hazara (17%), Tajik (16%) Uzbek (16%) and other (11%) communities.

Have you ever contacted your MP for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (Q-48, Base 6290) ALL AND BY GENDER AND ETHNICITY



Fig. 7.11

There are large differences reported across the regions regarding Afghans' contact with their MPs for help in solving personal or local problems. Around one quarter of respondents in the South East (28%), South West (25%) and East (24%) regions have contacted their MPs for such help, which is two times higher than in the Central/Hazarajat (10%) and North East (11%) regions.

Have you ever contacted your MP for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (Q-48, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 7.12

The percentage of Afghans who say they contacted their MPs for help in solving problems is a little lower in 2012 (18%) compared to 2011 (20%), but still higher than in previous years: 2006 (11%), 2007 (8%), 2008 (9%) and 2009 (12%).

Table 7.17: Have you ever contacted your MP for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (Q-48) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Yes	11	8	9	12	20	**18**
No	87	89	88	85	79	**80**

Respondents who say they contacted their MP for help in solving local problems (18% of all respondents) were asked a follow up question about whether their MPs tried to help to resolve the problem. Around two thirds of respondents (61%) say the MP tried to help, while more than one third (39%) say they did not. This

finding seems consistent with the proportion of respondents who agree that their MP is addressing the major problems of their constituency in the parliament (59%) *(see above, 7.6 Role of elected representatives)*. A much higher proportion of rural (65%) residents than urban (46%) residents were of the opinion that their MP tried to help resolve the problem.

(Filtered, Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q48) Did the MP try to help to resolve the problem? (Q – 49, Base 1162) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig 7.13

The highest proportions of respondents who say their MP tried to help resolve the problem are in the North East (70%), South West (70%), East (67%) and South East (64%) regions. On the other hand, just over half of respondents in the North West (55%) and Central/Kabul (53%) and half of the respondents in the West (50%) say their MPs tried to help resolve the problem.

(Filtered, ask if answered 'Yes' in Q48) Did the MP try to help to resolve the problem? (Q – 49, Base 1162) BY REGION



Fig. 7.14

7.8 Contact with provincial council representatives

The survey asked the same question about respondents' contact with a representative of the provincial council (PC) for help in solving personal or local problems. More than three quarters of respondents (78%) have not had this type of contact, with 22% reporting that they contacted a PC representative for assistance. This figure is slightly lower than in 2011 (24%), through it is still higher than 2006 (12%), 2007 (11%), 2008 (11%) and 2009 (15%).

Table 7.18: Now let's talk about the provincial councils. Have you ever contacted a representative on the provincial council for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (Q-50) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 AND 2012[4]

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Yes	12	11	11	15	24	22
No, did not contacted	87	87	87	82	75	78

Twice as many as male respondents (26%) say they have contacted a member of the PC compared to their female counterparts (16%). Again, more respondents living in rural areas (24%) compared to those in urban areas (15%) have contacted a PC representative for help in solving personal or local problems.

Now let's talk about the provincial councils. Have you ever contacted a representative on the provincial council for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (Q-50, Base 6290) ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 7.15

There are notable variations among regions. Around one third of respondents in the South East (35%) and the South West (33%), and about one quarter in the West (24%), say they contacted a representative from the provincial council for help in solving their personal or local problems, while only around one out six in the North West (15%), Central/Hazarajat (15%), Central/Kabul (17%) and the North East (17%) did so.

Now let's talk about the provincial councils. Have you ever contacted a representative on the provincial council for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (Q-50, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 7.16

4 This question was not asked in 2010.

Respondents were further asked whether, when asked for assistance, the PC representative tried to help resolve the problem. Sixty-three percent of respondents say their PC representative tried to help, which is a similar proportion to those who said the same about their MP (61%). More than one third (36%) said the PC representative did not try to assist them.

Did the provincial council member try to help to resolve the problem? (Filtered, asked if answered Yes in Q – 50) (Q-51, Base 1360)



Fig. 7.17

Perceptions of the responsiveness of PC members vary across regions. The highest proportion of respondents who say their PC member tried to help resolve the problem is in the East (73%), while the lowest figure is reported in the Central/Kabul (52%) region.

Did the provincial council member try to help to resolve the problem? (Filtered, asked if answered "Yes" in Q – 50) (Q-51, Base 1360) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 7.18

7.9 Role of community development councils

Community development councils (CDCs) were established as part of the national solidarity program as elected governance bodies in rural areas. Nearly 70% of rural communities have been mobilized, and more than 29,474 communities have elected local councils to represent them. These CDCs have prioritized needs and planned, managed and monitored over 62,152 subprojects made possible by block grants that have already supplied more than USD $973 million to community-driven rural reconstruction and development.[5]

5 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). (September 2012). *The largest people's project in the history of Afghanistan.* Retrieved on 16 September 2012 from: http://www.nspafghanistan.org/

The role of CDCs is defined in a Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) ratified bylaw that states they will "provide the social and development foundation at the community level and be responsible for implementation and supervision of development projects and liaison between the communities and government and non-government organizations." Current government policy indicates that CDCs are likely to play the role of village councils provided for in the Afghan Constitution until appropriate legislation is passed and elections are held to formally constitute such bodies.

The survey attempted to measure public awareness and views about CDCs. Respondents received a brief explanation about CDCs and were then asked whether they were aware of such institutions in their neighborhood. About half of respondents (48%) say they are aware of a CDC in their area, while almost the same proportion (49%) says they are not. Awareness of CDCs is noticeably higher among men (53%) than women (43%). Because CDCs operate exclusively in rural areas, it does not come as a surprise that awareness of them is more than twice as high among rural respondents (55%) than urban dwellers (27%).

The level of public awareness of CDCs varies across regions. Sixty-one percent of respondents in the North East say they are aware of a CDC in their local area, as do more than half in the East (55%), North West (53%) and West (52%) regions. Only one third of respondents in the Central/Kabul (34%) region are aware of CDCs.

Community development councils have been established as part of the national solidarity program, and members of the council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell me, are you aware of such an institution formed in your neighborhood/settlement? (Q-53, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 7.19

Across the country as a whole, awareness of CDCs in 2012 is nearly the same as it was in 2011, which is higher than any level during the 2006-2009 period, where awareness ranged from 32-44%.

Community development councils have been established as part of the national solidarity program, and members of the council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell me, are you aware of such an institution formed in your neighborhood/ settlement? (Q- 53) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 AND 2012[6]



Fig. 7.20

Respondents who are aware of a CDC in their neighborhood (48% of all respondents) were also asked to indicate which social groups are represented on the CDC, based on a pre-set list of groups. Traditional local leaders are most often identified as members of CDCs. More than eight out of 10 respondents say that elders of the local shura/jirga (86%) or local maliks/khans (75%) are members of their local CDC. Many respondents mention other influential members of the community, such as mullahs (63%), teachers (54%), shopkeepers, (48%), farmers (47%) and landless agricultural workers (39%). Fewer than one third of respondents think officials from the municipal/district administration (30%), local commanders (28%), women (27%) and doctors (25%) sit on the CDC.

Table 7.19: Percentage of respondents who say various groups are represented on the community development council (Q-54a-k, Base- 3047) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2011 AND 2012

Group	Representation (%)		
	2009	2011	2012
Elders of the local shura/jirga	77	84	86
Local maliks/khans	71	71	75
Mullahs	56	58	63
Local teachers	48	47	54
Shopkeepers	40	39	48
Farmers	45	45	47
Landless agricultural workers	36	37	39
Officials from municipal/district administration	23	23	30
Local commanders	32	28	28
Women	27	23	27
Doctors	19	21	25

6 This question was not asked in 2010.

The respondents who said they are aware of the CDC in their community were also asked about their level of satisfaction with the CDC's overall performance. About four out of five respondents (78%) say they are satisfied with the performance of their local CDC, including 28% who are very satisfied. Around one fifth (21%) of respondents expressed some level of dissatisfaction. The level of satisfaction changed very little from 2011 to 2012.

How satisfied are you with the job this community development council is doing? (Q-55) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2009, 2011 AND 2012



Fig 7.21

The level of satisfaction with CDCs' job performance differs across regions. More than three quarters of respondents who are aware of CDCs in the North East (84%), South East (83%), East (81%) and North West (77%) regions say they are satisfied with their performance, with somewhat lower levels of satisfaction in the West (74%), South West (73%), Central/Kabul (73%) and Central/Hazarajat (69%) regions.

How satisfied are you with the job this community development council is doing? (Q-55, Base- 3047) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 7.22

8. Corruption

8.1 Corruption – major or minor problem

To respond to the general impression that corruption is fairly widespread in Afghanistan, the Afghan government launched an anti-corruption drive, which is a core component of good governance. To ascertain the incidence of corruption and to assess the extent to which the government's anti-corruption drive is yielding results, this survey attempted to explore perceptions and experiences of the people of Afghanistan regarding corruption. The first set of questions explored the existence of corruption at different levels and in various facets of people's lives. Respondents were asked whether they think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in their daily life, their neighborhood, their local authorities, their provincial government, and in Afghanistan as a whole.

The survey results show that the majority of Afghans think that corruption is a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government. Over half of respondents (52%) say corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood. A slightly higher proportion of respondents say this about corruption in their daily life (56%) and in their local authorities (60%). More than two thirds say that corruption is a major problem in their provincial government (70%), whereas around eight out of 10 respondents say that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole (79%). Conversely, just over one in 10 say that corruption is not a problem at all in their daily life (13%) or their neighborhood (13%). Around one in 12 says there is no problem with corruption in their local authority (8%), one in 20 says corruption is not a problem in their provincial government (5%), and one in 25 says that corruption is not a problem in Afghanistan as a whole (4%). This is consistent with respondents' identification of corruption as one of the biggest problems facing the country *(see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National Level)*.

Table 8.1: Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem or no problem at all in the following area (Q-25a-e, Base 6290)

	Major Problem (%)	Minor Problem (%)	Not a Problem (%)
a) In your daily life	56	31	13
b) In your neighborhood	52	35	13
c) In your local authorities	60	31	8
d) In your provincial government	70	23	5
e) In Afghanistan as a whole	79	16	4

There are significant differences across the regions in the perception of corruption at different levels and in different facets of life. The perception of corruption as a major problem in daily life is the highest in the Central/Hazarajat (66%) region, followed by the Central/Kabul (62%), the West (62%), the East (60%), the South West (59%) and the North West (51%) regions. A relatively lower proportion of people identify corruption as a major problem in daily life in the South East (43%) and North East (48%) regions. Overall, Afghans perceive corruption as a major problem in their neighborhoods at a level that is lower than their perception

of it as a major problem in daily life, but nonetheless more than half of respondents in the West (59%), the South West (59%), Central/Kabul (56%) and the East (53%) regions say that corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood. Fewer than half of respondents in the North East (49%), the South East (44%), Central/Hazarajat (44%) and the North West (43%) say the same.

In all regions, more than 50% of respondents say that they think corruption is a major problem in local authorities. A relatively higher proportion of people in the Central/Kabul (64%), North East (63%), South West (61%) and West (61%) regions have this perception. The regions registering the highest perceptions of corruption at the provincial government level are the North West (78%), Central/Kabul (77%), South East (73%) and South West (69%) regions. There is a relatively lower perception of corruption at the provincial government level among respondents from the Central/Hazarajat (57%) region. Among the various regions, the proportion of respondents who say that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole is highest in the North East (89%), Central/Kabul (86%) and the North West (78%). The proportion of respondents who say that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole is lowest is in the Central/Hazarajat (58%) region.

Table 8.2: Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem or no problem at all in the following area (Q-25a-e, Base 6290) BY REGION. Major Problem responses

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Daily life	56	62	60	43	59	62	48	66	51
Neighborhood	52	56	53	44	59	59	49	44	43
Local authorities	60	64	58	59	61	61	63	54	53
Provincial government	70	77	65	73	69	62	78	57	65
Afghanistan as a whole	79	86	71	75	74	75	89	58	78

In 2012, perceptions of corruption as a major problem are higher in all facets and levels than in 2011 with the exception of the area of daily life, where it stayed at the same level as last year. In fact, analysis of the trend suggests that the perception that corruption is a major problem in all facets and levels has been rising over the years, and that it registers the highest level increase in 2012.

The perception that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole is at its highest point in 2012 (79%) since the first survey in 2006. This is also true for the perception of corruption as a major problem at the provincial government level, where the figure is at its highest (70%) this year. The proportion of respondents who say corruption is a major problem at the level of local authorities and the neighborhood, too, has been steadily rising; these perceptions are at their highest levels of 60% and 52%, respectively, in 2012. However, the proportion of those who hold the view that corruption is a major problem in their daily life has been stable since 2010, but still evinces a significant increase when compared from 2006 onwards (42% in 2006 to 56% in 2012).

Table 8.3: Percentage of the people who think corruption is a major problem in various facets of life and levels of government (Q-25a-e) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
In your daily life	42	47	51	53	55	56	56
In your neighborhood	40	43	48	50	50	47	52
In your local authorities	-	48	53	53	56	56	60
In your provincial government	66	60	63	61	65	64	70
In Afghanistan as a whole	77	74	76	76	76	76	79

At all levels, a higher proportion of urban residents, compared to their rural counterparts, tend to believe that corruption is a major problem.

Table 8.4: Percentage of the people who think corruption is a major problem in various facets of life and levels of government (Q-25a-e, Base 6290) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT

	All (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)
In your daily life	56	53	65
In your neighborhood	52	50	57
In your local authorities	60	59	64
In your provincial government	70	68	78
In Afghanistan as a whole	79	76	89

8.2 The forms of corruption

The survey sought to ascertain through an open-ended question which form of corruption, or setting in which corruption takes place, affects people the most. Nearly half (47%) of respondents say that they are most affected by administrative corruption. The second most commonly mentioned form of corruption is bribes (17%), followed by moral corruption (14%),[7] corruption in court (9%), corruption by police or in police headquarters (8%), and corruption in the education system (4%). A comparison between data from 2011 and 2012 reveals that there has been an increase in some forms of corruption. The highest increase in 2012 has been registered in administrative corruption (from 39% in 2011 to 47% in 2012).

7 Moral corruption includes anti-social behavior and other actions, which are considered to be against the norms of Afghan society. The Pashto word used for this is *Akhlaqi Fasaad* and the Dari word is *Fasaad-e-Akhlaqi*, which also means unethical behavior.

Please, tell me what kind of corruption affects you personally the most? Please give me two examples? (Q-24a&b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 8.1

These results on public perceptions and experiences of corruption are consistent with the finding that a high level of corruption is one of the core reasons for people's pessimism about the overall direction of the country (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 Reasons for pessimism*) and with respondents' identification of corruption as one of the biggest problems at the national level (*see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan's biggest problem: National Level*).

The forms of corruption identified by respondents vary across ethnic groups. The proportion of respondents who mentioned administrative corruption is higher among Tajiks (55%), Hazaras (51%), Uzbeks (47%) and other ethnic groups (47%) while it was mentioned least frequently by Pashtun (39%) respondents. This might be the result of other ethnic groups' more frequent interaction with government authorities. However, bribes are reported as a concern by an almost equal percentage of respondents across ethnic groups, with the highest level among the Tajiks (19%) and the lowest among the Uzbeks (14%). Among those respondents who identified moral corruption as the form of corruption that most affects them personally are other ethnic groups (19%), followed by Tajiks (18%), whereas, this concern registers relatively low among the Pashtun (10%), Uzbek (13%) and Hazara (13%) ethnic groups. With regard to corruption in the police/police headquarters, it was mentioned most frequently by Uzbeks (12%) and Pashtuns (10%). Corruption in the courts registers as a relatively high concern among the Uzbek (14%) and Pashtun (12%) populations. The percentage of Hazara (8%) identifying corruption in the education system as affecting them the most is twice as high as the national average.

Please, tell me what kind of corruption affects you personally the most? Please give me two examples? (Q-24a&b, Base 6290, Combination of multiple responses) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 8.2

There are also variations among the regions. Administrative corruption is mentioned by a relatively higher proportion of people in the Central/Hazarajat (61%), the West (61%), the Central/Kabul (51%) and North West (50%) regions, while it was mentioned at lower levels with the lowest record of administrative corruption reported in the East (32%) and South West (33%) regions. The first three regions mentioned are also places where moral corruption was frequently cited (by 25% in the West, 17% in Central/Kabul and 15% in central/Hazarajat), as well as by respondents in the North East (23%). Bribe taking is mentioned most by respondents in the Central/Kabul (23%) region, followed by the North West and East (both 22%). While corruption in the police is recorded in all regions, it is mentioned by very few respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (1%) and the West (3%) regions. Three regions with relatively higher concerns about police corruption also have the highest recorded concerns about corruption in the courts (14% in the East, 14% in the South West, and 13% in the South East). Corruption in the education system is mentioned by nearly three times as many respondents in the South East (12%) region compared to the national average.

Table 8.5: On another subject, please, tell me what kind of corruption affects you personally the most? Please give me two examples? (Q-24a&b, Base 6290, Combination of multiple responses) ALL AND BY REGION

Kind of Corruption	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Administrative corruption	47	51	32	40	33	61	46	61	50
Bribes	17	23	22	16	13	11	12	8	22
Moral corruption	14	17	1	9	10	25	23	15	4
Corruption in the police	8	7	14	9	10	3	9	1	9
Corruption in the court	9	7	14	13	14	6	10	6	7
Corruption in education systems	4	4	6	12	2	2	4	1	4

8.3 Payment of bribes

With corruption registering as one of the major problems in the country, the survey sought to measure people's actual personal experience with corruption in various facets of public life by asking how often in the past year they had to give cash or a gift to, or perform a favor for, a government official. The institutions and situations examined were seeking public healthcare services, applying for a job, dealing with the judiciary/courts, receiving public documents, dealing with the Afghan National Police, dealing with officials in the municipality, dealing with state electricity suppliers, seeking admission to schools/universities, dealing with the customs office, and dealing with Afghan National Army. Survey findings show that a substantial proportion of respondents had no contact with officials in the aforementioned institutions, which meant that they were not in a position to experience corruption directly.

The situation in which respondents most frequently encountered corruption in the form of an obligation to pay a bribe is when seeking public healthcare services (36%). More than a third of respondents also report encountering corruption when applying for jobs (34%) and interacting with the judiciary/courts (34%), followed by receiving official documents (32%) and in dealing with the Afghan National Police (31%). The lowest experience of bribery is recorded for contact with the Afghan National Army (18%).

Table 8.6: Whenever you have contacted government officials, how often in the past year have you had to give cash, a gift or perform a favor for an official? (Q-26a-j, Base 6290)

Institution	In all cases (%)	Most cases (%)	Isolated Cases (%)	Bribes paid (sum of All, Most, and Isolated Cases) (%)	No bribes paid (%)	No contact with officials (%)
Public healthcare service	3	12	21	36	36	27
When applying for a job	5	13	16	34	25	41
Judiciary/courts	6	12	16	34	22	43
To receive official documents	5	11	16	32	26	42
Afghan National Police	3	11	17	31	33	35
Officials in the municipality	6	11	12	29	26	46
State electricity supply	3	9	14	26	30	43
Admissions to schools/university	3	9	13	25	35	40
Customs office	4	8	12	24	22	51
Afghan National Army	3	6	9	18	39	43

Looking only at those respondents who had contact with the institutions listed, over half paid bribes for many basic public interactions such as healthcare, dealing with the judiciary/courts, applying for jobs, dealing with the Afghan National Police, and receiving official documents.

The proportion of respondents who paid bribes is similar in most of the regions except Central/Hazarajat, the North East, and Central/Kabul which reported the lowest overall level of paid bribes in different situations and with different institutions.

Table 8.7: Whenever you have contacted government officials, how often in the past year have you had to give cash, a gift or perform a favor for an official? (Q-26a-j, Base 6290 – sum of all, most and isolated cases) BY REGION

	All	Central/ Kabul	East	South East	South West	West	North East	Central/ Hazarajat	North West
	(%)								
Public healthcare service	36	30	38	45	42	46	28	18	39
Judiciary/courts	34	25	45	35	32	48	30	16	22
When applying for a job	34	29	47	37	38	41	25	12	29
To receive official documents	32	27	44	36	41	39	23	11	24
Afghan National Police	31	30	32	34	40	40	20	16	33
Officials in the municipality	29	24	38	22	44	39	18	11	25
State electricity supply	26	28	32	14	24	34	19	14	31
Admissions to schools/university	25	19	38	30	32	35	15	13	20
Customs office	24	18	39	25	37	34	15	8	15
Afghan National Army	18	14	24	9	27	28	8	13	19

Levels of corruption experienced in the different government institutions are slightly lower in 2012 compared to 2011. However, levels of corruption are still higher than in 2010 and four years prior to that. These findings are consistent with the rising proportion of respondents who say corruption has increased over the last year in all levels of government (*see above, 8.1 Corruption – major or minor problem*). These findings also help to explain why corruption continues to be identified as the third biggest problem facing Afghanistan (*see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan's biggest problems: National level)*, and the third biggest reason for pessimism among those who say that the country is moving in the wrong direction *(see Chapter 2, 2.3 Reasons for pessimism*). It also sheds light on the reasons why failure to tackle administrative corruption is identified as the first and most important failing of central government (*see Chapter 7, 7.4 Important achievements and failings of the central government*).

Table 8.9: Percentage of the people who have corruption-related experience – sum of all cases, most cases and isolated cases (Q-26a-j) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
To receive official documents	-	24	24	28	28	38	32
Judiciary/courts	35	23	23	29	29	35	34
When applying for a job	-	26	25	30	30	34	34
Afghan National Police	36	24	21	28	32	35	31
Public healthcare service	38	30	26	31	33	34	36
Admissions to schools/university	-	17	16	21	24	27	25
Officials in the municipality	26	19	17	22	22	30	29
Customs office	20	12	14	17	20	25	24
State electricity supply	24	22	17	23	22	26	26
Afghan National Army	-	11	10	13	17	20	18

8.4 Government efforts to fight corruption

The survey sought to explore what respondents think about the government's efforts to fight corruption, in terms of whether the government is doing too much, about right or not enough. Only 14% of respondents say the government is doing too much in fighting corruption, while 43% say it is doing about right. Four out of 10 of respondents (40%) say it is not doing enough to fight corruption.

Respondents in rural areas (of whom 16% say the government is doing too much, and 44% say about right) seem to be more optimistic about efforts to fight corruption than their urban counterparts (of whom 9% say the government is doing too much, and 38% say about right). Half of urban respondents (50%) say that government efforts to fight corruption are inadequate.

Do you think that the government is doing too much, about right or not enough to fight corruption? (Q-27, Base 6290) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 8.3

Perceptions of respondents vary across the regions on government efforts to fight corruption. The largest proportion of respondents in the Central/Kabul (50%), South East (45%) and North West (42%) regions say the government is not doing enough to fight corruption. This is likely influenced by the fact that the Central/Kabul region has among the highest proportion of respondents who say that corruption is a major problem across most levels of government (*see above, 8.1 Corruption – major or minor problem*). Most respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (54%) region – which among all the regions, records the lowest level of bribe payments across all services surveyed – say the government is doing about right in fighting corruption, with similar proportions of respondents holding this view in the South West (53%) and East (48%).

Do you think that the government is doing too much, about right, or not enough to fight corruption? (Q-27, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 8.4

When examining people's actual experiences of corruption-related incidences, what becomes evident is that the levels for 2012 are slightly lower compared to 2011. Paired with the finding that a substantial number of people believe that the government is doing about right in fighting corruption, it is possible to infer that the government's anti-corruption drive is yielding some results: due to the government's efforts, levels of corruption have been reduced and the trends are declining.

9. Political Participation

9.1 Freedom of expression

The survey gauged public opinion on freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy, by asking Afghans whether they feel safe when expressing their opinions and why they do (or do not) feel safe.

Respondents were first asked whether people in their community feel safer, equally safe or less safe to freely express their opinions than they did one year ago. About a quarter (24%) of respondents says they feel safer to express their opinions, but one sixth (16%) say they feel less safe. More than half (56%) of respondents say they feel as safe as they did one year ago.

Respondents' opinions vary across regions. More than a third of respondents in Central/Hazarajat (34%) say people feel safer expressing their opinions today than they did a year ago, followed by the North East (30%) and Central/Kabul (26%) regions. Just under one fifth of Afghans in the North West (18%) say they feel safer when expressing their opinions, as do more than one in five in the East (22%), South East (21%), South West (21%) and West (21%) regions.

In comparison to one year ago, do people in the area where you live feel safer, as safe, or less safe to freely express their opinions? (Q-29, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.1

Respondents who said that people in their local area feel safer to express their opinions this year (24% of all respondents) were asked a follow-up question about the changes or reasons that have made it possible. Respondents were allowed two responses. This year respondents cited a more diverse range of reasons. Half of respondents (50%) say that improvement in freedom of expression is due to good security conditions in their area, and more than one third (39%) say it is due to the legal guarantee of freedom of speech. Thirteen percent attribute improvements in freedom to express one's opinions to peace and democracy, and another 13% say it's due to the presence of the ANP and ANA. Good government was cited by about one in 12 (8%) respondents, and unity among people was identified by one in 14 (7%). Smaller percentages identified better

education, removal of the Taliban, freedom of the press and respect for human rights as reasons people now feel safer expressing their opinions.

What changes/reasons do you think have made people in your area feel safer over the past year to express their opinions? (Q-30a&b combined, Base 1487)



Fig. 9.2

There are regional variations in response to this question. The proportion of respondents who cite good security conditions as the reason for improved freedom of expression is highest in the South West (60%) and the North West (59%), followed by the East (55%), North East (55%), Central/Hazarajat (51%) and South East (50%) regions. Guaranteed freedom of speech was cited most frequently in the Central/Kabul (50%) region, and also by numerous respondents in Central/Hazarajat (48%) and the North East (41%). One fifth of respondents in Central/Kabul (20%) and the North West (19%) cited peace and democracy, but very low percentages cited this factor in Central/Hazarajat (4%) and the South West (4%). The presence of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) as a facilitating factor in improved freedom of expression was cited by almost one quarter of respondents in the East (24%). Better education (16%), unity among people (15%) and good government (14%) were more frequently cited by respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region than other regions. More people in the West (relative to other regions) identified the removal of Taliban (14%) and guaranteed freedom of the press (12%), and 10% cited better education as a reason people feel safer to express their opinions.

Table 9.1: What changes/reasons do you think have made people in your area feel safer over the past year to express their opinions? (Q-30a&b combined, Base 1487) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central /Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
The security conditions are good (in our area)	50	45	55	50	60	38	55	51	59
Freedom of speech is guaranteed	39	50	34	35	26	36	41	48	29
Peace and democracy	13	20	7	13	4	7	11	4	19
Having ANP and ANA	13	12	24	10	19	16	11	3	9
Good government	8	6	11	9	8	8	7	14	9
Unity among people	7	6	5	13	4	7	5	15	5
Better education	6	4	2	4	7	10	6	16	2
Removal of Taliban	6	2	5	7	6	14	6	4	9
Freedom of press is guaranteed	6	6	2	2	1	12	6	5	6
Respect for human rights	5	4	2	5	7	2	9	0	4

As noted above, some new responses to this question were recorded in 2012. Good security conditions, guaranteed of freedom of speech, peace and democracy and the presence of the ANP and ANA have fairly consistently been the four most frequently cited reasons for feeling safer to express opinions. However, in 2012 respondents cited such factors as unity, the removal of the Taliban, freedom of the press and respect for human rights for the first time. Consequently, the relative weight of the two leading reasons, good security conditions and freedom of speech, has decreased.

Table 9.2: What changes/reasons do you think have made people in your area feel safer over the past year to express their opinions? (Q-30a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
The security conditions are good (in our area)	45	42	37	54	56	50
Freedom of speech is guaranteed	60	60	55	32	47	39
Peace and democracy	26	14	14	10	17	13
Having ANP and ANA	0	-	1	6	6	13
Good government	0	3	11	6	6	8
Unity among people	-	-	-	-	-	7
Better education	0	0	4	2	5	6
Removal of the Taliban	-	-	-	-	-	6
Freedom of press is guaranteed	-	-	-	-	-	6
Respect for human rights	-	-	-	-	-	5

Respondents who say that people in their area feel less safe to express their opinions (16% of all respondents) were also asked to provide two reasons for why this is the case. The highest proportion, about one third of respondents (32%), cite bad security conditions in their local area, followed by 20% who say the government does not allow freedom of political opinion, and in turn by 18% who cite threats by anti-government elements. Thirteen percent say that freedom of expression is restricted due to the presence of the Taliban, and 8% cite fear for their personal safety, fear of other people and the presence of warlords. One in 20 respondents (5%) attributes it to ethnic discrimination, a reason that appeared for the first time in 2012.

Why don't people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Q-31a&b combined, Base 1015)



Fig. 9.3

There are differences between rural and urban residents' responses to this question. Poor security conditions are cited by more than one third of rural residents (34%) compared to one quarter of urban residents (26%). Five times more respondents in rural areas (16%) than urban areas (3%) cited the presence of the Taliban.

There are also regional variations. More than one third of respondents in Central/Kabul (38%) and the North West (34%) cite bad security conditions as a leading reason why people do not express their opinions freely, while only a little more than one quarter (26%) identify it in the North East region. Twice as many respondents in the South East (14%) than in other regions cite fear for personal safety; people in the South East also cite the presence of the Taliban at twice the level of other regions (20%) as the reason why people fear expressing their opinions freely. Six times as many respondents in the North East (35%) than the South West (6%) say that the government does not allow freedom of political expression. The proportion of people in the South West region who cite ethnic discrimination as a leading factor in restricted freedom of expression (12%) is twice as high as other regions. Afghans surveyed in the West (30%), South West (20%), North East (20%) and South East (19%) are more likely to cite threats by anti-government elements than Afghans surveyed in the East (10%) and Central/Kabul (11%) regions. These first three regions are also the regions where the security conditions are rated the lowest by survey respondents *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).*

Table 9.3: Why don't people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Q-31a&b combined, Base 1015) ALL AND BY REGION[8]

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Security conditions are bad in this area	32	38	31	32	30	33	26	34
The government doesn't allow freedom of political opinion	20	17	22	17	6	25	35	18
Threats by anti-government elements	18	11	10	19	20	30	20	17
Presence of Taliban	13	6	14	20	13	13	18	11
Fear for personal safety	8	5	11	14	8	7	7	4
Afraid of people	8	9	5	4	5	12	8	12
Presence of warlords	8	3	9	13	5	10	15	6
Ethnic discrimination	5	7	3	4	12	4	2	2

Trend analysis reveals that since 2006, poor security conditions have consistently been the leading reason why people feel they are not free to express their political opinions. However, the proportion of respondents who cite this factor is lower in 2012 (32%) than 2011 (37%), 2008 (38%), 2007 (36%) and 2006 (40%) but still higher than 2010 (25%) and 2009 (29%). Regarding the view that the government does not allow freedom to express political opinions, in 2012 20% held this view. This is the second highest recorded level since we began polling (in 2007, 22% held this view).

In 2012, for the first time in this survey, respondents cited threats by anti-government elements (18%) as a leading (and the third most frequently identified) reason why people are reticent to express their political opinions. The presence of the Taliban holds the fourth position in 2012, cited by 13% of Afghans surveyed. This represents a sharp drop compared to the 2009-2011 period; the proportion of those who attribute limited freedom of political expression to the Taliban presence is at its lowest since 2006. The proportion of Afghans who cite fear for personal safety in 2012 (8%) is almost four times lower than previous years, where the proportion has ranged from 30-41%. The presence of warlords, which was a frequently cited factor in 2006 (33%) and 2007 (18%), declined in subsequent years and has stayed low in 2012 (8%).

8 The sample size for this answer in the Central/Hazarajat region is very small (seven respondents) and therefore not statistically significant, so it has not been included.

Table 9.4: Why don't people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Q-31a&b combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Security conditions are bad	40	36	38	29	25	37	32
Government does not allow freedom of political opinions	17	22	15	12	11	18	20
Threats by anti-government elements	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Presence of Taliban	16	25	18	21	24	26	13
Afraid of people	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Fear for safety	30	34	41	34	34	32	8
Presence of warlords	33	18	8	7	6	6	8
Ethnic discrimination	-	-	-	-	-	-	5

9.2 Personal efficacy: ability to influence government decisions

The survey attempted to measure perceptions of personal efficacy in political participation, defined as the degree of influence people think they can have over government decisions by participating in political processes (both formal and informal). More than half (52%) of respondents say they feel they can influence government decisions, including 14% who say they can have a lot of influence and 38% who say they can have some influence. Less than half of respondents (46%) say that have limited (22%) or no influence (24%).

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-32, Base 6290)



Fig. 9.4

In 2012, the highest perceived level of personal efficacy is found in the East, where more than two thirds of respondents (67%) say that they have some or a lot of influence over government decisions, followed by over half of respondents in the South West (57%), North West (55%), Central/Hazarajat (55%), North East (55%) and West (51%) regions. The lowest perceived levels of personal efficacy are found in Central/Kabul (42%) and the South East (46%) region. More than one third of respondents (35%) in the Central/Kabul region say they have no influence at all over government decisions, as do nearly one third (31%) in the Central/Hazarajat region.

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-32, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 9.5

The overall proportion of respondents who think they have some or a lot of influence over government reached a high point in 2008 (66%), but the level has gradually and steadily declined since then from 56% in 2009, 54% in 2010, 53% in 2011 to 52% in 2012.

Table 9.5: How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-32) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Combination of some and lot of influence	47	53	66	56	54	53	**52**
Combination of very little and no influence at all	49	42	30	38	43	45	**46**

9.3 Consideration of the public interest when making decisions and policies

The survey also attempted to examine public perceptions of whether leaders of various institutions consider the interests of the Afghan people or their own interests when making decisions and policies. More than two fifths of respondents (43%) say religious leaders consider the public interest when making decisions and policies, consistent with the high level of public confidence in religious leaders *(see Chapter 7, 7.1 Confidence in public institutions and other important bodies)* and the support for consultation with religious leaders on local problems *(see below, 9.7 Involvement of religious leaders)*. A similar proportion (42%) say government employees consider the public interest rather than their own interests when making decisions and policies. From the list provided, these are the only two institutions that respondents say they believe primarily serve the public interest rather than their own interests.

For all other groups and institutions cited, a higher proportion of respondents believe that decisions and policies are made based on personal interests rather than the public interest. Perceptions of failure to serve the public interest are quite high for officials in national NGOs (47%), international NGOs (46%), officials in the court (45%), government ministers (44%) and donor institutions (44%).

Table 9.6: Thinking of officials, do you believe that people employed in the following institutions are driven in their work mainly to serve the interests of Afghan society, or mainly to serve their own interests? (Q-41a-h, Base 6290)

	Afghans' interests (%)	Their own interests (%)	Both (%)
Religious leaders	43	33	22
Government employees	42	35	22
Member of parliament	33	40	26
Ministers in the government	31	44	24
Officials in the court	28	45	25
Officials in international NGOs	27	46	25
Officials in donor institutions	27	44	27
Officials in national NGOs	24	47	27

The proportion of respondents who think religious leaders mainly serve the interests of Afghan society is highest in the North East (58%), South East (49%) and Central/Hazarajat (47%) regions.

Nationally, one third of respondents (33%) say MPs primarily serve the Afghan public's interests, and 31% say the same about government ministers. Nearly half of respondents in the North West (44%) and North East (44%), and more than one third in the Central/Hazarajat (39%) region say MPs consider the public interest when making decisions and policies. The proportion of respondents who say that government ministers look after the Afghan public's interests is also highest in these three regions (44% in the North East, 43% in Central/Hazarajat and 40% in the North West).

More than half of respondents in the North East (58%) and Central/Hazarajat (58%), and half in the North West (50%), think that government employees serve the public interest rather than their own interests. Well over one third of respondents in the West (44%), the North West (39%) and Central/Hazarajat (36%) say officials in the courts serve the public interest.

The level of confidence in national NGOs to act in the Afghan public's interest is highest in the Central/Hazarajat (44%) region, which is much higher than any other region; confidence in international NGOs (45%) to make decisions based on the public interest is also highest in that region. The Central/Hazarajat (47%) region is also where the highest proportion of respondents say they think that officials in donor institutions consider the Afghan public interest first, compared to around one third in the North East (33%) and North West (31%) regions, and only 21% in the South West, South East and Central/Kabul regions.

Table 9.7: Proportion of respondents who believe that people employed in the following institutions are driven in their work mainly to serve the interests of Afghan society (Q-41a-h, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Religious leaders	43	33	46	49	46	40	58	47	37
Government employees	42	33	40	35	31	43	58	58	50
Members of parliament	33	26	32	32	23	28	44	39	44
Ministers in the government	31	22	29	29	23	28	44	43	40
Officials in the court	28	20	24	19	22	30	44	36	39
Officials in international NGOs	27	22	27	26	27	26	29	45	32
Officials in donor institutions	27	20	23	24	25	29	33	47	31
Officials in national NGOs	24	21	26	21	21	23	25	44	27

9.4 Democratic spirit of the government

The survey sought to examine perceptions of the commitment of the Afghan government to core democratic principles. Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public." About two thirds of respondents (64%) agree with the statement, including 20% who strongly agree. Around one third of respondents (34%) disagree.

More than two thirds of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (70%), Central/Kabul (68%) and South West (66%) regions agree with the statement. On the other hand, more than one third in the South East (41%), North West (38%) and East (35%) regions disagree with the statement that it is not acceptable to criticize the government.

Level of agreement with the statement: "It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public?" (Q-12, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.6

Respondents were also asked their opinion on the statement, "It is a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition." More than three quarters of respondents (80%) agree. This is true for all regions, and especially so in the Central/Hazarajat region, where nearly nine out of 10 respondents (88%) agree with the statement. Around one quarter of respondents in the North West (24%), West (23%) and South West (23%) regions disagree with the statement that it's a good thing for the government to allow peaceful opposition.

Level of agreement with the statement, "It is a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition." (Q-58a, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.7

Respondents were also asked to react to the statement, "Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion." More than four fifths (83%) of respondents agree with the statement, but a higher proportion of urban respondents (93%) agree compared to their rural counterparts (80%).

The level of agreement with the statement is very high across all ethnic communities. In fact, with the exception of the Pashtun community (still high at 76%), more than four fifths of respondents (from 83-91%) within all other ethnic communities say they agree with the statement,

Level of agreement with the statement, "Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion" (Q-58b, Base 6290) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 9.8

There are regional variations in respondents' views on the assertion that everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion. A very high proportion of people in the North

East (91%), Central/Kabul (90%), South East (86%) and North West (84%) regions agree with this statement. A substantial minority disagrees with the statement in the South West (31%), West (26%) and Central/Hazarajat (24%).

Level of agreement with the statement, "Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or religion" (Q-58b, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.9

Looking at the longitudinal data, agreement with these three statements was at its highest point in 2006/2007, and reached its lowest point in 2009. The level of agreement recorded in 2012 is higher than 2009 for all three statements. However, agreement with the statement, "It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public," which rose in 2011 to 68%, dropped in 2012 to 64%.

Table 9.8: Level of agreement with the three statements (Q-12, 58a&b, combination of strongly and somewhat agree) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about the government in public	-	69	62	61	62	68	**64**
It is a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition	84	81	78	77	83	81	**80**
Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion	90	90	84	80	81	82	**83**

9.5 Attitudes toward participation in democratic processes

The survey also sought respondents' views on the principles that guide their own participation in democratic processes. Respondents were asked whether they more strongly identify with the idea that (A) voting is a personal individual matter, and should be guided by personal attitudes, rather than by the larger community; or (B) One should vote the way his/her community votes, rather than as an individual. Overall support for Statement A is substantially higher than for Statement B. More than four fifths (84%) of respondents say they agree with Statement A, whereas only one in six (15%) agree with Statement B.

Responses vis-à-vis these two statements vary across the regions. Though overall agreement with Statement A is high in all regions, it is especially high in Central/Kabul (91%), the North East (91%), the East (87%), the North West (83%) and the South East (80%).

Though overall agreement with Statement B is low in all regions, it is less so in Central/Hazarajat (27%), the West (22%) and the South West (21%).

Please tell me which statement you agree more with: Statement A, "Voting is a personal, individual responsibility. Each person should vote for oneself regardless of what his/her community thinks," or Statement B, "One cannot vote for oneself. We are all members of a community and one should vote the way his or her community votes." (Q-59, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.10

When the two statements are disaggregated in terms of settlement pattern and ethnicity, some variations become apparent. In terms of settlement pattern, a relatively higher proportion of urban residents (92%) say they agree with Statement A compared to rural residents (82%). Conversely, though still low, a relatively higher proportion of rural residents (17%) agree with Statement B in comparison with urban residents (8%).

In terms of ethnicity, slightly more Tajiks (90%), Hazaras (85%) and Uzbeks (83%) say they agree with Statement A. A higher proportion of Pashtuns (18%) and other ethnic groups (19%) agree with Statement B compared to the rest of the ethnic communities, although agreement is still quite low.

Table 9.9: Please tell me which statement you agree more with: Statement A. "Voting is a personal, individual responsibility. Each person should vote for oneself regardless of what his/her community thinks," or Statement B, "One cannot vote for oneself. We are all members of a community and one should vote the way his or her community votes." (Q-59, Base All Respondents 6290) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY AND SETTLEMENT

	All (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Pashtun (%)	Tajik (%)	Uzbek (%)	Hazara (%)	Other (%)
Statement A: Voting is a personal, individual responsibility. Each person should vote for oneself regardless of what his/her community thinks	84	82	92	81	90	83	85	81
Statement B: One cannot vote for oneself. We are all members of a community and one should vote the way his or her community votes	15	17	8	18	9	16	15	19

9.6 Perceptions of democracy

Afghan political actors and the international community have worked to restore democracy in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. For this reason, since 2004, the survey has sought to examine how Afghans understand and perceive democracy and how these perceptions are changing over time.

In order to ascertain whether Afghans believe they will gain any perceptible benefits from the introduction of democracy to the country, respondents were asked to identify the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring to them personally. They were allowed to provide more than one response. Thirty percent of respondents identify peace, a similar proportion say freedom (29%) and 20% say good security as the greatest personal benefits they expect from democracy.

Other popular responses were rights and law (15%), Islamic democracy (14%), less corruption (13%), a government of the people (12%) and more job opportunities (12%). Additional responses included women's rights (11%), prosperity (9%), better government services (6%) and a water and power supply (5%) as benefits that democracy will bring to the lives of people in Afghanistan.

There are variations between regions on perceptions of the benefits of democracy. These percentages in almost all domains are higher in Central/Kabul followed by the West, East and North West regions.

Table 9.10: What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you personally? (Percentages based on multiple responses) (Q-65, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Peace	30	33	27	24	21	37	29	28	32
Freedom	29	28	28	29	18	29	28	41	34
Good security	20	21	20	23	13	26	18	22	17
Rights and law	15	15	16	13	11	16	15	11	17
Islamic democracy	14	18	15	14	8	12	16	6	13
Less corruption	13	13	12	12	5	15	17	10	13
Government of the people	12	12	9	12	5	13	17	7	16
More job opportunities	12	18	3	10	4	9	17	8	13
Women's rights	11	11	11	11	3	11	13	14	14
Prosperity	9	7	8	6	3	10	15	12	11
Better government services	6	8	6	6	5	4	6	5	6
Water and power supply	5	4	3	6	2	4	8	7	6

Peace and freedom have consistently been the most commonly cited benefits and the most important expectations of democracy identified by survey respondents since 2006. However, the relative weight of these two responses (as well as other popular responses) has decreased as respondents have begun to cite other benefits.

This year respondents identified some very practical benefits of democracy that affect their daily lives, rather than more abstract democratic principles, including good security (a response that increased from 1% in 2011 to 20% in 2012) and more job opportunities (a response that increased from 1% in 2011 to 12% in 2012). In addition, the percentage of Afghans citing water and power supply increased from 2% in 2011 to 5% in 2012.

Table 9.11: What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you personally? (Percentages based on multiple responses) (Q-65) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 AND 2012[9]

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Peace	38	31	35	41	43	**30**
Freedom	42	34	33	50	42	**29**
Good security	1	1	*	1	1	**20**
Rights and law	33	23	19	24	20	**15**
Islamic democracy	30	20	19	23	22	**14**
Less corruption	-	22	23	17	16	**13**
Government of the people	29	22	19	19	21	**12**
More job opportunities	1	*	2	1	1	**12**
Women's rights	23	17	16	21	15	**11**
Prosperity	21	17	16	15	17	**9**
Better government services	14	13	15	13	10	**6**
Water and power supply	-	-	-	-	2	**5**
Elections	14	12	-	-	9	**4**

Respondents were also asked about their level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. More than two thirds of respondents (71%) say they are satisfied, including about one fifth (19%) who say they are very satisfied. However, over one quarter of respondents (29%) say they are either somewhat or very dissatisfied. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country has remained stable since 2008 (68% in 2008, 68% in 2009, 69% in 2011, and 71% in 2012).

There are apparent regional variations. Over three quarters of respondents in Central/Hazarajat (87%), the East (78%) and the North West (75%) and more than two thirds in the South West (71%), Central/Kabul (70%) and North East (69%) regions say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in the country. On the other hand, more than one third in the South East (36%) and West (34%) regions report being dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Afghanistan.

9 This question was not asked in 2010

On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? (Q-33, Base - 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.11

9.7 Involvement of religious leaders

The survey also attempted to examine public opinion regarding the involvement of religious leaders in government decision-making. Respondents were asked which viewpoint is closer to their own in this statement; "Some people argue that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area. Others argue that politics and religion should not mix." More than two thirds (69%) of respondents reply that the first statement is closer to their views, and that religious leaders should be consulted. Just over one quarter (28%) say the second is closer to their views, that politics and religion should not mix.

More than two thirds of respondents in all regions say they favor consulting with religious leaders, with the exception of the North West region (62%). Support for such consultation is highest in the North East (74%), followed by the East (72%), Central/Hazarajat (70%), South West (70%), South East (70%), Central/Kabul (67%) and West (67%) regions.

Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view? (Q-66, Base- 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.12

In 2012, the proportion of respondents (69%) who say religious leaders should be consulted on local problems was roughly the same as in 2011 (70%), but slightly higher than 2006 (61%), 2007 (60%) and 2009 (67%),

and equal to 2008 (69%). These findings are consistent with the high level of confidence people have in religious leaders *(see Chapter 7, 7.1 Level of confidence in public institutions and other important bodies).*

*Table 9.12: Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area, while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view? (Q-66) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 AND 2012**

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Religious leaders should be consulted	61	60	69	67	70	69
Politics and religion should not mix	37	36	26	27	27	28

9.8 Perceptions of the 2010 parliamentary elections

The survey asked respondents in 2012 whether they thought the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair. Before asking this question, respondents were briefed about what the terms "free" and "fair" mean. In an electoral context, "free" means that all people have the chance to vote as they wish. "Fair" means that all candidates and parties follow the rules and are given equal access to public channels of communication, and that votes are counted correctly and not manipulated.

A majority of respondents (58%) say that the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair, while more than one third (37%) say they were not. There is large difference between rural and urban respondents; in rural areas, a majority of the respondents (61%) say that the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair, while in urban areas fewer than half of respondents (45%) say that these elections were free and fair.

Do you think the past parliamentary elections were free and fair? (Q-67, Base 6290) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 9.13

More than half of respondents in all regions, with the exception of Central/Kabul, say that the past parliamentary elections were free and fair. Many respondents in Central/Hazarajat (77%), the North West (68%), the North East (65%) and the East (60%) say that the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair. Respondents in the first three regions also have the highest level of confidence (relative to other regions) in the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) *(see Chapter 7, 7.1 Level of confidence in public institutions and other important bodies).* More than half of respondents in Central/Kabul (54%) say that the 2010 parliamentary elections were not free and fair, followed by around one third in the East (37%), South East (33%), South West (33%) and

* This question was not asked in 2010

West (33%) regions. In the latter three regions, nearly one in 10 respondents (South East, 9%, South West, 8% and West, 8%) were unwilling to respond to this question.

Do you think the past parliamentary elections were free and fair? (Q-67, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.14

The survey asked respondents who said that the 2010 parliamentary elections were not free and fair (37% of all respondents) why, in their view, this was the case. More than two thirds of respondents (72%) identify fraud as the main reason. About one in 10 respondents (9%) say that bribery tainted the elections, with smaller percentages citing insecurity on elections day (3%) and the involvement of powerful people (3%). One in 20 respondents (5%) were not willing to identify a reason.

There are substantial differences across regions regarding the reasons why people think the 2010 parliamentary elections were not free and fair. More than three quarters of respondents in the North West (80%), Central/Kabul (79%) and the North East (78%) who said that the elections were not free and fair blamed it on electoral fraud. This is consistent with the finding that more than three quarters of people in these regions cite corruption as a major problem in Afghanistan as whole *(see Chapter 8, 8.1 Corruption – major or minor problem)*. Lower numbers of people in the East (54%), South West (62%) and South East (65%) regions attributed the lack of free and fair 2010 parliamentary elections to fraud. Bribery is given as a reason by one fifth of respondents in the East (20%), followed by one sixth of respondents in the South West (16%) and South East (14%) regions. On the other hand, very few people cited bribery as reason in the North West (3%) and North East (5%) regions. Insecurity on elections day was cited by about one in 15 respondents in the East (7%) and West (6%) regions. Powerful people's involvement in elections was identified more frequently by people in the South East (7%), East (6%) and West (5%) as a reason for thinking the 2010 parliamentary elections were not free and fair. The highest percentage of respondents who could not (or did not want to) provide a reason was recorded in the West (10%) region.

Table 9.13: (Filtered). You said that you think that the election was not free and fair. What makes you think so? (Q-68, Base-2340) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Fraud in elections	72	79	54	65	62	68	78	80
Bribery	9	8	20	14	16	6	5	3
Insecurity on elections day	3	2	7	3	1	6	3	2
Powerful people involved	3	1	6	7	4	5	2	4
Don't know	5	4	7	2	6	10	5	4

The survey also attempted to examine respondents' perceptions of which entity organizes elections in Afghanistan. A majority of respondents (62%) say correctly that elections are run by the Independent Election Commission, whereas a quarter of respondents (25%) say elections are run by the government. More than one in 10 respondents (11%) say that elections are run by the international community, while a few (2%) say they are run by a special court.

The Independent Election Commission was identified by around two thirds of respondents in the East (70%), North West (66%), Central/Kabul (63%) and South East (61%) regions, and over half in the South West (59%), North East (59%), West (58%) and Central/Hazarajat (53%) regions. On the other hand, there are sizeable numbers of people in the Central/Hazarajat (35%), North East (31%), West (27%), North West (25%), and South West (25%) regions who say elections are run by the government. The proportion of respondents who say that the elections are run by the international community is roughly twice as high in the South West (14%) and Central/Kabul (14%), than in the East (6%), North East (7%) and North West (8%) regions.

In your opinion, who is running elections in Afghanistan? (Q-69, Base- 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.15

All respondents were asked about the date of the next presidential election. In response, a majority (60%) say (correctly) that it is scheduled for 2014, while about one fifth (18%) say it will be held in 2013 and more than one in 10 (12%) say it is scheduled for 2015. In all, around 40% of Afghans (including those who got

the answer wrong or who said they did not know) are not aware of the actual date of the next presidential elections, suggesting a critical need for civic and electoral education. The highest percentages of people who could correctly identify the date of the next presidential election are found in the North West (68%), Central/Hazarajat (67%), West (64%) and East (64%) regions. Conversely, the highest percentages of respondents with the wrong information (i.e., those who said 2013 or 2015) are in the South East (42%), South West (39%), North East (33%), Central/Kabul (29%) and East (28%) regions. More than one out of 10 respondents in Central/Kabul (12%), Central/Hazarajat (12%) and the West (12%) lacked information about the date of the next presidential election or were unwilling to talk about the schedule.

As far as you know, when is the next presidential election? Is it scheduled for 2013, 2014 or 2015? (Q -70, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 9.16

9.9 Elections as a method for choosing leaders

The survey presented respondents with two alternative statements to ascertain their opinions on how leaders should be chosen in Afghanistan. Statement A read, "We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections," while Statement B read, "Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders." More than four fifths of respondents (84%) agree more with Statement A, compared to 16% who agree more with Statement B.

Nine out of 10 respondents in the North East (90%) say they agree with Statement A, followed by the Central/Kabul (89%) and Central/Hazarajat (85%) regions. The largest proportion of respondents who say they agree with Statement B are in the South West (25%), West (21%), North West (19%) and the South East (18%) regions.

Table 9.14: Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections," or Statement B, "Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders." (Q-35, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Statement A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections	84	89	84	81	74	78	90	85	81
Statement B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders	16	10	14	18	25	21	10	15	19

Opinions around these two statements differ slightly among ethnic communities. About nine in 10 Hazara (89%) respondents, followed by Tajiks (87%), express agreement with Statement A, while a lower percentage of Pashtuns (80%) and other ethnic groups (82%) say they agree with Statement A.

Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections," or Statement B, "Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders." (Q-35, Base 6290) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 9.17

9.10 Perceptions of political parties

To measure respondents' opinions on political parties, they were presented with a list of groups in Afghan society and asked which group's interests are served the most by the current political parties. One quarter of respondents (25%) say political parties mostly serve the interest of the country as a whole, while 18% say they serve the interests of broad layers of society. Around one out of six respondents say that parties serve group/personal interests (16%), regional interests (15%) and ethnic interests (15%). Four percent of respondents say that parties serve corporate interests (e.g., farmers, workers, businesspeople), and the same proportion (4%) say they serve local interests.

The proportion of respondents who says parties serve the interests of the country as whole is higher in rural (27%) areas than urban (19%) areas. More than twice as many respondents in urban (29%) areas compared to rural (12%) areas say that parties serve group/personal interests. More urban (18%) than rural (14%) dwellers say parties serve ethnic interests, while more rural (17%) than urban (11%) residents say that parties serve regional interests.

Political parties are usually established to serve the interests of various strata of society. At present, which one of the following groups do you think the political parties in our country serve the most? (Q-34, Base 6290) All AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 9.18

Respondents' perceptions vary across regions. More than one third of respondents in the East (36%), South West (34%) and Central/Hazarajat (31%) say that parties serve the interests of the country as a whole, compared to less than one fifth in Central/Kabul (17%) and the West (19%). More respondents in the North East (24%), Central/Hazarajat (22%) and the West (21%) say that parties serve the interests of broad layers of society, compared to respondents in the East (12%), South East (15%) and Central/Kabul (17%) regions. Around three times more respondents in Central/Kabul (29%) say that political parties serve group/personal interests than do respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (8%), North East (8%), North West (9%), and South West (10%) regions.

Table 9.15: Political parties are usually established to serve the interests of various strata of society. At present, which one of the following groups do you think the political parties in our country serve the most? (Q-34, Base- 6290) ALLAND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Country as a whole	25	17	36	24	34	19	26	31	29
Broad layers of society	18	17	12	15	18	21	24	22	19
Group/personal interest	16	29	19	17	10	13	8	8	9
Ethnic interests	15	17	12	15	13	16	15	15	16
Regional interests	15	12	10	16	14	18	18	17	20
Corporate interests (e.g., farmers, workers, business-people)	4	3	5	6	5	6	3	3	3
Local interests	4	3	6	6	5	5	3	3	4

The survey gathered respondents' views on two statements about political parties: Statement A, which read, "Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Afghanistan," and Statement B, which read, "Many political parties are needed to make sure that Afghans have real choices in who governs them." More than half of respondents (58%) say they agree more with Statement A, which is consistent with the relatively low level of confidence Afghans have in political parties *(see Chapter 7, 7.1 Level of confidence in public institutions and other important bodies)*. Agreement with Statement A is higher in urban (67%) than rural (55%) areas.

Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Afghanistan," or Statement B, "Many political parties are needed to make sure that Afghans have real choices in who governs them." (Q-36, Base- 6290) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 9.19

The level of agreement with Statement A differs across regions. Two thirds of respondents in Central/Kabul (66%), followed by the North East (60%), the East (59%) and the West (56%) say they agree with the idea that political parties create division and confusion, and that it would be better to have fewer parties in Afghanistan. Conversely, half or nearly half of respondents agree with the alternative statement, "Many political parties are needed to make sure that Afghans have real choices in who govern them," in the Central/Hazarajat (51%), South East (46%), South West (46%) and North West (45%) regions. The lowest level of agreement with Statement B is found in the Central/Kabul (33%) and North East (38%) regions.

Table 9.16: Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Afghanistan," or Statement B, "Many political parties are needed to make sure that Afghans have real choices in who govern them." (Q-36, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Statement A: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Afghanistan	58	66	59	53	52	56	60	49	54
Statement B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Afghans have read choices in who govern them	41	33	41	46	46	43	38	51	45

9.11 Constitutional responsibilities of the president and parliament

The survey sought to examine public views on the constitutional balance of power between the president and parliament. Respondents were asked whether they agree more with Statement A ("members of parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the president does not agree") or Statement B ("Since the president represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what

parliament thinks"). More than two thirds of respondents (70%) say they agree with Statement A, while fewer than one third of respondents (29%) say they agree with Statement B.

A majority of respondents in all regions say they agree more with Statement A than with Statement B. More than three quarters of respondents in this region (79%), the South East (71%), the North East (70%), the South West (68%) and the North West (67%) agree with Statement A, suggesting strong support for the balance of power that has been laid out in Afghanistan's constitution. However, more than one third of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (39%), West (37%) and East (34%) regions agree with Statement B, "Since the president represent all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what parliament thinks."

Table 9.17: Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "Members of parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the president does not agree," or Statement B, "Since the president represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what parliament thinks." (Q-37, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Statement A: Members of parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the president does not agree	70	79	65	71	68	61	70	60	67
Statement B: Since the president represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what parliament thinks	29	19	34	27	30	37	28	39	32

The survey then examined public opinion regarding the limitations of presidential power within the country's legal framework. Respondents were asked whether they agree more with the idea that "Since the president was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong," (Statement A), or with the idea that "The president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong," (Statement B). More than half of respondents (59%) say they agree with Statement A, while more than a third say they agree with Statement B.

The level of support for Statement A is higher among Pashtuns (66%) and Uzbeks (61%), while just under half of Hazaras (49%), other ethnic groups (47%), and Tajiks (43%) say they agree with Statement B.

Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "Since the president was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong," or Statement B, "The president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong." (Q-38, Base- 6290) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 9.20

Agreement with Statement A is higher in the East (73%), South West (69%), North East (61%) and North West (60%) regions. Nearly half of respondents in Central/Kabul (47%) and around two fifths of respondents in the West (43%), North West (40%) and South East (39%) regions say they agree with Statement B. In the Central/Hazarajat region, there was equal agreement with the two statements.

Table 9.18: Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "Since the president was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong," or Statement B, "The president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong." (Q-38, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Statement A: Since the president was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong	59	51	73	58	69	56	61	50	60
Statement B: The president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong	39	47	25	39	28	43	37	50	40

The survey also attempted to examine Afghan public opinion about presidential term limits by asking respondents whether they agree more with Statement A, "The constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office," or Statement B, "There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve." Nearly three quarters of respondents (72%) expressed agreement with Statement A.

Please tell me which statement you agree with more: Statement A, "The constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office," or Statement B, "There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve." (Q-39, Base- 6290)



Fig. 9.21

There is regional variation on responses to this question. The highest level of agreement with Statement A was in Central/Kabul (80%), while the highest level of agreement with Statement B was in the South West (34%) region.

Table 9.19: Please tell me which statement you agree with more: "Statement A: The constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office, or "Statement B: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve." (Q-39, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Statement A: The constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office	72	80	66	68	64	70	73	75	70
Statement B: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve	27	19	33	30	34	29	25	24	29

The survey asked respondents to identify the most important responsibility of their members of parliament, based on a pre-set list of responsibilities. Thirty-one percent of respondents say their MPs have to listen to them and represent their needs in parliament. Almost the same proportion (30%) say that the most important job of MPs is to make laws for the good of the country. A quarter of respondents say that MPs' most important responsibility is to deliver jobs or development to their constituencies. More than one in 10 respondents (12%) say that MPs are responsible for monitoring the president and his government.

Members of parliament have various responsibilities. Which of the following do you think is the most important responsibility of your member of parliament? (Q-40, Base- 6290)



Fig. 9.22

Responses to this question varied according to region. One half to one third of respondents in the East (55%), South West (43%) and South East (35%) regions identify listening to constituents and representing their needs as the most important responsibility of MPs. Around or just under one third of Afghans polled in the Central/Kabul (37%), West (31%), North East (31%), South East (31%) and the North West (30%) regions say MPs' most important responsibility is to make laws for the good of the country. A large proportion of respondents in Central/Hazarajat (38%), the West (31%) and the North West (30%) identify delivery of jobs or development as the top responsibility.

Table 9.20: Members of parliament have various responsibilities. Which of the following do you think is the most important responsibility of your member of parliament? (Q-40, Base- 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Listen to constituents and represent their needs	31	24	55	35	43	22	27	23	27
Make laws for the good of the country	30	37	16	31	24	31	31	28	30
Deliver jobs or development	25	23	19	17	26	31	26	38	30
Monitor the president and his government	12	14	7	15	6	13	14	11	12

10. Justice Systems

10.1 Dispute resolution

The 2012 survey sought to examine public opinion in Afghanistan regarding formal and informal justice institutions and mechanisms for resolving disputes within communities. Respondents were first asked whether, in the past year, they or their community have had a dispute they could not resolve themselves and therefore had to ask others for help or cooperation. Fewer than one fifth of respondents (19%) report that they or their community had such a dispute within the past year, while four out of five of respondents (80%) say they did not have this type of dispute.

More rural respondents (20%) report taking their disputes to either formal or informal institutions/mechanisms to be resolved than their urban counterparts (14%). Twenty-one percent of men took their dispute to be resolved, compared to 16% of women.

When this question is examined across regions, it becomes evident that people in some regions have accessed formal and informal justice institutions more than in others. Around one quarter of respondents report taking a dispute forward for resolution in the South East (27%), South West (24%) and West (23%) regions, and around one in five did so in the East (19%). Fewer than one in five report taking a dispute for resolution in the Central/Kabul (17%), North East (16%) and North West (15%) regions. The smallest percentage of people who asked for help or cooperation to resolve a dispute was found in the Central/Hazarajat (7%) region.

Sometimes people and communities have problems related to an issue that concerns everybody in their area that they can't resolve on their own, and so they have to ask for the help of a governmental or a nongovernmental person, group, or agency. In the past one year, have you or your community had such a problem in your area that you had to ask for help or cooperation to resolve? (Q-71, Base- 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 10.1

When the longitudinal data is examined, it appears that the incidence of taking disputes for third-party resolution (by either formal or informal entities) rose fairly steadily from 2006, peaked in 2011, and declined in 2012. The figure for 2012 (19%) matches the 2008 level, with levels above 20% in the intervening years.

Sometimes people and communities have problems related to an issue that concerns everybody in their area that they can't resolve on their own, and so they have to ask for the help of a government or a nongovernment person, group or agency. In the past one year, have you or your community had such a problem in your area that you had to ask for help or cooperation to resolve? (Q-71) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012



Fig. 10.2

Respondents who took community disputes for resolution elsewhere (19% of all respondents) were asked a follow-up question about the nature of the problem. As was the case in 2011, the most frequently identified problem in 2012 was disputes over land, reported by more than one fifth (22%) of respondents. Problems related to public infrastructure were also common. Thirteen percent cited disputes related to lack of water and electricity, followed by reconstruction of roads and bridges (7%), family problems (7%), robbery and burglary (6%) tribal problems (6%), and security (5%).

Disputes over land have regularly been the most common problem for which communities seek dispute resolution (28% in 2007, 21% in 2010 and 2011, and 22% in 2012), although in 2009 disputes related to lack of water and electricity topped the list (21%).

The survey findings show that community disputes over land are most common in the South West (33%) region, followed by the South East (28%), East (26%), Central/Kabul (23%) and North West (22%) regions. As in 2011, infrastructure problems related to lack of water and electricity are most often reported in the North East (29%) region.

Table 10.1: What kind of problem was/is that? (Q-72, Base 1197) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Dispute over land	22	23	26	28	33	14	9	22
Lack of water and electricity	13	20	6	11	7	8	29	8
Reconstruction of roads and bridges	7	13	5	10	*	5	9	2
Family problems	7	2	11	7	8	8	5	9
Robbery and burglary	6	6	4	5	8	7	7	6
Tribal problems	6	3	10	6	4	10	9	5
Security problems	5	5	4	1	4	11	2	2
Don't know (vol.)	4	4	4	2	5	8	1	5

There are variations in respondents' experiences across ethnicities. Disputes over land are more often reported by Pashtuns (28%), followed by Uzbeks (26%) and Hazaras (23%), but less frequently by Tajik (15%) respondents. Disputes related to lack of water and electricity are more often reported by Tajik (20%) and Hazara respondents (19%). A relatively high proportion of Pashtuns (9%) also cite family-related problems, whereas tribal problem are more often identified by Uzbeks (14%) compared to other ethnic groups.

Table 10.2: What kind of problem was/is that? (Q-72, Base 1197) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY

	All (%)	Pashtun (%)	Tajik (%)	Uzbek (%)	Hazara (%)	Other (%)
Dispute over land	22	28	15	26	23	8
Lack of water and electricity	13	8	20	7	19	15
Reconstruction of roads and bridges	7	3	12	5	10	6
Family problems	7	9	4	7	4	9
Robbery and burglary	6	6	8	6	3	4
Tribal problems	6	7	6	14	3	5
Security problems	5	4	7	2	3	1
Don't know (vol.)	4	4	5	3	5	6

Respondents who took disputes to an outside party for resolution (19% of all respondents) were then asked which individual or institution they approached or asked to solve the problem. The largest proportion of respondents says they took their dispute to a local shura or jirga for resolution (59%). A substantial proportion say they took their dispute to a local malik/khan (30%), sub-national government institution such as the district authorities (25%), mullah (25%), friends and family (25%), other government agencies (15%), community development council (15%) and provincial governor/authorities (13%). Nearly one quarter of respondents approached the Afghan National Police (ANP) (22%), while only 11% approached the Afghan National Army (ANA) and a member of parliament (11%). Only a small number of respondents approached representatives from the municipality (6%) and the national solidarity program (5%).

Table 10.3: Who did you approach/ask to solve the problem? (Q-73 a, b, and c, Base 1197)

	Combined a, b & c (%)
Elders of the local shura/jirga	59
Malik/khan	30
District authorities	25
Mullah	25
Friends and family	25
Afghan National Police	22
Government agency/office	15
Community development council	15
Provincial governor/authorities	13
A member of parliament	11
Afghan National Army	11
Municipality	6
National solidarity program	5

There are sizeable variations across regions regarding people's approaches to these institutions for dispute resolution. More than two thirds of respondents in the North East (73%) and North West (72%) regions rely on their local shura/jirga for problem solving, while less than half do so in the South West (48%) region. Relative to other regions, a higher proportion of people in the South West region approach mullahs (38%) and friends and family members (33%) to solve their problems. Maliks/khans were approached most often in the East (38%) and Central/Kabul (35%) regions, whereas they were approached less frequently in the South East (21%) and the West (23%) regions. District authorities were approached by one third of respondents in the North West (33%) region, while by only one quarter of respondents in the South West (20%). People surveyed in the Central/Kabul (15%), East (18%), and North East (19%) regions, when compared to those in other regions, say they are less likely to take their problem to a mullah.

Use of the Afghan National Police for dispute resolution is reported highest in the East (34%), and South West (32%) regions; these are also the regions where people are more likely to approach the Afghan National Army to solve their problems. Use of other government agencies is highest in the South East region (20%), but very few people in this region approach the municipality (3%) for problem solving. One quarter of respondents (25%) approached community development councils in the North East, but only one in 15 in the South West (6%) region did so. The region that reported the highest use of the provincial governor/authorities for dispute resolution is the North West (19%), while the East recorded the lowest proportion (7%). Around one in six respondents said they approached a member of parliament to solve their problem in the Central/Kabul (15%) and East (15%) regions. One in seven respondents in Central/Kabul (14%) said they took their problem to the municipality, and one out of 10 in the North East (10%) said they approached the national solidarity program, with much lower figures for use of these two institutions in other regions.

Table 10.4: Who did you approach/ask to solve the problem? (Q-73 a, b and c, Base 1197) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Elders of the local shura/jirga	59	56	63	51	48	60	73	72
Malik/khan	30	35	38	21	32	23	33	30
District authorities	25	25	26	28	20	23	22	33
Mullah	25	15	18	26	38	28	19	30
Friends and family	25	12	31	28	33	29	30	24
Afghan National Police	22	19	34	21	32	28	10	13
Government agency/office	15	19	7	20	9	16	17	12
Community development council	15	15	7	14	6	17	25	19
Provincial governor/authorities	13	17	5	10	5	16	16	19
A member of parliament	11	15	15	12	11	10	7	9
Afghan National Army	11	9	22	15	20	10	3	2
Municipality	6	14	4	3	4	4	8	2
National solidarity program	5	4	4	5	2	5	10	5

Disputes over land, which are the most common form of disputes put forward for resolution, were taken to a wide variety of institutions and individuals, including: mullahs (32%), friends and family (26%), maliks/khans (25%), elders of local shuras/jirgas (23%), the ANP (22%), district authorities (21%), provincial authorities (20%), members of parliament (19%), government agencies (18%) and community development councils (14%).

Aside from disputes over land, the most common issues respondents reported taking to shuras/jirgas are disputes over lack of water and electricity (13%), tribal problems (8%) and family problems (7%). Maliks/khans and mullahs are most frequently approached (land disputes aside) with disputes about lack of water and electricity (15% for maliks/khans, 9% for mullahs) and family problems (9% for maliks/khans, 11% for mullahs).

The data shows that local government and government agencies are commonly approached with community disputes over public service provision, including lack of water and electricity: 21% of respondents who approached provincial governors sought help for this type of problem, as did 15% of those who approached district authorities, and 12% of those who approached government agencies. Members of parliament (12%), community development councils (12%), government agencies (11%) and district authorities (9%) dealt with a relatively larger number of cases involving reconstruction of roads and bridges. Around one in 10 respondents who said they approached friends and family (12%) and mullahs (11%) say they sought help resolving family problems.

The ANP was reported approached most often for disputes over land (22%), followed by robbery and burglary (13%) and tribal problems (9%).

Table 10.5: What kind of problem was that? (Q-72 by 73a,b&c, Base 1197) BY PLACE APPROACHED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

	Shura/jirga	MP	Government agency/office	ANP	Malik/ Khan	Provincial governor	Community Development Council	District authorities	Mullah	Friends and family
	(%)									
Lack of water and electricity	13	19	12	5	15	21	23	15	9	8
Dispute over land	23	19	18	22	25	20	14	21	32	26
Reconstruction of roads and bridges	6	12	11	1	7	7	12	9	2	1
Robbery and burglary	5	5	3	13	7	3	4	4	8	8
Tribal problems	8	3	8	9	6	4	8	7	7	6
Security problems	5	3	4	7	2	9	4	5	3	4
Family problems	7	5	5	6	9	2	4	5	11	12

The survey asked respondents whether they personally had a dispute or a formal case in the past two years that they could not settle with another party, and had to go to a state court or village or neighborhood-based

shura/jirga, to resolve it. Around one in five respondents (21%) report that they indeed had such a dispute. A higher proportion of men (24%) than women (17%) have taken a dispute for resolution to one of these bodies. Twice as many rural respondents (24%) have done so compared to their urban (11%) counterparts. Individuals' use of these dispute resolution mechanisms is reported highest in the South East (33%), South West (31%), and West (28%) regions, followed by the East (23%) and North East (17%). Fewer than one in six respondents say they took a dispute to one of these bodies for resolution in the North West (16%), Central/Kabul (13%) and Central/Hazarajat (11%) regions.

In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it? (Q-75, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 10.3

Respondents who reported taking a dispute or case to a state court or local shura/jirga (21% of all respondents) were then asked about the subject of their case. Forty-two percent said the case was a land dispute, consistent with the finding that land disputes are by far the most common cause of contention, followed by commercial disputes (10%), family problems (9%), physical assault (8%) and property disputes other than land (8%). One out of 15 said their case involved robbery/burglary (6%) or a traffic accident (6%).

What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-76, Base 1310)



Fig. 10.4

There is a notable drop in referrals of land disputes to courts and shuras/jirgas in 2012 compared to previous years. In 2012, 42% of cases taken to the state court or village/neighborhood shura/jirga were land disputes, compared to 59% in 2011, 52% in 2009, 47% in 2008, and 48% in 2007. Of those cases taken to the state

court or village/neighborhood shura/jirga, one in 10 were commercial disputes in 2012 (10%); the figures for 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011 were 9%, 7%, 8% and 8% respectively. There is a marked rise in the number of people who say that they went to the state court or local shura/jirga with a family problem, from less than 1% in previous years to 9% in 2012. Another category that was not registered in previous years is traffic accidents; in 2012 this category represents 6% of cases reported taken to the state court or village/neighborhood shura/jirga.

Table 10.6: What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-76, Base 1310) COMPARISON BETWEEN ***2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 AND 2012***[10]

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Dispute over land	48	47	52	59	42
Commercial disputes	9	7	8	8	10
Family problems				*	9
Physical assault	10	12	8	8	8
Other property disputes, not land	14	9	11	9	8
Robbery and burglary	9	8	6	8	6
Traffic accident				*	6
Murder	4	5	4	3	3
Divorce	4	6	4	3	3
Pick-pocketing	2	1	2	1	3

Although land disputes were the most common type of disputes referred to state courts or local shuras/jirgas by respondents in both rural and urban areas, land disputes accounted for 43% of all disputes taken by respondents in rural areas to these two types of institutions, and for only 30% of the cases from urban areas. In rural areas, other types of disputes lag behind considerably (for example, the next most common type of dispute put forward for resolution, commercial disputes, constitutes 9% of all cases). There appears to be a slightly greater diversity of issues taken to courts and shuras/jirgas by people in urban areas. For example, family problems constitute 20% of all disputes put forward, with land disputes trailing behind at 10%.

Among those who took a case or dispute to be resolved by a state court or local shura/jirga, around half of Uzbeks (56%), Hazaras (50%) and Tajiks (47%) say that the case involved a land dispute, while only around one third of Pashtuns' (36%) and other ethnic groups' (32%) cases say they involved a land dispute. Cases involving commercial disputes were reported relatively higher among Pashtuns (11%) and others (16%) compared to other ethnic communities.

10 This question was not asked in 2010.

Table 10.7: What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-76, Base 1310) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT AND BY ETHNICITY

	Total (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Pashtun (%)	Tajik (%)	Uzbek (%)	Hazara (%)	Other (%)
Dispute over land	42	43	30	36	47	56	50	32
Commercial dispute	10	9	12	11	9	5	5	16
Family problem	9	8	20	9	10	13	5	8
Physical assault	8	8	8	9	5	7	11	14
Other property dispute, not land	8	9	5	11	6	5	8	10
Robbery/burglary	6	6	7	5	8	2	8	7
Murder	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	*
Divorce	3	4	1	4	3	*	5	3
Pick-pocketing	3	3	3	3	1	*	3	7

The proportion of respondents who reported taking disputes for resolution to state courts or local shuras/jirgas (again, 21% of all respondents) were asked to specify where they had taken their case. The proportion of respondents using their village or neighborhood-based shura/jirga held steady between 2012 (43%) and 2011, down from a high in 2009 (47%) but up slightly from the base year of 2008 (42%). The number of respondents who say they took their personal disputes to the state court increased in 2012 to nearly half (46%), compared to 39% in 2008, 38% in 2009 and 41% in 2011.

An overall upward trend in people's reported use of state courts for dispute resolution indicates that these courts may be becoming more accessible to people over time, and that the reach of the state is expanding: a phenomenon potentially resulting from an improved law and order situation within Afghanistan.

Table 10.8: Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Q-78) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008, 2009, 2011 AND 2012

	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
State court	39	38	41	46
Village, neighborhood based shura/jirga	42	47	43	43
Both (state court and shura/jirga)	17	10	12	6

There is a clear distinction between rural and urban respondents who say they took their cases to these dispute resolution mechanisms during the last two years. Over half of respondents living in urban areas report that they took their case to state courts (53%), while a lower proportion of rural inhabitants did so (45%). Likewise, most people who had experienced a dispute in rural areas say they approached their local shura or jirga (44%) compared to 38% of their urban counterparts. This suggests that people are open to using formal dispute resolution institutions if such mechanisms are accessible to them in their local area.

There is relationship between level of education of respondents and the dispute resolution forums that they approach. A higher proportion of those respondents who attended grade 10 or higher (52%) used the state courts compared to those who never went to school (45%). Conversely, a higher proportion of those who never attended school (46%) took their personal dispute to a local shura or jirga, compared to those with higher education (35%).

More respondents report taking their disputes to state courts in nearly all regions except the North East, where about half of respondents (49%) say they took it to a shura or jirga compared to a little more than one third (37%) who took it to a state court. Though not as marked as in the North East region, more residents in the South East say they approached the shura or jirga (44%) than the state court (42%). In contrast, more than half of respondents in the East say they took their case to the state court (56%) compared to one third (33%) who took it to a shura or jirga. A similar pattern is observed for the Central/Kabul (48% to the state court, versus 43% to a shura or jirga) and North West (45% to the state court, versus 41% to a shura or jirga) regions.

Table 10.9: Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Q-78, Base 1310) BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
State court	48	56	42	48	46	37	45
Village, neighborhood based shura/jirga	43	33	44	44	46	49	41

Those respondents who say they took a personal dispute to a village or neighborhood-based shura/jirga (21% of all respondents) were also asked whether they are satisfied with the outcome. Around two thirds (64%) of respondents who took disputes to these bodies say that they are satisfied with the solution, while more than one quarter of respondents (29%) are not satisfied. Six percent of respondents say that the dispute process is not finished yet.

There are clear variations among regions. Around three quarters of respondents from the South West (74%) who say they took disputes to the state court or shura/jirga report that they are satisfied with the results, followed by people in the East (68%) and the North East (68%) regions. The proportion reporting satisfaction is relatively lower in the West (56%), Central/Kabul (61%) and North West (61%) regions. One out of six respondents who took personal disputes to the state court or shura/jirga in the North East (15%, which is three times higher than other regions) report that the dispute has not been resolved yet.

Table 10.10: (Filtered, Ask if answered code 1 'Yes' in Q75) Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings, or not? (Q – 77, Base – 1310) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Yes, satisfied	64	61	68	63	74	56	68	61
Not satisfied	29	32	27	29	23	37	16	32
Not yet finished	6	4	3	6	2	3	15	6

Comparison of the satisfaction levels of those who took their disputes to the state courts to those who took their case to a shura/jirga reveals that a higher proportion of the latter report being satisfied with the outcome: 72% report satisfaction with the shura/jirga outcome, compared to 62% with the state courts. Nearly half of respondents (46%) who took their disputes to both the state court and shura/jirga were satisfied with the outcomes compared to one third of respondents (34%) who were not satisfied. These findings are consistent with respondents' overall more positive perceptions of shuras/jirgas (see Chapter 10, 10.3 Perceptions of state courts and 10.2 Perceptions of local shuras and jirgas) and are also consistent with the corresponding levels of confidence people have in shuras/jirgas and the state court (see Chapter 7, 7.1 Level of confidence in public institutions).

Table 10.11: (Filtered, Ask if answered code 1 in Q-75) Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Filtered, Ask if answered code 1 in Q-75) Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings, or not? (Cross-tabulation of Q – 77 & 78, Base 1310)

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Not finished yet (%)
State court	62	32	5
Village, neighborhood-based shura/jirga	72	23	4
Both	46	34	20

People who reported taking their case to a state court (46% of those respondents who took their personal disputes to either a state court or shura/jirga, and 11% of all respondents) were asked a follow-up question regarding their use of professional legal services. More than four in 10 (42%) report they used professional legal services, while more than half of the respondents (51%) pleaded their cases alone or were helped by friends.

When taking a case to a state court or being a party in settling case in a state court, did you use any professional legal services (from a lawyer) or did you plead your case alone, or were you helped by friends/relatives? (Q-79, Base 690)



Fig. 10.5

Survey findings show that more respondents report pleading their cases alone or with help from friends and relatives in nearly all regions, except for the South West, where a majority of respondents (57%) say they used professional legal services and fewer than half (42%) pleaded alone or were helped by friends and relatives. The proportion of those who use legal services has grown modestly over the last few years, from 35% in 2007 to 42% in 2012, with a dip in 2008.

Table 10.12: When taking a case to a state court or being a party in settling case in a state court, did you use any professional legal services (from a lawyer) or did you plead your case alone, or were you helped by friends/relatives? (Q-79, Base 690)

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Used professional legal services	35	22	39	42	42
Alone or by the help of friends and relatives	52	62	52	43	51
Both	13	13	8	12	3

Respondents who said they approached village or neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas to resolve their disputes (43% of those who took their personal dispute to either a state court or shura/jirga, and 9% of all respondents) were asked what made them decide to take their dispute to this body instead of the state court. More than one out of five (22%) said it was because of corruption in the state court, and a little less than one fifth (17%) mentioned that local shuras/jirgas are honest. Sixteen percent said they preferred this mechanism because shuras/jirgas resolve disputes efficiently, one in 15 (7%) stated that it was because local elders are members of this body, and 6% were recommended to go to the shura/jirga by their friends. One in 20 (5%) said that they went to the shura/jirga because its decisions are based on Islamic laws, and the same proportion said that there was no state court in their area or their case wasn't appropriate to take to the court.

(Filtered, if 'Village, neighborhood based shura/jirga' in Q78) What made you decide to take your dispute to the shura/jirga versus state court? (Q 80, Base 566)



Fig. 10.6

All survey respondents, irrespective of whether they reported taking a dispute for resolution in the last year, were asked about their level of satisfaction with the available dispute resolution mechanisms and services in their area. Around three quarters (73%) of respondents say they are satisfied (including 21% who say they are very satisfied), while 24% say they are not (including 5% who say they are very dissatisfied).

How satisfied you are with the available disputes resolution mechanisms/services in your area? (Q-81, Base 6290)



Fig. 10.7

Levels of satisfaction with available dispute resolution mechanisms are highest in the East (83%) and Central/Hazarajat (79%) regions, followed by the North East (76%), whereas the lowest satisfaction level is in the West, where around two thirds of respondents (62%) region are satisfied.

How satisfied you are with the available disputes resolution mechanisms/services in your area? (Q-81, Based 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 10.8

10.2 Perceptions of state courts

The survey sought to measure public perceptions of state courts. A series of statements related to the qualities and performance of this institution was read out, and respondents were asked to state whether they agree or disagree.

The most positive assessment of state courts relates to their fairness and trustworthiness. More than two thirds of respondents (68%) say that state courts are fair and trusted, including 21% who strongly agree with this statement.

More than half of respondents (55%) say that state courts follow the local norms and values of the Afghan people, while less than half (44%) disagree. A majority says that state courts treat men and women equally (59%) and are effective at delivering justice (56%). However, fewer than half of respondents (42%) say state courts resolve cases in a timely, prompt manner.

Table 10.13: Percentage of respondents who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree) with various statements related to state courts (Q-82a-e, Base 6290)

	Agree somewhat or strongly (%)	Disagree somewhat or strongly (%)
Are fair and trusted	68	31
Follow the local norms and values of our people	55	44
Are effective at delivering justice	56	43
Resolve cases promptly and in a timely manner	42	56
Treat men and women equally	59	39

A high proportion of people surveyed in all regions say they agree with the statement that state courts are fair and trusted. The statement that evinces the least support is about the courts resolving cases in a timely and prompt fashion. Regional responses to statements about state courts' effectiveness at delivering justice and following of local norms and values is more varied, with a majority of people in some regions agreeing with these statements. A relatively high proportion of respondents say they agree with all of the five statements in Central/Hazarajat, while respondents overall assessment is also positive in the North East and North West, which are also the regions that report the highest levels of positive assessments of national government performance (see Chapter 7, 7.3 Satisfaction with national government performance).

Table 10.14: Percentage of respondents who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree) with various statements related to state courts (Q-82a-e, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Are fair and trusted	68	61	65	59	71	71	77	81	68
Follow the local norms and values of our people	55	49	59	51	47	48	66	67	59
Are effective at delivering justice	56	52	54	51	56	52	63	63	63
Resolve cases promptly and in a timely manner	42	39	42	32	40	39	52	62	46
Treat men and women equally	59	53	64	55	53	49	69	75	67

When the responses for this question for 2012 are compared with those of previous years, there is a discernible sharp increase in the proportion of people who say they believe that state courts are fair and trusted. For all other statements, the figures for 2012 are slightly lower than those for 2011.

Table 10.15: Proportion of those who agree with the following statements about state courts (Q-82a-d) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007,2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Are fair and trusted	58	50	50	53	59	68
Follow the local norms and values of our people	57	50	49	51	57	55
Are effective at delivering justice	58	52	51	54	58	56
Resolve cases promptly and a timely manner	51	38	40	42	47	42

10.3 Perceptions of local shuras and jirgas

The survey attempted to explore public perceptions of informal justice mechanisms by asking respondents about the quality and performance of village and neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas in the same manner as they were asked about state courts.

As was the case with state courts, the most positive assessment of village and neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas relates to their fairness and trustworthiness. More than four fifths (86%) of respondents say they agree that local shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted, compared to just under three quarters who say the same about the state courts (68%). Around three quarters agree that village and neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas follow local norms and values (74%) and are effective at delivering justice (75%). Just under three quarters say that local shuras/jirgas resolve cases promptly (70%). The survey also shows that a significant majority of respondents (70%) say they believe that the local shuras/jirgas should include women as members.

Table 10.16: Perceptions of the qualities and performance of village, neighborhood based shura/jirga (Q-83a-e, Base 6290)

	Agree somewhat or strongly (%)	Disagree somewhat or strongly (%)
Are fair and trusted	86	12
Follow the local norms and values of our people	74	24
Are effective at delivering justice	75	24
Resolve cases promptly and in a timely manner	70	28
Should include women as members	70	27

Positive assessments of local shuras/jirgas are higher across most dimensions in the North East, Central/Hazarajat, North West, South East and East regions, but lower in the South West, West and Central/Kabul. The first three regions are also where positive assessments of the state courts are higher (see Chapter 10, 10.2 Perception of state courts). Similarly, the three latter regions (South West, West and Central/Kabul) are where respondents give the lowest positive assessments of state courts as well.

Table 10.17: Percentage of respondents who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree) with various statements related to village, neighborhood based shura/jirga (Q-83a-e, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Are fair and trusted	86	82	87	88	84	83	95	94	88
Follow the local norms and values of our people	74	71	76	80	72	62	90	73	74
Are effective at delivering justice	75	71	74	77	73	64	90	74	73
Resolve cases promptly and in a timely manner	70	69	69	75	62	57	85	75	70
Should include women as members	70	69	70	69	56	63	85	80	77

A longitudinal assessment of the data on public perceptions of local shuras/jirgas reveals a trend similar to that of state courts. In 2012 there is a sharp increase in the proportion of people who say that shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted, while for the remaining three statements, the figures for 2012 are slightly lower than those for 2011.

Table 10.18: Proportion of those who agree with the following statements about village, neighborhood based shura/jirga (Q-83a-d) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Are fair and trusted	78	70	72	73	79	87
Follow the local norms and values of our people.	76	69	70	70	77	75
Are effective at delivering justice	76	69	69	69	75	74
Resolve cases promptly and in a timely manner	72	59	64	66	73	70

Positive perceptions of village and neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas are strikingly higher than the assessment of state courts in all domains. This is consistent with the greater level of public confidence in shuras/jirgas (68%) compared to the government justice system (50%) *(see Chapter 7, 7.1 Level of confidence in public institutions).*

Table 10.19: Percentage of respondents who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree) with various statements related to state courts and shura/jirga (Q-82 and Q-83, Base 6290)

	Agree	
	State Court (%)	Village, neighborhood based shura/jirga (%)
Are fair and trusted	68	86
Follow the local norms and values of our people	55	74
Are effective at delivering justice	56	75
Resolve cases promptly and in a timely manner	42	70

Overall, these results reflect that many Afghans continue to view traditional dispute resolution mechanisms such as village and neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas more positively than they do institutions of the modern formal justice system, such as state courts.

11. Women in Society

11.1 Biggest problems faced by women

The 2012 survey sought to examine perceptions of problems faced by women in Afghan society. All respondents (both men and women) were asked to identify the biggest problems women face in their local area. Nearly one third of respondents (29%) identify lack of education and/or illiteracy as the biggest problem faced by women followed by lack of job opportunities (14%). Ten percent mention the lack of rights (including women's rights), 8% say domestic violence, and smaller percentages mention forced marriage/dowry (6%), general healthcare (5%) and poverty (4%).

What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? (Q-84, Base 6290)



Fig. 11.1

In an opposite trend from last year, a slightly higher proportion of respondents in rural (29%) than urban (27%) areas identify illiteracy and lack of education as the biggest problem facing women in their area. Lack of education and illiteracy are identified in all regions as the biggest problem by around one quarter to half of respondents (25-44%), with the exception of the South West, where it was cited by only 17% of respondents.

Lack of job opportunities for women was cited most frequently in the North East (28%) and North West (26%), followed by Central/ Hazarajat (18%) and Central/ Kabul (14%), but by much smaller numbers of respondents in other regions (between 3% and 9%).

The issue of forced marriages/dowry is the most commonly identified problem in the South West (19%). Lack of rights/women's rights is cited by at least one in six respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (17%) and West (17%) regions, and to a lesser but nonetheless notable degree in the East (12%) and South East (12%).

The issue of domestic violence is cited most often in the East (12%), South East (13%) and South West (10%).

Table 11.1: What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? (Q-84, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Education/illiteracy	29	29	32	28	17	31	26	44	33
Lack of job opportunities for women	14	14	7	5	3	9	29	18	26
Lack of rights/women's rights	10	7	12	12	10	17	8	17	8
Domestic violence	8	5	12	13	10	8	5	3	9
Forced marriages/dowry	6	3	10	10	19	3	3	2	1
Women have no problem	6	9	4	2	10	6	4	3	3
General healthcare	5	5	6	7	9	2	6	3	4

While most of the issues above are cited by roughly equal numbers of men and women, more women (17%) than men (12%) identify the lack of job opportunities as the biggest problem facing Afghan women.

Since 2006, lack of education and illiteracy have consistently been identified as the biggest problem facing women in Afghanistan, with some fluctuation since 2006 (from a low of 24% in 2006 to a high of 31% in 2010) and a slight rise from 25% in 2011 to 29% in 2012.

The proportion of respondents identifying the lack of women›s rights as a major problem facing women dropped slightly in 2012 from 2011 (from 15% to 10%), and it is much lower than 2006 (18%). Respondents' citation of domestic violence has remained fairly stable since 2006; however, 2011 (9%) and 2012 (8%) recorded the highest percentages to date. The identification of pregnancy-related healthcare as a major problem for Afghan women has remained steady (around 5% from 2007-2011) but dropped in 2008 and 2012 to 2%, which is one fifth the level of 2006 (10%). The proportion of respondents who identify forced marriages and dowry as a major problem has also changed very little (4-8%) since 2006. Lack of job opportunities for women, a problem that emerged as the third most frequently-mentioned problem facing women in Afghanistan in 2007 (9%, up from zero in 2006), reached its highest level in 2010 (15%) and fell dramatically in 2011 to 2%, but has regained its former level (14%) in 2012.

It is interesting to note that very few people were unwilling to answer this question in 2011 and 2012 (1% and 3%, respectively) compared to 2008 (11%), and 2010 (13%). This might be due to overall growing activism on women's rights since 2011. It is also possible that women's issues have become a popular topic among Afghans this year, given the transition in Afghanistan in 2014.

Table 11.2: What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? (Q-84) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Education/illiteracy	24	29	28	30	31	25	29
Lack of rights/womens rights	18	13	13	11	7	15	10
Lack of job opportunities for women	0	9	11	13	15	2	14
Domestic violence	5	7	6	5	7	9	8
Forced marriages/dowry	7	7	5	4	5	8	6
General healthcare	9	5	5	6	3	8	5
Poverty	2	5	6	5	2	8	4
Can't leave home	9	5	5	4	3	6	2
Under control of men/men have power	9	3	1	1	2	6	2
Pregnancy related healthcare	10	4	2	5	5	5	2
Don't know	1	3	11	2	13	1	3

Respondents were also asked if there is an organization, institution or authority in their area where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved. Less than one in five respondents (19%) say such an organization exists, while over three quarters (77%) say there is no such organization in their area. Four percent say they don't know. There is no major difference between male (18%) and female (20%) respondents' answers to this question. More urban respondents (27%) than rural respondents (16%) could identify an organization, institution or authority that helps women.

Around one fifth of respondents in the West (22%), East (21%), North East (21%) and Central/Kabul (20%) say there is such an organization or institution in their area, as do smaller numbers in the South East (19%), South West (17%) and North West (14%). Only 7% of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region could identify a place where women can go for assistance with their problems.

Is there an organization, institution or authority in your area where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved? (Q-85a, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 11.2

Respondents who say there is an organization, institution, or authority in their area where women can go for assistance with their problems (19% of all respondents) were asked to name one. More than half (52%) of respondents identify the Directorate of Women's Affairs, and 9% identify their district office. Fewer than 10% of respondents identify the Human Rights Council (8%), and only one in 25 reports women's shuras (4%) as a resource for women.

More respondents in urban (62%) than rural (46%) areas cite the Directorate of Women's Affairs as a place where women can go for help, and this institution is identified more frequently by women (55%) than men (49%). The Human Rights Council is identified by more respondents in urban (13%) than rural (5%) areas. District offices, on the other hand, are identified by many more rural (12%) than urban (2%) respondents, which is to be expected since district offices principally exist in rural areas.

(Filtered, if 'yes' in Q-85a) What organization, institution or authority is that? (Q-85b, Base 1185) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 11.3

Around half of respondents from all ethnic groups, with the exception of Uzbeks (29%), identify the Directorate of Women's Affairs, with Tajiks (56%) citing it most frequently. More than one fifth of Uzbek respondents (22%) identify the district office as a resource for women, which is more than twice the level of other ethnic communities. Uzbek respondents (11%) and members of other ethnic groups (8%) were much more likely to mention women's shuras than respondents from the Hazara (1%), Tajik (3%) and Pashtun (3%) communities. Close to or more than double the proportion of Hazaras (15%) compared to other ethnic groups (4%), Uzbeks (4%), Tajiks (6%) and Pashtuns (9%) say that women can go to the Human Rights Council for assistance with their problems.

(Filtered, if 'yes' in Q-85b) What organization, institution or authority is that? (Q-85b, Base 1185) BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 11.4

More than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul (64%), East (52%), South East (61%), South West (57%) and West (53%) regions identify the Directorate of Women's Affairs as a place for women to go to resolve their problems, as do more than one third in the North East (33%) and North West (32%). District offices are most commonly identified in the North West (18%) and North East (16%), but by very few in the West (3%). The Human Rights Council is cited by about one in seven of respondents in the East (14%), followed by the South East (11%) and West (10%) regions. Women's shuras are most commonly identified in the South West (11%), but by very few in Central/Kabul and the East (1% each).

Table 11.3: (Filtered, if 'yes' in Q-85a) What organization, institution or authority is that? (Q-85b, Base 1185) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	North West (%)
Directorate of Women's Affairs	52	64	52	61	57	53	33	32
District office	9	4	8	9	9	3	16	18
Human Rights Council	8	7	14	11	4	10	6	2
Women's shura	4	1	1	2	11	3	5	8

There are substantial differences between 2011 and 2012 in terms of the institutions, organizations and authorities that respondents identify as resources for women. This year twice as many respondents identified the Directorate of Women's Affairs, and the Human Rights Council was cited by 8% of respondents this year and by no respondents last year. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) initiated the establishment of Human Rights Councils in 2012, covering at least 22 provinces and led by civil society organizations to advocate for and address human rights and women's rights violations. The highest proportion of respondents who cited the Human Rights Council were from Kunduz (32%), Nangarhar (24%), Paktia (23%), Ghor (20%), Panjshir (17%), Logar (13%), Ghazni (13%), Dehkondi (13%) and Herat (11%) provinces. In 2012, far fewer respondents identified women's shuras, village shuras/elders, and the human rights office as potential institutions where women can take their problems to be resolved.

Table 11.4: (Filtered, if 'yes' in Q-85a) What organization, institution or authority is that? (Q-85b) COMAPRISON BETWEEN 2011 AND 2012

	2011	2012
Directorate of Women's Affairs	23	52
District office	12	9
Human Rights Council	-	8
Women's shuras	18	4
Village shuras/elders	12	3
Human rights office	13	3
The court	5	2

11.2 Attitudes toward gender equality: women and education

The survey also sought to gauge public opinion on the issue of gender equality. The first issue explored relates to gender equality in education. Respondents were asked whether they agree with the statement, "Women should have equal opportunities to men in education." Almost nine in 10 respondents (87%) say they agree with this statement, including 48% who strongly agree. Only 12% say they disagree with the statement. The response for this question in 2012 closely matches those for 2009-2011; in fact, responses have been fairly consistent since 2006. Respondents' views on equality in education are broadly consistent with the high level of public support for equal rights under the law, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion (83%) *(see Chapter 9, 9.4 Democratic spirit of government*).

A higher proportion of women (92%) than men (83%) support equal opportunities for women in education. Urban residents (94%, including 64% who strongly agree) are also more likely to support equal educational opportunities for women compared to their rural counterparts (85%, including 43% who strongly agree).

Some people say that women should have equal opportunities to men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Q-86, Base 6290) ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 11.5

There are variations between ethnic groups as well. A higher proportion of Pashtuns (19%) than Uzbeks (10%), other ethnic groups (10%) and Tajiks (9%) disagree with the statement. The lowest proportion, Hazaras (6%), disagrees.

Table 11.5: Some people say that women should have equal opportunities to men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Q- 86, Based 6290) ALL AND BY ETHNICITY

	All (%)	Pashtun (%)	Tajik (%)	Uzbek (%)	Hazara (%)	Other (%)
Agree somewhat and strongly	87	81	91	90	94	89
Disagree somewhat and strongly	12	19	9	10	6	10

At least 90% of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (92%), Central/Kabul (92%), East (90%), North East (91%) and North West (91%) regions say they support equal educational opportunities for women, as do more than four fifths in the South East (85%) and West (83%). This figure falls to 68% in the South West region, where around one third (31%) of respondents oppose equal educational opportunities for women, a proportion that is at least twice as high as in other regions.

Table 11.6: Some people say that women should have equal opportunities to men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Q- 86, Based 6290) BY REGION

	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Agree somewhat and strongly	92	90	85	68	83	92	92	91
Disagree somewhat and strongly	8	10	14	32	16	8	8	9

11.3 Attitudes toward gender equality: women and employment

Respondents were also asked whether they think women should be allowed to work outside the home. Two thirds (66%) of Afghans say women should be allowed to work outside the home, while one third (33%) say they should not.

Survey findings show that there is a major difference between men and women's attitudes in this regard. Four fifths of female respondents (80%) say women should be allowed to work outside the home compared to just over half (55%) of men. Likewise, significantly more urban respondents agree with the statement (81%) than do their rural counterparts (61%).

Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this? (Q-87, Base 6290) ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 11.6

Among different ethnic communities, support for women being allowed to work outside the home is reported strongest among Hazaras (77%), followed by Uzbeks (73%) and Tajiks (72%). A little more than half respondents from the Pashtun (55%) and other ethnic (66%) communities say they support the idea that women should be allowed to work outside their homes.

Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this? (Q-87, Base 6290) BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 11.7

As with support for equality in education, the highest levels of support for women working outside the home are reported in the North West (80%), Central/Kabul (75%), Central/Hazarajat (71%), North East (65%), East (59%) and West (58%) regions. Opposition is highest in the South West (55%) but also significant in the East (40%) and West (38%).

Table 11.7: Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this? (Q-87, Base 6290) BY REGION

	All	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	66	75	59	62	44	58	65	71	80
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	33	23	40	35	55	38	34	28	19

Although nationally a majority of respondents have consistently supported the view that women should be allowed to work outside the home, there has been a small but steady decline over time in the proportion of people who agree with this view (from 71% in 2006 to a low of 62% in 2011), with a small rise in 2012. A corresponding increasing trend exists for opposition to women working outside the home (from 27% in 2006 to 35% in 2011, then 33% in 2012).

Table 11.8: Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this? (Q-87) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	71	70	69	67	64	62	66
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	27	28	27	29	33	35	33

Respondents' views on women's independence to work outside the home are similar to their views on equal opportunity in education, particularly among those who feel strongly about these issues. For example, among the 48% of respondents who strongly agree that women and men should have equal educational opportunities, 82% strongly agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home. Similarly, among the small number of respondents (3%) who strongly disagree that women and men should have equal educational opportunities, 88% say they strongly believe that women should not be allowed to work outside the home.

Table 11.9: Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion about this? (Q-87, Base 6290) BY Some people say that women should have equal opportunities to men in education. (Q- 86, Based 6290)

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree somewhat (%)	Disagree somewhat (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	82	59	29	9
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	17	39	68	88

Respondents were also asked whether they think women should be allowed to stand up for their individual rights. More than four fifths of respondents (84%) say they should, and only 15% disagree. More women (90%) than men (79%) say women should be allowed to stand up for their individual rights, as do more respondents in urban (93%) than rural (81%) areas.

There is also variation between regions. Support for the idea of women standing up for their individual rights is highest in the North East (93%), Central/Kabul (87%), North West (87%), Central/Hazarajat (85%), East (83%), South East (83%) and West (80%) regions. However, around one third of respondents in the South West (32%) and one fifth in the West (20%) say women should not be allowed to stand up for their individual rights.

Please tell me if you agree with "Women should be allowed to stand up for their individual rights." (Q58c, Base All Respondents 6290) ALL AND BY REGION



Fig. 11.8

11.4 Women's political participation

The survey attempted to ascertain whether respondents' views on gender equality in general carry through into support for women's electoral participation. Respondents were asked whether women, when voting, should decide for themselves or receive advice from men on how to vote. Respondents added a third choice to the two available choices about the level of women's independence in voting: women should decide on their own, but consult with men. More than half (53%) of respondents say women should decide for themselves. Just over a quarter (26%) say that men should advise women how to vote, and one fifth (20%) say women should decide on their own but in consultation with men.

More women (62%) than men (46%) say they think that women should decide on their own how to vote. Conversely, more men (30%) than women (19%) say men should advise women on how to vote. A similar proportion of women (18%) and men (22%) say that women should decide in consultation with men. More urban residents (69%) than their rural counterparts (48%) say that women should decide themselves.

If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves, or should they receive advice from men? (Q-89, Base 6290)
ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 11.9

Opinions differ among ethnic communities in this regard. Nearly two thirds of Tajiks (63%) and Hazaras (61%) and the majority of Uzbeks (50%) and other ethnic groups (54%) say that women should decide for themselves, but this is true for only 43% of Pashtun respondents. More Pashtuns (27%) than any others say women should decide for themselves but consult with men; this view ranged between 14% and 18% within other groups. Almost one third of Uzbek (31%) and Pashtun (29%) respondents say men should advise women on their voting decisions; this is true for over one fifth of Tajiks (22%), other ethnicities (26%) and Hazara (20%) respondents.

If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves, or should they receive advice from men? (Q-89, Base 6290)
BY ETHNICITY



Fig. 11.10

Opinions also vary across regions. Around two thirds of respondents in the North West (64%), Central/Hazarajat (64%) and Central/Kabul (63%) regions agree that women should decide for themselves, followed by the West (59%) and just half in the North East (50%). A substantial proportion of residents in the South West (37%) and North East (31%) say that men should advise women how to vote, and large numbers of respondents in the East (42%), South East (32%) and South West (25%) say that women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men.

Table 11.10: If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves, or should they receive advice from men? (Q-89, Base 6290) BY REGION

	All	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Women should decide for themselves	53	63	36	44	36	59	50	64	64
Men should advise them	26	19	21	23	37	29	31	27	23
Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men	20	17	42	32	25	12	19	9	13

There has been a slight decrease over time in the proportion of respondents who say they think that women should decide for themselves how to vote (from 56% in 2009, to 51% in 2011 and 53% in 2012. Likewise, the proportion of respondents who say women should decide for themselves but consult with me, as well as the proportion who say men should advise women on how to vote, have increased slightly since 2009.

Table 11.11: If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves, or should they receive advice from men? (Q-89) COMAPRISON BETWEEN 2009, 2011 AND 2012[11]

	2009 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Women should decide for themselves how to vote	56	51	53
Men should advise them	23	28	26
Women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with men	19	21	20

11.5 Women and political leadership

The survey sought to assess public attitudes toward women in political leadership roles. Respondents were first asked whether they think political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or whether they should be equally represented. Forty-five percent of respondents say that men and women should have equal representation, while nearly the same number (43%) say that leadership positions should be mostly for men. Only 11% say that leadership positions should be mostly for women.

11 This questions was not asked in 2010

There is a large discrepancy in the opinions of male and female respondents on this issue. The survey shows that women have a much stronger belief in equality of representation than their male counterparts. Almost twice as many women (56%) as men (37%) say there should be equal representation in political leadership. More than half of men (53%) believe that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, while only around one in eight (14%) female respondents say that leadership positions should be mostly for women.

Just under half (45%) of respondents in rural areas say that leadership positions should be mostly for men, compared to one third (35%) of those in urban areas. In urban areas, the majority of respondents (58%) say that men and women should have equal representation in political leadership, while only 41% in rural areas agree.

Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in political leadership? (Q-88, Base 6290) ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 11.11

The survey findings also show that opinions vary between ethnic groups. The majority of Pashtun respondents (53%) say leadership positions should be for men, while most Hazara (58%), Uzbek (54%) and Tajik (50%) respondents say leadership positions should be for both men and women. Respondents from other ethnic groups are divided in this regard.

Support for equal representation of men and women in political leadership positions is highest in Central/Hazarajat and Central/Kabul (both 57%), followed by the North West (52%) and North East (49%) regions. The majority of respondents in the South West (72%) and East (54%) say that leadership positions should be for men only, as do just under half of respondents in the South East (44%), West (41%) and North East (43%). These regions also register higher levels of opposition to women working outside the home (*see above, 11.3 Attitudes toward gender equality: women and employment).*

Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership? (Q-88, Base 6290) BY REGION



Fig. 11.12

The 2012 survey results show that support for equal representation of men and women in political leadership positions has been declining steadily since 2008 (51% in 2008 to 47% in 2009, 46% in 2010, and 45% in both 2011 and 2012). Support for political leadership positions mostly for men has been rising over the same period.

Table 11.12: Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership? (Q-88) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Equal for both men and women	50	51	51	47	46	45	45
Mostly for men	37	21	35	39	40	44	43
Mostly for women	12	27	10	10	11	10	11

12. Access to Information

The survey has sought to examine over time how information is accessed and received by the Afghan people. In 2012, the survey measured radio listenership, television viewership, newspaper/magazine readership and household ownership of various types of communications technologies such as radio, television, fixed phone lines, mobile phones and computers. It also assessed people's preferences for receiving information through these and other channels, including informal community networks.

12.1 Access to communications technology

As in previous years, radio, is the most accessible form of media for Afghans. More than four fifths (80%) of all respondents say they own a functioning radio in their households. A higher proportion of rural residents (83%) compared to urban residents (73%) report owning a radio in 2012. A higher proportion of urban residents reports owning other communication technologies. Almost three quarters (71%) of respondents report owning mobile phones; more than nine out of 10 (94%) people in urban areas own a mobile phone, compared to about two out of three people (63%) in rural areas. More than half of the respondents (52%) say they own a TV set, but there is a large difference in ownership between urban residents (92%) and rural residents (40%). A small percentage of Afghans have computers in their households (12%); around seven times more residents in urban households (34%) report owning computers than their rural counterparts (5%). Fixed phone line ownership remains low in Afghanistan (3%). Four times as many urban residents report (8%) owning fixed land line phones compared to their rural counterparts (2%).

Table 12.1: Proportion of respondents who have the following communications technologies in functioning order in their households (Q-1, Base 6290) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT

	All (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)
Radio	80	83	73
Mobile phone	71	63	94
TV set	52	40	92
Computer	12	5	34
Fixed phone lines	3	2	8

Ownership of all forms of communication-related technologies directly depends on respondents' income and education levels. More than four fifths of households (84%) within the highest income group (earning over 10,000Afs a month) own radios as a source of information, while this is true for fewer (71%) of the households with the lowest level of income (earning under 2,000Afs). More than four fifths of respondents (86%) who have attended grade 10 or higher own a radio, compared to those who never went to school (78%).

Ownership of a TV set varies by the level of monthly income, with those of higher income having a higher level of TV ownership. Fewer than half of respondents (41%) who earn less than 2,000Afs per month own a functioning TV set in their homes, compared to 62% of those who earn above 10,000Afs. The same trend

is true for respondents' education level; 73% of those who have attended grade 10 or higher own a TV set, while among those who never attended school, only 43% own one. Television ownership is also related to the electricity supply, in that ownership is higher among those who reported that the electricity supply is good in their areas *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).*

The largest proportion of respondents who own TV sets (76%), mobile phones (92%) and computers (28%) are in the Central/Kabul region, where people are more satisfied with the electricity supply than in any other region in the country *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas).* Radio ownership is highest in the East (97%), followed by the South East (96%) and South West (94%) regions. The Central/Hazarajat region records the lowest radio ownership (48%). The South West region reports the lowest percentage of TV ownership (24%), followed by the East (34%). A large proportion of respondents who have a functioning mobile phone in their household (after the Central/Kabul region) is recorded in the East (80%), South East (78%) and North West (74%) regions. Computer ownership is very low in all regions except Central/Kabul (28%), which maintains the highest record, followed by the South East (13%) region.

Table 12.2: Regional comparison of ownership of communications technologies (Q-1, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central/ Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Radio	80	77	97	96	94	78	73	48	71
TV set	71	76	34	43	24	56	47	43	56
Mobile phone	52	92	80	78	45	49	66	49	74
Computer	12	28	7	13	6	8	4	6	5

Ownership of all forms of communication technology, with the exception of radio, has been rising steadily since 2007. Radio ownership has declined from 88% in 2007 to 80% in 2012, but radio continues to remain the leading form of communication technology. In regions and situations marked by lack of reliable supply of electricity, people continue to rely on it for accessing information.

Mobile phone ownership has seen a large increase over time, from 42% in 2007 to 71% in 2012. TV ownership has also increased, from 37% in 2007 to 52% in 2012. Computer ownership is still low, but has been rising steadily since 2008 (from 5% in 2008 to 6% in 2009, 9% in 2010, 9% in 2011 and 12% in 2012). An increase in computer ownership will increase usage of the internet: an alternative not only to radio, but also to TV, and in some cases, mobile phones.

Table 12.3: Proportion of respondents who have the following communications technologies in functioning order in their households (Q-1, Base 6290) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Radio	88	84	81	82	81	80
Mobile phone	42	40	52	59	66	71
TV set	37	38	41	41	42	52
Computer	-	5	6	9	9	12

12.2 Radio listenership

The survey sought to measure the usage of different means of communication by the Afghan public. While more than three quarters of respondents (77%) listen to the radio, more men (83%) report listening to the radio than women (69%). This is consistent with the higher proportion of women who report viewing TV *(see Chapter 12, 12.3 TV viewership)*. Radio listenership is higher in rural areas (80%) compared to urban areas (65%). This is consistent with higher access and availability of electricity in urban than in rural areas, which makes TV ownership and viewership more possible as an alternative to radio *(see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local Areas)*.

Do you listen to radio programs? (W-1, Base 6290) ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 12.1

Radio listenership rises with household income. Sixty-five percent of households that earn less than 2,000Afs listen to the radio. Seventy-three percent of households that earn between 2,001 to 3,000Afs listen to the radio, as do more than three quarters of those with a monthly income between 3,001 to 10,000Afs and eight out of 10 with a monthly income of more than 10,000Afs. However, one fifth (20%) of those with the highest monthly income do not listen to the radio.

Do you listen to radio programs? (W-1, Base 6290)



Fig. 12.2

There is a relationship between owning a radio and listening to it. Radio ownership is relatively high in the East (97%), South East (96%) and South West (94%) regions; these are also the regions where radio listenership is high. In contrast, Central/Hazarajat, the region with the lowest ownership (48%), also recorded the lowest listenership (47%) of radio.

Table 12.4: Comparison of ownership and listenership of radio (Q-1a & W-1, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Radio Ownership	80	77	97	96	94	78	73	48	71
Radio Listenership	77	71	95	90	92	74	71	47	67

12.3 Television viewership

Respondents were also asked whether they watch television programs. In 2012, half of respondents say they watch television; the other half say they do not. More women (54%) report watching television than men (47%). A disproportionately higher number of people in urban areas (91%) watch television than people in rural (38%) areas, consistent with findings on access to and availability of electricity supply, where urban areas report greater access and availability than rural areas (*see Chapter 6, 6.1 Services and facilities available in local areas*).

Do you watch television programs? (W-2, Base 6290)ALL AND BY GENDER AND SETTLEMENT



Fig. 12.3

Television viewership is directly linked to income and educational level. Sixty-one percent of households earning 10,001Afs or more on a monthly basis watch television, compared to 39% of those in the lowest income bracket (i.e., those who earn less than 2,000Afs per month). Viewership of television increases with the level of education, with seven out of 10 respondents (72%) who attained an education level of grade 10 or above watching television, compared to six in 10 (60%) of those who reached grade seven to nine, around half (52%) of those with a first through sixth grade level of education, and four out of 10 (40%) of those respondents who never attended school.

Television viewership depends on television ownership, and more importantly, on the supply of electricity in a given region, resulting in sizeable variations in viewership across regions. About two thirds of respondents (74%) in Central/Kabul (where two thirds of respondents own a functional TV set) watch television, followed by the West (where 54% watch television compared to 56% who own a set), North West (where 53% watch television compared to 56% who own a set) and North East (where 45% watch television compared to 47% who own a set) regions.

Table 12.5: Comparison of ownership of TV set and viewership of television (Q-1b & W-2, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Ownership of TV set	52	76	34	43	24	56	47	43	56
Viewership of TV	50	74	31	42	23	54	45	42	53

12.4 Sources of information for news and current events

The survey attempted to find out how the Afghan public currently gets news and information. Forty-three percent of respondents say that radio is their main source of information, followed by more than a third (38%) who say that television is their main source for information. Notably, the use of television to obtain news and information significantly increased in 2012 compared to 2011, with an increase from 28% to 38%. Fourteen percent of respondents get news and information from their friends and family and one in 25 (4%) receive news and information through religious leaders or the mosque (Masjid). Around 1% of respondents say they get news and information through newspapers/magazines, and less than 1% get it from the internet.

Survey findings reveal a large difference between respondents in urban and rural areas regarding their preferred source for news and information. Eight out of 10 respondents (80%) use television as their main source of news and information in urban areas, compared to a quarter (26%) in rural areas. Conversely, a majority of respondents (51%) in rural areas get news and information from the radio, compared to fewer than one in six (13%) who do so in urban areas. The proportion of respondents who receive news and information from their friends and families is three times higher in rural areas (17%) than in urban areas (5%). One in 20 respondents in rural areas (5%) receive news and information from the mosque (Masjid) compared to just 1% in urban areas.

Which of the following sources do you use most often for news and information? (W-3, Base 6290) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT



Fig. 12.4

More men (46%) than women (37%) make use of the radio as their main source of news and information. Conversely, more women (42%) use television as their main source of news and information compared to

men (35%). Friends and families are also used as a main source for news and information by more women (18%) than by men (11%).

The survey findings show that respondents who never went to school (47%) prefer the radio as their main source of news and information, compared to those who have a high school education (30%). Respondents who have completed high school (59%) indicate a greater proclivity for using television as their main source of information compared to those who never attended (30%) school. Those who never attended school are also more dependent than other groups on their friends and families for news and information; within this group, 19% get information from their friends and family members.

Which of the following sources do you use most often for news and information? (W-3, Base 6290) BY EDUCATION



Fig. 12.5

There is considerable variation across regions regarding the most often-used source of news and information. Radio ranks relatively high in the East (71%), followed by the South West (66%) and South East (50%) regions. Television ranks highest in Central/Kabul (64%), followed by 42% in the North West and 40% in the West regions. Central/Kabul, the North West and the West are the only regions where a greater proportion of households are seeking news and information from television than from radio. Central/Kabul is also the region where friends and family (6%) and mosques (Masjids) (2%) rank lowest as sources of news and information. The regions where friends and families rank relatively higher as sources of news and information include Central/Hazarajat (31%), North East (22%) and North West (20%). South East is the region with the highest proportion of respondents citing the mosques (Masjids) (7%) as their leading source of news and information, followed by the West (6%), Central/Hazarajat (5%), South West (5%) and North West (5%) regions.

Table 12.6: Which of the following sources do you use most often for news and information? (W-3, Base 6290) ALL AND BY REGION

	All (%)	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central Hazarajat (%)	North West (%)
Radio	43	26	71	50	66	39	42	32	32
Television	38	64	16	29	13	40	33	32	42
Friends and family	14	6	8	14	16	13	22	31	20
Mosque (Masjid)	4	2	3	7	4	6	3	5	5

An examination of the trend since 2006 illustrates that radio still remains the most prominent source of news and information for the people of Afghanistan, but reliance on radio has declined each year. In 2006, 55% of respondents reported radio as their most frequently used source of news and information; in 2012, this figure declined to 43%. Reliance on television has been increasing gradually over the years, from 22% in 2006 to 38% in 2012. Clear trends are not discernible for the other two sources of news and information: friends and family, and mosques (Masjids).

Table 12.7: Which of the following sources do you use most often for news and information? (W-3) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 AND 2012

	2006 (%)	2007 (%)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
Radio	55	54	51	47	46	45	43
Television	22	26	21	25	28	28	38
Friends and family	15	14	18	18	19	20	14
Mosque (Masjid)	2	1	2	2	6	6	4

13. Appendix 1: Target Demographics

A total of 6290 respondents were surveyed in the study, out of which 4828 (77%) were from rural areas and 1462 (22%) were from urban areas. Of all respondents interviewed, 56% were male and 44% were female. The following tables provide demographic and socio-economic details of the respondents including a rural-urban breakdown. They also provide the employment status, occupation, educational status, income status and marital status of the respondents.

Gender and Region

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
Gender	%	%	%
Male	56	58	50
Female	44	42	50
Region	%	%	%
Central/Kabul	24	14	55
East	10	11	4
South East	10	13	2
South West	11	12	7
West	13	15	9
North East	14	16	9
Central/Hazarajat	3	4	*
North West	14	15	12

Employment Status and Age Group

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
	%	%	%
Working	47	50	35
Retired	1	1	2
Housewife	38	37	43
Student	8	7	12
Unemployed	6	5	8
Other	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	*	*	*
Age Group	%	%	%
Years old 18-24	26	25	30
Years old 25-34	28	29	27
Years old 35-44	25	25	22
Years old 45-54	14	15	14
Over 55 years	6	6	7

Main Occupation

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	3007	2466	541
Base: Working or retired 3007	%	%	%
Farmer (own land / tenant farmer)	34	40	4
Farm laborer (others land)	9	11	1
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	9	9	9
Informal sales/ business	10	8	18
Skilled worker/artisan	11	10	15
Government Office - Clerical worker	4	4	7
Private Office - Clerical worker	1	1	4
Government Office – Executive/ Manager	2	1	5
Private Office – Executive/ Manager	1	*	2
Self-employed Professional	7	5	12
Small business owner	5	4	11
School Teacher	5	5	6
University Teacher	*	*	1
Military/ Police	2	2	5
Mullah	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	*	*	*

Farming Land

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	1008	988	20
Base: Farmers1008	%	%	%
Less than 1 Jerib	11	11	10
1 - 2 Jerib	23	23	11
2.1- 3 Jerib	24	24	14
More than 3 Jerib	41	41	65
Don't know	1	1	*

- Jerib: Once Jerib is equal to one fifth of hectare.

Educational Status

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
Base: All respondents 6290	%	%	%
Never went to school	58	63	40
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	9	9	9
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	5	5	5
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	5	4	7
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	3	3	3
High School (classes 10 to 12)	15	13	24
University education or above	5	3	11
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	*	*	*

Stability Indicator

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
If given opportunity would leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else?	%	%	%
Yes	38	35%	47%
No	60	62%	52%
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	2	2%	2%

Spoken Languages

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
Base: All respondents 6290	%	%	%
Pashto	49	50	47
Dari	77	72	92
Uzbeki	12	13	7
Turki	3	3	4
Urdu	3	1	7
Hindi	*	*	1
English	5	2	14
Arabic	1	*	2
Russian	*	*	1
Balochi	2	2	*
Pashaye	*	1	*
Nooristani	*	*	*
German	*	*	*

Marital Status

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
Base: All respondents 6290	%	%	%
Single	18	17	22
Married	80	81	76
Widower/ Widow	2	2	3
Divorced	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	*	*	*

Ethnicity Status

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
Base: All respondents 6290	%	%	%
Pashtun	40	43	28
Tajik	33	27	52
Uzbek	9	11	3
Hazara	11	11	10
Turkmen	2	2	3
Baloch	1	1	*
Kirghiz	*	*	*
Nuristani	1	1	*
Aimak	1	1	*
Arab	2	2	1
Pashaye	1	1	*
Sadat	1	1	2
Qazelbash	*	*	*

Average Monthly Household Income

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	6290	4828	1462
Base: All 6290	%	%	%
Less than 2,000 AFN	7	8	3
2,001 – 3,000 AFN	15	17	7
3,001 – 5,000 AFN	24	26	16
5,001 – 10,000 AFN	28	27	30
10,001 – 15,000 AFN	13	12	19
15,001 – 20,000 AFN	7	5	13
20,001 – 25,000 AFN	2	1	5
25,001 – 40,000 AFN	1	1	4
more than 40,000 AFN	1	*	2
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	2	2	2

14. Appendix 2: Methodology

The Asia Foundation 2012 Survey Wave 7

Country: Afghanistan **Study: TAF 2012**

Field Dates: June 17th – July 1st 2012 **Sample Size: 6,290**

Research Provider: ACSOR-Surveys **Number of Interviewers: 742**

Introduction

Asia Foundation 2012 is a face-to-face survey of the general public throughout the country of Afghanistan with a total sample size of 6,290 individuals, ages 18 and over(n=6,000 main sample and n=290 booster sample).

The questionnaire consists of 89 substantive questions, 19 demographic questions, and 21 management and quality control questions.

The fieldwork was conducted between June 17 to July 1, 2012 by trained interviewers and supervisors of the ACSOR-Surveys team.

The average length of a successful interview was 45.52 minutes; ranging from 20 minutes to 75 minutes.

The total margin of error for the sample is ±5.1 percent at 95 percent confidence level.

This error includes a stochastic error of ±2.4 percent which is a factor of the sample size and sampling design; and a systemic error of ±2.7 percent which has been added to account for the inaccessibility of certain areas and people in the country.

Project Schedule

Project Phases	Start Date	End Date	Comments
Translation	May-28 , 2012	June-12 , 2012	
Briefings	June-17, 2012	June-17, 2012	
Fieldwork	June-17, 2012	July-01, 2012	
Quality Control	June-17, 2012	July-03, 2012	

General Overview and Summary of Sampling

The target population for this survey is a nation-wide poll of Afghans age 18+. There is no current census for Afghanistan; however, the Afghan Central Statistics Office (CSO) with assistance from the United Nations and World Food Program released basic population statistics in 2011 for total numbers of residents by region, province, and district. ACSOR believes the data are generally accurate to the provincial level, but are more questionable for the district level. No data on settlement level populations is available.

The sample was drawn using a multi-stage random stratification process using the "settlement" level stratum as the primary sampling unit. The basic overview of the sampling process is as follows:

1st level - Region - The interviews were distributed proportionally across the 8 regions according to the available population updates.

2nd level - Province - The sample was then distributed by Province within each Region, also according to the population data from the Afghan CSO.

3rd level - District - The sample was then further distributed across the available districts in each province using the population estimates for each district, also from the CSO.

4th level - Settlement - Within cities, we used neighborhoods called "nahias" while in rural areas we used towns and villages. There is no population data about the settlement sizes. We use a simple random selection of all known settlements to select the location. In this study, we used 6 interviews per sampling point for distribution.

5th level - Starting points for Random Walk - Maps and available information about the settlements were used to select a starting point for random walks where the interviews were conducted. Interviewers used a Kish grid to select individual respondents from households.

The Sample: Selection Process and Specifics

Target Population: A national sample of Afghan individuals, 18 years of age and over, living in the 34 provinces of Afghanistan.

Achieved Sample: 6,290 Afghans, ages 18 years and over, living in the 34 provinces of Afghanistan.

The survey was conducted face-to-face with the respondents across the country.

Step One: Distribution of Sampling Points by Region and Urban/Rural Strata

The Asia Foundation 2012 survey is a national survey that includes both urban and rural respondents. The *Sheharwali* (municipal administration in Afghanistan) defines the urban population as those living within municipal limits. By default, the rural population comprises those who are living outside the municipal limits. The rural areas are defined neither in terms of population density nor remoteness.

The universe was divided into 8 regions consisting of 34 provinces. The sample was distributed proportional to residential characteristics and administrative divisions of population per province. Within each province districts were selected using the probability proportionate to size method. The probability of the district getting selected for the survey is higher for districts with higher population. Using this method ensures that some of the more populated districts that have a greater say in the views of the province get represented.

Booster samples (total n=290) were distributed proportional to population size in Logar, Panjshir, Laghman, Nooristan, Paktika, Nimruz, Zabul, Bamyan, and Samangan provinces, stratified by urban/rural status. This is done to boost up the samples in the low populated provinces to at least 100 interviews each.

Step Two: Selection of sampling points and replacement of sampling Points

The interviews were completed using multi-stage random sampling. Due to the local cultural traditions and difficulty to pick individuals of any gender randomly for interviews, the universe was divided into male and female sub-samples. Each region, province and further strata was allocated an equal number of male and female respondents per sampling points. The two sub-samples were covered by field-forces of the respective gender.

The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces has caused sampling points to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence. Sampling points may also be replaced due to natural phenomena, such as adverse weather conditions. A complete listing of replaced sampling points and reasons for replacement can be found later in this document.

Step Three: Selection of starting points within each sampling point

The settlements within districts were selected at random by the field director. Each sampling point was assigned a starting point. Generally, the starting points were recognizable locations – such as mosques, schools, bazaars, or other easily recognizable locations within each of the selected settlements for the survey.

Step Four: Household Selection

In urban areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer headed in the assigned direction and stopped at the 3rd street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route. The first contacted household was the 2nd house on the right from the beginning of the street. From then on, the selected household was each 3rd inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer route. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine was each 5th apartment. In buildings with more than one household, no more than two households were interviewed.

In rural areas, the interviewer started from the center of the village or the bazaar, mosque, or other landmark and headed to the east selecting each 3rd inhabitable house on his/her route.

Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall were treated like detached houses, counting them counter-clock-wise from the gate to the compound.

For Wave 7, sampling points were distributed with 6 interviews per sampling point. The average number of interviews per sampling point was 6, for a total of 1055 sampling points.

Step Five: Respondent Selection (Kish Grid)

After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and age in descending order. The Kish grid uses the household number (this is based on how many households the interviewer has covered in the area) and the number of inhabitants living in the household to randomly select one of the family members for the interview.

Step Six: Respondent Substitution

Under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after call-backs, the interviewer then moved on to the next household according to the random walk.

Step Seven: Call-backs (rate, method, and results)

Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the designated respondent. These call-backs are made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period, in order to provide a broader schedule in which to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force has had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substitution in many rural areas.

In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some call-backs, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt.

- First attempt = 98.7%
- Second attempt = 1.2%
- Third attempt = 0.1 %

Due to the high rate of unemployment, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan.

Interviewers

	Female	Male	Total
Number of female/male interviewers	314	428	742
Number of interviewers previously used in ACSOR projects	314	428	742
Number of interviewers new to a ACSOR project	0	0	0

Training of Interviewers

Where was the briefing(s) held?

The supervisor briefing was held in Kabul. The regional supervisors then organized their own briefing sessions with the interviewers. . The project managers translated the questionnaires, conducted the briefings on the main questions of both Dari and Pashto field questionnaires, and reviewed the sampling procedures. A senior director assisted with the translation review prior to the briefing and provided detailed instructions to the project managers.

Issues emphasized during briefing(s)

The following topics were covered during the briefings:

- Proper household and respondent selection.
- Review of the questionnaire content.
- Proper recording of each and every question
- Appropriate interviewing techniques.
- Mock interviews were conducted to get a better understanding of the logic and concept of the questions.

Rate Calculations

The American Association of Public Opinion Researchers (AAPOR) publishes four different types of rate calculations used in AAPOR reporting (response rates, contact rates, cooperation rates, and refusal rates). ACSOR Surveys uses AAPOR's Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 3, Refusal Rate 2, and Contact Rate 2 as their standards.

Acronyms used in the formulas;

I = Complete Interview
P = Partial Interview
R = Refusal and break-off
NC = Non-contact
O = Other
UH = Unknown if household/occupied household unit
UO = Unknown, other
e = Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible

Response Rate 3= $\frac{I}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$

Cooperation Rate 3= $\frac{I}{(I + P) + R}$

Refusal Rate 2= $\frac{R}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$

Contact Rate 2= $\frac{(I + P) + R + O}{(I + P) + R + O + NC + e(UH + UO)}$

Margin of Sampling Error:

MoSE (at 95% CI level) = 1.96 * SQRT [(p)*(100-p)/I]
MoSE = 1.96 * SQRT [(50*50) / I]

Refusals/Non-Contacts/Completed Interviews

SURVEY MANAGEMENT SECTION			
ACSOR Code	**AAPOR Code**	**Description**	
	1.0/1.10	Completed Interviews	6290
		Average Survey Length (minutes)	45.52
UNKNOWN HOUSEHOLD ELIGIBILITY			
	3.170	Unable to Reach/Unsafe Area (This comes from the replaced sampling points and inaccessible district list)	1681
2	3.130	No one at home after three visits	397
3	4.100	No adults (18+) after three visits	340
4	4.500	Non-Residential or empty house	124
		Total Unknown Household	2542
NON-CONTACTS			
1	2.230	Door or gate locked and no one came to open it	24
6	2.200	Respondent long -term absence /for the field work period	98
13		Selected respondent not available for interview	199
		Total Non-Contacts	321
REFUSALS			
7	2.111	Outright refusal at the door	161
8	2.112	Not feeling informed to answer the questions	86
9	2.112	Respondent got angry because of a question and aborted interview	14
10	2.112	Prefers head of the house to be interviewed	83
11	2.112	In a hurry/ No time	69
	2.112	Selected respondent initial refusal Cumulative (sums all '2.112' codes)	252
		Total Refusals	413
OTHER			
12	2.32	Physically or mentally unable	6
5	2.332	Respondent unable to complete interview in languages available	7
		Total Other	13
DISPOSITION RATES			
RATE		**FORMULA/CALCULATION**	**PERCENT**
Value for e		estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible	0.937
Response Rate 3		I / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)	0.668
Cooperation Rate 3		I / (I+R)	0.938
Refusal Rate 2		R / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)	0.044
Contact Rate 2		(I+R+O) / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)	0.713

Breakdown of Non-Response Rate

The breakdown of the non-response rate per region stands as following:

1. Central/Kabul = **80** refusals, **97** non-contacts
2. East = **32** refusals, **47** non-contacts
3. South-east = **80** refusals, **57** non-contacts
4. South-west = **92** refusals, **38** non-contacts
5. West = **62** refusals, **24** non-contacts
6. North = **60** refusals, **47** non-contacts
7. Central/Hazarajat = **7** refusals, **11** non-contacts

National Population Data vs. Realized Sample

The following national population data comes from the 2011 Afghan Central Statistics Office (CSO).This is the same data used in the previous survey.

Province	Share in National Population	Share in Unweighted Sample	Share in Weighted Sample
1. Kabul	14%	14%	16%
2. Kapisa	2%	2%	2%
3. Parwan	3%	2%	3%
4. Wardak	2%	2%	2%
5. Logar	2%	2%	2%
6. Ghazni	5%	4%	5%
7. Paktia	2%	2%	2%
8. Paktika	2%	2%	2%
9. Khost	2%	2%	2%
10. Nangarhar	6%	5%	6%
11. Laghman	2%	2%	2%
12. Kunar	2%	2%	2%
13. Nooristan	1%	2%	1%
14. Badakhshan	4%	3%	4%
15. Takhar	4%	3%	4%
16. Baghlan	3%	3%	4%
17. Kunduz	4%	4%	4%
18. Balkh	5%	5%	5%
19. Samangan	1%	2%	2%
20. Jawzjan	2%	2%	2%
21. Sar-i-Pul	2%	2%	2%
22. Faryab	4%	3%	4%
23. Badghis	2%	2%	2%
24. Herat	7%	7%	7%
25. Farah	2%	2%	2%

26. Nimroz	1%	2%	1%
27. Helmand	4%	3%	1%
28. Kandahar	4%	4%	5%
29. Zabul	1%	2%	1%
30. Uruzgan	1%	1%	0%
31. Ghor	3%	2%	3%
32. Bamyan	2%	2%	2%
33. Panjshir	1%	2%	1%
34. Daikundi	2%	2%	2%
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
# of Provinces	**34**	**34**	**34**

Weighting

The data was weighted (weighting variable 'Wgt') by province and urban/rural status to account for the booster samples.

Quality Control Methods

The quality of the data is assured by the following control procedures applied in various stages.

1. After the delivery of the questionnaires from field, completed questionnaires were spot-checked for proper administration as well as proper household and respondent selection before keypunching.
2. 35supervisors observed interviewer's work during field.
3. When there was no opportunity for direct supervision, a supervisor and assistant supervisor revisited selected houses after the completion of interviews or called back, if there was a working telephone at the household. The issues verified during in person back-checks were proper household and respondent selection, as well as the correct recording of answers to three randomly selected questions from the main body of the questionnaire.

At the end of the three procedures, 40.5% of the completed questionnaires were controlled (n=2,536); using the following methods:

- Back-check in person by supervisory team (3.5%)
- Direct supervision during the interview (25.4%)
- Back-check from the central office (5.6%)
- Back –check conducted by the Asia Foundation (6%).

Results of Back-Check & Quality Controls

	# Interviews Rejected	# Interviewers Terminated	# Supervisors Terminated
Prior to Completion of Interviews	--	--	--
After Completion of Interviews	76	--	--

Problems Encountered During Field

Political, Social, Weather, or Newsworthy Events That May Have Affected the Survey

Replacement of the sampling points and the reason for replacement is described in the following table.

Province	SP	Projected District/Village	Replaced with	Reason
1.Kabul	14	Qasabha. Village	Qala Fatullah. Village	No village with this name was found
	23	Masjid Jatari Ha. Village	Omar Khail. Village	No village with this name was found
	68	Qala E Mahfuz. Village	Qala Habib. Village	No village with this name was found
	128	Janak Khail. Village	Qala Yadgar. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	133	Surubi. District	Bagrami. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	136	Jaro. Village	Qala Bala. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	146	Haynak. Village	Malik Khail. Village	No village with this name was found
	148	Farashah Chandal Bayee. Village	Kaman Gar. Village	No village with this name was found
	149	Allah Bala. Village	Tolat. Village	No village with this name was found
2. Kapisa	151	Tagab. District	Hissa-i-Awali Kohistan. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	152	Tagab. District	Mahmood Raqi. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	161	Alasai. District	Koh Band. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	162	Alasai. District	Koh Band. District	The district is controlled by Taliban

3. Parwan	172	Sallay Khail. Village	Qalandar Khail. Village	No village with this name was found
	177	Haji Afraseyab. Village	Qala Naw. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	183	Kohnna Dahi. Village	Qaqshal. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	184	Kohi-i-Safi. District	Surkhi parsa. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	185	Kohi-i-Safi. District	Surkhi parsa. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	187	Taj. Village	Garorti. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	191	Sondar Khail. Village	Tutom Dara Bala. Village	No village with this name was found
	192	Dahi Balay Sayyadan. Village	Telanche. Village	People were not willing to be interviewed
4. Wardak	196	Kashmon. Village	Masti Khail. Village	There was fighting between government and Taliban
	197	Chak-i-Wardak. District	Nerkh. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	200	Qoul Mazar. Village	Deeh Kherqa. Village	There was fighting between government and Taliban
	202	Paitab. Village	Royan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	206	Jandi Khail. Village	Lalo Khil. Village	There was fighting
	207	Beni Qeshlaq. Village	Payeen Qala. Village	Name of this village changed to Payeen Qala
	211	Awalish. Village	Qul Ali Bay. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	213	Kharman Sokhta. Village	Khalq Bala. Village	Name of this village changed to Khaleq Bala

5. Logar	215	Baraki Barak. District	Puli Alam. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	216	Baraki Barak. District	Mohammad Agha. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	217	Baraki Barak. District	Puli Alam. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	218	Baraki Barak. District	Mohammad Agha. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	215	Bashir Qala. Village	Babus. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	217	Sarfe. Village	Porak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	221	Taghar Hesarak. Village	Qala Akhound Zada. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	223	Mani. Village	Meyan Dara. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	221	Charkh. District	Puli Alam. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	222	Charkh. District	Mohammad Agha. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	223	Kharwar. District	Khushi. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	224	Kharwar. District	Khushi. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	227	Khowja Mohammad Afzal. Village	Pashton Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	228	Qala Sabir. Village	Qala Shahe Dehana Raig. Village	There was armed people
	1101	Darab. Village	Kamal Khail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1103	Seya Beni. Village	Qala Mirza Abdul Rasheed. Village	There was risk of armed thieves
	1104	Mullah Hassan. Village	Pad Khwab Shana. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

33. Panjshir	231	Gadara. Village	Mula Khail. Village	Malik of the village didn't allow the interview
	232	Dostam Khail. Village	Bakhshe Khail Payen. Village	This village was surveyed within last 2 months
	234	Qoul Tari. Village	Qalat. Village	People of village didn't allow the interview
	1105	Parsa. Village	Sar Deh. Village	There was a wedding party and people weren't willing to be interviewed
	1106	Tawakh Gulyan. Village	Halim Khail. Village	This village was surveyed within last 2 months
	1107	Kar. Village	Miran Shah. Village	People of village didn't allow the interview
	1108	Shofa Dahi Payen. Village	Mukhtar Khail. Village	This village was surveyed within last 2 months
	1109	Dostum Khail. Village	Jula Lala Mirza Khail. Village	This village is related to Unaba district
	1110	Sangen. Village	Sang Lakhshan. Village	This village is related to Unaba district
	1115	Askaban. Village	Safid Chehr Deh Bala. Village	People of village didn't allow the interview
10. Nangarhar	243	Beatne. Village	Dakra. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	246	Sahib Gul. Village	Moder Qala. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	248	Chora Kalay. Village	Jamali Kalai. Village	No village with this name was found
	259	Chora Kalay. Village	Jamali Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	267	Dak Ghulam Khan. Village	Sholana. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	268	Chena. Village	Hafizan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	271	Say Touda. Village	Lamtak. Village	No village with this name was found
	276	Hazar Naw Kando. Village	Hazar Naw Kolal Kalai. Village	No village with this name was found
	281	Sarwar. Village	Amla Markazi. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	283	Tera Kas. Village	Khoyezo Dafta Khail. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	287	Gacho. Village	Hakim Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	288	Dargeyan. Village	Aman Khail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	289	Yusuf Kas. Village	Bar Beyar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	290	Angor Tak. Village	Kala Khail. Village	There was operation of foreign forces

11. Laghman	292	Bar Kashmon. Village	Aziz Khan Kas. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	293	Hazara Banda. Village	Deh Mazang. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	294	Walkank. Village	Hassan Khail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	295	Sayid Jan Banda. Village	Meya Khail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	296	Khowja Kot. Village	Shor Aaba. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	297	Parwaye Sufla. Village	Mando Zai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	298	Jalam. Village	Meya Khail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	300	Bam Hussain Hulya. Village	Dera Saheb. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	301	Rajakott. Village	Deh Qazi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	307	Lakri. Village	Bela. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
12. Kunar	310	Lotan. Village	Bara Arazi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	312	Chapa Dara. District	Noorgal. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	313	Chapa Dara. District	Noorgal. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	312	Sambat. Village	Hazar Mir Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	313	Masood Ghazi Abad. Village	Koz Noor Gul Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	314	Koz Adwal. Village	Speen Kar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	315	Zarkanda. Village	Shna Ghundi Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	318	Shepely. Village	Tango Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	319	Nawa. Village	Kamp. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	322	Dara-i-Pech. District	Sawkai. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	323	Dara-i-Pech. District	Sawkai. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	324	Dara-i-Pech. District	Khas Kunar. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	322	Islam Khana. Village	Sarkari Qala. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	323	Bar Chambeal. Village	Shaloti Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	324	Dak Maney. Village	Koza Arazi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

6. Ghazni	337	Andar. District	Jaghuri. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	338	Andar. District	Jaghuri. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	339	Andar. District	Qara Bagh. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	340	Andar. District	Qara Bagh. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	341	Andar. District	Qara Bagh. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	342	Andar. District	Ghazni rural	The district is controlled by Taliban
	342	Qarya Jalowger. Village	Naw Abad. Village	People of village didn't allow the interview
	346	Pair Shahbaz Sahib. Village	Qala Qadam Khan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	361	Giro. District	Jaghatu. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	362	Giro. District	Jaghatu. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	363	Nawa. District	Waghaz. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	364	Nawa. District	Muqur. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	365	Ab Band. District	Malistan. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	366	Ab Band. District	Nawur. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
7. Paktia	382	Tour Kai. Village	Peer Bagh. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	386	Waza Zadran. District	Laja Ahmad khel. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	387	Waza Zadran. District	Dand Patan. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	390	Nari Warma. Village	Nari Owba. Village	No village with this name was found
	392	Zurmat. District	Sayyid Karam. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	393	Zurmat. District	Sayyid Karam. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	394	Zurmat. District	Jaji. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	395	Zurmat. District	Gardez. District	The district is controlled by Taliban

9. Khost	415	Sabari (Yaqubi) . District	Tanay. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	416	Sabari (Yaqubi) . District	Manduzay (Esmayel khil) . District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	427	Spera. District	Jaji Maidan. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	428	Spera. District	Jaji Maidan. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
26. Nimroz	439	Khashrod. District	Zaranj. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	440	Khashrod. District	Char Burjak. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	441	Khashrod. District	Asl-i-chakhansur. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	442	Khashrod. District	Kang. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
28. Kandahar	492	Niko Karaiz. Village	Madrasa Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	494	Zala Dahi. Village	Tar Patan. Village	There was operation of foreign forces
	510	Khairati. Village	Habibullah Khan Kalai. Village	No village with this name was found
	512	Maruf. District	Arghistan. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	513	Maruf. District	Arghistan. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	517	Reig. District	Shorabak. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	518	Reig. District	Khakrez. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
29. Zabul	530	Kakar. District	Taranak Wa Jaldak. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	1285	Gidargo. Village	Baryam Manda. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1287	Amak. Village	Bar Laki. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1289	Sawat Khel. Village	Khail. Village	Due to land mines the way was blocked

23. Badghis	549	Ghar Gadi. Village	Aab Kamari Zeyarat. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	549	Jawand. District	Ab Kamari. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	550	Jawand. District	Murghab (Bala Murghab) . District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	551	Jawand. District	Ab Kamari. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	552	Jawand. District	Murghab (Bala Murghab) . District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	555	Ghormach. District	Qala-i-Now. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	556	Ghormach. District	Muqur. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	561	Murghab (Bala Murghab) . District	Qadis. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	563	Murghab (Bala Murghab) . District	Qadis. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
24. Herat	565	Shir Asadan. Village	Jada Sultan Ebrahim. Village	No village with this name was found
	577	Holang Sang Safed. Village	Naw Abad Jakan. Village	Not part of the selected district
	580	Kocha Maktab. Village	Mahala Naw Darwaza Qandahar. Village	No village with this name was found
	581	Baharistan. Village	Karta Safla. Village	Not part of the selected district
	586	Raghta Nal Kak. Village	Fahlan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	588	Shor Ab. Village	Changah. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	591	Qai Mast. Village	Mahajer Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	595	Dahi Manar. Village	Neshen. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	596	Qala Yusuf Khan. Village	Qala Wakil. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	605	Delgi Shair Khan. Village	Shakar Aab. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	613	Zahorya. Village	Qala Nokat. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	621	Band Imam Shair Sorkh. Village	Hosh Asia. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	626	Khoja Shahb. Village	Sayed Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	627	Akhund Jamshedi. Village	Qahraman 23. Village	This village is related to Heart city Nahia
	629	Tulaba Owlya. Village	Senan. Village	People weren't willing to be interviewed
	632	Khar Duzdan. Village	Kora Mali. Village	No village with this name was found
	633	Qala Hazrat Ha. Village	Nahreen Safla. Village	This village is related to Guzera district

25. Farah	636	Qala Haji. Village	Merwared. Village	Shura didn't allow to interview
	637	Sar Takht. Village	Khwaja Khezer. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	638	Hussain Abad. Village	Gerani. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	643	Gul Ashtor Bala. Village	Dokan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	645	Chah Korta. Village	Shor Abad Chah Zindan. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	646	Gala Jowi. Village	Naw Abad. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	647	Kohna Road. Village	Bor Kham. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	648	Khowja Mohammad Hasham. Village	Haji Abad Dokin. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	649	Chah Tak. Village	Haji Haidar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	651	Karaiz Saifudin. Village	Kariz Dozak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	648	Lash-I-Juwayn. District	Shibkoh. District	The district is controlled by Taliban

31. Ghor	655	Qala Miana. Village	Seya Khak. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	656	Say Paya Paitab. Village	Mayel. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	657	Sang Para. Village	Kham Shor. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	658	Choloba. Village	Dehan Sokhta. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	660	Qarghat. Village	Noorak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	661	Gharak. Village	Deh Sabz. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	662	Angori Aziz Khan. Village	Khwaja Wahajuddin. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	663	Safid Arak. Village	Gala Chashma. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	664	Sar Tangi Payen Tangi. Village	Satwan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	665	Buzghala Khorak. Village	Sar Chashma. Village	There was tribal fights
	666	Seya Dara. Village	Mahmoud Ahmad. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	669	Kanan. Village	Bidak Jalal. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	673	Sar Mai. Village	Safidak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	674	Qala. Village	Qala Gawhar. Village	There was mistake in name of village
	675	Khaldar. Village	Wardaka. Village	Due to rain the way was blocked
	676	Dah Khalil. Village	Alendar. Village	No village with this name was found
	677	Char Gan. Village	Akhta Khana Ulya. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	678	Jendak Payen. Village	Shaikh Almand. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	679	Wajan Bala. Village	Akhta Khana Safla. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	680	Alyta. Village	Kandewal. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked

14. Badakhshan	683	Kakan Bala. Village	Kakan Payeen. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	685	Now Abad. Village	Naw Abad Naser Abad. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	687	Shaer Kash. Village	Qarghambol. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	688	Baghak. Village	Karta Tarash. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	689	Aspkhowa Ya Aspakha. Village	Shaikhani. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	691	Payjoj. Village	Sarnegan. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	691	Raghistan. District	Shuhada. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	692	Raghistan. District	Shuhada. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	695	Dar Gak. Village	Gar Kashan. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	696	Payenton. Village	Chakolach. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	700	Chaqa Khowja Ya Dara Eashan. Village	Dolana Dara. Village	No village with this name was found
	702	Dara Hassar. Village	Naw Abad Kartanda. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	703	Darwaz-I-Payin (Mamay) .District	Baharak. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	704	Darwaz-I-Payin (Mamay) .District	Baharak. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	705	Arkhi. Village	Sargarosh. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	707	Kufab. District	Wardooj. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	708	Kufab. District	Wardooj. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	709	Kohistan. District	Arghanj Khwah. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	710	Kohistan. District	Zebak. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	708	Dahi Do Rowza. Village	Khush Dario. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	709	Banew. Village	Bagh Zaron. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	710	Row Kal. Village	Raz Kha. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	712	Shaikh Baik. Village	Shakmal. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	715	Chaqil Qeshlaq. Village	Usain Abad. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	716	Qara Bai. Village	Naw Abad Sarai Ha. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked

15. Takhar	723	Saram Baz Bala. Village	Nanwa. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	725	Gul Murad. Village	Mohammad Ali Kulyash. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	728	Assil Saf Qourugh. Village	Mamdai. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	731	Dahna Qeshlaq. Village	Gardangah. Village	Due to flood the way was destroyed
	735	Khara Qan. Village	Astana Tapa. Village	Due to flood the way was destroyed
	738	Tash Khor. Village	Afaqi. Village	Bridge was destroyed to this village
	743	Darqad. District	Chal. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	744	Darqad. District	Chal. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	744	Samballaq. Village	Khanqa. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
16. Baghlan	759	Arbab Rahman Zardaray. Village	Kabuli Ha. Village	No village with this name was found
	760	Taj Mohammad Bai. Village	Saheed Ha. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	761	Gulmir Khail Wa Arab Ha. Village	Naw Abad Sar Jar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	762	Qazaq Sai. Village	Gharo Shakh. Village	No village with this name was found
	763	Markaz Daka. Village	Qara Daka. Village	No village with this name was found
	764	Paitawak. Village	Chehek Kapa. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	765	Rahman. Village	Dehla Ha. Village	Due to flood the way was blocked
	766	Bano Zai. Village	Dasht Qazi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	769	Chob Tara. Village	Naw Abad Emam Ali. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	770	Kandhari. Village	Naw Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	779	Aka Bai. Village	Panjshiri Ha. Village	No village with this name was found
	781	Chashma Shair. Village	Seya Aab. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	783	Maiya Khail. Village	Haji Nader. Village	No village with this name was found
	784	Hashq Abad Khail. Village	Haji Karim Bai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	786	Az Ghari Payen. Village	Haji Rasol. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

17. Kunduz	792	Gozar Khaqani Work Shop. Village	Khak Kashi. Village	No village with this name was found
	797	Mir Hamza. Village	Raig Asqalan. Village	No village with this name was found
	800	Jaral Dehi Asqalan. Village	Mahewen Dayan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	803	Tarkan-Jan Qataghan. Village	Naw Abad Arjal. Village	No village with this name was found
	804	Lodin. Village	Sahak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	805	Noor Muhammad Ghambar-Khan. Village	Panjshiri Qeshlaq. Village	No village with this name was found
	806	San Jani. Village	Chegha Ulya. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	807	Dasht-i-Archi. District	Khan Abad. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	808	Dasht-i-Archi. District	Chahar Darah. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	809	Aq Shakh. Village	Popal Zai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	813	Qala-i-Zal. Village	Kashan. Village	No village with this name was found
	822	Jangal Safah Wartabuz. Village	Dokan Hai Qari Kamal. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	823	Qar Ghan Tepa Masjed Sufi Imam Khal. Village	Masjed Esmayel. Village	No village with this name was found
32. Bamyan	825	Dahi Yak. Village	Tapa Mamorin. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	826	Ispi Dark. Village	Kata Khana. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	832	Bani Kabot Dowro. Village	Roi Sang. Village	Security problems
	833	Sar Kundi. Village	Iraq Sufla. Village	Security problems
	834	Do Wareed. Village	Iraq Ulya. Village	Security problems
	835	Qala (Qula) . Village	Naw Abad Qatar Sum. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	836	Soma. Village	Ghor Aab. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	840	Qala Abdul. Village	Sarai. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	1431	Seya Kharak. Village	Kharaba Qoul. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	1432	Qounaq. Village	Jaw Qoul. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted

34. Daikundi	852	Sheena. Village	Koh Agha Matin. Village	No village with this name was found
	855	Qunfak. Village	Dasok. Village	No village with this name was found
	857	Baba Dad. Village	Qala Hafiz. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	858	Dahan Giro. Village	Kadank. Village	There were only few houses in this village
18. Balkh	864	Famil Hai Amnyat Mili. Village	Sarak Pul Hawaye. Village	Police of area didn't allow the interviews
	879	Kata Qanosh. Village	Sar Asyab. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
	883	Qala Razaq. Village	Yangi Qala. Village	Police of area didn't allow the interviews
	893	Abdo Qoul. Village	Arba Qoul. Village	There was mistake in name of village
	895	Ali Chopan. Village	Nasrat Abad. Village	This village was surveyed within last 2 months
	905	Qaisar Khail. Village	Shayesta Alar Khail. Village	No motorable road for vehicles
19. Samangan	910	Haqulmar. Village	Kohna Kocha Asakhchad. Village	Due to flood the way was destroyed
	912	Sharekyar. Village	Khwaja Esmayel. Village	Due to flood the way was destroyed
	914	Manqetan Bala. Village	Khwaja Ghayeb. Village	Due to flood the way was destroyed
	910	Dara-i-Soof-I-Payin. District	Aybak. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	912	Dara-i-Soof-I-Bala. District	Aybak. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	914	Dara-i-Soof-I-Bala. District	Aybak. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	916	Dara-i-Soof-I-Bala. District	Rui-Do-Ab. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	921	Color Khouram Huleya. Village	Ghazi Mard. Village	Due to flood the way was destroyed
20. Jawzjan	928	Qazan Kalak. Village	Dali Watani. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	929	Nowa Qoul Qanchaq. Village	Ali Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	933	Chapak Kol. Village	Jangal Aregh Mahajer. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	937	Qarqin. District	Mardyan. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	938	Qarqin. District	Aqchah. District	No motorable road for vehicles
	939	Maser Abad Naqilln Afghaniya. Village	Meser Abad. Village	No village with this name was found

21. Sar-i-Pul	945	Tash Muhammad. Village	Sel Bord. Village	No village with this name was found
	946	Murgh Ab. Village	Eshan. Village	Due to flood the village was blocked
	947	Bagh Bala Takzar. Village	Kocha Bala Tagzari. Village	No village with this name was found
	948	Shabo Kan. Village	Kocha Payeen. Village	Due to flood the village was blocked
	947	Kohistanat. District	Sangcharak. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	948	Kohistanat. District	Sangcharak. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	949	Kohistanat. District	Gosfandi. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	950	Kohistanat. District	Gosfandi. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	950	Boldeyan. Village	Qotan Mast. Village	No village with this name was found
	951	Now Abad Karan. Village	Faiz Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	952	Ab Dara. Village	Nazian. Village	Due to flood the village was blocked
	955	Balkhab. District	Sozma Qala. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	956	Balkhab. District	Sayyad. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	956	Hahoo Tajeka. Village	Ageshka Afghani. Village	Due to flood the village was blocked
	957	Khowja Darya. Village	Khwaja Qala. Village	No village with this name was found
	961	Taka Bai. Village	Egezak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	963	Khanqa. Village	Khair Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
22. Faryab	972	Sayadullah Naqi. Village	Arza Lak Payen. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	973	Mullah Mohammad Azim. Village	Tapa Qala. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	981	Kohistan. District	Shirin Tagab. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	982	Kohistan. District	Khani Charbagh. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	982	Jamshedi. Village	Kuhna Qala. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	988	Ab Paran. Village	Qabchaq. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	992	Shash Qara. Village	Alti Bulak. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	999	Sera Meyasht. Village	Aq Masjed. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted

13. Nooristan	1121	Paroon. District	Duab. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	1123	Wama. District	Duab. District	The district is controlled by Taliban
	1128	Chahel. Village	Zeyarat. Village	Due to remoteness of the village it was substituted
	1130	Tarot. Village	Nangrach. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire

Region

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Central/Kabul	24
East	10
South East	10
South West	11
West	13
North East	14
Central/Hazarajat	3
North West	14

Geographic Code

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Village	77
Town	5
City	6
Metro (Kabul)	13

Province

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Kabul	15
Kapisa	2
Parwan	2
Wardak	2
Logar	1
Ghazni	5
Paktia	2
Paktika	2
Khost	2
Nangarhar	6
Laghman	2
Kunar	2
Nooristan	1
Badakhshan	4
Takhar	4
Baghlan	3

Kunduz	4
Balkh	5
Samangan	1
Jawzjan	2
Sar-i-Pul	2
Faryab	4
Badghis	2
Herat	7
Farah	2
Nimroz	1
Helmand	3
Kandahar	5
Zabul	1
Uruzgan	1
Ghor	3
Bamyan	2
Panjshir	1
Dikundi	2

NOTE TO INTERVIEWERS:

REMEMBER THAT THIS IS A CONVERSATION. MAKE THE RESPONDENT COMFORTABLE. MAKE EYE CONTACT.

DO NOT TRY TO LEAD THE RESPONDENT DURING THE INTERVIEW OR GET THE "DESIRED" ANSWERS FROM THEM. MAKE SURE YOU TELL THEM THAT THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS, YOU JUST WANT THEIR OPINIONS.

DURING THE INTERVIEW, BE POLITE BUT INQUISITIVE. DO NOT ACCEPT ONE-WORD ANSWERS. DRAW OUT RESPONDENTS TO GIVE DETAILED RESPONSES BY FURTHER PROBING – SAY: "WHY DO YOU SAY THAT?" "ANYTHING ELSE?" "TELL ME MORE."

Asalaam-u-Alikum, I am from ACSOR-Surveys, an independent research organization. We regularly conduct surveys among people like you to find out what you feel about issues of public interest. ACSOR-Surveys has no relation to the government. I just want to ask you some questions about "matters of interest to Afghans". I am interested in your opinion. Your answers will be kept confidential and your name will not be given to anyone and your views will be analyzed along with those of thousands of others.

W-1. Do you listen to radio programs?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	77
No	23

W-2. Do you watch television programs?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	50
No	50

W-3. Which of the following sources do you use most often for news and information?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Radio	43
Television	38
Friends and family	14
Mosque	4
Newspaper	1
Internet	*
Other sources	*
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-1. Do you own any of the following here in your household in functioning order?

Base: All respondents 6290	Yes	No
	%	%
Radio	80	20
Mobile phone	71	29
Bicycle	53	47
TV set	52	48
Motorcycle	41	59
Car	20	80
Computer	12	88
Fixed phone line	3	97

Q-2. Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Right direction	52
Wrong direction	31
Some in right, some in wrong direction	15
Refused	*
Don't know	2

Q-3a. (Filtered. If '1' in Q-2): Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention: _____

Q-3b. (Filtered. If '1' in Q-2): Why else? (Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 2nd Mention: _____

Base: Right direction 3257	Q-3a. 1st mention	Q-3a &b. 1st&2nd mention
	%	%
Good security	25	41
Reconstruction / rebuilding	21	35
Schools for girls have opened	6	14
Having active ANA and ANP	6	13
Improvement in education system	6	13
Economic revival	4	8
Road reconstruction	3	8
Peace / end of the war	5	7
Good government	3	5
Freedom / free speech	2	4
Democracy / elections	2	4
International assistance	1	3
More job opportunities available	1	3
Disarmament	1	2
Reduction in level of administrative corruption	1	2
Reduction in poppy cultivation	1	2
Having legal constitution	1	2
Clinics have been built	1	2
Having Parliament	1	2

More electricity supply than before	1	2
National unity	1	2
Removing Taliban	1	2
Women can now work	1	1
Removing terrorism	1	1
More attention to human rights	1	1
Development of agriculture	1	1
Development of healthcare system in general	1	1
Establishing high Peace Jirga/Shura	1	1
Women have more freedom	*	1
Refugees return	*	1
Good communication system	*	1
Clean drinking water	*	1
Foreign forces leaving Afghanistan	*	1
Presence of foreigners	*	1
Signing strategic agreement	*	1
Free movement / travel possible	*	*
Respecting Islam	*	*
Better treatment of addicts	*	*
Better relations with foreign countries	*	*
prevention/Elimination of crimes	*	*
Mining of natural resources	*	*
Prevention/Elimination of suicide attacks	*	*
Decrease number of accidents	*	*
Less assistance provided to (insurgents in) Pakistan	*	*
Transfer of security responsibilities	*	*
Increased salaries of government employees	*	*
Hezb-e-Islami is getting weaker	*	*
Respecting women rights	*	*
More factories	*	*
Decrease in arbitrary attacks by the US	*	*
Improved justice	*	*
Decrease in crimes	*	*
Low prices	*	*
Access to products	*	*
Better transportation	*	*
Creation of Arbakies	*	*
Don›t know (vol.)	*	*

Q-4a. (Filtered. If "Wrong direction" in Q-2): Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction?
(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention:_____

Q-4b. (Filtered. If '2' in Q-2): Why else? (Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 2nd Mention:_____

Base: Wrong direction 1959	Q-4a. 1st mention	Q-4a &b. 1st&2nd mention
	%	%
Insecurity	28	39
There is unemployment	8	18
Corruption	7	14
Bad government	6	11
Suicide attacks	6	11
Administrative corruption	5	10
Bad economy	4	10
Presence of Taliban	3	6
No reconstruction has happened	3	6
Innocent people being killed	2	5
Injustice in the country	2	4
Too many foreigners are getting involved	2	4
Poor education system	1	4
Presence / Interference of foreigners	2	3
Neighboring countries cause problems	1	3
Lack of coordination between ISAF/ Coalition forces and ANP/ ANA during fights with AGE	1	3
Increase in drug trade	1	3
High prices	1	3
Ethnic problems	1	3
Increase in crimes	1	3
Presence of warlords	1	2
Kidnapping of children	1	2
Water & Power supply problems	1	2
Lack of implementation of the law	1	2
People disillusioned with the government	1	1
Lack of aid / no development assistance	1	1

Terrorism	1	1
Lack of unity	1	1
Pakistan's rocket attacks on Afghanistan	1	1
Placing bombs on the roads	*	1
Foreign aid causes problems	*	1
Western influence is too great	*	1
There is danger to Islam	*	1
Poor leadership	*	1
Disarmament didn›t take place	*	1
Lack of shelter	*	1
Interference of foreigners in country's military matters	*	1
US arbitrary attacks	*	1
Too much luxury	*	*
Unfair elections	*	*
Lack of freedom of speech	*	*
Healthcare problems	*	*
Lack of communication system	*	*
Women's rights	*	*
Transportation problem	*	*
Lack of attention to agriculture	*	*
High pollution levels	*	*
Weak Parliament	*	*
Lack of specialists/professionals	*	*
Signing strategic agreement	*	*
The government is supporting Taliban and Al-Qaeda	*	*
Poisoning school children	*	*
There is no progress	*	*
Presence of foreigners	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don›t know (vol.)	2	2

Q-5a. (Filtered. Ask if answered codes 3, 8 or 9 'Some in right, some in wrong direction', 'Refused' and 'Don't Know in Q-2): Why do you think so? (Write down answer)

Q-5b. (Filtered. Ask if answered codes 3, 8 or 9 'Some in right, some in wrong direction', 'Refused' and 'Don't Know in Q-2): Why else? (Write down answer)

Base All Respondent 1074	Q-5a. 1st mention	Q-5a &b. 1st&2nd mention
	%	%
Security has improved	15	23
Corruption has increased	8	20
Education has improved	9	13
Security has become worse	7	13
Reconstruction is going on	7	11
Weak government	6	11
Lack of reconstruction	6	10
Suicide attacks	3	8
Job opportunities	3	6
Good economy	2	3
Increase in police / army	2	3
Fight against poppy	1	3
Poor economy	1	3
The country has developed	1	2
Taliban / Insurgents have developed	1	2
Assistance of foreign countries	1	2
Lack of drinking water / electricity	1	2
Preventing return of Taliban	1	2
Lack of equipment for police	1	2
Freedom of speech	1	2
Lack of law	1	2
Ethnic partiality	*	2
High prices	*	2
Lack of justice	*	2
Promoting peace agreement	1	1
Fight against terrorism	1	1
US arbitrary attacks	1	1
Peace talks with Taliban	1	1
Human rights	1	1
Elections	1	1

The government is active	1	1
Public healthcare system	1	1
Foreign interference	*	1
Presence of American troops	*	1
Lack of road reconstruction	*	1
Pakistan's interference	*	1
Killing of innocent people	*	1
Increase in narcotics	*	1
Disrespect for Islamic values	*	*
Provincial councils have become better	*	*
Firing/Destruction of schools by Taliban	*	*
Kidnapping	*	*
International community aid	*	*
Lack of shelter	*	*
Lack of water for agriculture	*	*
Withdrawal of American forces	*	*
Lack of aid to agriculture	*	*
Control of mines	*	*
Increase in crimes	*	*
Lack of school reconstruction	*	*
Closure of clinics	*	*
Misuse of powers	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don't know (vol.	14	14

Q6a (ASK ALL) In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention:_____

Q-6b. And after that, what is the next biggest problem? (Do NOT read codes. Write down answer

Write 2nd Mention:_____

Base: All respondents 6290	**Q-6a. First problem**	**Q-6a&b. Next problem**
	%	**%**
Insecurity / attacks / violence/ terrorism	18	9
Unemployment	14	13
Corruption	13	11

Poor Economy	5	5
Education / schools / literacy	5	5
Presence of Taliban	4	4
Poverty	4	5
Suicide attacks	4	5
Government / weak government / central authority	3	3
Interference of foreign countries	3	3
Interference of Pakistan	3	3
Presence of warlords	2	1
Scarcity of electricity	2	2
High prices	2	3
Drugs smuggling	2	3
Tribal issues/ Partisanship	2	2
Presence of foreign troops	2	1
Reconstruction / rebuilding	1	1
Roads	1	1
Crime	1	1
Lack of efficient ANA and ANP	1	1
Innocent people being killed	1	1
Injustice	1	2
Lack of national unity	1	1
Discriminations	1	1
Health care / clinics / hospitals	*	1
Drinking water	*	*
Water for irrigation	*	*
Lack of (proper) shelter	*	1
Lack of production companies	*	*
Agricultural problems	*	*
Transportation problems	*	*
Lack of foreign assistance	*	*
Returnees' problems	*	*
Disrespect to our culture	*	*
Kidnapping of children	*	1
No problems	*	*
Too much luxury	*	*
Low salary for the government employees	*	*
No freedom	*	*
Irresponsible armed people	*	*
No attention to women's rights	*	*

Disrespect for Islamic laws	*	*
Existence of private prisons	*	*
Interference of Iran	*	*
Lack of respect for elders	*	*
Municipalities not doing their job well	*	*
Lack of natural gas	*	*
Lack of mines/Lack of mining for natural resources	*	*
Unfair elections	*	*
Weak judiciary system	*	*
Weak Parliament	*	*
Roadside bombings	*	1
Foreign forces' air-strikes	*	*
Lack of fuel	*	*
Pollution	*	*
Population levels are too high	*	*
Raping	*	*
Existence of armed groups / militias	*	*
Lack of factories	*	*
Foreigners arbitrary (military) operations	*	*
Government of infidels	*	*
Maintaining peace	*	*
Establishment of political parties	*	*
Lack of barricades	*	*
Business problems	*	*
Establishment of Peace Council	*	*
Establishment of private banks	*	*
Family problems	*	*
Improved communications	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don›t know (vol.)	1	6

Q-7a. (ASK ALL) What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Do NOT Read codes. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention:_____

Q-7b. And what is the next biggest problem in your local area? (Do NOT Read codes. Write down answer and then code in the second column below)

Write 2nd Mention:_____

Base: All respondents 6290	Q-7a. First problem in the area	Q-7b. Next problem in the area
	%	%
Unemployment	17	13
Electricity	14	11
Roads	10	9
Water	9	8
Insecurity / attacks / violence	7	4
Education / schools / literacy	6	9
Health care / clinics / hospitals	5	7
Poverty	3	3
High prices	3	3
Taliban	2	1
Poor Economy	2	3
Reconstruction / rebuilding	2	2
Corruption	2	2
Crime	2	2
Pollution	2	2
Presence of warlords	1	1
Government / weak government / central authority	1	1
Lack of (proper) shelter	1	1
Drugs smuggling	1	1
Transportation problems	1	1
Lack of agricultural tools /equipment	1	1
No problems	1	1
Ethnic problems	1	1
Water for irrigation	1	1
Presence of foreigners	*	*
Natural disasters	*	*
Lack of foreign assistance	*	*
Kidnapping of children	*	*
Innocent people being killed	*	*
Returnees' problems	*	*
Women's rights	*	*
Addiction to drugs	*	*
Lack of communication system	*	*
Lack of bakeries	*	*
Interference of Pakistan	*	*

Lack of entertainment opportunities	*	*
Municipalities not doing their job well	*	*
Lack of mosques	*	*
People not feeling responsible	*	*
Lack of industrial projects	*	*
Injustice	*	1
Gas	*	*
Arbakis (Armed groups supported by the government)	*	*
Lack of unity	*	*
Too much freedom	*	*
Moral corruption	*	*
Lack of fuel	*	*
Lack of ANA and ANP	*	*
Lack of law implementation	*	*
Presence of foreign forces/searching houses	*	*
Roadside bombs	*	*
Population levels are too high	*	*
Dikes and drains against flood	*	*
Disrespect for Islamic values	*	*
Family problems	*	*
No access to technology	*	*
Interference of Iran	*	*
Existence of terrorism and Al-Qaeda	*	*
People's representative cannot solve the problems	*	*
Governor misappropriating lands	*	*
Night raids	*	*
Elections	*	*
Population levels are too high	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don›t know (vol.)	*	7

Q-8. I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live. Would you rate(insert item here)as very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad in your area?

Base: All respondents 6290	VG	QG	QB	VB	Ref.	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) The availability of clean drinking water	32	44	18	6	*	*
b) The availability of water for irrigation	16	36	29	15	*	3
c) The availability of jobs	5	24	43	27	*	1
d) The supply of electricity	15	21	22	40	*	1
e) The security situation	33	41	18	7	-	1
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals	16	42	30	12	-	*
g) The availability of medicine	13	40	33	13	*	1
h) The availability of education for children	34	43	16	6	*	1
i) Your freedom of movement—the ability to move safely in your area or district	30	43	20	7	-	*
j) The condition of roads in your area	12	32	33	23	*	*

Q-9a. (ASK ALL) Various projects and programs have been implemented or are being implemented in some places of our country. Speaking of the past 12 months, do you know of, heard of any project or program in this area, district, implemented in the following fields?

Q-9b. (If answered "Yes", Code 1, in Q-9a, ASK)Has the Afghan Government or Foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for providing most of the aid for the projects?

Q-9a. Aware of project	Yes	No	Ref/ DK	Q-9b Who has provided the most aid for the project?	Afghan Gov.	Foreign Sponsor	Both	People themselves	Ref/ DK
Base: 6290	%	%	%	**Base: varied**	%	%	%		%
a) Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges	50	49	*	a) Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges	42	35	22	*	1
b) Water supply for drinking	43	57	*	b) Water supply for drinking	43	33	21	*	2
c) Water supply for irrigation	24	76	1	c) Water supply for irrigation	53	26	19	*	2
d) Electricity supply	22	77	*	d) Electricity supply	65	18	14	1	3
e) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	38	62	*	e) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	51	28	19	*	2

f) Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.)	53	47	*	f) Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.)	61	19	18	*	2
g) De-mining	24	76	*	g) De-mining	30	44	25	*	1
h) Demilitarization / disarmament	22	78	1	h) Demilitarization / disarmament	52	22	23	*	4
i) Reconstruction/ programs in agriculture	27	72	1	i) Reconstruction/ programs in agriculture	50	28	20	*	2
j) Reconstruction / programs in industry	14	85	1	j) Reconstruction/ programs in industry	46	30	21	*	3
k) Building new mosques	29	71	1	k) Building new mosques[12]	57	10	8	14	11
l) Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production materials etc.	23	77	*	l) Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production materials etc.	30	44	24	*	2
m) Other	*	100	*	m) Other	21	38	19	22	*

Q-10. Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned to have been implemented in this area, district? (Single response) [Do Not Read List]

Write country:_____

Q-11. Which other countries have provided aid for the projects in your area, district? PROBE: Any other?

DO NOT SHOW CODE LIST IN THE DARI OR PASHTO QQ

Countries provided aid to projects	Q-10. Which country provided most aid	Q-11. which other country
Base: 5276	%	%
USA	35	20
Germany	9	11
Japan	9	16
Australia	5	6
India	4	13
Turkey	3	6
Sweden	3	3
United Kingdom (Britain)	2	4

China	2	7
Iran	2	4
Saudi Arabia	2	4
Canada	2	3
France	2	5
Norway	2	3
National Solidarity Program	2	1
Pakistan	1	2
Italy	1	3
Spain	1	1
PRT team	1	1
UN agencies	1	*
Poland	1	1
DAFA Organization	*	*
Kazakhstan	*	*
Lybia	*	*
Bulgaria	*	*
Korea	*	1
Bangladesh	*	*
Holland	*	*
Denmark	*	1
Hungary	*	*
Uzbekistan	*	*
Tajikistan	*	1
Belgium	*	*
Turkmenistan	*	*
Russia	*	2
Switzerland	*	*
Lithuania	*	*
Foreign countries	*	*
World Bank	*	*
Indonesia	*	*
Kuwait	*	*
Ibn-e-Sena Foundation	*	*
Egypt	*	*

DAKAR agency	*	*
Red Cross	*	*
Foreign NGOs	*	*
Austria	*	*
UNICEF	*	*
Agha Khan foundation	*	*
European countries in general	*	1
Nepal	*	*
UNOPS	*	*
Brazil	*	*
The Czech Republic	*	*
Care organization	*	*
Albania	*	*
IRD	*	*
IRC	*	*
GFP	*	*
Dubai	*	*
Romania	*	*
Argentina	*	*
Nigeria	*	*
Singapoor	*	*
Iraq	*	*
Qatar	*	*
NATO	*	*
Ukraine	*	*
Singapoor	*	*
Lybia	*	*
Lebanon	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don›t know (vol.)	7	24

Q-12. Turning to another subject, tell me, do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with the following statements?

Base: All Respondents6290	
Strongly agree	20
Agree somewhat	43
Disagree somewhat	23
Strongly disagree	11
Refused (vol.)	*
Donɔt know (vol.)	2

Q-13. (ASK ALL)Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the economy of Afghanistan. If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
More prosperous	53
Less prosperous	31
About as prosperous under the Taliban Govt.	11
Absent during Taliban rule	4
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-14. Compared to one year ago, would you say that situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following?

Base: All respondents 6290	Better	The same	Worse	Ref.	DK
	%	%	%	%	%
a) Financial situation of your household	50	43	7	*	*
b) Employment opportunities	21	50	28	*	*
c) Availability of products in the market	34	51	14	*	1
d) Quality of your food diet	41	46	12	*	1
e) Physical conditions of your house/dwelling	33	51	14	*	1
f) Health well-being of your family members	42	46	12	*	*
g) Electric supply	24	42	32	*	1
h) Access to schools	51	40	9	*	1

Q-15a. (ASK ALL) What is your main source of energy for cooking, what do you cook on most? (Code in the first column below)

Q-15b. And what do you heat your house with most, what is your main source of energy for heating? (Code in the second column)

Base: All 6290	Q-15a. Main source of cooking	Q-15b. Main source of heating
	%	%
Firewood	46	33
Bottled gas/LPG	24	12
Animal dung/ manure	16	21
Grass or other biomass	6	10
Electricity	4	5
Coal	2	7
Charcoal	2	11
Kerosene	*	1
Diesel	*	*
Petrol	*	*
Don't Know (volunteered only)	*	*

Q-16. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Often	15
Sometimes	33
Rarely	23
Never	28
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-17. Have you or has anyone in your family been a victim of violence or of some criminal act in your home or community in the past year?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	16
No	83
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-18a. (Filtered. Ask if answered '1' in Q-17) What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? READ LIST (Multiple Response)

Base: Victims 1015	%
Physical attack or beating	29
Racketeering / extortion	14
Livestock stolen	10
Suicide attacks	9
Burglary/looting	8
Pick-pocketing	8
Foreign forces actions	6
Motor vehicle theft / Property taken from your vehicle or parts of the vehicle stolen	4
Militants/Insurgent actions	4
Murder	4
Kidnapping	3
Police actions	3
Army actions	1
Sexual violence	*
Smuggling	*
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q18b. (Filtered. Ask if answered 1 "physical attack or beating" in Q-18a) Was this physical attack or beating a case of domestic violence (within the family), a case with a neighbor, a case involving relative, or was it involving someone else? (Single Response)

Base: Victims Physical attack or beating 292	%
Case of domestic violence (within the family)	24
Case with neighbor	38
Case with relative	17
Case with someone else	18
Donot Know	3

Q-19. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'yes' in Q-17) You said that you've been a victim of violence or some criminal act in the past year. Did you report it to any authority?

Base: Victims 1015	%
Yes	52
No	36
Refused	*
Don't know	12

Q-20. (Filtered. Ask if answered "Yes" in Q-19) To what agency or institution did you report the crime? (Multiple Response) [Do Not Read Responses, Record All That Respondent Mentions, Specify If Other Mentioned]

Base: Reported 532	%
Afghan National Police	44
Shura/ Elders	32
Tribal leader / Malik	22
District Governor/ Woleswal	22
Afghan National Army	18
Mullah Saheb	12
Provincial authority	6
Public prosecutor	5
Courts	5
Local militia (police)	4
My family	4
Taliban	3
Central Government	2
Local Commander or Warlord	1
Office of UN Organizaitons	1
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	1
Press or other media	1
Local PRT	*
Don't know	3

Q-21. (Ask if answered "No" in Q-19) Why didn't you report the crime? (Multiple Response)

[Do Not Read Responses, Record All That Respondent Mentions, Specify If Other Mentioned]

Write Down All Mentioned By Respondent, Code

Base: Didn't report 361	%
It makes no difference	19
Danger or fear of retaliation	15
Lack of evidence	11
It wasn't serious	28
Didn't know where to report it	9
Lack of trust on government officials	11
Lack of legal counsel	1
Don't know	9

Q-22. If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party? (Read Out Answers)

Base: All respondents 6290	%
A great deal of confidence	16
A fair amount of confidence	43
Not very much confidence	25
No confidence at all	14
Refused	*
Don't know	2

Q-23. (Ask all) In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (Open-ended question. Write down answer)

Write Reason:_____

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Taliban	17
Unemployment	16
Corruption	11
Terrorism	7
Pakistan's interference	7
Illiteracy	6
Poverty	5
Insecurity	5
Drugs	4
Lack of law implementation	3
Presence of international forces	3
Existence of irresponsible armed groups	2
Lack of Govt. attention/ weak Govt.	2
Criminals released without punishment	2
Injustice	2
Lack of reconstruction	1
Discriminations	1
Western countries	1
Kidnapping children	1
Murders	1
Robberies	1
Powerful people misusing their power	1

Suicide attacks	1
Having a weak/low-paid police	*
Returnees	*
Rapes	*
Poorly protected borders	*
Family problems	*
Arbakis	*
Interference of Iran	*
Lack/Low level of culture	*
Other	*
Refused	*
Don›t know	*

Q-24a. On another subject, please, tell me what kind of corruption affects you personally the most? Please give me two examples? (Open-ended. Write down up to two responses)

a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

Q24b. Please give me another example of the kind of corruption that affects you personally. (Write down answer)

Write Second Mention: _____

Base: 6290	**Q-24a. 1st mentioned**	**Q-24a & b 1st & 2nd mentioned**
	%	**%**
Administrative corruption	34	47
Bribes	11	17
Moral corruption	7	14
Corruption in the police/police headquarters	4	8
Corruption in the court	4	9
Corruption in education systems	2	4
Corruption in the district offices	2	3
Robbery	2	4
Corruption in the Ministry of Social Affairs	1	2
Corruption in the municipality	1	2
Corruption in the customs bureau	1	1
Corruption in the public health department	1	2
Corruption in the attorney general office	1	2
Corruption in the provincial office	1	2

Corruption in the ANA	1	3
Corruption in the Ministry of Finance	1	1
Suicide attacks	1	2
Fighting in the country	1	2
Criminal corruption	1	2
Political corruption	1	1
Big crimes	1	1
Lack of law/ not implemented	1	2
Lack of government attention	1	2
Unemployment	1	3
Injustice in the society	1	3
Lack of government employees attention to their jobs	1	3
Drug traffic	1	2
Ethnic problems	1	4
None	1	1
Misusing power	1	2
Social corruption	1	2
Kidnapping children	1	1
All kinds of corruption is acceptable	1	1
Corruption in the electricity directorate	*	1
Corruption in the passport dept	*	*
Corruption in the CSO	*	*
Corruption in the parliament	*	1
Corruption in the Hajj (pilgrimage) department	*	*
Corruption in the agriculture directorate	*	*
Corruption in the traffic department	*	1
Corruption in the directorate of MRRD	*	*
Corruption in the directorate of women affairs	*	*
Corruption in the banks	*	*
Corruption in the red crescent society	*	*
Corruption in the private sectors	*	*
Corruption in the in the Ministry of Interior	*	1
Corruption in the Ministry of Justice	*	1
Corruption in the Ministry of Transport	*	*
Corruption in the Ministry of Defense	*	*
Corruption in the Ministry of Commerce	*	*
Corruption in the Ministry of Economy	*	1
Corruption in the press	*	*
Corruption in the directorate of communication	*	*
Corruption in the in the human rights commission office	*	*
Corruption in the provincial Shura	*	1
Corruption in the directorate of immigrants	*	*

Corruption in the airlines companies	*	*
Corruption in the directorate of prisons	*	*
Corruption in the directorate of martyrs and disabled persons	*	*
Corruption in the local councils	*	*
Misappropriation of properties	*	*
Corruption at borders	*	*
Corruption in ID or Tazkera department	*	*
Corruption in Mustofiat (financial departments)	*	*
Corruption in the Ministry of Mines	*	*
Presence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda	*	1
Corruption among warlords	*	*
Air-strikes	*	*
Illiteracy	*	1
Lack of knowledge in the society	*	*
Sexual abuse	*	1
Poverty	*	*
Foreign bad behavior	*	*
Anti-Islamic performances	*	*
Lack of attention people›s/women›s rights	*	1
Robbing mines	*	*
Corruption among foreign forces/organizations	*	1
Corruption among people	*	1
Land disputes	*	*
Family violence	*	*
High prices	*	*
Lack of clean drinking water	*	*
Corruption in the elections	*	*
Pakistan›s interference	*	*
Cultural corruption	*	*
Corruption in the reconstruction process as a whole	*	1
Lack of shelter	*	*
Violence against civilians	*	1
Corruption in gaining government jobs	*	1
Lack of water	*	*
Addiction to drugs	*	*
Iran's interference	*	*
Interference of other foreign countries	*	*
Refused	*	*
Don›t know	5	5

Q-25. Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (Circle '8' for Refused or '9' for Don't Know, if volunteered.)

Base: All respondents 6290	Major Problem	Minor Problem	Not a Problem	Refused	Don't know
	%	%	%	%	%
a) In your daily life	56	31	13	*	1
b) In your neighborhood	52	35	13	*	1
c) In your local authorities	60	31	8	*	1
d) In your provincial government	70	23	5	*	1
e) In Afghanistan as a whole	79	16	4	*	1

Q-26. Whenever you have contacted government officials, how often in the past year have you had to give cash, a gift or perform a favor for an official? If you had contacts with such officials in the past year, was it in all cases, most of the cases, in isolated or in no cases? How about your contacts with…. (Rotate items on the list)

Base: All respondents 6290	In all cases	Most cases	Isolated cases	No cases	Had no contacts	Ref.	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) Officials in the Municipality	6	11	12	26	46	*	*
b) Customs office	4	8	12	24	51	*	1
c) Afghan National Police	3	11	17	33	35	*	*
d) Afghan National Army	3	6	9	39	43	*	1
e) Judiciary / courts	6	12	16	22	43	*	1
f) State electricity supply	3	9	14	30	43	*	*
g) Public healthcare service	3	12	21	36	27	*	*
h) When applying for a job	5	13	16	25	41	*	*
i) Admissions to schools/university	3	9	13	35	40	*	*
j) To receive official documents	5	11	16	26	42	*	1

Q-27. Do you think that the Government is doing too much, about right, or not enough to fight corruption?

Base: All 6290	%
Too much	14
About right	43
Not enough	40
Refused	*
Dont know	2

Q-28. Now I will read you six different activities that you could participate in. Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities with 'no fear', 'some fear' or a 'lot of fear'?

Base: All respondents 6290	No fear	Some fear	A lot of fear	Refused	Don't know
	%	%	%	%	%
a)When participating in resolving problems in your community	57	34	8	*	1
b)Voting in a national election	45	35	19	*	1
c)Participating in a peaceful demonstration	29	41	28	1	2
d)To run for a public office	33	40	23	1	3
e) When encountering ANP officers	51	33	15	*	1
f) When encountering ANA	55	31	14	*	1
g) When traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	24	47	27	*	1
h) When encountering international forces	20	43	35	*	1

Q-29. In comparison to one year ago, do people in the area where you live feel more safe, as safe as before, or less safe to freely express their opinions?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
More safe to express their opinions	24
As safe as before to express their opinions	56
Less safe to express their opinions	16
Refused	*
Don't know	4

Q-30a. [ASK if Code 1 "more safe" in Q-29] What changes compared with the past, or reasons, do you think have made most people to feel safe to express their opinions in the area where you live? (Pre-coded. Do NOT read out. Write down the main answer and code to the list)

a. First Mention: _____

b. Second Mention: _____

Q-30b. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 'More safe' in Q-29) Is there another reason? (Write down answer)

Write Second Mention: _____

Base: More safe 1487	Q-30a 1st mentioned	Q-30a &b Cumulative
	%	%
The security conditions are good (in our area)	36	50
Freedom of speech is guaranteed	24	39
Having ANP and ANA	7	13
Peace and democracy	6	13
Good Government	4	8
(Respect for) Human rights	3	5
Unity among people	3	7
Freedom of press is guaranteed	2	6
Having a legal constitution	2	4
Better education	2	6
Taliban removal	2	6
The removal of local militias	1	1
People's cooperation with the Government	1	4
Increase in the level of people's awareness	1	3
Having (working) parliament and local Shuras	*	1
Presence of ISAF / Coalition forces	*	1
Presence of CDC	*	1
Presence of PC	*	*
Disarmament	*	1
Reconstruction	*	1
Corruption has decreased	*	1
More attention to women's rights	*	2
Better Justice system	*	*
Better economic situation	*	1
Islamic party led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar has been removed	*	*
Nothing	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don't know	3	3

Q-31a. [ASK if code 3 "less safe" in Q-29] Why don't people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Pre-coded. Do NOT read out. Write down up top answer and code to the list)

a. First Mention: _____

b. Second Mention: _____

Q-31b. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 3 'Less safe' in Q-29) Is there another reason? (Write down answer)

Write Second Mention: _____

Base: Less safe 1015	Q-31a	Q-31a&b cumulative
	%	%
Security conditions are bad in this area	22	32
The Government doesn't allow freedom of political opinions	11	20
Threats by the AGEs	11	18
Presence of Taliban in the area	8	13
Presence of warlords	5	8
Fear for their safety	4	8
Afraid of people	4	8
Ethnic discrimination	3	5
Elders / Mullahs don't allow freedom of opinions	3	4
Not interested in/Lack of information about politics	2	3
The Government doesn't care about people's opinion	2	4
Lack of education	2	3
Fear from police	2	3
Suicide attacks	2	4
Women are under the control of men	1	1
No real democracy	1	3
No disarmament	1	1
Fear from Coalition/foreign forces	1	3
Lack of awareness of legal rights	1	2
Corruption	1	4
Afraid of family members	1	2
Existence of terrorism	1	1
Lack of justice	1	3
Afraid of spies	1	2
Kidnapping	1	2

Interference by neighboring countries	1	1
Killing of innocent people	1	2
Afraid of revenge	1	2
Existence of smugglers	*	*
Fear from Malik	*	1
Animosity between government employees	*	*
Unemployment	*	1
Threats by district governor	*	1
Political/Party partisanship	*	1
Fear from militias	*	*
Poverty/ Weak economy	*	*
Don't trust anyone	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don›t Know (vol.)	6	6

Q-32. (ASK ALL) How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

Base: All Respondents 6290	
A lot	14
Some	38
Very little	22
None at all	24
Refused (vol.)	*
Don›t know (vol.)	2

Q-33. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. Are you…

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Very satisfied	19
Somewhat satisfied	51
Somewhat dissatisfied	20
Very dissatisfied	9
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-34. Political parties are usually established and serve the interests of various strata of society. At present, the interests of which one of the following, do you think, the political parties in our country serve the most?

Base: All Respondents6290	%
Country as a whole	25
Broad layers of society	18
Regional interests	15
Corporate interests (like those of farmers, workers, businessmen, etc.)	4
Ethnic interests	15
Local interests	4
Group/personal interests	16
Refused (vol.)	*
Don›t know (vol.)	1

Q-35. First is this pair of statements. (READ STATEMENTS) Please tell me which statement you agree with more.

Base: All Respondents 6290	
Statement A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	84
Statement B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.	16
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't Know (vol.)	*

Q-36. Please tell me which statement you agree with more (READ STATEMENTS).

Base: All Respondents 6290	
Statement A: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Afghanistan.	58
Statement B: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Afghans have real choices in who governs them.	41
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't Know (vol.)	1

Q-37. Please tell me which statement you agree with more (READ STATEMENTS).

Base: All Respondents 6290	
Statement A: Members of Parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree.	70
Statement B: Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what Parliament thinks.	29
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't Know (vol.)	1

Q-38. Please tell me which statement you agree with more (READ STATEMENTS).

Base: All Respondents 6290	
Statement A: Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong.	59
Statement B: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.	39
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't Know (vol.)	2

Q-39. Please tell me which statement you agree with more (READ STATEMENTS).

Base: All Respondents 6290	
Statement A: Constitution should limit the President to serving a maximum of two terms in office.	72
Statement B: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the President can serve.	27
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't Know (vol.)	1

Q-40. Members of the Parliament have various responsibilities. Which of the following do you think is the most important responsibility of your Member of Parliament?

Base: All Respondents	%
Listen to constituents and represent their needs.	31
Deliver jobs or development	25
Make laws for the good of the country	30
Monitor the president and his government	12
Other	*
Refused	*
Donɔt know	2

Q-41. Thinking of officials, do you believe that people employed in the following institutions are driven in their work mainly to serve the interests of the Afghan society, or mainly to serve their own interests?

Base: All 6290	Afghan society	Their own interests	Both	Refused	Don't Know
Government employees	42	35	22	*	1
Ministers in the Government	31	44	24	*	1
Officials in the Court	28	45	25	*	1
Members of the Parliament	33	40	26	*	1
Officials in International NGOs	27	46	25	*	2
Officials in Afghan NGOs	24	47	27	*	2
Officials in Donor Institutions	27	44	27	*	2
Religious Leaders	43	33	22	*	2

Q-42. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions and organizations in our country. I will read these out to you. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in each of the institutions and organizations and officials to perform their jobs. Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in..

Base: All 6290	Great deal	Fair amount	Not much	No Confide.	Refused	DK
a) Afghan National Army	67	26	5	2	*	*
b) Afghan National Police	47	35	14	5	*	*
c) Political parties	12	33	33	19	*	1
d) The Government Justice system	12	38	34	15	*	1
e) Government Ministers	16	39	30	14	*	1
f) Independent Election commission	21	39	26	13	*	1
g) Public administration	18	47	26	9	*	1
h) the Municipality	15	40	29	14	*	2
i) Local militias	11	29	28	30	*	2
j) Community Development Councils	23	43	23	9	*	1
k) Provincial Councils	23	43	23	9	*	1
l) Provincial Development Committees	20	44	25	9	*	2
m) Provincial Government	24	41	24	9	*	1
n) Parliament	24	38	26	11	*	1
o) Community Shuras/ Jirgas	28	40	22	8	*	1
p) National NGOs	15	39	31	13	*	2
q) International NGOs	17	36	31	13	*	2
r) Electronic media such as radio, TV	34	41	18	6	*	1
s) Newspapers, print media	30	42	20	7	*	2
t) Religious Leaders	40	33	18	8	*	1
u) Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	25	41	24	9	*	1

Q-43. I'm going to read some statements to you about ANA. Please tell me if you agree with each. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask): Strongly Agree, AgreeSomewhat, Disagree Somewhat or Strongly Disagree?

Base: All respondents 6290	SA	AS	DS	SD	Refused	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	59	34	5	1		*
b) ANA is professional and well trained.	47	35	14	3	*	1
c) ANA needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	30	35	23	11	*	1
d) ANA helps improve the security	54	33	10	2	*	*

Q-44. I'm going to read some statements to you about ANP. Please tell me if you agree with each. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):Strongly Agree, AgreeSomewhat, Disagree Somewhat or Strongly Disagree??

Base: All respondents 6290	SA	AS	DS	SD	Refused	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people.	44	41	11	3	*	*
b) ANP is professional and well trained.	32	42	20	5	*	1
c) ANP needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself.	31	36	23	9	*	1
d) ANP helps improve the security	40	41	15	4	*	1
e) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes so that they can be brought to justice	32	43	18	6	*	*

Q-45. Thinking of the National Government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsibilities? Is it doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Very good job	15
Somewhat good job	60
Somewhat bad job	20
Very bad job	5
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-46. And speaking of particular aspects of its work, do you think the National Government is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job in the following fields? (Ask for each on the list)

Base: All respondents 6290	VG	SG	SB	VB	Refused	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) Education	45	45	9	2	*	*
b) Healthcare system	18	48	28	5	*	1
c) Creating job opportunities	7	24	42	26	*	1
d) Maintaining relations with neighboring countries	18	44	27	9	*	1
e) International community	26	43	23	6	*	1
f) Reviving/Developing the economy	10	36	37	17	*	1
g) Fighting corruption	7	24	37	31	*	1
h) Security	23	47	21	8	*	*

Q-47. Turning to elements of the local government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

Base: All respondents 6290	VG	SG	VB	SB	Refused	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a)Provincial Government	26	54	16	3	*	1
b) Municipal authorities (*urban residents only 1365*)	11	54	24	10	*	*
c) Local authorities (*rural residents only 4983*)	18	49	25	8	*	1

Q-48. Have you ever contacted your Member of Parliament (MP) for help in solving any of your personal or local problems?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	18
No	80
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-49. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-48) Did the Member of Parliament (MP) try to help to resolve the problem?

Base: contacted 1271	%
Yes, the MP tried to help	61
No, the MP did not try to help	39
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-50. (ASK ALL) Now let's talk about Provincial Councils. Have you ever contacted a representative on the Provincial Council for help in solving any of your personal or local problems?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	22
No	78
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-51. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-50) Did the Provincial Council try to help to resolve the problem?

Base: contacted 1499	%
Yes, the Council tried to help	63
No, the Council did not try to help	36
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-52. (ASK ALL) Now I will read some statements about our elected representatives. For each statement, tell me if you strongly agree. Agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):

Base: All 6290	SA	AS	DS	SD	Refused	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) The Parliament is addressing the major problems of people in our country	22	49	20	7	*	1
b) My MP is addressing the major problems of my constituency in Parliament	17	42	29	10	*	1
c) My Provincial Council member is addressing the major problem of my community	17	41	28	11	*	2

Q-53. Community Development Councils have been established as part of the National Solidarity Program and members of the Council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell me, are you aware of such an institution formed in your neighborhood/settlement?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes, aware of CDC in the neighborhood/settlement	48
No, not aware of CDC in neighborhood	49
Refused	*
Don't know	2

Q-54. (Filter. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-53) Which of the following groups are members of the Community Development Council in your neighborhood/settlement? Ask for each and code

Base: 3047	Yes	No	Refused	DK
	%	%	%	%
a) Local Malik / Khan	75	24	*	1
b) Elders of the local shura/jirga	86	13	*	1
c) Mullah	63	36	*	1
d) Local commanders	28	70	*	2
e) Women	27	70	*	2
f) Local teacher	54	44	*	2
g) Doctor	25	73	*	3
h) Officials from municipal/district administration	30	68	*	2
i) Ordinary farmers	47	51	*	2
j) Landless agricultural workers	39	59	*	2
k) Shopkeepers	48	50	*	2

Q-55. (Filtered. Ask if 'yes` in Q-53) How satisfied are you with the job this Community Development Council is doing? Are you…

Base: aware of CDC 3047	%
Very satisfied	28
Somewhat satisfied	50
Somewhat dissatisfied	16
Very dissatisfied	5
Don't know	1

Q-56a. What in your opinion is the most important <u>achievement</u> of the central government in the past two years? And what is next? (Open-ended. Write down first two mentions]

a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

Q-56b. And what is the next most important achievement of the Central Government in the past two years? (Single response. Write down answer.)

Base: All respondents 6290	Q-56a 1st mentioned	Q-56 a &b Cumulative
	%	%
Better education system	16	28
Establishing peace and security	15	24
Reconstruction	11	21
Having ANP and ANA	8	16
No achievements	6	6
Building circle roads	5	9
Supplying water and power	3	6
Having a good relationship with foreign countries	2	3
Improving economy	2	4
Improving healthcare system	2	4
Freedom of speech	2	3
Having a strong government	2	3
Removing poppy cultivation	2	4
Removing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda	2	4
Endorsement of strategic agreement with America	2	3
Elections	1	2
Improving communication system	1	1
Attracting foreign aid	1	2
Having Parliament	1	2
Creating job opportunities	1	2
Disarmament	1	1
Observing women/human rights	1	2
Removing administrative corruption	1	3
Establishing Constitution	1	1
National unity	1	1
Negotiating with Taliban	1	2
Improving media	*	1
Creating Development Councils	*	*
Returnees	*	*
Improving agriculture	*	1
Paying attention to Islamic values	*	*
Using natural resources	*	1
Establishing private sectors	*	*

Improving carpet exports	*	*
Improving business	*	*
Sports	*	*
Transportation system	*	*
Preventing Pakistan and foreign countries interference	*	*
Building Factories	*	*
Democracy	*	1
Building entertainment parks	*	*
Foreign forces leaving Afghanistan	*	1
Creating private banks	*	*
Creating Provincial Shura	*	*
Creating National Solidarity programs (NSP)	*	*
Developing the handicraft trade	*	*
Preventing suicide attacks	*	1
Preventing crimes	*	1
Demining	*	*
Creating Arbakis	*	*
Development in stock-breeding	*	*
Improvement of mines	*	1
Low prices	*	*
Facilities in general	*	*
Night raids by foreign troops	*	*
Increase in salary of government staff	*	*
Prevention of kidnappings	*	*
Getting membership of Shanghai	*	*
Friendly relations with neighboring countries	*	*
Security transition to local security forces	*	1
Creating traditional Shuras	*	*
Getting over responsibly for prisoners from foreigners	*	*
Bringing justice	*	*
Strategic contract with European countries	*	1
Chicago conference	*	*
Building water dams	*	*
Printing new money	*	*
Creating Municipality	*	*
Refused	*	*
Don›t know	4	4

Q-57a. And what in your opinion is the most important failing of the central government in the past two years? And what is next? (Open-ended. Write down first two mentions]

Q-57b. And what is the next most important failing of the Central Government in the past two years? (Single response. Write down answer)

a) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

b) _____ 98. Refused 99. Don't Know

Base: All respondents 6290	Q-57a 1st mentioned	Q-57 a &b Cumulative
	%	%
Administrative corruption	19	32
Insecurity/continual fighting	16	23
Lack of job opportunities	8	18
Suicide attacks	6	12
Weak Government	4	9
Removing the Taliban	4	8
Bad education system	3	5
Weak economy	3	8
Removing drugs	3	*
No/ lack of reconstruction/roads/bridges	2	4
Removing the Terrorism	2	3
Injustice	2	5
Foreign forces in the country (long time)	2	*
Kidnappings	2	2
Preventing Pakistan and foreign countries interference	2	5
Lack of unity among tribes	2	3
No failures	1	1
Weak ANA and ANP	1	2
National unity	1	1
Water and power	1	3
High prices	1	2
Lack of transparency in the government affaires	1	1
Lack of law implementation	1	2
Negotiation with Taliban	1	2
Increase in crimes/criminals released without punishment	1	3
Presence of warlords	1	2
Killing of civilians	1	2
Holding unfair elections	*	*
Lack of foreign assistance	*	1

Lack of/no relations with foreign countries	*	1
Lack of healthcare centers	*	1
Weak Parliament	*	*
Lack of freedom of speech	*	1
Fulfilling its commitments	*	*
Preventing civilian casualties	*	1
Returnees	*	*
Disarmament	*	1
Observing Islamic rules	*	1
Human rights	*	1
Keeping safe historical heritage	*	*
Shelter	*	*
People referring to Christianity	*	*
Factories	*	*
Lack of attention to agriculture	*	1
Creating Arbaki forces (Armed groups supported by the government)	*	*
Not having good municipality	*	*
Lack of mining for natural resources	*	*
Violence against women	*	1
Moral corruption	*	1
Not consulting with people	*	1
Communication problems	*	*
Bad transportation system	*	*
Iran interference	*	*
Kochis creating problems	*	*
Lack of attention to Afghanistan's culture	*	*
High profile assassinations	*	1
Armed robberies	*	*
Night raids by foreign troops	*	1
Lack of good trade	*	*
Lack of professional staff	*	*
Signing strategic contract	*	*
Lack of companies	*	*
Taking control of prisons from Americans = positive	*	*
Roadside bombs	*	*
Torturing prisoners in foreign prisons	*	*
Kabul Bank being bankrupt	*	*
Conflicts between political parties	*	*
Ismail Khan in the Government	*	*
Low salaries for ANP	*	*
Refused	*	*
Don›t know	4	4

Q-58. I'm going to read some ideas. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with each. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):

Base: All respondents 6290	SA	AS	DS	SD	Refused	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) It is a good thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition	37	42	13	6	*	1
b) Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion	52	31	13	3	*	1
c) A person should vote the way his or her community votes, not how they feel individually	51	33	12	4	*	1

Q-59. Please tell me which statement you agree with more (READ STATEMENTS).

Base: All Respondents 6290	
Statement A: Voting is a personal, individual responsibility. Each person should vote for oneself regardless of what his/her community thinks.	84
Statement B: One cannot vote for oneself. We are all members of a community and one should vote the way his or her community votes.	15
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't Know (vol.)	1

We are going to change the topic. "Reconciliation" refers to a process where opposing parties explore and overcome the grievance brought on during the conflict and find ways to build trust and live cooperatively with each other. "Reintegration" refers to a process when armed opposition are removed from fighting context and incorporated into a peaceful civilian life.

Q-60. Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with the Government's reconciliation efforts and negotiations with the armed opposition groups?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Strongly agree	38
Agree somewhat	44
Disagree somewhat	13
Strongly disagree	6
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-61. Do you think the Afghan Government's reconciliation efforts and negotiations will help stabilize the country?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	71
No	25
Refused	*
Don't know	3

Q-62. Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or strongly disagree those Anti-Government elements who lay down arms and express willingness to re-integrate into society to be provided government assistance, jobs and housing?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Strongly agree	38
Agree somewhat	40
Disagree somewhat	14
Strongly disagree	8
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-63. In your opinion what is the reason that the armed anti-government groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (Open-ended question. Write down answer)

Base: All Respondents 6290	%
Presence of foreign troops/ international community	21
To gain power	16
Illiteracy	9
They are supported by Pakistan	8
Too much corruption in the government	5
They are dissatisfied from the government	4
To establish security	4
Unemployment/ poverty	4
They are supported/motivated by foreign countries	4
They are against Islam	4
To create insecurity	3
They are against democracy	2
To destroy our country	2
Fighting is their way of life	1
Lack of attention to their desires	1
Injustice	1

Ethnic problems	1
To defend the country	1
To establish security	1
Killing innocent people	1
To create fear/Terror	1
They are against police forces	*
There is no reason	*
To support drug traffic	*
Robbery	*
Moral corruption	*
Violence against women	*
Freedom	*
They are not Afghan	*
To destroy schools	*
Have available weapons	*
They are corrupt	*
They implement the law	*
They are brutal/cruel	*
They are Afghans	*
For money	*
To support Islam	*
Refused	1
Donɔt know	7

Q-64a. Thinking about the reasons the armed opposition used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for these armed opposition groups?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
A lot of sympathy	10
A little sympathy	20
No sympathy at all	63
Refused	1
Don't know	5

Q-64b. (Filtered, ask if answered "a lot of sympathy" in Q-64a) You said that you have a lot of sympathy for the armed anti-government groups. Why do you say that?

Q-64c. (Filtered, ask if answered "a little sympathy" in Q-64a) You said that you have a little of sympathy for the armed anti-government groups. Why do you say that?

Q-64d. (Filtered, ask if answered "no sympathy at all" in Q-64a) You said that you don't have any sympathy for the armed anti-government groups. Why do you say that?

Reasons for a lot, little and no sympathy at all	A lot Q-64b Base: 647	Little Q-64c Base: 1229	No Q-64d Base: 3992
	%	%	%
They are Afghans	34	36	*
They are Muslim	33	23	1
They bring peace	7	*	*
They want to fight a holy war (Jihad)	5	2	*
They fight against foreign forces	5	1	*
People want peace	4	3	*
Implement constitutional law	3	*	*
Eliminating war	2	*	*
They are made to do so	1	*	1
(Just) have (a lot of) sympathy	1	*	*
They resolve our disputes	1	1	*
Don›t want peace and security	*	4	13
Earn money through Islamic ways	*	1	1
Killing innocent people	*	6	31
They are infidels	*	*	2
Want to create disunity	*	*	1
They are against the government	*	1	4
They are oppressors	*	1	10
They are robbers	*	*	*
They are not Afghans	*	1	1
Destroying roads and bridges	*	*	1
The government mistreats the people	*	*	2
Don›t have any sympathy	*	*	1
They work for Pakistan	*	2	6
They are illiterate	*	1	1
Suicide attacks	*	1	3
Removing moral corruption	*	*	*
They are the enemy of Afghanistan	*	1	5
They are against reconstruction	*	*	*
They are against education system	*	*	1
To support poppy cultivation	*	*	*
To damage the economy	*	*	*
Lack of shelter	*	*	*

They get their rights	*	*	*
They are our relatives	*	*	*
They are our enemies	*	*	3
They are criminals	*	*	3
They work for foreigners	*	*	1
They are bad people	*	*	2
They are against women's rights	*	*	1
They place mines	*	*	*
Because of unemployment	*	1	*
Lack of shelter	*	*	*
Implement constitutional law	*	1	*
They don't have any particular goal/purpose	*	*	*
They get their rights	*	*	*
Eliminating war	*	1	*
For their personal reasons	*	*	*
People do not like them	*	*	*
Refused	*	1	*
Don›t know	9	5	3

Q-65. What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you personally? (Open ended. Multiple responses. Do Not Read Code List Write down and then code each mentioned)

Base: All Respondents 6290	%
Peace	30
Freedom	29
Good security	20
Rights and law	15
Islamic democracy	14
Less corruption	13
Government of the people	12
More job opportunities	12
Women›s rights	11
Prosperity	9
Better government services	6
Water and power supply	5
Elections	4
Access to more schools	4
Removing poppy	4

Roads	4
I donɔt want democracy	2
Good relations with other countries	1
Clinics	1
Communism	*
Reconstruction	*
Elimination of partiality	*
Elimination of Taliban	*
More attention to the countryside, provinces	*
Justice	*
Good economy	*
Freeing prisoners from international prisons	*
Lower prices	*
Refused	*
Donɔt know	2

Q-66. Now switching to local government, some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Religious leaders should be consulted	69
Politics and religion should not mix	28
Refused	*
Don't know	3

Q-67. Let's focus on the most recent Parliamentary election. When people talk about elections, they often describe them as free and fair. By "free" they generally mean that all people had the chance to vote as they wished. By "fair" they generally mean that all candidates/parties followed the rules and were given equal access to the public and votes were counted correctly and not manipulated. Thinking about what is meant by "free" and "fair":

Do you think the past Parliamentary election was free and fair?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Was free and fair	58
Was NOT free and fair	37
Refused	*
Don't know	5

Q-68. (Filtered. Ask if answered "was Not free and fair" in Q-64). You said that you think that the election was not free and fair. What makes you think so? (OPEN RESPONSE, Write down response and then code after field)

Base: Election was not fair and free 2340	%
Fraud in the elections in general	72
Bribery	9
Powerful people involved	3
Insecurity on election days	3
Foreign interference	2
Bias	2
There have been no elections in our area	1
Low turn-out on election day	1
People close to the government were elected	1
Delay in elections results	*
Illiteracy	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don›t Know (vol.)	5

Q-69. (Ask All) In your opinion, who is running election in Afghanistan? (Single response)

Base: All Respondents6290	%
Independent Election Commission	62
Government	25
International community	11
Special court	2
Other	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don›t know (vol.)	1

Q-70. As far as you know, when is the next presidential election? Is it scheduled for 2013, 2014 or 2015?

Base: All Respondents6290	
2013	18
2014	60
2015	12
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	9

Q-71. Now, to change the subject. Sometimes people and communities have problems, related to an issue that concerns everybody in their area, that they can't resolve on their own and so they have to ask for the help of a government or a non-government person, group or agency. In the past 1 year, has your community had such a problem in your area that you had to ask for help or cooperation to resolve it?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	19
No	80
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-72. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-71): What kind of problem was/is that? (Open-ended. Write down first mentioned answer)

Base: Contact Govt. or non Govt. person 1197	%
Dispute over land	22
Lack of water and electricity	13
Reconstruction of roads and bridges	7
Family problems	7
Robbery and burglary	6
Tribal problems	6
Security problems	5
Building clinics	3
Legal disputes	3
Building schools and kindergartens	2
Economic problems	2
Building mosque	1
Unemployment	1
Presence of Taliban	1
Agricultural problems	1
Murder	1
Lack of women rights	1
Business problems	1
Environmental problems	1
Natural disaster	1
Bribe	1
Traffic accidents	1
Garbage collection	1
Poppy cultivation	1

Divorce	1
Beating/Physical assault	1
Crime	1
Poor transportation system	*
Disarmament	*
Lack of shelter	*
Foreign forces searching houses	*
Problems related to Government agencies	*
Moral problems	*
Building shops	*
Obtaining official government documents	*
Kidnapping	*
Addicts	*
Killing of innocent people by Taliban	*
Refused	*
Don›t know	4

Q-73. (Filtered. Ask if answered 'Yes' in Q-71): Who did you approach/ask to solve the problem? (Up to Three Responses) [Do Not Read List, Write Answer Then Code Response]

Q73a. First Response: _____

Q73b. Second Response:_____

Q73c. Third Response:_____

Base: Contacted Govt. or non Govt. person 1197	Cumulative (a-c) %
Elders of the local shura/jirga	59
Malik / Khan	30
District authorities	25
Mullah	25
Friends and family	25
Afghan National Police	22
Government agency/office	15
Community Development Council	15
Provincial governor/ authorities	13
A Member of Parliament	11
Afghan National Army	11
Municipality	6

National Solidarity Program	5
NGO	3
PRT	2
Human Rights Commission	2
Foreign forces	1
Taliban	1
Local commanders	*
Provincial council	*
Courts	*
Ministry Power and Water Supply	*
Neighbors	*
Refused (vol)	*
Don't know (vol)	1

Q-74. (Filtered. Ask if contacted Government agency/office, answer '3' in Q73a/b/c): You said you contacted a government agency/office to resolve your problem. Which government agency/office is that?

Base: Contacted Govt. agency/office 180	%
Courts	19
District Governor	16
Police	10
Provincial authorities	9
Directorate of Water and Power	5
Directors in MRRD	4
Ministry of Public Health	4
Municipality	4
Attorney General	4
Directorate of Women Affairs	3
Directorate of Public Works	3
Local Shuras	2
Parliament	1
Ministry of Education	1
Human rights independent commission	1
Traffic department	1
National Solidarity Program	1
NDS	1
Ministry of Justice	1
Directorate of pilgrimage (Hajj)	*
Don't Know (vol.)	11

Q-75. (ASK ALL) In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to a State Court or village/neighborhood based Shura/Jirga to resolve it?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	21
No	79
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-76. (Filtered. Ask all with case or dispute, answer 'yes' in Q-73) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (If More Than One Case or Dispute, Ask For the Most Recent One)

Base: Those with case or dispute 1310	%
Dispute over land	42
Commercial dispute	10
Family problems	9
Other property dispute, not land	8
Physical assault	8
Robbery / burglary	6
Traffic accident	6
Divorce	3
Pick-pocketing	3
Murder	3
Dispute over water	1
Drug smuggling	*
Reconstruction problems	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Donɔt Know (vol.)	1

Q-77. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 'Yes' in Q-75) Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings, or not?

Base: All with case or dispute 1310	%
Yes	64
No	29
Not finished yet (vol.)	6
Don't Know (vol.)	2

Q-78. (Filtered. If answered 'Yes' to Q-73) Where have you taken this case or dispute?

Base: Those with case or dispute 1310	%
State Court	46
Village, neighborhood based Shura/Jirga	43
Both	6
Other	1
Refused	*
Donɔt Know	3

Q-79. (Filtered. If answered 'State Court', code 1, or 'Both', code '6' in Q-75) When taking a case to a State Court or being a party in settling case in a State Court, have you used any professional legal services (from a lawyer) or you pleaded your case alone or helped by friends/relatives?

Base: State Court or Both 690	%
Professional legal services	42
Alone/ helped by friends, relatives	51
Both	3
Donɔt Know	3

Q-80. (Filtered, Ask if answered '2' VILLAGE, NEIGHBORHOOD BASED SHURA/JIRGA in Q-75) What made you decide to take your dispute to the Shura/Jirga vs State Court? (Open ended question, write down reason.)

Base: Contacted village/neighborhood Shura/Jirga 566	%
Corruption in government courts	22
Because local Shuras are honest	17
Resolve disputes efficiently	16
Local elders are members of the Shura	7
My family and friends recommended it	6
Are not related to the courts	5
Decisions of Shuras are based on Islamic laws	5
No government courts in the area	5
Security problems	4
Land dispute	*
Refused	*
Don't know	13

Q-81. (ASK ALL) How satisfied you are with the available disputes resolution mechanisms/services in your area?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Very satisfied	21
Somewhat satisfied	52
Somewhat not satisfied	19
Not satisfied	5
Refused	*
Don't know	3

Q-82. (ASK ALL) Tell me, do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree with the following statements about State Courts?

Base: All respondents 6290	SA	AS	DS	SD	Ref	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) State Courts are fair and trusted	21	47	22	10	*	1
b) State Courts follow the local norms and values of our people	14	41	33	12	*	1
c) State Courts are effective at delivering justice	17	39	29	14	*	1
d) State Courts resolve cases timely and promptly	12	31	36	20	*	1
e) State Courts treat men and women equally	18	40	26	13	*	3

Q-83. Tell me do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood based Jirgas/ Shuras?

Base: All respondents 6290	SA	AS	DS	SD	Ref	DK
	%	%	%	%	%	%
a) Local jirgas, shuras are fair and trusted.	38	48	10	2	*	1
b) Local jirgas, shuras follow the local norms and values of our people.	28	46	20	4	*	1
c) Local jirgas, shuras are effective at delivering justice.	30	45	18	6	*	2
d) Local jirgas, shuras resolve cases timely and promptly	27	43	23	5	*	1
e) Local jirgas, shuras should include women as members	29	41	19	8	*	2

Q-84. (ASK ALL) Now let's talk specifically about women related issues. What is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? (Code in the first column of the table below) [Do Not Read Code List]

Base: All respondents 6290	Q 84. biggest problem facing women in this area today
	%
Education / illiteracy	29
Lack of job opportunities for women	14
Lack of rights / women›s rights	10
Domestic violence	8
Forced marriages/ dowry	6
Nothing	6
General health care	5
Poverty	4
Lack of professional courses	3
Can›t leave homes	2
Under control of men / men have power	2
Pregnancy related health care	2
Security	1
Freedom and democracy	1
Ethnic problems	1
Representation in Shura/ Jirga	*
Lack of electricity and water	*
Transportation problems	*
Lack of Bakery for women	*
Lack of shelter	*
Presence of Taliban	*
Government not paying attention to women	*
Cultural problems	*
Lack of public baths	*
Corruption	*
Not available religious education	*
Lack of markets for crafts	*
Rapes	*
Injustice	*
Lack of parks for women	*
Kidnaping of women	*
Bias	*
Lack of opportunities for women	*
Divorcing	*
Don›t know (vol.)	3

Q-85a. Is there in your area an organization, institution, or authority, where women can go to have their problem(s)

resolved?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	19
No	77
Refused	*
Don't know	4

Q-85b. (Filtered, if answered "yes" in Q-82a) What organization, institution or authority is that?

Base: If there is organization where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved 1185	%
Directorate of women affairs	52
District office	9
Human Rights Council	8
Women's Shura	4
Police	3
Human rights office	3
Village Shura/Elders Shura	3
The court	2
Chief of police	2
Local Jirgas	2
Qawm elders	2
Local council	2
Government organizations in general	1
National solidarity program	1
Provincial office	1
MRRD	1
Religious Ulema	1
Attorney general	*
None	*
Balkh girls union	*
Women capacity building literacy organization	*
Red Crescent Society	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Donɔt know (vol.)	4

Q-86. (ASK ALL) Some people say that women should have equal opportunities like men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Strongly Agree	48
Agree somewhat	39
Disagree somewhat	9
Strongly Disagree	3
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-87. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. While others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion about this?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	66
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	33
Refused	*
Don't know	2

Q-88. (ASK ALL) Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Mostly for men	43
Mostly for women	11
Equal for both men and women	45
Other	*
Refused	*
Don't know	1

Q-89. If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive advice from men?

Base: All Respondents 6290	%
Women should decide for themselves	53
Men should advise them	26
Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men	20
Refused	*
Donot know	1

DEMOGRAPHICS

D-1. Gender

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Male	56
Female	44

D-2. (Ask All) How old were you on your last birthday? (Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate)

Base: All respondents 6290	%
18-24 Years old	26
25-34 Years old	28
35-44 Years old	25
45-54 Years old	14
Over 55 years	6

D-3. Are you now working, a housewife, retired, a student, or looking for work?

Base: All respondents6290	%
Working	47
Retired	1
Housewife	38
Student	8
Unemployed	6
Other	*
Refused	*
Don't know	*

D-4. (Filtered. Ask if working or retired): What is your main occupation? (Write down and then code. If retired, ask for previous occupation and then code)

Base: Working or retired 3007	%
Farmer (own land / tenant farmer)	34
Farm laborer (others land)	9
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	9
Informal sales/ business	10
Skilled worker/artisan	11
Government Office - Clerical worker	4
Private Office - Clerical worker	1
Government Office – Executive/ Manager	2

Private Office – Executive/ Manager	1
Self employed Professional	7
Small business owner	5
School Teacher	5
University Teacher	*
Military/ Police	2
Mullah	*
Refused	*
Don't know	*

D-5. (Filtered. Ask if "Farmerin D-4) How much land do you farm?

Base: Farmers1008	%
Less than 1 Jerib	11
1 - 2 Jerib	23
2.1- 3 Jerib	24
More than 3 Jerib	41
Don't know	1

D-6. (ASK ALL) What is the highest level of school you completed? (Write down response and code)

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Never went to school	58
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	9
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	5
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	5
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	3
High School (classes 10 to 12)	15
University education or above	5
Refused	*
Don't know	*

D-7. Tell me, if given opportunity, would leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	38
No	60
Refused	*
Don't know	2

D-8. Which languages can you speak? (Multiple response. Code each mentioned)

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Pashto	49
Dari	77
Uzbeki	12
Turki	3
Urdu	3
Hindi	*
English	5
Arabic	1
Russian	*
Balochi	2
Pashaye	*
Nooristani	*
German	*

D-9. Are you married or single?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Single	18
Married	80
Widower/ Widow	2
Divorced	*
Refused	*
Don't know	*

D-11. (Ask All) How many people live here at this address? (Record Number Below)

Base: All respondents 6290	%
1-5 persons	13
6-7 persons	20
8-9 persons	27
10-11 persons	19
Over 11 persons	20
Refused	*

D-13a. For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly income? (Show Card and read out)

Base: All 6290	%
Less than 2,000 Afs	7
2,001 – 3,000 Afs	15
3,001 – 5,000 Afs	24
5,001 – 10,000 Afs	28
10,001 – 15,000 Afs	13
15,001 – 20,000 Afs	7
20,001 – 25,000 Afs	2
25,001 – 40,000 Afs	1
more then 40,000 Afs	1
Refused	*
Don't know	2

D-13b. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
Yes	15
No	84
Refused	*
Don't know	1

D-13c. [ASK IF YES AT D-13b] How much of your household's total income comes from female members of the household?

Base: Female members of the family contributes to Household income 963	%
Less than 25% (up to one quarter)	64
Between 26% and 50% (up to one half)	26
Between 51% and 75% (up to three quarters)	6
Between 76% to 100% (more than three quarters)	2
Refused	*
Don't know	2

D-14. (Interviewer code):Record number of people present for the interview: ____

Base:	%
Two	33
Three	43
Four	17
Five	4
Six	1
Seven	1
Eight	*
Nine	*
Ten and more than ten	*

RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-15 AND M-16)

Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:

"Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him do that, could I have your name and address?"

Respondent Information: Name: _____

Address: _____

Interviewer Certification: "I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research.

_____ _____

Signed Date

D-15. (Interviewer code): Code household status. Based on your impressions from the dwelling of the household, the environment, the appearance of its members, please rate the living standard of this household:

Base: All respondents 6290	%
The household is well-off; its standard is by all accounts well above the average	7
The household is enjoying a fair well-being, but generally, the features of luxury are missing, they are not rich	17
The household is not denying itself the most important, vital goods of life, but the environment bears indications of moderate existence; they can't indulge in any excesses	27
The household is not denying itself the most important, vital goods of life, but the physical infra-structure of the household is in bad condition or in need of repair	28
Property-wise the household is more or less OK, but there is an apparent problem with incomes; they are obviously surviving and living with difficulty	17
The household bears all signs of poverty; living in misery, with privations	5

D-16. (Interviewer code): Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
The respondent understood all of the questions	67
The respondent understood most of the questions	27
The respondent understood most of the questions but with some help	5
The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me	1

D-17. (Interviewer code): Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

Base: All respondents 6290	%
The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire	67
The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions	26
The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions	5
The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questionnaire	2

To Be Completed By The Supervisor:

D-18. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

Base: All Respondents 6290	%
Yes	35
No	65

D-19. Method of quality control/back-check

Base: All Respondents 6290	%
Back-check in person by supervisor	3.5
Direct supervision during interview	25.4
Back-check from the central office	5.6

National Mood - 2012



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National Mood - 2012

No	Provinces	Right direction	Wrong direction	Some in right, some in wrong direction
National Level		52%	31%	15%
1	Kabul	43%	37%	19%
2	Kapisa	42%	49%	8%
3	Parwan	48%	43%	9%
4	Wardak	32%	48%	14%
5	Logar	48%	32%	16%
6	Panjshir	46%	40%	12%
7	Ghazni	48%	36%	16%
8	Paktia	68%	22%	8%
9	Paktika	55%	39%	6%
10	Khost	49%	29%	15%
11	Ningarhar	57%	35%	7%
12	Laghman	53%	39%	8%
13	Kunar	57%	32%	10%
14	Nooristan	35%	48%	14%
15	Badakhshan	53%	21%	24%
16	Takhar	51%	27%	15%
17	Baghlan	55%	34%	12%
18	Kunduz	62%	23%	15%
19	Balkh	54%	21%	25%
20	Samangan	45%	40%	10%
21	Jozjan	55%	25%	19%
22	Sar-i-Pul	55%	25%	8%
23	Faryab	54%	29%	17%
24	Badghis	66%	12%	22%
25	Herat	37%	29%	30%
26	Farah	52%	41%	8%
27	Ghor	49%	32%	17%
28	Nimroz	44%	17%	39%
29	Helmand	79%	19%	2%
30	Kandhar	59%	31%	9%
31	Zabul	38%	56%	6%
32	Urozhan	49%	30%	16%
33	Bamyan	60%	28%	10%
34	Daikondi	81%	11%	7%

Legend

Afghanistan Region

- North East
- West
- North West
- South West
- Central/Hazarajat
- South East
- Cenral/Kabul
- East

National Mood

- Right direction
- Wrong direction
- Some right some wrong

Source:

Administrative Boundaries from AIMS
Data from 2012 Survey of Afghan People

Date: October, 2012

Prepared by: Abdullah Stanikzai

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