On Friday, July 25, a car bomb rocked the normally peaceful tourist haven of Betong in Thailand’s southern province of Yala, leaving three dead and 42 injured. For the last eight years, Betong had remained relatively untouched by the ongoing insurgency in the Deep South. However, in the last six months, the insurgents have changed tactics and are increasingly demonstrating that they have the ability and deadly resolve to strike anywhere and against anyone.
Following the breakdown of peace talks in July 2013, insurgents have shifted from ambushing soldier and police vehicles to car bombings in public spaces, which have inflicted a greater number of civilian casualties. Photo/Chandler Vandergrift
Following the first-round meeting in February 2013 between the Thai Government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebel group that marked the start of surprise peace talks, insurgents have primarily targeted hard targets such as military and police personnel. However, following the breakdown of talks in July 2013, insurgents have shifted from ambushing soldier and police vehicles to car bombings in public spaces, including markets, schools, and hospitals, which have inflicted a greater number of civilian casualties. Since the peace talks stalled, 35 women have been killed – with Buddhist women making up the majority of victims of targeted killings – and over 60 women have been injured, mainly from bomb blasts. Over the past 10 years, 62 children have lost their lives and over 370 have been injured.
“I don’t have any more children left. I don’t have a reason to live but when I die and am cremated, there will be no one to collect my ashes. Violent incidents take place here every day … anyone can be killed next,” said one mother who recounted her story after her daughter, who worked at a local bank, was shot and her body burned on her way home from work.
To provide a voice for those affected by the violence, Bangkok-based and southern women’s organizations organized a public forum, “Breaking the Wall of Silence: Stop Taking the Lives of Women and Children,” on July 22. Mothers, sisters, and daughters from both Buddhist and Muslim communities recounted heartbreaking stories of how they lost children and loved ones to the violence. A young Muslim mother who herself sustained severe injuries that almost led to her lose her leg, struggled to tell the story of how she awoke in the hospital to find that she would never again see her five-year- old son who was with her at the produce market at the time the bomb went off. Or the story of a disabled Buddhist woman who was unable to run away from an attack and her bullet-ridden body was discovered at the scene. These are the tragic stories disclosed by relatives who lost their loved ones in the decade-long subnational violent conflict in Thailand’s southernmost provinces.
In the forum, most victims and relatives disclosed that they felt invisible and forgotten by society. Although many have been able to access some government compensation schemes, still many victims and survivors are not listed in the official police database, which is a requirement for receiving government assistance. In most cases, victims’ relatives said the best healing for them is to hear the truth about who is responsible for committing the crime. The forum closed with a statement from relatives and representatives of the women’s organizations that addressed the armed parties directly, calling on them to respect the principles of International Humanitarian Law and stop any activity that would harm civilians.
At a public forum, “Breaking the Wall of Silence: Stop Taking the Lives of Women and Children,” on July 22, families of victims and representatives make a statement calling for armed parties to respect the principles of International Humanitarian Law.
They reiterated that public spaces such as schools, markets, hospitals, and religious compounds should be designated as safe zones, and that all armed groups must refrain from military activity in or around the areas that could put children and other civilians at risk. They also called for Muslim and Buddhist religious leaders to reconvene interfaith dialogues to correct any misconceptions in the interpretation of religious principles.
The statement also called for the media and high-ranking officials participating in the forum to take immediate measures to ensure security and safety for civilians, particularly women and children, and improve emergency response capacity and comprehensive short- and long-term assistance. There was also a strong call for the establishment of a truth-seeking mechanism to help speed up reparation and the judicial process.
Last week, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) announced its commitment that peace talks would continue with the aim of permanently ending the southern conflict, but the approach may be different from that taken by the previous government. While negotiations are still being worked out, the increasing attacks on soft targets sends a loud signal of the need for talks that bring lasting conflict resolution for the people of the Deep South.
Ruengrawee Pichaikul is The Asia Foundation’s senior program coordinator in Thailand. She can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
In March this year, a major milestone passed in the 40-year effort to end hostilities in the Philippines between the national government and Muslim separatist fronts. The government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), 17 months after signing a Framework Agreement. Currently a bill is being drafted to go to the Philippine Congress, which upon passage would be subjected to a plebiscite in areas proposed to be part of a new entity, the Bangsamoro, to replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
In March this year, a major milestone passed in the 40-year effort to end hostilities in the Philippines between the national government and Muslim separatist fronts. Photo/Karl Grobl
As the drafting is ongoing, controversies have swirled about how the new Bangsamoro would treat non-Islamized indigenous communities – advocates for such communities assert that their core interests are not being accommodated, even though two of the 15 members of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission producing the first draft are indigenes themselves. Central is the issue of ancestral domain (singular) versus ancestral domains (plural).
Negotiations with the MILF that culminated in the CAB were to solve “the Bangsamoro problem.” From 2001, such a solution was taken to have several strands, including that of “Ancestral Domain.” Most well known was the abortive “Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain” that was initialed in 2008 but declared unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court before it could be signed. Given this unhappy result (which was accompanied by an upsurge of violence displacing 750,000 persons), since then ancestral domain has been treated as one element of a more comprehensive approach, culiminating in the exclusive power of the Bangsamoro, according to the Annex on Power-Sharing signed in December 2013 over ancestral domain and natural resources.
At the same time, legal efforts to afford indigenous communities (some 17% of the Philippine population) legal instruments bolstering their security of tenure in ancestral lands (pertaining to individuals) and ancestral domain (for communities) have been gaining ground since the early 1990s. Under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, Certificates of Ancestral Domain Titles can be issued to indigenous communities, giving them power to manage the natural resources according to their customs and traditions. However, even though there are non-Muslim indigenous people located in the ARMM, IPRA was never operationalized in the region due to its autonomous status. When finally in 2013 a reform-minded ARMM administration wanted to cooperate with the IPRA-mandated National Commission on Indigenous Peoples to finally recognize an ancestral domain claim by Tidurays, the MILF objected in negotiations that this amounted to creating new facts on the ground in the middle of negotiations. Thus, the effort was stillborn.
This is not to say that the concerns of non-Muslims have been absent from the negotiations. Genealogies and tradition tell, after all, of two brothers – one who adopted Islam and one who did not – and both groups have stressed this shared ancestry. There have often been indigenous people on negotiating panels for both sides, and provisions in agreements mention their concerns. The upshot is that the next provision after the exclusive power over ancestral domain and natural resources is (quoted in full):
Protection of the rights of the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and taking into account, in addition to economic and geographical criteria, their individual and communal property rights, cultural integrity, customary beliefs, and historical and community traditions.
Indigenous people’s organizations and their allies, though, point out that what is missing from this is a recognition of their ancestral domains (plural). Immediately, lobbying sprang up both in the media and in Congress, and has found an echo among some members of the legislature. They may have the Bangsamoro Basic Law, currently being drafted for submission to Congress, reword the relevant provisions from the Comprehensive Agreement (perhaps by insisting that IPRA apply to the Bangsamoro). While the drafts of the Basic Law being discussed are still confidential, the MILF has disclosed that one of the points of disagreement is the pluralizing in a government version: substituting “domains” for “domain.”
The MILF has been firm on this matter, regarding those who press the case for recognition of plural ancestral domains as “spoilers” who are diluting the meaning of the Bangsamoro people and the Moro’s ancestral domain. However, many of those advocating this are, in fact, quite sympathetic to the peace process and have been operating for years under a “tri-people” framework trying to promote peace and development in Mindanao by bringing together Muslims, Lumads, and “settlers” (Christians whose family origins are from outside Mindanao).
Thus far the issue has generated more heat than light, and as activity moves from closed-door drafting of agreements and proposed bills to the more public halls of Congress, it behooves both sides to be more precise. For instance, indigenous peoples and their advocates should state precisely what is missing from the provision quoted above that would be included if IPRA was incorporated into the Bangsamoro Basic Law. And how their claim of separate “sub” ancestral domains would not weaken the case for a Bangsamoro identity (recognized in the CAB) and its ancestral domain.
The MILF, for its part, needs to provide reassurances about how fully this provision on the “rights of the indigenous peoples” will be implemented. A concrete example might be an open discussion of how territories of MILF camps and indigenous people’s ancestral domain might overlap, and how IPs “individual and communal property rights” will be respected in such places.
As Patrick Barron will point out on August 13 in part two of his In Asia blog post about subnational conflicts, when talking about why they are often neglected in bilateral relations between countries “Other things matter more. Subnational conflicts are usually marginal issues for bilateral relations.” An unfortunate parallel might be drawn when talking of negotiations between the national government and the Moro minority: some might think that other things matter more than the minority within the minority. That would not be in the spirit of equal rights for all.
Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in the Philippines. From 2009-2013 he observed negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as the Foundation’s representative on the International Contact Group. Since 2013 he has been a member of the Third Party Monitoring Team, overseeing the implementation of agreements. He tweets as @StevenRoodPH, and can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
In June 2014, almost five years after the end of the longstanding civil war in Sri Lanka, violent clashes broke out in several small towns in the south, including Aluthgama, Beruwela, and Dharga Town. The tensions were fueled by reports that a Muslim man had allegedly attacked a Buddhist monk and several others, triggering a spate of violence, including the burning of Muslim-owned shops and attacks on Muslim homes and citizens. The incident is most likely the worst outbreak of Sinhala Buddhist-Muslim violence in recent times.
The recent emergence of issues with the Muslim community in Sri Lanka reveals a growing sense of alienation, which have been articulated by various groups throughout the island. Photo/Karl Grobl
More than 70 percent of Sri Lanka’s 20 million people are Buddhists, with Muslims making up about 8 percent of the population, followed by Hindus and Christians. Over the past few years, several hardline Sinhala Buddhist extremist groups have emerged who are attempting to assert the dominance of the Sinhala Buddhist culture and to stand against issues such as halal certification, family planning, birth control, and Christian conversion. Hate campaigns targeting minorities have resulted in sporadic incidents of violence and attacks on evangelical churches and mosques. While these incidents are often fueled by individuals and groups seeking to manipulate and incite the public for personalized, political advantage, it appears that they are not isolated incidents, but rather, reflective of emerging fissures within Sri Lankan society.
Since independence, conflicts and ethnic tensions have from time to time marred the usually peaceful, multi-religious, multiethnic country that most Sri Lankans aspire to be part of. Sri Lanka’s post-independence history is replete with leaders at all levels who have come to power riding on the fears of a Sinhala voter base. We have seen this from time to time throughout Sri Lanka’s history, but to date, no Sri Lankan leader has put forward a vision for a truly united, plural Sri Lanka. Instead, the rhetoric in the public space has more to do with the “tolerance” of minorities within a predominantly Sinhala Buddhist state.
Despite these emerging trends, I think it is important to recognize that after 30 years of war, throughout Sri Lanka there is still a deep yearning for peace and normalcy. People value the freedom of being able to travel anywhere in the island, to live and work without fear of suicide bombs and security checks, and get back to a normal life. The moment for an overarching idealistic vision for a more inclusive Sri Lanka came in May 2009 when the government could have used its overwhelming victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to forge a new discourse on a multiethnic, multi-religious, and multilingual Sri Lanka. The country could have looked forward together, mourned the loss of Tamil and Sinhala sons and daughters and forged a common pluralistic future. But the path that Sri Lankan leaders set for the country, riding high on the euphoria of victory, was one of reestablishing the power of the Sinhala Buddhist majority and, in places like Aluthgama, these discriminatory forces have risen up to reveal the underlying fears of the majority community.
The recent emergence of issues with the Muslim community reveals a growing sense of alienation within yet another minority community. These feelings of alienation have been consistently articulated by various groups throughout the island, among the educated, unemployed Sinhalese youth in the South as well as among the lower caste young Tamils in the North-East. Sri Lanka’s post-colonial history has demonstrated that left unaddressed, such feelings of political alienation and discrimination can transform from a general sense of collective grievance to frustration, anger, and ultimately, mass violence. For Sri Lankans, the effects of this sense of collective grievance and alienation are particularly significant. The ingrained sense of discrimination that persists among various communities directly affects their sense of identity and colors their perceptions of their place in the nation’s social structure and their faith in the possibility of long-term reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in a country that has survived 30 years of war.
Feelings of grievance and discrimination are often exacerbated by the fact that different ethnic and religious communities in Sri Lanka tend to interact and socialize only among themselves. This is partially due to their monolingual nature and the language-based segregation of the education system. Communities outside of the multi-ethnic urban environment tend to exist in pockets of isolation, receiving information from monolingual media sources, forming relationships with only persons from their own ethnic group, and viewing other communities on the basis of long established biases and preconceived impressions. This tends to fuel antipathy toward other communities and creates invisible barriers between them.
Sri Lanka needs a new discourse of reconciliation and integration that is not based on externally driven agendas or diaspora aspirations, but one that builds on networks of civic solidarity that are prevalent in its communities through existing social bonds, community relations, and established civic associations.
As much as the outside world sees the discord and disintegration that is reported about Sri Lanka, over the past 20 years of working with The Asia Foundation in communities throughout the island, I see the endless opportunities where resilient communities cross religious, ethnic, and social barriers to co-exist and flourish. Community mediation boards, supported by the Ministry of Justice but led by community volunteers, meet every weekend in 328 locations, including now in the districts of Mullaitivu and Killinochci, to solve minor civil and criminal disputes at the local level; community policing forums meet monthly to discuss safety and security concerns; and local authorities prepare citizen report cards and present their findings to packed meetings in town halls to provide feedback on improving urban service delivery in their towns. Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs, District Chambers of Commerce, and Trader’s Associations all flourish with multiethnic, multi-religious membership and leadership. This type of civic engagement at the local level can be the starting point of broadening the sense of self and community and moving beyond a parochial sense of grievance and alienation.
Whatever Sri Lanka has achieved since 2009 will all be for naught if we do not begin to value our diversity, celebrate our difference, and learn to live with each other as a multicultural, multiethnic society within a united Sri Lanka.
Dinesha de Silva is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Sri Lanka. She can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
On the third day of Eid-ul Fitar last week, two Hindu trader brothers from district Umerkot in Sindh Province were murdered in front of their home. An Ahmadi doctor was murdered in Chiniot in May 2014 while a Hazara Shia community in Quetta was attacked and two brothers were murdered by Lashakr-e-Jhangvi on Eid-ul Fitar in July 2014. The killing of Rashid Rehman, a prominent human rights lawyer in the Punjabi city of Multan on May 8, 2014, who was defending a professor accused of blasphemy, has grave implications for the overall human rights situation in Pakistan.
According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, there were approximately 1,200 sectarian killings in 2013 and more than 80 Christians were killed in a double suicide bombing at a church in Peshawar. These string of attacks on religious minorities as well as a rise in kidnappings have escalated a sense of insecurity in these communities.
Home to 187 million people, Pakistan is divided among many different tribal, linguistic, and sectarian groups. According to the 1998 census, 96.14 percent of the population is Muslim and 3.86 percent are non-Muslim, out of which 1.58 percent are Christian, 1.6 percent Hindu, 0.22 percent Ahmadiyya, 0.2 percent are scheduled castes (a term used to denote lower class status), and 0.07 percent belong to other religions.
In 1940, the historical Pakistan Resolution declared religious nationalism as the unifying force for the foundation of an independent state, setting the groundwork for religious intolerance. The sectarian proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran to promote their respective strategic dominance has had a huge influence on the escalation and de-escalation of religious conflicts in Sunni-majority Pakistan. The religious pragmatism and puritanism in faith effectively backed by Saudi Arabia to promote the radical Wahhabi movement in South Asia played a role in rising religious tensions in Pakistan. The 1979 revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran ignited hope for the Shia community to maneuver effectively for greater strategic dominance in the region. The 1981 siege of the parliament house in Islamabad by the Shiite community was a small sign of influence by virtue of their close links with Iran. Soon after the attack, the state attempted to support the formation of Sipah-e-Sahaba, a pro-Sunni organization, in an attempt to weaken the influence of the minority Shia community. Dr. Hassan Askari, a well-known political analyst, rightly pointed out that: “In Pakistan, the state joined societal groups i.e., the Sunni community to promote Islamic orthodoxy and militancy in the 1980s … this caused fragmentation of the society.” This sharpened not only the division between Muslims and non-Muslims but also increased religious-sectarian consciousness that still manifests itself in the violent conflicts we see today.
The 1973 constitution of Pakistan does not allow non-Muslims to hold the highest positions of president, prime minister, or chief justice. Recently there was an increase in the overall seats of the National Assembly to adjust for population increase, but the seats for the non-Muslims remained the same. The mechanism for the allocation of tickets to non-Muslims by the political parties focuses only on the powerful within the “powerless” groups. Thus, the interests and issues of the religious minority groups are not well represented or negotiated within the corridors of power. Socio-economic structural divisions and realities make it impossible for the privileged group within different religious communities to empathize with the majority of the poor population who share their faith. The non-Muslim minority representatives in the national and provincial assemblies are not directly elected by their communities, and as such, may be cut off from the realities on the ground of the religious communities they are supposed to represent. Most religious minority communities neither relate to these representatives, nor trust them to further their agenda.
However, it is important to mention that there are some positive developments in advancing religious rights that are evolving across Pakistani society. Space is opening up gradually in the parliament and society at large to discuss and debate issues that were previously perceived as too controversial. Various public and private institutions are taking up some of the major issues that have caused religious conflicts within communities, including misuse of loud speakers to influence masses of people against certain communities, and availability of hate literature and speech through print and electronic media. The recent virtual anti-terrorism campaign “Awaz Uthe Gi,” (“the voice will rise up”) condemns discrimination and violence based on religious and sectarian grounds. The Supreme Court’s June 19, 2014, judgment is also a positive development calling for the establishment of a National Council for the Rights of Minorities and the setting up of a special task force to protect the places of worship of religious minorities. The judgment also instructs the government to put in place immediate measures for registering criminal cases against desecrators of places of worship and to prepare appropriate and religiously unbiased curricula for use in schools and colleges across the country.
The recent bill passed by the Sindh Assembly to prevent the forced conversion of girls below the age of 18 is also an encouraging step. The decentralization policies, introduced by the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Pakistan Constitution (passed in April 2010), has brought about one of the most significant political shifts in “responsibilities” in Pakistan’s history – thus providing a unique opportunity to redress human rights violations including the rights of minorities.
In 2013, The Asia Foundation established the Rights of Expression, Assembly, Association, and Thought (REAT) network under the Human Rights Fund III program to ensure strategic coordination and relationships among local civil society organizations on issues of religious freedom and freedom of expression. In addition, some of our local partners are members of the Coalition for Rights of Minorities (CRM), which is also actively engaged on addressing issues of religious freedom across the country.
While the sources of religious intolerance are deeply rooted in Pakistan, and these recent spikes in attacks are disturbing, the recent moves by the government and civil society take a step forward in opening up a space for greater protection and participation of the country’s religious minorities.
Farid Alam is The Asia Foundation’s deputy director of Programs in Pakistan and Sofia Noreen leads the Foundation’s Human Rights team there. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of The Asia Foundation.
Asia’s rise has been momentous. Since the early 1960s, Asia has grown richer faster than any other region in the world. In 1990, 56 percent of people in East Asia and 54 percent in South Asia lived on under $1.25 a day (PPP). By 2010, these rates had fallen to 12 percent and 31 percent, respectively. In 2013, East Asia grew by 7.1 percent and South Asia by 5.2 percent, far outpacing any other region. The Asian Development Bank is not alone in dubbing the decades ahead the Asian century.
Since the early 1960s, Asia has grown richer faster than any other region in the world. Yet while hundreds of millions have seen their incomes and opportunities expand precipitously, in many countries accelerated growth has been conjoined with an upsurge in violent subnational conflict. Photo/Conor Ashleigh
Yet the rising Asia narrative masks an ugly truth. While hundreds of millions have seen their incomes and opportunities expand precipitously, in many countries accelerated growth has been conjoined with an upsurge in violent subnational conflict.
Subnational conflicts (SNCs) affect half of the countries of Southeast and South Asia. These conflicts involve armed struggle over a part of a country with insurgents using violence to try to gain greater self-rule. In the past decade, 60 percent of the world’s SNCs have taken place in Asia and more than 100,000 people have been killed from these conflicts in Asia alone. An estimated 131 million people live in these conflict-affected areas, and in 2011, there were 13 active conflicts in Asia, almost the same total as those found in Africa.
These conflicts are nothing new. Indeed, Asia’s SNCs endure longer than those in other parts of the world with the average SNC in Asia lasting twice as long as the global average (Table 1).
If the shimmering towers of Bangkok, Mumbai, and Jakarta are the seductive smile of the “New Asia,” then enduring, deadly subnational conflicts are its dark underbelly.
Challenging thinking on conflict
The coexistence of high levels of development and conflict poses challenges for conventional thinking about why conflicts occur and how to prevent and respond to them.
First, growth is usually seen as a powerful conflict prevention pill. The conventional wisdom is that where people are well fed and have prospects for the future, they are less likely to rise up in rebellion. Yet the number of subnational conflicts has increased even as Asia has grown (Figure 1). Boosting incomes is obviously desirable. But it does not alone prevent conflicts from occurring.
Second, democracies are generally viewed as being more able to ensure that competition is managed through political channels rather than violently. Yet the third wave of democratization in the late 1970s and 1980s, which saw countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh move away from authoritarian regimes, also saw an increase in the number of SNCs. Scholars have pointed to the increased risk of conflict that nations face in the early years of democratization. But levels of SNC in Asia have remained high even as democracies have consolidated (Figure 2). There are many benefits to living in a liberal democracy. However, at least in Asia, it does not mean you are less vulnerable to conflict.
Third, state capacity is usually seen as a forceful conflict deterrent. Functioning states have more coercive capacity and can deliver on the needs of their populace. Yet most of Asia’s SNCs are not occurring in fragile states but in states with at least moderate capacity (Table 2). East Asia’s current most deadly SNC is situated in southern Thailand, where growth rates have been high and state capacity is substantial. The problem of conflict in Asia is not primarily one of state fragility.
If conventional wisdom on the causes of conflict in Asia is incomplete, then what are the implications for international agencies seeking to promote peace? In next week’s follow-up post, I will discuss three challenges development agencies face and three implications for how aid can better play a supportive role in addressing Asia’s SNCs.
Patrick Barron is The Asia Foundation’s Regional Director for Conflict and Development based in Thailand. He can be reached at [email protected]. Much of the analysis in this piece comes from The Asia Foundation’s Contested Corners of Asia study. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
In this year’s hotly contested presidential elections, Indonesia’s democracy went through what probably has been its hardest test yet. Two hours before the General Elections Commission (KPU) announced the final results on July 22, when Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s victory was becoming increasingly obvious, his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, retracted himself from the process, citing massive irregularities and unfair treatment by the KPU.
In 2012, Jokowi won the governorship of the country’s capital, Jakarta, and in early 2014 announced his presidential candidacy. In 10 years he moved up from a constituency of over 500,000 in Central Java to lead the third-largest democracy in the world. Photo/Flickr user Eduardo M. C. http://bit.ly/1pCZzIr
This was the first in a series of dramas staged by Prabowo’s team that had the potential to put a dent in the electoral system. Fortunately, Indonesian’s 16-year-long democratic project is surviving well. Dynamic local politics have produced key players actively participating in national politics. Their participation, combined with the tenacious power of civil society and most importantly, the strong commitment from Indonesians to democracy and constitution, have thus far avoided what could have been a crisis of trust.
When Prabowo retracted himself from the race, for a moment he created confusion. The whole country wondered how to respond to his move and what it meant. Later in the week, the country learned that Prabowo ‘s team would bring the case to the Constitutional Court – the only route available to contest election results. A day before the case was filed Prabowo uploaded a YouTube video claiming that “this election has failed. This election is unlawful.” With carefully chosen words, he attempted to instill distrust in the system. The country, he said, was “heading to failure.”
Prior to this about-face, Prabowo had continually reassured voters that he would accept the KPU’s results. For many, the KPU’s announcement of Jokowi’s victory was not a surprise, as the results accurately confirmed election-day quick-count results released only hours after polls had closed that also showed Jokowi’s lead. Yet Prabowo’s team quickly denounced the numbers and chose to cite other quick counts that put them on top and thus claimed to have been victorious. These questionable quick count institutions came under attack but they managed to create uncertainty over the results of the elections as well as to instill doubt in the process.
When Prabowo’s team submitted the case to the Court with much fanfare, many let out sighs of relief, for at least he had chosen a route recognized by the law. It is important to note that Prabowo is not the only candidate who has in the past contested the results of elections through the Constitutional Court. But none has done so with actions and statements that can only be seen as systematic attempts to delegitimize the entire electoral process.
Despite these blows, the electoral process remains intact and Indonesians have shown a strong belief in the system. It was only 16 years ago that a pro-democracy movement wrestled power away from Soeharto who had ruled the country for 32 years. In 2004, Indonesians had a chance, for the first time, to vote directly for their president. Electoral democracy is a young tradition in this country and the result of the reformasi movement that brought Soeharto down. The movement has also brought about changes that redefine Indonesia’s political landscape, including massive (some call it over-ambitious) decentralization and direct elections for president, governors, mayors, and district heads. Indonesia has also made critical decisions to secure its democracy, redefining the role of its military, installing the police in a more strategic position, and establishing institutions, including the KPU and the Constitutional Court.
The implementation of these projects has not always been perfect. What the world sees now as Indonesia’s success in transforming itself from an authoritarian state to a democracy cannot be separated from the country’s commitment to not give up on these endeavors. Today, it is very clear that Indonesia’s experiment with decentralization and direct local elections has given the country two key players: its president-elect and a very credible KPU.
President-elect Joko Widodo is the embodiment of local success turned national. In 2005, Jokowi became the mayor of Solo, a small town in the province of Central Java. Five years later in 2010, as an incumbent he was re-elected with an overwhelming victory with a new way of governing – listening, simplifying seemingly complex issues, and taking action. Civil society organizations took notice and Jokowi won various awards at the national and international levels, including a prestigious anti-corruption award and third place in the World Mayor Prize.
But the key political juncture that defined this former furniture businessman was when, as mayor of Solo, he won a very public battle against the governor of Central Java, a former high-ranking military figure. At the core of the dispute was the governor’s plan to build a mall in Solo. Jokowi’s position to reject it was widely applauded inside and outside Solo. In 2012, he won the governorship of the country’s capital, Jakarta, and in early 2014 announced his presidential candidacy. In 10 years he moved up from a constituency of over 500,000 in Central Java to lead the third-largest democracy in the world.
Another major player in the 2014 elections was the KPU itself. And again, this is a story of local gems with real experience managing local elections who have graduated to become key figures at the national level. Five of the seven commissioners had served in regional KPUs, each with more than 10 years of experience in managing elections, and four of them have even served as chairpersons at the provincial level. Five of the seven commissioners have served in regional KPUs, four of them as chairpersons. The other two came from civil society. When the commissioners were announced, many election observers hailed it as the “election dream team” that will imbue confidence to the system. Given Prabowo’s actions in the past weeks, it is extremely fortunate that Indonesia has a credible KPU.
And indeed they have delivered. Realizing the people’s vocal criticism of the past commissions, the new members have made utmost attempts for transparency, uploading documents that allowed citizens to check the numbers of votes recorded at each polling station. While citizen involvement has been one of the most amazing stories of this election, it was KPU’s decision to be open and transparent that has allowed unprecedented parallel vote tabulation through a variety of independent, crowd-sourcing websites. Confident with their work, and facing pressure from Prabowo’s team to postpone the announcement, the commissioners stood firm and continued with their schedule unfazed.
These commissioners will again take the center stage as they face Prabowo’s legal team in the Constitutional Court. Many experts project it to be close to impossible for Prabowo to change the result. After a much-needed lull from a tense election courtesy of the end of Ramadhan festivities, Indonesians are again wrapped up in the court process, including Prabowo’s report against the commissioners to the election Ethics Committee, his challenge of the results in the State Administrative High Court, and galvanizing class action.
Before the end of August, Indonesia will learn the final and binding decision of the Constitutional Court. How Prabowo and his team respond, and how Indonesian voters react to that response will define what comes next. Many political analysts have looked to Indonesia as an example of a country successfully establishing democracy on the ruins of authoritarianism. Key to this success is how local politics tested and screened politicians, regional commissioners, and elections activists. The reformasi project has allowed this to happen, and the best of them have become important players on the national stage. At the center, as in the regions, voters will have to continue engaging the new government to combat transactional politics and to demand action on critical issues, such as pluralism, public security, and human rights. The reformasi movement, long felt as a failure amid the serious problems facing Indonesia, is finally bearing fruit.
*Editor’s note: This version has been edited slightly from the original.
Sandra Hamid is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Indonesia. She can be reached at [email protected]. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of The Asia Foundation.
In Asia editor Alma Freeman recently interviewed Dwi Rubiyanti Kholifah, Indonesia country director for the Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN), which focuses on the role of women in peace building and inter-faith cooperation. Kholifah was selected as one of the 10 inaugural 2014 Asia Foundation Development Fellows.
After a hotly contested campaign, in July, Indonesians elected former Jakarta governor, Joko Widodo as their new president. What are your thoughts on this election?
Amid uncertain and complex political circumstances across Southeast Asia, the recent election of Indonesia stood out as being free and fair, with a voter turnout of over 70 percent – this in an archipelago with over 17,000 islands and most not easily reached.
I think that Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, is one of the most distinguished leaders that Indonesia has known. As governor of Jakarta, he created a sense of hope and a space for dialogue and negotiation with the people. For example, he spent countless hours talking to different groups with different interests to resolve the issue of resettling urban poor to new apartments. He led the same inclusive approach when he engaged everyone on the relocation of street vendors from Tanah Abang Market to the nearby Blok G to reduce congestion and help address ongoing crime and safety concerns. The key to his success is that he listens to the concerns of the people and takes this into consideration before coming up with a solution.
These characteristics reflected strongly in his campaign for president. His slogan, “Revolusi Mental” or mental revolution, became a magnet for people from different backgrounds such as farmers, fishermen, youth, women’s groups, professionals, and educators, who believed that the main change needed in Indonesia is the mentality of people. While the “Reformasi” movement that began in 1998 has strengthened institutions of democracy, we are still facing serious problems in bureaucratic reform, rule of law, a culture of violence, and lack of infrastructure.
What impact do you think this will have on development in the country?
I hope that this election and new leadership will bring about bureaucracy reform, where professionals and strong, committed figures are promoted into his cabinet as opposed to always coming from political parties. Such reform would have enormous impact on public services and infrastructure development, transparency and accountability, and strengthening public participation.
My hope is that the vital role that civil societies play in Indonesia becomes more recognized. With Jokowi’s strong leadership and open mindedness, it is very possible that in the future CSOs could become real partners with the government. This could result in the Indonesian government allowing CSOs to engage in state policymaking decisions in a positive way and work together to respond to the global agenda.
We also need stronger rule of law and law enforcement – not only strengthening the commission of corruption eradication (KPK) and other national commissions but also to synchronize international covenant into national regulation and subnational regulation. I believe that Jokowi will take serious action to remove 342 discriminatory laws against women and minorities that exist at the sub-national level as reported by KOMNAS Perempuan. It is also important to take quick response to return the internally displaced Shia and Ahmadiyya communities who were expelled from their village because of their belief. This will help raise awareness among Indonesian people to not discriminate or attack others on the basis of different religions or beliefs. We also hope that women’s rights organizations will have more space to address women’s needs and that they can work more closely with related government ministries.
Indonesia’s constitution in the Muslim-majority country is committed to protecting religious freedom, yet religious intolerance and conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups persists today.
Indonesia is made up of over 17,000 islands with 700 dialects, and reflects diverse ethnicities, cultures, religions, and traditional beliefs. It is not easy to unite them under a single national identity called Bahasa Indonesia and “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (“unity in diversity”). According to the 2010 Survey of the National Statistics Body, just over 87 percent of Indonesians are Muslim, followed by Christianity (6.96%), Chatolic (2.9%), Buddhist (0.27%), Hindu (1.69%), Confucianism (0.05%), and other traditional religions (0.13%).
It is unfortunate that not all Indonesians have the same protection to practice their religions. In fact, violations against minority rights are higher now than in the past. For example, there are now 193 internally displaced Shia minorities in Sampang who are still staying at the GOR stadium since the attack in August 2012, which left one person dead and six people injured. In 2011, the same attacker also burned a mosque, school, and some houses belonging to the Shiite leader.
In Aceh, 20 houses of worship located in Singkil district were closed down, accused of “lack of administrative document supports.” Barongsai and Liong (traditional Chinese arts) were banned under Soeharto’s New Order because they were considered a distraction from Ramadan. In 2010, there were 75 cases of discrimination and violation against minorities, of which 50 cases were relate to Ahmadiyya faith minorities. Moreover, for many years, followers of traditional beliefs such as Sunda Wiwitan cannot access public service as consequences of their unwritten religious identity on the national ID card.
As the country representative of AMAN, how do you see religious conflicts and intolerance affecting women?
Minority women have multiple layers of discrimination – as religious and often ethnic minorities and as women. As minorities, they are vulnerable to sexual harassment, intimidation when violence takes place, and their position within internal group is weak, with limited leadership, and confidence, due to the strong influence of patriarchal culture.
AMAN Indonesia takes three strategies; first, to educate women with tolerance and peacebuilding perspectives using Islamic interpretation. Through Women’s School for Peace, AMAN Indonesia has set up regular classes both for majority and minority. Over 600 women have been trained in the program and 30 percent of them have become community activists. We are interested in replicating this model to minority groups like Ahmadiyya group in Tasikmalaya and Lombok. Second, we strengthen the ability of women to adapt and respond to national and local challenges relating to inter-intra faith relationships. We are facilitating the Women’s School for Peace as an organization and have expanded to other cities to spread women’s rights, tolerance, and peace.
Third, through advocacy work, we bring voices to the national level to challenge inconsistencies in regulations, which must follow the constitution and international standards on human rights. We are also creating a space to advocate the Women, Peace and Security Agenda at the international level for the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda and Beijing+20, a UN campaign to celebrate the anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.
Subnational conflicts are the most deadly, widespread, and enduring violent conflicts in Asia. Recent studies by The Asia Foundation indicate that more people have died in the region’s 26 subnational conflicts than in international conflicts during the past 20 years. In South and Southeast Asia, active conflicts affect regions that are roughly the size of Indonesia and inhabited by more than 130 million people. In many countries, such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand explored in this photo blog, conflicts often derive from deeply rooted religious and ethnic differences and struggles over minority rights. Compiled by In Asia editor Alma Freeman.
In South and Southeast Asia, the average duration of a subnational conflict is over 30 years, such as one of the world’s longest-running violent conflicts in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in southern Philippines. Concentrated in the Muslim-majority areas of central and southwestern Mindanao, the conflict is rooted in the clash of interests over land and natural resources, and the struggle of Muslims (a minority in the largely Catholic Philippines) to preserve and protect their identity. Photo/Karl Grobl
As with most internal conflicts, women have been particularly affected by the conflict in Mindanao, which has claimed around 150,000 lives, leaving widows and survivors to provide for their families in a region mired in poverty. Here, members from different religious groups, local government, the Philippine National Police (PNP), Armed Forces of the Philippines, community and clan elders, and civil society participate in an Asia Foundation-supported forum to discuss peace and security in Marawi City. Photo/Karl Grobl
In March this year, the Philippine government and the main Muslim rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), signed a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in a power sharing agreement to empower the region and bring to close the decades-long armed conflict. Supporters of the October 2012 signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro stand with the ubiquitous green signage seen across the region. Flickr user dnorodin
After 30 years of a deadly civil war, Sri Lanka now boasts high-income growth and a notable improvement in human development indicators. The country has a multicultural, multi-religious demographic: more than 70 percent of Sri Lanka’s 20 million people are Buddhists, with Muslims making up about 8 percent of the population, followed by Hindus and Christians. Photo/Karl Grobl
However, tensions among different religious and ethnic groups remain – and most recently, violent clashes between Buddhist and Muslim groups have further threatened stability and increased a sense of alienation among minority communities across Sri Lanka. Photo/Karl Grobl
Despite this, opportunities where resilient communities cross religious, ethnic, and social barriers to co-exist and flourish exist throughout the country. For decades, community mediation boards – such as this one pictured – made up of non-political, volunteer mediators who facilitate voluntary settlement of minor disputes have played an important role in providing recourse for citizens to settle their disputes. Photo/Udaya Wijesoma
While Thailand’s Malay-Muslim population is a significant majority in the Deep South, it represents a small percentage of the majority Buddhist national population. A student walks to school in Pattani, one of the three southern border provinces. Photo/Chandler Vandergrift
Since Thailand’s century-old conflict reignited in 2004 in the southernmost region, nearly 6,000 people have been killed, among them religious and public school teachers, imams, monks, soldiers, police, and citizens. Here, Explosive Ordnance Disposal soldiers inspect a car bomb site. Photo/Chandler Vandergrift
For decades, the community of Mengabang has called for the renaming of villages in a manner that reflects the identity of the region. In February, The Asia Foundation, in cooperation with local partners, organized a Village Renaming Celebration event. Students from the local pondok school wave the newly renamed Megabang village flags.
In this TED talk, Conor Ashleigh, award-winning photographer and visual storyteller, shares stories of chronicling long-running conflicts, climate change hot spots, and communities undergoing transition in places where inequality and poverty remain among the world’s highest. In September, The Asia Foundation will feature Conor’s work on assignment for The Asia Foundation at a special photo exhibit at the World Affairs Council in San Francisco. RSVP or read more.
August 6, 2014 — Business Standard (India) quotes The Asia Foundation’s Country Representative for India Sagar Prasai in a piece on the burgeoning relationship between Nepal and India. Read more: “India and Nepal: A burgeoning friendship.”
On Friday, July 25, a car bomb rocked the normally peaceful tourist haven of Betong in Thailand’s southern province of Yala, leaving three dead and 42 injured. For the last eight years, Betong had remained relatively untouched by the ongoing insurgency in the Deep South. However, in the last six months, the insurgents have changed tactics and are increasingly demonstrating that they have the ability and deadly resolve to strike anywhere and against anyone.
If conventional wisdom on the causes of conflict in Asia is incomplete, then what are the implications for international agencies seeking to promote peace? In next week’s follow-up post, I will discuss three challenges development agencies face and three implications for how aid can better play a supportive role in addressing Asia’s SNCs.
(AMAN), which focuses on the role of women in peace building and inter-faith cooperation. Kholifah was selected as one of the 10 inaugural 2014 
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