THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

EXPANDING THE AGENDA FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, January 5, 2010

PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

RICHARD C. BUSH III
Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies

SCOTT SNYDER
Senior Associate and Center Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation

Panelists:

HEEJUN CHANG
Associate Professor, Portland State University

PETER BECK
Pantech Research Fellow, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

MICHAEL FINNEGAN
Senior Research Associate, The National Bureau of Asian Research

Discussant:

SCOTT SNYDER
Senior Associate and Center Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation

* * * * *
MR. BUSH: Why don’t we go ahead and get started. I’m Richard Bush. Happy New Year to all of you. Thank you for coming today. I’m glad I just had to come down four floors instead of come across town. This weather is miserable.

But it’s our great pleasure to have you here for a second session on expanding the agenda of the U.S.-ROK alliance. And as we look forward to a very complex and multifaceted world, it’s a worthy objective to explore the ways in which the alliance can be adapted to new missions. And this raises questions of whether these new missions are a good use of resources, whether they will make a difference.

And on that, I’m very pleased that Scott Snyder has taken the initiative to undertake this project and bring it to what is now successful conclusion. That’s enough from me. I would like to now invite Scott to talk a little bit about the project, to set the context for this morning’s discussions. Thank you.

Scott?

MR. SNYDER: Well, thank you, Richard, for your hospitality in co-hosting this with us and for your generosity to bring such a wonderful crowd out.

The Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, this is really our first major project. The focus and objective of our center is to promote new ideas for consideration by policymakers with the goal of promoting the effective development of stronger alliance cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea. And to that end, our first project has examined new areas of cooperation in the alliance.

Some of you, I think, were here in October, at which time we had a first meeting of this project. We also had a series of presentations in November. Essentially, what we have done is to use a list of areas identified in the joint vision statement that was released last June by the two Presidents in their White House meeting as a litmus test for
making an initial assessment about the prospects for expanded cooperation in a range of areas that were identified in that statement.

Frankly, as you will hear today, the results, I think, have been mixed. But I think it’s been a very interesting exercise that has illustrated a whole new range of ways in which the United States and South Korea may be able to cooperate more effectively with each other.

I just want to mention the areas that we covered last October. We had presentations on pandemic diseases. Jim Schoff wrote that. We had a presentation on counterterrorism cooperation by Kevin Shepherd. And we had a presentation on space cooperation.

And then last November in Seoul, we had papers presented by Mike McDevitt on Naval cooperation between the United States and South Korea. We’ve covered the topic of peacekeeping; Balbino Wong wrote a piece on that. And our Korea representative of the Asia Foundation, Ed Reed, has written a paper on overseas development assistance. And then also, we’ve commissioned a paper by Fred McGoldrich on U.S.-South Korea nonproliferation cooperation.

Today, we’re going to be examining three topics together that I think each pose separate but unique challenges to expanding a common vision for alliance cooperation: climate change, human rights, and post-conflict stabilization. The examination of prospects for U.S.-Korea cooperation on climate change issues should provide a basis upon which to judge the extent to which the alliance is equipped to engage in political and technical cooperation on a nontraditional or human security issue. The discussion on human rights is a lens through which to examine, front and center, whether the joint vision statement really means what it says when it talks about alliance cooperation on the basis of common values. And the question of post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan provides an
understanding of whether or not it is really possible to extend alliance-based cooperation off the peninsula in ways that suit our mutual interests.

I'm grateful to each of our authors today, and I'm also grateful to you, the audience, for coming to attend this symposium. Thank you.

MR. BUSH: Our first speaker, as advertised, is Professor Heejun Chang from Portland State University.

Professor Chang, you can speak from here or there, whichever you want. I think you have a PowerPoint.

MR. CHANG: Thank you for introducing me here. And it is my great pleasure to see everyone in this early morning. Today, I'm going to talk about the climate change issues, why U.S. and ROK should cooperate, and how we can expand the relationship in the future.

Last slide, okay. Here is a brief outline of my talk. First, I'm going to talk about the science of climate change, what is causing the climate change, why we should care about climate change. And there are two different areas we can cope with the situation: one is climate mitigation, and the second, climate adaptation. How they are different and how we can cooperate with each other in each area?

And from there I'm going to draw some strategies, how U.S. and ROK can make more closer relationship. And finally, I draw some conclusions.

This is a graph showing temperature change in the past 150 years. It's taken data from the UK, Hadley Center, starting from 1850 up to 2008. The blue indicates the temperature anomalies around the world, each averaged over land. And the solid black line shows the temperature anomalies in Korea.

As you see, this is the departure from the base year period, which is 1961 and 1990. And world temperature has risen about .7 degrees Celsius per decade. But in
Korea, the warming rate is much higher; it's about 1.7 degrees Celsius per century (SIC). So, it indicates if this trend is going to continue, the world temperature -- and particularly in Korea -- there will be some significant impacts on both a physical system and societies.

And what is causing these climate change? You can see the two factors. The climate can change by nature. For example, the Earth’s X tier and the Earth’s wobble changes a long time period, like 21,000 years or 46,000 years. So, based on the changes in X tier, the exposure to a certain part of the Earth to the sun also changes as it reach Earth, the climate can shift for a long period.

But also humans are contributing to this climate change, particularly for short-term period. And the main cause of these climate change is increasing concentrations of greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide or methane and so forth. And these greenhouse gasses primarily emitted by a lot of human activities, including combustion of fossil fuels, as well as changes in land cover. Once we clear out forests, the carbon can be released, which will add to the concentrations of greenhouse gasses on Earth.

So, some people argue that climate also has changed over the history of the Earth. So what is unique about the climate change the past two centuries or so, as you see from this graph, there is a close relationship between the concentration of carbon dioxide and/or temperature. And if you look at the first figure, you can see since the Industrial Revolution about -- which happened around 1750 (SIC), the concentration of carbon dioxide has risen exponentially.

So, the Earth can actually absorb these carbon dioxide, either in forests or the oceans. Once the oceans or forests cannot absorb additional carbons, the concentration will increase. Lower diagram which illustrates the process of greenhouse gas effect, which shows that the Earth receives incoming shortwave radiation, but also releases outgoing long wave radiation. But these greenhouse gasses trap these outgoing long wave
radiation, and re-radiate heat back to the surface. That is why the Earth’s lower atmosphere has warmed up in recent years.

So, there have been efforts in terms of measuring carbon dioxide concentration, and the first figure shows the carbon dioxide concentration measured in remote island in Hawaii. So, they have been measuring these carbon dioxides since 1958. As you see, the carbon dioxide concentration has risen from 315 ppm to close to 400 ppm in 2008.

You can also see the seasonal cycle, which reflects -- in summertime, when trees have full leaves, they can absorb carbon. By winter, when they loose these leaves, the carbon dioxide is released. That’s why you can see the fluctuations within a year.

But the bottom graph shows the carbon dioxide concentration in Korea, which shows a much faster increasing rate, based on eight years of data since 1999. So, some people argue that this may be also associated with not only what’s happening in Korea, but also what’s going on in adjacent countries, such as China. Because all these carbon dioxide, the pollutants may be transported from adjacent countries by Westerlies.

And this figure illustrates there’s a close relationship between temperature and carbon dioxide levels since 1880. As carbon dioxide concentration increases, the global temperature increases as well, although there is some natural fluctuations in the past century or so.

So, a lot of scientists project what’s going to happen in the future. So the current carbon dioxide concentration rate is around 375 ppm based on the year 2007. And then if we continue the current industrial or economic activities, the carbon dioxide concentration could reach up to close to 1,000 ppm. But you can also have different scenarios based on whether we introduced more efficient energy, which consumes less
fossil fuels.

So, this is based on all these different economic and social development scenarios.

And this picture is taken from the IPCC report, the latest report, based on three different sets of climate change scenarios. The A to illustrate the high emission scenarios and B-1 is the low emission scenario and A-1-b is a middle. So, B illustrates -- the A-1-b, the lower letter B, illustrates the source of energies balanced, which means that you have both fossil fuels, but also more cleaner energy.

It shows changes in some extreme events, such as change in precipitation intensity, which is measured by the number of the -- the amount of precipitation divided by the number of precipitation days. And the consecutive number of dry days, which all increase in the future as we continue emitting greenhouse gasses.

But the impacts of these changes on Earth are not spatially the same. So, for example, I just highlight the Pacific Northwest of U.S., where I live. You can see the precipitation intensity is going to rise in the future. This is based on nine different climate change model means compared to the previous period, which is 1980 to 1999, and what's going to happen by the end of 21st century.

But at the same time, the number of dry days is going to increase as well. It looks counterintuitive, but you can speculate you have a very heavy torrential rainfall days, but, in the meantime, more dry days. So although the mean condition may not change necessarily, the more extreme events are likely to happen.

But notice that the impacts on each region may be very different from one place to the other. That's why we need a spatially explicit climate impact assessment.

So, there are two areas we can consider. One is climate mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation is you can reduce the source of these greenhouse gas emissions.
For example, you control these power plants, which -- and ask them to use more clean energy, or you can introduce hybrid cars or electricity cars, which you can minimize the source of emissions.

But at the same time, we have to concede the adaptation, which means we have to change the human behavior or any equal system we have to adapt to these changes. The bottom figure shows, like amphibian house, which have been introduced in some Western European countries such as Germany or the Netherlands, because they now have to accept we have to live with water. So, make space for water. So you can see, people have to live with water, whether they are trying to combat with floods. But also, birds can migrate to other areas.

So, I identify these five different areas in terms of how U.S. and ROK can make a strong collaboration. And one is carbon trading, and the renewable energy and the urban spatial structure, transportation, and forestation. I will discuss these each one by one.

So these are some figures how we have to address all these, all together. So, forest. And we’ll talk about the carbon trading and how these two countries have been implementing these carbon trading. So, we can consider these carbon trading are different levels. We can first consider the federal level, the central government level, and the state provincial level in Korea and the local.

So, for example, in the U.S. in 2009, the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, they recommended we have to make a national cabinet and trade registration, which still have not passed yet. And the auto, okay, in the meantime, they just have released this news last week. They have been trying to implement a pilot, a carbon emission trading system, which will be launched as early as late 2010.

At the same time, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, they also introduced a carbon cash bag point system. So, basically the consumers or private industry, which
reduce the carbon dioxide emissions, they can get some credits.

At the state level, the U.S., they are doing some regional partnerships established in 10 Northeastern states, from New Hampshire to down in Maryland, and 7 Western United States. And also there are four Canadian provinces joined this Western initiative as well.

But interestingly, some states, like West Virginia or Pennsylvania, they were not part of these partnerships. Guess what. They have a lot of coal power plants to -- their politicians are very sensitive about these issues. And California is one of the leading states in terms of reducing these greenhouse gasses. They also pursue the Global Warming Solution Act, which have been implemented since 2006.

In Korea, there are over 100 municipalities participating in the carbon point system, which has been introduced since 2008. So basically, if consumers use less energy compared to the previous period, they can get some credit back. So they can get either cash back or they can get some gift cards.

And so the difference between the U.S. and the ROK is, basically, the U.S. is primarily lead by some state level because states have some autonomy, and then you can make some changes. But in ROK, it’s primarily driven by a top-down approach from the central government, and still the voluntary emission is the case. But also, notice that there are some very fast movement of some private sector. Because they consider now this is the place they can make some also profits, as well.

And the second topic is renewable energy. This figure illustrates some energy consumption rate by type. The U.S., the renewable energy is about 7 percent. And out of that, the biomass is a major portion of this renewable energy, over 53 percent. But in Korea, the renewable energy portion is less than the U.S., which is about 2 percent. And about three-quarters of them are coming from wastes.
So, both companies have ambitious goals. The U.S. Department of Energy, they announced that they are going to reduce about 50 -- over 50 percent of total electricity comes from the renewable energy by 2030. But also, the ROK government, they announced they are going to reduce about 6 percent of total energies by 2020, and there has been addressed by the 5-year Green Growth Plan.

At the national level, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, they also create some state climate and energy partnership program. This is a voluntary relationship among -- between the federal government and 16 states.

And also in the Obama administration, they introduced the Loan Guarantee Program. They can construct wind power plants.

And the Korean governments have been searching for new sources of renewable energy, particularly since 2008, when oil price skyrocketed. And they also tried to introduce some incentives to private sectors. This has been also announced as part of the package last week.

And so they also introduce more foreign investments, some U.S. companies such as JP Morgan. And also they also want to collaborate with other developing countries, such as Indonesia, in terms of biofuel generation.

But at the state and local level, once again the U.S. -- the state has autonomous power. They can also develop their own clean energy plan. They also introduced a lot of these tax incentives and the rebates and some requirements for new constructions.

And the city of Seoul, they attempt to do -- the first climate friendly city in Korea, and they also have some plans. They're going to reduce -- they're going to use more renewable energy. They're going to increase their portion by 20 percent. And also, because of the compact nature of the city development, they can also use some building materials to
generate some energy.

And the other area we can also consider, urban spatial structure, urban
development. So, we need to consider the different history of the development in both
countries. The U.S. has relatively new cities, less – most cities are less than 200 years of
history compared to Korea is much older cities. For example, the city of Seoul has more
than 600 years of history.

And the typical U.S. cities you can see the sparseness of urban
development, which people have to travel a lot. For example, people living come here; you
may have to commute more than 10 miles one way. But the inner city has new challenge for
the redevelopment. So, in the past, there was some vacancy in inner cities. But nowadays,
people try to use that space more wisely.

But also in Korea, there are some new towns surrounding the city of Seoul.
But the new trend in U.S. and also somewhere else, they introduce a new urbanism. In
other words, they use less energy and water and they’re going to do some smart growth.
This is a new concept in urban planning, and they will now make their neighborhood more
livable so they can walk around and then they can shop and they can talk with the neighbors
more closely.

And one thing that you can also notice, in Korea they are very well-
developed public transportation system: the subway and public bus, and they also have
some bus lane only so that you cannot – you’re not allowed to enter that lane.

And so in terms of some policy aspects. Again, urban planning is mostly
managed at the municipal level or the city level. So, basically the city can do what they are
going to achieve. And so there is a trend toward a more denser development. And there
are some U.S. cities that they have been implemented this denser development. And as a
result, they found that there is a substantial decrease in miles for travel; as a result, the
carbon dioxide emission has been reduced as well.

So, you need to integrate these land use planning and transportation more closely. But also there have been -- when they have new plans, they also invite the citizens to solicit their input.

And in Seoul, also the Ministry of Land and Transportation and Maritime Affairs in Korea, they announced they are going to build some more energy efficient on the urban planning so they use zero energy construction by 2025. And they are going to regulate the energy consumption for all the buildings in 2010.

So, as you see, the transportation sector is one of the leading causes of greenhouse gas emissions in both countries, accounting for over 20 percent of emissions. So, there are two different strategies you can think of. One is you have to reduce the vehicle travel distance. And also, you have to increase the renewable source of energy. So, both countries introduced hybrid car purchase. They can -- the consumers have tax rebates. And also we have to encourage this public transportation system. And then when they construct new roads or bridges they can use more eco-friendly technologies. So basically, when you want to implement any policy in transportation, you have to integrate with the land use planning.

And forestation, as you see, the forest can absorb more than 10 percent of carbon uptake in both countries. And we have to give some financial incentives to preserve the agri-forestry that have been already implemented in the state. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, they can buy some forest or farms and they can pay for the farmers to preserve that land.

So, you have -- there is a growing concept of how we can make some payment for this ecosystem services, which have been developed by environmental economies, and then how we -- where are the most appropriate places to preserve these
lands. This is one of the questions we have to address.

And so -- but also, we have to consider the forest may have some changes, particularly this more drought, severity, we have more forest fires. You have to consider these potential changes on the climate change when you make some compensating plans.

And there are some areas we can incorporate in terms of adaptation. So, one way we can do this, we have to make more decentralized system of both production and consumption. Maybe people have to produce their own foods or relying on water in the local land rather than importing people -- foods from distant miles.

And we have to also consider preserving these natural lands, particularly maintaining for these ecosystem services. For example, the urban forest, they have -- they can mitigate some urban heat island effect. We have to maintain those lands. And in terms of implementing adaptation, it is the local level. At the municipal level, they can make changing more dramatic way.

And the citizen participation is crucial. And the scientists and the policymaker, they have to communicate with each other. The one way we can consider, make alliances maybe at the municipal level. Maybe you can use some sister cities between U.S. and Korea and they can exchange some ideas and technologies.

So, I want to draw some common areas that we have interest. So first, we can provide more incentives to reduce these greenhouse gas emissions. Unless there is some tax credits, it might be hard to implement this. And we also have to expand both safe and convenient public transportation system, because people will travel more. There is no doubt about that, regardless what's going to happen. So we have to use a more efficient system.

And also we have to continue to invest in alternative forms of renewable energy. And you have to consider more compact or dense, livable urban development. And
And then at the municipal level, we can also provide more place-specific adaptation strategies, what each city can learn from each other. There’s also increasing city alliance in U.S., partially supported by NOAA, how the -- each municipalities can adapt to these potential climate change.

So, this is a more general level how we can make this tighter cooperation between U.S. and ROK. So, we have to first foster a more open dialogue between -- not only business, but also government. Without communication between these two agents, it might be hard to implement. Because the climate of security is essentially associated with economic security and eventual human security. And you can also -- I mentioned about there are many different strategies working at different levels, so we have to consider what strategy might be the most appropriate at different levels.

And the other thing is, we have to also consider what other countries, such as China and Japan -- and these countries are doing, and there’s also been alliance established between like Japan and Korea, and China and India. So we have to consider those other cooperations as well.

So, thank you. (Applause)

MR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Professor Chang. I’m sure that your presentation generated a lot of questions, but I ask you to hold your questions. We’ll have probably a full hour to get -- hear from you.

Our next speaker is Peter Beck with the Walter H. Shorenstein Center for Asia-Pacific Research at Stanford University. He’ll speak about human rights, a subject on which he knows a lot.

Peter.

MR. BECK: I guess it’s very appropriate that I’ll have a picture of polar
bears behind me while I’m giving my presentation. I’ve forgotten how cold it can get here now that I’m out in California.

I want to congratulate Scott and Richard for putting this program together and tell them what an honor it is to be the weak link in the strong chain that they’ve put together of papers on areas of cooperation that we don’t typically look at when we think of U.S.-Korea relations. And I really think this is a project that thinks outside of the box about issues that we should be concentrating on.

And one of those issues is human rights. It’s something that gets a lot of attention in our press; it gets a lot of attention in the Korean press. But -- and often there’s not much that we can do about it, but we’re certainly not doing much bilaterally. And so there’s a lot of area for potential cooperation.

As Scott mentioned in his -- in introductory remarks, in the joint vision statement that our two Presidents agreed on last June here in Washington, there’s a statement: We will work together to promote respect for the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people.

And it’s a fairly short document, and they said this. But it’s not clear what they actually intend to do in terms of cooperation. As you may know, our -- we have a new special envoy for North Korean human rights, Robert King, who is going out to Seoul next week. And this is -- one, it’s welcome that we now have a full-time envoy and I have every expectation that he will do a wonderful job.

But he has a big job because I think almost everyone agrees that his predecessor was an unmitigated disaster. Not only was he invisible most of the -- Jay Lefkowitz was invisible most of the time, but then when he did get attention, it was not so much for North Korean human rights, it was for criticizing the Bush administration’s approach towards North Korea. So, I think we’re definitely making progress in the right
direction. The -- our, too -- we have a human rights envoy for North Korea, South Korea has a human rights envoy. They've never met each other before. And so, there's a lot -- there's going to be a lot for them to talk about.

One of the challenges that we faced is that we had -- for the previous 10 years, until 2008, we had liberal governments in Seoul. And liberals in Seoul take this very hypocritical approach of focusing only on human rights in South Korea and no -- and virtually no attention to human rights in North Korea. They're silent on the issue, for a variety of reasons. And at the governmental level as well. There was a reluctance in Seoul to take up the human rights issue, and -- you know, abstaining from votes in the United Nations, for example.

And there's this fear that by pursuing human rights and raising the issue too prominently, that it would bring a chill in North/South relations. And that's still a concern today. And as you may be reading about, rumors of a North/South summit that could take place sometime this year, I'm sure that human rights will take a back seat in any discussions -- in any public discussions that the government -- Korean government has.

But I think we do have areas for -- real areas for potential cooperation because I think we have two Presidents that take a fundamentally similar approach to human rights. My paper's looking at human rights more broadly, but I'll focus my discussion on North Korea, since that is the area where I think there's the most potential cooperation.

But if we look at the positions of the two governments on the Dali Lama, for example, of both Presidents making decisions to not meet with him for fear of upsetting China, that there is a recognition that global politics and international security and national interest takes priority, sometimes, over human rights as much as we may think that they are important. So, I think they have a fundamentally compatible approach to dealing with human rights issues. Putting the nuclear issue first, that we have to try and negotiate with
North Korea; that that has to take priority over pressing human rights concerns.

So, I think -- you know, with governments with fundamentally similar world views, particularly when it comes to dealing with human rights and human rights in North Korea, I think there's great areas for cooperation.

Unfortunately, when we look at the experience in South Korea in the United States, South Korea remains very polarized on the issue of human rights, that you have liberals remaining largely silent on the issues, and it's conservatives that take up the cause of North Korean human rights. And here in the United States, I would say that it's increasingly becoming a bipartisan issue. particularly when we had the passage of the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act. It was unanimous vote and it was renewed again recently, and unanimous once again. So, there's no real fundamental disagreement between liberals and conservatives in the United States when it comes to the human rights situation in North Korea, but there is still a big divide in South Korea.

So, at the governmental level, it's certainly possible to work more closely together. And really this wasn't possible until we had the election of Lee Myung-bak as President.

And so human rights in North Korea remains a polarizing issue for the minority of Koreans who care about politics. Besides impeding North/South reconciliation past governments in South Korea have left -- on the left have relied on two main arguments to justify their hands-off approach.

One columnist in the liberal Hankyoreh newspaper insisted that he had too few facts about what was happening in North Korea, that he couldn't really write authoritatively on the issue, which I don't find very plausible.

And also the -- and the second is the fear that raising an issue will make negotiations -- North/South reconciliation impossible. And the second justification that the
government used quietly was that, you know, look, all of our projects with -- our economic projects with North Korea are a Trojan horse. The way that we’re going to bring about change in North Korea is through economic engagement. It’s not beating a drum, it’s not screaming and yelling about human rights, it’s finding areas of cooperation -- Geshung Industrial Complex, for example. That improving the lives of North Koreans, exposing them to South Koreans and to the rest of the world is really the way to bring about change.

And so those are the arguments that you saw most frequently as to why the South Korean government couldn’t raise the issue.

Now, Lee Myung-bak has changed that approach fundamentally. And for starters, the mandate of the National Human Rights Commission, which before -- I mean, the government-funded National Human Rights Commission could not do work on North Korea. And now they can. Amnesty International, even, has a Seoul branch. They have done zero work on North Korea, which is really quite amazing, that now the government is looking at this issue and starting with the abduction of hundreds of South Koreans during and after the Korean War that are still being held in North Korea. It’s the dozen Japanese that get all the attention in the media because of the Japanese government and abduction families, but it’s Seoul that really has the overwhelming number of abductees that are residing in North Korea. And, again, the previous South Korean governments were silent on this issue.

And also the Lee administration recognizes that China is really the key to improving human rights in the North. And it’s very clear that Seoul is not afraid of raising the issue with Beijing and has done so on several occasions.

But I think that there is a recognition that it is a delicate issue for China and has to be raised delicately by South Koreans so that it will require some behind the scenes work. But the bottom line is as long as China is repatriating North Koreans residing in China,
that there can be no fundamental progress on human rights in North Korea.

But the reality is that thousands of North Koreans are getting out through China every year and that's continuing.

The point person in the South Korean government for North Korean human rights is a Chung-Ang University law professor by the name of Jay Sung Ho, who I had a chance to meet with last summer. Wonderful man, but, unfortunately, he only serves part time. He still has a regular teaching load at his university. And he's not just looking at North Korea, but he's looking at all of the human rights issues internationally. And so he has a full plate and a very limited amount of time to work on those issues.

So like Washington, you know, Seoul needs a special envoy for human rights who can focus full time.

At the non-governmental level, you know, again, the two biggest NGOs -- Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy -- effectively chose to ignore the human rights issue in North Korea and focus only on human rights in South Korea. But over the last 10 years, we've seen the emergence of NGOs in South Korea. The first and most active is the Citizens Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, run by Reverend Benjamin Yoon and Good Friends, as you probably know, run by Bam Yan Sunyim, and who make regular visits to Washington and host conferences and commission papers and research on human rights conditions in North Korea.

They were really working, effectively, alone for several years. And then I would argue in 2005, there was an event that really changed public perceptions in South Korea, and that was the Seoul Summit for North Korean Human Rights. It was held in December of 2005 at Chey Ku when he was with Freedom House, helped put together -- that brought together dozens of NGOs for major international gathering in Seoul that gained a great deal of press attention and really helped mainstream the issue of North Korean
human rights.

It’s also about this time that in addition to people’s -- Citizens Coalition for Human Rights and the Buddhists, you also have a whole host of NGOs being created by North Korean defectors. There are several North Korean radio stations that are broadcasting every day to North Korea, there are at least a dozen NGOs that are being run by North Korean defectors focused on North Korean human rights.

They’re all living very much hand-to-mouth, all of these NGOs. Even the big 2 are only big in the relative sense that they have 10 or 12 -- or a dozen people working. But they're still very small organizations, particularly in comparison to the largest NGOs in Korea.

So, South Korean NGOs are still toiling in obscurity and toiling with very limited budgets. But finally, we have a government in South Korea that has attached a greater priority to this issue.

In the United States, again, we had the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004, but Congress and even the Bush administration often didn’t put its money where its mouth was in terms of actually allocating the funds that were set aside in this bill. President Bush talked a good game on North Korean human rights, but often didn’t have -- wasn’t able to marshal funds to actually act.

Fortunately, we did see an expansion in the service of Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, of course, are here today. They’re now broadcasting five hours a day to North Korea, but clearly we could do better. We should be having 24-hour coverage to North Korea.

So, very -- actually very little progress was made at the governmental level in terms of advancing North Korea. President Bush did meet with family members of abductees, did meet with defectors. I’ve met with several defectors in Seoul who proudly
have pictures on their walls of meeting with President Bush.

And he did -- when he appointed his special envoy, he did give the envoy face time so that the world saw that the envoy had, in fact, the ear of the President. But again, it wasn’t until the very end of the Bush administration that we actually started to see North Koreans come to the United States, which was part of the North Korean Human Rights Act. And now we’re up to about 100 North Korean defectors that are residing here in the United States, which, of course, is almost nothing compared to the 17-, 18,000 that are residing in South Korea.

At the NGO level, there are really three organizations that have been active that you’re probably aware of. The most grassroots-oriented organization, Liberty in North Korea -- LINK -- was very active, but they moved to California and have taken a bit of a lower profile. You have -- also you have the North Korea Freedom Coalition, run by Suzanne Scholte. She won Seoul Peace Prize last year, very, very active individual. Extremely committed and trying to bring different groups, trying to bring Uighurs and Falun Gong and Tibetans and other groups and individuals that have an interest in human rights, to bring them together to try and press for human rights. She has the most important annual event of each year to North Korea, Freedom Week, which is a wonderful gathering of events and sharing of information on North Korea.

And then you have the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, where I worked, which is also doing important work and complementing the work of the other two by publishing reports on North Korea, the most famous being “Hidden Gulag” by David Hawk, looking at the prison camp system in North Korea.

But all three of these organizations combined roughly have a budget of -- combined of not much more than a million dollars, if that, in some years. So, again, really very small underfunded organizations that are struggling to try and advance human rights.
So, again, you have a commitment, at least a verbal commitment at the government level, but not much action. And then you have NGOs, both in South Korea and the United States, struggling to advance human rights on very limited budgets with small -- very small staffs.

So, I think, again, we can see that there’s common values, common approach being taken in North Korea. But there’s really -- to date, there’s been a failure to coordinate activities.

This raises, then, the question of, what is the most effective vehicle for advancing human rights in a coordinated manner between Seoul and Washington. And one logical vehicle is that -- the United Nations. After all, the UN has been passing resolutions every year in recent years condemning human rights in North Korea. The UN Human Rights Commission just held last month their universal periodic review. It did not receive a lot of attention in the press, but the North Koreans for the first time had to submit a report on their human rights and were subjected to a lot of criticism, even on a commission that has friends of North Korea, including Libya and other regimes that we don’t necessarily think very highly of.

But the commission issued a long report with 150 recommendations of how North Korea needs to improve their human rights. And North Korea agreed to at least look into about 100 of them. They rejected about 50 of the recommendations, and they said that they would look into 100 of the recommendations. So, there is some attempt by the United Nations to try and press North Korea on human rights. There’s a special reporter, who also visits Washington from time to time, who’s issued several reports.

South Korea is a member of the Human Rights Commission. Unfortunately, the United States is not. The Bush administration decided that they thought the commission was too harsh on Israel and had members that didn’t belong on a human
rights commission and decided not to join the commission as a member. So, that -- the U.S. did participate in this universal periodic review, but they have not been a member of the commission. So, that's obviously one change that the Obama administration should make, is to join the commission.

But I still think, given that the U.S. isn't a member of this commission and given that these bodies aren't meeting on a regular basis, I still think the most effective means for our two governments to coordinate efforts on human rights is bilaterally. And, of course, the first step, I think, is for our human rights envoys to have regular meetings with each other. And I'm glad that that's -- that their first meeting will be next week because already they'll be ahead of the progress made over the last 10 years, really, in terms of coordination. So, that's a first step is to try and have regularized meetings.

I think the second -- so, I have eight recommendations for areas of cooperation. And the first is having regular bilateral consultations.

The second is one that I'm having a little trouble getting positive response from the U.S. officials I've talked to is trilateral consultations. I always thought that TCOG, the Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group, was a very useful mechanism for coordinating a range of policies focusing primarily on security issues and the North Korean nuclear issue, but a whole range of issues, I think, could be addressed if TCOG were revived. But a number of current and former U.S. officials told me we don't need TCOG. We're already meeting with each other enough as it is. We don't need this formal mechanism.

But even if there isn't a formal mechanism in place, you know, Japan has such -- attaches such high priority to the human rights issue that it makes sense to have trilateral coordination to share ideas and to pool resources and come up with a joint strategy. Because often, Japan has been working -- to date, has been working in isolation on pressing
human rights in North Korea.

The third area of cooperation that I would emphasize is expanded and coordinated public outreach. So, given the limited capabilities of NGOs in Washington and in Seoul, that there’s a need for expanded outreach efforts. And that this could be very effective in raising public awareness. You know, the average Korean, unfortunately, just doesn’t care about human rights in North Korea. And the average American is just totally unaware of human rights in North Korea.

And so it’s very disappointing when I attend North Korea Freedom Week and there are only -- you know, this is the biggest national event on North Korean human rights, and if they get 100 people at an event they’re doing very well. To have this many people at an event would be -- is a major accomplishment. And again, this is a nationwide effort that they’re undertaking. So, it’s been hard to mobilize even just Korean Americans, let alone average Americans to get involved and to care about human rights in North Korea.

The fourth area of cooperation is in radio broadcasting. South Korea, again, has their own government channel, but they also have religious and defector stations that are targeting North Korea. We have Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. But by South Korean law, South Korean government transmitters cannot be used to transmit foreign radio broadcasts. And so, VOA, RFA have had to catch as catch can to get their broadcasts to North Korea.

Recently, they were allowed to use a religious station’s transmitter in (inaudible). But there’s more -- there’s more potential for cooperation. And we do know that radio is getting through to North Koreans. The defectors that come out are saying that one of the things that influenced their world view and even their decision to defect is the fact that they can quietly at night listen to North Korean radio.

I was personally skeptical about this until a few years ago, and then I
noticed that a couple of friends of mine -- Andre Lankov and Greg Scarliotu, who grew up in the Soviet Union and Romania -- commit time every week to broadcasting for Radio Free Asia in Korean. And it's wonderful to hear Korean with Russian and Romanian accents. When I was asked to review their radio broadcasts -- but they don't do it for the money. They do it because they themselves were listening to Voice of America in the 1980s when they were living in the Soviet Union and Romania, and it made a difference for them. And we know that some North Koreans -- we don't know exactly how many are listening. So, we need to do better when it comes to radio broadcasting.

And finally -- I'm sorry, not finally. The fifth area of cooperation, I think, is that we need to jointly press North Korea on its treaty commitments. (inaudible) is a signatory to a range of covenants and treaties relating to human rights. So, it's not holding up a U.S. standard, it's not holding up a South Korean standard for human rights. It's holding North Korea to the standard to which they themselves have signed on to in a variety of human rights treaties and charters, whether it's the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Rights of the Child. There are a whole range of treaties and conventions that North Korea is already signed on to.

The sixth area that I would recommend is to upgrade the human rights discussion at the Six-Party Talks. You know, we know that the Six-Party Talks are rightfully focused on the nuclear issue, but human rights have always been a part of the Six-Party Talks. And that's taken the form of Japan raising the issue in its working group with North Korea on a regular basis. But it should be multilateralized instead of bilaterally being raised only by Japan.

The seventh area that I would propose is that, over time that we try to transform the Six-Party Talks into Helsinki process. There -- you know, there are several people that have been trying to -- and Jim Goodby, for example, has really led the efforts.
Roberta Cohen here at Brookings have been pushing for a Helsinki process. It worked with the Soviet Union to try and, you know, to bring together security and humanitarian and human rights issues together in one discussion. That’s the direction that we need to move the Six-Party Talks in, particularly, as Scott has called, the Six-Party Talks -- I agree with Scott that they’re not -- they’re unlikely to resolve the nuclear issue. The best we can hope for is that they’re crisis management mechanism, and if we’re really not going to solve the issue, then at least we should be able to use the talks to have a wide range of discussion with North Korea.

And finally, my eighth and final recommendation is the boldest, probably, of all. And that is to establish a North Korean refugee protection and resettlement organization, or what I would call NKPRO, to assist North Koreans trying to leave North Korea and to resettle in the United States. You know, we’ve had informal cooperation -- this is an area where the cooperation has been very, very quiet, for understandable reasons. But we don’t have any formal cooperation between our two governments when it comes to helping North Koreans leave and resettling.

There was a sense of competition, of Seoul not wanting North Koreans to come to the United States. But the fact is that we are not in a very strong position to evaluate potential defectors and potential immigrants to the United States. And really rely on the knowledge and experience of South Korea and particularly the intelligence agency in terms of evaluating North Koreans and the veracity of their stories, and so there’s really a need for cooperation. And again, we’re approaching 20,000 North Korean defectors in South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. And there’s really a need -- and all three countries, even South Korea, a whole book could be written on the -- and books have been written on the struggles that North Koreans face in resettling in South Korea. It has to be that much more difficult for the hundred that are here in the United States. And we don’t have the formal
assistance program that South Korea has for resettlement, so there would be -- I think there would be a great deal of benefits to create an organization to help North Koreans resettle.

Now, again, I don’t want to -- I’ll close by just pointing out that there are obstacles to cooperation, that there’s still going to be a reluctance in Washington. And so if we move forward in the nuclear talks there will be a temptation to step back or ease off of pressing North Korea on human rights. Unfortunately, that’s just the reality that there’s -- often this false choice that I think Seoul -- that North Korea tries to force the U.S. and South Korea to make this false choice. Either you’re going to focus on security issues, you’re going to focus on human rights issues, and we have to find a way to focus on both at the same time and that’s going to be a challenge.

The second dilemma is whether or not future economic development and cooperation projects with the North should be tied to concrete improvements in human rights, and that’s something that I’m not sure either the Obama or the Lee Myung-bak administrations have the stomach for. Even Lee Myung-bak -- it was North Korea that was threatening to close the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, not Lee Myung-bak. It didn’t matter if North Korea tested a nuke. It didn’t matter how bad the human rights situation was. There’s still this fundamental support for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, but should future projects be tied to improvements in human rights?

The human rights situation in North Korea is grim and there’s every indication it will only get worse, particularly if famine returns to North Korea in the not too distant future, but must the North Korean people suffer in silence? Having spent the last few years focused on the plight of North Korean refugees in China, I’m not holding my breath that the situation will improve until China changes its policy, but there’s much more that Washington and Seoul and the world can do to improve prospects for the North Korean people.
The security and economic benefits of pursuing human rights in North Korea are -- vigorously are minimal in the short term and could impose significant cost, but as freedom-loving peoples, we have an obligation to North Korea’s 24 million people to do better.

Thank you very much.

MR. BUSH: Thank you, Peter, very well said.

Our next speaker is Mike Finnegan, who’s going to speak on post-conflict resolution. Do you want to speak from there or from here?

Okay, before you start I’d just note that Mike is certainly not a one-trick pony. He recently disseminated a really outstanding paper on the U.S.-Japan alliance which I recommend to you all. Mike?

MR. FINNEGAN: Thank you, Richard. And thank you all for coming out on a brisk morning here in Washington. I’d also like to thank Scott for putting together a very interesting project, a very eclectic group of areas to explore. I’m going to take us -- Peter said we were kind of out of the box on some of these areas of cooperation. I’m going to take us back into what might traditionally be the box for cooperation between the U.S. and the ROK, and that is security cooperation. But a corner of that box that is not explored well enough, and that’s the area of stability operations and reconstruction, and I’ll get to why that hasn’t been explored.

But for several years while I was in the Pentagon and previous to that, I spent a lot of my military career looking for ways to expand cooperation and find ways to broaden, to deepen this alliance. On the one hand, alliance managers have struggled to give the alliance more heft, to provide -- to give it more versatility, more applicability, if you will, as a tool of national policy. On the other hand, we’ve looked to diversify the portfolio somewhat and to provide that broader rationale for the alliance so that if we were to suffer
catastrophic success and North Korea was to disappear on us, the alliance would still have some applicability after all the investment we’ve put into it.

At the same time we’ve obviously been very focused on ways to enhance and increase our capabilities to carry out the current mission of the alliance, which is the primary role of defending the Republic of Korea and ensuring stability on the peninsula. There’s a certain tension between meeting that near-term need of building capability and capacity for the current mission and looking at the broader mission.

But as I looked at this, it seemed to me that cooperation on stability and reconstruction operations was something of a natural area for expanding cooperation as it seemed to meet several of the alliances needs. And indeed our political leadership in summit statements and in the vision -- the most recent vision statement on the alliance had identified reconstruction operations as an area for cooperation. So, I was very pleased when Scott asked me to take a look at this area.

In the interest of time what I'd like to do is make four brief points that kind of summarize the paper. The first point is that when looking at the Republic of Korea’s capabilities, there is broad agreement that the ROK is one of the few countries that has the political, economic, and military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to international stability and reconstruction efforts. The ROK military, for example, now has a wealth of experience to bring to bear on such challenges and has done so in a remarkably effective and sophisticated way.

The Ziaton unit’s performance, for example, as well as the performance of units that were in Afghanistan up until 2007, has been exemplary. Both of those activities were looked at by coalition partners as models for how such operations should be done. And as I wrote in a recent piece for the center, the U.S. military looks at ROK participation in any coalition operation very favorably because of the capabilities they bring, the
professionalism that they bring. So the bottom line is that the ROK is a valued partner and it is fully capable of the types of cooperation required for stability operations and reconstruction operations.

My second point, though, is that despite this great capacity on both the ROK and the U.S. part, combined stability and reconstruction operations have been given fairly short shrift in our discussions and in our actions. The single most challenging operation the U.S. and the ROK will likely face on the peninsula is a situation of instability in North Korea to which the both must jointly respond. Unfortunately, that mission area has not received priority within the alliance. Indeed, during the previous ROK administration, the entire process of planning a response to instability in North Korea was halted. Think about that, if this is the most dangerous mission, and maybe the most likely mission for the alliance on the peninsula, to halt that was a serious statement. But tension in this critical area of cooperation has always existed. It’s been seen as sensitive, politically charged at both the domestic ROK and the inter-Korean political level. Finding a way to address that tension and thereby allow us to address the shortfall in this mission set, both at the operational and strategic level, has been an elusive goal for alliance managers.

My third point, expanded global cooperation that is off the peninsula, cooperation in the area of stability and reconstruction operations away from the peninsula would allow the two governments to develop an alliance capacity, the individual and organizational skill sets necessary to better deal with instability on the Korean peninsula. It’s a bit of a bank shot. Such cooperation would be useful in and of itself because we’re cooperating on the international level, but it would also be useful, real experience that would translate into saved lives should we ever need to carry out stability operations in Korea.

On the one hand, there would be a real value in taking the cooperation to the strategic level and developing a whole-alliance approach to stability and reconciliation --
reconstruction operations. The U.S. approach is a whole of government approach and interagency approach. The ROK has taken a similar approach in its internal or unilateral planning efforts for North Korea. If the allies believe that this mission area, that this area of cooperation warrants the expenditure of resources, then drawing on both of these systems to develop a generic, if you will, whole-of-alliance system to deal with, to assess, to plan, to implement stability and reconstruction operations would go a long way to filling critical gaps in both our mutual understanding of how we would jointly approach stability from a strategic level as well as provide additional heft for our operational plans.

Exercising such a system off the peninsula would to an extent depoliticize a very sensitive area of North Korean stability planning and perhaps allow the necessary room for bilateral -- for meaningful bilateral thinking and planning to occur.

Taking this one step further and institutionalizing this to the operational and even to the tactical level, we might consider development of a ROK-led combined interagency Center for Excellence for stability and reconstruction operations in Korea, perhaps leveraging the ROK's already outstanding PKO training center. Such a center could develop for the alliance combined procedures and policies, translating a strategic whole-of-alliance approach to the operational and tactical level.

And a fourth point, to the elephant in the room, Afghanistan. If, as it appears, Korea has made the decision that redeployment to Afghanistan to help stabilize and build that war torn country is in Korea's national interest, an argument I hope that President Lee begins to make with some vigor, then the allies should seize that opportunity for all it's worth. For example, the discussion of a ROK-led PRT in Parwan Province is a great starting point. Embedding U.S. support into that PRT, thinking of it something like a Ziaton-plus unit, would go a long way to building an alliance capacity for reconstruction operations.
Obviously the primary mission for that PRT must be stabilizing the Afghan situation and assisting the Afghan people. I’m not suggesting otherwise. But arguably a ROK-U.S. cooperation in Afghanistan can serve additional purposes of both preparing the allies for potential combined operations in North Korea as well as broadening, deepening, and strengthening the overall security alliance. It’s an opportunity I hope our leaders will explore, will recognize, and will exploit.

Thank you.

MR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Mike, for getting us back on time.

We now turn to Scott Snyder for some commentary. Scott?

MR. SNYDER: Okay. My job here is to be a discussant, but I do feel a little bit of an obligation to also provide some framework through which we can understand how these papers hang together.

Mike used the word “eclectic” to describe the offerings that we’ve had as part of this project and I think that that is true. But maybe I can try to, you know, answer the question for any of those in the audience who are still wondering what -- great presentations, but what do they have in common with each other? And I think the way of doing that is by going back and looking a little bit at the joint statement that was released last June by the two presidents at the White House, and the key phrase from that statement is, “Together we will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope based on common values and mutual trust.”

I think this is a very ambitious statement of purpose because it magnifies the importance of the alliance in two dimensions. One is geographical, and I think that Mike just touched on that. You know, issues in the U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship are now conceived of, according to the joint statement, as having a regional dimension and also a global dimension, not just a peninsular dimension. That means that the bilateral relationship
between the United States and South Korea can now be related to what goes on almost anywhere in the world.

The second is functional, and I think that Heejun’s presentation on climate change illustrates some of the functional challenges. Essentially, according to the joint vision statement and some of the topics that were listed, there’s, in theory, nothing, no functional issue that would be outside the bounds of a U.S.-Korea cooperation. Every issue can and, arguably, should be examined through the question, how can we address this shared challenge together? So, the joint vision statement could be interpreted to mean that alliance cooperation is relevant to almost anything, anywhere. But do both countries really have the capacity to live up to that standard and is it in their interest to do so? And so I want to highlight some of the aspects related to that.

I think it’s clear that there’s a gap, still, between the scope of the U.S. interests and capabilities and the scope of South Korean interest and capabilities. But, at the same time, the reason why we are able to do this project is that Korean capabilities have increased and that there is considerably greater potential for U.S.-Korea cooperation than there used to be. So, there’s new capability and many new areas.

So, I think that the real importance of the joint vision statement is it identifies and pledges both sides to work more diligently to realize the potential inherent in the relationship and that this framework drives a broader set of forms of cooperation than has existed between the two countries in the past.

Now, there’s a second aspect of the joint vision statement that I think is very intriguing, and it’s this phrase “shared values and mutual trust,” and I want to make a critical evaluation of that particular phrase. The phrase “shared values and mutual trust” is expressed as at the core of expanded cooperation between the two countries, but I think that this is misleading in two aspects.
One, close students of alliance interaction know that mutual trust is almost impossible to achieve because the main task of managing relations between allies often boils down to the need for constant reassurance which is arguably evidence of a lack of trust. But the second danger in presuming that the alliance is based on mutual trust is it gives the impression that cooperation cannot occur in the absence of trust yet the institutional structures that support the alliance, in many cases, have composed the infrastructure that enables effective coordination despite a lack of trust. I think that we can look back on the alliance and see numerous occasions where that proposition has been tested and thus far, there has not been an abandonment of the institutional mechanisms for coordination despite severe instances of lack of trust between the two countries.

Another way of putting this is that institutional and political commitments on both sides are necessary to survive moments of mistrust. If commitments are based solely on trust, they may indeed be capricious.

Now, the second aspect is this idea of shared values, and this really gets, I think in many respects, to the human rights paper that Peter gave. The standard axiom—and also, by the way, this issue of shared values is new in the Obama administration’s formulation. In the April 2008 U.S.-ROK summit between Lee Myung-bak and George Bush, the phrase that was used was “to develop the current U.S.-Korea alliance into a strategic alliance that seeks to enlarge common interests.” It doesn’t talk about values.

I think that one of the interesting things about this project that I’ve wanted to explore is this question of, well, what do common values provide? I don’t want to say that they’re not important, but traditionally, the rationale for the formation of alliances has been on the idea that alliances are based on shared interests. Common threats have effectively served to form the basis for alliance cooperation between states with very different systems. At the same time, it’s absolutely true that South Korean social and political structures have
much in common with those of the United States and a common commitment to democratic and economic freedom has enabled the two countries to see eye-to-eye more easily than would be the case elsewhere. And I think the history of alliance cooperation, where we have a context in which South Korea’s own political system has evolved, validates the fact that we can cooperate more effectively now when there are common systems than was the case when South Korea had a different system.

But one of the core challenges of the projects that, in fact, was raised in our October meeting by Sung Hoshin, who was resident here at Brookings, especially as it relates to non-traditional security or functional cooperation, is the question of what value-added does working within an alliance offer compared to the potential for cooperation with non-allies. And to put this in starker terms, if China’s the country that has the potential and willingness to cooperate on peacekeeping or post-conflict stabilization in ex-country while U.S. allies, in theory, are unable or unwilling to do so, does it mean the United States would not seek cooperation from China because it has a system founded on different values from those of the United States? Or flipping it around, is it fair to allies to create expectations that their contribution to an out-of-area challenge will always be higher than that of non-allies?

I think these are some very practical questions that the project has raised as part of its effort to evaluate, in specific terms, items mentioned in the joint statement.

In some cases, the studies that we have commissioned also reveal that there are considerable asymmetries between the respective capacities of the United States and South Korea to tackle some of the items on the international agenda. I think that to a certain extent, although Heejun didn’t explicitly mention it, climate change is one of them, overseas development assistance is another. But that doesn’t mean that there isn’t a potential for limited cooperation in these areas in ways that reinforce mutual interests. And so maybe the best way of illustrating that is to make some specific comments on each of the
presentations.

I think that the paper on climate change provides really an excellent test of whether the alliance can cooperate on newly emerging functional issues. And I think that actually climate change presents an issue where the situation is very mixed. At the same time, the paper underscores that climate change is truly a human security issue, it’s a common security challenge, but the manifestations of climate change may pose differing challenges that countries may need to face with differing levels of priority. And I actually think that Heejun’s graph showing the rise in temperature in Seoul, in South Korea, compared to the world average shows geography matters on this issue.

Just yesterday Seoul received, I think, its largest snowfall in history. Geography matters. We’re concerned, but we’re not concerned about snow today. And so this means that -- I think this poses a potential challenge to how one coordinates effectively on this type of issue.

Second issue, I think that is interesting that Heejun didn’t touch on, but that I want to highlight, President Lee Myung-bak has made a pledge to play a brokering role between developing and developed nations on the issue of climate change. And we’ve just had the Copenhagen summit, but I don’t think the South Korean president was in the room with President Obama or Wen Jaibao at the end of the day, and I don’t think South Korea was involved in meetings together with South Africa, Brazil, and India, which were really the key players in terms of brokering a broader climate change deal.

On the other hand, Lee Myung-bak has taken on the business development aspect of low carbon green growth in ways that may well create an entirely new set of opportunities for U.S.-ROK private sector cooperation and some of these were referred to in Heejun’s presentation. These avenues need to be explored more aggressively, I think, given that South Korea is poised as both a competitor and a partner in a newly emerging
sector where there is a host of opportunities to be exploited.

Another aspect that I think came out of his presentation is the difficulty of managing policy coordination in a context where South Korea is pursuing the issue from a centrally led approach while in the United States it’s really more of a bottom up approach. The question I have for Heejun, given the multidimensional and multisectoral set of challenges that he laid out, is what does he think is the most important area where the United States and South Korea have a chance to cooperate together with each other in addressing climate change? And also what are the specific areas where the United States and the South Koreans have the most to learn from each other in their experience thus far in dealing with climate change?

Now, Peter’s presentation, I think, illustrates both the promise and the disappointment associated with new opportunities for cooperation on human rights, as I’ve suggested. On the one hand, those who remember human rights issues in South Korea from the 1970s will know that human rights use to be the issue that posed the greatest threat to the sustainability of the alliance. From that perspective it’s truly remarkable to see the implications of South Korea’s political evolution. But, on the other hand, as Peter pointed out, South Korea’s public debate over human rights has been politicized and really limited to North Korea. And so, the question is really can human rights -- can shared values be a basis for policy coordination, not just related to North Korea, but related to other parts of the world?

Human rights is a universal value. It’s provided a limited basis for alliance coordination. I mean, Peter outlined the difficult of that, but I just want to ask Peter, what is his project about whether this might change in the future?

And finally, Mike’s paper really explores the broadening of the geographical scope of the alliance in a core area of security cooperation and the Lee Myung-bak
administration has shown a willingness to rejoin the United States in this effort, but it remains to be seen how the deployment will play out and, in particular, whether or not the deployment can win public support. I see this as kind of a direct challenge to one of the catch phrases that Lee Myung-bak administration has used, the idea of a global Korea, the idea that the South Korean government is willing to incur obligations and responsibilities proportionate to the benefits that it derives as a major economic player in the global system.

And so the question I have for Mike is whether or not he thinks that the South Korean public is ready to support off- peninsula deployment? And then also, if they are, in what ways can the alliance serve to enable a more active role for South Korea in pursuit of a more -- a higher profile in the area of post-conflict stabilization?

Thanks.

MR. BUSH: Thank you very much. Those are good questions. What I propose is that we go ahead and open up to audience questions. Our speakers are smart enough to weave their answers to your questions into answers to other ones. So, the floor is open. Please wait for the mic once you’ve been recognized and once you get a mic, please identify yourself, your affiliation, and to whom your question is posed. I see a hand back there.

MR. POMPER: Hi. Miles Pomper from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. I have a question for Dr. Chang.

I was intrigued that in your presentation dealing with how the ROK is dealing with climate change, you didn’t mention nuclear energy, which has been the largest low carbon source of power that Korea has by far. I mean, something about more than a third of its electricity, I believe, comes from nuclear power and its plans for expanding that even further.

At the same time, you mentioned that alternative energy only supplies
about 2 percent, I think, of the energy needs. And I’m just wondering how much of this is a conscious policy decision by the government to favor nuclear power versus what you hear from the nuclear industry and people in the nuclear establishment in Korea is that Korea does not have a lot of sources of potential alternative energy. So, I’m just wondering how much of this is kind of a geographic endowments and how much of this is government policy?

MR. BUSH: Dr. Chang?

DR. CHANG: Sure. Yes, you’re very right. So, the Korea -- the nuclear energy is about -- a third of energy comes from the nuclear power plant. As most of you know, Korea can also export nuclear energy to other countries including the Arab Emirates, which they have an agreement to contract with Korea. So, I think -- and also people’s perception have been maybe changing these days. In the past they are very concerned about the nuclear waste, so it’s not a safe source of energy. But as with other countries -- and there’s no doubt that the nuclear energy can reduce the carbon dioxide emission dramatically. And, for example, in the case of France, the carbon dioxide emission is really low compared to other OECD countries. So, I think still my point is they less rely on the fossil fuels, like coals or oils, while maintaining this nuclear energy, but they want to diversify the source of renewable energy at the same time. I think that is my understanding. Yeah.

MR. BILLINGTON: Yes, Mike Billington from Executive Intelligence Review. I’d like to expand on that question. I was struck that nuclear wasn’t brought up either in terms of the climate change thing, but also in terms of cooperation between the U.S. and Korea, and that there wasn’t really any reference to the huge shift in Asia over these last couple of months and especially in Korea. You have dramatic agreements between Russia, China, and India to use the Chinese dollar reserve to build mass infrastructure in Russia. Russia will be building nuclear power in China. Russia’s going to
build nuclear agreements in India. These are a real shift in the geometry of Eurasia generally and Korea is very much involved in this. This government is committed to working with Russia on this development of the Far East. This nuclear export policy is a -- they're very proud and it's a dramatic shift in their role. And as I'm sure you know, the U.S. is already part of that in the sense that Westinghouse is going to get about a billion dollars of the parts production for this UAE project and they intend to expand all of Southeast Asia is looking to Korea for support for their nuclear power ambitions.

So, I mean, this is an area where the U.S., if it were to return to a kind of Roosevelt approach to policy, instead of the current mess, could play a dramatic role with Korea and the rest of the Asian countries in what I think is the new frontier for the human race right now, which is the development of the Asia-Eurasian region. And I'd be interested in what Mike and Scott as well have to say on that.

MR. BUSH: Other comments?

MR. CHANG: I think also there's a separate issue, talking about nuclear weapons, but in terms of energy security I think you're very right. So, there's also traditionally in Korea a lot of technology export from U.S., but not Korea trying to export this knowledge to other developing countries, that there is a place that U.S. and ROK can have a better relationship in that area.

MR. BUSH: Mike, do you want to comment?

MR. FINNEGAN: Yeah. I'll take your example one step further. Not only is the U.S. involved because of Westinghouse, Japan's involved because Toshiba owns Westinghouse. So it is -- it really is -- just the UAE deal really starts to illustrate how these -- the nuclear energy industry is so tied together now globally and it's ripe for some regional cooperation strategy.

I think Northeast Asia, for me, has for a long time been a keen example of
how energy security, environmental security, and traditional security, if you will, kind of come together at sort of a nexus. And this is an area that is ripe for cooperation, finding a way to expand nuclear power. Because as the point was made, it is the proven low carbon energy that’s out there, so could we expand nuclear power in Northeast Asia to meet energy security needs, to deal with some of the environmental issues? Could we develop cooperative strategies for handling spent fuel to keep it out of the proliferation area?

There are several areas where the Chinese government, the Russian government, Seoul, Tokyo, the United States could find a way and have expressed a desire for cooperation, whether we can bring it together in a meaningful way is a good question.

MR. SNYDER: I just want to mention that as part of this project we did have a paper on U.S.-ROK nonproliferation cooperation and, in fact, it was written by Fred McGoldrick. We have a version that focuses on some of the challenges related to the upcoming renegotiation of the U.S.-South Korea bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. That’s available outside. His paper doesn’t go into much detail about the idea of nuclear energy cooperation, but that’s also an important area of interest for us.

SPEAKER: Do you have anything to say on the renegotiation of the nuclear agreement in terms of Lee Myung-bak’s request that the U.S. drop its provisions preventing their processing and reprocessing so that they can have a full cycle nuclear?

MR. SNYDER: Fred’s paper addresses some of those issues and tries to explore possible ways of managing any differences between the two governments on that issue.

MR. BUSH: Question right here?

MR. GOW: Roddy Gow, Asia House London. I was particularly interested in Peter’s comments on the gradual impact of the radio and communications to the North on breaking down barriers and on increasing the understanding of the population in the North of
what it is they’re not getting. And we have a unique opportunity here to hear from this panel about the extent to which there is beginning to be a breakdown in the North and the extent to which the realization of what else is available may be leading towards a replication of what we saw happening in East Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I’d be interested from a military and from an environmental and from a communications and human rights standpoint on the panel’s view on that.

MR. BUSH: Why don’t we start with Peter?

MR. BECK: Excellent question. The fundamental challenge we face when we’re looking at radio to North Korea is assessing listenership and we don’t -- obviously we can’t have a representative sample of the North Korean people, so we have a very self-selected sample. So it’s very difficult to -- even though surveys are being done of North Korean defectors of their listening habits prior to leaving, it’s still -- it’s anyone’s guess as to how many North Koreans are actually listening, anywhere from 1 percent to 10 or 15 percent or even higher, but we just can’t say with any confidence.

When we look at the terms of the spread of information whether it’s through radio or through DVDs and CDs that are going back and forth across the border, I’ve met young North Korean defectors who said which house in the neighborhood was quietly selling movies, American and South Korean movies. And friends would trade with -- if you really trusted your friend you could trade movies with each other, and that they are listening to radio stations to the point where the North Korean government has had to issue -- has publically criticized the radio stations for their slanderous activities and told North Koreans how they shouldn’t -- to not be influenced by the West. So we know that the information is getting through.

But, on the other hand, when we look at -- so, in absolute terms for North Korea, information’s starting to get in, but when we look at, say, other regimes that seem
very -- that are oppressive and closed, if we look at Burma and Iran, for example, you know, it was amazing to me to see these almost real-time images coming out from the demonstrations in Iran. Burma -- I was in Burma a few years ago and was, you know, meeting Burmese who are hooked on South Korean dramas. And I was traveling freely and meeting with whoever I wanted to meet with in Burma and meeting monks who are disgusted with the regime and wanting change, but were pessimistic about change coming.

So, North Korea still has a long way to go before it even reaches the point of, say, Burma or Iran, and I don’t think we see those regimes falling too soon or not soon enough. So, that makes me a bit pessimistic, at least in the short term. You know, it’s a long-term project that I don’t think will necessarily yield short-term results.

To quickly answer Scott’s question about how do I see cooperation evolving in the near -- in the future, it’s always hard to prognosticate, but I would say that there are three factors that will determine the extent to which Washington still can cooperate effectively on human rights issues. The first is, how is the policymaking mechanism going to work within the Obama administration now that we have a part-time nuclear envoy, we have a full-time day-to-day envoy, and then we have a full-time human rights envoy? And it’s not clear to me how all of these pieces are going to fit together. So, what voice will Robert King have in the policymaking process in North Korea I think remains to be seen.

The second factor, I think, really is the nuclear talks. For the time being, I don’t think the Obama administration is going to try and insert human rights actively into the nuclear talks, into the Six-Party Talks. If the talks get bogged down, then I think there will be more of an opportunity for the voices to be raised on human rights. And for South Korea, I think it’s going to come down to a summit. If it looks like a summit is going to move forward -- and I think a summit really depends on how much money South Korea is willing -- the Lee Myung-bak government’s willing to put up. If they’re willing to put up enough money, a
summit can happen. But if it looks like a summit’s going to happen, then I think South Korea will get laryngitis when it comes to human rights.

And so, those, I think, are the three factors that will shape what happens.

MR. BUSH: Mike, do you want to talk about the security piece?

MR. FINNEGAN: Yeah, just very briefly. I think we’ve seen -- pardon the pun -- mixed signals on how the radio broadcasting is going, the effect it’s having in North Korea. There are defectors that tell us that they did hear these broadcasts and that it did affect their decisions. However, I’ve also had many discussions with defectors that their main motivation was -- and what they were thinking was just get to China because China’s better than North Korea. Then once they got there, then they became more exposed. So, I think it’s kind of a mixed bag right now. It’s not having a great effect yet, but, as Peter put it, it’s a long-term investment and it may over time begin to have a significant effect.

We’ve not seen a great effect on the military side of this here. Military defections still remain few and far between. That has to do with the control mechanisms obviously that are in place. If we were to start seeing significant numbers of military defectors and being able to tie that to what they were hearing on Voice of America, then that would be a significant finding I think. But as I said, it’s a long-term investment.

I would like to try and answer Scott’s question about the ROK public support for an off-peninsula deployment to Afghanistan. As I wrote in a piece just the other day, what the public support really comes down to is the argument, I think, that the Lee Myung-bak administration decides to make. Will they make a strategic argument about why it is in Korea’s global interest to be in Afghanistan, to be working with the coalition there, to be seen as contributing on the global level? Or will they fall back on the tried and true for the alliance argument that going to Afghanistan is a good thing just because it’s for the alliance? I would hope that he does the former, that he makes a strategic argument. I personally
believe it’s in Korea’s interest. As Scott put it, you know, it helps to help Korea’s national brand, if you will. It puts them on the global stage in a roll that they are quite capable and worthy of playing.

But that’s an argument that he has to make, that the current government needs to make to the South Korean people. I think the South Korean people are open to that argument, to hearing that argument, to understanding it. My reason for saying don’t use the alliance as the rationale is despite the positives it would have on the alliance, obviously, is that doing things for the alliance tends to not carry the day for long-term commitment. I think Korea went to Afghanistan the first time for the alliance and when things got tough, it was very easy to pull out, unfortunately. If it goes there for its national interests, I think that’s a much easier thing to commit to for the long term, so I would hope that that’s the argument that they would make.

Having said that, the alliance obviously gives them a leg up in a deployment to Afghanistan. There are tremendous alliance capabilities that can be leveraged. There is a culture of cooperation between the United States and ROK militaries, between our two governments that can be leveraged greatly to increase South Korea’s chances for success in a deployment to Parwan Province. I think, as I suggested, a PRT that is ROK-led, a robust PRT that is ROK-led, but that has embedded U.S. support would be a way of leveraging the alliance of ensuring success.

Thanks.

MR. LEE: Thank you. (inaudible), South Korean newspaper (inaudible). I’d like to make a question to Mike. I think one of the difficult issues between alliance is -- you haven’t touched today is the concept there are strategic flexibility, which allows the U.S. forces to operate out of Korean Peninsula. And Mike, you were the main architect of the concept of strategic flexibility. So, I’m wondering, when do you think the Pentagon would
like to apply the concept of strategic flexibility 100 percent to U.S. forces in Korea? And if
Afghanistan situation is being deteriorated, do you think that there are U.S. forces -- there's
some possibility U.S. forces in Korea will be dispatched instantly?

Thank you.

MR. BUSH: Do you want to take that hypothetical?

MR. FINNEGAN: Given that I had the strategic flexibility rose pinned on
me, I guess -- when would we apply -- when would the U.S. Government apply strategic
flexibility 100 percent? That seems to -- your question seems to imply when would we leave
in entirety? I don't think that's the case. In fact, that was never the thought behind strategic
flexibility. The idea of strategic flexibility, it's a double-edged sword, if you will. Yes, you
might pull some forces out of Korea to meet another contingency, another contingency that
the U.S. has to deal with somewhere else in the world, but the other side of that sword is that
you would bring forces to Korea. And that's the part that Koreans have not focused on
enough, that strategic flexibility for U.S. forces globally means being able to meet
commitments in South Korea.

I think you could see, for any number of contingencies, units be pulled out
of Korea temporarily to be used in other parts of the world, whether it's Afghanistan, whether
it's another mission somewhere else, it's all hypothetical. But I think the Pentagon's
approach to this -- and realize I've been out of the Pentagon now for a little bit -- the
Pentagon's approach to this would be that there are forces that are available. If you look at
that entirety of U.S. forces in Korea, there are pieces of that that are available for global
deployment under the idea of strategic flexibility, but there are core pieces that are not.
There are core pieces of U.S. forces in Korea that are needed for the defense of Korea.
Today that has to do with the headquarters which forms the U.S. side of the combined
forces command. In the future, that headquarters will form the U.S. supporting headquarters
to the ROK war fighter.

So, I think, at that headquarters level you would never anticipate a deployment off the peninsula, but there are units under that. There are smaller units, whether they be an infantry battalion, whether they be an engineer company, an explosives ordinance detachment, they might be deployed for various missions around the world.

So, I think when you ask when would we apply this 100 percent, never is probably the answer. I do think, though, that this is an area that we should begin exercising and I've argued this for a long time, that the Pentagon should exercise this. Move people in and out of Korea to, one, attenuate Koreans to that coming and going, but, two, to also build up that confidence that when something leaves it actually comes back or it's replaced with another capability, that the deterrent and defense capability on the peninsula is not degraded by strategic flexibility.

Thank you.

MR. BUSH: I'd like to take the prerogative of the chair to address a question to each of the three. The premise of our leaders in the United States and Korea, and the premise of this project is that we can increase the alliance's value by working together on a broader set of problem than we've worked on before. But I suspect the contrary is also true, that if we work together on problems and fail, it may decrease the value of the alliance in the eyes of publics, at least, and maybe in the eyes of the officials. And we've talked some about, you know, capacity and interests as factors governing success and failure, but I would like each of you to step back and think a bit about the nature of the problems that are trying to be addressed because the nature of the problem is also a factor in governing success and failure.

So, the question for Professor Chang is, what are the circumstances under which collective action has worked to address major environmental problems that have a
global impact?

The question for Peter is, what are the circumstances in sort of the last 50 years, where we have seen a significant improvement in human rights in an totalitarian system? And what does that say about the prospects for cooperation?

For Mike the question is, looking at the problem of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, what do we know about what works and what doesn’t and whether this is a problem that can be solved even with those who have the best will in the world?

Who wants to start? Okay, Professor Chang.

DR. CHANG: Yes, it echoes Scott’s comments about based on multidimensional challenges that the U.S. and ROK face, what are the most important areas for collaboration? I think we can concede there are two different areas. The first are the technology transfer aspect and the police aspect, although these two are not mutually exclusive. First in the technology aspect. We need to encourage both the government and private sectors, as I already briefly mentioned in my talk together more explicitly, for example, the private sectors can monitor the carbon dioxide emissions in both countries. I know that China rejected a U.S. monitor of their carbon dioxide emission at the Copenhagen meeting, so I think we need to be very transparent and build trust, which also echoes both countries, the president announced the last year. Based on mutual trust we can monitor this in a more objective way, which can serve as a role model for other countries. This is one area we can collaborate.

And the other aspect is more like a private sector investment, how we can develop more green technology or green jobs. The Korean attempt to create about a million green new jobs in the next upcoming decades and I know that also U.S. tried to attempt to do a similar job. But I heard the other day from NPR that China is also taking a lot of this green technology, a lot of these solar panels are now being created in China rather than in
the U.S. So, maybe the U.S. is just exporting all these ideas to other countries and then whether they're creating jobs in here, so they have some implications how we can collaborate in mutual ways.

The other aspect is more like a police aspect and I think, as I mentioned before, all these global changes, global climate change, occur at the local place. So it's a local area, people can actually manage and implement some concrete actions. There's actually a nice report written by the AAG, stands for Association of American Geographers, "Global Change in Local Places," how each locale have different unique characteristics and they can mitigate and adapt to these climate changes.

We can take some lessons from a lot of the U.S. cities as part of the Clinton Climate Initiatives, the U.S. cities and some world major cities have been collaborating in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and also they have been partly supported by U.S. green building energy concerns, which use more renewable materials and use less energy. And solar is also part of that climate -- Clinton Climate Initiative. We can expand that relationship among other cities both in U.S. and Korea and they can also learn from each other.

There are some cases, for example, the city of Portland in U.S. and Ulsan, they have a sister city relationship. Maybe we can encourage -- we can establish in those sister cities relationships. In the past, they just focused on the economic aspect, but now we can broaden that aspect to include more environmental aspect. We can also make the city more eco-friendly, but, at the same time, create more green jobs, and how each city can learn from each other.

And the other, finally, in terms of more direct policy implication, it is actually the consumer who can actually feel they could make some changes. I know that as gasoline price increases, the U.S. customer immediately responds to these changes. That
was probably one of the reasons why the U.S. government tried to maintain the gasoline price low compared to all other developed countries, less than 30 percent lower compared to OECD countries, but we can also use the same system for carbon crediting. For example, the Koreas are already using the carbon point system. The customers can get a credit back to their bill as long as they use less energy. So we can also quantify these carbon emissions and then credit back to either industry or customers then we can reduce the greenhouse emissions in the long run.

So, these are my comments. Thank you.

MR. BUSH: Thank you. Peter?

MR. BECK: A couple of tough questions. I think it’s fair to say that among the 10 issue areas, the human rights issue, particularly relating to North Korea, is going to be one of if not the most difficult one in terms of achieving tangible progress as a result of cooperation. And so it’s a point well taken that we should consider the possibility of will this failure hurt the alliance. It’s a very good question to ask.

My position would be that even failing would not harm the alliance. I would argue that without cooperation the chances of success are extremely low. With cooperation, they’re higher, but still, we’re unlikely to see change any time soon. But I think the only chance for making progress is a coordinated approach. If it’s just Japan in isolation or countries in isolation trying to approach North Korea, that’s bound to fail, but working together could work. And I don’t see -- and I welcome you or the audience, if you see areas where they could hurt the alliance, I don’t see failing to make progress, if nothing else because our expectations are so low, as really hurting the alliance.

In terms of examples over the last 50 years, I guess the one I briefly or indirectly referred to in my presentation was the Soviet Union and the Helsinki Process, that you did have a process emerge in the 1970s in the context of security, and particularly
nuclear negotiations, that really lead to a process for raising human rights issues with the Soviet Union. But I am also compelled by -- not so much by what Ronald Reagan did, but what Gorbachev decided to do and the fact that you did have well-known visible dissidents like Sakharov, that you need statesmen or potential statesmen on both sides that can -- Helsinki created pressure and then you had statesmen on both sides that were able to take advantage of that pressure and opening.

The other case that I personally was a little involved in as a student at Berkeley was South Africa. And there were demonstrations at Berkeley about divesting from South Africa, getting the university’s investments out of South African companies or investing in South Africa. Just last weekend I taught my daughter the song that we sang. I didn’t even know who he was. She -- my seven-year-old knows more about him than I did at that time, but that was what the student movement in the United States was focused on. And I think it did, again, enlightened leadership, a tremendous statesman in Mandela and de Klerk on the Afrikaner side, but it was the pressure combined with individuals that were in a position to make a change. Unfortunately, we don’t have -- I don’t know who those individuals are in North Korea, so it does make me pessimistic and it’s too easy to think of Burma and Tibet and other seemingly hopeless cases.

MR. BUSH: Thanks. Mike?

MR. FINNEGAN: This is a hard question and there may be others in the room that are more versed in the post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, but I think there’s three things that come to my mind that we know have worked or do work, and that one of them is that we know that the ROK approach in Iraq worked in that situation. Their focus was in working with the local community, building infrastructure, adding stability to the situation, and that worked very well.

We also know from long experience, I think, that a whole of government
approach is what works, that you have to look at this not from a military standpoint. In fact, that's what doesn't work, when you treat this as simply a military problem. You have to look at the economics of it. You have to look at the basic infrastructure that needs to be built to provide that stability.

And the third point I think that we are learning and have learned in Afghanistan is resources. You have to put the right amount of resources against the problem to be successful. I think Korea has understood that. Instead of trying to talk about sending a 50-man PRT or something to Afghanistan, they're talking about a fairly robust PRT element that would be able to conduct the mission.

But we have to understand that in the case of Afghanistan, and this is one of the things where I think we have to be very cautious, this is not post-conflict reconstruction and stability. This is in the middle of an insurgency and there's many activities happening along that continuum of conflict. It's very different from what Korea experienced in Iraq. Korea was in, let's face it, a fairly quiet corner of the country. So, in Iraq, it's going to be a little bit different for Korea. And I think one of the things that will come out of this will be a division of labor where Korea is able to focus on the reconstruction and the stability operations in this geographic area, but allowing the United States and other coalition partners to provide, perhaps, that more robust counterinsurgency envelope around them.

Thank you.

MR. BUSH: Thank you. Scott?

MR. HARROLD: Thank you, Richard. Scott Harold, the RAND Corporation. Two questions, one for Dr. Chang and one for Dr. Finnegan.

First, with respect to climate change and environmental stresses, I wonder if you could say something about how those are going to pose a greater challenge, if you believe they are, in the future to the DPRK? Going forward, as the climate changes around
the peninsula, are we going to see greater famine, greater drought, greater deforestation than we’ve already seen and how might that stress Pyongyang?

And conversely, if we do see a transition away from authoritarian rule in the North and towards reunification, presumably that will come with tremendous investment by the South in the North, leading new reindustrialization, potentially leading to greater output of carbon in the North. Currently the North is pretty -- certainly less production in an industrial sense than the South. Therefore, you might anticipate that actually reunification might lead to a worsening of the peninsula’s carbon emissions. I wonder if you could comment on that.

Dr. Finnegan, you know that the ROK is currently undertaking an effort to enhance the technical capabilities of its military while downsizing the number of forces. That has tremendous implications for a post-conflict or collapse scenario in the North where quite frankly airplanes and ships and submarines don’t substitute well for boots on the ground. I completely echo your call for more training of the ROK in post-conflict stability ops. But I wonder if 300 people, quite frankly, is going to be enough to really help the ROK ground forces deal with the situation that they will encounter when potentially insurgents will continue to exist, tremendous human rights violations have occurred in the North and will need to be redressed, calls for justice by victims of those human rights abuses will exist. You may be dealing with weapon systems that have been used that have consequences for the environment.

So, I guess if you could just comment on the ROK’s overall military strategy going forward and how it fits with a post-collapse scenario, I’d be very interested in hearing your thoughts.

MR. BUSH: Professor Chang?

MR. CHANG: So there are two issues here. The first is what’s the trend in the climate and what’s going to happen in the future as we continue the current development
patterns? And I have to admit that I am not a climate change policy scientist, I'm more like a biophysical scientist. I have a background in hydrology and water resources, and I am also working with the Korean scientists looking at the climate change impact assessment on water resources. I'm going to focus on that aspect.

So, climate change will bring a lot of challenges. For example, as I briefly showed at the beginning, more significant severe droughts and floods. And a lot of these projections suggest that Korea will become wetter in summer and dryer in the winter and early spring. The early spring drought is very significant in terms of this is (inaudible) season, farmers use more water for crops.

And also there are other people looking at the human health issues. What if you have the heat waves which occurred more frequently in the past several years? And the Korean Meteorological Administration, they released a report last year showing all these increasing extreme events and the changing of arability of precipitation and the other concern is the potential sea level rise. A lot of people are living in coastal areas. It's the case for any major cities around the world, not only particularly in Korea, also big cities located in these coastal communities, they might be more vulnerable to these climate change effects and more frequent forest fires and maybe trees can blossom much earlier than in the past years. These have been already found in a lot of scientific literature and there are also several studies looking at the potential impacts of climate change on water resources.

And the second issue is, what if North Korea got developed in the future as a result of reunification or maybe a more direct investment from South Korean companies? And as I said, the deforestation is another major source of climate change. Interestingly, the North Korean economic activity is low, but they have to also clear out a lot of forests, which exacerbates the flood hazards in late 1990s and 2000s. This is just coincidentally after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. They did get less oil from the Soviet Union, they have to rely on more biofuel, they have to cut all these forests to produce these fuels. On top of that, they have very heavy -- the torrential rains, which worsened the problem.

So, I think, in the future we don’t have to follow the same path. Maybe we can move more toward a greener development, maybe use clean technology which traps these carbons. They have plans they can develop more clean technology we can implement in North Korea in the future.

So, I think it requires some kind of paradigm shift. In the past, traditionally, all these developed countries may have transferred all these old technologies to developing countries which now they are facing with the pollution problems, but I think we can change the paradigm and the new developed areas they can have less polluting industries.

MR. BUSH: Mike?

MR. FINNEGAN: I think the ROK has, as you put it, for many years, been trying to leverage technology and figure out ways to downsize its military. However, that downsizing, I think, under the Lee Myung-bak administration has been paused, relooked, the wisdom behind it questioned. But we have to recognize that there is a pressure still, there’s a societal pressure to figure out a way to downsize the military that has to do with the draft and, frankly, would have to do with trying -- if you switched to a volunteer force -- trying to maintain a volunteer force the size of the current ROK military on the population base of the Republic of Korea would be, as RAND has done several studies, very, very difficult. But they are looking at ways to mitigate that downsizing, to change their downsizing plans, I think a lot of that driven by the realization that airplanes and ships don’t do a lot for stabilization in North Korea.

But, having said that, as I said in the presentation, the ROK has taken a different approach, if you will, to what it would take to stabilize or the approach they would
take to stabilize North Korea. It’s not a simply military approach. They have invested significant resources, time, effort, money, in training a civilian workforce that is versed, capable, ready, to take it’s part in stability operations in North Korea.

I think they’re also, at this point, looking for how they build a professional reserve system that would allow them to have something they can fall back on.

You make the point about 300 people going to Afghanistan, I think for -- does that provide them the training to be able to take on North Korea? Obviously, no, but what it does do, and not just the 300 that go there, but if you’re there for several years, it’s the thousands that rotate through, it’s the thousands that rotated through Iraq, it’s the thousands that rotated through all the PKO. They’re building up a tremendously well-versed core cadre of people that understand this type of problem set, that have done it for real, and at the soldier level, at the lower level of a military, these problems aren’t all that different. It has to do with the mindset that you go into the mission with, but the skill set of providing security, of driving vehicles, of doing the normal things a military does, are not that different mission to mission. What’s different is the planning construct, the framework that you’re working within. And I think that’s what ROK-U.S. cooperation in places like Afghanistan can do is help give us a more robust framework at the alliance level to deal with this issue. So, what I would hope would come out of cooperation in Afghanistan would be this idea of a whole of alliance approach that provides that framework for operations that the military can really fall into.

Thanks.

MR. BUSH: Thanks. There’s a question over here.

MR. CHIN: Chow Chin, freelance correspondent.

First, to Professor Chang. In addition to carbon dioxide contribution to the global warming there’s (inaudible) do you know what’s the (inaudible) contribution of
(inaudible) and CO2 to the global warming? And when you talk of global warming I think you didn’t particularly mention Korea that industry production.

And also, what’s the status of green chemistry in South Korea? Green chemistry is a new science. It’s a clean technology and the green production.

To Mr. Finnegan, you are familiar with so-called U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. Peter talked about human rights and Professor Chang talked about climate change. Do you think that these two issues can add to the cooperation? And you talk about the stability, and I would like everybody on the panel to answer these two questions. First is this, what’s the other factor in stability of North Korea? And then, how to deal with from people outside of North Korea? And also --

MR. BUSH: I think that’s enough questions.

MR. CHIN: Okay, this is very important. The alliance cooperation of North Korea and South Korea is very important and how the U.S. and China can help for this alliance cooperation into a reality. And if there’s time, I have another question, too, later on.

MR. CHANG: Okay, let’s talk about -- there are several issues here, the first is the ozone hole. Remember, the ozone is also a greenhouse gas. They’re talking about when the ozone or the (inaudible) ozone is depleted, it actually cools down the upper atmosphere, so it’s the opposite. But the problem is, we are talking about a warming of the lower atmosphere, of long wave radiation emitted from the earth. So it -- there’s nothing to do with the ozone hole with climate change.

And, yes, you’re right, industrial production is the major source of carbon emissions, particularly the cement industry or any -- and the people have actually tried to tease this out, what’s the source of -- but what’s the source of carbon from the industry? But also we have to concede to all other cascading effects when we export materials from one place to another. There’s also transportation cost -- transportation involved, which we can
count as part of the production process or we can separate these. But, yes, industry is the major source.

And what type of industry they are having, for example, in Korea, they used to have a lot of the heavy industry which used a lot of energy, but by moving toward more green industries, they could reduce this carbon (inaudible). There have been several studies as a result of industry with structuring so the carbon emission rate has dropped.

And the third is green chemistry. So to be honest, I don’t have any further update about the status of the current position of green industry in Korea, but they have a lot of plans. Some corporations voluntarily participate in these plans, so like solar panel is or (inaudible) or all these industries. Sometimes the U.S. private company want to invest some money to develop these green chemistry in Korea.

And the broad issues, like how this climate change issue may be associated with human rights and stability, one interesting thing you can consider, as the climate changes, people might migrate from one place to another. For example, there’s a small island in the Indian Ocean. Sea level rise, the whole country, like Maldives, the whole country will disappear if the current rate of sea level is going to continue. They are considering migrating all of their residents to India. The same thing might happen in a lot of coastal areas in terms of sea level rise. And for example, even in the states people living in New Orleans after the Hurricane Katrina, they have been relocated elsewhere. They may not go back to their home because they may fear about getting additional flood damage. They may end up somewhere else in Pacific Northwest or California.

And maybe as a result of climate change, for example, if the North Korean gets more floods, which is closely associated with poor land management, we can think about how that may work as a push factor, may migrate, may send their people out from their region. So, by saying that, one thing we could, in terms of adaptation, is wise land use
planning or, as I said, intelligent spatial planning, which have not been implemented in a lot of countries. But in some European countries and some states they have now considered the land use planning is probably one the only ways we can reduce the potential damage of climate change. So, make space for water, for example. Don’t build buildings on the flood plain. And we can also quantify the value of these natural areas.

There’s an emerging (inaudible) the ecosystem service. I think that’s one area so the U.S. can deliver their expertise to other countries including Korea, how we can actually quantify these services that nature provides us, and what are the target areas which is called a spatial targeting. Which area might serve the best value given all these tradeoffs?

These are some of the areas I can think of. Thank you.

MR. BUSH: Peter?

MR. BECK: I know we’re running out of time and I see there are more questions, so on this issue of stability I’ll be very brief and just say that we’ve had -- it’s always difficult and problematic to try and assess stability in North Korea. But we’ve had two tests in the last year, year and a half, and that is, Kim Jong-ll’s suspected stroke a year ago and more recently the currency revaluation. And in both cases -- well, at least in the case of Kim Jong-ll’s health scare, the situation appears to remain very stable. He just disappeared from view, which isn’t too abnormal for him, at least publicly. But as near as we can tell, things were stable inside the regime and out.

In terms of the currency reform, we’re getting reports of anger and confusion and even some unrest, if you can believe the defector groups and NGOs in South Korea. I always take what they say with a big grain of salt, and some observers are concluding, even Americans, well, this is the last gasp of a desperate regime, it’s the beginning of the end. I don’t take that view. I think if anything the iron fist can get stronger by weakening the invisible hand. And so I don’t think that in and of itself is going to lead to
change in North Korea, but the real test is going to be when Kim Jong-Il has a health situation that he doesn’t recover from and whether they can make a smooth transition to new leadership I think will be the ultimate test for stability in the North.

MR. BUSH: Mike?

MR. FINNEGAN: I think the question about trilateral cooperation, I think in the theoretical and in the policy -- from a policy perspective, trilateral cooperation between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan on a whole host of security issues, including reconstruction and stability operations, is possible. From a practical measure though, I just don’t think we’re going to go down that road any time soon, and that has mainly to do with Japan. The types of operations, particularly with the Afghanistan situation, the idea of Japan being able to make a political decision to commit Japanese forces to such an operation is just unthinkable at this point. So, I think from a practical standpoint, such cooperation remains elusive.

On North Korea, I would just echo what Peter has said. I think what we’ve seen in North Korea, rather than the signs of instability, really are signs of remarkable stability. The way they managed their way through the health scare, if you will, showed that there was a system in place that at least in the short term was able to maintain stability. The question, as Peter put it, is, what happens if we have Kim Jong-Il go through another health situation where he doesn’t recover? Perhaps we have short-term stability, but what about the long term? Can they make that transition?

MR. BUSH: Thank you. For the last question, Dr. Park in the back?

DR. PARK: Thank you. My name is Hyeong Jung Park, visiting fellow at Brookings.

Well, I think we need to expand the cooperation in multilateral level as well as bilateral level. As you know, Korea will host a G-20 Summit in November. Well, the G-20
Summit has built an important agenda such as financial regulations, but we could include some important global issues based on Korea-U.S. strong support. We could consider development and the climate change issue in the G-20 Summit.

So, my question is for Scott Snyder and Professor Chang. So, what do you think about it and will you try it?

Thank you.

MR. SNYDER: Can you repeat that? Sorry?

MR. BUSH: Repeat the question. Elaborate on the question a little bit.

DR. PARK: Well, Korea will host the G-20 Summit in November. Well, G-20 Summit has already some built an agenda, important agenda such as financial regulations, but the Korean government (inaudible) to include some global important issues in the agenda, so we could consider development and climate change issues in G-20 Summit. So, what do you think about it and will you try it?

MR. SNYDER: I do think that there is a way in which climate change issues are coming up in the context of the G-20. I don’t know if it’s going to necessarily be a centerpiece because the issue of financial stability is really going to be, I think, the primary focus, exit strategies, all the issues connected with coming out of the global financial crisis. And so there’s a danger, on the one hand, of trying to overload the agenda and as a result possibly diffusing it. At the same time, Korea needs to try to find a distinctive contribution to make as part of its G-20 role.

Maybe this is something that I can use as a segue to say something kind of to conclude?

MR. BUSH: Yeah, sure.

MR. SNYDER: The alliance -- in fact, another area that’s very interesting to look at is the economic issues related to the U.S.-Korea relationship. I think the
conversation that we’ve had really underscores that this is just one node in a very complex and interdependent global system, but it is a node that has been effective in fostering cooperation in the past and can be made more able to try to address some of the current challenges on the global agenda today.

MR. BUSH: We’ve come to the end of our time. I want to thank all of you for coming and I want to thank our presenters for stimulating a great discussion, and thanks again to Scott Snyder for allowing us to be part of this project. Thank you.

* * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the foregoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2012