Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand

A Survey of the Thai Electorate in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani

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The Asia Foundation
About The Asia Foundation

The Asia Foundation is a non-profit, non-governmental organization committed to the development of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region. The Foundation supports Asian initiatives to improve governance, law, and civil society; women’s empowerment; economic reform and development; sustainable development and the environment; and international relations. Drawing on nearly 60 years of experience in Asia, the Foundation collaborates with private and public partners to support leadership and institutional development, exchanges, and policy research.

With 18 offices throughout Asia, an office in Washington, DC, and its headquarters in San Francisco, the Foundation addresses these issues on both a country and regional level. In 2009, the Foundation provided more than $86 million in program support and distributed nearly one million books and journals valued at over $43 million.
Preface

This report presents the findings of The Asia Foundation (Foundation)’s first survey of the Thai electorate in the three southern border provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. The 2010 Southern Survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews with a random, representative sample of 750 individuals of voting age in the three provinces between July 2 and August 30, 2010.

Building on an earlier national survey of the Thai electorate conducted in 2009, this survey is the latest in a series of democracy assessments that the Foundation has conducted in the countries in which it works. Beginning with a voter education survey conducted in Indonesia in 1999, the Foundation has undertaken numerous public opinion polls and a succession of milestone and follow-up surveys in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and several other countries. These surveys can be accessed at http://www.asiafoundation.org/publications/.

In addition to informing its own country program strategy, the Foundation’s primary purpose in undertaking the 2010 Southern Survey was to provide lawmakers, government officials, political leaders, academics, civil society organizations, the international community, and other stakeholders with information about the opinions of citizens in Thailand’s Deep South. The survey is intended to advance knowledge of issues relevant to the challenges facing political parties, security forces, local administrators, and development assistance providers in addressing the violence that has plagued Thailand’s three southern border provinces since January 2004. It is further intended to measure citizen knowledge of, and attitudes towards, democracy and democratic institutions in the context of democratization in Thailand.

The 2010 Southern Survey was made possible by the generous support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to the Foundation, and was implemented with the technical support of a professional Thai survey firm, MIAdvisory. A special thanks to the author of this report, my predecessor Dr. James Klein, who recently completed a distinguished 15-year tenure as country representative for Thailand.
We hope that the survey findings will prove useful to those who seek a greater understanding of the current state and development of democracy in Thailand and the perceptions of the Thai public in the context of the southern border provinces. We welcome reader feedback.

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Executive Summary

Deep South Demographics
Citizens of the Deep South (defined in this report as residents of Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani provinces) present a mirror image of national demographics, with 94% of the population identifying as Muslim and 6% as Buddhist compared to the national statistical average of 95% Buddhist and 5% Muslim. While the mother tongue of the typical Thai national is the Central Thai dialect or one of the regional Thai dialects, only 13% of southerners speak the Central Thai dialect and 4% the Southern Thai dialect, with the vast majority (83%) learning the Pattani-Malay dialect from their parents.

While following the national trend in the level of citizens aged 20-29 with a higher level of post secondary education than preceding generations, only 39% of southerners have a higher education compared to the national average of 47% in the 20-29 age group, falling to 4% among those aged 60 and over – compared to 7% nationally. There also is a similar urban/rural divide, both nationally and in the Deep South, among those with a higher education.

Data for 2009 indicate that the average household income of southern families is less than the Baht 20,304 monthly national average and, in the case of Pattani (Baht 13,511) and Narathiwas (Baht 11,224), less than in the Northeast, which is generally considered the least economically developed region of the country, with an average monthly income of only Baht 15,358.

Less than 7% of southerners are members of a local militia (chor ror bor), and, contrary to the national conventional wisdom, most members of the militia (89%) are Muslim rather than Buddhists. While Muslims make up more of the militia in absolute numbers, Buddhists are nearly twice as likely (11% versus 6.2%) to be members of a chor ror bor.

The Southern Mood
Citizens of the Deep South are more optimistic about the direction of the country than their compatriots were in 2009. In the national poll, less than one-third (31%) thought the country was going in the right direction, while 58% thought it was going in the wrong direction; in contrast, 46% of southerners thought the country was
going in the right direction and only 41% thought things were going wrong. Nationally, 64% cited the poor economy for why they thought things were going wrong. By 2010 only 41% of southerners who thought the country was going in the wrong direction mentioned the economy — perhaps because of the impact of the government’s economic stimulus policies. In sharp contrast, 39% of southerners noted the conflict in the Deep South compared to only 9% nationally. Among southerners who believed the country was going in the right direction, on the other hand, 47% cited economic growth (28% nationally).

Similarly, when asked about the biggest problem facing Thailand in the 2009 national poll, 60% had pointed to the bad economy compared to only 23% of southerners in 2010, with another 20% pointing to the southern conflict compared to just 3% nationally. The juxtaposition of national and southern perspectives on the economy is perhaps explained by their responses to the question of how they evaluated their personal economic situation compared to two years ago. Nationally, two-thirds (67%) stated they were worse off (54%) or much worse off (13%); only one-third (34%) of southerners stated they were worse off (30%) or much worse off (4%) with 64% indicating they were much better off, better off, or about the same. Thus, 75% of southerners said they were satisfied with the government compared to only 53% nationally in 2009.

**Democracy in Thailand and the Deep South**

At both the national level and in the Deep South, 48% of voters characterize democracy in terms of rights or freedoms, and a third (36%) nationally and a quarter (26%) in the Deep South associate democracy with participation, elections, or majority rule. One in five southerners (21%) could not provide a characteristic of democracy, compared to only 9% at the national level.

The majority of Thais nationally (69%) recognize that political conflict and the difficulties of reaching decisions are a normal part of the democratic process, while those in the Deep South are even more cognizant (76%) of this reality. In spite of its problems, 95% nationally and 82% in the Deep South believe that democracy is the best form of government, although under some circumstances 30% nationally and 29% in the Deep South would accept an unelected authoritarian leader. Nationally, 64% considered the army
to be an important institution and about the right size (69%). Southerners agreed it was important (55%), but more than a third (37%) thought the army was too big.

Southerners (51%) agree with their national peers (52%) that although decisions may be difficult, the majority should compromise with minority views. Despite differences, there is almost national unanimity (98%) and strong consensus (88%) in the Deep South that common values unite Thais. Three-quarters (75%) of southern citizens and 70% nationally are satisfied with how democracy works in Thailand.

**Democratic Values**
In 2010, a significant majority of southerners (75%), like 80% of citizens nationally in 2009, believe that people are free to express their political opinions. Thais are very tolerant of other political views (79% nationally and 72% in the Deep South) and very few would end a friendship over politics (4% in the Deep South and 6% nationally). There is strong support nationally (78%) and in the south (72%) for women in leadership positions, although 18% of men and women in the Deep South think men should advise women on their political choices compared to only 8% nationally.

**Political Interest and Efficacy**
Despite their support for democratic governance, 61% in the Deep South and 55% nationally do not think that the government cares very much about their views. The majority of southerners (57%) and voters nationally (64%) do not believe that their elected representatives in Parliament address constituency problems, while the vast majority (75% in the Deep South and 84% nationally) believe amendments to the Constitution should be put to a national referendum rather than leaving the decision to Parliament.

**Influences on Voting Choice**
Availability/accessibility is the most important criteria influencing a voter’s choice of candidates (50% nationally and 44% in the South). Other important factors are candidate education (20% in the Deep South and 17% nationally) and personal achievements (10% in both the Deep South and nationally). In the Deep South, 9% also consider religious piety or values compared to only 1% nationally.
More than a third (37%) of voters in the Deep South believe that local leaders have strong influence over voters compared to just 16% nationally. Southerners also are more likely (34%) than those nationally (7%) to state that their party or candidate selections are influenced by religious leaders. Two-thirds of southern voters (64%) and a majority nationally (58%) believe that many or some in their area could be influenced by vote-buying.

Civil Society and Trust
Membership in voluntary associations, the foundation of civil society, is relatively low in Thailand (22%), although higher in the Deep South (33%). Typically, Thais belong to farmer groups, women’s associations, and youth groups. This lack of interaction may contribute to the high levels of distrust of other people (61% nationally and 60% in the South). Nevertheless, nationally Thais consider their neighbors trustworthy (74%), even more so in the Deep South (81%). Probed further on trust issues in the Deep South (but not nationally) southern Thais are split on whether or not to trust members of other religions (49% trustworthy; 47% untrustworthy). Women (27%) are much less trusting than men (41%) in general and slightly less trusting of neighbors (78% and 84%, respectively). Likewise they are less trusting of people of other religions (46% versus 53%).

Democratic Institutions
Echoing their national peers, citizens in the Deep South perceive the courts as the only institution with a significant level of high integrity (64% in both the Deep South and nationally). At the other end of the spectrum, police are viewed as the least trusted public institution (39% nationally; 31% in the Deep South). While the army is rated second highest in integrity level nationally (44%), it receives significantly lower marks (23%) in the Deep South, where the Election Commission (35% nationally) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) tie for second place with 42%.

In terms of independence and neutrality, the courts again are the only institution that receive positive marks (58% in the Deep South and 62% nationally), followed in the Deep South by the Election Commission (36% Deep South; 30% nationally). Nationally, the
army’s neutrality ranks second (37%), but southerners have a much lower opinion (16%) of the army, although slightly above that accorded the police (14%).

Overall, a significant majority of Thais (94% nationally; 89% Deep South) believe that corruption is very or fairly common among government officials. Although only 9% reported nationally that they have personally known someone who had to bribe a government official, over a quarter (26%) of those in the Deep South reported this experience.

Causes of the Southern Conflict
The remaining portion of the Southern Survey focuses on issues related to southern unrest. These questions were designed specifically for the Southern Survey and, with a few exceptions, were not asked of national respondents. Consequently, there is little comparative data at the national level.

Over a third (37%) of southerners believe that the main cause of the southern conflict is the failure of officials to understand the local population. Only 17% believe that separatism is the main issue. Two-thirds (65%) believe that ethnic and religious differences are of equal status in explaining the conflict.

Southerners have greatest fear of those causing the unrest (67%), followed by the military (42%). While only 8% of southern voters have experienced detention by security forces either personally or have a close friend or relative who has, 66% are not often or never apprehensive when passing a military checkpoint or patrol.

Few southern citizens (4%, all of which were men) report ever having been abused or intimidated by state officials or security forces, who are rated as always or usually (65%) polite and respectful; although 35% fail to meet this expected standard of a public official. Less than a quarter of southerners (22%) believe that there are never different standards of justice for Pattani-Malay and Thai citizens, while 49% perceive this to be always or usually the case. At the same time, 70% think that Pattani-Malay and Thais have equal economic opportunities.
The majority of southerners (51%) do not believe that the internal migration of Thais to southern Thailand is a significant factor exacerbating the conflict, while 58% think tensions are about the same between migrants and the indigenous Thai population.

**Separatism or Decentralization**
The majority of southerners (56%) believe that local self government would help end the southern conflict. This aligns with a national and southern preference for decentralization as a more effective form of governance (69% nationally; 67% Deep South), with governors elected locally (75% nationally; 71% Deep South).

The majority of southerners (62%) believe that political decentralization might help resolve the southern conflict, although their peers were split nationally in the 2009 poll, with only 48% believing decentralization would help and 45% believing it would not impact on the conflict. The majority of southern citizens (51%) reject the idea of combining the three southern provinces into one administrative area, while 59% prefer retaining the current provinces, each with their own elected governor, with a preference for a local politician (70%) over an experienced outsider (21%). The majority of southerners (56%) would likewise support the election of the local chief of police.

**Acknowledging Uniqueness of Pattani-Malay Culture**
Even without an elected local government, 60% of citizens in the Deep South believe that government recognition of the unique history of the region and the withdrawal of troops would decrease the conflict. Discussion of this issue remains sensitive among the population, with a majority (53%) stating that they do not feel free to discuss this issue (38%) declining to give an opinion (8%), or indicating that they do not know (7%). Nevertheless, Muslims as a minority at the national level and Buddhists as a minority in the Deep South all perceive that they have personal freedom to practice their cultural traditions.

Almost unanimously, 95% of southerners believe that officials stationed in the Deep South should be able to speak Pattani-Malay. They also believe that road signs should be written in both Thai and Yawi (97%) and that students in primary schools should study both Thai and Pattani-Malay (96%).
Introduction

In 2009 the Foundation conducted a national survey to explore citizen views on national reconciliation and political reform; however, due to a combination of lack of qualified local enumerators to conduct face-to-face polling interviews in the three southern provinces and the local security situation, the southern border provinces of Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani were not included in the national sample. To address the first constraint, in cooperation with the Foundation’s polling contractor, MIAdvisory, Foundation staff assisted in the identification of potential enumerators living in the Deep South, which MIAdvisory trained to conduct face-to-face interviews and implement a Deep South survey.

The need for a Deep South survey is critical. From January 2004 through January 2010, Professor Srisomphop Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University’s Deep South Watch has documented 4,100 deaths and 6,509 injuries in Thailand’s southern border provinces, where an indigenous movement seeking the return of the Pattani Sultanate and separation from Thailand re-emerged at the turn of 2004.

To date, the average Thai-Malay citizen has been denied a substantive voice in the peace process, with all peace recommendations resulting from a top-down, Bangkok-based process that has focused on the limited views of Thai-Malay leadership. While the National Reconciliation Commission, and other groups, visited scores of communities throughout the Deep South to canvass grassroots opinions, some observers have suggested that the formal council meeting format that they adopted for eliciting information did not take into account fundamental characteristics of traditional community interpersonal interaction. At its most basic level, this means villagers will not express their views in the presence of officials, and senior outside officials in particular, in formal settings. More problematic, even the Thai-Malay leadership that spoke in these meetings was often reluctant to fully express its views, fearing that comments might be misconstrued and consequently lead officials to associate them with insurgent forces.
What are the perceptions of southern citizens toward the ongoing violence and alternatives for mitigating the violence? Unfortunately, most statistical data is undependable because Thai survey data is normally based on telephone interviews, with samples limited to households with a fixed landline telephone. According to the 2000 Thailand Census, less than 28.0% of households in Thailand have a fixed line, and this percentage is significantly lower in rural areas and the three southern provinces. As a result, all national surveys – not just southern surveys – which limit their samples to less than one-third of households, are not reliable indicators of the views held by the more than 70% of the households nationwide that do not have a land line.

Another problem associated with typical surveys in Thailand is that they are normally conducted only in the Thai language. In test surveys, the Foundation confirmed that the typical Thai-Malay respondent in the three southern border provinces was more comfortable communicating in the Pattani-Malay dialect than in Thai. Accordingly, the Foundation cooperated with a number of linguists to translate the survey questionnaire and each respondent was offered the opportunity to participate in the survey in either Thai or the Pattani-Malay dialect.

Further information about the methodology used to conduct this survey can be found in the appendix at the end of the report.
Chapter 1
Deep South Demographics
1.1 Religion
What is your religion? (S9)

The population of the Deep South is predominantly Muslim (94%), with only 6% identified as Buddhist. This is the opposite of the Thai national religious demographic as presented in the 2000 Population and Housing Census, in which Buddhists are a majority at approximately 94.6% and Muslims are a minority at 4.6%.

Although Buddhists constitute 14% of urban residents in the Deep South, only 51% of the total Buddhist population in the Deep South lives in urban areas; the other 49% are rural residents.

The number of Buddhists varies in each province, with 41% of southern Buddhists living in Yala province, where they constitute 10% of the population; a third (36%) in Pattani, where Buddhists make up 7% of the population; and the balance (23%) in Narathiwat, where Buddhists are the smallest minority of only 4%.
1.2 Mother Tongue
In which language did you learn to speak (mother tongue)? (S1)

The dominant mother tongue in the Deep South, spoken by 83% of the population, is Pattani-Malay, one of many Malay dialects spoken throughout Malaysia and Indonesia. The standard, or Central Thai, dialect is spoken by 13% of the population, a quarter of whom live in urban areas. The Southern Thai dialect, widely spoken throughout other regions of southern Thailand, is the mother tongue of only 4% of those in the Deep South.

Pattani-Malay is the mother tongue of 88% of Muslims in the Deep South, although one in ten (10%) learned the Central Thai dialect.
from birth, and another 1% learned the Southern Thai dialect. More than half of the Buddhists (55%) speak the Central Thai dialect, while 41% speak the Southern Thai dialect. Surprisingly, 4% of Buddhists actually spoke Pattani-Malay from birth.

Yala has the highest concentration of Central Thai speakers (22%) and Southern Thai speakers (7%), while Narathiwas has the highest concentration of Pattani-Malay (89%) speakers and the lowest number of Central Thai (7%) and Southern Thai dialect (3%) speakers.

Nearly all Pattani-Malay speakers (99.7%) are Muslims and the majority (70%) of those who speak the Southern Thai dialect are Buddhists. Southern Thai Buddhists women are far more likely to speak the southern dialect (60%) than men (40%).

Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, nearly three-quarters (74%) of those speaking the Central Thai dialect in the Deep South are Muslims. This is a significant factor when
interpreting questionnaire data based on dialect because those speaking Central Thai are a mixture of local Muslims, local-born southern Thai Buddhists, and Buddhist migrants to the Deep South (either farmers, businessmen, or officials). Thus, the perspective of local-born southern Thai Buddhists may be provided best by speakers of the southern Thai dialect, rather than the Central Thai dialect.

While 80% of Muslims and 96% of Buddhists can read Thai, literacy is correlated with age. Although 100% of those aged 18-19, and 98% among those in their 20s (including both Muslims and Buddhists) are able to read Thai, the proportion declines to only 37% among those over age 60. Similarly, 83% of 18-19 year olds can read Yawi (the Pattani-Malay dialect written in an Arabic script), while only 52% of those aged 60 and over can read it.
1.3 Education
Could you please tell me your highest education? (S7)

Nationally, 31% of those surveyed have some form of post-secondary education compared to 18% in the Deep South. Indicative of improvements in the Thai educational system over past decades, those aged 20-29 have the highest level of post-secondary education (47% nationally and 39% in the Deep South), which decreases each generation to only 7% nationally and 4% in the Deep South for those aged 60 and older. Urban residents are more likely to have post-secondary education (44% nationally and 29% in the Deep South) compared to their rural neighbors (23% nationally and 16% in the Deep South).

Among the southernmost provinces, residents of Yala have the highest level (25%) of post-secondary education compared to only 17% in Pattani and 15% in Narathiwat. Buddhists have slightly higher (20%) levels than Muslims (18%). Central Thai speakers are more likely (33%) to have a higher education than either Pattani-Malay speakers (17%) or speakers of the southern Thai dialect.
1.4 Household Income (Urban)
Could you please tell me your monthly household income which means the income of all household members (including all sources of income) – Urban (S6)

In 2009, the National Statistical Office determined that the average national household income was Baht 20,304, with a high in Bangkok of Baht 37,732 and a low of Baht 15,358 in the Northeast. Deep South income levels were in the lower stratum, with a high of Baht 19,619 in Yala to lows of Baht 13,511 in Pattani and Baht 11,244 in Narathiwats. Yet in 2010, 36% of southern households reported average income of Baht 15,000 to 34,999 per month, while 16% in Narathiwats reported income of Baht 35,000 to 49,999 and 8% in Pattani more than Baht 50,000 per month.

One in five (21%) Muslim households report income of less than Baht 8,000 per month, compared to only 11% of Buddhist households. Buddhists (46%) are more likely than Muslims (35%) to be in the mid-income level of Baht 15,000m-34,999, particularly those Buddhists who speak the Southern Thai dialect (52%).
1.5 Household Income (Rural)

Could you please tell me your monthly household income which means the income of all household members (including all sources of income) – Rural (S6)

In rural areas of the Deep South, 51% of households report an average monthly income of less than Baht 8,000, while 26% report less than Baht 5,000 as compared to 20% among those in urban areas.

Over a quarter (27%) of rural Muslims and Buddhists report income under Baht 5,000 per month. At the next income level, 33% of Buddhist households depend on Baht 5,000 to 7,999 per month compared to only 25% of Muslim households. A third of Muslim households (35%) have monthly incomes between Baht 8,000 to 19,999 compared to only 30% of Buddhist rural households. There is no significant difference between the rural household incomes of
1.6 Militia Membership

Are you a member of a chor ror bor (militia)? (S10)

As a measure taken to control southern violence, the government has established local militia (chor ror bor), although media reports often identify militia members as the instigators of conflict and of attacks by Buddhists against Muslim targets. Throughout the Deep South, only 6.5% are members of the militia (70% male; 30% female). The majority of militia members live in rural areas, with Yala having the highest concentration among its citizens (11.8%). Nearly half (47%) of all militia live in Yala and another third (35%) live in Narathiwas.

Contrary to conventional wisdom that the militia is predominantly Buddhists, survey data indicates that most militia members are Muslims (89%), and that 6% of Muslims belong to the militia, while 11% of southern Buddhists are militia members.
Chapter 2
The Southern Mood
2.1 Direction of the Country

Generally speaking, do you think things in Thailand today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? (Q1)

Southern citizens are more optimistic about the direction their country is taking than citizens had indicated nationwide in 2009. Only 41% of southerners felt the country was moving in the wrong direction compared to the 2009 national average of 58%. The only group in the Deep South in which more than 50% think the country is moving in the wrong direction was those with a diploma/vocational education (54%). Rural southerners are most optimistic about the direction of the country (48%), with only 39% of urban citizens expressing optimism. The results of the Foundation’s upcoming 2010 National Survey should clarify whether the significant difference in optimism between southerners and the nation as a whole reflects a regional variation or (if national optimism significantly increases) whether it is perhaps the result of the government’s economic stimulus package (Thai khemkaeng).

1 The 2010 National Survey results are scheduled for release in March 2011.
2.2 Direction of the Country: Reasons for Wrong Direction
Why do you say that? (Wrong direction reasons) (Q2)

In the 2009 National Survey, the most common reasons given by those who thought the country was going in the wrong direction were related to the bad economy (64%), followed by the ongoing political conflict at the national level (41%). In sharp contrast, only 41% of the 2010 respondents from the Deep South cited the bad economy, with this view placed on an almost equal footing with the conflict in the Deep South (39%), which was cited by only 9% of national respondents. Vocational and diploma graduates (47%), urban southern residents (44%), Muslims (42%) and women (47%) were more concerned about the economy than were their rural neighbors (40%), Buddhists (25%), and men (36%).

Rural residents and vocational and diploma graduates (44%) were more concerned about the southern conflict than those in urban areas (25%) or primary school graduates (40% and 31% of BA and higher graduates. Muslims (40%) were nearly twice as concerned about the southern conflict as Buddhists (24%), while women (25%) were likewise more concerned about the conflict than men (16%). Southern Thai speakers were the least concerned about the southern conflict (9%) and the most concerned with the national political conflict (73%), although a third (35%) of Muslims and half (51%) of Buddhists shared concerns about the national level conflict, along with 40% of those with vocational/diploma education.
2.3 Direction of the Country: Reasons for Right Direction

Why do you say that? (Right direction reasons) (Q2)

Among those who indicated that the country was moving in the right direction, 47% of southern respondents cited economic growth in contrast to only 28% of the respondents from the 2009 National Survey. Rural southerners (50%) were much more inclined to cite positive economic growth than their urban neighbors (33%). Positive factors cited by respondents both at the national level and in the Deep South were improved social services such as health and education. More particularly mentioned in the Deep South were infrastructure developments such as the building of roads and new schools. Both the national sample and the southern sample cited democratic liberalization (7%) as another positive indicator.

Muslims (48%) were more impressed with the economy than Buddhists (34%), while Buddhists (45%) more often cited improved social services than did Muslims (26%). Likewise 30% of women and 23% of men mentioned social services.
2.4 Biggest Problem Facing Thailand

*In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Thailand? (Q3)*

When asked about the biggest problem facing Thailand, 60% of all respondents in the 2009 National Survey indicated that the bad economy was the most significant issue. In sharp contrast, only 23% of southerners mentioned the economy, while another 22% cited political conflict or the southern conflict (20%). In sharp contrast to the significance placed on the southern conflict (20%) in the Deep South, it was cited by just 3% of 2009 national respondents as the biggest problem facing Thailand, with a low of only 2% in the Central Plains and Northeast and a high of 6% in the Deep South. Citizens in the Deep South also highlighted illicit drugs (17%) as a major problem, which received insignificant (0.7%) recognition in the national poll.

While males and females were equally concerned about the economy (23%), women in the Deep South were far more anxious about the southern conflict (25%) than males (16%). Men expressed greater concern (19%) than women (15%) about drugs, as did Muslims (18%) compared to Buddhists (8%).
2.5 Economic Well-Being

Thinking about your own personal economic situation now compared to two years ago, would you say you are much better off, better off, worse off, much worse off, or about the same? (Q4)

It was not surprising in the 2009 National Survey that almost 60% of the population thought Thailand was heading in the wrong direction when two-thirds (67%) said their personal economic situation had gotten worse or much worse in the previous two years. Among those who thought Thailand was heading in the wrong direction, 91% said they were financially worse off, much worse off, or about the same as they had been two years ago. In the Deep South, where only 41% thought the country was going in the wrong direction, 41% perceived themselves to be much better off or better off and two-thirds (64%) reported being much better off, better off, or about the same.

Only a third (34%) of the Muslim community perceived themselves to be worse off compared to 46% of the Buddhist community. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of the Muslim community were optimistic about the economy, seeing themselves as better off or about the same, compared to only 55% of their Buddhist neighbors.
Although women in the Deep South were equally split between better or worse off (38% for both), the majority of men considered themselves much better or better off (44%), with only 31% reporting a decline in their economic situation. This may be due to an increase in female-headed households as a result of the detention, death, or injury of male family heads.

Those with a BA or higher degree reported the highest levels of being better off (52%), followed by those with a diploma/vocational education and those with a primary education (both 44%), compared to only 35% of those with a secondary education.
2.6 Satisfaction with Government

Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the job the national government is doing? (Q5)

In view of their perceived improved economic status, it is not surprising that a significant majority (75%) of those in the Deep South are satisfied with the job that the government has been doing, a view expressed by 86% among Buddhists and 75% among Muslims. This is significantly more than the small majority (53%) in the 2009 National Survey who said they were fairly or very satisfied with the job the government was doing, which was a strikingly high approval rate given that 67% said they were worse off economically than they were two years ago. The Foundation’s upcoming 2010 National Survey should shed light on any changes in satisfaction levels over the past year.
3.1 Understanding Democracy
A lot of people in Thailand today are talking about democracy. If a country is called a democracy, what does that mean to you? (Q12 –Q13)

When asked about the characteristics of a democracy, almost half (48%) of both the national respondents and those in the Deep South describe democracy in terms of rights or freedoms. While rights and freedoms are not unique to democracies, they are often associated with democratic political systems. Just over a quarter (26%) in the Deep South associates democracy with elections, participation, and majority rule compared to 36% in the 2009 national poll. Nationally, only 9% could not provide any characteristic of a democracy, while in the Deep South this rose significantly to 21%. This suggests that the need for civic education on the meaning of democracy is greater in the Deep South than in the rest of Thailand. While men and women in the Deep South hold relatively similar views, there is a significant variation between provinces, with one in three (34%) respondents in Pattani unable to identify any characteristic of a democracy compared to 18% and 9%, respectively, in Narathiwats and Yala. Similarly 32% of those with only a primary education could not identify any characteristic compared to 13% of secondary graduates, 11% of diploma/vocational graduates, and 2% of those with a BA or higher.
3.2 Support for Democracy

In democratic countries, there is always conflict so this makes it difficult to make decisions: What’s your opinion towards this statement? (Q14)

Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (Q16)
Thais are realistic in their assessment of democracy, with a strong national majority (68%), and an even stronger Deep South majority (76%), recognizing that political conflict is a normal part of the democratic process, and that it can be difficult to reach consensus or to make decisions. Regardless of these drawbacks, the people of Thailand overwhelmingly believe democracy is the best form of government (95%), with southerners holding slightly less confidence in democracy (82%). Nationally, these findings were remarkably consistent across regions, with only the intensity of support varying from a low of 54% who strongly agree with the statement in the Deep South to a high of 81% who strongly agree in the central region. In the Deep South, however, those who strongly agree (34%) are significantly less than nationally (69%) with a low of 26% in Yala and a high of 39% in Pattani. Buddhists agree on this more than Muslims (91% to 23%).
Respondents, both nationally and in the Deep South, are split in their opinions as to whether it is more important to compromise with the minority to build as much consensus as possible for government decisions, or if the majority preference should always take precedence when decisions are made. While 52% nationally and 51% in the Deep South favored compromise, almost as many (46% and 44%) said the majority opinion should be respected. Nationally, support for majority rule was lowest in the urban north (35%) and urban south (39%), and highest in the rural south (53%). Within the Deep South, diploma/vocational graduates (53%), rural Yala voters (52%), and rural Narathiwat voters (48%) expressed the greatest support for majority rule. Buddhists, who are the minority in the Deep South, are far more supportive of compromise (68%) than Muslims (49%). Likewise 56% of women and 45% of men support compromise whereas 49% of males and only 39% of females favor majority rule.
3.4 National Identification

Despite our differences, as Thais we have many values that unite us. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (Q17)

Although recent political events both nationally and in the Deep South have prompted some to see increasing polarization in Thai society, the Thai people as a whole believe strongly that there is more that unites them than divides them. This is consistent with the 2009 National Survey finding that political polarization exists primarily at the narrow margins of society, with the majority inhabiting a less contentious middle ground. At the national level, 72% overall strongly support the statement, with 26% somewhat supportive, for a total of 98%. In the Deep South, support remains significant but only 88% support the statement. Support among the southern Buddhist community (99%) is consistent with the national average, while the southern Muslim community is less positive overall (88%). Nationally, results were relatively consistent across demographic and geographic groups, with the lowest levels of strong support seen in central Bangkok (58%) and the Deep South (59%). The highest levels of strong support in the Deep South were observed in urban Yala (57%) and urban Pattani (51%). Even stronger support was seen among diploma/vocational graduates (63%) and graduates with a BA or higher degree (62%), compared to only 41% among primary graduates and 40% of secondary graduates.
3.5 Support for Authoritarianism

On some occasions, democracy doesn’t work. When that happens there are people that say we need a strong leader who doesn’t have to be elected through voting. Others say that even if things don’t function, democracy is always the best. What do you think? (Q18)

While a strong majority (68% nationally and 65% in the Deep South) sees democracy as always the best form of government, almost a third would support authoritarian rule in some circumstances. Findings on this question were relatively consistent across age and gender, with minor variations observed regionally. The highest levels of support for authoritarian government were seen among holders of a BA or higher degree (48%) in the Deep South, women in Pattani (45%), Muslims in the Deep South (37%), and residents in the rural Northeast (36%) and rural South (35%). The lowest figures were found among southern diploma/vocational graduates (19%) and residents in rural Yala (22%) and the rural Central region (26%).
3.6 Role of the Army in Politics

Many people think the army plays too big a role in Thai politics, while others see the army as an important independent institution that has helped safeguard and stabilize the country. Which is closer to your view? (Q10)

Even though only a third of Thais nationally would accept an authoritarian government under some circumstances, the majority of voters at both the national level (64%) and in the Deep South (55%) sees the military (which has traditionally controlled authoritarian governments in Thailand) as an independent institution that plays an important role in protecting and stabilizing the country. This sentiment was similar across age groups and gender, but varied by region from a bare majority (53%) in Bangkok who felt the army served an important role, to 71% in the Central region. Among the three southern border provinces, respondents in Narathiwat (59%) and Yala (56%) were the most supportive of the military as an institution, with a low of 49% in Pattani. Buddhists in the Deep South were overwhelmingly supportive of the role played by the military (88%) compared to their Muslim neighbors (53%). Whereas more than one in three Muslims (37%) felt the army played too big a role, only 11% of Buddhists shared this sentiment. Nearly half of diploma/vocational graduates (49%) and 40% of BA and higher graduates believe the army plays too big a role compared to a third (34%) of primary and secondary school graduates.
3.7 Size of the Army

*How about the size of the army? Do you think the army is too small, the right size, or too big? (Q11)*

National respondents overwhelmingly thought that the military is the right size (69%) rather than too small (10%), or too big (13%), with responses similar across regions, age, and gender. In the Deep South only a marginal majority share this view, with 54% thinking the military was the right size rather than too small (5%), and over one-third (37%) thinking it was too big. The proportion of those that view the army as too big rises to 44% in Pattani and 40% in Yala, however, only 18% of females in Narathiwats share this view.
3.8 Perception of Government

Which of these is closest to your view of what the government should be? (Q23)

The understanding of democracy revealed through earlier questions is echoed here, with a national majority of 70% and a smaller majority of 58% in the Deep South viewing the government and people as equals. Still, 24% in the Deep South express a paternalistic view of government that sees the government as father, while 14% view the government as a boss. Almost four in ten (38%) do not characterize the appropriate role of government in democratic terms, suggesting the need for civic education on this issue. As with the national sample, understanding of the appropriate role of government in the Deep South varies by age, with older voters slightly more likely to support non-democratic interpretations.
3.9 Satisfaction with Democracy in Thailand

In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the way democracy works in Thailand? (Q19)

Seven in ten (70%) Thais nationally and three-quarters (75%) in the Deep South are satisfied to some extent with democracy in Thailand. High levels of satisfaction are even more significant in the Deep South (22%) than nationally (17%). Dissatisfaction is greatest in Bangkok (37%) and the Northeast (35%) and among Muslims in the Deep South (23%), while satisfaction is highest in the North (80%) and the Deep South (80%), and among 78% of secondary school and diploma/vocational graduates in the Deep South.
3.10 Ratifying Constitutional Amendment

Do you think a new or amended constitution should be put to a referendum, or is it enough for it to be endorsed by Parliament? (Q6)

An overwhelming majority (84%) at the national level and in the Deep South (75%) believes that a new or revised Constitution should be ratified through a referendum. This suggests that many of those who want to change the 2007 Constitution nevertheless approve of the process through which it was enacted. This finding also reinforces the notion that the Thai people want increased public participation in the constitutional reform process. Support for a referendum in the Deep South is relatively consistent among urban (72%) and rural (75%) residents, but those in Yala province are at the national level (84%) of support for a referendum, compared to 73% in Narathiwats and a low of 69% in Pattani.
Chapter 4
Democratic Values
4.1 Freedom of Speech

Do people feel free to express their political opinions in the area where you live? (Q22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pattani</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narathiwas</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yala</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A significant majority (80%) of national respondents believed in 2009 that their fellow citizens feel free to express their political opinions. In 2010, 75% of respondents in the Deep South hold this view. This is largely consistent with polling in other Asian countries: Indonesia 83% (1999) and Bangladesh 77% (2006). Freedom of expression of political views in the Deep South varied from 85% in Pattani to 65% in Yala, with 90% of the southern Buddhist population expressing this view compared to only 74% of Muslims. Diploma/vocational graduates were the most likely (27%) to state that they did not feel free to express their opinions.
4.2 Political Tolerance

Do you think that all political parties, even the ones most people do not like, should be allowed to hold meetings in your area? (Q20)

Suppose a friend of yours supported a party that most people did not like. Would you accept that, or would it end your friendship? (Q21)
Nationally (79%) and in the Deep South (72%), Thais are very politically tolerant. Tolerance also is common at a personal level, where just 6% nationally and 4% in the Deep South said that a friendship would end if a friend joined an unpopular party. This finding, combined with others in the survey, suggests that the extreme political polarization depicted by the media in Thailand may be representative of a relatively small proportion of the population, including in the strife-torn Deep South.

At the national level in 2009 there was a significant split among men and women in tolerance for political meetings, with 14% of men saying “no” to political meetings, compared to 22% of women. This difference was not as significant in the Deep South, where 20% of men and 22% of women opposed political meetings of this kind. The difference was more significant between Muslims (21%) and Buddhists (17%).

The regions most tolerant of political meetings in 2009 were Bangkok and the North, with 87% reporting that they would allow meetings of unpopular parties. Those most likely to end a friendship based on political affiliation were in the Northeast (9%) and South (10%).
A very strong majority of Thais, both men (78%) and women (78%) nationally and men (73%) and women (72%) in the Deep South, believe that political leadership is the domain of men. Regionally, belief that leadership is mostly for men ranged from a high in the North and Northeast of 85% to a low of 63% in the Deep South and in central Bangkok. In the Deep South, Muslims (74%) are more likely than Buddhists (57%) to prefer the dominance of men in politics. This finding suggests that there may be value in future efforts to promote greater public education on gender equality both nationally and in the Deep South.
4.4 Women’s Political Choice

Do you think a woman should make her own choice for voting, or do you think men should advise her on her choice? (Q58)

In contrast to their attitudes toward women in positions of political leadership, most Thais nationally (92%) and in the Deep South (81%) support the idea that women should be free to make their own choice in voting. Buddhists in the Deep South are nearly unanimous (99%) in their support of a woman’s right to make her own voting choice compared to only 80% among the Muslim community. The percentage favoring women’s political choice in Thailand is higher than in any other country surveyed by the Foundation over the last decade. For example, it is 20% higher than the response to a similar question asked in Indonesia in 2003.
Chapter 5
Political Interest and Efficacy
5.1 Political Alienation
Some people say, “I don’t think that the national government cares very much about what people like me think.” Do you agree or disagree? Strongly, or somewhat? (Q28)

Thais nationally are divided on their opinion as to whether or not the government cares what they think, with 55% believing the government does not care, and a substantial minority (43%) believing that it does. Results are similar across regions and demographic groups. In the Deep South, however, 61% think the government does not care what they think. This perception is particularly strong among the Muslim community (63%) when compared to the Buddhists in the Deep South (35%), who are far more confident (64%) that the government cares what they think. This difference in perception (evident in other findings) is significant and reflects a general feeling among Muslims that they are treated differently than Buddhists. Diploma/vocational graduates express the greatest concern (70%) that the government does not care about them, compared to only 56% of primary school graduates. This suggests that lower-income primary school graduates may be greater beneficiaries of government programs than those that are moving into the ranks of the middle class.
5.2 Political Efficacy

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over national government decisions? A lot, some, very little or none at all? (Q29)

As seen in responses to the previous question, nationally a slight majority believe the government cares what they think. Some of this opinion may be attributable to an interpretation of “care” in a paternalistic sense (i.e., a parent cares for a child), rather than as genuine government interest in citizen opinion, because when asked if they thought they could influence government decision-making, 80% of respondents nationally and 74% in the Deep South said that their opinion will have very little or no influence on government decision-making. In total, just 19% nationally and 22% in the Deep South thought they could have at least some influence on policy. Feelings of political efficacy were greatest in the Northeast, where a quarter (25%) felt they had some or a lot of influence over government decision making and among the Buddhist community in the Deep South (32%). Although diploma/vocational graduates expressed the greatest concern about the government not caring about them, on a par with higher income groups in the Deep South, one in three (33%) believe that they can have an impact on government policy.
5.3 Quality of Representation

If you think about the persons elected to Parliament, suppose someone said: “My MP addresses the major problems of my constituency in Parliament”. Would you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly? (Q30)

![Chart showing responses to the question about MP addressing major problems.]

The belief by a strong majority that they have little influence over government decision-making may contribute to their generally low assessment of the quality of representation provided by their Members of Parliament. Just a third (33%) nationally and 41% in the Deep South thought their MP generally addressed their major concerns in Parliament. Satisfaction with MPs was highest both nationally (43%) and in the Deep South (50%) among 50-59 year olds. It was higher in the North (37%) and lowest in the central region (27%). By comparison, those in Pattani (46%) and Narathiwat (44%) were the highest in agreement, followed by 30% in Yala. Primary school graduates (43%) agreed far more than university graduates (34%) that their MPs addressed their interests. Taken together, the findings on political efficacy suggest that Thais in general feel a lack of constructive engagement with the political process. They question the quality of representation and accountability provided by their current representatives. This sense of frustration creates a political opportunity for those candidates and representatives that can convince voters that they both care about their opinion, and will act on it.
Chapter 6
Influences on Voting Choice
6.1 Choosing a Candidate

Different people consider different factors when deciding which candidate to vote for. Please tell me which factor is most important to you. (Q31)

The single greatest factor influencing voters’ choice of candidate is the candidate’s availability and accessibility, with fully half nationally (50%) and 44% in the Deep South selecting this option. Other important factors include education (17% nationally and 20% in the Deep South) and personal achievements (10% both nationally and in the Deep South). The most striking difference between the national level and the Deep South is seen in the importance of religious piety and values, with 9% in the Deep South (10% in the Muslim community) thinking this was important compared to just 1% in the Buddhist community. This more traditional political understanding and sensibility among respondents in the Deep South compared to Thais nationally is also reflected in the other findings in the chapter.
### 6.2 Choosing a Party

**Okay, that was for candidates, but what about parties? What attribute do you consider most important for a party?** (Q32)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
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<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party achievements</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program and proposals</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party history</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection to religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family voting tradition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is little difference between Thais at the national level and in the Deep South on how they choose a party, except in the relative importance given to the leaders of the party at the national level, and the importance of party connection to religion in the Deep South.

A majority of voters look to the past for clues to the future performance of a party, with 57% nationally and 55% in the Deep South saying that the past history or accomplishments of the party were the most important factor in their decision. Party history and achievements were more important to the Buddhist community (69%) than their Muslim neighbors (53%). A fifth (22%), both nationally and in the Deep South, thought the current plans of the party most important, while another fifth nationally (19%) would choose based on the character and accomplishments of the party’s leaders. For those in the Deep South, party leadership was less important (10%) with more attention paid to religious connections (10%).
6.3 Influence of Local Leaders

Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree, “Because it’s hard to know the candidates, or which candidate will be best for our area, it makes sense to follow the recommendations of local leaders when deciding who to vote for.” (Q24)

While just 16% of Thais nationally thought it made sense to follow the advice of local leaders, more than a third (37%) held that opinion in the Deep South, again suggesting a greater need for civic education in the southern border provinces than in other parts of Thailand. This finding also supports the perception that society is more traditional in the Deep South, as reflected in other survey findings.

Although it is commonly asserted that local leaders have strong influence over voters, poll findings suggest the opposite, with just 16% at the national level agreeing that following the recommendations of local leaders makes sense. However, over one-third of respondents in the Deep South (37%) are influenced by local leaders. Older voters are more susceptible to the influence of local leaders, with 22% of those over 50 years old at the national level and 40% in the Deep South agreeing. Nationally, women (18%) were slightly more susceptible than men (13%), yet in the Deep South they were equally susceptible (38%). Similarly,
Buddhists and Muslims were equally susceptible (38%). Regional responses to this question were relatively similar except in the Northeast, where a quarter (25%) said it made some sense to listen to local leaders, compared to an average in the other regions of just 11%, thus indicating that those in the Deep South are the most susceptible (37%) to this perception. Diploma/Vocational graduates and those with a primary school education in the Deep South are twice as likely (44% and 40%, respectively) to be influenced by local leaders than university graduates (20%).
6.4 Influence of Family
Do you think family members should follow the advice of the household head when deciding how to vote, or should they make their own choice? (Q25)

Nationally, almost all Thai people (90%) believe that family members should make their own choice in voting. This finding was relatively consistent across regions, except in both the North and the Deep South, where 18% thought family members should follow the advice of the household head, 21% among primary school graduates.

Muslim respondents were more receptive (19%) to household advice, compared to only 6% of Buddhists voters. Female voters in Pattani (27%) were the most influenced by family in the Deep South, while male voters in Yala (6%) were the least open to family influence.
6.5 Role of Religion in Politics

Religious leaders are often viewed as moral leaders in the community. Some people say religious leaders should be more involved in politics, while others think they should avoid involvement in worldly affairs and concentrate on the moral and religious needs of the community. Which is closer to your view? (Q26)

While just 8% of Thais nationally think that religious leaders should be more involved in politics, four times as many Muslims (31%) hold this view in the Deep South, and twice as many Buddhists (17%). More than a third (36%) of the middle household income earners want more involvement by religious leaders, compared to only a quarter (25%) of lower income earners. These findings suggest that, while there may be a religious element in the social conservatism of the Deep South, there are also common cultural attributes that cross the religious divide.
6.6 Influence of Religious Leaders

If your religious leader encouraged you to support a particular party or candidate, how much influence do you think that would have on your own voting decision: a lot, a little, not much, none at all? (Q27)

In addition to sharing an almost complete consensus that religious leaders should not be involved in politics, a similar majority at the national level (91%) indicate that the political opinion of religious leaders would have little or no effect on their voting decision. This is in sharp contrast to the Deep South, where 34% of both genders indicated that religious leaders could influence their voting decisions. Voters under the age of 20 and over the age of 60 (40% and 41%, respectively) were the most open to such influence, while those in their thirties and those in upper income levels were the least likely to be influenced by religious leaders (26% and 25%, respectively), but still far more than the national average.
6.7 Perception of Vote-buying

*If a political party offered money, food, or gifts to voters in this area, how many would vote for it because of that: very many, some, a few, almost no one? (Q33)*

A solid majority (58% nationally and 64% in the Deep South) believe that voters in their area could be influenced by vote-buying. This perception, whether accurate or not, undermines the credibility of the election process and the perceived legitimacy of elected representatives. This finding was very consistent across regions, with the greatest variation seen in the response “almost no one,” which ranged from a high of 16% in the rural North, to a low of just 7% in the rural South and 5% in the Deep South.
Chapter 7
Civil Society and Trust
### 7.1 Membership in Associations

Which organization/association are you a member or do you join? (Q34)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Association</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth association</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student association</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (only micro-credit)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (advocacy, awareness)</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (micro-credit, others)</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s association</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports and recreational club</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social club</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade association (group, chamber)</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious association (non-political)</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union</td>
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<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer group</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious charity group</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
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<td>Teacher association</td>
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<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer / journalist association</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village fund (such as the saving group)</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village health volunteer</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / None</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although membership in voluntary associations was relatively low in Thailand, (just 22%), it was significantly higher in the Deep South where a third (33%) belong to at least one association. To put this in a regional perspective, when the question was asked in Bangladesh (TAF 2006) — a country viewed as having a relatively weak civil society — 29% reported belonging to some form of association; while in Indonesia, which is generally acknowledged to have the strongest civil society in Asia, a 1999 survey reported 72% belonging to an association.

This finding – denser association life in the conflict-ridden Deep South than in the relatively conflict-free north – may be counter-intuitive, as generally peace is seen as a key precursor for association formation. The explanation may be that culturally ethnic Malay are more open to association formation than Thais or Sino-Thais, so that in a conflict-free environment the Pattani-Malay might have association rates closer to the 72% of ethnic Malay in Indonesia.

Nationally, Thais are most likely to belong to some sort of saving association, particularly in rural areas, where 13% report belonging to a saving group or coop agricultural bank. Southerners are more likely to belong to a women’s association (18% of females or 6% of women nationally) or to a youth association (10% of males, or 1.4% of men nationally).

The very low level of association membership in Thailand can perhaps be attributed to the high levels of societal distrust described below. Future democratization initiatives in Thailand could potentially include programs that promote the formation and strengthening of voluntary associations.
7.2 Trust in Society

*Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted? (Q35)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t want to give opinion/Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yala</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narathiwas</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattani</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A majority of people in Thailand (61%) say that most people cannot be trusted. Trust is the necessary glue for voluntary association formation, and the lack of societal trust would certainly be one factor in the low levels of association membership. It is no surprise, then, that the North, Northeast and Deep South show both the highest levels of societal trust and the highest levels of membership in associations.

Trust varies significantly by region. Just one person in five (21%) in the central region believes that most people can be trusted, while at the other extreme a majority (56%) trust people in the North.

In the Deep South there is a significant difference provincially, with Yala residents reporting the highest levels of trust (66%) and Pattani voters the lowest (21%), on a par with the central region. Similar to the national relationship, Yala voters have the highest membership in voluntary associations (42%) and Pattani the lowest membership (31%).

Nationally, there is a significant difference between men’s and women’s responses, with 68% of women (65% in the Deep South) saying most people cannot be trusted, compared to 55% of men (54% in the Deep South). Diploma/vocational graduates (69%) are more distrustful than university or primary school graduates (57%).
7.3 Trust in Neighbors

Now, speaking in general terms of the people from here, would you say that people in this neighborhood are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or untrustworthy? (Q36)

Although Thais in general have low levels of societal trust, they have higher levels of trust in their neighbors, with three-quarters (74%) at the national level and 81% in the Deep South saying they are trustworthy. This suggests that efforts to strengthen voluntary associations will be most effective at the community level.

Men in the Deep South are more trusting (84%) of their neighbors than women (78%), while Buddhists are more trusting (87%) than their Muslim neighbors (81%). Diploma/vocational graduates (23%) are the least trustful of neighbors and university graduates (88%) the most trustful.
7.4 Trust in Members of other Religions

*Speaking in general terms of people of other religions, would you say that people of other religions are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or untrustworthy? (Q37)*

In the Deep South (but not in the 2009 National Survey) the survey also explored levels of trust in people of other religions. Southern citizens were evenly divided on this issue, with just under half (49%) trusting those of other religions. Southern Buddhists, however, expressed far higher levels of trust of other religions (68.2%) than their Muslim neighbors (48.1%). Men are more trusting than women of those from other religions (84% and 78%, respectively). More than half (51%) of diploma/vocational graduates distrust those of other religions compared to only a third (34%) of university graduates.
Chapter 8
Democratic Institutions
8.1 Integrity of Institutions

*Please rate the integrity of each institution according to this scale: very high, high, neither high nor low, low, very low. (Q38-47)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Very High</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Neither High nor Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBPAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gov't</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The courts are the only public institution that over half of respondents rated as having high integrity, with two-thirds (64%) expressing this view at both the national level and in the Deep South. Significantly less than half (42%) rated the integrity of the Election Commission as high, while less than a quarter (23%) gave the army high marks (42% had rated the army as high in the National Survey). The lowest positive rating for the army was in Yala (18%), followed by Pattani (24%) and Narathiwat (25%).
While at the national level 47% of the rural population viewed the army positively compared to 37% of the urban population, there was a similar but reversed split in the Deep South, with 31% of the urban population perceiving the military to have high integrity but only 20% in rural districts. Men (28%) were more likely than women (18%) to rate the army as having high integrity. Muslims (23%) were twice as likely as Buddhists (12%) to rate the army as having low integrity.

In a separate question for the Deep South, the survey also explored the perceived integrity of SBPAC, which has significant responsibilities in the strife-torn South. Strong minorities perceived SBPAC to have either high integrity (42%) or neither high nor low integrity (43%), with only 11% perceiving it to have low integrity.

The international community and domestic NGOs garnered similar (low) levels of trust as institutions both nationally and in the Deep South, but also shared the highest levels of “no response.” This suggests that they are not well known in general and that, consequently, the intensity of opinion may be shallower than that held with respect to better known institutions.

At the other end of the integrity scale, the police tied parliamentarians as the least trusted of the institutions listed, with just 16% rating the integrity of the police and MPs as high. Local government followed at a 17% high integrity rating, with the media faring just marginally better at 18%. Buddhists (28%) were nearly twice as likely as Muslims (16%) to rate the integrity of local government officials as low, while nearly half of Buddhists (47%) rated police integrity as low, versus 30% of Muslims.
8.2 Politicization of Institutions

Some people say democratic institutions in Thailand have become politicized, and are no longer neutral. I will read you a list of institutions and for each one please tell me if you think it is generally neutral and unbiased; sometimes biased; or often biased: (Q48-53)

Fifty-eight percent of southerners say that the courts are generally neutral and unbiased. This is a positive ranking only in relative terms, as 42% think that the courts are sometimes or often biased (48% among diploma/vocational graduates). This finding suggests again that the “neither high nor low” response in the previous question should be interpreted as slightly negative.
From the relatively high rating accorded the courts, which was the only institution for which positive opinions exceeded negative views, belief in the political neutrality of institutions plunges. Although the army scored the second highest favorability rating nationally (37%), in the Deep South only 16% believed it is generally neutral and unbiased. In the Deep South the Election Commission received the second highest rating of 36%, whereas nationally the Commission ranked third, with only 30% stating it was generally neutral and unbiased.

Just a fifth (19% nationally and 20% in the Deep South) felt NGOs were generally neutral and unbiased, while a plurality had no opinion. The strong perception of politicization within the NGO community has negative implications for those seeking to strengthen civil society, or to develop NGO capacity for non-partisan election observation and civic education. Likewise more Buddhists feel that NGOs have lower levels of integrity (15%) and 70% believe they are biased, compared to 7% low integrity and 52% biased among Muslims. This may be due to the focus of NGOs on the Muslim population.

The police and the media are the least trusted institutions in the Deep South, with over 80% believing that they are often or sometimes biased (94% among diploma/vocational graduates). Lack of trust in these institutions can contribute to both a perception of persecution, and a perception that the dominant culture fails to understand the causes of conflict and concerns of the people in the Deep South.
8.3 Fairness of Elections
Some people have called for elections to resolve the current political conflict. If elections were held, do you think they would be free and fair or do you think they will not be free and fair? (Q54)

- Free and fair
- Not free and fair
- Don’t want to give opinion/Don’t know

The Thai people’s low estimation of the neutrality and integrity of institutions is reflected in their expectations as to whether or not future elections will be free and fair. Half (48%) of the voters in the National Survey believe that elections will not be fair, compared to 45% in the Deep South. Southern Buddhists are particularly pessimistic (69%) that elections would not be free and fair.
8.4 Perception of Corruption in Government

How common do you think corruption is among government officials: very common, fairly common, fairly rare, or very rare? (Q55)

Thais perceive government officials to be highly corrupt, with 94% at the national level and 89% in the Deep South indicating corruption is very common or fairly common. This compares to 69% of Indonesians who felt that corruption was common (2003). Nationally, these findings were very consistent between men and women, across age groups, and across regions. In the Deep South, however, Muslims were more likely to find corruption common (90%) than their Buddhist neighbors (78%). One reason that the finding might be so high is that the term “government official” is very inclusive, and can be interpreted by the respondent as anyone from a senior government official involved in contracts and leases to a local administrative official or police officer.
8.5 Personal Knowledge of Corrupt Practices

Within the past five years, have you personally known someone who had to bribe a government officer for proper service or fair treatment from the government or police? (Q56)

Less than a tenth (9%) of voters in the Deep South had personally known someone that had to pay a bribe, although just over a quarter (26%) nationwide had this experience. Some may suggest that perceptions of corruption are greater than the actual situation. On one hand, this relatively low number may indicate that most people have little or no contact with government officials; on the other hand, the nature of corruption has changed from a focus on seeking rents from individual citizens to policy-level corruption where profits are sought through politics and megaprojects.

Those most likely to report knowing someone who had paid a bribe were in central Bangkok (46%), while those least likely resided in the North (17%). In the Deep South, the Muslim community was more likely to report corruption (10%) than the Buddhist community (2%), while males were nearly three times more likely to respond “yes” than females (5% to 14%). Diploma/vocational graduates were twice as likely (18%) to have experienced corruption than their southern peers, which is not surprising as this group also perceived, in the previous question, the highest level (94%) of corruption among sub-groups in the Deep South,
Chapter 9
Causes of the Southern Conflict
9.1 Causes of Southern Problems

What is the main cause of the problems in Southern Thailand? (Q59)

In the view of over one-third (37%) of citizens in the Deep South, the main cause of the southern conflict is the failure of the government to understand the local population. Muslims cited this issue far more (37%) than Buddhists (24%), who cited separatism (31%) as their number one issue behind southern problems. Diploma/vocational graduates (44%) and university degree holders (43%) were far more likely to perceive this failure of the government than less educated
southerners with a primary education (33%), who were more likely to cite the interference of a third hand or outsiders (36%). This finding clearly highlights the differing understanding of the source of the problems in the Deep South between ethnic Malay and ethnic Thai, and among those with higher levels of education; and suggests that a settlement will be difficult without efforts to improve understanding.

Similarly, speakers of Pattani-Malay cited this failure (38%) far more than speakers of the southern Thai dialect (20%), who cited separatism (39%) as the major issue. Younger voters under the age of 20 were the most likely (42%) to view failure to understand local citizens as the underlying cause. Those in their thirties and forties also strongly held this view (41% and 39%, respectively), with just over a third (31%) of the oldest (60+) generation citing failure to understand as a major cause.

Although Buddhists and speakers of the southern Thai dialect perceived separatism as the most significant issue (31% and 38%, respectively) behind the southern unrest, it was perceived as only the third most important issue among Muslims (17%) and speakers of the Pattani-Malay dialect (16%). For these two groups (and citizens of the Deep South in general), the second most important issue behind the southern unrest is a third hand (27%).

There also was significant difference among the provinces. Whereas 47% of those in Pattani cited the government’s failure to understand citizens of the Deep South as the number one issue, only 27% of Narathiwat citizens cited this issue, referring instead to a third hand (39%). Although both men and women cited failure to understand the local population as the most important issue, more men (39%) held this view than women (34%). Women (8%) were twice as likely as men to attribute the problems to common criminals (4%).

Another very significant finding from this question is the pervasive perception that the source of the problems in the Deep South is outsiders or a third hand. More than a third overall (35%), and almost half (47%) in Narathiwas, held this view. Whether this perception is true or not, it is a widely held belief and, consequently, those seeking to reduce conflict and misunderstanding in the Deep South will need to address this issue.

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2 Respondents indicated both a “third hand” (27%) and “outsiders” (8%). Focus groups will be required to determine if, and how, southerners differentiate between these two classifications.
9.2 Religion or Ethnicity as a Factor

Which factor is more important in explaining the conflict in the Deep South, ethnic differences between Pattani-Malay and Thai, or religious differences between Muslims and Buddhists? (Q67)

Nearly two-thirds (65%) believed that religion and ethnicity were both equally important factors in the southern conflict, with the exception of speakers of Southern Thai (37%), who were much more inclined to view ethnicity (29%) as a key factor or not to provide an answer (26%). While there was no significant difference on the equal importance of these two issues among men (64%) and women (65%), men were more inclined to cite ethnicity (12%) than women (7%), while women (11%) were more likely than men (9%) to cite religion.
9.3 Groups Feared
I will read you a list of groups/institutions. For each one, please tell me if you are afraid of the actions of the group/institution. (Q68-72)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know/No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Officials</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those causing unrest</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To further clarify the perception of citizens in the Deep South about the cause of the southern unrest, they were asked to indicate which of five groups they were personally afraid of: militia, local officials, police, military, and those causing the unrest. Not surprisingly, those causing the unrest (third hand, outsiders, insurgents, separatists) were viewed as the most feared (67%). Almost half (47%) feared the military or were unwilling to respond, and a third feared the police. Interestingly, the local militia, who are often cited in the media as potential instigators of violence, were the least feared (6%); a finding probably attributable to the fact that militias are drawn from fairly homogenous local communities so that respondents are most likely to encounter militias that are composed of neighbors and co-ethnics.

Women were significantly more afraid of those causing the unrest (71%) than men (63%). As demonstrated in the charts that follow, there was some significant variation on responses by religion, language group, and province. While those causing the unrest were feared about equally among both Muslims (68%) and Buddhists (63%), Muslims (44%) were far more fearful than Buddhists (7%) of the military, and of the police by 32% versus 22%. Buddhists, on the other hand, were more fearful of local officials by 20% versus 7%.
Similarly, Pattani-Malay speakers were significantly more afraid of the military (46%) than either speakers of the Southern Thai dialect (7%) or the Central Thai dialect (26%). This pattern held true as well for police.
Residents of Narathiwat (75%) were significantly more fearful of those causing the unrest than Yala residents (54%), who by contrast were significantly more fearful than those in other provinces of the military (52%), the police (46%), and the militia (12%). Youth under the age of 20 were far more fearful of the separatists (82%) than their elders aged 60 and above (63%).

When all expressions of fear are combined, the residents of Pattani province express far higher levels of fear (185) that those in Yala (114) or Narathiwat (155). Although the Deep South is a Muslim majority region, an averaging of fear responses indicates that Muslims (31%) are significantly more afraid than Buddhists (23%). Interestingly, Central Thai speakers are almost as fearful (28%) as Pattani-Malay speakers (32%), while Southern Thai speakers are only half as fearful (16%).
9.4 Bombings

Some people say that some of the bombs that go off in the Deep South are set by outsiders who want to keep the region unstable for their own reasons. How likely do you think that is? (Q73)

![Bar chart showing responses to the question on the likelihood of bombs being set by outsiders.]

Nearly two-thirds (63%) of respondents in the Deep South (75% among diploma/vocational graduates) believe that those who set off bombs in the Deep South are doing so to keep the region unstable for their own reasons. While there was no significant difference based on religion, ethnicity, or language, residents of Narathiwat believed this the most (71%) compared with those in Pattani (61%) and Yala (56%). Those under age 20 (52%) and those age 60 and over (50%) were the least likely to believe bombers had a personal agenda to keep the region unstable. This finding again highlights the critical need for those seeking peace in the Deep South to more deeply investigate this issue.
9.5 Detention

Have you or a close friend or relative ever been detained overnight by the security forces? (Q74)

On average, 8% of citizens aged 18 years and older in the Deep South have either been detained overnight by security forces, or have a close friend or relative who has. Those living in Pattani are twice as likely to have been detained (13%) than those in Yala and four times more likely than those in Narathiwat (3%). Youth under 20 years of age, those aged 50-59, and university graduates all have the highest detention rate (13%), followed by 12% among diploma/vocational graduates, with the lowest among those over 60 (4%) and those in their twenties and forties (7%). Muslims are more likely to have been detained (8%) than Buddhists (5%), as are those speaking Pattani-Malay (8%) compared to speakers of the southern Thai dialect (2%).

The relatively high detention rate in Pattani (13%) may be directly related to both the high Pattani fear index and the higher than average fear of the military and police in the province.
9.6 Military Checkpoints and Patrols

When you pass a military checkpoint or patrol, do you generally feel afraid or nervous? (Q77)

The fear citizens experience when confronted by the pervasive military checkpoints and patrols in the Deep South may be related to the number of respondents who have been detained. Two-thirds (66%) of southern Thai citizens are not often or never afraid when they pass a military checkpoint or patrol, although Buddhists are less likely (28%) to be afraid than Muslims (35%). Interestingly, 57% of residents in Pattani are never afraid compared to only 39% in Yala and 40% in Narathiwats. The least fearful of military checkpoints and patrols are diploma/vocational graduates (60%) and those in their thirties (51%) and forties (52%), while youth tend to be much more anxious than their elders, with 42% of those under age 20 and 41% of those in their twenties indicating they were always or usually fearful.
9.7 Abuse and Intimidation

Have you ever been abused or intimidated by state officials or security forces? (Q78)

The vast majority (96%) of citizens in the Deep South indicated that they have never been personally abused or intimidated by state officials or security forces. However, there is some variation by province, with citizens of Yala (2%) and Narathiwas (3%) reporting lower levels than those in Pattani (5%). Urban Pattani residents reported twice the amount of abuse and intimidation (8%) than the Deep South average.

While 6% of men reported such abuses, less than 1% of women reported experiencing abuse or intimidation. There appears to be no differences among the Muslim and Buddhist communities, with 95% of each reporting that they had never suffered abuse or intimidation. Those 60 and over reported no instances, while youth aged 18-19 reported the highest number (11%) of cases, followed by diploma/vocational graduates (9%) and those aged 40-49 (7%).
9.8 Attitude of Officials

*In your dealings with state officials, are they polite and respectful? (Q76)*

Nearly two-thirds (65%) of the residents in the Deep South find that state officials are always or usually polite and respectful, although 5% more Buddhists state this (70%) than Muslims (65%). Nevertheless, this means that over a third (35%) of the citizens in the Deep South (46% among diploma/vocational graduates) perceive that they are not treated with respect by the officials whose salaries their tax dollars pay.

Those speaking the southern Thai dialect apparently experience the greatest politeness and respect (70%; 43% always and 27% usually), while speakers of the Central Thai dialect are the most likely (48%; 44% not often, 4% never) to experience a lack of politeness and respect in their dealings with state officials.
9.9 Double Standards
Do you feel that there are different standards of justice for Pattani-Malay and Thai? (Q79)

One of the main complaints by those at the national level with regard to the current administration is “double standards.” In the Deep South, fully half (49%) of all citizens feel that double standards are common in the administration of justice. Narathiwas residents perceive the highest levels (52%) of double standards and Yala residents the lowest (44%), although Pattani residents reflected the highest incidence of double standards in reporting that they “always” occur (32%).

These perceptions are not shared equally across ethnic lines, with half of Buddhists (53%) and Southern Thai speakers (51%) stating that there are never any double standards, compared to just 20% of Muslims and speakers of Pattani-Malay. A quarter of all Muslims and Pattani-Malay speakers (26%) believe that there are always double standards. Men (51%) are more likely than women (46%) to perceive double standards to exist always or usually. Those aged 40-49 perceive a much greater problem (55%) than those a generation older in their fifties (38%). Deep South residents with the highest levels of education perceive the greatest level of double standards, 61% among diploma/vocational graduates and 57% among university graduates. This pervasive perception of unfairness appears to contribute to the southern view that the dominant culture neither understands nor cares for their concerns.
9.10 Equal Economic Opportunities

Do you feel Thai and Pattani-Malay have equal economic opportunities in your area? (Q75)

The majority of citizens in the Deep South (70%) believe that the two major ethnic groups have equal economic opportunities, although almost a third (32%) in urban areas disagreed. Buddhists were significantly more likely to believe that equal economic opportunities exist (81%) than Muslims and Pattani-Malay speakers (69%). There are some significant differences among the three southern border provinces: Pattani residents place greatest confidence in equal economic opportunities (79%), while confidence is lowest among Narathiwat residents (65%), particularly urban residents (57%). Women are more optimistic (74%) than men (66%). Belief in equal economic opportunities increased progressively by age from 62% among those under the age of 20 to 74% among those aged 50-59, before falling to 71% for those over 60 years of age. Diploma/vocational graduates were far more likely (43%) to perceive unequal economic opportunities than those with a university degree (20%) or primary schooling (25%).
9.11 Access to Positions of Responsibility in Local Government

Do you feel that Pattani-Malay people have fair access to positions of responsibility in local government, or are these positions usually for Thai people? (Q80)

A third (34%) of Muslims in the Deep South do not believe that they have fair access to positions of responsibility in local government, while only 19% of their Buddhists neighbors perceive such discrimination against the Pattani-Malay. Women (63%) believe more than men (59%) that Pattani-Malay have equal access. Those just beginning their careers aged 20-29 are more likely than those under age 20 (40% and 26%, respectively) or those aged 60 and above (21%) to perceive that such positions are reserved for ethnic Thai. Among diploma/vocational graduates, 47% perceive positions of authority to be reserved for ethnic Thai, compared to only 29% of those with a primary education.
9.12 Role of Internal Migration in Conflict

So, in your opinion has the internal migration of central Thai to southern Thailand had an impact in exacerbating the conflict? (Q83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>Don’t want to give opinion/Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pattani-Malay</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Thai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Thai</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In many countries that experience a center-periphery conflict or an ethnic conflict, internal migration of a nationally dominant group into the traditional homelands of minority communities is often viewed as a major trigger or escalating factor for the conflict. The survey suggests this also may be the case in southern Thailand. In the Deep South, while half (51%) of respondents reject this as a significant issue, a significant minority (41%) do see it as a factor affecting the conflict (61% among diploma/vocational graduates). Buddhists were the least likely (76%) to believe that internal migration was an aggravating factor, while only 49% of Muslims (those potentially most affected by internal migration) held this view. Speakers of the Southern Thai and Central Thai dialects, whose communities would be bolstered the most by internal migration, also were far more of the view (62% and 65%, respectively) that internal migration does not have much of an impact on the southern conflict. Likewise women (36%) were less likely than men (47%) to hold this view.
9.13 Central and Issan Thai in Conflict
In your opinion, is the tension and conflict in the Deep South usually between Pattani-Malay and Central or Issan people; or is it usually between Pattani-Malay and Southern Thai; or about the same? (Q82)

Respondents were significantly more likely to believe the tension in the Deep South was predominantly between Southern Thai and Pattani-Malay (19%) than between Central Thai and Pattani-Malay (8%). Most (58%) thought tensions are about the same between the Pattani-Malay community and migrants (Central and Issan people) and the indigenous minority in the Deep South (Southern Thai). This was constant among both Muslims and Buddhists (58%) but was most strongly felt in Yala (69%) and least strongly (43%) in Narathiwas, where 29% stated that they did not know (17%) or did not want to give their opinion (12%).
9.14 Treatment of Internal Migrants

Are Central Thai and Issan Thai in the Deep South treated differently by officials and security forces than Southern Thai? (Q81)

The majority in the Deep South (65%) believe that migrants are never (36%) or not often (29%) treated differently by officials and security forces. Diploma/vocational graduates (53%) and the ethnic Thai indigenous to the region (speakers of the Southern Thai dialect) were the most likely to perceive (41%) that migrants were usually treated differently, while Muslims were the least likely (33%) to perceive this. Why Southern Thai speakers see Central Thai speakers as treated differently should be explored more deeply in focus groups or other research, but the presumption would be that they perceive racial or ethnic discrimination by the central government based on dialect.
Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand

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Chapter 10
Separatism or Decentralization
10.1 Separatism to end conflict

Some people think that those people involved in the separatist conflict will not stop fighting until the Deep South separates and forms a new state, while others think that some form of local self-government like that in Aceh or Bangkok would probably be enough to end the conflict. Which is closer to your opinion? (Q86)

- The conflict will only end if the Deep South separates
- Local self-government would probably end the conflict
- Don’t want to give opinion/Don’t know

Only 23% of southern residents think separation would be required to end the conflict in the Deep South, although an unusually high 21% preferred not to give an opinion (12%) or stated that they did not know (9%). This overall non-response rate was skewed by the very high non-response rate in Narathiwat, can possibly be explained by the previous finding that respondents in Narathiwat had the greatest fear of “those causing the unrest”.

An overall majority (55%) made up of strong majorities in Yala (65%) and Pattani (69%) and a plurality in Naratiwat (39%) believe that some form of local self government might solve the conflict. This majority consensus remained consistent across genders, religions, and dialects, with a high of 67% among Buddhists and speakers of Central Thai, to a low of 54% among Pattani-Malay speakers. However, on this sensitive issue 13% of Pattani-Malay speakers and 12% of Muslims preferred not to provide their opinion. The popular consensus suggests that local self-government is the most promising path to peace short of separation.
10.2 View of Decentralization

Sometimes people in Bangkok and up-country have different interests and different points of view; so some people say that governance would be better if some power and decision-making were shifted from the central government in Bangkok to local governments, and that provincial governors should be directly elected like in Bangkok. However, some people believe that the government will be more fair, more effective, and more efficient if centrally controlled. Which statement is closer to your point of view? (Q7)

A substantial majority (69%) of respondents nationally, and 67% in the Deep South, are in favor of shifting some power from the national to the local level and directly electing provincial governors. Nationally, support for decentralization was relatively consistent across age groups and regions. In the Deep South, however, 35% of Buddhists were more comfortable with the current system compared to only a quarter (25%) of Muslims. Conversely, men (71%) were more likely to favor decentralization than women (63%). In addition, 16% of those aged 60 years or older had no opinion and did not want to answer – 42% of that age group lives in Narathiwas.

This finding at both the national and local levels is significant for peace prospects in the Deep South, as one of the highest political hurdles for local self-government in the southern border provinces is the common perception in the rest of the country that there should not be special preferential arrangements for southerners. If, however, local self-government for the Deep South came as part of a package of decentralization reforms that granted the same level of local self-government to the rest of the country, it would likely be much more politically acceptable to the general population.
10.3 Election of Provincial Governors
Do you think provincial governors should be appointed or directly elected? (Q9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Should be appointed</th>
<th>Should be elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general support expressed for decentralization is even clearer when more narrowly defined as a preference for elected or appointed provincial governors, with three-quarters of respondents at the national level (75%) and 71% in the Deep South saying they would prefer to choose their own governor. Nationally, women were 5% more likely overall to support elections than men (72% to 77%), with most of the difference coming from just two regions: the Central region (71% men to 84% women), and the Deep South (66% to 79%). Contrary to the previous finding, this same pattern holds true in the Deep South, where only 68% of men support elections compared to 74% of women. Muslims are 10% more likely overall to support elections than Buddhists (72% and 62%, respectively), while speakers of the Southern Thai dialect are the least supportive (60%) of elections. Diploma/vocational graduates (74%) are the strongest supporters of locally elected governors.

At the national level, the highest support for electing governors (82%) is seen in central Bangkok, which is an interesting finding, as these residents also have the most personal experience of directly elected governors.
10.4 Decentralization and Conflict

Similarly, some people suggested that political decentralization or limited autonomy (not relating to separatism) might help solve the long-term conflict in southern Thailand. What is your opinion about this? (Q8)

Although a majority of respondents nationally and in the Deep South support political decentralization in Thailand, respondents to the 2009 National Survey were evenly divided in their opinion as to whether decentralization might help resolve the ongoing southern conflict (an area, to reiterate, that was not included in that survey). A belief that decentralization might help resolve the southern conflict ranged from a high of 58% in the Bangkok metropolitan region to lows of 36% in the Central region and 42% in the South. In sharp contrast, residents of the Deep South (those directly impacted by the conflict on a daily basis) agreed by a large margin (62%) that decentralization might help resolve the conflict. This was true across all three provinces and among both males and females, but Muslims were significantly more supportive (63%) of the idea that decentralization might resolve the conflict than Buddhists (46%), whose thinking on this issue is more in line with the national average. The difference between Muslims and Buddhists on this issue is another indication of the differing understanding of the conflict between the groups, which may be hindering resolution of the conflict.
10.5 Consolidation of Three Southern Provinces

Some people have suggested that the three southern provinces be combined and have an elected local government like that which governs Bangkok. Do you agree or disagree with this proposal? (Q84)

When southerners were further probed on the issue of decentralization, 51% rejected the idea that the three southern border provinces should be combined together as a single elected local government. There was significant variation in responses among the provinces. More than two-thirds (69%) of those in Yala viewed the idea of combining the provinces favorably, while nearly two-thirds (61%) rejected the idea in Pattani. The fact that Yala constitutes the highest proportion of Buddhists (10% of provincial population and 41% of Buddhists in the Deep South) and Central Thai speakers (22% of provincial population and 43% of Central Thai speakers in the Deep South) may account for this higher favorability rating in Yala.

Younger voters aged 18-19 disagreed far more (61%) than their elders aged 60 and older (37%), and only a third of those who completed secondary school (34%) agreed with this option compared to nearly half (48%) of primary school graduates.
10.6 Maintain Three Provinces
Others have suggested that each province have its own elected government. Would you prefer that, or to combine the three provinces and have a single elected government? (Q85)

When presented with the option of either combining the provinces or having an elected governor for each province, 59% stated a preference for maintaining the three provinces, each with its own elected governor. Those in Yala expressed this view the strongest (63%) and those in Narathiwas the least (54%), although it is difficult to determine more precisely the exact views of those in Narathiwas, as 11.5% declined to give their opinion on this sensitive issue. Women (12%) were twice as likely to decline to answer than men (6%).

Those speaking Central Thai (75%) and Buddhists (70%) were major supporters of this option, while less than half (44%) of Southern Thai dialect speakers preferred it.
If given the opportunity to vote for their own governor, the majority (70%) would opt for a local politician over an experienced outsider, although over a quarter (26%) in Yala and Narathiwas would accept an experienced outsider over a local politician. There was no difference (24%) between the Muslim and Buddhist communities in voting for an experienced outsider; however, a third (33%) of Central Thai speakers would prefer an outsider while only 13% of Southern Thai speakers and 23% of Pattani-Malay speakers would accept an outsider over a local politician. There was no significant difference between male (70%) and female (69%) preference for a local politician. Younger voters aged 18-19 (69%) were much less willing than their elders 60+ (77%) to consider a local politician over an experienced outsider.
10.8 Locally Elected Chief of Police

In some countries the chief of police for a town or province is elected locally, rather than appointed by the central government. A similar system has recently been proposed in England to increase local accountability and responsiveness. Do you think that would be a good idea for this area? (Q88)

More than half of respondents (56%) in the Deep South would like the opportunity to elect their own chief of police, a viewpoint that is particularly strong in Pattani (66%), where regional fear of the police was highest. The strongest supporters of this option were the Southern Thai speakers (85%) and the lowest (but still a majority at 53%) were Central Thai speakers, followed by Muslims and Pattani-Malay speakers (55%) and Buddhists (62%). Males support the election of the police chief more than females, 59% to 53%, while younger voters aged 18-19 were less supportive than their elders aged 60 and above (40% to 57%).
Chapter 11
Acknowledging Uniqueness of Pattani-Malay Culture
11.1 Acknowledging Pattani-Malay History

Even without elected local government, some people believe that if the state would simply revise the history books to acknowledge the unique history of the Pattani region, and withdraw the military from the region, the conflict would decrease. Do you agree? (Q87)

As an alternative to decentralization, the majority of citizens in the Deep South (60%) believe that government recognition of the unique history of the region and the withdrawal of troops would decrease the conflict. Those in Pattani were the most supportive (72%) overall, while in Narathiwas (among those willing to express an opinion) 74% agreed with the proposition.

As demonstrated in the following table, two-thirds of Muslims (62%) and Pattani-Malay speakers (63%) support this view. Opinion is more divided among Thai speakers, but strong minorities of Central Thai (43%) and Southern Thai (46%) also support this interpretation. The majority of Buddhists (55%) and Central Thai speakers (53%) reject it. This could explain the lower support for this argument in Yala (56%), since the province has the highest concentration of Buddhists (10% of

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3 In retrospect, it would have been more informative to have raised these two elements separately.
provincial population and 41% of Buddhists in the Deep South) and Central Thai speakers (22% of provincial population and 43% of Central Thai speakers in the Deep South).
11.2 Freedom to Discuss Pattani History

Do you feel free to discuss alternative versions of Pattani history? (Q91)

There is significant concern everywhere about expressing alternative views of Pattani history. The majority of Yala residents (62%) and Pattani residents (53%) indicated that they feel free to discuss alternative versions of Pattani history, while just 45% in Narathiwat expressed the same opinion.
While a slight majority of Buddhists (50%) and Central Thai and Southern Thai dialect speakers indicated that they feel free to discuss local history, Muslims (47%) and Pattani-Malay speakers do not share this view, with nearly two in five (39%) stating that they do not feel free to discuss this issue, along with nearly half (49%) of those with a diploma/vocational education.

As with support for recognition by the government of the unique history of the region as a potential alternative to decentralization, there is a clear trend among residents of the Deep South on the issue of freedom to discuss alternative views of Pattani history. That is, it remains a sensitive issue among the population with a high percentage of individuals who do not want to give an opinion or who say that they do not know.
11.3 Freedom to Practice Cultural Traditions

*Do you feel free to practice your cultural traditions? (Q90)*

As expressed in Table 4.2, Southern Thais have a relatively high level of political tolerance (72%). This extends to an even greater degree in the cultural sphere, where 92% of southerners affirm personal freedom to practice their cultural traditions. On a positive note, the minority Buddhist community (96%) and Central-Thai speaking communities (98%) express the highest levels of perceived freedom. This data indicates that Muslims and Pattani-Malay speakers (as a minority at the national level) and Buddhists, and Central and Southern Thai dialect speakers (as a minority at the local level) all perceive personal freedom to practice their cultural traditions.
### 11.4 Use of Pattani-Malay by State Officials

*Should there be a requirement that state officials posted in the Deep South be able to speak Pattani-Malay? (Q92)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Central Thai</th>
<th>Southern Thai</th>
<th>Pattani-Malay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the National Reconciliation Commission released its 2006 recommendations for building peace in southern Thailand, it proposed that Pattani-Malay be recognized as a working language in the region. At that time, there was strong vocal opposition to this recommendation at the national level on the basis that all Thai citizens should speak Thai. In the Deep South, where 83% of the population speak Pattani-Malay, there is significant support (95%) across both majority and minority communities for a requirement that state officials posted in the Deep South be required to be able to speak Pattani-Malay, i.e., be able to use Pattani-Malay as a working language.

This suggests that adoption of this recommendation, while perhaps unpopular at the national level, would not cause any significant tensions in the Deep South itself, except possibly among Central-Thai speaking officials posted there, and among those with a bachelor degree or higher (85%).
11.5 Road Sign Language

Should road signs and announcements in the Deep South be written in both Thai and Yawi, as Lanna and Thai are used in some parts of northern Thailand? (Q93)

The posting of multilingual road signs is an expression and indicator of official recognition for minority cultures and languages in many nations, such as French in Canada or Sami in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Multilingual road signs actually abound across Thailand in Thai and English in recognition of the importance of international investors and tourists. The residents of the Deep South are nearly unanimous (97%) in support of multilingual Pattani-Malay and Thai road signs.
11.6 Languages Taught in Schools

To acknowledge the distinct cultural identity of the Deep South, all children in the Deep South should study both Thai and Pattani-Malay in primary school. Do you agree or disagree? (Q94)

There also is strong support in the Deep South, even among the long-term indigenous minority Southern Thai dialect speakers, that all primary school age children living in the Deep South should study both the Thai and Pattani-Malay language at school. This issue does not address, however, the use of Thai as the primary language of instruction in non-language courses. It merely addresses whether or not Pattani-Malay and/or Thai should be taught as second languages in the Deep South as are English, Chinese, and other languages in schools at the national level as well as in the nation’s international schools.
Appendix A – Demographic Subgroups

Polling often identifies sub-groups within society that hold views significantly different from those of their peers on a number of issues. This 2010 Southern Survey reveals a number of such differences (as well as commonalities) between citizens of the Deep South and their national counterparts who were polled in 2009. The 2010 Southern Survey also reveals groups that often respond outside the norm or differently than their peers.

Diploma/Vocational Degree Graduates
Diploma and vocational degree graduates (DVDGs) consistently responded outside the southern norm, either significantly higher or lower. These are individuals (55% male and 45% female) who completed their secondary education and subsequently received a diploma or vocational degree below that of a bachelor’s degree. They represent 8% of the adult population in the three southern border provinces; the majority (77%) is aged 20-39, lives in rural areas (71%), and is found at comparable levels across all household income strata. Almost all (97%) are Muslims and 84% are speakers of Pattani-Malay, while 14% are fluent in Central Thai. Among all sub-groups in the Deep South, they are the only one where 100% can read Thai, and they equal their university degree peers in their capacity to read Yawi (82%).

DVDGs is the only sub-group identified in which more than half (54%) believe that the country is going in the wrong direction. They also are the most dissatisfied (33%) with the current government. Of the majority of the DVDGs say that the country is moving in the wrong direction, 49% point to the bad economy; however, only 23% state that they are worse off economically than they were two years ago compared to 27% throughout the Deep South and 29% among all southern Muslims. Among all DVDGs, while a quarter (25%) believe the economy is the nation’s biggest problem, more than a third (36%) point to political conflict and demonstrations (only 22% among their southern peers), with just 15% citing the southern conflict compared to 20% throughout the Deep South.

The poll data suggest DVDGs are far more influenced by democratic values and political issues than their southern peers. For example, 70% believe the government doesn’t care about them, compared to only 61% throughout the Deep South; nevertheless, a third (33%) do believe
Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand

(on par with wealthier citizens) that they can have an influence on government, compared to only 23% throughout the South. They also are more distrustful of others than their peers, whether it is people in general (69% compared to 60%), of neighbors (23% compared to 17%), or those of other religions (51% compared to 46%).

DVDGs award the lowest integrity marks to the police (39% versus 31%), the army (35% versus 22%), MPs (28% versus 18%), local government (22% versus 16%), and NGOs (15% versus 7%). Moreover, they are far more likely than their peers to see bias in key institutions such as the courts (48% versus 39%), NGOs (70% versus 53%), the Electoral Commission of Thailand (ECT) (73% versus 60%), and the police (94% versus 83%). Not surprisingly, they report the highest incidence of personal knowledge of someone paying a bribe (18%, twice the southern norm of 9%). In spite of their pessimism, paradoxically they are far more confident (60%) that the next elections will be free and fair, compared to only 47% of their peers.

Regarding southern issues, DVDGs are far more likely than their peers to believe (44% versus 37%) that the main cause of the conflict is the failure of the government to understand the local population, and they are more likely to believe local self-government will yield peace (63% versus 56%). They are the least afraid of those causing the violence (38% versus 27%) and the most afraid of the police (40% versus 32%) and local officials (22% versus 8%). Not surprisingly, they are the most likely (46% versus 35%) to have experienced disrespect by local officials and three times more likely (9% versus 3.5%) than their peers to have been intimidated by state or security officials.

DVDGs are significantly more likely (61% versus 48%) than their peers to perceive double standards in justice toward Malay and Thai, and to perceive that Central and Issan Thai are treated differently by officials and security forces (53% versus 36%). They are far more concerned about the perceived disparity in equal economic opportunities for Thai and Malay (43% versus 28%) and access to positions of government responsibility (47% versus 33%). Not surprisingly, 61% believe that internal migration is exacerbating the southern conflict compared to their compatriots (41%).

**Gender Disaggregated Demographics**

In terms of demographics, the number of male and female respondents
were roughly equal, however it is interesting to note that approximately 14% of respondents (15% female and 13% male) were between 60-80 years old compared to the national statistical figure in the 2000 National Housing Census of 9.4% (10.1% female and 8.7% male). The upcoming 2010 census should indicate whether the Thai population is aging, or whether only southern residents have a higher percentage of elderly.

Women (81%) were slightly less likely than their male counterparts (84%) to learn Pattani-Malay as their first language; however, they were slightly more literate in Yawi (70% and 66%, respectively).
Economically, women are worse off than men, with 52% of women in urban areas reporting an average income below Baht 15,000 versus 45% of men reporting an income between Baht 15,000 and Baht 35,000. Their rural counterparts are equally economically disadvantaged when compared to men.
While only 1% of male respondents in the Deep South are widowers, an astounding 12% of women reported being widowed. As the majority of the 4,100 deaths from the conflict are males, one direct impact is clearly an increased number of widows. Unsurprisingly, women (38%) indicated that their economic situation had declined more than men (31%).

While generally men and women did not differ greatly in their opinions and perceptions, there were some differences regarding issues of fear, trust, and knowledge of civics and democracy.

Women were significantly more likely to cite the conflict in the Deep South as the biggest issue facing the country and ranked it as the number one national issue. Conversely, men appear to have a broader perspective, ranking the southern conflict fourth behind bad economy, political conflict, and drugs.

Although 43% of women said that they were afraid of the actions of the military, female support for the army was significantly higher than male support, with only 31% saying it was too big (males 43%). This may be due to women’s increased fear of those causing the unrest (71%), as well as less than one percent (0.7%) reporting abuse at the hands of the security forces. However 21% felt that the army had low levels of integrity and 77% felt it was biased.
Unsurprising given their higher levels of fear, women were less trusting than their male compatriots, registering lower levels of trust in general, in neighbors, and in those of other religious faiths. This is consistent with the national findings of last year’s survey.

In terms of knowledge of and attitudes toward democratic ideas, women (74%) were more likely than men (68%) to support the election of governors, yet less supportive of decentralization generally (63% women and 71% men). While these findings may seem contradictory, the non-response rate (no opinion or don’t know) for women was consistently higher than that of men. Likewise, women (22%) were more likely than men (20%) to not be able to provide any definition of a democracy, peaking at 4 in 10 women in Pattani. A comparison of these results to the national average (women 12%, men 5%) highlights the need for targeted civic education for women in the Deep South.
Appendix B – Media Tables

How many days a week do you watch TV? (Q95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every/almost every day</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–4 days</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 days</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than one day a week</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During what time do you regularly watch TV? (One or two responses are allowed) (Q98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Day</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5–8 a.m.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–12 a.m.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 a.m. – 5 p.m.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 9 p.m.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9–11 p.m.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sporadic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never watch</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How many days a week do you listen to the radio? (Q99)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days per Week</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every/almost every day</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–4 days</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 days</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than one day a week</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never listen</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What time of day do you listen to the radio? (Q102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of Day</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5–8 a.m.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–12 a.m.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 a.m. – 5 p.m.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–9 p.m.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9–11 p.m.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sporadic</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never listen</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Can you read Thai? (Q103)

Nationally, 96% of Thai voters can read Thai; this falls to 81% in the Deep South, and is even lower in rural areas (79%).

How many days a week do you read a newspaper? (Q104)
Can you read Yawi? (Q105)

How do you normally get information about what is happening in the country? (Q106)
Appendix C – Methodology of the Survey

This quantitative study, Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand, was conducted using face-to-face, in-home interviews in Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani provinces. A total of 750 interviews were conducted in urban and rural areas of the three provinces, with a total of 117 questions (10 stratification/qualification questions and 107 substantive questions).

Respondents were selected using a simple random sampling methodology with a 50:50 rural/municipal mix: 
First – sampling areas were selected in both urban and rural areas 
Second – each dwelling was selected using a random start point followed by a skip interval
Third – individual respondents in the dwelling were screened for eligibility using population gender-age quota criteria in proportion to the target population and other eligibility requirements.

All interviews were conducted between July 2, 2010 and August 30, 2010.

Margin of Error
The Democracy and Conflict in Southern Thailand Study required a confidence level of 95% and thus a margin of error of 6% (at the 95% confidence level) for region-wide estimates. This required a sample size of 750 respondents for meaningful analysis of ethnicity, religion, age, gender, urban/rural residence, and province.

Stratification
For the purposes of this survey the Deep South was stratified into three geographic strata: the provinces of Yala, Narathiwas, and Pattani. Within each geographic stratum the optimum sample design is to select a sample of districts with probability proportional to their size, and then to select within each province a fixed number of respondents. This gives a self-weighting sample within each stratum (meaning that each dwelling is selected with the same

4 Due to security issues, some randomly selected sampling units were removed from the sampling frame.

5 Thai adult, aged 18 years and above, living in the household longer than 90 days; no previous participation in a survey research within the past six months; neither the respondent nor any member of his or her household working for an advertising, media, public relations or marketing research company or serving as a local or national politician, a sub-district headman, or a village headman.
There is a cost-quality trade-off in this decision. The fewer the districts that are selected, the more clustered the sample will be across the stratum. This means that a small number of districts will be used to represent the full stratum, leading to higher standard errors. On the other hand, if a large number of districts is selected then only a small number of dwellings will be selected per district, which could significantly add to cost. The survey methodology struck a compromise between these two extremes, which resulted in the following provincial sample:

**YALA**
Yala Urban (N=125)
Baan Jaru, Kupatasa, Kuhamuk, Baan Malayu Bangkok, Baan Kuelaema, Talad Kaow Thanon Siroros, Santiuk, Moo 1 Burseang, Moos & Nibongbaru, Moo 10 Tae Bo.

Yala Rural (N=125)
Amphoe Krong Pinang: Tambon Krong Pinang Moo 8, Moo, Moo 2, Moo 4; Amphoe Kabang: Tambon Kabang Moo 6, Moo 2, Moo 3; Amphoe Yaha: Tambon Yaha Moo 1, Moo 2, Moo 3.

**NARATHIWAS**
Narathiwas Urban (=125)
Muddamun, Kalae Pa Yae, Kalae Ta Pae, Kampong Bahru, Kampng Pa Yoo, Ya Kang, Ya Kang
Narathiwas Rural (N=125)
Amphoe TakBai: Tambon Ko Sathon Moo 1, Tambon Ko Sathon Moo
2, Tambon Ko Sathon Moo 4, Koah Ngue Ba (Sipo), Tambon Ko Sathon Moo5, Plug Pla village; Amphoe Yi-ngo: Tambon Lahan Moo7, Ka Deng, Tambon Lahan, Lahan Village, Tambon Lahan, Tohmae, Tambon Lubo Buesa Moo 2, Tambon Lubo Buesa Moo 3; Amphoe Ra-ngae: Tambon Kalicha Moo1, Tambon Kalicha Moo 2.

**PATTANI**
Pattani Urban (N=125)
Sabarang, Anoru, Chabang Tiko, Rusa Milae, Pakaraw, Rong Ang, Rong Lao, Bue Ting, Yu Yo, Jue Rare Batu.

Pattani Rural (N=125)
Amphoe Yarang: Tambon Khlong Mai Moo 5, Tambon Rawaeng Moo 4, Tambon Krado Moo 3, Tambon Yarang Moo 5; Amphoe Nong Chik: Tambon Don Rak Moo 1, Tambon Bang Khao Moo 2, Tambon Tuyong Moo 8; Amphoe Mayo: Tambon Sakam Moo 1, Tambon Sakam Moo 4, Tambon La-nga Moo 5.

**Data Processing**
All data collected from the interviews was processed using SPSS weighted data: the population demographic information (i.e. age-gender distribution by region) used in the tabulations is based on the figures shown in The 2000 Population and Housing Census report of the National Statistical Office of Thailand (TNSO). (Remark: The Population and Housing Census of TNSO is conducted every 10 years.)
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