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SURVEY ON PERCEPTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE OF CORRUPTION

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN MONGOLIA PROJECT
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INTRODUCTION

From March to June 2017, The Asia Foundation, in collaboration with Sant-Maral Foundation, conducted its eighteenth Survey on Perceptions and Knowledge of Corruption (SPEAK) in Mongolia, a nationwide survey of citizens in rural soums, aimags, and the capital city Ulaanbaatar. Since March 2006 the survey has gathered data and provides a unique view as citizen perception and experience with corruption have changed over time. This survey is conducted in an effort to better understand the scope and public perception of corruption, and evaluate the changes in public attitudes toward corruption, the incidence of corruption at the household level, and government progress in implementing reforms that will combat corruption in Mongolia. Through this annual survey we hope to provide a deeper understanding of a key issue in Mongolia, while also contributing to the knowledge environment for policymaking and programming as the Mongolian government further develops its anti-corruption policies.

The SPEAK is an integral part of the Global Affairs Canada funded Strengthening Democratic Participation and Transparency in the Public Sector in Mongolia (STEPS) project implemented by The Asia Foundation. The SPEAK survey builds on the semi-annual corruption benchmarking survey conducted under the USAID-funded STAGE and MACS project. Known from 2006 to 2011 as the Mongolia Corruption Benchmarking Survey, it was renamed SPEAK in 2012. The survey measures public perceptions and understanding of corruption, grand corruption, government institutions, and the size and impact of petty corruption on the day-to-day life of Mongolian households.

This is the second of three annual SPEAK surveys that will be conducted over the period of the STEPS project. The survey serves as a backbone to evidence-based programming, informing the project of changes at critical stages of the program. The SPEAK survey is extensively disseminated to a broad range of public, private as well as civil society stakeholders and triggers public discussions on transparency, accountability, and corruption. The longitudinal design of the survey helps to track long-term changes and trends in perceptions and attitudes. Additionally, the SPEAK survey is complemented by the Foundation’s Study of Private Perceptions of Corruption (STOPP) which is designed to capture data on perceptions of corruption in the business sector. As part of the STEPS project, a survey on transparency, ethics, and corruption issues in Mongolia’s education sector was released in April, 2017. Together, the surveys and other project research provide a broad picture of the level of corruption in Mongolia.
KEY FINDINGS

- Only 11.0 percent think that the current government will do better. 21.3 percent of respondents think that the current government will do worse than the previous administration, headed by PM Ch. Saikhanbileg, in combating corruption.

- 60.4 percent of respondents think that corruption in the last three years increased against the 10.6 percent that think it decreased.

- There is a decline in petty corruption statistics. In March 2017, only 5.7 percent of households admitted paying bribes in the last three months. It is one percent lower than the previous year and is at an all-time low.

- There is increasing support that bribery is socially unacceptable with 81.8 percent of respondents supporting the statement that “the person who gives the bribe is in the same way responsible as the one who accepts it”, which is the also at an all-time high.

- TV9 and Facebook are the main sources of information on corruption related issues. In the last few years Facebook coverage grew rapidly and most likely it will become an increasingly important source of information in the fight against corruption.

- Political parties, National government, and Parliament remain among the top five most corrupt institutions.

- The “Absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at a national level” (43.6 percent) and “the habit to solve problems through corrupt practices” (44.1 percent) are considered the main reasons behind corruption.
There is a shift to a tougher stand against corruption with more respondents giving preference to “strong enforcement measures and punishment” as the most effective tool: 20.8 percent in 2014, 21.4 percent in 2015, 24.6 percent in 2016 and 28.5 percent in 2017. In comparison, preferences for other approaches like transparency, civil control, increasing salaries are in decline. “Increasing salaries” declined from 10.5 percent in 2016 to 8.2 percent in 2017. At the same time, “transparency in administrative decision-making” dropped from 12.9 percent to 10.9 percent and “strengthening civil control over public administration” dropped from 13.0 percent to 11.4 percent.

There is a growing expectation of civil society leading in the fight against corruption. In September 2013, 9.5 percent of respondents thought of civil society as a leader and in March 2017 it became 11.3 percent. Somehow this attitude does not apply to grand corruption. Since March 2014 there was an increasing group of respondents that see grand corruption as involving cases with high level of damage to the country. There was also a high support of the opinion that it involved cases with strong political interest. When asked “who should lead the fight against grand corruption” public expectations towards the role of civil society have significantly declined from 12.8 percent in March 2013 to 6.3 percent in March 2017. Nearly a third thinks that the IAAC should lead the fight.
1 PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY
1. PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY

In the survey, the respondents are asked about the major problems facing the country through an open question. Altogether about 90 categories are used in this item in the survey. The top ten positions are presented in Figures 1.1

From observations in this survey and other Sant Maral Foundation (SMF) surveys (Politbarometer 1996-2017), in general, unemployment leads the list of major problems facing the country. If we compare this to the situations in March 2017 and March 2016, both unemployment and corruption underwent substantial growth. “Unemployment” increased from 27.8 percent to 34.6 percent, while “Corruption” shifted one position up from forth to third, increasing from 7.7 percent to 9.9 percent.

The trend in “unemployment” as a major problem shows a gradual increase from September 2013 (Figure 1.2). The “corruption” trend grew in a similar way, at 9.9 percent “Corruption” is now at the highest value observed since September 2010 (Figure 1.3).

In March 2017, “Bureaucracy” made an appearance in the top ten most important problems, (it was not among the top ten in 2015 and in 2016). Public perception of “bureaucracy” is closely correlated with corruption.

Figure 1.1: Major Problems in March 2017 (top 10, only valid percentage).
Figure 1.2: Trends in “unemployment” as a major problem (2006 to 2017)

![Unemployment Trends Chart]

Figure 1.3: Trends in “corruption” as a major problem (2006 to 2017)

![Corruption Trends Chart]
These trends in unemployment and corruption have been mirrored by women and men however, women have prioritized unemployment more than men where as men have ranked corruption slightly higher than women.

Figure 1.4: Trends in unemployment and corruption (2006 to 2017) by Gender
2 PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
2. PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

In assessing the impact of corruption (Figure 2.1) there is a steady view about its impact on personal life and business environment. Mean values for the impact of corruption (from 1 “not at all” affected by corruption, to 4 “to a large extent” affected by corruption) show very little fluctuation. However, the assessment of its impact on personal life has stayed around values close to “a small extent” but the assessment of its impact on the business environment is closer to “a medium extent”. Political life is the only area where we observed gradual growth from March 2014. It also seems that starting from 2016 the assessment of the impact on corruption on the business environment is also starting to change. If we compare observations for the last two years, there is almost no change in the mean assessment of its impact on personal life evaluations, while the mean assessment in business environment increased by 0.08 and of political life by 0.1 (Figure 2.2).

*Figure 2.1: Impact of corruption on personal life, business environment and political life*
Since 2006, respondent’s views that “corruption is a common practice in our country” has remained largely unchanged with 91.2 percent of respondents in March 2006 and 86.7 percent of March 2017 respondents agreeing with this statement (Figure 2.3). However, we can still observe a minor change over time. From March 2006 to March 2014 the trend was positive with the number of respondents agreeing with the statement declining to only 81.3 percent. But from March 2014 until present the trend was reversed and the percentage of respondents that agree stated to increase.

**Figure 2.2: Impact of corruption in 2016 and 2017**

**Figure 2.3: “Corruption is a common practice in our country”**
A more positive picture can be observed in the level of acceptance of corruption by the respondents (Figure 2.4). Although the number of those that disagree that some level of corruption is acceptable was always higher than of those thinking otherwise, in the latest survey we can see that there is a significant increase in their numbers. It increased from 60.7 percent in March 2016 to 69 percent in March 2017.

*Figure 2.4: “Some level of corruption is acceptable”*

In recent years Mongolia has been going through major debates relating to the political structure and systems and confidence in the political systems’ capability to reduce corruption has declined (Figure 2.5). In March 2014 half of the respondents had confidence that the political system has had some success in stopping corruption (51.6 percent), in March 2015 only slightly over a third of respondents agreed (38.5 percent). This slightly improved in March 2016 (41.9 percent), but in March 2017 it further decreased with only a third of respondents believing that the political system can stop corruption (34.6 percent). Accordingly, the number of respondents, who do not believe that the system has been successful in stopping corruption, has increased and reached more than a half in March 2017 (59.5 percent).
In general, civil society is ranked higher than government institutions in its ability to prevent corruption (Figure 2.6 - Figure 2.7). In March 2017, over a half of respondents believed that “civil society can prevent corruption” (59.9 percent). In contrast, slightly under a half of respondents believed that “only government institutions may help to prevent corruption” (48.4 percent).

Figure 2.5: “The existing political system has had success in stopping corruption”
Figure 2.7: “Only government institutions can help prevent corruption”

Similar attitudes were observed toward citizens, NGOs, and politicians (Figure 2.8 - Figure 2.9). In March 2017, 77.4 percent of respondents agreed that “Fighting corruption is currently being led by citizens and NGOs” while 86.3 percent thought that “Politicians have no real will to fight corruption as they may benefit from it”.

Figure 2.8: “Fighting corruption is currently being led by citizens and NGOs”
Since 2006, most respondents supported the statement that: “the only way to overcome bureaucracy is to pay bribes” except in September 2009 (Figure 2.10). In March 2017, over half of respondents agreed that paying bribes helps to overcome bureaucracy (57.6 percent). That could be one of the reasons that propelled “bureaucracy” to the top 10 major problems in March 2017. Similar attitudes were observed related to if giving a bribe helped overcome unjust regulations (Figure 2.11). Over a half of respondents agreed with that statement (57.3 percent).
Figure 2.10: “Do you agree that the only way to overcome bureaucracy is to pay bribes?”

Figure 2.11: “Giving a bribe helps to overcome unjust regulations”
In contrast, respondents overwhelmingly supported the statement that “small and medium businesses are more negatively affected by corruption than large businesses” (Figure 2.12). Their opinions fluctuated over time with the lowest measurement seen in March 2009 (60.9 percent). However, in March 2017, the highest number respondents agreed with this statement since the start of the surveys in March 2006 (87 percent).

In addition, a high level of support was also observed for the statement that large business was one of the main sources of corruption (Figure 2.13). This attitude had slightly fluctuated over time, yet stayed at around three quarters of respondents agreeing with this statement. In March 2017, it reached 78 percent.

**Figure 2.12:** “Small and medium businesses are more negatively affected by corruption than large businesses”
**Figure 2.13**: “Do you agree that large business is one of the main sources of corruption?”

One of the positive developments in the last decade has been improvement of local administration’s image in society (Figure 2.14). In our observations, there was a steady growth of support for a statement that “local administration officers are generally reliable and responsible people.” Over time it grew from slightly over a third of respondents supporting this statement in March 2006 (38.1 percent) to slightly over a half in March 2017 (54.0 percent).

**Figure 2.14**: “Local administration officers are generally reliable and responsible people”
The vast majority of respondents support the view that: “citizens should be responsible to reduce corruption,” which highlights an increasing role that a civil society could play in combating corruption (Figure 2.15). From November 2012 to March 2017 the support for this statement increased from 89.1 percent to 92.9 percent. Also, the number of those who had no opinion or did not answer decreased from 4.6 percent in November 2012 to 1.0 percent in March 2017. This could be a positive sign in public awareness of anti-corruption measures.

Similar trends could be observed toward decision makers with respondents’ view on the statement “decision-makers are less affected by corruption than ordinary people” (Figure 2.16). Over time there were less people who reported no opinion, and the number declined from 7.2 percent in November 2012 to 1.8 percent in March 2017. Moreover, the support for this statement had increased from 85.1 percent in November 2012 to 91.9 percent in March 2017.

Figure 2.15: “Citizens should be responsible in reducing corruption”
Among the negative developments were attitudes toward the anti-corruption legal environment (Figure 2.17). Respondents’ opinion on whether the existing legislation on corruption was ineffective could be split in two parts. From March 2006 to September 2008 we could observe a positive development with fewer respondents thinking it was ineffective. However, this trend was reversed after March 2009. The number of those who agree that the existing legislation on corruption was ineffective increased from 70.3 percent in September 2009 to 87.7 percent in March 2017. Also, starting from September 2009 less respondents reported no opinion. The “no answer” or “don’t know” responses declined from 13.8 percent in September 2009 to 2.6 percent in March 2017.
In the surveys, the respondents’ opinion varied on whether low salary was the main reason for bribes among public civil servants (Figure 2.18). The number of people with no opinion was relatively high with about a tenth of respondents (8.3 percent in March 2017). Over half of respondents supported this statement (59.1 percent) while 32.6 percent did not support it. Women have consistently said that low wages contribute to corruption more than men (Figure 2.19)

Figure 2.18: “Low salary is the main reason for bribes among public civil servants”
Over time, support for stronger punishment for public officials convicted of corruption is gradually increasing (Figure 2.20). In November 2012, 76.7 percent of the respondents supported this statement, in March 2017 it became 82.9 percent.

Additionally, respondents support the statement that “the person who gives the bribe is in the same way responsible as the one who accepts it” has reached its’ highest point in March 2017 with 81.8 percent (Figure 2.21). The lowest measurement was in March 2007 with 66 percent.

Figure 2.20: “A deterrent to corruption will be stronger punishment for public officials convicted of corruption”
Respondents were divided in their opinion on whether implementation of anti-corruption policies was politically unbiased (Figure 2.22). In March 2017, nearly a fifth of respondents had no opinion (20.1 percent), while around 40 percent thought that implementation of anti-corruption policy was politically biased (39.5 percent) and the other 40 thought it was politically unbiased (40.4 percent).

Figure 2.21: “The person who gives the bribe is in the same way responsible as the one who accepts it”

Figure 2.22: “Implementation of anti-corruption policies is politically unbiased”
3 ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION TRENDS
3. ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION TRENDS

Over time, the positive trend in respondents’ opinion on levels of corruption over the past three years has changed (Figure 3.1). The number of respondents believing that the levels had ‘increased a lot’ was falling with a continuous decrease from March 2006 until March 2014. However, since March 2014 this trend was reversed and an increasing number of respondents started believing that levels of corruption was increasing in comparison to the past three years. In March 2014, 17.4 percent of respondents thought that corruption increased a lot over the past three years, by March 2017 this number had doubled to 34.2 percent. Similarly, in March 2014, 25 percent of respondents thought that corruption levels had “decreased a little” over the past three years, and in March 2017 their number dropped to 10 percent. Moreover, when tabulated by employment sector, state sector employees had a more negative assessment of corruption trends than NGO and private sector employees (Figure 3.2-Figure 3.3).

*Figure 3.1: “In the past three years, how has the level of corruption in Mongolia changed?”*
**Figure 3.2:** “In the past three years, how has the level of corruption in Mongolia changed?” (By state sector employees)

![State Sector Chart]

**Figure 3.3:** “In the past three years, how has the level of corruption in Mongolia changed?” (By private sector and NGOs)

![Private Sector & NGO Chart]
Regarding future developments in corruption levels, respondents’ opinions have fluctuated over time. The highest level of optimism about decreasing corruption levels was observed in September 2013 (Figure 3.4). At that time, slightly over half of respondents believed that over the next three years, corruption would decrease (52.5 percent). By March 2017 the number of optimists dropped to 31.9 percent.

In a retrospective assessment, state employees were also more pessimistic than private sector and NGOs about future corruption levels (Figure 3.5 - Figure 3.6)

*Figure 3.4: How do you expect the level of corruption in the next 3 years to change?*
Figure 3.5: “How do you expect the level of corruption in the next 3 years to change?” (By state sector employees)

Figure 3.6: “How do you expect the level of corruption in the next 3 years to change?” (By private sector and NGOs)
PETTY CORRUPTION AND BRIBES
4. PETTY CORRUPTION AND BRIBES

Over time, the number of petty bribes reported by respondents is continuing to decrease (Figure 4.1). The decline in petty bribes is a result of several factors relating to: increasing negative attitudes to demands of bribes, little and declining personal experience with corruption, and the success of anti-corruption initiatives.

In March 2017, only 5.7 percent of respondents reported that their household paid bribe in the last three months. Despite clear indications that there was a significant fall in the number of petty bribes since 2006, it seems to be paralleled by a development in the complexity of bribes. This development may leave certain type of petty bribes hard to capture by our measurements.

For example, the population is almost evenly split about definition of “donations” issue (Figure 4.2). “Donations” exist in Mongolian society on all levels starting from kindergartens ending with political parties. Although some of them are likely to be of a corrupt nature, it is very convenient to mask them under the premise of “sustaining” an organization. The latest observation in 2017 shows that the proportion of population that does not consider “donations” as a bribe has slightly increased.

Figure 4.1: “Did your family give some money or gifts as a bribe in the last 3 months?” (”Yes” responses)
Figure 4.2: Donations – a bribe or a way to sustain an organization?

![DEFINITION OF DONATION](image)

It seems that the effects of the global financial crisis of the 2007-2008 on Mongolian economy reached some of the households. In March 2009, there was a big spike of respondents (42.5 percent) that reported that giving a bribe in last three months “seriously” damaged their family budget (Figure 4.3). In 2017 Mongolia is facing another national economic crisis, but due to the high level of government’s social spending its impact on the standard of living seems to be weaker (Figure 4.4). That could be one of the reasons why in March 2017 only 20.5 percent of bribe givers reported their budget was being “seriously” damaged.

Figure 4.3: “How much does the total amount of bribes paid affect your family budget?”
In March 2017, there was a significant increase of those who “offered a bribe to avoid a problem with the authorities” (Figure 4.5). It increased from 11 percent in March 2016 to 21.8 percent in March 2017. There is a significant gender difference in response to this question as only 15.8 percent of women offered to avoid a problem compared to 27.5 percent of men (Figure 4.6). Over time this indicator is affected by the decreasing number of reports of bribe-giving by respondents (5.7% of respondents in March 2017). Thus, while we see the changes in the types of bribes the respondents paid, it may also reflect seasonal changes and factors that are best answered through further qualitative study.
Figure 4.5: “Which of the following applies to the bribes paid in the past three months?”
There were no significant changes in petty bribe statistics in comparison to the last year (Figure 4.7 and Table 4.1). In our projections, the average size slightly increased from 336,000 MNT in 2016 to 370,000 MNT in 2017. Despite the fall in the number of bribe-givers from 6.7 percent in 2016 to 5.7 percent in 2017, it seems that the total amount of bribes paid by households in 2017 remains almost the same and is estimated to be 18.1 billion MNT. Over the past 10 years, the percent of households paying bribes has been in relatively steady decline, however 2008 to 2009 saw the highest overall bribe amounts and 2013 and 2014 saw the highest average bribe amount.
Figure 4.7: Petty bribe statistics

Table 4-1: Petty bribe statistics

<table>
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<th>Mar-07</th>
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<td>Average bribe (in 1000 MNT)</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>187</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of households giving bribes</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total amount paid (in billion MNT)</td>
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<td>% of households giving bribes</td>
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<td>520</td>
</tr>
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<td>% of households giving bribes</td>
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<td>12.40%</td>
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<tbody>
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<td>Average bribe (in 1000 MNT)</td>
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<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households giving bribes</td>
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<td>6.70%</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total amount paid (in billion MNT)</td>
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<td>18.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
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<td>823412</td>
<td>859100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statistical Yearbook</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
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</table>
5 GRAND CORRUPTION
5. GRAND CORRUPTION

In the 2012 survey we introduced the concept of grand corruption. In the six year period since then, there were some patterns emerging in public attitudes about grand corruption (Figure 5.1). Approximately a quarter of respondents in recent surveys linked grand corruption to public officials. It is followed by a group who consider that grand corruption is defined by cases with strong political interests. During the same period awareness of grand corruption has increased as no responses have declined from 20.8 percent in 2012 to only 7.9 percent in 2017.

Since March 2014 there was also an increasing group of respondents that see grand corruption as involving cases with high level of damage to the country. There was also a high support of the opinion that it involved cases with strong political interest. However, the view that big local and foreign businesses are a source of grand corruption is declining.

*Figure 5.1:* “What is your understanding of grand corruption?”

![Understanding Grand Corruption Chart](chart.png)
In November 2012, one fifth of respondents could not specify the level of grand corruption in Mongolia (Figure 5.2). At that time, the concept was not that common. In six years, the concept spread and in March 2017 only 6.5 percent could not specify the level of grand corruption in Mongolia. Most of those who gave their opinion thought that there was a significant amount of grand corruption. Their number has reached 54.9 percent in March 2017 compared to 43.1 percent in November 2012.

Figure 5.2: “What do you think about the level of grand corruption in Mongolia?”

In March 2017, in the assessment of main reasons for grand corruption the majority of respondents selected the merger of business and political interests (Figure 5.3). There seemed to be less xenophobia in March 2017 compared to previous years as in November 2012 17.2 percent of respondents linked grand corruption to large foreign companies, in March 2017 it dropped to 12.4 percent. Most likely since many foreign investors left the country but perceptions of the levels of grand corruption increased instead of decreasing. Imperfection of legal system was also at the top of reasons behind grand corruption.
Figure 5.3: “Why do you think there is grand corruption in Mongolia?” (Multiple responses)

The evolving understanding of grand corruption was also reflected in understanding of its impact at a household level. In November 2012, 42.4 percent of respondents could not assess the impact, in March 2017 only 17.1 percent could not specify the impact. Moreover, in March 2017, 12.9 percent of respondents estimated grand corruption’s impact on their household as “very strong”.

Deterioration in the standard of living and inflation were most frequently mentioned as negative effects of grand corruption (Figure 5.5 – Figure 5.6).
**Figure 5.4:** “Do you think that GC has any negative impact on you and your family?”

**Figure 5.5:** “If there is a negative impact, can you be specific about what sort of impact it has on you and your family?” March 2013
Among the types of bribes in grand corruption cases, “position in administration” and “cash” have been mentioned the most (Figure 5.7 – Figure 5.8). In the Mongolian legislation, both giving and receiving sides of a bribery process are considered guilty of corruption. However, “cash” is linked to the giving side and is usually followed by the payback of a receiving side through offerings like a “position in administration”. This process can work in a different direction, when a “position in administration” is put on a tender for the highest bidder.

**Figure 5.6:** “If there is a negative impact, can you be specific about what sort of impact it has on you and your family?” March 2017

**Figure 5.7:** “If you heard about GC, which way the bribe was given?” (Multiple responses) March 2013
In March 2017, the IAAC continues to be the main anti-grand corruption leader for respondents. Nearly a third thinks that IAAC should lead the fight (30.1 percent). On the other side the position of National government as the leader against Grand corruption has increased by 6 percent reaching 27.5 percent in March 2017. Expectations toward the civil society have significantly declined from 12.8 percent in March 2013 to 6.3 percent in March 2017.

Figure 5.9: “In your opinion, who should organize and lead the effort to combat grand corruption?” March 2013
**Figure 5.10:** “In your opinion, who should organize and lead the effort to combat grand corruption?”
March 2017
MOST CORRUPT ENTITIES
6. MOST CORRUPT ENTITIES

Based on respondents’ evaluations of the levels of corruption, the same five entities have occupied the top spots for most corrupt entities since April 2015 (Table 6.1). In March 2017, land utilization regained its top place in the ranking and political parties returned to second place.

If we consider the mean values, the means of “land of utilization” and “political parties” are close to four, implying they are “significantly” corrupt according to the scale (Figure 6.1). However, compared to the earliest measurement in 2006, land utilization’s evaluations have improved decreasing from 4.5 to 4, while political parties’ evaluations have worsened increasing from 3.58 in 2007 to 3.94 in 2017.

*Table 6-1: Ranking of most corrupt areas and institutions*
Figure 6.1: Ranking of corrupt entities in March 2017

(from 1 not at all affected by corruption, to 5 extremely affected by corruption)

If we look at the trends in evaluation of the highest ranked entities: “land utilization”, “mining” and “political parties”, from March 2006 until March 2014 there were some differences and fluctuations in their evaluations by respondents in the earlier surveys (Figure 6.2). However, starting from March 2015, all three entities evaluations became similar.
In an open question asking respondents to name additional areas affected by corruption, the highest frequency was observed for construction and state owned enterprises (Figure 6.3). These items and their relative rankings will be tested in the next 2018 spring survey.

**Figure 6.2:** Ranking trend of the three most corrupt entities in March 2017

**Figure 6.3:** Additional corrupt areas and institutions in March 2017
(number of mentioned cases by respondents)
INDIVIDUALS FACING CORRUPTION
7. INDIVIDUALS FACING CORRUPTION

In March 2017, there was a slight setback in respondents’ attitudes toward bribe demands compared to the previous year (Figure 7.1). In March 2016, 45.1 percent of respondents said that they “will not pay”, in March 2017 that number decreased to 38.8 percent. At the same time the number of those who would prefer to look for someone to avoid the payment has increased from 13.4 percent in March 2016 to 18.9 percent in 2017. The overall percentage of those willing to pay if they have money has not significantly changed. Overall, it seems that the situation in March 2017 is very similar to what was observed in March 2015. As a year of parliamentary elections, March 2016 was likely to be affected by the political environment.

Figure 7.1: “If you face a situation in which you are directly asked for a bribe from a public or private official, what possible action would you take?”

Different social groups have some differences in behavior pattern when facing corruption. In March 2017, when tabulated by gender (Figure 10.2), women appeared to be less tolerant than men. 41.1 percent of women responded that they “will not pay” if asked for bribe in comparison to slightly over a third of men (36.3 percent). Also slightly over a fifth of men were ready to pay a bribe (22.8 percent), compared to less than a fifth of women were willing to do so (17.6 percent).
Figure 7.2: “If you face a situation in which you are directly asked for a bribe from a public or private official, what could be your most possible action?” (March 2017, by gender)

Similar differences were found when data was tabulated by age group (Figure 7.3). Tolerance to corruption decreased with age. The most tolerant age group was 25-29 years old. Only 28 percent in this age group was not willing to pay a bribe in comparison to 53.4 percent of 60+ group.

Figure 7.3: “If you face a situation in which you are directly asked for a bribe from a public or private official, what could be your most possible action?” (March 2017, by age group)
When presented with choices in reporting corruption, the IAAC remains the most frequent choice with more than half of respondents willing to report to it (Figure 7.4). In comparison to the previous surveys, there is a growth of reporting corruption to ‘other’ entities than management, IAAC, police and media. This could be correlated with a growing tendency in Mongolian society to settle disputes outside of the formal system.

*Figure 7.4: “If you report than where?”*

Conflict of interest cases are usually closely related to corruption. Compared to the previous year, there was an increase in willingness to report such cases. In March 2016, 47.4 percent of respondents were willing to report such a case, in March 2017 it increased to 55.5 percent (Figure 7.5). In addition, when asked about public officials and conflict of interest (Figure 7.6), nearly a half of respondents reported that public officials were “sometimes” involved in conflict of interest situation (48.8 percent), and a quarter of respondents reported that officials were “always” involved in conflicts of interest (24.6 percent). Among choices to report such incidents, management was the most common place to report (37.5 percent) followed by IAAC (21.6 percent) (Figure 7.7).
Figure 7.5: “If you discover a case of conflict of interest would you report it?”

Figure 7.6: “In your opinion, how often are public officials acting in violation of conflicts of interests?”
Figure 7.7: “If you were aware of a situation of conflict of interest where would you report it?” March 2017

WHERE TO REPORT CONFLICT OF INTEREST (MARCH 2017, ONLY VALID %)

- Management: 37.5%
- IAAC: 21.6%
- Police: 17%
- Media: 12.6%
- Hotline 11-11: 10.7%
- Other: 0.7%
8 EXPECTATIONS OF FAIR TREATMENT
8. EXPECTATIONS OF FAIR TREATMENT

While in general expectations to receive fair treatment from the institutions are low, taken over time these expectations are gradually improving. Starting from 2010, expectations to receive fair treatment increased in all observed institutions (Figure 11.1 to Figure 11.6). This is likely to be a sign of some progress in development of Mongolian institutions. Higher expectations of fairness are also contributing to the improvements of public confidence in the system. However, the level of confidence apparently is not related to the level of corruption in these institutions. Since, the overwhelming majority of respondents accept that “corruption is a common practice” that could be affecting their views of these institutions as well (Figure 2.3). The gradual increase in the number of those who would expect fair treatment means that the population has slightly different confidence criteria. It may be related to the improvements in services and communication. The best improvements in respondents’ expectations of fairness were achieved at the level of the local government administration (Figure 8.5).

There was a following increase in expectations of fairness:

- Education + 17 percent (since March 2010)
- Health + 17.4 percent (since March 2010)
- Judiciary + 9.3 percent (since March 2010)
- Law enforcement + 9.3 percent (since March 2010)
- Local administration +18.4 percent (since November 2012)
- National administration +13.3 percent (since November 2012)

If we compare these findings with the results from the Politbarometer of SMF (Table 8.1 and Table 8.2), the President and Parliament have seen declines however, there is a substantial growth of confidence to the government administration and judiciary since 2010. Nevertheless, the expectations of the National government continue to be low in terms of fairness and corruption (Compare Figure 8.6 and Table 6.1 ranking).

In March 2017 women were slightly more likely to say that the education system was fair 54.9 percent when compared to men 49.5 percent, however men were more likely to say that the health system was fair (48.1 percent versus 46.5 percent for women). Both men and women felt the judiciary and law enforcement was unfair, but local government administration was fair (Figure 8.7).
Table 8-1: Confidence in state institutions in March 2017 (Source: SMF Politbarometer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Judiciary System</th>
<th>Gvt admin</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
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<td>15.3</td>
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<td>16.0</td>
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<td>rather confident</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
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<td>25.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
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Table 8-2: Confidence in state institutions in April 2010 (Source: SMF Politbarometer)

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Figure 8.1: Fair treatment: Education system
**Figure 8.2: Fair treatment: Health system**

![Graph showing health system fairness from March 2010 to March 2017]

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<tr>
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<td>Fair</td>
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<td>34.8%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
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<td>53.5%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
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**Figure 8.3: Fair treatment: Judiciary system**

![Graph showing judiciary system fairness from March 2010 to March 2017]

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<th>Mar-17</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>12.8%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
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<td>27.1%</td>
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<td>21.6%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not fair</td>
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<td>57.9%</td>
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<td>51.1%</td>
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Figure 8.4: Fair treatment: Law Enforcement

Figure 8.5: Fair treatment: Local Government administration
Figure 8.6: Fair treatment: National Government administration

Figure 8.7: Fair treatment (by gender)
2017 ELECTION INTEGRITY
9. 2017 ELECTION INTEGRITY

The pattern of assessing integrity of the Presidential Elections in 2017 (Figures 9.1-9.5) is quite similar to the assessment of the integrity of Parliament Elections in 2016 (2016 SPEAK report).

About a fifth of respondents thought that the preparatory stage of elections would not be transparent and fair at all (21.8 percent) (Figure 9.1). However, among the more controversial assessments was campaign financing, where the highest number of respondents had no opinion (24.4 percent) (Figure 9.2). Moreover, the assessment of this stage found the highest number of respondents thought that campaign financing would not be transparent and fair (38 percent).

In comparison, the assessment of the election campaigns is much better. A fifth of respondents expected it to be fair “to a large extent” (21 percent) (Figure 9.3).

Since the Parliament Elections of 2016 went quite smoothly at the vote counting and results presentation stages, the expectations of transparency and fairness of these stages appeared much better in March 2017 (Figure 9.4 – Figure 9.5).

*Figure 9.1: Preparation stage: registration of voters, hiring staff, forming local and foreign observers*
Figure 9.2: Campaign financing

Figure 9.3: Election campaign
Figure 9.4: Vote counting process at the polling station

Figure 9.5: Aggregate counting and results presentation by GEC
While women consistently have higher non-response rates, over the past three years the percentage of non-responses for women and men on corruption in the electoral process has generally declined. The only exception is related to campaign financing that has seen an increase in non-responses from both men and women.

*Figure 9.6: Election integrity Non-response rates by gender*
10 Reasons Motivating Corruption
10. REASONS MOTIVATING CORRUPTION

In evaluating the reasons behind corruption, seven options were given to respondents:

- Low professionalism in the delivery of state services
- Absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at the national level
- Absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at the local level
- The habit to solve problems through corrupt practices
- Corruption in law enforcement bodies
- Public passivity
- Imperfect legislation or sanctions against corruption

When ranked, the highest values were received by “absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at the national level” and “the habit to solve problems through corrupt practices” (Figure 10.1). Therefore, highest values were linked to political leadership. Next down the line comes individual behavior, which is followed closely by “corruption in law enforcement bodies” and “imperfect legislation or sanctions against corruption.” In comparison, “low professionalism” was less of a factor leading to corruption.

Figure 10.1: Reasons behind corruption (means)
In March 2017, there was a major change in public attitudes compared to the previous year in almost all of the measurements (Figure 10.2-10.8). The category “a lot” of impact increased significantly in six out of seven variables:

- Absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at the national level
- Absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at the local level
- The habit to solve problems through corrupt practices
- Corruption in law enforcement bodies
- Public passivity
- Imperfect legislation or sanctions against corrupt

*Figure 10.2: Low professionalism in the delivery of state services*
**Figure 10.3:** Absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at a national level

![Graph showing absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at a national level](image)

<table>
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<td>3.4%</td>
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<td>4.0%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>33.6%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
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</table>

**Figure 10.4:** Absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at a local level

![Graph showing absence of will to control corruption from political leadership at a local level](image)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Mar-15</th>
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<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure 10.5:** The habit to solve problems through corrupt practices

**Figure 10.6:** Corruption in law enforcement bodies
Figure 10.7: Public passivity

Figure 10.8: Imperfect legislation or sanctions against corruption
11 Preventing Corruption
11. PREVENTING CORRUPTION

In terms of what should be done to prevent corruption a clear pattern can be seen emerging from 2014 to 2017 (Figure 11.1)

The respondents were given the following options for evaluation:

- Strong enforcement measures and punishment
- Consistency of implementation of the rule of law
- Increasing public employees’ salaries
- Transparency in administrative decision-making
- Strengthening state control over public administration
- Strengthening civil (non-government) control over public administration
- Building public awareness

Among them two options “strong enforcement measures and punishment” and “consistency of implementation of the rule of law” received the highest priority. In March 2017, 28.5 percent of respondents selected “strong enforcement measures” and 20.1 percent selected consistency in law implementation.

Figure 11.1: “What should be done to prevent corruption?”
Figure 11.2: “What should be done to prevent corruption?” March 2017

In comparison to previous surveys March 2017 marked the lowest level of awareness about prosecution of corruption. Only 29 percent of respondents said they were aware of officials prosecuted on a corruption charge (Figure 11.3). In addition, the lowest level of awareness was registered with regards to the operation of a telephone hotline to report corruption (Figure 11.4). On this issue respondents’ awareness has continuously decreased, and in March 2017 slightly less than a fifth of respondents reported that they were aware of this hotline (19.3 percent).

The willingness of respondents to report corruption if anonymous information is accepted remained relatively unchanged throughout the survey period (Figure 11.5). Over a half of respondents reported they would report corruption in such circumstances.
Figure 11.3: “Since the introduction of the new law on corruption in 2006 are you aware of any officials being prosecuted by the justice system on a corruption charge?”

Figure 11.4: “Are you aware of any telephone hotline on reporting corruption?”
Figure 11.5: “Would you report a corruption case if the IAAC would accept anonymous information?”
12  FIGHTING CORRUPTION
12. FIGHTING CORRUPTION

In March 2017, the Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) continues to be the leading choice in efforts to combat corruption (Figure 12.1). However, there has been a decline in this trend since November 2012. The preference for the IAAC decreased from 44.4 percent in November 2012 to 35.3 percent in March 2017. The decrease happened along with the higher expectations of the national government’s involvement in fighting corruption, which increased from 13.1 percent in November 2012 to 17.1 percent in March 2017. Also, there was an increase in the respondents’ choice of law enforcement which fluctuated over time but reached 10 percent in March 2017.

Figure 12.1: “In your opinion, who should organize and lead the effort to combat corruption?” (Top 5)

In recent surveys, there were slight improvements in expectations that the current government would do better than its predecessor. Nonetheless, negative expectations prevailed. In March 2016, slightly under a tenth of respondents thought that the PM Ch. Saikhanbileg would do better in fighting corruption than that of PM N. Altanchuyag (8 percent). In March 2017, slightly more than a tenth of respondents thought that PM J. Erdenebat would do better than PM Ch. Saikhanbileg (11 percent). Despite some fluctuations, nearly a fifth of respondents have no opinion on this matter and nearly a half believes things will be the same.
**Figure 12.2:** “How do you think the current government will perform compared to its predecessor in fighting corruption?” (2010 to 2017)

**Figure 12.3:** How do you think the current government will perform compared to the previous government? (2006 to 2017)
In March 2017, over half of respondents considered implementation of the Transparent accounting law as “significantly” or “extremely” important for combating corruption (64.6 percent in Figure 12.4). Nonetheless, over time there is a growing number of those who believe that this law is ineffective. In March 2016, 26.5 percent of respondents considered this law is “not at all” or “a little” effective and in one year it almost doubled reaching 41.5 percent in March 2017 (Figure 12.5).

Figure 12.4: How Important? Introduction of the Transparent Accounting Law (Glass Budget Law)
A different trend was observed regarding introduction of technology to eliminate human factor in corruption (Figure 12.6 – Figure 12.7). In March 2017, a vast majority of respondents thought that the introduction of new technology such as electronic registry, one window service etc. was “significantly” or “extremely” important (83 percent). Also, a 66.8 percent in March 2017 thought that it was “extremely” or “significantly” effective compared to 56.8 percent in March 2016.
**Figure 12.6:** How important: Introduction of new technology like electronic registry, one window service etc

**Figure 12.7:** How Effective: Introduction of new technology like electronic registry, one window service etc
In March 2017, 64.9 percent of respondents thought that income statements by state officials were “significantly” or “extremely” important (Figure 12.8). However, respondents' views on the effectiveness declined slightly from 33.5 percent in March 2016 to 31.5 percent in March 2017 (Figure 12.9).

*Figure 12.8: How Important: Income and Asset Disclosure by state employees*
Among initiatives dealing with corruption, respondents give a relatively high evaluation of the One Stop Service (Figure 12.10 – Figure 12.11). In March 2017, a vast majority of respondents considered it “significantly” or “extremely” important (84 percent), and also a vast majority also considered it “extremely” or “significantly” effective (80.5 percent).
Figure 12.10: How Important: One Stop Service Centers (March 2017)

Figure 12.11: How Effective: One Stop Service Centers (March 2017)
The latest initiative to deal with corruption appeared mostly unnoticed. Only 29 percent of respondents said that they know about the National Anti-Corruption program adopted by Parliament in November 2016.

**Figure 12.12:** Awareness of the new National Anti-Corruption Program passed in November 2016
INDEPENDENT AGENCY AGAINST CORRUPTION
13. INDEPENDENT AGENCY AGAINST CORRUPTION

There is a continuing decline in the evaluation of IAAC’s performance since September 2013 (Figure 13.1). While it reached its highest point in September 2013 with a quarter of respondents believing its performance was good (24.8 percent), their number gradually declined since then and reached less than a tenth in March 2017 (7.6 percent). In March 2017, the evaluations were 8.8 percent positive, 33.5 percent neutral, and 49.2 percent negative (Figure 13.2).

*Figure 13.1:* “How do you evaluate the IAAC’s performance in fighting corruption?”
At the same time a decline in respondents’ confidence was observed (Figure 13.3). In March 2017, respondents’ confidence distribution was as following: 27.6 percent confident against 65.8 percent not confident (Figure 13.4). Starting from March 2014, respondents also increasingly lost their confidence in political impartiality of IAAC (Figure 13.5). In March 2017, only 13.4 percent of respondents believed that IAAC was politically impartial.
Figure 13.3: How much confidence do you have in the IAAC in fighting corruption?”

![Chart showing confidence levels of IAAC in fighting corruption over time]

**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence Level</th>
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<tr>
<td>Confident</td>
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<td>7.9%</td>
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<td>5.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
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<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Don’t know/No answer</td>
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<td>17.5%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 13.4: “How much confidence do you have in the IAAC in fighting corruption?” March 2017

Figure 13.5: “Are you confident that the IAAC is an impartial law enforcement body?”
14 MEDIA
14. MEDIA

The media plays a crucial role in forming awareness about corruption in the general population. If perception of petty corruption relies on personal experience, the perception of grand corruption is formed predominantly by mass media.

Starting from 2012, with our surveys we could observe significant changes in the media landscape regarding coverage of corruption issues. Although TV remained an unquestionable leader in providing information on corruption with 67.9 percent in November 2012 and 64.7 percent in March 2017, we can see the increasing role of the Internet and social media. The number of respondents using it as a source of information about corruption increased from 3.8 percent in November 2012 to 17.4 percent in March 2017. This expansion is happening at the expense of traditional forms of information, since an increasing number of interactions and social contacts is shifting to the Internet. In comparison to November 2012 the following sources decreased by:

- Words of mouth: -3.4 percent
- Friends / Relatives: -3.7 percent
- Newspapers, magazines: -3.5 percent

*Figure 14.1: What is your main source of information about corruption? (single choice)*
Among TV channels, the highest number of respondents now consider TV9 to be the most informative in exposing corruption. In March 2010, MNTV was the main channel on corruption issues with 31.8 percent of respondents selecting this channel and TV9 was second with 23.7 percent of respondents. However, starting from November 2012 there was a shift and since then TV9 has continuously led the list. In March 2017, 40.3 percent of all respondents mentioned TV9 as their main source of information on corruption with MNTV in second with 27.9 percent.

In the earlier surveys 25 Channel was very active. In March 2010, 22.6 percent of respondents selected that channel and it was among the top three sources exposing corruption. But apparently, it gradually cut its coverage of corruption topics and in March 2017 only 3.3 percent of respondents considered it as the most informative source.

**Figure 14.2:** “If TV is the main source, which channel is most informative in exposing corruption?” (Single choice)
Over the period of six years we can see a trend that the Internet has and most probably will continue to play an increasing role in information dissemination (Figure 14.3).

In Mongolian social media space, some major changes are also on the way. The role of information sites in corruption issues has declined from 72 percent in March 2010 to 49.2 percent in March 2017. However, the role of Facebook is expanding from 17.3 percent in March 2010 to 44.9 percent in March 2017.

Figure 14.3: “If Internet or Social Media is the main source which one is the most informative in exposing corruption?”
15 DEMOGRAPHICS
15. DEMOGRAPHICS

In March 2017, the gender distribution in the sample was 47.1 percent men and 52.9 percent women. The largest age group in the sample was 30-39 age. People with the secondary education were the largest group in educational distribution (38.5 percent). People with higher education are presented more than in national statistics, which is 33.4 percent. This is typical for surveys. In the employment category, the largest group was “full time employed” representing 34.1 percent of respondents.

*Figure 15.1: Respondents gender distribution in March 2017*
Figure 15.2: Respondents age distribution in March 2017

Figure 15.3: Respondents education in March 2017
Figure 15.4: Employment status of respondents in March 2017

![Bar chart showing work status percentages]

- Full time employed: 34.1%
- Part time employed: 13.9%
- Professional training: 1%
- Unemployed: 20.7%
- Homemaker: 6.3%
- Retired/Disabled: 18.3%
- Student: 5.7%
ANNEX: METHODOLOGY

Structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with adults 18 years of age and above. A multi-stage, random sampling was used with probability sample in an area cluster.

At the first stage, Ulaanbaatar and up to two aimags (provinces) from each of the four regions were selected randomly, followed by random selection of soums (counties) within those aimags and khorooos (sub-districts) in Ulaanbaatar. Aimag centers and soum centers were always included in the sample.

In the second stage, the primary sample units (PSUs) were selected. In Ulaanbaatar, the PSUs were randomly selected sections within selected khorooos. In the aimag centers, the PSUs were randomly selected bags (smallest political subdivisions). In soum centers, a block of households was determined by the supervisor. The size of PSU was kept at eight households.

In the third stage, the starting point and households were determined. In apartment areas of Ulaanbaatar, interviewers were provided with addresses (building and flat number). In ger districts, the field executive provided interviewers with street numbers and starting points. Working from the starting point, the interviewers in ger district would skip the first household, interview the second household, then use the right-hand rule and interviewer every third household. In aimag centers and soum centers, starting points were determined by supervisors, and then interviewers followed the right hand rule and selected every third household. At the household level, the head of household or the household member who was most familiar with household matters was selected for the interview.

This report highlights the findings from the SPEAK VI survey, which was started on March 16, 2017 and completed on April 7, 2017. The enumerators interviewed 170 PSUs consisting of 1,360 households in eight districts of Ulaanbaatar and in 22 soums of six aimags. The sample distribution is shown in the following table:

---

2Results are based on face-to-face interviews with 1,360 adults aged 18 and older. For results based on the total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is ±1.6 percentage points (if p=10 percent and 1-p=90 percent) to ±2.6 percentage points (if p=40 percent and 1-p=60 percent) at the 95% confidence level. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.
Table A. Sample Distribution

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>City/Aimag</th>
<th>District/Soum</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
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