

1947

**1947**  
Pakistan becomes an independent nation, comprising East and West Pakistan, following partition.

**1948**  
Insurgency breaks out in Balochistan, the first of five.

**1971**  
Pakistan army attacks East Pakistan. The Bangladesh Liberation War lasts for eight months; a quarter million to 3 million people die.

**1977**  
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq seizes power from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and implements Islamization policies, raising tensions between Sunnis and Shias.

**1999**  
General Pervez Musharraf takes power and forms a military government.

**2004**  
Fifth insurgency erupts in Balochistan. It remains ongoing.

**2007**  
New wave of sectarian violence begins between Sunni and Shia militants.

**2007**  
Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister, and chair of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), is assassinated.

**2008**  
PPP wins general elections.

**2010**  
Eighteenth Amendment to the constitution paves the way for local elections.

**2013**  
Parliament passes the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act.

**2013**  
Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League wins general elections.

**2013**  
Church bombing in Peshawar kills more than 80 in one of the deadliest attacks on Christians.

**2013**  
Many key Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders are killed by U.S. drone strikes, leading to internal power struggles.

**2014**  
Karachi airport attack by TTP and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) kills 37.

**2014**  
TTP attack on an army public school in Peshawar kills almost 150, mostly children; government steps up counterterrorism operations.

**2015**  
Government launches National Action Plan to boost counterterrorism efforts.

**2015**  
Suicide bombing at Quetta hospital kills 93, mostly lawyers gathered to mourn the killing of the Balochistan Bar Association president.

**2015**  
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement is signed.

**2015**  
Police statistics report 34 percent increase in violence against women.

**2016**  
Parliament passes anti-honor-killing and anti-rape laws.

**2017**  
Supreme Court ousts Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, ruling that his failure to disclose his family's assets disqualifies him from holding office.

2017

# Pakistan

## At a glance



National civil war  
**Absent**



Communal/ideological conflict  
**High**



National political conflict  
**High**



Local political and electoral conflict  
**Low with potential to rise**



Transnational terrorism  
**High**



Local resource conflict  
**High**



Separatism and autonomy  
**High**



Urban crime and violence  
**Medium**

*\* Rankings are based on the last 15 years and are relative to other Asian countries.*

## Overview

Pakistan's security landscape remains volatile and complex due to sectarian and ethno-political tensions and the intricate web of terrorist and militant groups in the country. In 2016, Pakistan saw 749 violent incidents that killed 1,887 people by various forms of violence related to politics and elections, terrorist attacks, security operations against terrorist groups and armed insurgents, ethno-political tensions, and sectarian cleavages. The overall number of violent incidents fell by 32 percent from 2015 to 2016, and fatalities fell by 46 percent in the same period.<sup>1</sup> Terrorist attacks were the most common form of violent incident reported. The decrease in violent incidents and fatalities is largely attributable to military-led operations throughout the country. Due to the heavy crackdown on terrorist and militant groups in the tribal areas, however, terrorist activities are spreading from the border region to many parts of the country.<sup>2</sup> In 2016, Balochistan was the region most affected by terrorist attacks, accounting for 34 percent of all attacks and 45 percent of deaths from terrorism.<sup>3</sup> Changing dynamics of unrest and insecurity in Balochistan indicate that the province faces a larger threat from terrorist and militant groups, as seen in Quetta and Khuzdar, than from Baloch nationalist insurgents.



### National civil war

There has been no civil war in Pakistan since the Bangladesh Liberation War, which ended in 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh. The war broke out in March of that year when the Pakistani army launched a military operation against Bengali civilians, students, intellectuals, and armed personnel after the Bengali-led Awami League won a majority in the National Assembly and demanded the separation of East Pakistan from the rest of the country. The Bengali population in East Pakistan had been underrepresented in the central government and army, which were dominated by political elites from West Pakistan. In response to the Pakistani military operation, Bengali politicians and army officers declared Bangladesh independent, forming the *Mukti Bahini* (Liberation Army), which engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Pakistani army. During the war, the Pakistan army, together with religious extremist militias, committed systematic genocide and atrocities against Bengali civilians. Bangladeshi authorities claim that as many as 3 million people died, but the total may be significantly lower. World Health Surveys data collected in 2002–2003 estimates that 269,000 people died,<sup>4</sup> whereas other independent researchers have estimated between 300,000 and 500,000 deaths as a result of the eight-month war.<sup>5</sup>



### National political conflict

Pakistan has a long history of political violence in which competition among political parties involves frequent clashes. The dominance of Punjab and the political, social, and economic exclusion of other provinces, particularly Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), are major drivers of political violence in the country.<sup>6</sup> The Pakistani military often intervenes in politics, overthrowing weak civilian governments. The country has had alternating periods of electoral democracy and authoritarian, military government since its independence in 1947. Following the Musharraf-led military government that took power in 1999, democratic governance returned in 2008 when the left-oriented Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won the general elections. The PPP government completed its five-year term, and another democratic election was held in May 2013, when the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), led by Nawaz Sharif, won the largest number of votes.

There were waves of political unrest ahead of the 2008 and 2013 general elections. Following the December 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister and chair of the PPP, there were several attacks in KP and FATA targeting leftist politicians and political rallies in the weeks preceding the 2008 general elections. For example, a suicide attack killed as many as 31 people at a political rally for the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) in Charsadda, KP, on February 9, 2008, and another attack killed ten ANP activists in North Waziristan Agency on February 11, 2008.<sup>7</sup> Political violence continued to negatively affect security in Karachi throughout 2008, resulting in 143 deaths and 333 injuries.<sup>8</sup> Most political clashes in Karachi were between the Sunni Tehreek (ST), a Sunni Islam religious political organization, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a liberal, secular political party. A number of criminal groups in the city, some supported by local land mafia, were also involved in violent acts with backing from political parties.

Terrorist attacks and violent clashes among different political parties during the 2013 general elections led to 298 deaths and 885 injuries between January 1 and May 15 of that year.<sup>9</sup> The province of Sindh—primarily Karachi—was the most affected by both terrorist attacks and incidents of political violence, followed by KP and Balochistan. A total of 148 terrorist attacks were reported across Pakistan in that four-and-a-half-month period, targeting political leaders, offices, and rallies, election candidates, and polling stations. Of the 148 attacks, 108 were perpetrated

# 40+

## terrorist organizations operate in and from Pakistan

by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its local affiliates, killing 156 people and injuring 665. Baloch nationalist insurgents were responsible for 40 attacks, which killed 14 and injured 78. The ANP and the PPP were targeted in almost every region of Pakistan, while the MQM was primarily attacked in Karachi. The 2013 elections demonstrated the lengths to which militant groups would go to manipulate political outcomes through violence, targeting secularist parties, such as the PPP, ANP, and MQM, who formed the last government.

Beyond terrorist attacks, riots and protests between political parties are also common across the country. During the same period in 2013 there were 97 reported incidents of political clashes between supporters and workers of different political parties, resulting in 128 deaths and 142 injuries.<sup>10</sup> Seventy-three of these incidents took place in Sindh—70 of them in Karachi alone—taking the lives of 97 people, largely leaders and workers of political parties including the ANP, the MQM, the PPP, the ST, the PML, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement-Haqiqi (MQM-H), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and the People’s Aman Committee. Political violence has long been a prominent feature of insecurity in Karachi; however, during the weeks preceding the May 2013 elections, incidents were also reported in other provinces.

From August to December 2014, an opposition party, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), held public rallies, marches, and sit-ins across the country, accusing the PML of electoral fraud during the 2013 elections and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The PTI’s protests in Islamabad prompted violent clashes between protesters and security forces, resulting in at least three deaths and hundreds of casualties.<sup>11</sup> Following a deadly attack by the Taliban in December, 2014, PTI decided to cancel the protest to restore national unity.

In July 2017, the Supreme Court ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The court had appointed a panel to investigate his assets after the publication of the “Panama Papers”, files from a law firm in Panama that had facilitated offshore transactions for many political leaders, including Nawaz Sharif. The court ruled that he had failed to disclose his family’s assets and disqualified him from holding office.



## Transnational terrorism

Pakistan experiences a high number of terrorist attacks. According to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, it is among the world's top five countries most affected by terrorism.<sup>12</sup> The country had over 12,000 terrorist attacks between 2009 and 2016, resulting in 16,526 deaths (figure 1). The number of terrorist attacks and consequent fatalities has been declining, however, with the exception of 2013, which saw a jump in sectarian attacks. The recent reduction in terrorist incidents can be attributed to military-led counterterrorism operations, such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. Zarb-e-Azb was implemented in June 2014 in response to the joint terrorist attack by the TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, which left 37 people dead, including 10 militants.<sup>13</sup> The government strengthened counterterrorism operations by launching the National Action Plan in January 2015, following an attack by the Taliban on the Army Public School in December 2014, which killed 136 schoolchildren and nine teachers.<sup>14</sup> The government also started to strengthen the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which launched the Pakistan Action to Counter Terrorism (PACT) program in April 2017, aiming to enhance the capacity and technical expertise of counterterrorism efforts in the country.<sup>15</sup> Supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the program will first be piloted in KP, then expanded across the country.

Transnational terrorism is most common in areas bordering Afghanistan. Balochistan is the region most affected by terrorist violence in the last few years, followed by KP and FATA. Balochistan accounted for 34 percent of all attacks in 2016, resulting in 412 deaths and 702 injuries.<sup>16</sup> This included the August 8 hospital suicide bombing in Quetta, which killed 93 people, many of them lawyers gathering to mourn the killing of the Balochistan Bar Association president the day before.<sup>17</sup> KP was also significantly affected by terrorism in 2016, with 127 reported attacks killing 189 people and injuring another 355.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, FATA had 99 attacks, which killed 163 people and wounded 221.<sup>19</sup> Patterns of terrorist activity in 2016 suggest that militants who have been pushed out of the tribal regions are moving into Pakistan's urban areas, such as Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta, to carry out large-scale attacks.<sup>20</sup>

There are over 40 terrorist organizations operating in and from Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> More than 60 percent of the terrorist attacks in 2016 were carried out by the Pakistani Taliban, mainly the




Figure 1. Terrorist attacks and related fatalities in Pakistan (2009–2016)

Source: PIPS<sup>22</sup>



TTP, and other groups with similar objectives, including Islamic State (IS) affiliates and supporters.<sup>23</sup> Since the key TTP leaders were killed by U.S. drone strikes in 2013, terrorist groups have experienced a period of power struggles, splits, and internal reorganizations. Since 2014, military-led counterterrorism operations against terrorist groups have significantly reduced the capability of militant groups, particularly the TTP. The presence of transnational groups such as al-Qaeda and IMU has also been largely eradicated. However, the geopolitical situation in the region complicates the country's approach to different terrorist organizations. The International Crisis Group (ICG) pointed out that the military still distinguishes between "bad" jihadi groups, which target the government and security forces, and "good" jihadi groups, which are perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> For example, anti-India outfits, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (formerly Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), have not been targeted in ongoing operations in FATA, while Pakistan accuses India of supporting the Baloch insurgent movement.



### Separatism and autonomy

Balochistan suffers from a history of separatist conflict. Baloch nationalists previously led four insurgencies against the federal government, in 1948, 1958–59, 1962–63, and 1973–77. These insurgencies were suppressed by the Pakistani army. The fifth insurgency, which began in 2004, is still ongoing.<sup>25</sup> It is estimated that nearly 1,000 people were killed by insurgent attacks between 2004 and 2015 in Balochistan.<sup>26</sup> Balochistan is the largest but least populous province of Pakistan.<sup>27</sup> It is rich in natural resources,<sup>28</sup> meeting more than 40 percent of Pakistan's energy needs through its gas and coal reserves and accounting for 36 percent of the country's total gas production.<sup>29</sup> However, Balochistan is the least economically developed of the four provinces of Pakistan. It has the country's lowest rate of economic growth, highest poverty rate, and lowest social indicators for health and education.<sup>30</sup>

The conflict in Balochistan is driven by a number of grievances and inequities, including lack of autonomy, lack of Baloch representation in the government and military, and economic oppression. After Pakistan became independent in 1947, it adopted a highly centralized and militarized state model, insisting on a high level of central control over its provinces and imposing a top-down conception of the federation and national identity. This became a source of tension between the federal government and multiethnic Balochistan. Each time the Balochs demanded autonomy, the central government suppressed them by force, alienating the Balochs further. The Balochs are not significantly represented in government, as Punjabis dominate the central government, the Pakistani military, and the provincial administration of Balochistan.

One of the primary drivers of the current conflict is the federal government's extraction of natural gas in Balochistan and its failure to distribute a fair share of the revenue to the local population. Balochistan's natural gas fields are a major revenue earner for the federal government, but the majority of Baloch benefit little. The ICG notes that Baloch anger over central control and exploitation of the province's economic resources reached new heights when the central government excluded them from the development of the Gwadar port, which aims to transform a small fishing village into a major transportation hub for Afghanistan, China, Central Asia, and the Middle East.<sup>31</sup>

In April 2015, Pakistan signed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement with China, which agreed to invest USD 46 billion in a series of energy and transport projects in Pakistan.<sup>32</sup> Trade through the corridor, which connects Gwadar port with China's largest province, Xinjiang, had partially begun in November 2016. CPEC aims to contribute to the development of Balochistan and connect hard-to-reach areas with other parts of the country.<sup>33</sup> However, it is suspected that Balochistan may not directly benefit from economic activities through CPEC, because revenue generated from ports and airports will be collected by the federal government, not the provincial government.<sup>34</sup>

The political and economic marginalization of the Baloch, coupled with the increased presence of Pakistani security forces in the province, have led to further resentment and resistance by the Baloch against the federal government. Alleged foreign interventions have added to the conflict's complexity. Pakistani officials claim that India has been involved in perpetuating the conflict by providing Baloch militants with training and financial support through its 26 consulates established along the Balochistan border in Afghanistan and Iran.<sup>35</sup> The Pakistani parliament has made some attempts to resolve the conflict, but negotiations have fallen through, and fighting has continued. Insecurity in the province is further exacerbated by sectarian-related terrorist attacks by the TTP and other militant groups.




## Large-scale communal and ideological conflicts

Sectarian and ethnic violence has been a recurrent feature of Pakistan's history since 1947, in the form of both violent conflict between religious and ethnic groups, and one-sided violence against religious and ethnic minorities by the state and Islamic extremists. Home to an estimated population of over 190 million in 2015,<sup>36</sup> Pakistan has many different ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian groups. Ethnic composition roughly corresponds to the linguistic distribution of the population, at least among the largest groups: Punjabi 44.7 percent, Pashtun 15.4 percent, Sindhi 14.1 percent, Sariaki 8.4 percent, Muhajir 7.6 percent, Baloch 3.6 percent, and others 6.2 percent.<sup>37</sup> The vast majority of the population (96.3 percent) is Muslim, with much smaller minorities of Christians (1.6 percent), Hindus (1.6 percent), Ahmadiyyas (0.2 percent), scheduled castes (0.2 percent), and other religions (0.07 percent).<sup>38</sup>

Sectarian violence between the majority Sunnis (70–85 percent) and the minority Shias (15–20 percent) is prevalent in the country.<sup>39</sup> Since 2007, Pakistan has seen a new wave of sectarian attacks perpetrated by militant groups. Even though incidents of sectarian violence have been decreasing since 2013, such fluctuations in sectarian violence are common in Pakistan (figure 2). In 2016, there were 34 sectarian terrorist attacks, perpetrated mostly by banned Sunni and Shia militant groups, which killed 104 people.<sup>40</sup> Over 80 percent of people killed in sectarian violence in 2016 were in Khuzdar, in Balochistan, and Karachi, in Sindh.<sup>41</sup> While a single suicide attack at the Shah Noorani shrine in Khuzdar took 54 lives, most attacks in Karachi were targeted killings.

Tensions between Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan rose when Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator, seized power from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. His Islamization policies favored the Sunni interpretation of Islam, causing a rift between the two denominations. Sunni-based Sharia law was incorporated into Pakistani law. A Sharia court and a Sharia bench of the Supreme Court were established, leading to a demand from the Shia community to follow their own interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. Shia leaders also strongly opposed Zia's imposition of the Islamic tax system, known as Zakat. The sectarian proxy war between Saudi Arabia (Wahhabi Sunni Islam) and Iran (Twelver Shia Islam) has helped ignite the escalation of sectarian violence



**Figure 2.** Sectarian violence in Pakistan (2010–2016)

Source: PIPS<sup>42</sup>



# 80% + of those killed in sectarian violence in 2016 were in Khuzdar and Karachi

in Pakistan.<sup>43</sup> Sunni and Shia militant groups have each targeted members of the other sect. The rise of the TTP in the mid-2000s, and its growing ties with militant sectarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami (LeJ-A, formerly known as LeJ), have led to more violence.

In addition to violence between Sunnis and Shias, Pakistan's religious minorities, such as Christians, Ahmadis, and Ismailis, who belong to the Shia branch of Islam, suffer discrimination and violence. For example, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a group affiliated with the TTP, targeted Christians in Lahore on Easter Sunday in March 2016, killing more than 70 people, including children.<sup>44</sup> It was the deadliest attack on Christians since the 2013 Peshawar church bombing, which killed over 80. The Ahmadis, who are considered non-Muslim under Pakistani law, also face continued attacks and persecution. On Prophet Mohammed's birthday in December 2016, a procession of around 2,000 Sunni Muslims attacked the Ahmadi mosque, injuring several people despite police resistance.<sup>45</sup> A massacre of Ismailis carried out by a TTP-associated group in 2015 left at least 45 people dead.<sup>46</sup>

## Local level



### Local political conflict and electoral violence

Local electoral violence has been relatively limited in Pakistan. Balochistan was the first province to hold local government elections after the Local Government Acts (LGAs) were passed by the provincial assemblies.<sup>47</sup> Compared to the May 2013 general elections, the first phase of the local elections, in December 2013, was held in a peaceful manner, with just over 30 people receiving minor injuries in a few violent incidents.<sup>48</sup> Strict security measures by the provincial government helped, as over 54,000 personnel from the army, Frontier Corps, Balochistan Constabulary, Levies Force, and police were deployed in and around the polling stations.<sup>49</sup> Following Balochistan, KP, Punjab, and Sindh held their local government elections in 2015. KP had 13 reported incidents of political or election-related violence, which took the lives of 25 people and injured 70 others, while as many as 19 such incidents were reported in Punjab, resulting in 11 deaths and 107 injuries.<sup>50</sup> Out of 30 reported incidents of political and election-related violence in Sindh, as many as 23 took place in Karachi, resulting in 26 deaths.<sup>51</sup> Violent incidents were also reported in the interior of Sindh, killing 18 people and injuring 99 others. The election-related violence was primarily caused by clashes between rival political groups. Over 30,000 police officers were also deployed in these provinces during the elections.<sup>52</sup>



### Local conflict over resources and community rights


See the separatism and autonomy section on the local conflict over natural resources in Balochistan.



### Urban crime and violence

Urban crime and violence are widespread in Pakistan. Between 2008 and 2016, the police recorded over 12,000 homicide cases in Karachi, the most populous city in Pakistan, with 9.8 million inhabitants (1998 census). In the years leading up to 2012, the city witnessed a steady rise in lethal violence. This increase was partially attributed to rapid and uncontrolled urbanization and ethnopolitical tensions.<sup>53</sup> Since 2012, the city has experienced a downward trend in the number of crimes and violent incidents. In 2016, crime statistics indicated a 91 percent decrease in targeted killings, a 93 percent decrease in extortion cases, and a 72 percent decrease in incidents of terrorism.<sup>54</sup> The recent crime reduction is primarily due to security operations against terrorist and criminal groups, launched in September 2013 by the Sindh Rangers.

Underrepresentation of migrants, intensifying ethnopolitical conflict, and the migration of hardline and extremist groups are key factors driving violence in Karachi. Demographic changes have significantly contributed to a sharp resurgence in ethnopolitical tensions and sectarian violence in Karachi. The ethnic composition of the city has been transformed since 1941, when Sindhis were about two-thirds of the population and Muhajir immigrants from northern India were just 6 percent.<sup>55</sup> Karachi today is 43 percent Muhajir, 17 percent Pashtun, 11 percent Punjabi, 6 percent Sindhi, 5 percent Balochi, 3 percent Saraiki, and 2 percent Hazara or Gilgiti. Relations between the Muhajirs and the Pashtuns have been strained by economic and political competition for control of land and resources.<sup>56</sup> Much of the ethnic violence in recent years has involved turf wars between rival criminal groups backed by political parties, such as the ANP, a Pashtun nationalist party, and the MQM, which represents the interests of the Muhajir community. Karachi is also a major target of sectarian violence by militant groups, such as the TTP and LeJ.



**Figure 3.** Number of homicide cases in Karachi (2008–2016)

Source: Crime statistics provided by the Sindh Bureau of Statistics and Sindh Police<sup>57</sup>


# Almost **1,100** honor killings reported in 2015

Beyond Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta are also operational and financial bases for various extremist groups and criminal gangs that exploit poor governance and failing law and order to establish recruitment and patronage networks.<sup>58</sup> These groups attempt to lure youth into their violent activities by providing services, work, and a purpose in life. Criminal gangs and jihadi networks continue to inflict violence in the big cities. Lack of political representation and the neglect of some ethnic groups have also exacerbated conflict in some cities, as seen in Balochistan.



## Domestic and gender-based violence

Violence against women (VAW) is prevalent in Pakistan, due to patriarchal social norms and values coupled with customary and religious practices. Pakistan had over 53,000 reported VAW cases between 2011 and 2015 (figure 4).<sup>59</sup> Police statistics indicated an increase of 34 percent in VAW cases between 2014 and 2015. Punjab had the most recorded cases in 2015, followed by Sindh and KP. Crimes targeting women, such as abduction, murder, and rape, are among the most common. According to the Aurat Foundation, a women's rights organization based in Islamabad, while rates of most crimes ebb and flow, rape and gang rape are significantly increasing.<sup>60</sup> In October 2016, the parliament passed anti-honor-killing and anti-rape bills, which lengthened sentences and prevented victims' relatives from pardoning the perpetrators of honor killings.<sup>61</sup>



**Figure 4.** Cases of violence against women in Pakistan (2011–2015)

Source: Abbasj<sup>62</sup>

Domestic violence is an endemic social problem in Pakistan. Even though Pakistan passed the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act in March 2013, cases of domestic violence are underreported and often not investigated thoroughly because domestic violence is considered a private matter. One study found that 85 percent of women had experienced domestic violence by their spouse since marriage.<sup>63</sup> The most common form of domestic violence was psychological abuse (81 percent), followed by physical violence (75 percent) and sexual violence (66 percent).<sup>64</sup> Sixty-four percent of women who experienced physical violence had been injured by it, including broken bones and teeth, bruises, sprains, and burns.<sup>65</sup> The majority of women (63 percent) who received injuries never sought medical treatment, and 35 percent of those were not allowed by their families to seek treatment.

Other forms of domestic violence—including honor killings, where women are killed because they are believed to have brought shame to their family, dowry-related violence, acid attacks, and burning—are also prevalent. The Aurat Foundation recorded nearly 4,000 cases of honor killings between 2008 and 2014.<sup>66</sup> A report by the independent Human Rights Commission estimated almost 1,100 honor killings in 2015 alone.<sup>67</sup> In a Rutgers WPF study, 34 percent of women had witnessed an honor killing within their extended family.<sup>68</sup> Women who had a history of honor killing in their families were more likely to experience psychological, physical, and sexual violence from their spouse than women who had not. Dowry- and family-related disputes often resulted in death or disfigurement by acid attack or burning. Women are often attacked and murdered if their husband or his family deem their dowry to be insufficient.

## Notes

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