




The Asia Foundation

AFGHANISTAN FLASH SURVEYS ON  
PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE, COVID-19,  
AND THE ECONOMY:

WAVE 3 FINDINGS





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**ABOUT THE ASIA FOUNDATION**

The Asia Foundation is a nonprofit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia. Informed by six decades of experience and deep local expertise, our work across the region addresses five overarching goals—strengthen governance, empower women, expand economic opportunity, increase environmental resilience, and promote international cooperation.

Headquartered in San Francisco, The Asia Foundation works through its network of offices in 18 Asian countries and in Washington, DC. Working with public and private partners, the Foundation receives funding from a diverse group of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, foundations, corporations, and individuals. For more information, visit [asiafoundation.org](http://asiafoundation.org)

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
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**REGION/DOMAIN**

- CENTRAL/KABUL
- CENTRAL/HIGHLANDS
- EAST
- NORTH
- NORTH EAST
- SOUTH
- SOUTH EAST
- WEST





## A READER'S GUIDE TO ANALYSIS


The Asia Foundation's *Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions of Peace, Covid-19, and the Economy: Wave 3 Findings* is a unique opportunity to pivot from traditional forms of data collection, for example in-person interviews as with the *Survey of the Afghan People* to telephone interviews. Across three waves of the *Survey*, from September 2020 to February 2021, more than 12,000 interviews were conducted with Afghans across the country.

A proportion of the 12,000 interviews were with the same individuals across either two or three waves. The advantage of interviewing the same individuals across a longer period of time is that it allows researchers to look at changes in perceptions at the individual level, rather than the aggregate level (as with the *Survey of the Afghan People*). The interviews with the same individuals over a number of waves is denoted as panel data.

Given the rapidly changing nature of public perceptions, particularly on evolving topics such as the ongoing Afghan peace talks, panel datasets are a unique opportunity to measure changing behaviors and attitudes during a critical time.

In Wave 3 (W3), 4,059n respondents were interviewed from all provinces in Afghanistan. Among these participants, 35% participated in Wave 1 (W1), Wave 2 (W2) and W3; 13% participated in W1 and W3, but not in W2; 19% participated in W2 and W3, but not in W1; and one third (33%) participated in W3 only.

The figure below provides a distribution of the sample size of respondents for each wave.



The findings in this *Survey* are presented in a unique format with multiple analytical approaches.

- 1) Overall findings from the 4,059n respondents are presented in Sections 1–7
  - a. Section 7 shares findings from an experiment aimed at controlling for the social desirability bias and capturing implicit attitudes towards key actors by asking respondents different versions of the same questions. All analysis from Sections 1–7 inclusive are based on the overall 4,059n sample.
- 2) Section 8, *Panel Analysis: Wave 1, Wave 2 & Wave 3* is an analysis of the 1,437n respondents who participated in all three waves of the *Survey*. While multiple analytical tools are available, the analytical approach applied here is descriptive analysis.
- 3) Section 9, *Panel Analysis: Wave 1 & Wave 3* is an analysis of the 1,994n respondents who participated in W1 and W3. While multiple analytical tools are available, the analytical approach used here is the application of the McNemar’s test, appropriate for paired proportions. The analysis and narrative shared here are only of findings that are *highly statistically significant*. Findings that are *statistically significant* are offered in a table.

In Sections 8 and 9, the data is dichotomized and cleaned to accommodate panel analysis. Thus, the percentages offered in these two sections are unique from those in Sections 1–7.

All analysis is weighted against data provided by the National Statistics and Information Authority to ensure representation.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Asia Foundation's *Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions of Peace, Covid-19 and the Economy: Wave 3 Findings* is the third wave of a mobile-only Tablet-Assisted Phone Interviewing (TAPI) – based survey of the mobile phone-using public of Afghanistan.

The third wave follows the successful completion of Wave 1 (W1) and Wave 2 (W2), fielded in 2020, and is partially a panel survey. Altogether, more than 12,000 telephone interviews have been conducted on Afghan's perceptions on peace, security, Covid-19, the economy, and women's rights. The sample for each of the three waves was generated via random digit dialing (RDD), so any existing mobile phone number in Afghanistan had a theoretical probability of selection.

Wave 3 (W3) targets a representative sample of mobile-using Afghans (age 18+) totaling n = 4,059. Among the 4,059 respondents, 1,437 (35%) were panel participants who had taken part in both previous waves; 521 (13%) participated in W1 but not in W2; 761 (19%) participated in W2 but not in W1; and 1,340 (33%) were new respondents who had not participated in the previous wave. The survey was fielded using Research Control Solutions (RCS) software.

Fieldwork for W3 was conducted from February 9, 2021 to February 23, 2021, by 70 native Dari and Pashto speaking interviewers. The final sample was 78% male and 22% female, and comprised 62% urban and 38% rural respondents.

As in previous waves, the Foundation's longstanding research partner, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) conducted the fieldwork, while its parent company, D3 Systems, Inc., provided analytical and methodological support.

Sayara Research led the third-party verification of the fieldwork, a best practice for survey research in challenging environments. Additional quality-control measures were implemented at every step of the process by the Foundation and its partners to ensure methodological consistency for longitudinal comparisons. In total, 35% of interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control. Together with its partners, the Foundation is committed to quality-control processes guided by principles of validity and reliability.

### PEACE

In W3, less than half of Afghans (43.9%) believe peace is achievable within the next two years. While a similar proportion to the 43.6% captured in W2, this is notably lower than the 54.1% in W1. In W3, for the first time, a higher percentage say peace is not achievable (44.2%), and 11.1% “don't know” if peace is achievable in two years. Afghan men (51.5%) remain significantly more likely than women (36.0%) to say that peace is achievable in the next two years.

Among the 44.2% of Afghans who say peace is not achievable, a fifth (21.1%) believe so because violence and fighting are continuing. Other top cited answers in this category include 18.9% who say the Government and Taliban are too far apart to reach an agreement, while 17.7% say interference by other countries.

Almost two fifths of respondents (38.5%) feel people like them are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. This is a slight increase on W2 (36.1%) but a decrease when compared with W1 (40.9%).

The protection of women's rights, freedom of the press, and protection of the constitution among others, have been noted objectives of the Afghan negotiating team. Over 90% of Afghans believe it is either very important or somewhat important to protect the following as part of a peace agreement: the current constitution (92.0%), freedom of speech (96.0%), freedom of the press (96.3%), a strong central government (96.6%), women's rights (97.0%), and equality among different groups of people (96.0%). 88.1% say it is important to protect foreign economic assistance in a peace deal. Over half of respondents (51.6%) say it is important to protect the presence of foreign troops.

Over three fifths of respondents said they were very willing (37.3%) or somewhat willing (23.7%) to accept a peace deal in which blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban fighters. When comparing findings to W1 (39.3% and 26.3% respectively), this represents a small decrease on findings.

Over half of respondents say they would be very willing (30.3%) or somewhat willing (23.3%) to accept a blanket amnesty for Taliban senior leaders. This represents an overall decrease on findings from W1 (33.3% and 23.9% respectively).

Regarding a Taliban role in government, 58.4% say they are willing to accept this (27.4% very willing and 31.0% somewhat willing).

Ceding control of certain provinces to the Taliban as part of a peace agreement does not, however, find support among Afghans. Over two thirds say they would be very unwilling (63.5%) or somewhat unwilling (3.5%) to accept this. When comparing findings for W1 (54.6%) and W3 (63.5%), the percentage of those citing they are very unwilling to cede control of certain provinces has increased by almost 10 percentage points.

## SECURITY

Almost three quarters of respondents strongly (54.3%) or somewhat agree (19.6%) that the Afghan National Army (ANA) will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance (e.g. tactical, operation, and mentoring support to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces [ANDSF]).

Regarding the Afghan National Police (ANP), just over two thirds of Afghans say they strongly (45.5%) or somewhat agree (23.0%) that the ANP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance.

Almost three fifths of respondents say that they either strongly agree (35.6%) or somewhat agree (22.4%) that the Afghan Local Police (ALP) will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance.

A third of respondents (34.6%) strongly agree the ANA will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance, while a third (34.7%) strongly disagree with the statement.

More Afghans strongly disagree (35.0%), than strongly agree (30.4%) that the ANP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance.

Two fifths of Afghans (41.5%) strongly disagree that the ALP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance, while just over a quarter (27.6%) strongly agree.

More than half of respondents (51.6%) strongly agree the ANP is honest and fair, the highest percentage reported in all three waves.

In a further sign of improved confidence in the ANP, 57.9% strongly agree the ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan, which is an increase on W1 (53.9%) and W2 (55.0%).

Additionally, an increase is also seen in the percentage of Afghans who strongly agree (53.6%) the ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes, when compared with W1 (50.9%) and W2 (50.3%).

Over 70 percent of Afghans (70.8%) strongly agree they would contact the ANP if they needed assistance, an increase when compared with W1 (64.8%).

Less than one fifth, 14.8% of respondents say they or someone in their family had suffered from violence or a criminal act in the past year. The top cited response for what type of violence or crime was experienced, remains “don’t know” (55.4%), a huge increase on the 30.5% who reported this answer in W1 and the 28.7% in W2.

Among those who (or had a family member who) had experienced an act of violence or a criminal act in the past year, over half (54.9%) said that the crimes or violent acts were reported to someone outside the family; findings consistent with 52.2% in W1 and 58.7% in W2.

## **WOMEN’S RIGHTS**

Respondents were asked which places they agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work. In the strongly agree category, female-only schools (94.6%) remain the top cited answer, marginally increasing during the three waves (W1, 92.1%; W2, 93.1%). The second most cited answer in the strongly agree category was hospitals or clinics (93.9%).

Three fifths (59.4%) of respondents strongly agree it is acceptable for women to work in co-ed schools. Just under half of respondents strongly agree it is acceptable for women to work in a nongovernmental organization

(49.3%). Suggesting resistance to men and women mixing in the workplace, 80.1% strongly agree that women who work in a private company outside the home, should work with only female employees. On the other hand, when utilizing the same question but having male and female employees work in the same office, the percentage saying they strongly agree decreases substantially to 41.5%.

Regarding women and leadership positions, 71.4% say they strongly support a woman being CEO of a large company. Almost three fifths (58.5%) of Afghans surveyed strongly agree it is acceptable for women to run for president, up from the 57.4% who said so in W2.

When asked what elements should be protected in a peace deal, 87.9% of respondents say it is very important to protect women's rights during any peace settlement; this is over three percentage points higher than in W1 (84.7%).

## ECONOMY

Fewer respondents say their household financial situation has gotten worse in the past 12 months in W3 (66.8%), than those who said so in W1 (70.9%) and W2 (70.2%).

The percentage of respondents who say that employment opportunities in their household has gotten worse in the past 12 months has remained consistent throughout the three waves of the *Survey* (W1, 74.0%; W2, 74.1%; W3 74.3%)

Speaking to economic uncertainty and high levels of unemployment, only 10 percent of respondents (10.3%) say that employment opportunities had gotten better.

The availability of quality products in the market (e.g. rice, wheat, oil) shows a decline; 70.6% said it had gotten worse in the past 12 months, representing an almost four percentage point increase when compared with W1 (66.8%).

Further, in a continuing trend of economic woes for Afghans, 79.1% say the affordability of quality products in the market had gotten worse in the past 12 months.

Over half of Afghans say that physical access to health care services (transportation, accessibility) had gotten better (17.8%) or stayed the same (34.9%), almost consistent with findings in W1 and W2.

The percentage of respondents who say that the cost of health care services (doctor, hospital fees, testing, procedures, routine care) has gotten worse in the past 12 months shows a slight decrease in W3 (60.9%), when compared with W1 (63.4%) and W2 (63.0%).

For three quarters of respondents (75.9%) the cost of medication (prescriptions) has gone up in the past 12 months. While this figure is high, it represents a decrease on the four fifths of respondents who answered the same question in W1 (80.4%) and W2 (79.6%).

Regarding access to electricity, in W1 less than half of respondents (43.0%) said access to electricity had



gotten worse in the past 12 months, this rose by over 12 percentage points to 55.4% in W2. In W3, this has dropped to just below half of respondents (49.5%).

When asked about access to clean drinking water over the past 12 months; over three quarters report that it had gotten better (32.1%) or stayed the same (44.1%), consistent with findings observed in W1 and W2.

When asked about the different types of aid being provided in their local areas during this time, just a third (32.7%) report being aware of food being provided. Of those who report awareness of food being provided, 37.3% report accessing it, of which less than half (44.2%) report it being sufficient for their needs.

Awareness of the availability of medical equipment shows marginal improvement across the three waves of the *Survey*, with almost a fifth (19.4%) reporting this in W3, compared to 15.2% in W1. Just under half (49.4%) cite the Afghan government as the provider of this service, while a fifth cite either an international (11.6%) or national NGO (8.9%).

Almost a fifth of respondents (19.0%) report awareness of financial support being offered. This is an increase on the 12.8% from W1 and 14.4% in W2, suggesting increasing visibility and promotion of such a service.

Less than a fifth of respondents (16.1%) reported awareness of the provision of health care services in their area, just slightly higher than W1 (14.9%) and W2 (14.0%).

Regarding awareness of employment opportunities being provided in their local area to aid households, the vast majority (90.0%) report no awareness of this service, suggesting a significant issue with awareness raising of such an important service.

Less than 10 percent (9.3%) report being aware of the provision of water in their local area to aid households during this time.

Indicative of the scale of the issue, 84.6% of respondents cite corruption as a major problem in their daily life, which resonates with findings from W1 (85.0%) and W2 (85.4%).

Further indicating the scale of the issue, 94.6% of respondents say corruption is a major problem in the country as a whole.

## COVID-19

Respondents were asked a number of questions regarding their concern about conducting certain activities in a Covid-19 environment. Overall, the findings highlight decreasing concern from Afghans regarding Covid-19 during W3.

In W3, less than half of Afghans report being either very worried (35.3%) or worried (12.8%) about

going to work. This represents a significant decrease on the almost two thirds who responded to the same question in W2 (45.8% and 19.2% respectively).

Utilizing the same question but for engaging in community activities, less than one fifth (19.0%) say they are not worried at all, an increase on the 14.9% in W2 but a decrease on findings from W1 (22.0%).

When asked about attending funerals and religious functions, less than two fifths (38.5%) say they are very worried, while almost half report being not worried at all (20.4%) or somewhat worried (28.4%).

A 10 percentage point decrease is observed in those who are very worried about attending school, with two fifths (39.8%) reporting this, compared with over half during W2 (50.6%).

Just over two fifths (43.6%) report being very worried about visiting a health care facility, representing a 6 percentage point decrease when compared with W2 (50.0%).

Over half of respondents report being very worried (38.4%) or worried (13.4%) about travelling outside of their local area to visit family, access health-care, purchase goods, etc., in a Covid-19 environment. This represents a noticeable decrease on findings from W2, where it was 45.3% and 18.9% respectively.

Of all the precautionary measures available to protect from Covid-19, frequent handwashing (93.7%) remains the most cited answer, followed by the use of soaps and other detergents for cleaning surfaces (86.5%), facemasks (83.2%), social distancing (79.3%) and hand sanitizer (74.3%). The use of other protective equipment, for example, gowns and face shields, is lowest by some distance with just 30.1% saying they utilize these items to protect themselves.

85.5% of Afghans report that they received adequate news and information on Covid-19 and the actions they need to take to respond to it.

When asked about the extent to which the government provided timely information about Covid-19, a decrease is noted when comparing all three waves of the *Survey*. In W1, 34.2% said that to a great extent the government provided timely information. During W2, this decreased to 30.6%, and in W3, this decreased again, to 28.8%.

A similar fluctuation is observed when respondents are asked to what extent the government provided accurate information about Covid-19. During W1, this was 36.5%. In W2, this decreased five percentage points to 31.3%, and this has decreased again in W3 (30.5%).

When asked to what extent the government has provided support to respondents and/or their family during the pandemic, 70.4% of respondents stated not at all.

When asked which source(s) of news and information they used to stay informed about Covid-19, family and friends (85.0%) remains the most cited answer. Television (77.0%) remains the second most cited answer among Afghans, followed by doctor and other professionals (72.0%), social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 63.7% and radio at 52.3%.

Afghans were asked a range of questions regarding whether they or someone in their household had experienced symptoms of Covid-19 since December 2019. The most cited answer remained fever, with over half of respondents (51.8%) saying they or someone in their household experienced this symptom. Sore throat (51.5%) was the second most cited symptom. The least cited symptom was shortness of breath (32.8%).

At the national level, 21.9% of respondents say that someone in their household had received a confirmed diagnosis of Covid-19, which is generally commensurate with the percentage of confirmed cases in official government figures at the time of writing.

When asked whether respondents would associate with someone in their community whom they knew previously had Covid-19 findings are consistent across all three waves of the *Survey*, where in all cases, just over half (W1 50.4% and W2 50.5%, W3 50.5%) report that they would not associate.

Less than half of Afghans say they are very concerned (48.9%) about the lasting impact of the coronavirus outbreak on their personal health.

A somewhat larger proportion, 52.9% say they are very concerned about the lasting impact of Covid-19 on their lifestyle. This represents a noticeable decrease on the three fifths (60.2%) who responded to the same question in W2 and is marginally lower than the 53.6% who responded in W1.

A new question posed in W3, 94.3% of respondents said that if a vaccine for Covid-19 was made available to them they would get it.

Of those respondents who stated they would not take the vaccine, the most given answer was concerns about side effects (41.8%), while the second most given answer was “do not need it /will not get Covid-19” (22.2%).

## EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

The experimental analysis section of the *Survey* explores the “social desirability effect,” a tendency for participants to respond in a way they believe may be viewed favorably by the enumerator or others. Understanding this effect is particularly useful in the context of politically sensitive topics including a peace deal or attitudes towards the Taliban. Findings from the experimental analysis between the waves show a consistency among Afghans’ implicit attitudes towards priorities for a peace deal and attitudes towards key actors.

## PANEL W1, W2 & W3

The section *Panel Wave 1, Wave 2, & Wave 3* compares findings from the 1,437 respondents who were interviewed during all three waves, in W1 (September 6–October 4, 2020), W2 (November 18–December 10, 2020), and again during W3 (February 9–23, 2021). The analysis shared is descriptive analysis of a panel dataset. To conduct descriptive analysis of panel data, the data is dichotomized and thus the percentages in this section, while dissimilar from the regular analysis, is still consistent in terms of trends.

## PANEL W1 & W3

The *Panel Wave 1 & Wave 3* section compares findings from 1,994 respondents who were interviewed during W1 (September 6 to October 4, 2020) and again during W3 (February 9 to 23, 2021). The analysis shared is based on McNemar's test which looks at paired data. To conduct analysis on paired proportions, the data is dichotomized and thus the percentages in this section are dissimilar from the regular analysis. The narrative shared in this section is based only on findings that are highly statistically significant ( $p=0.000$ ). Findings that are significant ( $p<0.05$ ) are shared in a table proceeding the highly significant findings.

Due to the dichotomized nature of the panel data, comparison of the percentages from both panel sections to the overall data is discouraged.



## METHODS

The Asia Foundation's *Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions of Peace, Covid-19, and the Economy: Wave 3 Findings* is a mobile-only Tablet-Assisted Phone Interviewing (TAPI) –based survey of the mobile phone-using public of Afghanistan. The survey was fielded using Research Control Solutions (RCS) software.

The third wave follows the successful completion of Waves 1 (W1) and Wave 2 (W2). Fieldwork for W1 was from September 6, 2020 to October 4, 2020; fieldwork for Wave 2 (W2) was between November 18, 2020 to December 10, 2020, and is partially a panel survey.

Fieldwork for W3 was conducted from February 9 to February 23, 2021. The third *Survey* targets a representative sample of mobile-using Afghans (age 18+) totaling 4,059n. Of the sample of 4,059 respondents:

- a. 35% (1,437n) participated in W1, W2 and W3
- b. 13% (521n) participated in W1 and W3, but not in W2
- c. 19% (761n) participated in W2 and W3, but not in W1
- d. 33% (1,340n) participated in W3 only

The sample for each wave was generated via random digit dialing (RDD), so any existing mobile phone number in Afghanistan had a theoretical probability of selection.

A brief overview of the sampling methodology, questionnaire design, field team, and overall field experience are summarized in this section. More detailed information is provided in *Appendix 1: Methodology*.

1. The *Survey* included a random sample of 4,059 mobile phone-using Afghans.
2. Fieldwork for W3 was completed by 70 native Dari and Pashto speaking interviewers. The final sample was 78% male and 22% female, and comprised 62% urban and 38% rural respondents.
3. The mobile sample was drawn using a list assisted random digit dialing (RDD) methodology. Mobile telephones were not stratified. The sample frame has been developed based on source data provided by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Approximately two-thirds of the sample consisted of panel respondents who had participated in one or both of the previous waves, but these had been selected in the same manner.
4. Calls were made using SIM-card enabled devices, with AWCC, Afghan telecom Salaam, Etisalat, MTN and Roshan as the network operators.

5. The questionnaire included questions about the Covid-19 pandemic, opinion of the security forces, the peace process, crime and violence, and the role of women in society. In addition, the *Survey* captured demographic information, such as age, gender, education level, ethnicity, and work status, among others.
6. The average length of a completed interview was 29 minutes and 39 seconds, with a standard deviation of 8 minutes and 35 seconds. The minimum interview length was 15 minutes and 30 seconds, while the maximum length was 1 hour, 35 minutes, and 19 seconds.
7. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, interviewers worked from home on cellular phones and SIM-enabled tablets issued. The supervisor assigned Case IDs and phone numbers to interviewers.
8. All cases that were recorded were processed through D3's (ACSOR's parent company) audio analysis program, sAIren, which checks audio files for long intervals of silence or the absence of human voices, which suggest data falsification or poor quality interviewing. The sAIren results and the ability to immediately pull interview lengths from the online data allowed ACSOR to focus its field-level quality control on cases which were more likely to be problematic due to short interview length or a high percentage of silence.
9. In addition to sAIren analysis, field-level quality control consisted of audio monitoring (listening to recordings) and phone back-checks.
10. An independent third-party monitor, Sayara Research, also listened to randomly selected audio recordings or conducted phone back-checks in cases where audio was not available.
11. Sayara Research's third-party validation consisted of listening to audio files to confirm the quality of the fieldwork. In total, 35% of all cases in the final data file were subject to some form of field-level quality control: 21% of cases were subject to audio audit, 4% were subject to phone back-check, and 10% were quality-controlled by a non-ACSOR monitoring team (either the Foundation or Sayara Research). In total, 56 cases were removed due to field-level quality control, and 30 were deleted as a result of validation activities.
12. Quality control tests were conducted following the completion of fieldwork to monitor interviewer performance. During the data cleaning phase, the Valkyrie program was used, which searches for patterns or anomalies in the data that may indicate an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer. For this *Survey*, no cases were deleted for having over 50% refused or "don't know" answers (i.e. failing the non-response test), no cases were deleted for having 90% similarities in responses to another interview (i.e. failing the duplicates test), and no cases were deleted for failing both straights tests (i.e. having the same answers for all battery items in two batteries). However, 50 additional cases were deleted as a result of other post-field quality control measures, mostly due to technical issues or incorrect or unreasonable interview durations, and 317 cases were deleted for having duplicate case IDs (i.e. the same phone number was called twice).
13. The Foundation conducted additional logic checks after the initial data delivery: 37 cases were deleted as a result of the Foundation's logic checks.

14. The data was weighted to gender, urban/rural status, and regional population estimates published by the National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA).
15. For this sample, the Response Rate is 15.67%, the Cooperation Rate is 56.40%, the Refusal Rate is 6.64%, and the Contact Rate is 27.79%.
16. Considering the survey design, the estimated design effect was 2.6. The margin of error with 95% confidence at  $p=.5$  is  $\pm 1.54\%$ . The complex margin of error with design effect with 95% confidence at  $p=.5$  is  $\pm 2.48\%$ .





# 1 PEACE

Despite ongoing intra-Afghan talks, peace, for the moment, appears as elusive as ever. Little tangible progress has been made between the Afghan government and Taliban, and levels of violence appear to be rising. Such is the lack of progress, the United States and key regional entities are pursuing alternative strategies in an attempt to expedite the process. Talk of a second Bonn conference and a ‘participatory government plan’<sup>1</sup> have permeated much recent discourse and steps are already being undertaken to pursue such a strategy.

The lack of progress in Doha is reflected in the thoughts of Afghans. According to Wave 3 (W3) of the *Survey*, less than half of Afghans now believe peace is achievable in the next two years. Continued violence and fighting, and that the Government and Taliban are too far apart to reach an agreement, are top cited reasons among Afghans pessimistic about peace. This appears very much reflective of the ground realities in both Afghanistan and Doha.

There are continued fears that any peace deal between the Afghan government and Taliban may result in the loss of gains or compromises in areas such as women’s rights, girls’ education, a strong central government, and freedom of the press. Afghans however, appear resolute in their determination to resist such losses, and across all waves of the *Survey*, a majority of Afghans have expressed the importance of protecting such areas under the terms of any peace deal. In other areas however, Afghans appear more willing to compromise and while this may not be indicative of support for the Taliban, a majority of those surveyed appear to be willing to back the idea of amnesties for Taliban fighters/senior leaders, and for a Taliban role in government as part of a peace deal.

Very much coinciding with peace talks is the proposed withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan as part of the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” signed between the US and the Taliban.<sup>2</sup> There are fears however, that a withdrawal without progress in peace talks will create further insecurity, add pressure to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), create the conditions for political instability, and potentially result in the Taliban breaking off peace talks with the Afghan government to pursue a military victory. While such issues may be speculative only at this point, they appear of concern to Afghans – over half now say it is important to protect the presence of foreign troops.

## KEY QUESTIONS

**Q-22.** *Do you think peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years?*


**Q-23.** *(Ask if no in Q-22) Why do you think peace is not achievable in the next two years? (Single mention)*

**Q-24.** *Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

**Q-25.** It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (a) The current Constitution. (b) A democratic system. (c) Freedom of speech. (d) Freedom of the press. (e) A strong central government. (f) The current judicial and court system. (g) Women’s rights. (h) Equality among different groups of people (regardless of ethnicity, class, etc.) (i) The presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan. (j) Foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan.


**Q-26.** And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which: (a) Blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban fighters. (b) Blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban senior leaders. (c) A role in the government is given to the Taliban. (d) Control over certain provinces is ceded to the Taliban. (e) Women may no longer work outside the home. (f) Women and girls may no longer attend school.

In W3 less than half of Afghans (43.9%) believe peace is achievable within the next two years. While consistent with the 43.6% in W2, this is notably lower than the 54.1% in W1. In W3, for the first time, a higher percentage say peace is not achievable (44.2%), and some 11.1% “don’t know”. Afghan men (51.5%) are more likely than women (36.0%) to say peace is achievable. This pessimism is likely related to a continued lack of substantive progress in the Intra-Afghan negotiations that are hampered by slow progress, procedural issues, and undermined by increased violence across much of the country.



**Fig. 1.1: Q-22.** Do you think peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years? (Percent who say yes.)

By region, respondents in the East (64.9%) are the most likely to report that they believe peace is achievable in the next two years, while this is lowest by some distance in the Central/Kabul region (35.6%).



**Fig. 1.2: Q-22.** Do you think peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years? (Percent who say yes.)

Interestingly, an 11 percentage point increase is observed in the percentage of respondents in the Central/Highlands who believe peace is achievable in W3 (43.0%) when compared to W2 (32.3%). A similar finding is also observed in the South West, where 56.2% believe peace is achievable in the next two years, when compared to 44.3% in W2.

Across age groups, findings are broadly similar with those aged 46–55 (46.2%) most likely to report that peace is achievable in the next two years, while this is lowest in the 26–35 age category (41.6%).

Reflective of observed increases in violence and a rise in civilian casualties after the start of Intra-Afghan negotiations,<sup>3</sup> a fifth of Afghans (21.1%) believe that peace is not achievable in the next two years because violence and fighting are continuing. Other top cited answers in this category, and again reflective of publicly noted issues surrounding the pace and progress of Intra-Afghan negotiations, 18.9% say the Government and Taliban are too far apart to reach an agreement, while 17.7% cite interference by other countries.

## WHY PEACE IS NOT ACHIEVABLE, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
VIOLENCE & FIGHTING ARE CONTINUING	15	23	21
INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES	18	19	18
GOVERNMENT & TALIBAN ARE TOO FAR APART TO REACH AN AGREEMENT	16	19	19
AMERICAN INTERFERENCE	13	8	7
THE TALIBAN ARE NOT INTERESTED IN PEACE	9	9	8
ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WILL PREVENT A PEACE DEAL	8	6	7
CORRUPTION	6	5	6
PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE	6	4	6
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	1	1	1
BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT WANT PEACE	1	1	0
DISUNITY AMONG PEOPLE	1	0	1

Fig. 1.3: Q-23. (Ask if no in Q-22) Why do you think peace is not achievable in the next two years?

Reasons for why peace is not achievable vary regionally.

## WHY PEACE IS NOT ACHIEVABLE, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
VIOLENCE & FIGHTING ARE CONTINUING	22	15	22	24	26	18	11	20
GOVERNMENT & TALIBAN ARE TOO FAR APART TO REACH AN AGREEMENT	19	33	15	20	18	17	12	19
INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES	18	10	22	21	15	16	20	18
THE TALIBAN ARE NOT INTERESTED IN PEACE	5	6	10	6	10	9	9	12
AMERICAN INTERFERENCE	6	3	5	12	5	13	1	8
ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WILL PREVENT A PEACE DEAL	9	5	4	1	8	10	2	6
CORRUPTION	4	9	9	6	5	5	15	8
PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE	7	14	6	9	4	4	3	3
DON'T KNOW	2	1	2	0	4	4	15	2
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	1	0	0	0	3	0	7	1
ALL OF THEM	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

DISUNITY AMONG PEOPLE	1	2	0	0	0	0	7	1
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**Fig. 1.4: Q-23.** (Ask if no in Q-22) Why do you think peace is not achievable in the next two years? (Single mention)

Variations in the reasons why peace may not be achievable in the next two years is noted in the East across W1 through W3. For example, concerning the Government and Taliban being too far part for peace to be achievable, a significant increase is noted among the percentage of respondents in the East when comparing W1 (15.1%) to W3 (32.7%). Regarding continued violence and fighting, in W1 the percentage citing this was 13.4%, which increased substantially to 27.6% in W2, and then decreased to 15.1% in W3. Concerning American interference, during W1 the figure was 11.3%, by W3 this decreased substantially to just 2.7% in the East.

Fluctuations in perceptions of a similar nature are also noted in the South East. For example, violence and fighting are continuing was cited by 15.1% in W1, 25.6% in W2, and 22.1% in W3. While, similar to the East, a drop is noted in the percentage of respondents who cited American interference from 12.9% in W1 to 5.0% in W3. Variations are also noted with respondents in the South East who cite the Taliban has no interest in peace, from 15.4% in W1, to 6.3% in W2, and 10.4% in W3.

Regarding the South West, similar trends hold true, with 18.9% citing violence and fighting are continuing in W1, dropping to just 7.7% in W2, and rising substantially to 24.0% in W3. Moreover, respondents in the South West also display varying perceptions in other areas. For example, during W1, 12.9% cited the Government and Taliban being too far apart while this had risen substantially to 20.5% in W3.

Such fluctuations noted above can possibly be attributed to the fluid nature of peace talks, where optimism ebbs and flows per the prevailing security and political conditions.

When comparing W1 (12.8%), W2 (8.4%), and W3 (7.4%) a noticeable drop in the percentage of respondents citing American interference as a reason peace is not achievable in the next two years is noted. This may be as a result of perceived American disengagement from Afghanistan on both a military and political level. By region, and concerning American interference, a significant drop is noted among respondents in the Central/Kabul region when comparing W1 (14.2%), W2 (10.5%), and W3 (6.4%).

By gender, significant perceptual differences emerge. 28.6% of Afghan women believe that peace is not achievable in the next two years because violence and fighting are continuing, while this figure is substantially lower among men (12.8%). Afghan men (24.1%) however, are significantly more likely than women (12.1%) to cite interference by other countries as a reason.


Continued violence and fighting as a barrier to achieving peace in the next two years is reported highest among those in the West (25.6%), while this is lowest by some distance by those in the Central/

Highlands (10.9%). A third of respondents in the East (32.7%) cite the Government and Taliban are too far apart to reach an agreement as a barrier to peace, while this figure is lowest in the Central/Highlands (12.5%).

Across categories, interesting variations are noted among respondents in the Central/Highlands. For example, 6.9% believe that economic conditions will be an impediment to peace being achieved in the next two years, whereas for the remaining regions, such a possibility barely registers. Indeed, aside from the West (2.7%), less than one percent report this in all other regions.

A similar finding holds true when comparing for disunity among the people as a reason peace is not achievable, with 6.7% in the Central/Highlands citing this as a reason, while this is less than two percent for all other regions, except for East (2.1%). And those in the Central/Highlands (14.5%) are significantly more likely to cite corruption as an impediment to peace in the next two years, when compared with all other regions, where it is nine percent or less.

Almost two fifths of respondents (38.5%) feel people like them are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. This is a slight increase from 36.1% in W2 but a decrease when compared with W1 (40.9%). Still, the findings strongly suggest a consistent pattern of concern among Afghans regarding representation at peace talks.



**Fig. 1.5: Q-24.** Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban? (Percent who say yes.)

Belief that individuals like them will be represented well at peace talks is highest among respondents in the East (54.8%), while it is less than half across all other regions, and lowest in Central/Kabul (31.5%).

For peace talks to succeed there will undoubtedly be need for compromises on all sides. While all sides hold maximalist positions currently, these will no doubt have to change as talks progress.

The protection of women’s rights, freedom of the press, and protection of the constitution among others, have been noted objectives of the Afghan negotiating team. And the need to protect such issues appears to resonate strongly with Afghans. For example, over 90 percent of Afghans believe it is either very important or somewhat important to protect the following as part of a peace agreement; the current constitution (92.0%), freedom of speech (96.1%), freedom of the press (96.3%), a strong central government (96.6%), women’s rights (97.0%), and equality among different groups of people (96.0%).

Among respondents who say “very important”, the protection of a strong central government is the top cited response.

### POLICY PRIORITIES FOR A PEACE DEAL, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
CURRENT CONSTITUTION	79	80	81
A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM	63	66	68
FREEDOM OF SPEECH	79	83	84
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS	79	83	85
A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	85	85	89
CURRENT JUDICIAL AND COURT SYSTEM	69	68	73
WOMEN’S RIGHTS	85	87	88
EQUALITY AMONG DIFFERENT GROUPS OF PEOPLE	84	83	85
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN	22	26	29
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN	66	71	73


**Fig. 1.6: Q-25.** *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (a) The current Constitution. (b) A democratic system (c) Freedom of speech. (d) Freedom of the press. (e) A strong central government, (f). The current judicial and court system. (g) Women’s rights. (h) Equality among different groups of people (regardless of ethnicity, class, etc.). (i) The presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan. (j) Foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan. (Percent who say very important.)*

Interestingly, and perhaps cognizant of increases in violence and pressure on the ANDSF, especially since the initiation of Intra-Afghan Negotiations, over half of respondents (51.6%) say it is important to protect the presence of foreign troops, whereas this was less than half in W2. This represents a significant increase on the findings from W1, where 39.4% said it was either very important or somewhat



important to protect the presence of foreign troops. Indeed, this has been an increased trend through the three waves of the *Survey*.

### PROTECTING PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, BY WAVE



**Fig. 1.7: Q-25.** *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?*

Indicative of the central role that the US in particular plays in financially supporting the ANDSF, 88.1% say it is either very important or somewhat important that foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan is protected as part of any peace deal.

Respondents were asked questions regarding their level of willingness to accept a peace agreement that contained certain conditions.

## SUPPORT FOR DIFFERENT CONDITIONS IN A PEACE DEAL, BY WAVE


	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED FOR TALIBAN FIGHTERS	66	57	61
BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED FOR TALIBAN SENIOR LEADERS	57	49	54
A ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT IS GIVEN TO THE TALIBAN	62	54	58
CONTROL OVER CERTAIN PROVINCES IS CEDED TO THE TALIBAN	33	28	28
WOMEN MAY NO LONGER WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	19	16	20
WOMEN AND GIRLS MAY NO LONGER ATTEND SCHOOL.	10	10	11

**Fig. 1.8: Q-26.** *And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which: (a) Blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban fighters (b) Blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban senior leaders (c) A role in the government is given to the Taliban (d) control over certain provinces is ceded to the Taliban (e) Women may no longer work outside the home (f). Women and girls may no longer attend school. (Percent who say very and somewhat willing.)*

Over three fifths said they were very willing (37.3%) or somewhat willing (23.7%) to accept a blanket amnesty for Taliban fighters. This represents a small increase on findings from W2 (33.1% and 24.2% respectively) but is a decrease when compared with W1 (39.3% and 26.3% respectively). Still, the figures across all three waves are broadly similar and suggest sustained levels of support for such an amnesty. That said, almost a third (32.8%) report they are very unwilling to accept a blanket amnesty.

By region, over three quarters of those in the South West (76.8%) and East (76.3%) say they would be very willing or somewhat willing to accept this, while this is less than half in the Central/Highlands (41.7%).

## SUPPORT FOR PEACE AGREEMENT IN WHICH BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED TO TALIBAN FIGHTERS, BY GENDER & REGION




**Fig. 1.9: Q-26.** *And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which: (a) Blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban fighters. (Percent who say very or somewhat willing.)*

Over half of respondents say they would be very willing (30.3%) or somewhat willing (23.3%) to accept a blanket amnesty for Taliban senior leaders. This represents a slight increase from findings in W2 (26.1% and 23.0% respectively) and a decrease on findings from W1 (33.3% and 23.9% respectively). Again however, there appears to be sustained levels of support from Afghans to accept some form of amnesty for the Taliban in furtherance of a peace deal.

Regarding a Taliban role in government, a majority say they are very willing (27.4%) or somewhat willing (31.0%) to accept this. Support for a Taliban role in Government is stronger among Afghan men, where over two thirds of men say they are either very willing (36.1%) or somewhat willing (35.1%) to accept this, while it less than half for women (18.2% very willing or 26.8% somewhat willing).

As with all findings related to the Taliban in this section, while findings may fluctuate slightly, Afghans generally are receptive to accepting conditions that would allow for some form of Taliban reintegration as part of a peace deal.


### SUPPORT FOR PEACE AGREEMENT IN WHICH ROLE IN GOVERNMENT IS GIVEN TO TALIBAN, BY GENDER & WAVE



**Fig. 1.10: Q-26.** *And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which: (c) A role in the government is given to the Taliban. (Percent who say very or somewhat willing.)*

Ceding control of certain provinces to the Taliban as part of a peace agreement does not, however, find support among Afghans. Over two thirds say they would be very unwilling (63.5%) or somewhat unwilling (3.5%) to accept this. When comparing findings for W1 (54.6%) and W3 (63.5%), the percentage of those citing they are very unwilling to cede control of certain provinces has increased by almost 10 percentage points.

## SUPPORT FOR PEACE AGREEMENT IN WHICH CONTROL OVER CERTAIN PROVINCES IS CEDED TO TALIBAN, BY REGION & WAVE



**Fig. 1.11: Q-26.** *And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which: (d) control over certain provinces is ceded to the Taliban (Percent who say very and somewhat willing.)*

Support for the protection of women’s rights appears strong throughout the three waves of the *Survey*. In all waves, only a fifth or less of respondents said they would be very willing or somewhat willing to accept a peace agreement where women may no longer work outside the home. Unsurprisingly, Afghan women are more likely to say they are very unwilling to accept a peace agreement where women may no longer work outside the home, when compared with men (81.6% females compared to 67.1% males). Utilizing the same question but disaggregated by region, 92.4% of respondents in the Central/Highlands region say they would be very unwilling, while this is significantly lower in the East (61.7%) and South West (66.3%).

Support for accepting a peace deal where women and girls may no longer attend school is extremely low. Just over 10 percent say they would be either very willing (6.7%) or somewhat willing (3.9%) to accept such a deal. Again, women (90.8%) are most likely to report being very unwilling to accept such a deal, while this is slightly lower for men (83.1%). Almost all respondents in the Central/Highlands (99.1%) say they would be very unwilling to accept such a deal, while this is lowest in the East (78.3%).

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Another Bonn Style Conference: A new plan to ‘fix’ the war and enable US troops to leave; <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/another-bonn-style-conference-a-new-plan-to-fix-the-war-and-enable-us-troops-to-leave/>
- 2 A deal in the Mist: How much of the US-Taliban Doha Agreement has been implemented? <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/a-deal-in-the-mist-how-much-of-the-us-taliban-doha-agreement-has-been-implemented/>
- 3 United Nations, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2020 <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14391.doc.htm>



## 2 SECURITY

Wave 3 (W3) came at a time of sustained levels of insurgent initiated violence across Afghanistan and increased pressure on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Pressure on ANDSF has been exacerbated by decreased levels of International Military Force contact with ANDSF/security ministries,<sup>1</sup> and longer term concerns over levels of both financial and technical support that will be provided once any United States (U.S.)/NATO troop withdrawal is complete. Indicative of this, a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report notes that the ANDSF faces ‘long-term capability and sustainability challenges that require various forms of continuing U.S. military support.’<sup>2</sup> W3 finds that the public is generally optimistic that ANDSF will be able to provide adequate levels of security with reduced technical assistance from the United States/NATO, but some level of concern is noted among Afghans regarding the impact that reduced financial assistance may have on the ability of the ANDSF.

Speaking to the Afghan National Police (ANP), W3 finds increasingly positive public perceptions of the ANP, with increases in the percentage of Afghans noting the ANP as honest and fair, those who believe that the ANP helps improve security, those who believe that the ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes, and in the number of Afghans who say they would contact the ANP if they needed assistance.

Additionally, W3 garnered Afghan views on violence and crime that may have impacted them or their family in the past year. While figures across the three waves of the *Survey* for the percentage of those impacted by crime have remained broadly consistent, a minor decrease in the overall in the total is observed in W3.

### KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-34.** *Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance? By technical assistance we mean tactical, operational and mentoring support to the ANDSF. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) Afghan National Army. (b) Afghan National Police. (c) Afghan Local Police.*
- Q-35.** *Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) Afghan National Army. (b) Afghan National Police. (c) Afghan Local Police.*
- Q-36.** *I’m going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then*



ask): Would you say strongly or somewhat? (a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people (b) ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. (d) I would contact the ANP if I needed assistance.


**Q-37.** (Ask all) Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year?

**Q-38.** (Ask if 'Yes' in Q-37) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

**Q-39.** (Ask if 'Yes' in Q-37) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not?

Almost three quarters of respondents report they either strongly agree (54.3%) or somewhat agree (19.6%) that the Afghan National Army (ANA) will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance. This finding is almost in line with observations in W1 (52.9% and 18.7% respectively) and W2 (53.3% and 20.5% respectively) and shows strong confidence in ANA abilities. Almost three fifths of males (58.9%) claim they strongly agree, while this is just less than half for females (49.4%). By region, differences emerge. For example, less than half of respondents in the South East (49.6%) and West (47.9%) state they strongly agree, while this is two thirds for those in the East (66.8%).

### CAN ANA PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY WITHOUT FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE? BY REGION



**FIG. 2.1: Q-34.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance? By technical assistance we mean tactical, operational and mentoring support to the ANDSF. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) Afghan National Army. (Percent who say strongly agree.)

Utilizing the same question but for the Afghan National Police (ANP), just over two thirds claim that they strongly agree (45.5%) or somewhat agree (23.0%) that the ANP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance.


### CAN ANP PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY WITHOUT FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE?, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
STRONGLY AGREE	43	45	46
SOMEWHAT AGREE	23	24	23
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	9	7	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE	20	21	21

**FIG. 2.2: Q-34.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance? By technical assistance we mean tactical, operational and mentoring support to the ANDSF. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (b) Afghan National Police.

While findings by region are generally commensurate with the national level response, it is worth noting that over half of respondents in the East (53.4%), Central/Highlands (51.4%) and South West (50.8%) say they strongly agree that the ANP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance.

### CAN ANP PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY WITHOUT FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE? BY REGION



**FIG. 2.3: Q-34.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance? By technical assistance we mean tactical, operational and mentoring support to the ANDSF. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (b) Afghan National Police. (Percent who say strongly agree.)

While the future of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) is in doubt,<sup>3</sup> it does not appear to have impacted public perceptions, where almost three fifths of respondents state that they either strongly agree (35.6%) or somewhat agree (22.4%) that the ALP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance. Interestingly, females are more likely to say they both strongly agree (37.0%) and somewhat agree (24.0%), when compared with males (34.4% and 20.8% respectively). Continuing this theme, just over a quarter of females (26.2%) strongly disagree that the ALP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance, while this is over a third for males (34.4%).

### CAN ALP PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY WITHOUT FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE?, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
STRONGLY AGREE	37	36	36
SOMEWHAT AGREE	20	22	22
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	10	7	8
STRONGLY DISAGREE	29	30	30

**FIG. 2.4: Q-34.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance? By technical assistance we mean tactical, operational and mentoring support to the ANDSF. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (c) Afghan Local Police.

Whether the ANA will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance shows a mixed picture among Afghans. A third of respondents (34.6%) strongly agree the ANA will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance, while a third (34.7%) strongly disagree with the same statement.

More Afghans strongly disagree (35.0%), than strongly agree (30.4%) that the ANP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance. However, Afghans generally appear to believe that the ANP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance with over half stating they either strongly agree (30.4%) or somewhat agree (22.2%).

Two fifths of Afghans (41.5%) strongly disagree that the ALP will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance, while just over a quarter (27.6%) say they strongly agree. Over half of females either strongly agree (30.0%) or somewhat agree (20.7%) with the statement while is less than half for males (25.3% and 19.4% respectively). While figures by region are generally in line with the national level, over two fifths (42.6%) of respondents in the Central/Highlands strongly agree.


## CAN ANDSF PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY WITHOUT FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE?

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
ANA	35	21	8	35
ANP	30	22	10	35
ALP	28	20	8	42

**FIG. 2.5: Q-35.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) Afghan National Army. (b) Afghan National Police. (c) Afghan Local Police.


For the first time in the three waves of the *Survey*, over half of respondents (51.6%) state that they strongly agree that the ANP is honest and fair. By some distance, respondents in the Central/Highlands (73.7%) are more likely to report the ANP as honest and fair, while this is less than half (41.2%) in Central/Kabul.

### ANP IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, BY WAVE



**Fig. 2.6: Q-36.** I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat? a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (Percent who say strongly and somewhat agree.)


In a further sign of improved confidence in the ANP, 57.9% strongly agree that the ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan, which is an increase on that observed in W1 (53.9%) and W2 (55.0%).



**Fig. 2.7: Q-36.** *I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement: Would you say strongly or somewhat? b) ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (Percent who say strongly agree.)*

Additionally, an increase is also seen in the percentage of Afghans who strongly agree (53.6%) that the ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes, when compared with W1 (50.9%) and W2 (50.3%).


## ANP IS EFFICIENT AT ARRESTING THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES, BY REGION & WAVE



**Fig. 2.8: Q-36.** *I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement: Would you say strongly or somewhat? (c) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. (Percent who say strongly agree.)*

Over 70 percent of Afghans (70.8%) strongly agree that they would contact the ANP if they needed assistance, while less than 10 percent (9.6%) strongly disagree. The figures for strongly agree show a six percentage point increase when compared with W1 (64.8%).


### I WOULD CONTACT THE ANP IF I NEEDED ASSISTANCE, BY WAVE



**FIG. 2.9: Q-36.** I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement: Would you say strongly or somewhat? (d) I would contact the ANP if I needed assistance. (Percent who say strongly agree.)


Almost three quarters of females (74.2%) strongly agree that they would contact the ANP if they needed assistance, while this is just over two thirds for males (67.5%).

### I WOULD CONTACT THE ANP IF I NEEDED ASSISTANCE, BY REGION



**Fig. 2.10: Q-36.** I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement: Would you say strongly or somewhat? (d) I would contact the ANP if I needed assistance. (Percent who say strongly agree.)

Less than one fifth (14.8% of respondents) claim that they or has someone in their family had suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year. While the decrease is marginal, it is less than those recorded in W1 (16.0%) and W2 (15.5%). By region, a fifth of respondents in the West (20.0%) cite this answer, while it is just 7.2% in Central/Highlands.



**Fig. 2.11: Q-37.** *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year? (Percent who say yes.)*

When asked what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year the top cited answer remains “don’t know” (55.4%). However, the 55.4% figure represents a huge increase on the 30.5% who reported this answer in W1 and the 28.7% in W2. Social stigma surrounding certain types of crime may go some way to explaining this increase. Over a quarter (27.2%) cited murder, which is also an increase on figures observed in W1 (21.0%) and W2 (22.4%). The number of respondents citing physical attack or beating (17.1%) is at the lowest from the three waves of the *Survey*. The number reporting suicide attacks (14.2%) is the same as it was in W2 (14.1%).



## TYPES OF VIOLENCE OR CRIME EXPERIENCED, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
DON'T KNOW	31	29	55
MURDER	21	22	27
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	21	18	17
RACKETEERING/EXTORTION	13	15	14
BURGLARY/LOOTING	15	13	11
SUICIDE ATTACKS	10	14	14
MILITANTS/INSURGENT ACTIONS	12	14	10
REFUSED	8	13	10
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT	9	7	7
PICKPOCKETING	8	5	6
POLICE ACTIONS	6	3	5
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	4	3	3
KIDNAPPING	4	4	3
FOREIGN FORCES ACTIONS (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	5	3	2
ARMY ACTIONS	2	4	2
KILLED OR INJURED IN WAR	1	3	2
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	1	0	1
SMUGGLING	1	0	1
LAND CAPTURE/SEIZURE	0	0	1
STEALING MOBILE	0	0	2
THREATENED BY TALIBAN	0	0	1
CORRUPTION	0	0	1
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	0	1	0

**Fig. 2.12: Q-38.** (Ask if Yes in Q-37) *If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*

By gender, significant differences in reporting emerge. Females (61.2%) are most likely to report “don’t know”. Almost a third of females (32.3%) cite murder, while this is less than a quarter for males (22.8%). Males (20.0%) are however, more likely to report physical attack or beating, when compared with females (13.8%).

Murder is most frequently given as the answer by respondents in Central/Highlands (45.5%), and least likely by those in the South West (13.2%). Suicide attacks are reported by 46.7% in the Central/Highlands and 35.1% in the South East, while it is less than a fifth across all other regions, and less than two percent in the West (1.6%). Perhaps representative of the densely populated nature of Kabul city and its environs, those in the Central/Kabul region (14.3%) are significantly more likely to report pickpocketing as a crime than all other regions.

## TYPES OF VIOLENCE OR CRIME EXPERIENCED, BY REGION


	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
DON'T KNOW	56	57	36	43	63	69	56	51
MURDER	21	30	25	13	35	32	46	33
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	22	23	14	25	12	12	0	16
RACKETEERING/EXTORTION	16	16	7	25	12	9	0	15
SUICIDE ATTACKS	15	3	35	6	2	16	47	20
BURGLARY/LOOTING	7	16	5	33	11	3	0	6
MILITANTS/INSURGENT ACTIONS	7	10	16	0	6	25	0	8
REFUSED	8	9	11	14	11	8	4	14
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT	9	3	4	7	11	2	3	8
PICKPOCKETING	14	3	4	6	5	1	0	2
POLICE ACTIONS	6	3	4	12	2	4	0	1
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	3	0	0	0	15	1	0	0
KIDNAPPING	2	0	16	0	1	1	0	0
KILLED OR INJURED IN WAR	1	6	0	0	1	2	39	5
ARMY ACTIONS	2	0	4	6	1	4	3	0
STEALING MOBILE	2	0	0	0	5	0	0	2
FOREIGN FORCES ACTIONS (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	8
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	1	3	4	0	0	1	0	3
LAND CAPTURE/SEIZURE	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	8
THREATENED BY TALIBAN	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	0
VIOLENCE BY TALIBAN	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	0
CORRUPTION	1	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
SMUGGLING	0	6	4	0	0	0	1	0
IMPRISONED WHILE INNOCENT/FALSE IMPRISONMENT	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FIGHT WITH THE NEIGHBOR	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0
TALIBAN ATTACK/VIOLENCE	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0

**Fig. 2.13: Q-38.** (Ask if Yes in Q-37) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

Of those that said that they or someone in their family had suffered from violence or a criminal act in the past year, over half (54.9%) said that the crimes or violent acts were reported to someone outside the family, which is broadly similar to findings from W1 (52.2%) and W2 (58.7%). By some distance, males (60.4%) are more likely to report a crime or violent act to someone outside the family, when compared with females (48.6%).

Regionally, variations are observed. For example, less than half of those in Central/Kabul (47.7%), Central/Highlands (42.2%), and the North West (41.6%) report that the crime or violent act had been reported outside the family, while it is over three fifths in the East (65.7%), South West (61.5%), and West (63.3%).

### REPORTING CRIME OR VIOLENCE TO ANYONE OUTSIDE OF FAMILY, BY GENDER & REGION



**Fig. 2.14: Q-39.** (Ask if 'Yes' in Q-37) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not? (Percent who say yes.)

## ENDNOTES

- 1 SIGAR: 2021 High-Risk List <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2021-High-Risk-List.pdf>
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Afghanistan Analysts Network, Disbanding the ALP: A Dangerous Final Chapter for a Force with a Chequered History: Afghanistan Analysts Network: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/disbanding-the-alp-a-dangerous-final-chapter-for-a-force-with-a-chequered-history>



### 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS

While great strides have undoubtedly been made in advancing women's rights in Afghanistan, more can and must be done to break down barriers and change often deep-rooted societal views on the role of women. Indicative of this, a recent study by the UN Women and partners said that just 15 percent of Afghan men think women should be allowed to work outside of their home after marriage, and two thirds of men complain Afghan women now have too many rights.<sup>1</sup>

Although women in Afghanistan are now more visible and hold important public facing positions, inequality still exists. With intra-Afghan talks ongoing and with concerns that the hard fought gains of women may stall or worse, even deteriorate, the issue of women's rights is as prominent now as it has ever been. To that end, W3 offers further insight into public perception regarding women's rights in Afghanistan.


W3 continues to highlight strong support among Afghans for the advancement of women in the public and private spheres, and for the protection of hard won gains in peace talks, where 87.9% of respondents say it is very important to protect women's rights during any peace settlement. W3 does, however, also highlight that there are still issues and that, when it comes to the women working in mixed sex environments or being in leadership positions, for example, there is still some degree of skepticism.

#### KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-25.** *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? g) Women's rights.*
- Q-40.** *And thinking about where women can work. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernment organizations (NGO). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – where male and female employees work in the same room.*
- Q-41.** *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a Community Development Council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for President of Afghanistan*

In a follow-on to Wave 1 (W1) and Wave 2 (W2), respondents were again asked a number of questions regarding which places they agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work. In the strongly agree category, female-only schools (94.6%) is again the top cited answer and is one that has marginally increased during the three waves of this *Survey* (W1, 92.1%, W2, 93.1%). The second most cited answer in the strongly agree category was hospitals or clinics (93.9%), which also shows a marginal increase across the three waves (W1, 91.6%, W2, 93.1%).

Three fifths (59.4%) strongly agree that it acceptable for women to work in co-ed schools. Less than half of respondents, however, strongly agree that is acceptable for women to work in a nongovernmental organization (49.3%). Suggestive of an aversion to males and females mixing, 80.1% strongly agree that it is acceptable that women should work in a private company outside the home – with female employees only, while when utilising the same question but having male and female employees work in the same room, the percentage saying they strongly agree decreases substantially to 41.5%.




**Fig. 3.1: Q-40.** *And thinking about where women can work. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Non-government organizations (NGO). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who strongly agree.)*

In all cases, females are more likely than males to offer a strongly agree answer. However, here, as with the range of answers noted above, there are varying percentages that appear predicated to a large extent

on an aversion to the mixing of males and females in the work place. For example, 48.6% of females and 34.8% of males say they strongly agree that it is acceptable for women to work in a private company outside the home – where male and female employees work in the same room. The figure for females represents an eight percentage point decrease when compared with W2 (57.1%), and two percentage point decrease for males compare to W2 (32.7%).

When the question is female only, the percentage reporting strongly agree for both female (86.2%) and male (74.3%) increases substantially. The figures for males represent a three percentage point increase on that observed in W2 (71.1%) A similar trend is observed when considering mixed schools. For women working in female-only schools, 94.9% of females and 94.4% of male respondents strongly agree that this is acceptable. When the question is changed to co-ed schools, this drops to 70.1% for females and 49.2% for males.

### ACCEPTABLE PLACES FOR WOMEN TO WORK, BY GENDER



**Fig. 3.2: Q-40.** *And thinking about where women can work. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernment organizations (NGO). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who strongly agree.)*

Across the regions, respondents in the Central/Highlands are most likely to strongly agree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places, except for the Army/Police where respondents in the South East and East are most likely to give this answer.




## ACCEPTABLE PLACES FOR WOMEN TO WORK, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
GOVERNMENT OFFICES	74	76	73	61	79	68	92	73
NGO	47	43	56	47	50	47	70	49
HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	93	96	97	96	94	93	100	91
FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS	95	98	97	92	93	94	99	93
CO-ED SCHOOLS	62	52	61	48	59	60	81	63
ARMY/POLICE	56	64	68	56	60	53	61	56
PRIVATE COMPANY WITH FEMALE EMPLOYEES ONLY	84	74	80	74	83	78	90	80
PRIVATE COMPANY WITH BOTH MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES	42	41	52	34	41	32	61	45

**Fig. 3.3: Q-40.** *And thinking about where women can work. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernment organizations (NGO). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who strongly agree.)*

Regarding women and leadership positions, almost three fifths (58.5%) of respondents strongly agree that it is acceptable for women to run for President, which represents a one percentage point increase on the 57.4% who responded in W2. When considering women in other leadership positions, the top cited answer in the strongly agree category is CEO of a large company (71.4%).


## SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY WAVE



**Fig. 3.4: Q-41.** *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (Wait for response and then ask: Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a Community Development Council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for President of Afghanistan. (Percent who strongly agree.)*

Unsurprisingly, females are more likely than males to strongly agree that it is acceptable for women to be in a leadership position in all categories. Females are most likely to strongly agree with a woman being the CEO of a large company (82.1%), while they are least likely to strongly agree with a woman running for President (68.0%). Less than half of males (49.5%) strongly agree that it is acceptable for women to run for president. In a break from the trend towards the CEO of a large company position, males are most likely to strongly agree that it is acceptable for women to be a member of a Community Development Council (61.6%).


## SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY GENDER



**Fig. 3.5: Q-41.** *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a Community Development Council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for President of Afghanistan. (Percent who strongly agree.)*

87.9% of respondents say it is very important to protect women’s rights during any peace settlement, this represents a marginal increase on the 86.7% who responded in W2, but is over three percentage points higher than in W1 (84.7%). The increased visibility of women at the Doha peace talks and public commitments from the Afghan government and other actors to protect such rights may be a factor in this modest rise. Further indicative of strong support for the protection of women’s rights in any peace deal, less than three percent say it is either not too important (0.9%) or not at all important (1.7%).

## SUPPORT FOR PROTECTION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN A PEACE DEAL, BY GENDER & WAVE



**Fig. 3.6: Q-25.** *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (g) Women's rights. (Percent who say very important.)*

Support for the protection of women's rights in any peace deal is strongest in the Central/Highlands where 95.7% say it is very important, while it is lowest in the South West (79.4%). Bucking the national trend, almost five percent of respondents in the South West (4.8%) say that it is not important at all to protect women's rights in any peace deal.

## PROTECTION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN A PEACE DEAL, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
VERY IMPORTANT	89	89	91	79	91	87	96	87
SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	8	9	7	13	7	11	4	10
NOT TOO IMPORTANT	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	2
NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	2	2	1	5	1	1	0	1

**Fig. 3.7: Q-25.** *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (g) Women's rights.*

## ENDNOTES

- 1 The fate of women's rights in Afghanistan. John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown. The Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-fate-of-womens-rights-in-afghanistan>



## 4 ECONOMY

The Covid-19 pandemic has impacted economies across the globe and Afghanistan is no exception. Already one of the economically weakest and most aid dependent nations in the world,<sup>1</sup> Covid-19 has added to the country's financial woes, and some estimates indicate that the economy may have shrunk by as much as five percent in 2020<sup>2</sup> due to Covid-19, pushing the economy into negative growth.<sup>3</sup> While some analysts suggest there may be economic growth in 2021, much of this will likely be contingent on progress in peace talks and the political situation. A drop in donor pledges<sup>4</sup> will also no doubt have an adverse impact on the future of Afghanistan's economy.

The economic impact of Covid-19 has been acutely felt by Afghans, some reports indicate increased poverty<sup>5,6</sup> and unemployment rates<sup>7</sup> as a result. While there is a modest decline in findings, Wave 3 (W3) notes that two thirds of Afghans say that their household financial situation has worsened in the past 12 months. Additionally, almost three quarters of Afghans say employment opportunities in their household has gotten worse in the past 12 months. A Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report<sup>8</sup> notes an increase in the cost of basic household food items such as sugar, cooking oil and rice throughout 2020, and these findings are reflected among *Survey* respondents in W3, who cite the affordability and quality of products had worsened over the past 12 months.

Widespread and persistent corruption<sup>9</sup> has been noted as a persistent feature of Afghanistan and is one that appears to impact Afghans on a consistent basis. W3 finds that 85 percent of Afghans see corruption as a major problem in their daily life, while 95 percent see it as a major problem in the country as a whole.

### KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-14.** *During the past 12 months, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (b) Employment opportunities. (c) Availability of quality products in the market (e.g. rice, wheat, oil). (d) Affordability of quality products in the market (e.g. rice, wheat, oil). (f) Physical access to health-care services (transportation, accessibility). (g) Cost of health care services (doctor, hospital fees, testing, procedures, routine care). (h) Cost of medication (prescriptions). (i) Electricity supply. (l) Access to clean drinking water.*
- A.** *Are you aware of [INSERT ITEM] being provided in your local area to aid households during this time? Q.15 Food. Q.16 Employment. Q.17 Water. Q.18 Health-care. Q.19 Financial. Q.20 Medical equipment (gloves, facemasks, sanitizer, etc)*
- B.** *(Ask if 1 'Yes' at A) What entity is primarily providing it?*
- C.** *(Ask if 1 'Yes' at A) Have you or anyone else in your household personally accessed the support?*



**D.** *Is the support sufficient for your needs?*

**Q-21:** *Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem at all in the following areas: (a) In your daily life. (b) In Afghanistan as a whole.*

A slight decline in the percentage of respondents who say that their household financial situation has gotten worse in the past 12 months is noted during W3 (66.8%), when compared against W1 (70.9%) and W2 (70.2%). An increase is observed in those who say that the household financial situation has stayed the same over the three waves of the *Survey* (W1, 16.6%; W2, 19.3%; W3, 22.0%).


### HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
BETTER	12	10	11
THE SAME	17	19	22
WORSE	71	70	67

**Fig. 4.1: Q-14.** *During the past 12 months, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.*

By gender, no discernible differences are observed with males (67.7%) marginally more likely than females (66.0%) to say it had gotten worse, although both represent a decrease when compared with W2 (71.0% and 69.3% respectively). By region, an 11 percentage point increase is noted among respondents in the Central/Highlands (79.4%) who say their household financial situation had gotten worse in the past 12 months when compared with W2 (68.5%). Other noticeable changes between W2 and W3 are noted in the East, where 75.1% said that their household financial situation had worsened in the past 12 months in W2, while this had dropped seven percentage points to 68.1% in W3.

## HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION, BY REGION & WAVE




**Fig. 4.2: Q.14.** During the past 12 months, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (Percent who say gotten worse.)

The percentage of respondents who say that employment opportunities in their household has gotten worse in the past 12 months has remained static throughout the three waves of the *Survey* (W1, 74.0%; W2, 74.1%; W3 74.3%) and speaks to broader connected issues such as a lack of employment prospects brought about by increasing violence, an uncertain peace process, concerns over future levels of donor assistance and an economy rebounding from the shock of Covid-19. Speaking to economic uncertainty, just 10 percent of respondents (10.3%) say that employment opportunities had gotten better. Again, those in the Central/Highlands region appear to be suffering the most economically, with 83.1% saying that employment opportunities had gotten worse in the past 12 months, representing an eight percentage point increase when compared with W2 (75.2%). A high number of respondents in the West (81.9%) also report that employment opportunities had gotten worse.

The availability of quality products in the market (e.g. rice, wheat, oil) is a worsening trend according to *Survey* findings, in W3, 70.6% said this had gotten worse in the past 12 months, representing an almost four percentage point increase when compared with W1 (66.8%). Just 10.0% say it has gotten better. When disaggregated by region, those in the Central/Highlands are again most likely to report a worsening situation, with 81.5% stating the availability of quality products had gotten worse.

In a continuing trend of economic woes for Afghans, 79.1% say the affordability of quality products in the market had gotten worse in the past 12 months. Less than seven percent (6.7%) say it has gotten better. 89.4% of respondents in the Central/Highlands say that affordability had gotten worse in the past 12 months, an increase of four percentage points when compared with W2 (85.2%).

Over half of Afghans say that physical access to health-care services (transportation, accessibility) had gotten better (17.8%) or stayed the same (34.9%), and these findings are almost consistent with those observed in W1 and W2.



**Fig. 4.3: Q-14.** During the past 12 months, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? (f) Physical access to health-care services (transportation, accessibility). (Percent who say gotten worse.)

The percentage of respondents who say that the cost of health-care services (doctor, hospital fees, testing, procedures, routine care) has gotten worse in the past 12 months shows a slight decrease in W3 (60.9%), when compared with W1 (63.4%) and W2 (63.0%).

Three quarters of respondents (75.9%) say that the cost of medication (prescriptions) has gotten worse in the past 12 months. While this figure is high, it represents a decrease on the four fifths of respondents who answered the same question in W1 (80.4%) and W2 (79.6%).


Regarding access to electricity, a fluid picture is observed throughout the three waves of the *Survey*. In W1, less than half of respondents (43.0%) said access to electricity had gotten worse in the past 12 months, while this rose by over 12 percentage points to 55.4% in W2. In W3, this has dropped to just below half of respondents (49.5%). Just under a fifth (19.0%) say that access to electricity had gotten better in W3. A mixed picture is observed when dissected by region also. For example, 28.2% of respondents in the North West and 21.8% in the Central/Kabul region report that access to electricity had gotten better, while this was just 6.5% in the Central/Highlands region.

Regarding access to clean drinking water over the past 12 months, over three quarters report that it had gotten better (32.1%) or stayed the same (44.1%), which is broadly consistent with findings observed in W1 and W2. By gender, a mixed picture is observed across findings. For example, males (34.8%) are more likely to say access to water had gotten better, when compared with females (29.4%). On the other hand, females (48.7%) are more likely to report that access to clean drinking water had stayed the same, when compared with males (39.7%).

Further differences are noted by region. For example, just a fifth of respondents in the West (21.4%) report that access had gotten better, while this is two fifths in the South East (39.7%). Just 15.0% in the East say access to water had gotten worse, while this is 30.6% in the South West.

At the national level, just a third (32.7%) report being aware of food being provided in their local area to aid households during this time. Of those who report awareness of this item being provided, 37.3% report accessing it, from which less than half (44.2%) report it being sufficient for their needs indicating that much more can be done to improve such services. By gender, males (37.0%) are more likely than females (28.2%) to report awareness of this item. When disaggregated by region there are some discernible differences with awareness of this service most likely among those in the South West (35.1%), and least likely in Central/Highlands (23.7%) and North East (29.9%). Almost three fifths (57.8%) identify the Afghan government as the provider of this service, while “don’t know” (12.9%), and international NGO (9.7%) are the next most frequently cited answers.

### AWARENESS OF FOOD BEING PROVIDED, BY REGION & WAVE



**Fig. 4.4. Q-15A.** Are you aware of [INSERT ITEM] being provided in your local area to aid households during this time? Food. (Percent who say yes.)

Regarding awareness of employment opportunities being provided in their local area to aid households during this time, the vast majority (90.0%) report no awareness of this service, suggesting a significant issue with awareness raising of such an important service. While the Afghan government are noted as the primary provider of this service less than half (49.2%) report so. Just a third of those who were aware of this service (33.0%) report accessing it. Of those who accessed this service, almost three fifths (57.6%) report it as sufficient for their needs.

Less than 10 percent (9.3%) report being aware of the provision of water in their local area to aid households during this time. Again, while the Afghan government is noted as the primary provider of the service, less than half (49.4%) report so. Interestingly, a quarter of respondents cite either local NGO (10.4%) or international NGO (15.3%) as the provider. Over half of those who were aware of this service (52.7%) accessed it, and of those that accessed it, 70.5% said it was sufficient for their needs.

Less than a fifth of respondents (16.1%) reported awareness of the provision of health-care services in their area. While the increase is only marginal, it is a rise when compared with W1 (14.9%) and W2 (14.0%). Almost three fifths (59.2%) report the Afghan government as the provider of this service, while local (8.4%) and international NGOs (12.9%) account for just over a fifth. Less than half (44.4%) of those who were aware of this service report accessing it. Almost two thirds (64.6%) of respondents who accessed this service, report it as sufficient for their needs.


Almost a fifth of respondents (19.0%) report awareness of financial support being offered. This is a noticeable increase on the findings from W1 (12.8%) and W2 (14.4%) suggesting increasing visibility and promotion of such a service.

While findings by region are generally in line with national findings, respondents in the Central/Highlands (29.3%) and South West (24.2%) stand out as reporting higher levels of awareness of this service.

The Afghan government is again noted as the primary provider of this service and over half of respondents (56.3%) cite them. Just a third of those who were aware of this service report accessing it (32.8%), while of those who did access it, just over three fifths (61.6%) claim it was sufficient for their needs.

Awareness of medical equipment shows marginal improvement across the three waves of the *Survey*, with almost a fifth (19.4%) reporting this in W3, compared to 15.2% in W1. Just under half (49.4%) cite the Afghan government as the provider of this service, while a fifth cite either an international (11.6%) or national NGO (8.9%). Three fifths (61.4%) of those who were aware of this service report accessing it, and the same percentage (61.4%) among those who accessed it, claim it was sufficient for their needs.

## AWARENESS OF SERVICES BEING PROVIDED, BY WAVE



**Fig. 4.5: Q15–20.** Are you aware of [Financial aid] being provided in your local area to aid households during this time? Q.15 Food. Q.16 Employment. Q.17 Water. Q.18 Health-care. Q.19 Financial. Q.20 Medical equipment (gloves, facemasks, sanitizer, etc.) (Percent who say yes.)

Endemic corruption is a noted and consistent problem across Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, it has been called a “silent cancer steadily affecting all aspects of the lives of Afghan citizens.”<sup>11</sup> While action has been and continues to be taken by the Afghan government, its effectiveness is questionable,<sup>12</sup> and corruption remains a persistent issue. Indicative of the scale of the issue, 84.6% of respondents cite corruption as a major problem in their daily life, which resonates with findings from W1 (85.0%) and W2 (85.4%).


## CORRUPTION AS PROBLEM IN DAILY LIFE, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
MAJOR PROBLEM	85	85	85
MINOR PROBLEM	8	7	8
NOT A PROBLEM	6	6	7

**Fig. 4.6: Q-21.** Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem at all in the following areas: (a) In your daily life.

Further indicating the scale of the issue, 94.6% of respondents claimed it was a major problem in the country as a whole. While figures across regions are almost commensurate with the national observation, 99.6% of respondents in the Central/Highlands and 98.4% in the South East cite it as a major problem.

### CORRUPTION AS MAJOR PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE, BY GENDER & WAVE



**Fig. 4.7: Q-21.** Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem at all in the following areas: (b) In Afghanistan as a whole. (Percent who say major problem.)

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Janus-Faced Pledges: A review of the 2020 Geneva donor conference in Afghanistan: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/international-engagement/janus-faced-pledges-a-review-of-the-2020-geneva-donor-conference-on-afghanistan>
- 2 Afghanistan's GDP to Contract in 2020 Due to Covid-19; Small Recovery Projected for 2021: <https://www.adb.org/news/afghanistans-gdp-contract-2020-due-covid-19-small-recovery-projected-2021>
- 3 Covid-19 in Afghanistan (8): The political economy repercussions of Covid-19 and the aid response: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/covid-19-in-afghanistan-8-the-political-economy-repercussions-of-covid-19-and-the-aid-response>
- 4 Janus-Faced Pledges: A review of the 2020 Geneva donor conference in Afghanistan: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/international-engagement/janus-faced-pledges-a-review-of-the-2020-geneva-donor-conference-on-afghanistan>
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Tolo News, <https://tolonews.com/business-169704>
- 7 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress: <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-01-30qr-section2-economic.pdf>
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 SIGAR: High Risk List, 2021: <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2021-High-Risk-List.pdf>
- 11 Deborah Lyons, remarks delivered by Ramiz Alakbarov on behalf of Deborah Lyons to the Afghanistan 2020 Conference Side Event on Institutional and Societal Methods for Fighting Corruption, 11/23/2020, cited in SIGAR: High Risk List, 2021: <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2021-High-Risk-List.pdf>
- 12 SIGAR: High Risk List, 2021: <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2021-High-Risk-List.pdf>





## 5 COVID-19

The extent to which Covid-19 has impacted Afghanistan is open to debate. Limited testing and a lack of authoritative infection figures<sup>1</sup> means that the true extent of Covid-19 in Afghanistan may never be truly known. At the time of writing, official figures indicate there has been just 55,600 cases in the country.<sup>2</sup> Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that Afghanistan has been greatly impacted. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Public Health, with the support of the World Health Organization and John Hopkins University suggests as many as 10 million people may have been infected with Covid-19 across the country,<sup>3</sup> and this figure is likely to have increased since.

While much of the world has entered into strict lockdowns and have enacted measures such as social distancing and mask wearing, this has not generally been the case in Afghanistan. While there were some early containment measures, such as the closure of schools and universities,<sup>4</sup> these were loosely followed, and in many cases ignored. For many Afghans, plagued by decades of violence and poverty, adherence to such measures came with an economic cost they could ill afford, and Covid-19 became something that Afghans would have to learn to live with.

Wave 3 (W3) indicates decreasing concern among Afghans about conducting certain activities, for example, going to work or partaking in community activities, in a Covid-19 environment, and decreased concern about any lasting impact that Covid-19 may have on their health. W3 also notes a mixed picture with regards to levels of information and support provided by the government regarding Covid-19.

In February, Afghanistan received its first shipment of Covid-19 vaccine,<sup>5</sup> and has begun its vaccination drive, which will initially focus on inoculating security force members, health-care workers, and journalists.<sup>6</sup> Longer term, a vaccination program would appear one way that Afghanistan can confidently consider as an aid to mitigating against future waves and outbreaks, and this would seem a plausible strategy: 94.3% of Afghans surveyed said they would take a vaccine if offered.

### KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-1.** *With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: a) Going to work. b) Engaging in community activities. c) Attending funerals and religious functions. d) Attending school. e) Visiting a health-care facility.*
- Q-2.** *Which of the following precautionary measures are you using to protect yourself from the virus? (a) Facemask. (b) Gloves. (c) Hand Sanitizer. (d) Frequent handwashing. (e) Soap and other detergents for cleaning surfaces. (f) Social distancing. (g) Self-isolation. (h) Other personal protection equipment (gowns, face shield, etc.)*
- Q-3.** *Which of the following sources of news and information do you use to stay informed*


about Covid-19? (a) Radio: which station(s)? (b) Television: which station(s)? (c) Newspaper. (d) Family and friends. (e) Doctor or other health professional (f) Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc). (g) Other.

- Q-5.** Do you feel you receive adequate news and information on the Covid-19 and actions taken to respond to it?
- Q-6.** Thinking now about the government response to Covid-19, to what extent do you feel the government has: (a) Provided timely information about Covid-19. (b) Provided accurate information about Covid-19. (c) Provided support to you and your family during the pandemic.
- Q-7.** Since December 2019, have you or any member of your household experienced any of the following symptoms: 1. Fever. 2. Shortness of Breath Or Difficulty Breathing. 3. Tiredness. 4. Dry Cough. 5. Nasal congestion. 6. Sore throat. 7. Other. Q-7 B) If yes, how many people in your household contracted the symptoms? Q-7 C) Approximately when did they most recently get it? Q-7 D) Did you or the household member visit the doctor? Q-7 E) (If yes at Q-7D) Was your usual doctor or other health-care professional aware of the signs and testing of Covid-19?
- Q-8.** Has anyone in your household received a confirmed diagnosis of Covid-19?
- Q-9A.** Would you associate with someone in your community whom you knew had previously had Covid-19 but now is healthy?
- Q-10.** How concerned are you about the lasting impact of coronavirus outbreak on your personal health?
- Q-11.** How concerned are you about the lasting impact of Covid-19 on your lifestyle (i.e. your daily routine and ability to work and socialize with others)?
- Q-12.** If a vaccine for Covid-19 was made available to you, would you get it?
- Q-13.** (Ask if no in Q-12) Why would you not take the vaccine?

During W3 respondents were again asked a number of questions regarding their concern about conducting certain activities in a Covid-19 environment. Overall, the findings highlight decreasing concern from Afghans regarding Covid-19.

In W3, less than half of Afghans report being either very worried (35.3%) or worried (12.8%) about going to work. This represents a significant decrease on the almost two thirds who responded to the same question in W2 (45.8% and 19.2% respectively). By some distance, females (43.1%) are more likely to report being very worried about going to work, when compared with males (27.8%). The figure for females is however, an 11 percentage point decrease from findings in W2 (54.1%).


## WITH SOME GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS LIFTING, ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT: GOING TO WORK, BY GENDER & WAVE



**Fig. 5.1: Q-1.** With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: (a) Going to work. (Percent who say very worried.)

Regionally, the findings are broadly similar to the national averages, however, just over a fifth of those in the South West (22.3%) report being very worried about going to work, while this is over two fifths in the West (43.2%) and North East (41.9%).


## WITH SOME GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS LIFTING, ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT: GOING TO WORK, BY REGION



**Fig. 5.2: Q-1.** With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: (a) Going to work. (Percent who say very worried.)

Utilizing the same question but for engaging in community activities, just under a fifth (19.0%) reported that they are not worried at all, which represents an increase on the 14.9% from W2 but a decrease on findings from W1 (22.0%). Over half of males report not being worried at all (25.3%) or somewhat worried (25.8%), while this is less than half for females (12.3% and 33.5% respectively).

### WITH SOME GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS LIFTING, ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT: ENGAGING IN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES, BY GENDER & WAVE



**Fig. 5.3: Q-1.** *With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: b) Engaging in community activities. (Percent who say very worried.)*

By region, differences emerge. Less than 10 percent of respondents in the West (9.9%) and Central/Highlands (8.8%) report being not worried at all about engaging in community activities, while this is over a quarter for those in the South West (26.2%).

When asked their level of worry about attending funerals and religious functions, less than two fifths (38.5%) say they are very worried, while almost half report being not worried at all (20.4%) or somewhat worried (28.4%).


## WITH SOME GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS LIFTING, ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT: ATTENDING FUNERALS AND RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONS, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
NOT WORRIED AT ALL	23	16	20
SOMEWHAT WORRIED	18	20	28
WORRIED	17	18	13
VERY WORRIED	42	46	38

**Fig. 5.4: Q-1.** With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: (c) Attending funerals and religious functions. (Percent who say very worried.)

A 10 percentage point decrease is observed in those stating they are very worried about attending school, with two fifths (39.8%) reporting this compared with over half during W2 (50.6%). A third of respondents in the South West (33.3%) report being not worried at all about attending school, while this is significantly lower in the West (15.8%) and North East (16.0%).


## WITH SOME GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS LIFTING, ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT: ATTENDING SCHOOL, BY GENDER & WAVE



**Fig. 5.5: Q-1.** With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: (d) Attending school. (Percent who say very worried.)

When asked about concern over visiting a health-care facility, just over two fifths (43.6%) report being very worried, representing a six percentage point decrease when compared with W2 (50.0%). Over half of respondents in the West (54.3%) and Central/Highlands (52.3%) report being very worried about attending a health care facility, while this is just a third in the South West (33.1%). Over half of females (52.6%) report being very worried, while this is 35.1% for males. Over half of respondents report being very worried (38.4%) or worried (13.4%) about travelling outside of their local area to visit family, access health-care, purchase goods, etc., in a Covid-19 environment. This represents a noticeable decrease on findings from W2, where it was 45.3% and 18.9% respectively.

### WITH SOME GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS LIFTING, ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT: TRAVELLING OUTSIDE OF LOCAL AREA, BY REGION



**Fig. 5.6: Q-1.** *With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: f) travelling outside of your local area to visit family, access to health-care, purchase goods, etc? (Percent who say very worried.)*

Of all the precautionary measures available to protect from Covid-19, frequent handwashing (93.7%) remains the most cited answer, although this is a minor decrease on the percentage utilizing this when compared with W2 (95.4%). Other top cited answers include the use of soaps and other detergents for cleaning surfaces (86.5%) use of facemasks (83.2%), social distancing (79.3%) and hand sanitizer (74.3%). The use of other protective equipment, for example, gowns and face shields, is lowest by some distance with just 30.1% saying they utilize these items to protect themselves.


## USE OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, BY WAVE

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
FACEMASK	83	84	83
GLOVES	66	62	57
HAND SANITIZER	77	76	74
FREQUENT HANDWASHING	94	95	94
SOAP AND OTHER DETERGENTS FOR CLEANING SURFACES	86	86	87
SOCIAL DISTANCING	82	82	79
SELF-ISOLATION	63	65	60
OTHER PERSONAL PROTECTION (GOWNS, FACE SHIELDS, ETC.)	27	26	30
OTHER	6	8	5

**Fig. 5.7: Q-2.** Which of the following precautionary measures are you using to protect yourself from the virus? (a) Facemask. (b) Gloves. (c) Hand Sanitizer. (d) Frequent handwashing. (e) Soap and other detergents for cleaning surfaces. (f) Social distancing. (g) Self-isolation. (h) Other personal protection equipment (gowns, face shield, etc.). (Percent who say yes.)

Females are more likely than males to report utilization of these measures in all cases except for the use of other protective equipment, for example, gowns and face shields, where males (30.9%) are marginally more likely than females (29.3%) to report using them.

## USE OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, BY GENDER



**Fig. 5.8: Q-2.** Which of the following precautionary measures are you using to protect yourself from the virus? (a) Facemask. (b) Gloves. (c) Hand Sanitizer. (d) Frequent handwashing. (e) Soap and other detergents for cleaning surfaces. (f) Social distancing. (g) Self-isolation. (h) Other personal protection equipment (gowns, face shield, etc.). (Percent who say yes.)



Access to accurate public health information remains critical when fighting a pandemic – it assists in guiding public response, in keeping people informed of trends, and disseminating public health measures and precautions. 85.5% of Afghans report that they received adequate news and information on Covid-19 and the actions they needed to take to respond to it. This figure represents a minor increase on the findings from W1 (84.5%) and W2 (84.6%).


When asked about the extent to which the government provided timely information about Covid-19, a decrease is noted when comparing all three waves of the *Survey*. In W1, 34.2% said that to a great extent the government provided timely information. During W2, this decreased to 30.6%, and in W3, this decreased again, to 28.8%. A similar trend is observed among respondents who were asked to what extent the government provided accurate information about Covid-19. During W1, this was 36.5%. In W2, this decreased five percentage points to 31.3%, and this has decreased again in W3 (30.5%). Respondents in the East appear happiest with the levels of information provided during the pandemic, with over 75% stating that to a great extent or moderate extent the government provided both timely and accurate information.

When asked to what extent the government had provided support to you and your family during the pandemic, 70.4% of respondents said not at all. This figure represents a minor decrease on findings from W1 (74.2%) and W2 (74.6%). Respondents in the East (13.2%) were most likely to report that to a great extent the government provided support to them and their family during the pandemic, while this was less than five percent in the West (4.4%) and North East (4.5%).

When asked which source(s) of news and information they used to stay informed about Covid-19, family and friends (85.0%) remains the most cited answer. Television (77.0%) remains the second most cited answer among Afghans. 52.3% report the radio. An increase is noted across all three waves in the percentage of Afghans citing the newspaper as a source of information for Covid-19 with 29.8% citing this in W1, 33.3% in W2, and 36.4% in W3. A similar trend is also observed across the three waves when utilizing doctor or health-care professional as a source of information (W1, 68.2%; W2, 70.6%; W3, 72.0%). With ever increasing access to the internet and social media, it is no surprise to see that the percentage of Afghans citing social media as a source of Covid-19 information has also increased across the three waves (W1, 58.9%; W2, 61.9%; W3, 63.7%).

Males are more likely to report utilizing radio, newspaper, doctor/health-care professional, and social media, while females are more likely to report utilization of television. The percentage of males and females reporting family and friends is exactly the same, at 85.0%.

## SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION REGARDING COVID-19, BY GENDER




**Fig. 5.9: Q-3.** Which of the following sources of news and information do you use to stay informed about Covid-19? (a) Radio: which station(s)? (b) Television: which station(s)? (c) Newspaper. (d) Family and friends. (e) Doctor or other health professional. (f) Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) (g) Other. (Percent who say yes.)

By region, interesting variations are observed. For example, almost three quarters of respondents in the East (73.2%) report radio as a source of information, while this is significantly lower in the Central/Highlands where just 36.1% say this. Less than half of respondents in the Central/Highlands (48.0%) and West (48.3%) report use of social media as an information source, while this is almost three quarters in the South East (72.2%) and 70.4% in the North West.

Reflective of a correlation between age and use of social media 71.4% of those aged 18-25% cite social media as a source of Covid-19 information, while this is less than half (43.9%) in those aged 55+.

## USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AS SOURCE OF COVID-19 INFORMATION, BY AGE




**Fig. 5.10: Q-3.** Which of the following sources of news and information do you use to stay informed about Covid-19? (f) Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc). (Percent who say yes.)

Azadi radio (32.4%) remains the most cited answer when respondents were asked which radio stations they primarily used to stay informed about Covid-19. Arman radio (26.2%) is the second most cited station. Males are most likely to cite Azadi radio (41.8%), while females are most likely to cite Arman radio (35.4%). Tolo TV (75.5%) remains the most cited TV station.

Afghans were again asked a range of questions regarding whether they or someone in their household had experienced symptoms of Covid-19 since December 2019. The most cited answer remained fever, with over half of respondents (51.8%) saying that they or someone in their household had experienced this symptom. Sore throat (51.5%) was the second most cited symptom. The least cited symptom was shortness of breath (32.8%).

## COVID-19 RELATED SYMPTOMS EXPERIENCED, BY WAVE




**Fig. 5.11: Q-7.** *Since December 2019, have you or any member of your household experienced any of the following symptoms: 1. Fever. 2. Shortness of Breath Or Difficulty Breathing. 3. Tiredness. 4. Dry Cough. 5. Nasal congestion. 6. Sore throat. 7. Other. (Percent who say yes.)*

Despite Covid-19 being an ongoing global pandemic, over 50 percent of respondents said that any symptoms had been over three months ago. In all cases where a symptom was observed, the majority said that they had visited a doctor and that the doctor was aware of the symptom.

At the national level, 21.9% of respondents say that some in their household had received a confirmed diagnosis of Covid-19, which is generally commensurate with the percentage of confirmed cases vs samples tested in official government figures at the time of writing. Perhaps reflective of levels of access to Covid-19 testing facilities, those most likely to report that someone in their household had received a confirmed Covid-19 diagnosis was highest in the West (28.1%) and North East (27.0%), while this is lowest in the South West (16.4%) and North West (16.8%).


## CONFIRMED COVID-19 DIAGNOSIS, BY REGION & WAVE



**Fig. 5.12: Q-8.** Has anyone in your household received a confirmed diagnosis of Covid-19? (Percent who say yes.)

When asked whether they would associate with someone in their community whom they knew had previously had Covid-19 findings are exactly the same across all three waves of the *Survey*, where in all cases, a slight majority (W1 50.4% and W2, W3 50.5%) report that they would not associate.


## ASSOCIATING WITH SOMEONE WHO HAD COVID-19 BUT IS NOW HEALTHY, BY GENDER & REGION



**Fig. 5.13: Q-9A.** Would you associate with someone in your community whom you knew had previously had Covid-19 but now is healthy? (Percent who say yes.)

Less than half of Afghans report being very concerned (48.9%) about the lasting impact of the coronavirus outbreak on their personal health. Two fifths report being either not concerned (17.7%) or somewhat concerned (22.6%). By gender, females (55.7%) are significantly more likely to be very concerned about the lasting impact, when compared against males (42.4%). Over a quarter of respondents in the South West (27.2%) report not being concerned at all.

### CONCERN WITH LASTING IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON PERSONAL HEALTH, BY GENDER & WAVE




**Fig. 5.14: Q-10.** How concerned are you about the lasting impact of coronavirus outbreak on your personal health? (Percent who say very concerned.)

Over half of Afghans (52.9%) say they are very concerned about the lasting impact of Covid-19 on their lifestyle. This represents a noticeable decrease on the three fifths (60.2%) who responded to the same question in W2 and is marginally lower than the 53.6% who responded in W1. Females (57.7%) are more likely than males (48.3%) to be very concerned. Less than half of respondents in the North West (49.9%) and South West (46.5%) say they are very concerned. Over a fifth of those in the South West (22.3%) report not being concerned at all.

At the national level, 94.3% of those surveyed said that if a vaccine for Covid-19 was made available to them they would get it. There is no difference by gender (male, 94.1% / female (94.5%). Regionally, the findings are in line with the national trend, although respondents in Central/Kabul (90.5%) report the lowest intended uptake of any vaccine, while this is highest in Central/Highlands (99.6%). There would appear to be some correlation – although minor – between level of education and uptake of any vaccine. While there is not much deviation from the national findings, those with no formal education (97.2%) are most likely to say they would get the vaccine, while those with over 12 years education are least likely (92.8%).

## IF A VACCINE FOR COVID-19 WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU, WOULD YOU GET IT? BY GENDER & REGION



**Fig. 5.15: Q-12.** *If a vaccine for Covid-19 was made available to you, would you get it? (Percent who say yes.)*

Of those respondents who said they would not take the vaccine the most given answer was concerns about side effects (41.8%), while the second most given answer was do not need it / will not get Covid (22.2). Females (45.2%) are more likely to report being concerned about side effects, while for males this is 38.7%. Females are also most likely to not take the vaccine due to concerns over vaccine effectiveness (10.2%), because the vaccine is considered haram/against Islam (11.0%), and because the vaccine is not useful (7.1%).

### REASONS FOR NOT TAKING THE COVID-19 VACCINE, BY GENDER

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
CONCERNS ABOUT SIDE EFFECTS	39	45	42
CONCERNS ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS / DO NOT THINK IT WILL WORK	4	10	7
CONCERNS ABOUT COST/CANNOT AFFORD	3	0	1
THE VACCINE HAS A MICROCHIP/IS USED FOR TRACKING	0	5	2
THE VACCINE IS USED FOR MIND CONTROL	3	0	2
VACCINES CAUSE INFERTILITY	0	2	1
VACCINE IS HARAM/ AGAINST ISLAM	3	11	7
IT IS AGAINST OUR CULTURE	2	0	1

I DON'T NEED IT / WILL NOT GET COVID	28	16	22
BECAUSE I AM FINE NOW	6	0	3
DON'T TRUST VACCINE	2	1	2
I DON'T NEED IT	4	1	3
I AM NOT AFRAID OF COVID-19	2	0	1
BECAUSE THE VACCINE IS NOT USEFUL	1	7	4
BECAUSE I AM PREGNANT	0	1	1
DON'T KNOW	2	0	1

**Fig. 5.16: Q-13.** (Ask if no in Q-12) Why would you not take the vaccine if it were available?

Indicative that perhaps more public awareness is needed with regard to the vaccine itself, when considered by region, significant variations occur among those who would not take the vaccine. For example, four fifths of respondents in the Central/Highlands (80.8%) say they would not take the vaccine due to concerns about side effects, while this is just 6.7% in the South West. Almost a fifth of respondents in the Central/Highlands (19.2%) say they would not take the vaccine because the vaccine has a microchip/ is used for tracking. Over 11% percent of those in the South East who said they would not take the vaccine said it was because the vaccine is used for mind control (11.7%). Almost a fifth of those who would not take it in the North West (19.2%) say because the vaccine is considered haram/ against Islam. And over 11% percent of those in the South East (11.7%) say they would not take it because it is against their culture.

### REASONS FOR NOT TAKING THE COVID-19 VACCINE, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST	TOTAL
CONCERNS ABOUT SIDE EFFECTS	51	50	38	7	28	50	81	41	42
I DON'T NEED IT/ WILL NOT GET COVID	14	27	38	31	24	32	0	21	22
CONCERNS ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS/ DO NOT THINK IT WILL WORK	12	23	0	2	2	9	0	0	7
VACCINE IS HARAM/ AGAINST ISLAM	8	0	0	2	0	0	0	19	7



BECAUSE THE VACCINE IS NOT USEFUL	4	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	4
BECAUSE I AM FINE NOW	0	0	0	29	2	1	0	4	3
I DON'T NEED IT	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	3	3
THE VACCINE HAS A MICROCHIP/ IS USED FOR TRACKING	0	0	0	0	19	0	19	0	2
THE VACCINE IS USED FOR MIND CONTROL	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	4	2
DON'T TRUST VACCINE	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
CONCERNS ABOUT COST/ CANNOT AFFORD	1	0	0	0	2	7	0	0	1
DON'T KNOW	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
IT IS AGAINST OUR CULTURE	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	1
VACCINES CAUSE INFERTILITY	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
I AM NOT AFRAID OF COVID-19	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	4	1
BECAUSE I AM PREGNANT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1

Fig. 5.17: Q-13. (Ask if no in Q-12) Why would you not take the vaccine if it were available?

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Covid-19 in Afghanistan (8): The political economy repercussions of Covid-19 and the aid response: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/covid-19-in-afghanistan-8-the-political-economy-repercussions-of-covid-19-and-the-aid-response>
- 2 M&E - Health Information System General Directorate. National Diseases Surveillance and Response: <https://moph-dw.gov.af/dhis-web-dashboard>
- 3 Afghanistan's unseen Covid crisis: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/afghanistan-s-unseen-covid-crisis>
- 4 Afghanistan's unseen Covid crisis: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/afghanistan-s-unseen-covid-crisis>
- 5 Afghanistan gets first Covid-19 vaccine shipment from India: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/8/afghanistan-gets-first-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine-from-india>
- 6 Afghanistan Kicks Off Covid-19 Vaccination Campaign Amid Rising Violence: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/covid-vaccine-afghanistan-health-care-violence/31117388.html>



## 6 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

A well-documented effect in social science, social desirability, occurs when respondents answer questions in a manner where it will be viewed favorably by others. To minimize this effect, the *Survey* sought out a number of experiments on key topics, including peace, security, and support for key actors. Experimental methods can be used to solicit truthful responses to sensitive questions.

Two types of survey experiments were conducted: 1) A conjoint experiment explored the contours of the peace deal, 2) An endorsement experiment to learn implicit attitudes about key actors. The value of implicit versus explicit experiments can measure true support towards a policy option or actor.

All responses are randomized so the version respondents received in Wave 1 (W1) has no bearing on the version received in Wave 2 (W2) or Wave 3 (W3). The following section shares findings of three experiments conducted during W1 and W3 only.

### 1 CONJOINT EXPERIMENT: WHICH ASPECTS OF A PEACE DEAL ARE SUPPORTED BY CIVILIANS

A conjoint experiment is useful in determining what combination of a limited number of attributes is most influential on respondents' preferences. In this experiment, a conjoint experiment is used to determine participants' support for various aspects of a peace deal. The following question (Q-27) is preceded by a paragraph that includes four different policy dimensions of a potential peace deal. Each respondent received a different arrangement of each of the two policy options (randomly), and then answered a question about support for the peace deal.

Within each of the four brackets below are two options that were independently randomized. Thus, there are 16 total configurations of the prompts that a respondent may have received.

#### KEY QUESTION

*"Currently the government of Afghanistan is talking about a peace process with the Taliban. There are various goals being discussed for this peace process. For example, the new government after the peace process may [allow / not allow] the Taliban to have majority influence over the government. Also, the new government may [reduce/ increase] the public role of women in society. It may [include / not include] a requirement that Islamic law is higher than secular law. Lastly, the new government may [ask you to democratically elect your leaders / be an Islamic Emirate]."*

**Q-27.** Would you support a peace deal with these conditions? 1) Yes 2) No

## SUPPORT FOR A PEACE DEAL UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS

VARIABLE		WOULD SUPPORT A PEACE DEAL	WOULD NOT SUPPORT A PEACE DEAL	CO-EFFICIENT	OR	P-VALUE
<b>CONDITION 1:</b> <b>TALIBAN TO HAVE MAJORITY INFLUENCE</b>	ALLOW (1)	67.1 (63.6, 70.4)	32.9 (29.6, 36.4)	.087, 95% CI (-.044, .219)	1.091, 95% CI (.956, 1.245)	0.195
	NOT ALLOW (0)	65.2 (61.5, 68.6)	34.8 (31.4, 38.5)			
<b>CONDITION 2:</b> <b>ROLE OF WOMEN</b>	REDUCE (1)	57.4 (53.7, 61.0)	42.6 (39.0, 46.3)	-.788, 95% CI (-.925, -.650)	.454, 95% CI (.396, .521)	0.000
	INCREASE (0)	74.8 (71.6, 77.7)	25.2 (22.3, 28.4)			
<b>CONDITION 3:</b> <b>REQUIREMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW HIGHER THAN SECULAR LAW</b>	INCLUDE (1)	70.0 (66.6, 73.2)	30.0 (26.8, 33.4)	.338, 95% CI (.204, .472)	1.402, 95% CI (1.227, 1.603)	0.000
	EXCLUDE (0)	62.5 (58.8, 66.0)	37.5 (34.0, 41.2)			
<b>CONDITION 4:</b> <b>DEMOCRATICALLY ELECT LEADERS OR BE AN ISLAMIC EMIRATE</b>	DEMOCRACY (1)	69.7 (66.1, 73.1)	30.3 (26.9, 33.9)	.317, 95% CI (.184, .450)	1.373, 95% CI (1.202, 1.569)	0.000
	ISLAMIC EMIRATE (0)	62.7 (59.1, 66.0)	37.4 (34.0, 40.9)			

**Fig.6.1: Q-27.** *Would you support a peace deal with these conditions? (1) Yes. (2) No.*

Condition 1: Similar to Wave 1, whether or not the Taliban have majority influence does not seem to impact whether Afghans would support a peace deal; 67.1% responded to supporting the peace deal under Taliban majority influence (slightly higher than 65.8% in W1), whereas 65.2% supported the peace deal otherwise (compared to 64.4% in W1). Compared to when the government did not allow the Taliban to have majority influence after the peace process the condition of allowing Taliban majority influence slightly increased the odds of supporting peace by 1.09 times (95% CI for OR, 0.956-1.245) though the change is not statistically significant.

Thus, similar to findings from W1, the Taliban having a majority influence within the new government does not affect support for a peace deal.

Condition 2: As found in W1, the role of women continues to impact whether Afghans would support a peace deal; 74.8% supported the peace deal if women's role was to increase in the public space, whereas 57.4% supported the peace deal if women's role reduced. Compared to when the government increased the public role of women in society, the condition of reducing the women's role reduces the odds of supporting peace by 55% (95% CI for OR, 0.396 - 0.521).

In summary, similar to Wave 1, respondents are more likely to support a peace deal if women have an increased public role in society.

Condition 3: The requirement that Islamic law is higher than secular law continues to impact whether Afghans would support a peace deal; 70.0% supported the peace deal if Islamic law is higher than secular law (an increase from 67.9% in Wave 1), whereas 62.47% supported the peace deal otherwise (consistent with the 62.48% in Wave 1). Compared to when the government did not include a requirement that Islamic law is higher than secular law, the condition of superseding Islamic law relative to secular law increased the odds of supporting peace by 1.4 times (95% CI for OR, 1.227-1.603).

Thus, respondents are more likely to support a peace deal if Islamic law is deemed higher than secular law. The support for a peace deal preferring Islamic law over secular law has slightly increased from 67.9% in W1 to 70.0% in W3.

Condition 4: In W3, the condition of democratically electing leaders continues to impact whether Afghans would support a peace deal; 69.7% supported the peace deal if leaders are elected democratically (consistent with 68.1% in W1), whereas 62.7% supported the peace deal if Afghanistan was an Islamic Emirate (marginally higher than 61.8% in W1). Compared to Afghanistan being an Islamic Emirate, the condition of democratically electing leaders increased the odds of supporting peace by 1.37 times (95% CI for OR, 1.202-1.569), a marginally higher impact than the 1.32 in W1.

Thus, in W3 respondents continue to be more likely to support a peace deal if leaders are democratically elected, rather than to be part of an Islamic Emirate.

### SUPPORT FOR PEACE DEAL UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS, BY WAVE

VARIABLE	CONDITION	WAVE 1	WAVE 3
<b>CONDITION 1: TALIBAN TO HAVE MAJORITY INFLUENCE</b>	ALLOW (1)	65.8	67.1
	NOT ALLOW (0)	64.4	65.2
<b>CONDITION 2: ROLE OF WOMEN</b>	REDUCE (1)	56.6	57.4
	INCREASE (0)	73.9	74.8
<b>CONDITION 3: REQUIREMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW HIGHER THAN SECULAR LAW</b>	INCLUDE (1)	67.9	70.0
	EXCLUDE (0)	62.4	62.5
<b>CONDITION 4: DEMOCRATICALLY ELECT LEADERS OR BE AN ISLAMIC EMIRATE</b>	DEMOCRACY (1)	68.1	69.7
	ISLAMIC EMIRATE (0)	61.8	62.7

Fig. 6.2: Q-27. Would you support a peace deal with these conditions? (Percent who say yes.)

## 2 ENDORSEMENT EXPERIMENT: TRUE SUPPORT FOR TALIBAN OR GOVERNMENT

In the endorsement experiment, respondents are asked to express their opinion toward a policy endorsed by a specific actor (the Taliban or Afghan government) whose support is to be measured. This method protects an individual's affect toward the actor, a positive response could reflect support for either the policy or the actor. Responses for these two actors are compared with a 'control' group that answered the same question however without any actors endorsed. A similar proportion of respondents are asked the same question without the endorsement (Taliban or Afghan government) to separate affect toward the actor from the policy preferences. Higher levels of support for a policy with an actor (the Taliban or Afghan government) is evidence of support for the actor.

In other words, each respondent randomly received one of three options for each of the two questions below (Q-28 and Q-29). These were randomized independently – that is, the version respondents received for Q-28 had no bearing on what version they received in Q-29.

For more information on the endorsement experiment, please refer to Lyall, J., Blair, G., & Imai, K. (2013) Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan. *American Political Science Review*, 107(4), 679-705.

### KEY QUESTIONS:

- Q-28.** A recent proposal [insert either a) blank, b) by the Taliban, or c) by the government] calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?
- Q-29.** It has been proposed [insert either a) blank, b) by the Taliban, or c) by the government] to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government as well as its responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. It would also permit local people to actively participate in local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacy for office in these district councils. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?

In the first experiment, Afghans were asked about a hypothetical proposal related to sweeping reforms of the prison system: “A recent proposal **[insert either a) blank, b) by the Taliban, or c) by the government]** calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained.

Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?”

Findings between W1 and W3 reveal some differences. In W3, 80.5% of Afghans support the proposal if endorsed by the government, an increase from the 74.2% measured in W1. Support for the proposal if endorsed by the Taliban remains the same between W1 and W3, 64.4% compared to 64.2% respectively. The placebo effect is marginally higher, at 78.9% in W3, compared to 76.2% in W1.

### SUPPORT FOR SWEEPING REFORM OF THE AFGHAN PRISON SYSTEM

	AGREE	DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW/ REFUSED
<b>PLACEBO/CONTROL</b>	78.9	16.4	4.7
<b>BY THE TALIBAN</b>	64.2	30.4	5.4
<b>BY THE GOVERNMENT</b>	80.5	17.5	2.1
<b>TALIBAN - CONTROL</b>	-14.7	+14.1	+0.6
<b>GOVERNMENT - CONTROL</b>	+1.6	+1.1	-2.7
<b>TALIBAN - GOVERNMENT</b>	-16.3	+13.0	+3.3

Fig. 6.3: Q-28.

A similar statement was presented to participants in the second experimental question: “It has been proposed to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government as well as its responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. It would also permit local people to actively participate in local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacy for office in these district councils.”

When participants were informed that the Taliban have made the proposal, they were less likely to say they agree (78.6%), compared to when neither group was named in the placebo (86.1%). But when the government was indicated to have made the proposal, the level of support increased (88.2%).

### SUPPORT FOR CHANGES TO DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS

	AGREE	DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW/ REFUSED
<b>PLACEBO/CONTROL</b>	86.1	10.1	3.8
<b>BY THE TALIBAN</b>	78.6	16.5	4.9
<b>BY THE GOVERNMENT</b>	88.2	9.4	2.4
<b>TALIBAN - CONTROL</b>	-7.6	+6.5	+1.1
<b>GOVERNMENT - CONTROL</b>	+2.1	-0.7	-1.5
<b>TALIBAN - GOVERNMENT</b>	-9.7	+7.1	+2.6



**Fig. 6.4: Q-29.**

Findings between W1 and W3 are consistent; in W1, 79.6% of respondents support the initiative if endorsed by the Taliban, 83.5% if placebo, and 87.3% if endorsed by the government.

### 3 SURVEY EXPERIMENT ON PERCEIVED SERVICE PROVISION BY TALIBAN

In this *Survey* experiment, each of the following questions (Q-30 and Q-33) were randomly assigned one of the two options below presented to respondents.

#### KEY QUESTIONS

**Q-30.** *Security (Participant randomly assigned A or B)*

- A. *Some Afghans have reported that they recently have witnessed an increase in issues related to security. Have people in your village received assistance related to peace and security from the government or Taliban?*
- B. *Some Afghans have reported that they recently have witnessed an increase in issues related to security, but that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve this issue. Have people in your village received assistance related to peace and security from the government or Taliban?*
  - 1. *Yes, from the government*
  - 2. *Yes, from the Taliban*
  - 3. *Yes, from both*
  - 4. *No, from neither*

**Q-31.** *Justice (Participant randomly assigned A or B)*

- A. *Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to the speed and fairness of justice. Have you heard about this happening in your area? 1) Yes 2) No*
- B. *Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to the speed and fairness of justice, but that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve this issue. Have you heard about this happening in your area? 1) Yes 2) No*

**Q-32.** *Healthcare (Participant randomly assigned A or B)*

- A. *Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to emergency healthcare. Have people in your village received assistance related to emergency healthcare from the government, Taliban or international development actors? (Multiple Response)*

- B. *Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to emergency healthcare, but that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve this issue. Have people in your village received assistance related to emergency healthcare from the government, Taliban or international development actors? (Multiple Response)*

**Q-33.** *Aid gatekeeping (Participant randomly assigned A or B)*

- A. *Some Afghans have reported that they have benefited from development projects. Have people in your village benefitted from infrastructure projects facilitated by the government, Taliban, or international development actors? (Multiple Response)*
- B. *Some Afghans have reported that they have benefited from development projects, and the Taliban allowed the project to occur. Have people in your village benefited from development projects facilitated by the government, Taliban, or international development actors? (Multiple Response)*
- 1. Yes, from the government*
  - 2. Yes, from the Taliban*
  - 3. Yes, from international development actors*
  - 4. No, from none of these sources*

Respondents were presented the scenario of some Afghans having witnessed an increase in issues related to security. In one scenario respondents were informed the Taliban had made efforts to resolve the issue, and in the other scenario the Taliban efforts were not mentioned. Respondents were then asked whether people in their village received assistance related to peace and security from the government or the Taliban.

On the whole, findings between W1 and W3 are consistent.

When informed that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve the issue (compared to placebo [control] or no efforts identified), there is a small increase of 3.2 percentage points of Afghans who reported receiving assistance from government. This is lower than the 5.2 percentage point difference in W1. There is a 1.1 percentage point decrease among those who reported assistance from Taliban, and 1.2 percentage point increase among those who reported assistance from both.

## ASSISTANCE RELATED TO PEACE AND SECURITY

	YES, FROM GOVERNMENT	YES, FROM THE TALIBAN	YES, FROM BOTH	NO, FROM NEITHER	REFUSED/ DON'T KNOW
<b>CONTROL</b>	18.9	2.5	0.6	77.2	0.9
<b>TALIBAN HAVE MADE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE</b>	22.1	1.4	1.8	72.4	2.3
<b>TALIBAN - CONTROL</b>	+3.2	-1.1	+1.2	-4.7	+1.5

Fig.6.5: Q-30.

In the second experiment on service provision, respondents were presented the scenario of some Afghans having issues related to the speed and fairness of justice, and were asked whether they have heard of this happening. When informed that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve the issue (compared to when no efforts were identified in the placebo/control), 12.4% fewer Afghans reported having heard of this happening. This 12.4% difference is marginally lower than the 10% difference in W1.

## ASSISTANCE RELATED TO SPEED AND FAIRNESS OF JUSTICE

	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW/ REFUSED
<b>CONTROL</b>	30.6	67.4	2.0
<b>TALIBAN HAVE MADE SOME EFFORT TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE</b>	18.1	80.3	1.6
<b>TALIBAN - CONTROL</b>	-12.4	+12.9	-0.4

Fig. 6.6: Q-31

In the next *Survey* experiment, respondents were presented the scenario of some Afghans having issues related to emergency health care and were asked whether their village received assistance related to emergency health care from the government, the Taliban or international development actors.

Less than a fifth, 17.6%, report receiving assistance from government (an increase from 14.9% in W1), 0.8% from the Taliban (a decrease from 1.3% in W1) and 5.1% from international partners (a marginal increase from 4.6% in W1). When informed that Taliban have made some efforts to resolve the issue, there were minor differences in the percentage of Afghans who reported received assistance from the government (19.1%), Taliban (1.0%) and international development partners (5.6%).

The 5.6% who said they have received assistance from international development partners is a marginal increase from 3.8% in W1.

## RECEIPT OF EMERGENCY HEALTH CARE

	YES	NO
<b>YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT</b>		
CONTROL	17.6	82.4
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	19.1	80.9
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+1.5	-1.5
<b>YES, FROM THE TALIBAN</b>		
CONTROL	0.8	99.2
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	1.0	99.0
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+0.2	-0.2
<b>YES, FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS</b>		
CONTROL	5.1	94.9
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	5.6	94.4
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+0.5	-0.5
<b>NO, FROM NONE OF THESE SOURCES</b>		
CONTROL	77.5	22.5
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	74.5	25.5
TALIBAN - CONTROL	-3.0	+3.0
<b>YES, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE (VOL.)</b>		
CONTROL	0.3	99.7
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	0.0	100.0
TALIBAN - CONTROL	-0.3	+0.3
<b>REFUSED</b>		
CONTROL	0.03	99.9
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	0.00	100.0
TALIBAN - CONTROL	-0.03	+0.3
<b>DON'T KNOW</b>		
CONTROL	1.1	98.9
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	2.1	97.9
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+1.0	-1.0

**Fig. 6.7: Q:32**

In the final experiment on service provision, respondents were presented the scenario of some Afghans reporting benefit from development projects and were asked whether their village benefited from development projects facilitated by the government, the Taliban, or international development actors.

Findings between W1 and W3 vary. In W3, a larger proportion, 31.3% reported benefiting from development projects from government, an increase from 25.9% in W1. Consistent with the two

waves, in W3 1.2% reported benefiting from the Taliban, consistent with 0.9% in W1. And 9.3% from international partners, consistent with 10.0% in W1.

When informed that the Taliban allowed the project to occur, there was a decrease in the percentage of Afghans who reported benefiting from government (27.8%, compared to 31.3% who said government). Differences among those who reported benefiting from the Taliban (1.9%) and international partners (9.9%) are negligible at +0.7% each.

## AID GATEKEEPING & AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

	YES	NO
<b>YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT</b>		
CONTROL	31.3	68.7
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	27.8	72.2
TALIBAN - CONTROL	-3.5	+3.5
<b>YES, FROM THE TALIBAN</b>		
CONTROL	1.2	98.8
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	1.9	98.1
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+0.7	-0.7
<b>YES, FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS</b>		
CONTROL	9.3	90.7
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	9.9	90.1
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+0.7	-0.7
<b>NO, FROM NONE OF THESE SOURCES</b>		
CONTROL	59.0	41.0
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	60.8	39.2
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+1.8	-1.8
<b>YES, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE (VOL.)</b>		
CONTROL	0.6	99.4
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	0.7	99.3
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+0.1	-0.1
<b>REFUSED</b>		
CONTROL	0.00	100.00
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	0.01	99.99
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+0.01	-0.01
<b>DON'T KNOW</b>		
CONTROL	1.7	98.3
TALIBAN ALLOWED PROJECT	2.9	97.1
TALIBAN - CONTROL	+1.3	-1.3

Fig. 6.8: Q-33.

Q2. COVIDProtect

در حالت امتحانی معلومات ارائه شده ثبت نمیشود

قبل

بعد

یوسپین دسجس

بلی

استفاده از مواد ضد عفونی دستان

نخیر

شستن مکرر دستان

بلی

استفاده از صابون و یا مواد ضد میکروب برای شستن سطوح

بلی

فاصله اجتماعی

بلی

قرنطین شخصی

بلی

استفاده از لوازم محافظتی دیگر (مانند: چین طیب، شیشه محافظتی روی)


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## 7 PANEL ANALYSIS: WAVE 1, WAVE 2 & WAVE 3

This section looks only at the 1437n respondents who participated in all three waves of the *Survey*. While a number of statistical approaches are available for the analysis of panel data, the analysis below is limited to descriptive analysis.



Further, in the proceeding analysis, three separate weights for each respective wave are used.<sup>1</sup> Where necessary, responses are dichotomized for ease of analysis and interpretation.<sup>2</sup>

### PEACE

The *Survey* asks respondents whether or not peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years. In Wave 1 (W1), 58.8% of respondents said peace is achievable. By Wave 2 (W2), this dropped to 47.9%, and increased slightly to 48.8% in Wave 3 (W3). This represents a 10 percentage point decrease when comparing W1 and W3.

In W1, the most common reason why peace is not achievable was because of interference by other countries (17.7%). By W2, the most common reason given was that violence and fighting were ongoing (20.9%), and this continues to be the most common reason why peace is not achievable, albeit at an increased percentage, 25.9% in W3. Increased violence across Afghanistan since the initiation of intra-Afghan negotiations may go some way to explaining this switch.

## REASONS WHY PEACE IS NOT ACHIEVABLE, BY WAVE




Fig. 7.1: Q-23. Why do you think peace is not achievable in the next two years?


There is also a steady increase in the number of respondents who say peace is unachievable because the government and Taliban are too far apart (from 16.2% in W1 to 20.9% in W3). A lack of tangible progress in intra-Afghan negotiations may explain this rise.

Interestingly, in W1 the percentage of respondents who claim American interference was 13.7%, and in W3 this has dropped significantly to just half (6.9%). This may be reflective of increased signs of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan as a result of the Agreement signed with the Taliban.

Afghans are asked whether they feel people like them are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. In W1, 42.4% of respondents felt represented in efforts to negotiate peace, while this decreased to 33.9% in W2. And again increased to 39.3% in W3.

In a series of questions, Afghans are asked to ascertain whether certain aspects are important to protect in a peace deal. On the whole, responses between the three waves show marginal differences for some peace priorities. However, some notable differences do stand out.






**Fig. 7.2: Q-25.** *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (a) The current Constitution. (b) A democratic system. (c) Freedom of speech. (d) Freedom of the press. (e) A strong central government. (f) The current judicial and court system. (g) Women’s rights. (h) Equality among different groups of people (regardless of ethnicity, class, etc.) (i) The presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan. (j) Foreign economic assistance to Afghanistan. (Percent who say very important or somewhat important.)*

There is a sharp increase in the percentage of respondents who say it is very important or somewhat important to protect the presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan in a peace deal. This has increased dramatically from 45.8% and 45.7% in W1 and W2, to 56.9% in W3.

There are also some fluctuations on whether or not Afghans are willing to accept certain conditions should there be a peace deal. Consistent with W1 and W2, Afghans are most likely to say they support a blanket amnesty being provided for Taliban fighters in W3 (63.8%, 57.6% and 59.8%).

## ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS IN PEACE DEAL, BY WAVE




**Fig. 7.3: Q-26.** *And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which: (a) Blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban fighters. (b) Blanket amnesty is provided for Taliban senior leaders. (c) A role in the government is given to the Taliban. (d) control over certain provinces is ceded to the Taliban. (e) Women may no longer work outside the home. (f) Women and girls may no longer attend school. (Percent who say very willing or somewhat willing.)*

## SECURITY

To better understand Afghans' confidence in the capacity of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), respondents are asked whether or not the ANDSF will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance. In W3, Afghans continue to demonstrate the high levels of confidence in the Afghan National Army (ANA) with 76.7%, the Afghan National Police (ANP) with 73.1%, and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) with 62.0% of Afghans expressing confidence.


## CAN THE ANDSF PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY WITHOUT FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE? BY WAVE



**Fig. 7.4: Q-34.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance? By technical assistance we mean tactical, operational and mentoring support to the ANDSF. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (Percent who say strongly agree or somewhat agree.)


On the other hand, after a decline from W1 to W2, Afghans' perceptions of the ANDSF's ability to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance has increased from W2 to W3. Afghans continue to have the highest levels of confidence in the ANA (55.2%) followed closely by the ANP (54.1%) and the ALP (50.1%).

## CAN THE ANDSF PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY WITHOUT FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE? BY WAVE



**Fig. 7.5: Q-35.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) ANA. (b) ANP. (c) ALP. (Percent who say strongly agree or somewhat agree.)

Elsewhere, Afghans' perceptions regarding the ANP are at an all-time high. More than 80 percent of Afghans say the ANP is honest and fair (81.8%), helps improve security (87.4%), are efficient at arresting criminals (82.6%), and would contact the ANP if they needed assistance (88.4%).




**Fig. 7.6: Q-36.** *I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. Would you say strongly or somewhat? (a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. (b) ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (c) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. (d) I would contact the ANP if I needed assistance. (Percent who say strongly agree or somewhat agree.)*

Against the backdrop of increasing confidence in the ANP, there is a decrease in the number of respondents who say they or a family member experienced an act of violence or crime. In W3, 14.8% say they or a family member experienced an act or violence or crime, a decrease from the 16.2% reported in W2.

The types of violence or crime experienced changed dramatically from W1, to W2 and W3. In W1, the most common response was “don't know” (28.3%) followed by physical attack (21.0%). These remained among the top three responses in W2 (23.8% said “don't know,” 21.5% cite murder, and 17.8% cite physical attack). Interestingly, in W3 the percentage of respondents who said “don't know” surged dramatically to 48.5 %, followed by 31.7% citing murder.

## TYPES OF VIOLENCE OR CRIME EXPERIENCED, BY WAVE



**Fig. 7.7: Q-38.** (Ask if yes in Q-37) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

When asked whether or not the violence or crime was reported to anybody outside of their family, 54.3% said yes, a decrease from the 58.4% in W2 and 59.1% in W1.


## WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Support for women's participation in the workforce continues to be relatively high. Afghans are most supportive of women engaging in female dominated environments (hospitals or clinics, 99.0%; female-only schools, 97.4%; and a private female-only company outside the home, 94.2%).

While there is consistency across the three waves, the largest change in support is for women's participation in the army/police, an increase from 78.0% to 84.4% from W2 to W3.

The lowest levels of support are for women's employment in a private company where male and female employees work in the same room, 71.9%. The second lowest level of support is for women's engagement in nongovernmental organizations 77.1%, although this is an increase from the 71.4% recorded in W2.

## SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORKPLACE, BY WAVE




**Fig. 7.8: Q-40.** *And thinking about where women can work. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernment organizations. (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) – where male and female employees work in the same room (Percent who say strongly agree or somewhat agree.)*

In W1, participants expressed high levels of support for women’s engagement in different types of leadership. This support dropped marginally in a few positions in W2, however, by W3 support for women’s leadership positions has re-established to levels commensurate with W1.

The highest levels of support continue to be at the local levels with women’s leadership in Community Development Council (87.5%), while the lowest is with running for president of the country (73.8%).

## SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S ENGAGEMENT IN LEADERSHIP ROLES, BY WAVE



**Fig. 7.9: Q-41.** *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a Community Development Council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for President of Afghanistan. (Percent who say strongly agree or somewhat agree.)*

## ECONOMY


The economic situation of Afghans remains weak in W3, where more than 70 percent of Afghans report worsening, employment, availability and affordability of products, and cost of medication.

Concerns about corruption persist among Afghans. In W1, 94.7% of respondents said corruption was a problem in their daily life, this increased to 94.9% in W2, and 95.1% in W3.

When asked about whether corruption is a problem in Afghanistan as a whole, an overwhelming 99.2% said yes in W1, this remained 99.0% in W2, and 98.7% in W3.




## WORSENING HOUSEHOLD SITUATION, BY WAVE



**Fig. 7.10: Q-14.** During the past 12 months, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (b) Employment opportunities. (c) Availability of quality products in the market (e.g. rice, wheat, oil). (d) Affordability of quality products in the market (e.g. rice, wheat, oil). (f) Physical access to health-care services (transportation, accessibility). (g) Cost of health care services (doctor, hospital fees, testing, procedures, routine care). (h) Cost of medication (prescriptions). (i) Electricity supply. (l) Access to clean drinking water. (Lettering intentionally nonsequential). (Percent who say worsened.)

When asked about different types of aid offered to households during the pandemic, differences emerge. The most notable difference is an increase among respondents who said there was financial aid being provided to aid households, from 13.8% in W1, to 15.9% in W2 and 19.5% in W3. While other components show marginal increase or drops, for example, a slight increase among those who say the provision of healthcare, and a decrease among those who say employment opportunities were provided during the pandemic.

## AWARENESS OF AID BEING PROVIDED IN LOCAL AREA, BY WAVE



**Fig. 7.11: Q-15–20. A.** Are you aware of [INSERT ITEM] being provided in your local area to aid households during this time? Q-15: Food. Q-16: Employment. Q-17: Water. Q-18: Health-care. Q-19: Financial. Q-20: Medical equipment (gloves, facemasks, sanitizer, etc.) (Percent who say yes.)

## COVID-19

Nearly one quarter of respondents continue to report that someone in their household has received a confirmed Covid-19 diagnosis, 24.1% in W3 (23.8% in W1 and 25.7% in W2).

The stigma associated with Covid-19 remains unchanged at 50.3% in W3 who say they would associate with someone who had Covid-19 but is now healthy. These findings are consistent with 49.1% in W1, and 50.2% in W2.


When asked about the impact of the virus on their personal health, there are fluctuating concerns among respondents: 83.8% in W1 to 88.6% in W2, and down slightly to 87.0% in W3.

Similarly, the percentage of respondents concerned about the impact of Covid-19 on their lifestyle and ability to socialize with others also fluctuates, from 86.9% in W1, up to 92.5% in W2 and an increase again to 90.5% in W3.

When asked about whether or not participants or a member of their household experienced any Covid-19 related symptoms, across the three waves, respondents reported the highest percentages of symptoms in W2. Given the timing of data collection in W2 (November 18 to December 10, 2020), it

is likely that a spike in some symptoms is commensurate with seasonal changes and/or the onset of the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic.


The most common symptoms reported among respondents in W3 are fever (51.2%) and sore throat (51.2%).



**Fig. 7.12: Q-7.** *Since December 2019, have you or any member of your household experienced any of the following symptoms: (1) Fever. (2) Shortness of Breath or Difficulty Breathing. (3) Tiredness. (4) Dry Cough. (5) Nasal congestion. (6) Sore throat. (7) Other. (Percent who say yes.)*

Among those who say they or a household member(s) experienced any Covid-19 related symptoms, a decrease emerges among the percentage who sought medical attention for most of the symptoms offered in W2 and W3. Respondents continue to be more likely to visit a doctor if they experienced shortness of breath (76.2%) and fever (71.5%), and least likely if they experienced nasal congestion (61.2%).

## SEEKING MEDICAL ATTENTION FOR COVID-19 SYMPTOM, BY WAVE



**Fig. 7.13: Q-7D.** (If yes in Q-7A) Did you or the household member visit the doctor? (Percent who say yes.)

Afghans are asked about their source of news and information regarding Covid-19. Consistent with previous waves, family and friends continues to be the most commonly reported source of news (84.6%), higher than the 79.3% reported in W1. Television (80.5%) is the second most frequently cited, followed by doctor or health professional (70.9%), social media (61.3%), radio (51.5%), and newspaper (33.6%).


In W1, 87.3% of respondents say they receive adequate news and information on the virus and the appropriate measures to take. This decreased to 84.5% in W2, and by W3, increased again to 86.2%.

Regarding the governments' response to the pandemic, 81.6% of Afghans say they received timely information (down from 83.1% in W2). A similar proportion, 83.6% say the government provided accurate information about the pandemic (a marginal increase from 82.9% in W2 and 79.6% in W1).

On the other hand, less than a third say the government provided support to them and their families during the pandemic, 27.1%. An increase from 21.6% in W2, and 25.0% in W1.

Respondents are also asked whether they are worried about engaging in a number of activities following the government restrictions lifting. Afghans continue to be most worried about visiting engaging in community activities (83.0%) and visiting a health-care facility (82.7%), and least about going to work (78.0%).

Between W1 and W3, the most dramatic decrease is among those who are worried about returning to work, this has dropped from 86.7% to 78.0%.



**Fig. 7.14: Q-1.** *With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following: (a) Going to work. (b) Engaging in community activities. (c) Attending funerals and religious functions. (d) Attending school. (e) Visiting a health-care facility. (Percent who say very worried, worried or somewhat worried.)*


## ENDNOTES

- 1 In the raw dataset these weights are rakedwgt\_1 for W1, rakedwgt\_2 for W2, and rakedwgt\_3 for W3.
- 2 While there are some limitations to dichotomizing data, this is a preferred approach for purposes of this report. The raw data for all three waves is publicly available for more customized approaches.



## 8 PANEL ANALYSIS: WAVE 1 & WAVE 3

The following analysis looks at the subset of data (1994n) of interviews conducted with the same individuals in Wave 1 (W1) and Wave 3 (W3).



To analyze the data, while a number of analytical approaches are available, the following analysis will be based on the McNemar's test. Because the same 1994n individuals are interviewed during W1 and W3, we can denote the data as 'paired proportions'.

The McNemar's test looks at paired proportions, that is proportions that are not independent of one another. In this case, these are not independent because they are the same individuals asked at two different time points, during W1 and W3. Paired analysis contains both concordant and discordant pairs.

With paired proportions, the null hypothesis (the *p value*) tests whether the proportion of discorded pairs is the same or not. In other words, the null hypothesis tests whether the discordance between W1 and W3 is the same or not (for example if Afghans agreed or supported an initiative in W1 but later changed their mind in W3), and whether the probability of people agreeing to certain things is the same over two time periods.

Here the *p value* between discordant proportions can be statistically significant if  $p < 0.05$ , meaning there is less than 1 in 20 chances of being wrong. If  $p < 0.001$  ( $p = 0.000$ ), the analysis is statistically highly significant, meaning there is less than one in a thousand chance the data is wrong.

The following analysis and narrative looks only at W1 and W3 data of panel respondents that is *highly statistically significant* where  $p < 0.000$ . The *p value* and sample size (n) is indicated for all analyses. All other analyses where  $p < 0.05$  is included as tables.



Using the McNemar's test allows us to understand whether Afghans' response to the specific questions, whether yes or no, changes over time from W1 to W3.

The output for analyses using the McNemar's test is presented in the following table format:

RESPONSE TO QUESTION IN W1	RESPONSE TO QUESTION IN W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	YES (W1), YES (W3) [CONCORDANT]	YES (W1), NO (W3) [DISCORDANT]	YES IN W1
NO	NO (W1), YES (W3) [DISCORDANT]	NO (W1), NO (W3) [CONCORDANT]	NO IN W1
	YES IN W3	NO IN W3	SAMPLE SIZE (N)

## PEACE

**Q-22.** *Do you think peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years?*

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	635	320	955
NO	163	518	681
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>798</b>	<b>838</b>	<b>1,636</b>

Do Afghans think peace being possible in the next two years? And to what extent do Afghans' perceptions change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 38.8% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 19.6% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 10.0% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 31.7% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 58.4% of Afghans said peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years. In W3, this proportion decreased to 48.8% of respondents who said peace is achievable. Thus, the proportion of Afghans who said peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years has decreased.

The 9.6 percentage point decrease in Afghans' perceptions over time ( $p$  value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

**Q-25:** It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? (i) the presence of foreign military forces in Afghanistan.

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	627	274	901
NO	420	558	978
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,047</b>	<b>832</b>	<b>1,879</b>

Do Afghans think the presence of foreign military forces is important to protect in a peace deal? And to what extent do Afghans' perceptions change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 33.4% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 14.6% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 22.4% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 29.7% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 48.0% of Afghans said it is important to protect the presence of foreign military forces in a peace deal. And in W3, this proportion increased to 55.7% of respondents who said it is important to protect the presence of foreign military forces. Thus, the proportion of Afghans who said the presence of foreign military troops is important to protect should there be a peace deal has increased.

The 7.7 percentage point increase in Afghans' perceptions over time (p value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

## COVID-19

**Q-2:** Which of the following precautionary measures are you using to protect yourself from the virus? Have you used... (b) Gloves.

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	911	421	1,332
NO	208	452	660
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,119</b>	<b>873</b>	<b>1,992</b>

Are Afghans using gloves as precautionary measures to protect themselves from the virus? And to what extent do Afghans' use of gloves change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 45.7% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 21.1% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 10.4% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 22.7% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 66.9% of Afghans said they were using gloves as a safety precaution from the Covid-19 virus. And in W3, this proportion decreased to 56.2% of respondents who said they use gloves.

There is a 10.7 percentage point decrease in the number of Afghans who use gloves as a safety precaution. The decrease in Afghans' use of gloves from W1 to W3 (p value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

**Q-2:** Which of the following precautionary measures are you using to protect yourself from the virus? Have you used... (g) Self-isolation.

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	866	494	1,360
NO	261	366	627
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,127</b>	<b>860</b>	<b>1,987</b>

Are Afghans using self-isolation as a precautionary measure to protect themselves from the virus? And to what extent do Afghans' use of self-isolation change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 43.6% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 24.9% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 13.1% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 18.4% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 68.4% of Afghans said they were engaging in self-isolation as a safety precaution to protect themselves from the virus. And in W3, this proportion decreased to 56.7% of respondents who said they were engaging in self-isolation as a safety precaution.

Thus there is a 11.7 percentage point decrease from W1 to W3. The decrease in Afghans' use of self-isolation over time (p value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

**Q-2:** Which of the following precautionary measures are you using to protect yourself from the virus? Have you used...(f) Social distancing.

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	1,382	291	1,673
NO	170	148	318
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,552</b>	<b>439</b>	<b>1,991</b>

Are Afghans using social distancing as a precautionary measure to protect themselves from the virus? And to what extent do Afghans' use of social distancing change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 69.4% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 14.6% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 8.5% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 7.4% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 84.0% of Afghans said they are engaging in social distancing as a precautionary measure against the Covid-19 virus. And in W3, this proportion decreased to 78.0% of respondents who said they were engaging in social distancing. Thus, the proportion of Afghans who said they engage in social distancing has decreased.

The 6.1 percentage point decrease in Afghans' perceptions over time ( $p$  value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

**Q-3:** Which of the following sources of news and information do you use to stay informed about Covid-19? (a) Radio.

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	608	260	868
NO	422	701	1,123
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,030</b>	<b>961</b>	<b>1,991</b>

Do Afghans use the radio as a source of news and information to stay informed about Covid-19? And to what extent do Afghans' use of the radio to stay informed about Covid-19 change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 30.5% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 13.1% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.

3. 21.2% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 35.2% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 43.6% of Afghans said they use the radio as a source of news and information to stay informed about Covid-19. And in W3, this proportion increased to 51.7% of respondents who said they use the radio as a source of news and information. Thus, the proportion of Afghans who said they listen to radio as a source of news and information about Covid-19 has increased.

The 8.1 percentage point increase in Afghans' use of radio over time (p value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

## ECONOMY

**Q-19:** Are you aware of financial aid being provided in your local area to aid households during this time?

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	73	179	252
NO	307	1,425	1,732
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>1,604</b>	<b>1,984</b>

Are Afghans aware of financial aid being distributed in their local areas to aid households during the pandemic? And to what extent do Afghans' awareness of financial aid change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 3.7% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 9.0% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 15.5% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 71.8% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 12.7% of Afghans said they were aware of financial aid being distributed in their local areas to aid households during the pandemic. And in W3, this proportion increased to 19.2% of respondents who said they were aware of financial aid being distributed in their local areas. Thus, the proportion of Afghans who said they are aware of financial aid being distributed has increased.

The 6.5 percentage point increase in Afghans' awareness of financial aid being distributed over time (p value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

**Q-20:** Are you aware of medical equipment (face masks, gloves, sanitizer, etc.) being provided in your local area to aid households during this time?

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	106	144	250
NO	257	1,482	1,739
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>1,626</b>	<b>1,989</b>

Are Afghans aware of medical equipment (face masks, gloves, sanitizer, etc) being provided in their local areas during the pandemic? And to what extent do Afghans' awareness change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 5.3% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 7.2% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 12.9% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 74.5% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 12.6% of Afghans said they were aware of medical equipment (face masks, gloves, sanitizer, etc.) being provided in their local areas. And in W3, this proportion increased to 18.3% of respondents who said they were aware of such aid being provided during the pandemic. Thus, the proportion of Afghans aware of medical equipment being provided has increased from W1 to W3.

The 5.7 percentage point increase in Afghans' awareness over time (p value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

## SECURITY

**Q-36:** I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-green coloured uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (d) I would contact the ANP if I needed assistance.

Q_W1	Q_W3		TOTAL
	YES	NO	
YES	1,506	127	1,633
NO	225	93	318
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,731</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>1,951</b>

Would Afghans contact the ANP if they needed assistance? And to what extent would Afghans' willingness to contact the ANP if they needed assistance change within the two waves?

Interpretation:

1. 77.2% of individuals said yes in both W1 and in W3.
2. 6.5% of individuals said yes in W1 but changed their mind to 'no' in W3.
3. 11.5% of individuals said no in W1 but changed their mind to 'yes' in W3.
4. 4.8% of individuals said no in both W1 and W3.

Overall, in W1 alone, 83.7% of Afghans said they would contact the ANP if they needed assistance. In W3, this increased to 88.7% who said they would contact the ANP if they needed assistance. Thus, the proportion of Afghans who said they would contact the ANP has increased from W1 to W3.

The 5.0 percentage point increase in Afghans' perceptions over time (p value = 0.0000) is thus highly significant.

## ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

PEACE: Significant findings where  $p < 0.05$

QUESTION		P- VALUE	STATUS	N
Q-24	DO YOU FEEL PEOPLE LIKE YOU ARE SUFFICIENTLY REPRESENTED IN EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH THE TALIBAN?	0.0058	SIGNIFICANT	1,734
Q-25F	IT IS LIKELY THAT TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENT, ALL SIDES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES. HOW IMPORTANT WOULD YOU SAY THE FOLLOWING THINGS ARE TO PROTECT AS PART OF A PEACE AGREEMENT? WOULD YOU SAY IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT, NOT TOO IMPORTANT, OR NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT? <b>THE CURRENT JUDICIAL AND COURT SYSTEM</b>	0.0187	SIGNIFICANT	1,939
Q-25G	IT IS LIKELY THAT TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENT, ALL SIDES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES. HOW IMPORTANT WOULD YOU SAY THE FOLLOWING THINGS ARE TO PROTECT AS PART OF A PEACE AGREEMENT? WOULD YOU SAY IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT, NOT TOO IMPORTANT, OR NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT? <b>WOMEN'S RIGHTS</b>	0.0051	SIGNIFICANT	1,975
Q-25J	IT IS LIKELY THAT TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENT, ALL SIDES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES. HOW IMPORTANT WOULD YOU SAY THE FOLLOWING THINGS ARE TO PROTECT AS PART OF A PEACE AGREEMENT? WOULD YOU SAY IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT, NOT TOO IMPORTANT, OR NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT? <b>FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN</b>	0.0426	SIGNIFICANT	1,944

Q-26D	AND HOW WILLING WOULD YOU BE TO ACCEPT A PEACE AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS? WOULD YOU BE VERY WILLING, SOMEWHAT WILLING, SOMEWHAT UNWILLING, OR VERY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT A PEACE AGREEMENT IN WHICH: <b>CONTROL OVER CERTAIN PROVINCES IS CEDED TO THE TALIBAN</b>	0.0002	SIGNIFICANT	1,860
Q-26E	AND HOW WILLING WOULD YOU BE TO ACCEPT A PEACE AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS? WOULD YOU BE VERY WILLING, SOMEWHAT WILLING, SOMEWHAT UNWILLING, OR VERY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT A PEACE AGREEMENT IN WHICH: <b>WOMEN MAY NO LONGER WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME</b>	0.0007	SIGNIFICANT	1,946
Q-26A	AND HOW WILLING WOULD YOU BE TO ACCEPT A PEACE AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS? WOULD YOU BE VERY WILLING, SOMEWHAT WILLING, SOMEWHAT UNWILLING, OR VERY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT A PEACE AGREEMENT IN WHICH: <b>BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED FOR TALIBAN FIGHTERS</b>	0.0072	SIGNIFICANT	1,906
Q-25B	IT IS LIKELY THAT TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENT, ALL SIDES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES. HOW IMPORTANT WOULD YOU SAY THE FOLLOWING THINGS ARE TO PROTECT AS PART OF A PEACE AGREEMENT? WOULD YOU SAY IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT, NOT TOO IMPORTANT, OR NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT? <b>A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM</b>	0.0093	SIGNIFICANT	1,914
Q-25C	IT IS LIKELY THAT TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENT, ALL SIDES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DIFFICULT COMPROMISES. HOW IMPORTANT WOULD YOU SAY THE FOLLOWING THINGS ARE TO PROTECT AS PART OF A PEACE AGREEMENT? WOULD YOU SAY IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT, NOT TOO IMPORTANT, OR NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT? <b>FREEDOM OF SPEECH</b>	0.0025	SIGNIFICANT	1,967

### WOMEN'S RIGHTS Significant findings where $p = <0.05$

Q-40G	AND THINKING ABOUT WHERE WOMEN CAN WORK. FOR EACH OF THESE PLACES, DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR WOMEN TO WORK IN THESE PLACES? (WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND THEN ASK) STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT? <b>A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) – WITH FEMALE EMPLOYEES ONLY</b>	0.0441	SIGNIFICANT	1,972
Q-40D	AND THINKING ABOUT WHERE WOMEN CAN WORK. FOR EACH OF THESE PLACES, DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR WOMEN TO WORK IN THESE PLACES? (WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND THEN ASK) STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT? <b>FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS</b>	0.0056	SIGNIFICANT	1,985



<b>Q-41E</b>	AND THINKING ABOUT WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, PLEASE TELL ME, DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR WOMEN TO HAVE ACCESS TO THESE LEADERSHIP ROLES? (WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND THEN ASK) STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT? <b>RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN</b>	<b>0.0071</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,950</b>
<b>Q-40E</b>	AND THINKING ABOUT WHERE WOMEN CAN WORK. FOR EACH OF THESE PLACES, DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR WOMEN TO WORK IN THESE PLACES? (WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND THEN ASK) STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT? <b>CO-ED SCHOOLS</b>	<b>0.0024</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,981</b>

### COVID-19 Significant findings where $p = <0.05$

<b>Q-1C</b>	WITH SOME GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS LIFTING FOLLOWING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU ARE NOT AT ALL WORRIED, SOMEWHAT WORRIED, WORRIED, OR VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE FOLLOWING: <b>ATTENDING FUNERALS AND RELIGIOUS EVENTS.</b>	<b>0.0057</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,991</b>
<b>Q-2C</b>	WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ARE YOU USING TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM THE VIRUS? HAVE YOU USED? <b>HAND SANITIZER</b>	<b>0.0204</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,989</b>
<b>Q-2E</b>	WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ARE YOU USING TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM THE VIRUS? HAVE YOU USED? <b>SOAP AND OTHER DETERGENTS FOR CLEANING SURFACES</b>	<b>0.0028</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,994</b>
<b>Q-3C</b>	WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION DO YOU USE TO STAY INFORMED ABOUT COVID-19? <b>NEWSPAPER</b>	<b>0.0180</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,988</b>
<b>Q-3D</b>	WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION DO YOU USE TO STAY INFORMED ABOUT COVID-19? <b>FAMILY AND FRIENDS</b>	<b>0.0008</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,991</b>
<b>Q-3E</b>	WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION DO YOU USE TO STAY INFORMED ABOUT COVID-19? <b>DOCTOR OR OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONAL</b>	<b>0.0348</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,987</b>
<b>Q-3F</b>	WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING SOURCES OF NEWS AND INFORMATION DO YOU USE TO STAY INFORMED ABOUT COVID-19? <b>SOCIAL MEDIA (FACEBOOK, TWITTER, ETC).</b>	<b>0.0198</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,988</b>
<b>Q-6A</b>	THINKING NOW ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO COVID-19, TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU FEEL THE GOVERNMENT HAS: <b>PROVIDED TIMELY INFORMATION ABOUT COVID-19</b>	<b>0.0335</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,957</b>
<b>Q-6B</b>	THINKING NOW ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO COVID-19, TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU FEEL THE GOVERNMENT HAS: <b>PROVIDED ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT COVID-19</b>	<b>0.0010</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,950</b>

<b>Q-6C</b>	THINKING NOW ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO COVID-19, TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU FEEL THE GOVERNMENT HAS: <b>PROVIDED SUPPORT TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY DURING THE PANDEMIC</b>	<b>0.0001</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,986</b>
<b>Q-7</b>	SINCE DECEMBER 2019, HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD EXPERIENCED ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SYMPTOMS: <b>NASAL CONGESTION</b>	<b>0.0075</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,983</b>
<b>Q-9A</b>	WOULD YOU ASSOCIATE WITH SOMEONE IN YOUR COMMUNITY WHOM YOU KNEW HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD COVID-19 BUT NOW IS HEALTHY?	<b>0.0029</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,981</b>
<b>Q-10</b>	HOW CONCERNED ARE YOU ABOUT THE LASTING IMPACT OF CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK ON YOUR PERSONAL HEALTH?	<b>0.0004</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,992</b>
<b>Q-11</b>	HOW CONCERNED ARE YOU ABOUT THE LASTING IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON YOUR LIFESTYLE (I.E. YOUR DAILY ROUTINE AND ABILITY TO SOCIALIZE WITH OTHERS)?	<b>0.0001</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,990</b>

### ECONOMY: Significant findings where $p = <0.05$

QUESTIONS		P VALUE	STATUS	N
<b>Q-17A</b>	ARE YOU AWARE OF [INSERT ITEM] BEING PROVIDED IN YOUR LOCAL AREA TO AID HOUSEHOLDS DURING THIS TIME? <b>WATER</b>	<b>0.0024</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,985</b>

### SECURITY: Significant findings where $p = <0.05$

QUESTIONS		P VALUE	STATUS	N
<b>Q-36C</b>	I'M GOING TO READ SOME STATEMENTS TO YOU ABOUT AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP). ANP OFFICERS ARE THE ONES WHO WEAR SOLID BLUE-GREY COLORED UNIFORMS. PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH STATEMENT. (READ OUT STATEMENT, WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND THEN ASK): WOULD YOU SAY STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT? <b>ANP IS EFFICIENT AT ARRESTING THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES</b>	<b>0.0017</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,928</b>
<b>Q-36B</b>	I'M GOING TO READ SOME STATEMENTS TO YOU ABOUT AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP). ANP OFFICERS ARE THE ONES WHO WEAR SOLID BLUE-GREY COLORED UNIFORMS. PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH STATEMENT. (READ OUT STATEMENT, WAIT FOR RESPONSE AND THEN ASK): WOULD YOU SAY STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT? <b>ANP HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN</b>	<b>0.0340</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>1,936</b>

### COVID-19: Significant findings where $p = <0.05$ but $n = \text{small}$

N. OF QUESTION	QUESTIONS	P VALUE	STATUS	N
<b>Q7_3D</b>	DID YOU/FAMILY MEMBER VISIT THE DOCTOR WHEN YOU HAD TIREDNESS SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0379</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>543</b>

<b>Q7_4D</b>	DID YOU/FAMILY MEMBER VISIT THE DOCTOR WHEN YOU HAD DRY COUGH SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0028</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>470</b>
<b>Q7_6D</b>	DID YOU/FAMILY MEMBER VISIT THE DOCTOR WHEN YOU HAD SORE THROAT SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0423</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>645</b>
<b>Q7_7D</b>	DID YOU/FAMILY MEMBER VISIT THE DOCTOR WHEN YOU HAD OTHER SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0455</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>Q7_2E</b>	WAS THE DOCTOR AWARE OF THE SIGNS AND TESTING SHORTNESS OF BREATH AS COVID SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0091</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>196</b>
<b>Q7_3E</b>	WAS THE DOCTOR AWARE OF THE SIGNS AND TESTING TIREDNESS AS COVID SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0390</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>261</b>
<b>Q7_4E</b>	WAS THE DOCTOR AWARE OF THE SIGNS AND TESTING DRY COUGH AS COVID SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0002</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>244</b>
<b>Q7_5E</b>	WAS THE DOCTOR AWARE OF THE SIGNS AND TESTING NASAL CONGESTION AS COVID SYMPTOMS?	<b>0.0007</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>199</b>

**ECONOMY:** Significant findings where  $p = <0.05$  but  $n = \text{small}$

<b>N. OF QUESTION</b>	<b>QUESTIONS</b>	<b>P VALUE</b>	<b>STATUS</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Q19D</b>	IS THE SUPPORT SUFFICIENT FOR YOUR NEEDS? <b>FINANCIAL AID</b>	<b>0.0001</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Q15C</b>	HAVE YOU OR ANYONE ELSE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD PERSONALLY ACCESSED THE SUPPORT? <b>FOOD</b>	<b>0.0016</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>399</b>

**SECURITY:** Significant findings where  $p = <0.05$  but  $n = \text{small}$

<b>N. OF QUESTION</b>	<b>QUESTIONS</b>	<b>P VALUE</b>	<b>STATUS</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Q39</b>	<b>(ASK IF 'YES' IN Q-37) WERE THE CRIMES OR VIOLENT ACTS REPORTED TO ANYBODY OUTSIDE YOUR FAMILY OR NOT?</b>	<b>0.0035</b>	<b>SIGNIFICANT</b>	<b>108</b>



# APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The Asia Foundation's *Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions of Peace, Covid-19 and the Economy: Wave 3 Findings* is a mobile-only Tablet-Assisted Phone Interviewing (TAPI) – based survey of the mobile phone-using public of Afghanistan.

The third wave follows the successful completion of Wave 1 (W1) and Wave 2 (W2), fielded in 2020, and is partially a panel survey. Of the sample of 4,059 respondents, 1,437 (35%) were panel participants who had taken part in both previous waves, 521 (13%) had participated in W1 but not in W2, 761 (19%) had participated in W2 but not in W1, and 1,340 (33%) were new respondents who had not participated in the previous wave. The survey was fielded using Research Control Solutions (RCS) software.

This survey targets a representative sample of mobile-using Afghans (age 18+) totaling  $n = 4,059$ . The sample for each of three waves was generated via random digit dialing (RDD), so any existing mobile phone number in Afghanistan had a theoretical probability of selection.

Fieldwork was conducted from February 9, 2021 to February 23, 2021. Fieldwork was completed by 70 native Dari and Pashto speaking interviewers. The final sample was 78% male and 22% female, and comprised 62% urban and 38% rural respondents.

## 2 SAMPLE DESIGN

The target sample size for this survey is 4,000 Afghans aged 18+. The sampling methodology is a single mode design composed only of mobile phones, due to very low landline penetration in Afghanistan. For the mobile sampling frame, all telephone numbers consist of 10 digits. The sample is not stratified by provider code. The field team first attempted to reach panel respondents who had previously participated in both W1 and W2, then those who had participated in W1 but not W2, then those who had participated in W2 but not in W1. Lastly, the field team completed the remainder of the sample using a Simple Random Sample (SRS) of telephone numbers generated by a computer program RDD. Interviews were performed by native Dari and Pashto speakers.

### 2.1 SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

**Target Population:** Mobile owning Afghans aged 18+

**Target Sample Size:** 4,000

**Achieved/Realized Sample Size:** 4,059

The sampling methodology for this study was as follows:

- The field team attempted to complete as much of the target sample size of  $n=4,000$  with panel respondents as possible, calling them first. After the first week of fieldwork, the field team began to reach out to new respondents who had not participated in the previous wave, using a SRS of telephone numbers generated without replacement.
- The sample consisted of:
  - 6,036 callback numbers, for respondents who had participated during the first and/or second wave or during the additional calls conducted afterwards who had consented to being called back for a follow-up study
  - 50,000 additional newly generated phone numbers
  - A replicate is exhausted when all callbacks to each number have been completed, at which point a new replicate is loaded to the sample database. The first replicate was sufficient to complete fieldwork, so additional replicate sample draws were not required.
- Calls were made through each device's SIM card.
- Method of respondent selection:
  - Mobile phones are treated as a personal device and the person who answers the phone is selected as the respondent.
  - Based on previous experience with mobile surveys, it was expected that women would be difficult to reach due to cultural reasons: Afghan women are often unwilling to answer the phone when a stranger calls, and are often reluctant to speak with strangers on the phone, even other women. Therefore, if a female interviewer placed a call and a male picked up, she was instructed to ask to speak with the lady of the house, and interview her if she was available. If no women were available or if the male respondent refused to pass the phone to a woman, she could proceed with interviewing him.
- Callbacks
  - After autodialing<sup>1</sup>, a maximum of three contact attempts are made at the household level, with call back intervals of half an hour for busy lines, and every 2+ hours for answering machines / not reached. Once the selected respondent has been identified, an additional two attempts are made to either the phone number selected, or a provided alternative number, to complete an interview with the respondent.
- The final sample consisted of 4,059 respondents, of whom 1,437 (35%) were panel participants who had taken part in the previous wave, 521 (13%) were respondents who had taken part in Wave 1 but not in Wave 2, 761 (19%) had taken part in Wave 2 but not in Wave 1, and 1,340 (33%) were new respondents who had not participated in the previous wave.

**TABLE 2: PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION POPULATION VS. REALIZED SAMPLE**

<b>PROVINCE</b>	<b>NSIA PERCENTAGE IN POPULATION (TOTAL)</b>	<b>REALIZED TOTAL SAMPLE - UNWEIGHTED (N=4,059)</b>
BADAKHSHAN (BDS)	3.5%	3.4%
BADGHIS (BDG)	1.8%	0.6%
BAGHLAN (BGL)	3.4%	3.2%
BALKH (BAL)	4.9%	8.0%
BAMYAN (BAM)	1.7%	1.2%
DAYKUNDI (DAY)	1.6%	1.5%
FARAH (FRA)	1.9%	1.5%
FARYAB (FYB)	3.7%	2.2%
GHAZNI (GHA)	4.5%	3.2%
GHOR (GHO)	2.5%	1.1%
HELMAND (HEL)	3.4%	1.8%
HERAT (HER)	7.0%	11.1%
JAWZJAN (JOW)	2.0%	1.7%
KABUL (KAB)	16.1%	24.7%
KANDAHAR (KAN)	4.5%	3.2%
KAPISA (KAP)	1.6%	1.2%
KHOST (KHO)	2.1%	1.7%
KUNAR (KNR)	1.7%	1.4%
KUNDUZ (KDZ)	3.7%	4.2%
LAGHMAN (LAG)	1.6%	2.0%
LOGAR (LOW)	1.4%	1.4%
NANGARHAR (NAN)	5.6%	6.0%
NIMROZ (NIM)	0.6%	0.7%
NURISTAN (NUR)	0.5%	0.1%
PAKTIKA (PKA)	1.6%	1.1%
PAKTIA (PIA)	2.0%	0.3%
PANJSHIR (PAN)	0.6%	0.6%
PARWAN (PAR)	2.5%	2.5%
SAMANGAN (SAM)	1.4%	1.1%
SAR-E-PUL (SAR)	2.1%	1.7%
TAKHAR (TAK)	3.6%	3.3%
URUZGAN (ORU)	1.4%	0.2%
WARDAK (WAR)	2.2%	1.6%
ZABUL (ZAB)	1.1%	0.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

## 2.2 WEIGHTING

For this study, a raked weight, 'W3\_rakedwgt' was created. This weight was created to adjust the data based on population figures by Region, Gender, and Urban/Rural status. It is recommended that this weight be used analyzing the data.

Due to a lack of reliable census figures, gender is assumed to be 50/50 while the other targets are taken from the 2020/2021 population estimates released by the NSIA.

**TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF WEIGHTS**

	SHARE IN NSIA POPULATION ESTIMATES	SHARE IN UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE	SHARE IN RAKED WEIGHTED SAMPLE (‘RAKEDWGT’)
<b>GENDER</b>			
MALE	50.0%	78.4%	50.0%
FEMALE	50.0%	21.6%	50.0%
<b>URBAN/RURAL STATUS</b>			
RURAL	74.5%	38.4%	74.4%
URBAN	25.5%	61.6%	25.6%
<b>REGION</b>			
CENTRAL HIGHLANDS	3.2%	2.7%	3.2%
CENTRAL KABUL	24.5%	32.1%	24.5%
EASTERN	9.1%	9.5%	9.1%
NORTH WEST	13.6%	14.7%	13.6%
NORTHERN	13.7%	14.1%	13.7%
SOUTH CENTRAL	12.3%	6.3%	12.3%
SOUTH EAST	10.8%	6.3%	10.8%
WESTERN	12.8%	14.3%	12.8%

## 2.3 MARGIN OF ERROR AND DESIGN EFFECT

The estimated design effect for the survey was computed by computing a weighted average of the design effects for the responses to Q-1a “With some government restrictions lifting following the Covid-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following ...Going to work?”

The margin of error with 95% confidence at  $p=.5$  is 1.54%. Considering the survey design including weighting, the estimated design effect was 2.6.<sup>2</sup>



**TABLE 4: DESIGN EFFECT ESTIMATION USING Q1A**

<b>Q1A</b>	<b>MEAN</b>	<b>STANDARD ERROR</b>	<b>DEFF</b>
NOT WORRIED AT ALL	0.2406	0.0108	2.5700
SOMEWHAT WORRIED	0.2759	0.0115	2.6951
WORRIED	0.1276	0.0083	2.5227
VERY WORRIED	0.3529	0.0125	2.7804
REFUSED	0.0030	0.0019	4.8422
DON'T KNOW	0.0000	0.0000	0.2069
	<b>WEIGHTED AVERAGE<sup>3</sup></b>		<b>2.6</b>

Assuming a Design Effect of 2.6 and  $p = 0.5$ , at the 95% CI level with  $n = 4,059$ , the resulting complex MOE is +/- 2.48%

### 3 FIELD IMPLEMENTATION

The field team is provided with the numbers to be included in the sample based on the draw performed by D3. These numbers are released to the field team and randomly allocated to each of the interviewer by the project managers, to make calls from project-issued devices (cellphones and SIM-enabled tablets) at home. Calling is done using RCS CAPI/TAPI software, which works on most Android devices.

The numbers are dialed in random order, sorted randomly using a random number generator, to distribute contact attempts across the country and among mobile carriers over the entirety of the field period.

#### 3.1 CONTACT PROCEDURES

A maximum of three attempts are made to reach the respondent to determine eligibility. Following this, an additional two contact attempts are made to try and reach the selected respondent on his/her mobile.

Appointments which result in busy lines are called again after thirty minutes, answering machines and “not reached” calls are called again after a minimum of two hours.

The dialing/working hours for this study were from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. Afghan time, though a small number of calls occurred outside that timeframe.

#### 3.3 SAMPLE DISPOSITION

This section of the sample disposition is another diagnostic tool to understand the validity of the sample. Final disposition codes, call outcome rates, and response rates contribute to an understanding of the presence of potential survey error.<sup>4</sup>

This section contains:

- A thorough accounting of the survey call dispositions resulting from this survey.
- The formulas for calculating response rates, cooperation rates, and contact rates.
- A report of the final outcome rates for the evaluation of this survey according to the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Standards for Minimal Disclosure requirements (Part III of the Code of Professional Ethics and Practices).

### 3.4 RATE CALCULATIONS

The response rate is the number of complete interviews divided by the number of interviews plus the number of non-interviews plus all cases of unknown eligibility. The cooperation rate is the proportion of all cases interviewed of all eligible participants ever contacted. The refusal rate is the proportion of all cases in which a participant refuses to do an interview, or breaks-off an interview of all potentially eligible cases. The contact rate measures the proportion of all cases in which the participant responsible and associated with the provided phone number was reached by the *Survey*.

AAPOR's Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 1, Refusal Rate 2, and Contact Rate 2 are used as guiding standards.

Acronyms used in the formulas are below:

I	=	Complete Interview
P	=	Partial Interview
R	=	Refusal and break-off
NC	=	Non-contact
O	=	Other
UH	=	Unknown if eligible
UO	=	Unknown, other
e	=	Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible

$$\text{Response Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Cooperation Rate 1} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + R}$$

$$\text{Refusal Rate 2} = \frac{R}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Contact Rate 2} = \frac{(I + P) + R + O}{(I + P) + R + O + NC + e(UH + UO)}$$

### 3.5 FINAL DISPOSITION CODES

AAPOR standard code systems are adopted as a replacement for traditional methods. AAPOR standard code systems are indisputable by government agencies and their suppliers, thus in adopting a common language with the rest of the industry, comparisons can be made with outcome codes of different surveys. AAPOR provides an industry standard set of final disposition codes and associated outcome rate formulas. The AAPOR codes and formulas are widely accepted throughout North America as the only standard and are built into the business and science standards of all other major research associations. There are four different types of rate calculations used in AAPOR reporting (response rates, contact rates, cooperation rates, and refusal rates).

The following table provides the final disposition classifications:

**TABLE 5: INTERVIEW STATUS: FINAL DISPOSITION CODES AND DEFINITIONS<sup>5</sup>**

SURVEY MANAGEMENT SECTION			
VENDOR CODE	AAPOR CODE	DESCRIPTION	
<b>COMPLETED INTERVIEWS</b>			
24	1.0/1.10	INTERVIEW WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED	4,155
1	1.0/1.10	INTERVIEW SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, BUT REJECTED DUE TO DUPLICATE PHONE NUMBER/CASEID	317
25	1.0/1.10	INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED BUT REJECTED FOR QUALITY REASONS	56
			4,528
<b>PARTIAL INTERVIEWS</b>			
23	1.200	PARTIAL INTERVIEW/REFUSAL/BREAK-OFF	1,605
		<b>TOTAL PARTIALS</b>	1,605
<b>UNKNOWN ELIGIBILITY</b>			
2	3.130	NO ANSWER / BUSY SIGNAL / PHONE TURNED OFF	5,363
6	3.140	VOICEMAIL/ANSWERING MACHINE	458
		<b>TOTAL UNKNOWN HOUSEHOLD</b>	5,821
<b>NON-CONTACTS</b>			
5	4.310	NON - WORKING NUMBER/NUMBER NOT IN SERVICE	15,045
		<b>TOTAL NON-CONTACTS</b>	15,045
<b>OTHERS</b>			
12	2.332	LANGUAGE BARRIER	0
14	2.320	RESPONDENT PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY UNABLE TO COMPLETE INTERVIEW	0
		<b>TOTAL OTHERS</b>	0

REFUSALS			
3	2.11	REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE	1,572
4	2.11	UNAVAILABLE (CALL BACK LATER, MAKE AN APPOINTMENT)	323
		<b>TOTAL REFUSALS</b>	1,895
NOT ELIGIBLE			
7	4.700	NOT ELIGIBLE - LESS THAN 18 YEARS OLD OR BUSINESS NUMBER	4
		<b>TOTAL NOT ELIGIBLE</b>	4
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE</b>	28,898

DISPOSITION RATES			
RATE	FORMULA/CALCULATION		PERCENT
VALUE FOR E	ESTIMATED PROPORTION OF CASES OF UNKNOWN ELIGIBILITY THAT ARE ELIGIBLE		0.9998
RESPONSE RATE 3	$I / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+E(UH+UO)$		15.67%
COOPERATION RATE 3	$I / (I+P+R)$		56.40%
REFUSAL RATE 2	$R / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+E(UH+UO)$		6.64%
CONTACT RATE 2	$(I+P+R+O) / (I)+(R+NC+O)+E(UH+UO)$		27.79%

## FORMULAS FOR CALCULATING RATES

In this *Survey*, 28,898 telephone numbers were dialed, out of a total of 56,036 provided to the field team. Of these, 4,528 interviews were completed (of which 56 were removed due to field-level quality control measures and 317 were removed due to duplicate CaseIDs/phone numbers), with 1,605 partial interviews, and 1,895 were refusals and break offs. The remaining were non-contacts (15,045), “other” (0), unknown eligibility (5,821), or not eligible (4). Table 6 provides the distribution of dispositions:

**TABLE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSITION CATEGORIES**

DISPOSITION CODES	
I=COMPLETE INTERVIEWS	4,528
P=PARTIAL INTERVIEWS	1,605
R=REFUSAL AND BREAK OFF	1,895
NC=NON-CONTACT	15,045
O=OTHER	0
CALCULATING E: THE ESTIMATED PROPORTION OF CASES OF UNKNOWN ELIGIBILITY THAT ARE ELIGIBLE.	0.9998
UH/UO=UNKNOWN	5,821
NE= NOT ELIGIBLE	4
TOTAL PHONE NUMBERS SAMPLED	28,898

## REPORT OF FINAL OUTCOME RATES

For this sample, the response rate 3 was 15.67%, the cooperation rate 1 was 56.40%, the refusal rate 2 was 6.64% and the contact rate 2 was 27.79%.

### 3.6 FIELD OUTCOMES

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, most of the interviewing team worked from home to complete their projects. There were minor technical issues in the tablets and that were fixed either by ACSOR IT or remotely by D3. Because teams mostly worked from home, the impact of major news events on fieldwork progress was lower than for face-to-face studies, but those that occurred during the fieldwork period are provided here:

#### February 9, 2021

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Two individuals were killed and four others wounded in improvised explosive device (IED) and gun attacks in Kabul on Tuesday morning, police said.

A government Land Cruiser was attacked in an IED in the first Macro Ryan area in 16th police district, the Kabul police spokesman said.

One person was wounded in the explosion, said Firdos Faramarz, who did not identify the injured.

Minutes later, unknown gunmen opened fire on a Toyota Corolla car in the Company area of the 5th police district, killing two people and injuring three others.

The victims of the attack in Kabul, where violence has sharply spiked in recent months, are said to be workers of the Maidan Wardak Rural Development Department.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attacks from any group or individual.

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Four staffers of the Rural Rehabilitation and Development Department of central Maidan Wardak were killed by unidentified gunmen in Kabul on Tuesday morning.

Police spokesman Firdos Faramarz told Pajhwok Afghan News the shooting took place in the Bagh-i-Dawood area of the 5th police district at around 9:20a.m.

He said four employees of the Maidan Wardak RRD Department, including the acting head of the department, came under attack from unidentified gunmen.

Faramarz identified the victims as Mohammad Habib, Faridullah, Riaz Ahmad and Baryalai.

A joint team of security organs are investigating the shooting. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the gun attack.

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Four security personnel were killed and a fifth wounded in a roadside bombing in western Herat province on Tuesday morning.

Governor Waheed Qatali, confirming the incident, said the Public Protection Force members came under bomb attack on the Herat-Islam Qala highway.

“The members of the Public Protection Force were on patrol when the blast happened,” Qatali was quoted as saying by Tolo News. He accused the Taliban of planting bomb.

The Taliban, however, have not yet commented on the blast, which comes amid soaring violence in the country.

**HERAT CITY** (Pajhwok): Four security personnel were killed in a roadside blast on the Herat-Islam Qala highway in western Herat province on Tuesday.

Governor Said Abdul Wahid Qatali told Pajhwok Afghan News a fifth public protection policeman was wounded in the blast, which he blamed on the Taliban.

Public Health Department spokesman Mohammad Rafiq Sherzai said one injured person had been taken to the civil hospital in Herat City, the provincial capital and his condition was stable.

There was no claim of responsibility for the blast.

### **February 10, 2021**

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): At least two people were killed and five others wounded as a result of three explosions in Kabul on Wednesday morning, an official said.

Police spokesman Firdos Faramarz told Pajhwok Afghan News the first blast happened in the Qala-i-Abdul Ali area of Paghman district, where a pick-up was hit by a sticky bomb at 8:12a.m.

He said the second explosion took place in the Quwa-i-Markaz area of the 2nd police district, injuring four individuals.

On the other hand, a Land Cruiser vehicle was hit by a magnetic bomb close to the Baraki Square, As a result of the bombing, two people were killed and a third wounded.

Meanwhile, eyewitnesses said a blast rocked the Lab-i-Jar locality of Khair Khan in limits of the 11th police district. But police did not provide information about the incident.

There has been no claim of responsibility for the bombings so far.

### **February 11, 2021**

**PESHAWAR** (Pajhwok): A Pakistani Taliban leader, who was allegedly involved in the killing of a renowned Japanese aid worker, has been killed in Afghanistan, a newspaper reported on Thursday.

Amir Nawaz, who was suspected of playing a key role in the murder of Dr. Tetsu Nakamura in eastern Nangarhar province in 2019, was killed during an operation near Kabul.

The militant leader, also known as Haji Dubai, was wanted by Pakistan for complicity in a string of killings and kidnappings in Karachi, Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Daily Times reported.

According to the newspaper, Nawaz was the mastermind behind the Bannu jailbreak in April 2012. About 260 Taliban fighters had fled the prison as a result of the attack, claimed by the Tehreek-0-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Pakistani security sources confirmed to Daily Times the TTP leader's killing in Afghanistan. TTP sources acknowledged Amir Nawaz's killing during an operation near Kabul a couple of days ago.

**PULI-ALAM** (Pajhwok): One civilian has been killed and 25 have been wounded in a bomb blast in the Baraki Barak district of central of Logar province, an official said on Thursday.

Ahmad Wais Abdul Rahimzai, the district's administrative chief, told Pajhwok Afghan News the injured included two security personnel. The blast occurred late on Wednesday night.

Provincial Council Chairman Haseebullah Stanikzai confirmed one civilian was killed and 40 others, including four soldiers, were injured in the explosion.

Meanwhile, the Taliban also confirmed the blast. The group's spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid said the bomb, planted beneath a power pylon, went off when government troops tried to defuse it.

He said civilians suffered casualties in the incident.

**JALALABAD** (Pajhwok): Two civilians were killed and five others injured in two separate blasts in Behsud and Kama districts of eastern Nangarhar province on Thursday, officials said.

The governor's house said in a statement one person was killed and four others were wounded in a roadside bombing in Behsud district on Thursday morning.

It added the second blast took place in Kama district, where one man killed and another wounded.

A person named Almas was killed and his friend wounded when a magnetic bomb hit their vehicle in the Dar Gali village of Kama district.

No one has so far claimed responsibility for the attacks.

**JALALABAD** (Pajhwok): Three personnel of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) 02 Unit were wounded in a roadside blast on Thursday, a statement said.

The blast happened on NDS personnel convoy in the limits of fourth police district of Jalalabad City.

NDS 02 Unit in a statement confirmed blast on its personnel at around 3:30pm in Jalalabad.

The statement said it was a suicide blast in which three NDS personnel were superficially injured.

## February 12, 2021

**CHARIKAR** (Pajhwok): Four people were injured on Friday when a sticky bomb attached to the vehicle of a former Wolesi Jirga member exploded in Bagram district of central Parwan province, an official said.

Bagram district chief Abdul Shakoor Qudusi told Pajhwok Afghan News the blast took place in Sayad area of Bagram district.

He said former lawmaker Zahoor Saadat was not in the car at the time of the blast but four people in the car were injured.

Without elaborating, he said two of the wounded had been taken to Kabul for treatment and the two others were being treated at the Bagram clinic.

Meanwhile, some sources said one person was killed in the blast, but Qudusi said he had not received any report about someone's death in the incident.

The blast comes amid increasing targeted killings in the country, especially in Kabul.

No one has claimed responsibility for most of the incidents, although the government has accused the Taliban of the bombings, but the group has denied any involvement.

## February 13, 2021

**ASADABAD** (Pajhwok): Five police personnel have been killed in a bomb blast in eastern Kunar province, a public representative said on Saturday.

The explosion hit the vehicle the policemen were travelling in in Chapa Dara district on Friday night, provincial council member Din Mohammad told Tolonews.

Feroz, the commander of a reinforcement company of police, was among the fatalities, the private TV channel reported.

In southern Kandahar province, seven policemen were wounded on Saturday morning when a car bomb struck their outpost in Arghandab district.

**JALALALBAD** (Pajhwok): Three people were wounded a result of a magnetic bomb blast in eastern Nangarhar province on Saturday, an official said.

Police spokesman Fareed Khan told Pajhwok Afghan News the bomb hit a police pick-up in limits of the 2nd police district of Jalalabad at around 8:00am.

Three civilians were injured in the morning explosion and evacuated to the main provincial hospital in Jalalabad.

Gulzada Sangar, spokesman for the Jalalabad Zonal Hospital, said a policeman was among the injured.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the blast.



**KABUL** (Pajhwok): The National Directorate of Security (NDS) on Saturday claimed killing a Daesh insurgent in eastern Nangarhar province.

The militant was killed in an operation by NDS personnel in the 6th police district of PD6 of Jalalabad, the provincial capital, on Friday night.

A statement from the intelligence agency said that two other Daesh fighters were arrested during the overnight raid.

It added: “The militants were involved in targeted killings in Jalalabad and extorting from civilians and businessmen to finance the group’s activities.”

**CHARIKAR** (Pajhwok): Unidentified gunmen have shot dead a couple in front of their three children in the Regrawan area of central Kapisa province.

Abdul Shaiq Shurish, the Kapisa police spokesman, said the incident happened on Thursday night. The woman’s ex-fiancé had killed the couple, he added.

Hashmatullah Ishaqzada, in-charge of Kapisa civil society groups, slammed the killing of parents in front of their children as a crime of the darkest dye.

He said two armed men broke into the couple’s home and committed the double murder.

“The couple had three children — their eldest son is six years-old. The perpetrators used Kalashnikov and a knife to murder the couple,” he explained.

The woman had been married to the man for six years after walking out of her engagement with her former fiancé, who informed the slain man’s brother that he had killed the couple.

## **February 14, 2021**

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Unidentified gunmen have shot dead the driver of Defense Minister Asadullah Khalid, according to security official on Sunday.

Defense Minister Khalid’s driver was gunned down on Saturday night in the Fourth Macroryan area in the limits of 9th Police District of Kabul City, according to the source. The driver’s little son was also killed in the incident.

“Armed men forced their way into the driver’s house and killed him and his son,” the source said.

No group claimed responsibility for the incident so far.

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Thirty Taliban have been killed and 11 others injured in the Abkamri district of northwestern Badghis province, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) said on Sunday.

With the support of Afghan Air Forces, security forces conducted military operation in the Rogiha, Gen. Zia, Haji Abdullah and Pahlawan villages, the MoD statement said.

Thirty Taliban including their two group leaders Najibullah and Gul Ahmad were killed and 11 others injured in operation.

Eighteen Taliban motorcycles were destroyed and eight weapons recovered during the operation.

The Taliban have not spoken in this regard.

### **February 15, 2021**

**KALAT** (Pajhwok): Six security personnel manning a check-post have been killed and four others wounded in an insider attack on the Zabul-Kandahar highway, an official said on Monday.

A security source in southern Zabul province, wishing anonymity, told Pajhwok Afghan News the incident came on Sunday night in the Pul-i-Sangi area on the Kalat-Kandahar highway.

The source added a policeman with links to Taliban killed six security personnel and wounded four others. Three other security force members have disappeared as a result of the overnight attack.

“Taliban insurgents also took away weapons and ammunitions from the check-post,” the official revealed.

However, the Taliban have not yet commented on the incident, which comes amid soaring violence across the country in recent months.

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Seven Daesh insurgents have been killed during an operation by the National Directorate of Security personnel in eastern Nangarhar province.

The intelligence agency said in a statement on Monday the NDS Special Unit carried out the raid in the 7th police district of Jalalabad on Sunday night.

It said seven Daesh terrorists were killed, including a suicide bomber. The rebels allegedly used civilians as human shields, but they were not harmed.

“The militants planned to carry out suicide and coordinated attacks on government facilities in Jalalabad city,” the NDS said, giving no further details.

A suicide vest, an RPG, three Kalashnikov assault rifles, 20 grenades and explosives were seized during the raid.

### **February 17, 2021**

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Unidentified gunmen shot dead two security personnel in the Bagrami district of Kabul on Wednesday morning, an official said.

Police spokesman Firdos Faramarz told Pajhwok Afghan News the incident took place in the Hussainkhel area of the district at around 7:15a.m.

He said two security force members were killed in the shooting. No arrest had been made but an investigation is underway.

Meanwhile, a security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said a officer of the Ministry of Defense and an NDS agent had been killed in Kabul.

**LASHKARGAH** (Pajhwok): Two children have been killed and four others, including a woman, wounded as a result of a mortar strike in southern Helmand province.

Attaullah Afghan, chairman of the provincial council, told Pajhwok Afghan News a number of individuals suffered casualties when a mortar shell hit a house in Nawa district on Tuesday evening.

A source in the Emergency Hospital in Lashkargah — the provincial capital — confirmed receiving the bodies of two children and four injured people from the site of the incident.

The source said the injured included one woman and three children.

Mohammadullah, a resident of Nawa district, told Pajhwok the casualties were caused by a mortar shell fired by Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers.

“A security operation has been underway in the district over the past few days and the mortar shell that struck the house was fired by government forces,” he claimed.

Deputy Government Baryalay Nazar also acknowledged the incident and said that an investigation was ongoing into the mortar strike.

The Taliban, who have a strong presence in most parts of Helmand, have not yet commented regarding the mortar strike.

**HERAT CITY** (Pajhwok): Two policemen were killed, and three others wounded in a landmine explosion in western Herat province on Wednesday morning, an official said.

A police tank struck the roadside bomb on the Herat-Islam Qala highway at around 10:00a.m., said Governor Abdul Wahid Qatali.

He added two policemen were killed and three others wounded. It is said the bomb had been planted by the Taliban.

The insurgent movement, however, has not commented on the incident.

**MAZAR-I-SHARIF** (Pajhwok): Local officials on Wednesday confirmed a school building was destroyed in an airstrike by Afghan security forces in Charbulak district of northern Balkh province.

Atta Mohammad Sharafyar, Charbulak district chief, told Pajhwok Afghan News that Abu Sahkoor High School was destroyed in the airstrike targeting Taliban militants in Aaq Tapa area on Tuesday.

The Taliban, using the school as a bastion, fired at a convoy of Afghan forces who called in air support that destroyed the school building, he said.

Haji Awrangzib, a tribal elder in Charbulak district, said that the conflicting sides did not care about civilian lives and public facilities during their fights

He said the latest clash between Afghan forces and Taliban militants in Aaq Tapa area lasted one hour.

“When the fight intensified, aircrafts bombarded the area which also destroyed the school where hundreds of local children including girls and boys are getting education,” he said.

Awrangzib asked the Taliban and Afghan forces not to use public facilities as their shields during conflict.

Aliullah Amiri, Balkh education director, said that around 1,000 children were getting education in Abu Shakoor High School.

“If the school building is not reconstructed before the start of new academic year, it would confront the education process with problems,” he added. He also asked the Taliban and security forces not to damage educational facilities.

However, 209th Shaheen Military Corps in the north said that they were unaware about the destruction of the school in Balkh.

Hanif Rezayee, spokesman of the corps, told Pajhwok that they targeted a Taliban base and killed 10 of them in the attack in Charbulak district two days ago.

“No one told us about the destruction of the school in airstrike, I do not confirm this incident, but sometimes public facilities receive damages because the Taliban use them as their bastions and then attack Afghan forces from there,” he said.

The Taliban did not comment on the incident so far.

A day earlier, the Taliban said that a health-care center was destroyed in an airstrike of Afghan forces in Charbulak district, but local officials did not say anything on the regard.

**NELLI** (Pajhwok): Four Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers were killed, and two others injured in a roadside blast in the Kajran district of central Daikundi province, an official said on Wednesday.

Deputy Daikunid Governor Mohammad Ali Uruzgani told Pajhwok Afghan News the incident happened at around 9:00am in the Kareez locality.

He said the injured had been shifted to the hospital, but their health condition is critical.

No group claimed responsibility for the blast.

## **February 18, 2021**

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): One individual was killed as two explosions jolted Kabul on Thursday, an official said.

Police spokesman Firdos Faramarz told Pajhwok Afghan News a magnetic bomb hit a Corolla-type vehicle in the Aliabad Hospital street in the 3rd police district at around 11:25a.m.

Without giving the victim's identity, Faramarz said one person was killed in the explosion.

But social media reported Mubashir Muslim, — a teacher of the Sharia faculty of Kabul university, — was killed in the bombing.

In a statement, the Ministry of Higher Education said the cell phone of Mubashir was off and that it was trying to contact his family.

According to the police spokesman, a second bomb blast hit a pick-up in limits of the 10th police district at around 8:07a.m.

Meanwhile, unidentified gunmen shot dead an employee of the Amiri Medical Complex in the 2nd police district of Kabul in the morning.

There were no claims of responsibility for the incidents, which occurred amid soaring violence in the nation's capital.

**KANDAHAR** (Pajhwok): At least 29 armed militants have been killed and five others wounded in security forces operations in southern Kandahar province, said local official on Thursday.

Lieutenant Colonel Khwaja Yahya Alawi, spokesman for the 205th Corps of the Afghan National Army, told Pajhwok Afghan News that 29 insurgents were killed and five wounded in security forces airstrikes in Arghandab and Maiwand districts.

He said a cache of explosives, a landmine-making factory, four bunkers and ammunition and a quantity of weapons were also destroyed in the operation.

He said security forces also discovered and defused eight roadside bombs in the districts. He added security forces suffered no casualties in the operation.

The National Directorate of Security (NDS) 03 Unit said seven insurgents were killed and 11 wounded in the Zherai district

A source said security forces during an ongoing clearing operation in Zherai district fired mortar shells at Payenda, Haji Bismillah and Loya Hadira areas.

As a result of the shelling, seven militants were killed and 11 others were wounded and a number of weapons, ammunition and hideouts were destroyed, the source said.

According to the source, as a result of these operations, large and small villages of Bianco area of the district have been cleared of militants.

The Taliban have not commented on the development, but said they blew up security check-posts in the Zalkhan area between Panjwai and Dand districts.

Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousaf Ahmadi said five soldiers killed of a check post were killed and several others wounded in a bomb attack.

However, a security source told Pajhwok Afghan News that one policeman, two intelligence men were killed, and two army soldiers were wounded in the blast.

### **February 20, 2021**

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): A series of bomb explosions rocked Kabul on Saturday morning, killing five people and wounding two others, officials said.

The first Improvised Explosive Device (IED) targeted a vehicle on the Darul Aman Road in the 6th police district of the capital at around 8am.

At least two people were wounded in the explosion, police said, adding a second IED struck a vehicle in the Kart-i-Parwan locality of the city 15 minutes later.

At least three people, including a woman, were killed in the second incident, which was followed by a third blast in the 3rd police district at 10:20a.m.

A Ranger-type vehicle was hit by the blast in Pul-i-Wahdat area, where two people lost their lives to the IED attack.

### **February 21, 2021**

**KANDAHAR** (Pajhwok): A tribal leader was gunned down by unidentified attackers in the Panjwai district of southern Kandahar province, an official said on Sunday.

Jamal Barezai, Kandahar police spokesman, confirmed the incident, but provided no further details.

A security source, who wished anonymity, identified the slain elder as Khan Mohammad Norzai,

He said Norzai was a local representative of Spirwan village and chief of District Development Assembly (DDA).

Separately, a civilian was killed in a roadside blast in Daman district.

The incidents come a day after National Directorate of Security (NDS) announced arresting a 10-member insurgent group in connection with terror attacks in Kandahar city and districts.

Targeted killings have spiked along with intensified clashes between Taliban and government forces in Kandahar province, which claim lives of security personnel and tribal elders.

**LASHKARGAH** (Pajhwok): Sixteen civilians were wounded on Sunday when a bomb-rigged motorcycle went off in this capital city of southern Helmand province.

A reliable source in the Helmand provincial administration told Pajhwok Afghan News the bomb was attached to a motorcycle which exploded in limits of first police district of Lashkargah city.

He said 16 civilians were wounded as a result of the blast.

Helmand police spokesman Mohammad Zaman Hamdard confirmed the blast, but he had no correct figures.

An eyewitness, Noor Mohammad, said eight wounded were carried in an ambulance and some of the wounded were in critical condition.

Officials at the Emergency-run hospital in Lashkargah said they had been delivered 15 wounded and one dead body.

No group has so far claimed responsibility for the incident.

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Two people were killed, and five others injured in a bomb blast in the Baraki Square of capital Kabul late on Sunday, an official said.

Police Spokesperson Ferdos Faramarz said the blast happened on a police vehicle at around 4:20p.m. in Baraki Square situated in the limits of fourth Police District of Kabul City.

He said a woman and children were among those injured.

A video went viral in social media in which an injured woman was laying on the roadside and two injured children are screaming.

No group claimed responsibility for Kabul blast as yet.

### **February 22, 2021**

**KABUL** (Pajhwok): Four people have been killed and five others wounded as a result of bomb blasts in the Baraki square of Kabul, said First Vice President Amrullah Saleh on Monday.

Police spokesman Ferdos Faramarz said an explosion took place in Baraki Square in limits of 4th police district at around 4:20p.m. on Sunday evening.

He said two people were killed and five others injured in the blast.

But first vice-president Amrullah Saleh in his 6:30a.m. report said that four people were killed in yesterday's explosion in Baraki square.

He said a seven-year-old laborer child was among the dead.

A video goes viral in social media in which an injured woman was laying on the roadside two injured children are screaming.

According to another report, National Security Advisor Hamdulla Mohib, visited the injured of the explosion in Wazir Akbar Khan and Indira Gandhi hospitals.

**HERAT CITY** (Pajhwok): Unidentified gunmen shot two National Directorate of Security (NDS) personnel in western Herat province on Monday morning.

Governor Syed Waheed Qatali said unknown armed men gunned down two security personnel in “Sayed Mukhtar” area of 12th police district at around 9:00a.m.

However, it is said that the gunmen reportedly opened fire at the vehicle of deputy director of NDS, killing two personnel, but the governor did not provide details about it.

Mohammad Rafiq Sherzai, spokesman for the Herat Public Health Department, told Pajhwok that to NDS personnel who were killed in a gun attack in Sayed Mukhtar area this morning had been shifted to civil hospital.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack.

**CHARIKAR** (Pajhwok): Five commando soldiers and two Taliban insurgents have been killed during three days of fighting in central Kapisa province, the Afghan military said on Monday.

A statement from the army’s 201 Selab Corps that 18 people had been killed and wounded clashes between government forces and Taliban insurgents in the Nijrab district of Kapisa

Five ANA troops and two Taliban have been killed and eight commando soldiers and three rebel fighters injured during the clashes.

The Taliban have said nothing in this regard.

### **February 23, 2021**

**PU-I-ALAM** (Pajhwok): Five uprising forces have been killed and several others were missing in a Taliban attack in central Logar province, said an official on Tuesday.

A security source told Pajhwok Afghan News that Taliban stormed security check-posts in Hasarak area of Pul-i-Alam on Monday night.

He said five uprising members were killed and several others were missing in the clash.

He added the attack was carried out with the help of an infiltrator and the Taliban also took away weapons and ammunition from the check-posts.

Ahmad Shah, a resident of the area said, five security men were killed, and some others were captured alive by the armed Taliban.

The Taliban confirmed the incident. The group’s spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said the rebels attacked check-posts in the Hesarak area on Monday night.

He said nine government soldiers were killed in the attack and their weapons and ammunition fell into the hands of the Taliban.



### 3.7 CALLBACK RATE, METHODS, RESULTS

In the *Survey*, the field team was able to complete 67.5% (n=2,738) of the interviews on the first call (from identifying the selected respondent). The remaining 32.5% (n=1,321) were completed on the second or third call.

**TABLE 7: CALLBACK INFORMATION**

INTERVIEW COMPLETED ON:	NUMBER	PERCENT
FIRST CALL	2,738	67.5%
SECOND CALL	868	21.4%
THIRD CALL	453	11.2%
TOTAL	4,059	100.00%

### 4 QUALITY CONTROL

This section provides a description of quality control procedures. Additional data processing checks and hard checks taken to ensure the quality of the report are summarized in this section.

#### 4.1 FIELD TEAM

A total of 70 interviewers worked on the *Survey*. The field team consisted of native Dari and Pashto speaking men and women.

	FEMALE	MALE	TOTAL
NUMBER OF FEMALE/MALE INTERVIEWERS	37	33	70
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWERS PREVIOUSLY USED IN D3 PROJECT	37	33	70
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWERS NEW TO A D3 PROJECT	0	0	0

#### 4.2 TRAINING

Following initial quality control procedures, phone project requires a detailed initial training/briefing for the interviewers. All interviewers received training: the initial training sessions were held on February 2 for male interviewers and February 3 for female interviewers. Follow-up trainings were held as more female interviewers were brought onto the project. The briefings covered the following aspects:

- General information regarding Survey research, including explanations of different types of surveys, standard questions found across surveys, and the purpose behind survey research, and of this project specifically.
- Survey details (sample size, fieldwork timing)
- Selection of respondents, interviewing techniques, usage of the TAPI system and application, facilities of the calling system, timing, and control issues.

- Questionnaire review – question-by-question review, demonstration on a screen with detailed explanations of questions’ meanings, requirements (filtering instructions, “do not read,” etc.) and potential reactions from respondents.

Briefings were held in-person with social distancing due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Representatives of the Foundation and Sayara Research (the third-party validator) attended the trainings virtually.

#### 4.3 QUALITY CONTROL METHODS – FIELD LEVEL

The quality of the data is guaranteed by the control procedures:

- The TAPI system ensures that all questions are presented in the correct order, and that skip patterns and basic logic tests are met.
- The field team strove to record all interviews, though this was not always possible due to technical issues with the devices or limited internet connectivity. D3’s AI tool sAIren analyzes the audio recordings for long intervals of silence or the absence of human voices, which suggest fraudulent or low-quality interviewing. Cases flagged by sAIren are then sent to the field team for further investigation.
- Field team supervisors exercised field-level quality control, focusing checks on cases that were flagged either by sAIren or for having abnormally short or long interview times. ACSOR also checked randomly selected cases each day, and ensured that each interviewer’s work was being checked regularly. 18% of cases were subject to audio audit, 6% were subject to phone back-check.
- Sayara Research served as a third-party validator. Every 5th, 10th, or 15th completed case was sent to Sayara for audio audit at the end of each day of fieldwork. If an audio recording was not available for a selected case, the field team would instead supply information for Sayara to conduct back-checks. Sayara would then share its feedback on the monitored cases with the Foundation. Ten percent of cases were quality-controlled by Sayara.
- Interviews that do not meet quality standard are rejected and replaced with a new interview. In total, 56 cases were removed due to field-level quality control, and 30 were removed due to Sayara’s validation activities.

#### 4.4 POST-FIELD QUALITY CONTROL

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, D3 uses a proprietary program called Valkyrie that searches for additional patterns and duplicates that may indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer. D3 regularly downloaded data for checks throughout fieldwork.

The Valkyrie program includes four tests:

1. Equality test – compares interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling point, province, or any other variable. Typically, interviews with an interviewer average of 90% or higher are flagged for further investigation.
2. Non-response test – determines the percentage of “don’t knows” for each interviewer’s cases. Typically, interviews with 50% or higher “don’t know” responses are flagged for further investigation.
3. Duplicates test – compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Typically, any cases that have a similarity of 90% or higher are flagged for further investigation.
4. Straights test – compares responses across two selected battery items. Analysts typically select batteries for which respondents would be expected to express differing views, such as one that asks about both government and opposition figures. If all items are the same in both batteries, the case is flagged for further investigation.

Any interview that does not pass Valkyrie is pulled out for additional screening. If the interview does not pass screening, it is removed from the final database before delivery. In W3 of the *Survey*, no cases were removed for failing the non-response test, none were removed for failing the duplicates test, and none were removed for failing both straights tests. In addition, 50 other cases were deleted as a result of other post-field quality control measures, mostly due to technical issues or incorrect or unreasonable interview durations, and 317 cases were deleted for having duplicate case IDs (i.e. the same phone number was called twice).

## 4.5 THE ASIA FOUNDATION LOGIC CHECKS

The Foundation conducted additional logic checks after the initial data delivery, but prior to weighting; 37 cases were deleted as a result of the Foundation’s logic checks.

## 5 QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire included questions about the Covid-19 pandemic, opinion of the security forces, the peace process, crime and violence, and the role of women in society. In addition, the *Survey* captured demographic information, such as age, gender, education level, ethnicity, and work status, among others.

The average length of a completed interview was 29 minutes 39 seconds, with a standard deviation of 8 minutes and 35 seconds. The minimum interview length was 15 minutes and 30 seconds, while the maximum length was 1 hour, 35 minutes, and 19 seconds. Due to the length of the questionnaire, an incentive of 100 AFN to each respondent who completed the survey was provided. Despite this, the field team still faced high rates of break-offs and mid-interview refusals. Some of the questionnaire topics were also sensitive for a phone survey: while most respondents felt comfortable answering questions about the pandemic, some became uneasy or uncooperative when asked about the peace process, government, or Taliban.

## 6 OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED

The three waves of the *Survey* were completed successfully. Although the questionnaire is considerably shorter than the face-to-face interviews for the *Survey of the Afghan People* or the *Survey of Afghan Returnees*, it is still longer than optimal for a phone survey, which led to higher rates of partial interviews/non-completion than is typically seen in phone surveys, as well as a lower number of completes per day.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Interviewers would enter a Case ID and then confirm that the corresponding phone number was correct, rather than dialing the number themselves.
- 2 The R package survey was used to estimate this design effect using the 'replace' option for singleton PSUs.
- 3 To provide an overall design effect estimate, each response category's design effect is weighted by the frequency and the mean is taken. This is survey-wide design effect estimate is provided as a reference, as it is only based on one identified key statistic. However, we recommend the use of complex survey software in practice. This allows statistical analyses and reporting of standard errors to accurately account for the survey design across all variables and response categories.
- 4 According to the American Association of Public Opinion Research, "by knowing the disposition of every element drawn in a survey sample, researchers can assess whether their sample might contain nonresponse error and the potential reasons for that error" (AAPOR 2011, 7).
- 5 I = Interviews, E = Eligible (temporary code, not part of final calculation), R = Refusal, NC = Non-Contact, NE = Not Eligible, UH= Unknown Eligibility, O=other



Effectiveness Perceptions of Face Mask Usage and COVID-19

Question	Yes	No	Total
1. I use face mask when I go out	100	0	100
2. I use face mask when I go to work	100	0	100
3. I use face mask when I go to school	100	0	100
4. I use face mask when I go to shopping	100	0	100
5. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
6. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
7. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
8. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
9. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
10. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
11. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
12. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
13. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
14. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
15. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
16. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
17. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
18. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
19. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
20. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
21. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
22. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
23. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
24. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
25. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
26. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
27. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
28. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
29. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
30. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
31. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
32. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
33. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
34. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
35. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
36. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
37. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
38. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
39. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
40. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
41. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
42. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
43. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
44. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
45. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
46. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
47. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
48. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
49. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
50. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
51. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
52. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
53. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
54. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
55. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
56. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
57. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
58. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
59. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
60. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
61. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
62. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
63. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
64. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
65. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
66. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
67. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
68. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
69. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
70. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
71. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
72. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
73. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
74. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
75. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
76. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
77. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
78. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
79. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
80. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
81. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
82. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
83. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
84. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
85. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
86. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
87. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
88. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
89. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
90. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
91. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
92. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
93. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
94. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
95. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100
96. I use face mask when I go to crowded places	100	0	100
97. I use face mask when I go to outdoor places	100	0	100
98. I use face mask when I go to indoor places	100	0	100
99. I use face mask when I go to public transport	100	0	100
100. I use face mask when I go to public places	100	0	100

## APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

### AFGHANISTAN FLASH SURVEYS ON PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE, COVID-19, AND THE ECONOMY: WAVE 3 FINDINGS

*Questionnaire*

*Version 2*

*January 20, 2021*

#### **M1. Respondent ID (system-generated)**

##### **startint. Start Datetime of Entire Interview (Unix)**

Start Datetime of Entire Interview (Unix)

##### **M-2. Year of Interview: 2021 (Autofill by system)**

##### **M-3. Month of Interview (Autofill by system)**

**W1RESPID** – RESPID from W1 (system variable)

**W2RESPID**– RESPID from W2 (system variable)

**PanelID** – Panel participant ID (system variable)

1. JANUARY	4. APRIL	7. JULY	10. OCTOBER
2. FEBRUARY	5. MAY	8. AUGUST	11. NOVEMBER
3. MARCH	6. JUNE	9. SEPTEMBER	12. DECEMBER

##### **M-4. Date of Interview: \_\_\_\_\_ (Autofill by system)**

##### **M-5. Day of Week of Interview (Autofill by system)**

1. FRIDAY	3. SUNDAY	5. TUESDAY	7. THURSDAY
2. SATURDAY	4. MONDAY	6. WEDNESDAY	

##### **M-6. Date Formatted Field: AUG 2020 (Autofill by System)**

#### **SL. Select Language (Language of questionnaire)**

1. DARI
2. PASHTO

##### **startsub. Start Datetime of Substantive Interview (Unix)**

Start Datetime of Substantive Interview (Unix)

##### **M-7. Interviewer ID**

**Interviewer Code:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-8. Supervisor ID:** \_\_\_\_\_

## NOTE TO INTERVIEWERS

**REMEMBER THAT THIS IS A CONVERSATION. MAKE THE PERSON COMFORTABLE. BE RESPECTFUL. DO NOT TRY TO LEAD THE RESPONDENT DURING THE INTERVIEW OR GET THE “DESIRED” ANSWERS FROM THEM. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. WE JUST WANT THEIR OPINIONS.**

## INTRODUCTION

Asalaam Aleikum, my name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am from ACSOR-Surveys, an independent research organization.

We are doing a survey with people such as you. We adhere to all data protection laws in Afghanistan: your responses will be kept confidential and will be analysed only in anonymous, aggregated form. If I come to a question that is sensitive and you feel uncomfortable answering it, please let me know. We can either decide to ignore that particular question, or else I will explain what the question is about in more detail so that you can decide whether to answer it or not. The interview will take about 20-30 minutes; and to thank you for your participation, we will send you 100 AFN in phone credit via electronic transfer. Are you willing to participate in this survey?

1. Yes
2. No (refused to participate)
3. No (call back later, make an appointment)

### M-9. Province

1. BADAKSHAN
2. BADGHIS
3. BAGHLAN
4. BALKH
5. BAMYAN
6. DAYKUNDI
7. FARAH
8. FARYAB
9. GHAZNI
10. GHOR
11. HELMAND
12. HERAT
13. JOWZJAN
14. KABUL
15. KANDAHAR



16. KAPISA
17. KHOST
18. KUNAR
19. KUNDUZ
20. LAGHMAN
21. LOGAR
22. NANGARHAR
23. NIMROZ
24. NURISTAN
25. PAKTIA
26. PAKTIKA
27. PANJSHIR
28. PARWAN
29. SAMANGAN
30. SAR-E POL
31. TAKHAR
32. DRUZGAN
33. WARDAK
34. ZABUL

**M-10A. CSO region (auto-coded by system based on province)**

**M-10B. TAF region (auto-coded by system based on province)**

**M11. District:** \_\_\_\_\_ (selected from list based on province at M9)

**M12. Which of the following areas do you live in?**

1 KABUL CITY
2 BIG CITY (HERAT CITY, MAZAR CITY, JALALABAD, KANDAHAR CITY, PUL-E-KHUMRI CITY)
3 TOWN
4 VILLAGE

**D-1. Gender (Do not ask)**

1. MALE
2. FEMALE

**D-2. How old are you? (Record actual age; if respondent doesn't know or refuses, please estimate)**

**Write Response:** \_\_\_\_\_

## SECTION 1: COVID-19

I would like to begin by asking some questions about the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Q-1:** *With some government restrictions lifting following the COVID-19 pandemic, would you say that are you not at all worried, somewhat worried, worried, or very worried about the following:*

	NOT WORRIED AT ALL	SOMEWHAT WORRIED	WORRIED	VERY WORRIED	REFUSED (VOL)	DON'T KNOW (VOL)
A) GOING TO WORK	1	2	3	4	98	99
B) ENGAGING IN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES	1	2	3	4	98	99
C) ATTENDING FUNERALS AND RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONS	1	2	3	4	98	99
D) ATTENDING SCHOOL	1	2	3	4	98	99
E) VISITING A HEALTHCARE FACILITY	1	2	3	4	98	99
F) TRAVELLING OUTSIDE OF YOUR LOCAL AREA TO VISIT FAMILY, ACCESS HEALTHCARE, PURCHASE GOODS, ETC.	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-2:** *Which of the following precautionary measures are you using to protect yourself from the virus? Have you used....*

	YES	NO	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW
A) FACEMASK	1	2	98	99
B) GLOVES	1	2	98	99
C) HAND SANITIZER	1	2	98	99
D) FREQUENT HANDWASHING	1	2	98	99
E) SOAP AND OTHER DETERGENTS FOR CLEANING SURFACES	1	2	98	99
F) SOCIAL DISTANCING	1	2	98	99
G) SELF-ISOLATION	1	2	98	99
H) OTHER PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT (GOWNS, FACE SHIELD, ETC)	1	2	98	99
I) OTHER: _____	1	2	98	99

**Q-3:** *Which of the following sources of news and information do you use to stay informed about COVID-19? [READ OUT OPTIONS]*

	YES	NO	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW
A. RADIO WHAT STATION(S)?	1	2	98	99
B. TELEVISION: WHAT TELEVISION(S) STATION(S)?	1	2	98	99
C. NEWSPAPER	1	2	98	99
D. FAMILY AND FRIENDS	1	2	98	99
E. DOCTOR OR OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONAL	1	2	98	99
F. SOCIAL MEDIA (FACEBOOK, TWITTER, ETC).	1	2	98	99
G. OTHER: _____	1	2	98	99

**Q4a. (Ask if Code 1 at Q3a)** Which radio stations do you primarily use to stay informed about COVID-19? (Record First Two Mentions)

A) 1 <sup>ST</sup> MENTION: _____
B) 2 <sup>ND</sup> MENTION: _____
97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q4b. (Ask if Code 1 at Q3b)** Which TV stations do you primarily use to stay informed about COVID-19? (Record First Two Mentions)

A) 1 <sup>ST</sup> MENTION: _____
B) 2 <sup>ND</sup> MENTION: _____
97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-5:** Do you feel you receive adequate news and information on the COVID-19 and actions taken to respond to it?

1. YES
2. NO
_____ 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-6.** Thinking now about the government response to COVID-19, to what extent do you feel the government has:

	A GREAT EXTENT	A MODERATE EXTENT	A SMALL EXTENT	NOT AT ALL	REFUSED (VOL)	DON'T KNOW (VOL)
A) PROVIDED TIMELY INFORMATION ABOUT COVID-19	1	2	3	4	98	99

B) PROVIDED ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT COVID-19	1	2	3	4	98	99
C) PROVIDED SUPPORT TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY DURING THE PANDEMIC	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-7:** Since December 2019, have you or any member of your household experienced any of the following symptoms:

A) SYMPTOM		B) IF YES, HOW MANY PEOPLE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD CONTRACTED THE SYMPTOMS?	C) APPROXIMATELY WHEN DID THEY MOST RECENTLY GET IT?	D) DID YOU OR THE HOUSEHOLD MEMBER VISIT THE DOCTOR?	E) WAS YOUR USUAL DOCTOR OR OTHER HEALTH-CARE PROFESSIONAL AWARE OF THE SIGNS AND TESTING OF COVID-19?
1. FEVER	1. YES 2. NO 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	WRITE NUMBER:____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. CURRENTLY HAVE IT 2. WITHIN PAST MONTH 3. 1-2 MONTHS AGO 4. 3-4 MONTHS AGO 5. MORE THAN 5 MONTHS AGO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW
2. SHORTNESS OF BREATH OR DIFFICULTY BREATHING	1. YES 2. NO 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	WRITE NUMBER:____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. CURRENTLY HAVE IT 2. WITHIN PAST MONTH 3. 1-2 MONTHS AGO 4. 3-4 MONTHS AGO 5. MORE THAN 5 MONTHS AGO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW
3. TIREDNESS	1. YES 2. NO 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	WRITE NUMBER:____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. CURRENTLY HAVE IT 2. WITHIN PAST MONTH 3. 1-2 MONTHS AGO 4. 3-4 MONTHS AGO 5. MORE THAN 5 MONTHS AGO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW

4. DRY COUGH	1. YES 2. NO 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	WRITE NUMBER: ____  97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. CURRENTLY HAVE IT 2. WITHIN PAST MONTH 3. 1-2 MONTHS AGO 4. 3-4 MONTHS AGO 5. MORE THAN 5 MONTHS AGO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW
6. SORE THROAT	1. YES 2. NO 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	WRITE NUMBER: ____  97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. CURRENTLY HAVE IT 2. WITHIN PAST MONTH 3. 1-2 MONTHS AGO 4. 3-4 MONTHS AGO 5. MORE THAN 5 MONTHS AGO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW
7. OTHER (SPECIFY): _____	1. YES 2. NO 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	WRITE NUMBER: _____  97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. CURRENTLY HAVE IT 2. WITHIN PAST MONTH 3. 1-2 MONTHS AGO 4. 3-4 MONTHS AGO 5. MORE THAN 5 MONTHS AGO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW	1. YES 2. NO 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW

**Q-8.** *Has anyone in your household received a confirmed diagnosis of COVID-19?*

1. YES
2. NO
_____ 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-9A:** *Would you associate with someone in your community whom you knew had previously had COVID-19 but now is healthy?*

1. YES
2. NO
_____ 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-10:** How concerned are you about the lasting impact of coronavirus outbreak on your personal health?

1. NOT CONCERNED
2. SOMEWHAT CONCERNED
3. MODERATELY CONCERNED
4. VERY CONCERNED
_____ 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-11:** How concerned are you about the lasting impact of COVID-19 on your lifestyle (i.e. your daily routine and ability to work and socialize with others)?

1. NOT CONCERNED
2. SOMEWHAT CONCERNED
3. MODERATELY CONCERNED
4. VERY CONCERNED
_____ 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-12:** If a vaccine for COVID-19 was made available to you, would you get it?

1. YES
2. NO
_____ 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-13:** (Ask if Code 2 – no at Q-12) Why would you not take the vaccine if it were available?

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Pre-codes: \_\_\_\_\_

1. CONCERNS ABOUT SIDE EFFECTS
2. CONCERNS ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS / DO NOT THINK IT WILL WORK
3. CONCERNS ABOUT COST / CANNOT AFFORD
4. THE VACCINE HAS A MICROCHIP / IS USED FOR TRACKING
5. THE VACCINE IS USED FOR MIND CONTROL
6. VACCINES CAUSE INFERTILITY
7. VACCINE IS HARAM / AGAINST ISLAM
8. IT IS AGAINST OUR CULTURE
9. I DON'T NEED IT / WILL NOT GET COVID

96. OTHER (VOL. – SPECIFY): \_\_\_\_\_  
 97. NOT ASKED  
 98. REFUSED (VOL.)  
 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

## ECONOMY

Now I would like to ask you some questions about economic issues and access to goods and services.

**Q-14.** *During the past 12 months, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same or gotten worse with respect to the following?*

[Was Q-12 in Wave 2]

	BETTER	THE SAME	WORSE	REF (VOL.)	DK (VOL.)
A) FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD	1	2	3	8	9
B) EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	1	2	3	8	9
C) AVAILABILITY OF QUALITY PRODUCTS IN THE MARKET (E.G. RICE, WHEAT, OIL)	1	2	3	8	9
D) AFFORDABILITY OF QUALITY PRODUCTS IN THE MARKET (E.G. RICE, WHEAT, OIL)	1	2	3	8	9
F) PHYSICAL ACCESS TO HEALTH-CARE SERVICES (TRANSPORTATION, ACCESSIBILITY)	1	2	3	8	9
G) COST OF HEALTH-CARE SERVICES (DOCTOR, HOSPITAL FEES, TESTING, PROCEDURES, ROUTINE CARE)	1	2	3	8	9
H) COST OF MEDICATION (PRESCRIPTIONS)	1	2	3	8	9
I) ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	1	2	3	8	9
L) ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER	1	2	3	8	9

A. ARE YOU AWARE OF [INSERT ITEM] BEING PROVIDED IN YOUR LOCAL AREA TO AID HOUSEHOLDS DURING THIS TIME?		B. (ASK IF 1 'YES' AT A) WHAT ENTITY IS PRIMARILY PROVIDING IT?	C. (ASK IF 1 'YES' AT A) HAVE YOU OR ANYONE ELSE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD PERSONALLY ACCESSED THE SUPPORT?	D. IS THE SUPPORT SUFFICIENT FOR YOUR NEEDS?
Q-15. FOOD	1. YES 2. NO _____ 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 2. UN 3. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY 4. LOCAL NGO 5. INTERNATIONAL NGO 6. TALIBAN/ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 96. OTHER: _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. YES 2. NO _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. YES 2. NO _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)
Q-16. EMPLOYMENT	1. YES 2. NO _____ 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 2. UN 3. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY 4. LOCAL NGO 5. INTERNATIONAL NGO 6. TALIBAN/ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 96. OTHER: _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. YES 2. NO _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. YES 2. NO _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)
Q-17. WATER	1. YES 2. NO _____ 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 2. UN 3. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY 4. LOCAL NGO 5. INTERNATIONAL NGO 6. TALIBAN/ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 96. OTHER: _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. YES 2. NO _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)	1. YES 2. NO _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)



<p>Q-18. HEALTH CARE</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 2. UN 3. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY 4. LOCAL NGO 5. INTERNATIONAL NGO 6. TALIBAN/ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 96. OTHER: _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>
<p>Q-19. FINANCIAL</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 2. UN 3. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY 4. LOCAL NGO 5. INTERNATIONAL NGO 6. TALIBAN/ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 96. OTHER: _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>
<p>Q-20. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT (GLOVES, FACEMASKS, SANITIZER, ETC)</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 2. UN 3. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY 4. LOCAL NGO 5. INTERNATIONAL NGO 6. TALIBAN/ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 96. OTHER: _____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>	<p>1. YES 2. NO ____ 97. NOT ASKED 98. REF (VOL.) 99. DK (VOL.)</p>

**Q-21:** Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem at all in the following areas:

	MAJOR PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	NOT A PROBLEM	REF. (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) IN YOUR DAILY LIFE	1	2	3	98	99
B) IN AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE	1	2	3	98	99

## PEACE

Turning to a different topic...

**Q-22:** Do you think peace is achievable in Afghanistan in the next two years?

1. YES
2. NO
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-23.** (Ask if code 2 at Q-22) Why do you think peace is not achievable in the next two years? (Single mention)

WRITE RESPONSE: _____
PRE-CODES:
1. VIOLENCE & FIGHTING ARE CONTINUING
2. GOVERNMENT & TALIBAN ARE TOO FAR APART TO REACH AN AGREEMENT
3. AMERICAN INTERFERENCE
4. PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE
5. INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES
6. CORRUPTION
7. THE TALIBAN ARE NOT INTERESTED IN PEACE
8. ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WILL PREVENT A PEACE DEAL
9. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
96. OTHER: _____
97. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-24.** Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?

1. YES
--------

2. NO
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-25.** *It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides would have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?*

	VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	NOT TOO IMPORTANT	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION	1	2	3	4	98	99
B. A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM	1	2	3	4	98	99
C. FREEDOM OF SPEECH	1	2	3	4	98	99
D. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS	1	2	3	4	98	99
E. A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	1	2	3	4	98	99
F. THE CURRENT JUDICIAL AND COURT SYSTEM	1	2	3	4	98	99
G. WOMEN'S RIGHTS	1	2	3	4	98	99
H. EQUALITY AMONG DIFFERENT GROUPS OF PEOPLE (REGARDLESS OF ETHNICITY, CLASS, ETC.)	1	2	3	4	98	99
I. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN	1	2	3	4	98	99
J. FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-26.** *And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which:*

	VERY WILLING	SOMEWHAT WILLING	SOMEWHAT UNWILLING	VERY UNWILLING	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A. BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED FOR TALIBAN FIGHTERS	1	2	3	4	98	99

B. BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED FOR TALIBAN SENIOR LEADERS	1	2	3	4	98	99
C. A ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT IS GIVEN TO THE TALIBAN	1	2	3	4	98	99
D. CONTROL OVER CERTAIN PROVINCES IS CEDED TO THE TALIBAN	1	2	3	4	98	99
E. WOMEN MAY NO LONGER WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	1	2	3	4	98	99
F. WOMEN AND GIRLS MAY NO LONGER ATTEND SCHOOL	1	2	3	4	98	99

## 1 CONJOINT EXPERIMENT - WHICH ASPECTS OF A PEACE DEAL ARE SUPPORTED BY CIVILIANS

The following question is preceded by a paragraph that includes four different policy dimensions of a potential peace deal. Each respondent will get a different arrangement of each of the two policy options (randomly), and then will answer a question about support for the peace deal.

Within each of the four brackets below are two options that should be independently randomized. Thus there are 16 total configurations of the prompts that a respondent might receive.

**Interviewer: read statement verbatim**

“Currently the government of Afghanistan is talking about a peace process with the Taliban. There are various goals being discussed for this peace process. For example, the new government after the peace process may [**allow / not allow**] the Taliban to have majority influence over the government. Also, the new government may [**reduce / increase**] the public role of women in society. It may [**include / not include**] a requirement that Islamic law is higher than secular law. Lastly, the new government may [**ask you to democratically elect your leaders / be an Islamic Emirate**].”

**Q-27.** *Would you support a peace deal with these conditions?*

1. YES
2. NO
98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

## 2 ENDORSEMENT EXPERIMENT - TRUE SUPPORT FOR TALIBAN OR GOVERNMENT

In the endorsement experiment we ask two questions, each with three randomized versions. Thus

each respondent would receive (randomly) one of three options for each of the questions. These should be randomized independently (that is, the version they got for question 1 should have no bearing on what version they get in question 2).

**Q-28- RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A, B, or C**

**Q-28a.** *A recent proposal calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. SOMEWHAT AGREE
3. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
-----
97. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-28b.** *A recent proposal by the Taliban calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. SOMEWHAT AGREE
3. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
-----
97. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q28c.** *A recent proposal by the government calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. SOMEWHAT AGREE

3. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
<hr/> 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-29- RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A, B, or C**

**Q-29a.** *It has been proposed to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government as well as its responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. It would also permit local people to actively participate in local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacy for office in these district councils. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. SOMEWHAT AGREE
3. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
<hr/> 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-29b.** *It has been proposed by the Taliban to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government as well as its responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. It would also permit local people to actively participate in local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacy for office in these district councils. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. SOMEWHAT AGREE
3. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
<hr/> 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-29c.** *It has been proposed by the government to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government as well as its*

*responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. It would also permit local people to actively participate in local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacy for office in these district councils. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. SOMEWHAT AGREE
3. SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
----- 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

### 3 SURVEY EXPERIMENT ON PERCEIVED SERVICE PROVISION BY TALIBAN

In this survey experiment each of the following four questions should (randomly) have one of the two options below presented to respondents.

#### Q-30. Security (RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A or B)

- a. Some Afghans have reported that they recently have witnessed an increase in issues related to security. Have people in your village received assistance related to peace and security from the government or Taliban?

1. YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT
2. YES, FROM THE TALIBAN
3. YES, FROM BOTH
4. NO, FROM NEITHER
----- 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

- b. Some Afghans have reported that they recently have witnessed an increase in issues related to security, but that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve this issue. Have people in your village received assistance related to peace and security from the government or Taliban?

1. YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT
2. YES, FROM THE TALIBAN
3. YES, FROM BOTH
4. NO, FROM NEITHER
----- 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

#### Q-31. Justice (RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A or B)

- a. Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to the speed and fairness of justice. Have you heard about this happening in your area?

1. YES
2. NO
----- 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

- b. Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to the speed and fairness of justice, but that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve this issue. Have you heard about this happening in your area?

1. YES
2. NO
----- 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-32. Health Care (RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A or B)**

- a. Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to emergency healthcare. Have people in your village received assistance related to emergency healthcare from the government, Taliban or international development actors? **(MULTIPLE RESPONSE, CODE ALL MENTIONED)**

1. YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT
2. YES, FROM THE TALIBAN
3. YES, FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS
4. NO, FROM NONE OF THESE SOURCES
----- 97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

- b. Some Afghans have reported that they recently have had issues related to emergency healthcare, but that the Taliban have made some efforts to resolve this issue. Have people in your village received assistance related to emergency healthcare from the government, Taliban or international development actors? **(MULTIPLE RESPONSE, CODE ALL MENTIONED)**

1. YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT
2. YES, FROM THE TALIBAN
3. YES, FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS
4. NO, FROM NONE OF THESE SOURCES



- 96. YES, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE (VOL.)
- 97. NOT ASKED
- 98. REFUSED (VOL.)
- 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-33. Aid gatekeeping (RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A or B)**

- a. Some Afghans have reported that they have benefitted from development projects. Have people in your village benefitted from infrastructure projects facilitated by the government, Taliban, or international development actors? **(MULTIPLE RESPONSE, CODE ALL MENTIONED)**

1. YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT

2. YES, FROM THE TALIBAN

3. YES, FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

4. NO, FROM NONE OF THESE SOURCES

- 96. YES, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE (VOL.)
- 97. NOT ASKED
- 98. REFUSED (VOL.)
- 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

- b. Some Afghans have reported that they have benefitted from development projects, and the Taliban allowed the project to occur. Have people in your village benefited from development projects facilitated by the government, Taliban, or international development actors? **(MULTIPLE RESPONSE, CODE ALL MENTIONED)**

1. YES, FROM THE GOVERNMENT

2. YES, FROM THE TALIBAN

3. YES, FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

4. NO, FROM NONE OF THESE SOURCES

- 96. YES, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE (VOL.)
- 97. NOT ASKED
- 98. REFUSED (VOL.)
- 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

## SECURITY

I would now like to ask some questions related to the security situation.

- Q-34.** *Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign technical assistance? By technical assistance we mean tactical, operational and mentoring support to the ANDSF. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?*

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	1	2	3	4	98	99
B) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	1	2	3	4	98	99
C) AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-35.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following will be able to provide adequate security without foreign financial assistance? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DON'T KNOW (VOL.)
A) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	1	2	3	4	98	99
B) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	1	2	3	4	98	99
C) AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-36.** I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask): Would you say strongly or somewhat?

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REFUSED (VOL.)	DK (VOL.)
A) ANP IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE	1	2	3	4	98	99
B) ANP HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN	1	2	3	4	98	99
C) ANP IS EFFICIENT AT ARRESTING THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES	1	2	3	4	98	99
D) I WOULD CONTACT THE ANP IF I NEEDED ASSISTANCE	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-37.** (Ask all) Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year?

**[Was Q-30 in TAF Wave 14]**

1. YES
2. NO

98. REFUSED (VOL.)  
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**Q-38.** (Ask if answered code 1 'Yes' in Q-37) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (DO NOT READ OUT LIST).

**[Was Q-31 in TAF W14 (Survey of the Afghan People)]**

**Q-38a. First Mention:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Q-38b. Second Mention:** \_\_\_\_\_

<b>ACSOR CODES (DO NOT READ OUT)</b>	
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	1
RACKETEERING / EXTORTION	2
BURGLARY/LOOTING	3
PICKPOCKETING	4
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT / PROPERTY TAKEN FROM YOUR VEHICLE OR PARTS OF THE VEHICLE STOLEN	5
KIDNAPPING	7
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	8
MILITANTS/INSURGENT ACTIONS	9
POLICE ACTIONS	10
ARMY ACTIONS	11
FOREIGN FORCES ACTIONS (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	12
MURDER	13
SUICIDE ATTACKS	14
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	15
SMUGGLING	16
OTHER (SPECIFY): _____	96
NOT ASKED	97
REFUSED (VOL.)	98
DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	99

**Q-39.** (Ask if answered code 1 'Yes' in Q-37) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not?

**[Was Q-32 in TAF W14]**

1. YES
2. NO
97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

## WOMEN'S RIGHTS

I would now like to ask some questions about the role of women in our society.

**Q-40.** *And thinking about where women can work. For each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat?*

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REF (VOL)	DK (VOL)
A) GOVERNMENT OFFICES	1	2	3	4	98	99
B) NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)	1	2	3	4	98	99
C) HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	1	2	3	4	98	99
D) FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS	1	2	3	4	98	99
E) CO-ED SCHOOLS	1	2	3	4	98	99
F) ARMY/POLICE	1	2	3	4	98	99
G) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) -- WITH FEMALE EMPLOYEES ONLY	1	2	3	4	98	99
H) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) -- WHERE MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES WORK IN THE SAME ROOM	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-41.** *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat?*

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	REF (VOL)	DK (VOL)
A) MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	1	2	3	4	98	99
B) GOVERNOR OF A PROVINCE	1	2	3	4	98	99
C) CEO OF A LARGE COMPANY	1	2	3	4	98	99
D) MINISTER OR CABINET MEMBER	1	2	3	4	98	99
E) RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN	1	2	3	4	98	99

## TELEPHONY QUESTIONS

I would like to ask some questions about your phone usage

**T-1.** How many mobile phone numbers do you use to regularly receive calls? Please include SIM cards assigned to different phone numbers.

RECORD NUMBER: _____
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**T-2.** What is the name of your primary mobile phone service provider?

<b>PRE-CODES:</b>
1. ETISALAT
2. MTN
3. ROSHAN
4. AWCC/AFGHAN WIRELESS
5. SALAAM
6. WASEL
_____
96. NOT ASKED
97. OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY): _____
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**T-3.** How many people aged 18 and older, including yourself, regularly use your primary mobile phone to receive calls?

WRITE NUMBER: _____
96. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**T-4a.** Does one person typically answer your shared mobile phone?

1. YES
2. NO
_____
97. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**T-4b. (If '01' in T-4a)** What is the gender of this person?

01. MALE
02. FEMALE
_____
96. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**T-4c. (If '01' in T-4a)** What is the age of this person?

RECORD AGE IN YEARS: _____
96. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

## DEMOGRAPHICS

We are almost done. I just need to ask a few questions for statistical purposes, so that we can be sure we are talking to a wide range of people.

### D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money?

1. YES	[GO TO D4]
2. NO	[SKIP TO D5]
98. REFUSED (VOL.)	[SKIP TO D5]
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	[SKIP TO D5]

### D-4. [Ask if 'yes' in D-3] And what type of activity is that?

[Same as D4 in TAF W14]

Occupation/Job: \_\_\_\_\_ [do not read out list]

1. FARMER (OWN LAND / TENANT FARMER)
2. FARM LABORER (OTHER'S LAND)
3. LABORER, DOMESTIC, OR UNSKILLED WORKER
4. INFORMAL SALES/ BUSINESS
5. SKILLED WORKER/ARTISAN
6. GOVERNMENT OFFICE - CLERICAL WORKER
7. PRIVATE OFFICE - CLERICAL WORKER
8. GOVERNMENT OFFICE – EXECUTIVE/ MANAGER
9. PRIVATE OFFICE – EXECUTIVE/ MANAGER
10. SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL
11. SMALL BUSINESS OWNER
12. SCHOOL TEACHER
13. UNIVERSITY TEACHER
14. MILITARY/ POLICE
96. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____
97. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

## HOUSEHOLD INCOME

**D-5.** For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?  
*[Interviewer: If respondent can only tell you their annual family income, divide this by 12]*

**[Same as D-6 in TAF W14]**

WRITE RESPONSE: _____ AFS
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**D-6.** (Ask if 98 Refused or 99 Don't Know in D-5) If you are unsure of the actual monthly amount, what's the general range? Again, this is for your whole household.

**[Same as D-7 in TAF W14]**

1. LESS THAN 2,000 AFS
2. 2,001 – 3,000 AFS
3. 3,001 – 5,000 AFS
4. 5,001 – 10,000 AFS
5. 10,001 – 15,000 AFS
6. 15,001 – 20,000 AFS
7. 20,001 – 25,000 AFS
8. 25,001 – 40,000 AFS
9. MORE THAN 40,000 AFS
97. NOT ASKED
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**D-7.** Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?

**[Same as D-8 in TAF W14]**

1. YES
2. NO
_____
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

## EDUCATION

**D-8.** How many years, if any, have you studied at Islamic madrasa? (INTERVIEWER: If none, write down zero)

**[Same as D-9 in TAF W14]**

_____ (WRITE DOWN NUMBER OF YEARS)
98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**D-9.** *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in Islamic madrasa? (calculate the highest level into years)*

**(INTERVIEWER: If none, write down zero)**

**[Same as D-10 in TAF W14]**

_____ (WRITE DOWN NUMBER OF YEARS)
97. INFORMAL SCHOOLING AT HOME OR AT A LITERACY CLASS 98. REFUSED 99. DON'T KNOW

**D-10.** *Are you married or single?*

**[Same as D-12 in TAF W14]**

1. SINGLE	<b>[SKIP TO D-12]</b>
2. MARRIED	<b>[GO TO D-11]</b>
3. WIDOWER/WIDOW	<b>[GO TO D-11]</b>
98. REFUSED (VOL.)	<b>[SKIP TO D-12]</b>
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)	<b>[SKIP TO D-12]</b>

**D-11.** *(Ask if 2 "married" or 3 "widower" in D-12) How many children do you have?*

**[Same as D-13 in TAF W14]**

WRITE RESPONSE: _____
97. NOT ASKED 98. REFUSED (VOL.) 99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**D-12.** *Which ethnic group do you belong to?*

**[Same as D-14 in TAF W14]**

WRITE RESPONSE RECORD FIRST MENTION: _____
1. PASHTUN
2. TAJIK
3. UZBEK
4. HAZARA
5. TURKMEN



6. BALOCH
7. KIRGHIZ
8. NURISTANI
9. AIMAK
10. ARAB
11. PASHAYE
12. SADAT
13. QEZELBASH
14. GUJAR
15. WAKHI
-----
96. OTHER (VOL.): _____
98. REFUSED (VOL.)
99. DON'T KNOW (VOL.)

**CLOSING. Closing Statements**

**CS1.** This concludes our survey. Thank you so much for participating. Within a few days, someone else may call you with a few questions to confirm some of your responses. Do we have your permission to call you back?

1. YES
2. NO

**endint. End Datetime of Entire Interview (Unix)**

End Datetime of Entire Interview (Unix)

**Length. Screentime of Entire Interview**

Screentime of Entire Interview

**D-13.** (Interviewer code): Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

**[Same as D-18 in TAF W14]**

1.THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THE QUESTIONS
2.THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD MOST OF THE QUESTIONS
3.THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTOOD MOST OF THE QUESTIONS BUT WITH SOME HELP.
4.THE RESPONDENT HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, EVEN WITH HELP FROM ME

**D-14.** (Interviewer code): Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

**[Same as D-19 in TAF W14]**

1. THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE (AT EASE) WITH THE ENTIRE QUESTIONNAIRE
2. THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH MOST OF THE QUESTIONS
3. THE RESPONDENT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH ONLY SOME OF THE QUESTIONS
4. THE RESPONDENT WAS GENERALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

**END. End of Survey**

**Interviewer: You have reached the end of the survey. Please make sure the call has ended. When you are ready to proceed, please select “Finish” above to save and close this interview.**

**M-20. Language of Interview (spoken)**

1. PASHTO
2. DARI
3. UZBEKI
4. TURKMENI
5. HAZARAGEE
6. BALOCHI
7. PASHAYEE
8. NORESTANEE
9. SHEGHNEE
10. PAMIRI
96. OTHER (SPECIFY): _____

**M-21. Interview Completed on the ...**

1. FIRST CONTACT
2. SECOND CONTACT
3. THIRD CONTACT

**POST-FIELD BACK-CHECK & QC QUESTIONS:**

**D-15. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?**

**[Same as D-20 in TAF W14]**

1. YES
2. NO

**D-16. Method of quality control/back-check**

**[Similar to D-21 in TAF W14 with revised response options]**

1. BACK-CHECK FROM THE CENTRAL OFFICE
---------------------------------------

2. AUDIO AUDIT
3. NOT APPLICABLE
4. QUALITY CONTROL BY NON-ACSOR MONITORING TEAM

**D-17.** *Back Checker ID:* \_\_\_\_\_

**[Same as D22 in TAF W14]**

9996: NA
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