

A SURVEY OF THE

AFGHAN PEOPLE

AFGHANISTAN IN 2021



The Asia Foundation

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PROJECT DIRECTION

The Asia Foundation

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ABOUT THE ASIA FOUNDATION

The Asia Foundation is a nonprofit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia. Informed by six decades of experience and deep local expertise, our work across the region is focused on good governance, women's empowerment and gender equality, inclusive economic growth, environment and climate action, and regional and international relations.

Headquartered in San Francisco, The Asia Foundation works through a network of offices in 18 Asian countries and in Washington, D.C. Working with public and private partners, the Foundation receives funding from a diverse group of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, foundations, corporations, and individuals. For more information, visit asiafoundation.org.

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
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
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REGIONS

-  CENTRAL/KABUL
-  EAST
-  SOUTH EAST
-  SOUTH WEST
-  WEST
-  NORTH EAST
-  CENTRAL/HIGHLANDS
-  NORTH WEST

PREFACE

2021 was a devastating year in Afghanistan, which endured not only the Covid-19 pandemic, but also drought and economic crisis. Most critically, attempts to engage in peace talks in Doha aimed at breaking a deadlock with the Taliban lost momentum during the summer of 2021. As international forces withdrew, Taliban fighters made rapid gains across the country which led to the Taliban's breathtaking, swift return to power following the dramatic fall of Kabul in August.

Afghanistan in 2021: A Survey of the Afghan People is The Asia Foundation's sixteenth annual public opinion survey in Afghanistan and provides a longitudinal portrait of evolving public perceptions. From July 10 to August 2, 2021, over 1,300 *Survey* enumerators fanned out across Afghanistan and interviewed more than 18,000 people, face to face on issues of security, peace and reconciliation, the economy, governance, women's rights, the withdrawal, and the Taliban. On August 15, the Taliban entered Kabul. By the evening, the Afghan President and his vice president had left the country. In just 10 days, the Taliban had gone from taking their first provincial capital to preparing to declare a new Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan.

Against this unprecedented backdrop, the importance of the *Survey* data cannot be overstated. What do we know from conducting nearly two decades of painstaking opinion surveys? That while Afghanistan has many challenges, two-thirds of the country is under age 25, meaning a whole generation of Afghans have experienced decades of increased personal freedom and possibility, expanded opportunities for education, improved services, improvements in women's lives and status, and far greater access to technology, media, ideas, and development. And their opinions reflect this.

Beyond the lens of war, the country's deep political divisions, structural governance challenges, and economic insecurity have impeded development progress and the prospect of peace. Despite enormous investments by the international community, Afghanistan remains in the lowest human development category, and is facing a humanitarian crisis. The Asia Foundation began working in Afghanistan in 1954 and re-opened its Kabul office in 2002 where programs focused on governance and law, women's empowerment, education, regional cooperation, and the signature *Survey of the Afghan People*. Given the challenging security environment, we have had to temporarily suspend our in-country programs and operations. However, we continue to explore ways to support the efforts of our longstanding Afghan partners to achieve a positive path forward for the people of Afghanistan. We know providing timely, accurate data and access to information are often vital prerequisites to making meaningful progress toward meeting intractable development challenges.

David D. Arnold

President, The Asia Foundation

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A Survey of the Afghan People is the product of numerous contributions from the partners and staff of The Asia Foundation. The survey report was produced under the guidance of Afghanistan Country Representative Abdullah Ahmadzai and led by a team of Afghan data analysts and authors working under the direction of Dr. Tabasum Akseer, director of policy and research. Additional production support was provided by The Asia Foundation's Global Communications team and Washington, D.C., office.

Fieldwork and monitoring was conducted by Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) and Sayara Research. ACSOR Surveys, a subsidiary of D3 systems, Inc., worked closely with the Foundation to conduct all survey fieldwork. The Foundation is grateful for ACSOR's facilitation of third-party monitoring by an independent company, and for their commitment to quality-control best practices in one of the world's most challenging research environments. Special thanks are due to ACSOR's managing director for their professionalism and attention to detail.

The former General Directorate for the Office of the Minister of the Interior provided valuable assistance in securing permission to conduct fieldwork, while the Afghan National Statistics and Information Authority provided population estimates used for the formulation of survey weights.

The Asia Foundation thanks the United States Agency for International Development and the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade for their support for this survey and for Afghan research capacity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Asia Foundation's *Survey of the Afghan People* is the longest-running nationwide survey of the attitudes and opinions of adult Afghans. Since 2006, over 148,100 Afghan men and women have taken the survey, representing more than 400 districts, city *nahias* (municipal districts), and towns and villages across the country.

In 2020, due to the pandemic, fieldwork was impossible, so the Foundation conducted a series of shorter mobile-phone “flash surveys.” Thus, comparisons in this document are to the 2019 *Survey of the Afghan People*, it being the most recent full edition of the *Survey*.

In 2021, from July 10 to August 2, over 1,300 *Survey* enumerators fanned out across Afghanistan and interviewed 18,362 men and women. On August 2, 2021 the *Survey* fieldwork was completed, and shortly thereafter, on August 15, 2021, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Thus, the data collected in Summer 2021 reflects the views of the nation just as a new regime was taking place. All major and most minor ethnic groups are represented from 33 provinces on security, economic growth, employment, development, governance, political participation, access to information, migration, and women's issues. The 34th province, Ghazni, was not included, because heavy fighting in and around Ghazni City prevented survey enumerator training from being held.

Because the data was collected just prior to Kabul's fall to the Taliban, it remains the single tool available to assess and measure broad public opinion at this historical moment.

The sample was fielded entirely via face-to-face random selection, but unlike previous years, intercept interviews were not conducted in 2021. The 2020–2021 population estimates provided by the National Statistics and Information Authority, formerly the Afghan Central Statistics Office, provided accurate estimates for urban and rural populations at the district level of Afghanistan. Respondents were 18 years old and older, 49% male and 51% female, and weighted to be 50:50. The final, unweighted sample consisted of 30% urban households and 70% rural households. Interviews ranged from 15 to 120 minutes, with the average PAPI (paper) interview taking 43 minutes and the average CAPI (tablet) interview taking 40 minutes.

Given the importance of peace, reconciliation, and the withdrawal of international military forces, questions were added to the *Survey* to explore Afghan attitudes towards these matters. The data was

collected just prior to Kabul's fall to the Taliban, and it remains the single tool available to assess and measure broad public opinion at this historical moment.

As in previous years, The Asia Foundation's longstanding research partner, the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research conducted the fieldwork for this project, while its parent company, D3 Systems, Inc., provided analytical and methodological support. Since 2013, third-party verification of the fieldwork, a best practice for survey research in challenging environments, has been employed. Additional quality-control measures were implemented at every step of the process by The Asia Foundation and its partners to ensure methodological consistency for longitudinal comparisons. In total, 35% of interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control. Together with its partners, the Foundation is committed to quality-control processes guided by principles of validity and reliability.

All figures in this report refer to the weighted data. An in-depth discussion of the *Survey* methodology is provided in appendix 1. The sample demographic is provided in appendix 2, and the entire *Survey* questionnaire can be found in appendix 3.

1. NATIONAL MOOD

DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY. The lowest recorded percentage in *Survey* history, just over a fifth of Afghans (21.1%), said they believed the country was heading in the right direction, a notable drop from 2019 (36.1%).

REASONS FOR OPTIMISM. Over half of those who said that the country was moving in the right direction cited improved security (52.4%), followed by reconstruction/rebuilding/ infrastructure (47.3%) and improved governance (20.6%). Just 8.7% cited improved rights for women, which is the lowest figure on record and 18 percentage points lower than the high of 27.0% in 2006.

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM. Among the 73.0% who said the country was headed in the wrong direction, 81.1% cited concerns with crime or security, the highest figure for this answer. Worries about the economy were the next-most common answer, at 40.2%

LOCAL MOOD. When asked what was going well in their local area, the most common answer was infrastructure, offered by 40.0% of respondents, an increase from 38.3% in 2019. Over a fifth (22.1%) said "nothing" when asked what was going well in their local area.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA. When asked what the biggest problem was in their local area, lack of security (security/crime issues) was the most common answer, at 42.4%, up from 35.9% in 2019 and more than double of the percentage in 2007 and 2012 (both 20.0%). Lack of utilities / public services was the second-most commonly cited problem, at 37.7%.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH. When respondents were asked about the biggest problems facing youth, lack of employment opportunities was cited most often (70.8%). Lack of educational opportunities was the second-most cited problem (36.8%). Both figures represent a marginal decrease from 2019. The percentage of respondents citing economic concerns was at its highest level, 17.7%, three percentage points higher than 2019, and very close to the second highest of 17.6% recorded in 2016.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN. The *Survey* also asked about the biggest problems facing women in the local area. Lack of educational opportunities was the most common response (39.0%), followed by lack of rights/participation/justice (30.8%).

OVERALL HAPPINESS. When asked whether respondents were happy overall, nearly three-quarters said they were either very happy (30.4%) or somewhat happy (44.4%). This is a noticeable decrease since 2018 (very happy 36.0%, somewhat happy 44.7%) and 2019 (very happy 34.9%, somewhat happy 46.5%). Just 5.7% in 2021 reported being not at all happy.

2. SECURITY

PERCEPTIONS OF AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES. Respondents were asked who is responsible for providing security in their local area. Overall, the Afghan National Police (ANP) were the most frequently cited, at 56.9%, followed by the Afghan National Army (ANA), at 40.4%. Fewer than a quarter (22.9%) cited local police. Just 8.9% said that no one was responsible for providing security.

A third (32.9%) claimed that the ANP had gotten better at providing security, 11 percentage points lower than 2019 (44.4%).

The percentage who strongly agreed that the ANP was honest and fair (38.9%) is the lowest in *Survey* history except for 2016 (37.1%). Just 36.1% of those interviewed strongly agreed that the ANP improved security, a small drop from 2019 (36.4%), and the fewest in *Survey* history. Seventy-one percent of respondents said they strongly agreed (31.9%) or somewhat agreed (39.4%) that the ANP was efficient at arresting those who committed crimes.

Almost four-fifths of respondents either strongly agreed (39.8%) or somewhat agreed (38.8%) that the ANP needed foreign support to do their job properly. And over four-fifths of respondents said they either strongly agreed (43.6%) or somewhat agreed (39.7%) that the ANA needed foreign support to do their job properly.

Ninety percent of respondents stated that they either strongly agreed (56.4%) or somewhat agreed (33.1%) that the ANA was honest and fair.

Half of those surveyed (50.3%) said they strongly agreed that the ANA helped to improve security in Afghanistan. This is lower than previous years, exceeding only the 49.5% recorded in 2016. There was a significant drop in those who said the ANA was getting better at providing security: just over two-fifths (42.4%) said this was the case down from 2019 (57.5%).

FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY. Fear for one's own or one's family's personal safety was at its highest level on record, with 84.8% reporting that they feared for their family's safety always, often, or sometimes, up from 62.5% in 2013 and 74.5% in 2019.

Some 70.9% of respondents reported a lot of fear when encountering the Taliban, which, while high, is surprisingly the lowest figure on record. Fear when encountering Daesh/ISIS was consistently higher than for the Taliban, with 81.6% saying that they feel a lot of fear.

CRIME AND VIOLENCE. Some (45.9%) of respondents reported that some group posed a threat to the security of their local area, a significant increase from 2018 (35.8%) and 2019 (36.4%). Of those who reported that a group posed a threat to the security of their local area, 76.0% cited the Taliban as the threatening group, an increase from 68.9% in 2019.

Fewer than a fifth of respondents (18.5%) claimed that they or someone in their family had been a victim of violence in the past year, a number almost consistent with previous years. Physical beatings or attacks were the most cited type of violence or crime that had affected respondents or their family members in the previous 12 months (39.8%). A majority of the 18.5% who had experienced a crime or act of violence and had reported the crime to someone outside the family stated that they reported it to the ANP (54.6%). Just 9.7% of respondents had a lot of faith that government law enforcement and judicial systems would punish the guilty party if the respondent were the victim of a crime or act of violence. This represents a drop of more than 50% from 2011 (19.7%).

Afghans were asked if they worried about the potential effects on the country of the international military withdrawal. Almost half, 45.8%, said that the effects would be mostly negative. A fifth (20.2%) said there would be no effect, while less than a fifth (16.3%) said there would be positive effects.

3. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

OVERALL PERCEPTION OF THE ECONOMY. The *Survey* found that Afghans are deeply concerned about their household economies. Of the 73.0% of Afghans surveyed who believed that the country was going in the wrong direction, 22.0% cited unemployment, 15.9% cited the bad economy, and 3.9% cited high prices. A majority of respondents (77.9%) cited economic difficulties as the biggest problem facing youth.¹

The *Survey* asked respondents why their school-aged children weren't going to school. The most frequent answers reflect economic concerns, such as "they need to work" (16% for girls and 40.3% for boys),

transportation difficulties (18.9% for girls and 14.1% for boys), and “cannot afford tuition or school supplies” (12.5% for girls and 11.3% for boys). Most of these percentages are higher than in 2019.

EMPLOYMENT. Overall, 45.7% of respondents in 2021 said they were involved in an activity that generates money. The proportion of Afghan women who reported involvement in any economic activity to earn income remained dramatically low, at 10.3%, compared to 81.1% of men.

WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY. One-sixth of respondents (16.5%) said that female family members contribute to household income, down somewhat from 18.6% in 2019. The *Survey* also asked respondents whether they thought women should be allowed to work outside the home. This year, 77.7% of respondents said women should be allowed to work outside the home, similar to the 76.0% in 2019.

HOUSEHOLD ASSETS. This year, 72.8% of respondents said their household owns at least one TV, a number that has slowly increased over the years (for example, from 58.3% in 2014).

HOUSEHOLD INCOME. A quarter of respondents, 24.9%, reported an income of up to AFN 5,000 per month, 65.8% had an income of AFN 5,001–20,000 per month, and 8.0% had an income of more than AFN 20,000 per month.

Survey findings show that the implementation of development projects can predict an improvement in the economic situation of households in the area. When respondents are aware of more development projects in their area, they are also more likely to report an improvement in the economic situation of their household.

4. DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION. Almost half of Afghans (46.8%) said the financial situation of their household had gotten worse in the past 12 months, up from 31.1% in 2019 and the most recorded over the years of the *Survey*. Urbanites (61.0%) were more likely than rural dwellers (41.2%) to say that their household’s financial situation had gotten worse.

For the first time in the *Survey*, over half of respondents (51.5%) reported that the availability of products in the market (e.g., rice, wheat, oil) had gotten worse compared to the past year. More than two-fifths of Afghans (44.2%) reported that the quality of food in their diet had gotten worse compared to the past year, representing a significant increase from 2019, when just 29.7% said so.

Over a third of Afghans (37.6%) said that the health and well-being of family members had gotten worse compared to the past 12 months, an increase from 24.6% in 2019 and the most in *Survey* records.

Almost half of respondents (47.5%) reported that their access to electricity had worsened compared to the past 12 months. This figure is the second highest recorded in *Survey* history after 2008 (49.2%).

Just over a fifth (21.3%) of respondents said that access to roads had improved, while almost a third (32.6%) said it had worsened.

Almost two-fifths of respondents (38.8%) said access to clean drinking water had worsened, an increase from 27.9% in 2019.

AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. Just over a third of respondents (36.4%) said that there had been project(s) involving the reconstruction/building of roads or bridges implemented in their area in the past 12 months.

Less than a fifth of those surveyed (17.3%) reported that a new government school had opened in their area in the past 12 months. Figures were broadly comparable for new private schools: 19.2% said that a new private school had opened in their area in the past year. This percentage, however, is the highest since the question first appeared in the *Survey*.

The number of respondents reporting a government project to supply electricity in their area (21.8%).

Fewer than 10% of those interviewed (8.9%) reported that a project related to reconciliation with antigovernment elements had been implemented in their area in the past 12 months. Reconciliation efforts were more frequently reported in rural areas (10.2%) than in urban areas (5.8%).

Less than a fifth of respondents (19.1%) reported the implementation of programs in agriculture in their area in the past 12 months, a decrease since 2019 (25.5%).

Over a fifth (21.4%) stated that there had been a healthcare project (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) implemented in their area in the past 12 months. This figure represents a decline from 2019 (24.6%).

ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE. More than half of those surveyed (56.8%) reported that they had visited a public hospital or clinic for medical treatment or some health-related reason in the past 12 months.

When asked the same question, but for a private hospital or clinic, fewer than half of respondents (43.3%) reported utilizing such a facility. This is a small increase over 2019 (41.0%), and a somewhat larger increase over 2018 (39.2%).

5. GOVERNANCE

SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE. Satisfaction with the performance of Afghan central government, provincial government and municipal authorities increased continuously from 2016 to 2019, but in 2021 this upward trend reversed, and satisfaction with the central government, provincial governments, district governments, and municipal authorities dropped. In 2021, 63.9% of Afghans said the central government was doing a good job (18.6% very good and 45.3% somewhat good).

The view that the government had improved (by a lot or a little) the living conditions of people living in their local area also fell, from 69.3% in 2019 to 66.0% in 2021. This marks a reversal of a gradual upward trend in 2017 and 2018, when the perception that government had improved local living conditions rose from 63.0% of respondents in 2017 to 65.0% in 2018.

CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS. Afghans continued to have the most confidence in the media (65.1%), community shuras/jirgas (61.1%), and religious leaders (61.3%). They had the least confidence in government ministers (39.1%), the Independent Election Commission (39.7%), and parliament as a whole (41.1%).

Confidence in all officials, institutions, and organizations decreased from 2019 to 2021. In some instances, confidence reached the lowest levels since the question was first asked: confidence in provincial governments fell to 53.8%; community shuras/jirgas, 61.1%; national NGOs, 45.6%; provincial councils, 46.8%; and religious leaders, 61.3%.

CORRUPTION. Reported experiences of corruption among various authorities and institutions decreased from 2019 to 2021. Respondents were most likely to cite experiences of corruption (in all cases, in most cases, or in some cases) when interacting with officials in the municipality/district office and the judiciary/courts (each respectively 46.1%).

In 2021, Afghans' perceptions of corruption as a major problem almost held steady at 2018 and 2019 levels: 81.3% said corruption is a major problem in the country.

When asked about perceptions of corruption in their daily lives, the proportion of Afghans who said it was a major problem reached an all-time high in 2021 of 72.1%.

JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION. In 2021, 14.9% of respondents said they were very satisfied, and 48.2% said they were somewhat satisfied, with available dispute-resolution services in their area. Both percentages are lower than 2019 (16.6% very satisfied and 52.3% somewhat satisfied).

The percentage of Afghans who had a dispute or a formal case that could not be settled with the other party and thus had to go to the state court, Huquq Department, or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it decreased marginally compared to 2019, from 20.6% to 19.6%.

6. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

POLITICS AND RELIGION. In 2021, more than half of respondents (56.2%) said that religious leaders should be consulted or involved in politics. This figure is the lowest on record in the history of the *Survey* and more than 13 percentage points lower than the high of 69.5% in 2011.

EXERCISING BASIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS. The percentage of respondents in the 2021 *Survey* reporting a lot of fear when voting in a national or provincial election (20.8%) is the highest on record, followed closely by 20.6% recorded in 2010.

Just over a third (34.5%) said they felt a lot of fear when participating in a peaceful demonstration, the highest proportion on record. Females (41.1%) were significantly more likely than males (27.9%) to report a lot of fear.

Thirty percent of respondents (29.8%) reported a lot of fear when considering running for public office. This figure includes more than a third of females (34.4%) but only a fourth of males (25.2%).

DEMOCRACY. The percentage of respondents who said they are satisfied with democracy dropped from 65.1% in 2019 to 60.6% in 2021. Interesting correlations to educational attainment can be discerned. Respondents with more than 12 years of formal education were more likely to be very satisfied with democracy (19.8%) than those with no formal education (14.8%).

There is a positive relation between economic situation and confidence in democracy. Afghans who said their household's financial situation had improved than those who said their household's financial situation has worsened were slightly more likely to be very satisfied with democracy (20.3% vs. 15.2%).

7. ACCESS TO INFORMATION

SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION. More than half of respondents (55.0%) said they use the radio to get news and information, a drop from previous years, the highest percentage being 80.4% in 2013 when the question was first asked.

More than two-thirds of respondents said they use television to get news and information (69.4%), an increase from 54.6% in 2013.

Higher levels of educational attainment are correlated with more television use: respondents with 12-plus years of formal education were far more likely to use television as a source of news and information (84.1%) than respondents with no formal education (59.9%).

Internet usage continues to grow in Afghanistan, with almost one-fourth of respondents (24.9%) citing the internet as a source of news and information in 2021, compared to just 3.3% in 2013. Almost two-

fifths of urbanites (39.3%) use the internet for news and information, compared with just one-fifth of rural dwellers (19.2%).

Fewer than half of respondents said they get their news and information from the mosque (40.1%). This percentage has fluctuated marginally over the years and is now at the lowest level since 2014 (46.9%).

Community shuras as a source of news and information were cited by almost one-third of respondents (32.0%), the lowest figure since 2014 (36.4%).

Friends and family were still the most common source of news and information at the time of this research, the choice of 81.7% of respondents; however, this figure is five percentage points lower than the 86.7% who relied on friends and family in 2019.

More than half of respondents (53.7%) said they listen to radio programs. Listening to the radio has significantly decreased over the years, and 2021 marked the lowest figure since the question was first included in the *Survey*.

On the other hand, the number of respondents who said they watch television programs has significantly increased, to more than two-thirds (68.7%) since the question was first asked.

INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA. In 2021, 56.1% of respondents said that people in their area had access to the internet, the highest percentage recorded and substantially more than the 40.0% in 2016 when the question was first asked.

Respondents with more years of formal education were more likely to say that people in their area had access to the internet than those with less or no formal education (more than 12 years of formal education, 76.9%; seven to nine years of formal education, 57.4%; no formal education, 45.2%).

Among respondents who said people in their area had access to the internet, more than one-third said they personally had internet access (38.3%).

Respondents with the highest level of formal education were more likely to say they personally had access to the internet than those with less or no formal education (more than 12 years of formal education, 71.9%; seven to nine years of formal education, 41.1%; no formal education, 15.8%).

Among respondents with personal access to the internet, 68.7% said they use it for Facebook and other social media sites, followed by getting news (44.7%), watching videos (27.4%), listening to music (12.2%), and for work purposes (11.3%).

8. WOMEN IN SOCIETY

WOMEN'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE. Each year the *Survey* asks respondents if they are aware of any organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problems resolved. In 2021, more than one-fourth of respondents (26.5%) said yes to this question, the highest percentage since the question was first asked in 2011 (19.3%).

Among respondents who reported the existence of an organization in their area where women can go to have their problems resolved, 47.4% identified the Directorate of Women Affairs—the provincial arm of the former Ministry of Women's Affairs—followed by a women's shura (9.8%), the Human Rights Council (8.0%), the district office (5.5%), the police or the chief of police (5.0%), a safe house (2.6%), a village/elders shura (2.1%), the court (2.1%), and Qawm [tribal] elders (2.0%).

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. The *Survey* found significant support among Afghans for women in leadership positions. Overall, support for women becoming members of a Community Development Council was high, with nearly three-fourths of respondents (71.5%) agreeing strongly or somewhat that a woman may become a member of a Community Development Council, and more than half agreeing that a woman can be the CEO of a large company (58.4%), the governor of a province (57.1%), a minister or cabinet member (56.4%), or a candidate for president of Afghanistan (47.3%). In all cases, women were more supportive of women's access to leadership positions than men.

The *Survey* asked respondents if they would prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the National Parliament. Under half, 41.6%, said they would prefer to be represented by a man, 20.0% said a woman, and 37.4% said it makes no difference.

Afghans were asked whether they think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, or that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or that leadership positions should be open to anyone, based on merit. Overall, 34.4% chose “mostly for men,” 29.0% chose “both men and women,” 26.0% chose “anyone, based on merit,” and just 10.3% chose “mostly for women.”

Afghans were also asked if they think women should be allowed to vote in elections. A majority said yes (87.3%), just two percentage points fewer than 2019 (89.3%).

Respondents were asked how women should decide whom to vote for: should they decide for themselves, should men decide for them, or should women decide in consultation with men? More than half of Afghans (56.8%) said that women should decide for themselves, 19.8% said men should decide for women, and 22.5% said women should decide in consultation with men.

Respondents with no formal education (52.0%) were less likely to think women should decide for themselves than respondents with 1–6 years of formal education (55.2%), 7–9 years (60.5%), 10–12 years (60.8%), or more than 12 years (66.2%) of formal education.

EDUCATION. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed that women should have the same opportunities for education as men. A majority of respondents (82.9%) strongly or somewhat agreed that they should, fewer than in 2019 (86.6%) and even fewer than the 91.5% in 2006. Support for gender equality in education is higher among women (86.3%) than men (79.5%), and higher among urban residents (89.7%) than rural residents (80.2%).

Afghans were asked if they strongly or somewhat agreed or disagreed with gender equality for specific types and levels of education, including Islamic madrasa education, primary school, high school, a university in their province, studying in another province, and studying abroad on scholarship. Overall, 93.0% of respondents strongly or somewhat agreed with gender equality in Islamic madrasa education, 87.8% agreed with gender equality in primary school, 85.1% in high school, and 75.7% in a university in their province. There was less support for equal opportunity to study in another province (53.3%) or to study abroad on scholarship (42.3%).

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES. Fewer than a fifth of respondents (16.5%) said female members of their family contributed to their household income, two percentage points lower than 2019 (18.6%).

Since 2006, the *Survey* has asked respondents whether women should be allowed to work outside the home. In 2021, more than three-fourths of respondents (77.7%) said that women should be allowed to work outside the home, the highest percentage of respondents in the history of the *Survey*. Women (84.4%) were significantly more likely than men (71.0%) to say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, and urban respondents were more likely than rural residents to hold this view (urban 86.3%, rural 74.4%).

Respondents were asked about acceptable places for women to work. As in previous years, the greatest support was for female-only schools (86.4%), hospitals or clinics (86.0%), and government offices (72.5%). Co-ed schools (67.4%), NGOs (57.0%), a female-only private company (55.4%), the army or police (41.7%), and a co-ed private company (39.7%) received less support.

When asked to cite the two biggest problems facing women in their area, the most commonly cited problem was lack of educational opportunities (39.0%), followed by lack of rights/participation/justice (30.8%), lack of employment opportunities (26.1%), violence (18.2%), economic concerns (12.8%), lack of services/infrastructure (11.5%), and security (7.2%). There were no significant differences in the perceptions of male and female respondents in this regard.

9. MIGRATION

WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE. More than two-fifths of Afghans surveyed (42.0%) said they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This is the highest figure in *Survey* records—higher than 2019 (37.9%) and 12 percentage points higher than 2016 (29.6%).

At the same time, over half of those interviewed (52.4%) said they would not leave. Younger Afghans, aged 18–25, are the most likely of all age groups (46.8%) to say they would leave.

REASONS FOR LEAVING. Of the 52.4% who said they would not leave Afghanistan given the opportunity, the reasons most cited were “I love my country” (48.3%) and “it is my country” (46.6%).

The most cited reasons for not leaving the country were related to Afghan identity (85.3%), that they are “restricted from leaving” (18.4%), “to serve/ improve Afghanistan” (10.0%), and because there are “poor prospects elsewhere” (9.8%).

Among the 42.0% who said they would leave, 84.3% cited insecurity as the reason, the most on record and 7 percentage points more than 2016 (73.3%). The number of respondents citing unemployment as a reason to leave (43.2%) is nine percentage points lower than 2019 (51.7%).

Respondents who personally had access to the internet were more likely to say they would leave the country if given the opportunity (52.7%) than Afghans who did not have internet access (38.4%).

When Afghans who want to leave the country were asked where they would go if given the opportunity, Turkey was the most favored destination (38.1%), Iran was second (37.6%), and fewer than 10% chose Pakistan as a prospective destination (9.7%). Germany was the most cited European destination, at 20.6%.

PROMOTING THE DECISION TO STAY. When those who said they would leave were asked what the government could do to make them stay, the most common answer was “maintain security” (79.8%). Despite high levels of unemployment, just over half of respondents said that improved opportunities for participation (51.6%) would persuade them to stay.

RELATIVES LIVING ABROAD. Almost two-fifths of respondents (39.5%) said they had a close relative or family member living abroad. When respondents were asked in what country their close relative or family member lived, Turkey was the most common answer (38.1%), followed by Iran (37.6%), and Europe (36.8%). Almost a third of those with relatives living abroad (32.3%) stated that these relatives helped them financially, a decrease from 36.7% in 2019.

Less than a fifth of all respondents (18.7%) stated that a family member had moved abroad in the past 12 months. Of those who did, over two-fifths (42.9%) said that the relative now lived in Iran, while a quarter (24.7%) said Turkey.

ENDNOTES

- 1 This figure represents a combination of multiple responses: lack of employment, poor economy, costly marriages, high cost of living, and joining antigovernment elements due to unemployment.

NATIONAL MOOD

In the months leading to Afghanistan's fall to the Taliban in 2021, the country was confronting a host of challenges: failed peace talks (compounded by the absence of a consensus among political actors for a unified approach to talks), the pandemic and its impact on healthcare services, deteriorating security, drought, unemployment, high levels of corruption, a faltering economy, and widespread internal displacement and migration. It's not surprising that this combination of issues is culminating in all-time high increases of pessimism among the people of Afghanistan.

By May 2021, as foreign forces officially began drawing down, the Taliban had launched a coordinated strategy designed to overwhelm and demoralize the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) by identifying and exploiting their weaknesses.¹ They launched offensives countrywide, overrunning ANDSF checkpoints, bases, and district centers.² Unlike previous years, these attacks were answered with limited airstrikes.³ ANDSF resistance was mixed: in some areas they stood and fought; in others they surrendered or simply fled.⁴

In May and June, the Taliban captured approximately 50 districts in quick succession. In June, *Tolo News* estimated nearly 1,700 ANDSF and civilian casualties over a 30-day period.⁵ By early July the Taliban had reportedly captured 127 district centers in addition to those they already controlled,⁶ and on July 21, U.S. General Mark Milley stated that the Taliban controlled approximately half of Afghanistan's 419 districts and were putting pressure on half of the provincial capitals.⁷ In a sign of disarray, more than 1,000 ANDSF personnel were reported to have fled to Tajikistan in July to avoid Taliban advances in Badakhshan Province.⁸ In other locations, local elders reportedly brokered truces that allowed the ANDSF to abandon their positions to the Taliban without resistance.⁹ Elsewhere, in a display of their military dominance and confidence on the battlefield, the Taliban moved strategically to preempt any resistance in the north of the country by focusing on key areas including previous government strongholds in Jawzjan, Sar-e-Pul, Faryab, Kunduz, Badakhshan, and Balkh.

Despite talk of continued U.S. financial and logistical support, including an "over-the-horizon" attack capability, in the end it all seemed more of an effort to bolster ANDSF and public confidence. There were clear signs that the even the messengers themselves were unconvinced by their message. Afghan officials continually downplayed the potential negative impacts of the U.S. troop withdrawal while emphasizing the need for continued U.S. financial assistance to Afghan forces.¹⁰ A June 2021 trip to the United States by President Ashraf Ghani and other senior Afghan officials¹¹ appeared to be an almost desperate bid for additional support from the United States in the face of Taliban gains and the apparent weakness of the Afghan government.

Surveyed in the midst of the Taliban's advance, public perceptions were undoubtedly shaped by the unravelling security environment. This chapter delves more deeply into the national mood of Afghans during one of the most tumultuous times in the country's history.

1.1 DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-1.** *Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?*
- Q-2.** *(Ask if Q-1 answer is "right direction.") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?*
- Q-3.** *(Ask if Q-1 answer is "wrong direction.") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?*

Just over a fifth of Afghans (21.1%) stated they believed the country was heading in the right direction. This figure is the lowest in *Survey* history, a 15 percentage point drop from 2019 (36.1%) and more than 36 percentage points lower than 2013 (57.7%). The low figure for 2021 reflects a population grappling with political turmoil, insecurity, high levels of unemployment, multiple waves of Covid-19,¹² drought,¹³ food insecurity, and a more general disaffection with overall government performance.

Just one fifth of Afghans stated they believed the country was heading in the right direction. This figure is the lowest in *Survey* history, and reflects a population grappling with political turmoil, insecurity, high levels of unemployment, multiple waves of Covid-19, drought, food insecurity, and a more general disaffection with overall government performance.

NATIONAL MOOD: DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY




Fig. 1.1: Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

By region and province, interesting variations are apparent. Over two-fifths in the South East (41.7%) chose “right direction,” compared to fewer than 15% in Central/Kabul (14.7%). Just over half of respondents in Paktika (50.7%) chose “right direction,” but far fewer did so in Herat (8.6%), Faryab (8.1%), Jawzjan (7.4%), Sar-e-Pul (5.6%), and Panjshir (5.0%).




Fig. 1.2: Q-2. (Ask if Q-1 answer is “right direction.”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Surprisingly, given the well-publicized insecurity that gripped much of Afghanistan in 2021, over half of those who said that the country was moving in the right direction cited improved security (52.4%). Other top answers were reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure (47.3%) and improved governance (20.6%). Some 8.7% cited improved rights for women, which is the lowest figure on record and 18 percentage points lower than the high of 27.0% in 2006. The growing Taliban presence across much of Afghanistan throughout 2021, their ambiguous pronouncements on women’s rights,¹⁴ and the underrepresentation of women¹⁵ in peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban may have contributed to this perception. Just 2.3% cited greater freedoms or human rights as a reason that the country was moving in the right direction, a huge drop from 19.3% in 2006.

By region, interesting variations can be observed. Less than a third in Central/Highlands (32.7%) cited improved security, compared to more than two-thirds in the East (67.6%). Over three-fifths in the North West (62.6%) mentioned reconstruction/rebuilding/infrastructure.

Over 70% of those who said that the country was heading in the wrong direction cited concerns with crime or security (81.1%), the highest figure for this answer on record and far higher than the low of 10.0% recorded in 2006. Worries about the economy were the next-most common answer, a 40.2%




Fig. 1.3: Q-3. (Ask if Q-1 answer is “wrong direction.”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Urbanites are more likely to express concerns about security or crime (83.7%) and the economy (45.7%) than rural dwellers (79.9% and 37.6%, respectively).

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM, BY STRATA




Fig. 1.4: Q-3. (Ask if Q-1 answer is “wrong direction.”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

1.2 LOCAL MOOD

Key Questions

- Q-4.** (Ask all.) In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)
- Q-5.** (Ask all.) In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)

When asked what was going well in their local area, respondents most often cited infrastructure (40.0%). The figure for infrastructure is nominally higher than 2019 (38.3%), but 10 percentage points higher than 2017 (30.1%), suggesting some breakthrough in local and national government infrastructure projects. Over a fifth (22.1%) said “nothing” when asked what was going well in their local area.

When asked what was going well in their local area, respondents most often cited infrastructure.




Fig. 1.5: Q-4. *In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)*

By a substantial margin, urban dwellers (30.4%) were more likely than rural residents (18.9%) to say that nothing was going well in their local area. Infrastructure was cited by more than half of respondents in the East (52.9%) but just 6.9% in Central/Highlands. More than half of respondents in Central/Highlands (55.6%) mentioned agricultural development, compared to a quarter or fewer in all other regions.

When asked what the biggest problem was in their local area, lack of security (security/crime issues) was the most common answer at 42.4%, six percentage points higher than 2019 (35.9%) and double the percentage in 2007 and 2012 (both 20.0%).

Lack of utilities / public services was the second-most commonly mentioned problem, at 37.7%, 19 percentage points lower than 2009 (57.0%), suggesting once again some long-term improvement in service provision by local and national governments.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA




Fig. 1.6: Q-5. *In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)*

Interestingly, urbanites (41.3%) were more likely to mention lack of utilities or public services than rural dwellers (36.2%), which may be due to public services overburdened by internal displacement of rural Afghans to urban areas. Economic issues were cited more by rural dwellers (27.0%) than urbanites (20.8%).

Just 11.1% of those in Central/Highlands cited issues of crime or security, compared to 52.0% in the South West and 55.0% in the West. More than two-thirds in Central/Highlands (66.3%) mentioned the lack of utilities or public services as the biggest problem. Those in the South East (38.6%) were most likely to cite economic issues as the biggest problem in their local area, while those in Central/Kabul were the least likely (20.1%).

BIGGEST PROBLEMS IN LOCAL AREA, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
SECURITY/CRIME ISSUES	40	28	47	52	55	48	11	35
LACK OF UTILITIES / PUBLIC SERVICES	47	45	26	25	29	32	66	41
LACK OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	32	36	25	25	34	34	30	34
ECONOMIC ISSUES	20	31	39	24	24	25	37	24
LACK OF INFRASTRUCTURE	14	13	15	8	8	18	11	21
LACK OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES	7	15	6	8	7	5	5	9
GOVERNANCE/ JUSTICE ISSUES	3	9	10	13	10	3	1	3
CONFLICTS IN THE COMMUNITY	1	1	3	9	3	2	1	1
ENVIRONMENTAL/ NATURAL DISASTER	3	1	0	1	2	2	4	1
NOTHING	3	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
ISSUES WITH HUMAN RIGHTS	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	1
DON'T KNOW	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	2

Fig. 1.7: Q-5. In your view, what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)

1.3 BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH & WOMEN

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-6.** *(Ask all.) In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next-biggest problem?*
- Q-7.** *(Ask all.) What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem?*

Lack of employment opportunities is the most-cited problem for youth, with lack of educational opportunities cited second-most often.

With unemployment high overall, it is not surprising that lack of employment opportunities is the most-cited problem for youth (70.8%). Lack of educational opportunities was the second-most cited answer (36.8%). Both figures represent a marginal decrease from 2019. In line with observations of countrywide economic issues, the percentage of respondents citing economic concerns was at its highest level, 17.7%, three percentage points higher than 2019. Lack of employment opportunities was cited most often in Central/Kabul (78.3%) and least often in the South East (55.8%). More than a third in Central/Highlands (34.4%) mentioned economic concerns as a problem facing youth, compared to 21% or fewer in all other regions.

Interestingly, respondents aged 55 and over (75.2%) were more likely to cite lack of employment opportunities as an issue for youth than those 18–25 (72.3%).

The *Survey* also asked about the biggest problems facing women in the local area, and findings here are consistent with previous years. Lack of educational opportunities (39.0%) was the most common answer. This figure is 14 percentage points lower than 2012 (52.7%), suggesting that women's access to education has increased since then.

BIGGEST LOCAL PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN




Fig. 1.8: Q-7. *What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem?*

The second-most common problem mentioned was lack of rights/participation/justice (30.8%). Females were marginally more likely to mention economic concerns, violence, and lack of rights/participation/justice. These differences by gender are shown in the next figure.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN, BY GENDER




Fig. 1.9: Q-7. What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem?

Lack of educational opportunities was found to be one of the biggest problems facing women, but, this figure is 14 percentage points lower than reported a decade ago in 2012 suggesting that women’s access to education has increased since then.

1.4 SELF-REPORTED HAPPINESS

KEY QUESTION

D-16. In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?

Three-quarters of respondents said they were either very happy (30.4%) or somewhat happy (44.4%). The three-quarters figure represents a noticeable decrease since 2018 (very happy 36.0%, somewhat happy 44.7%) and 2019 (very happy 34.9%, somewhat happy 46.5%). Just 5.7% in 2021 reported being not at all happy.

Males (32.8%) were more likely than females (27.9%) to report being very happy, while females (45.5%) were more inclined than males (43.4%) to report being somewhat happy.

Almost 85% of those surveyed in the East reported being very happy (42.3%) or somewhat happy (42.2%), compared to just over three-fifths in the West (16.7% very happy and 45.4% somewhat happy).




Fig. 1.10: D-16. *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*

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SECURITY

In the weeks preceding the Survey of the Afghan People 2021 fieldwork, the ability of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) to secure the country came under considerable pressure. Multiple districts and provinces fell to the Taliban, and government/ANDSF control receded at an alarming rate. As fieldwork began, the Taliban had already taken control of large swaths of the country. Fieldwork ended just 13 days before the fall of the capital, Kabul. This data, below, accurately captures the perceptions of Afghans during a time of unprecedented ANDSF and government collapse. Fear for personal safety, a critical barometer, is at a record level among respondents. Afghan perceptions of the ability of the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army ability to defend the country are also represented in the *Survey* and reflect in real time the impact of the Taliban advance throughout the country during 2020 and 2021.

As fieldwork began, the Taliban had already taken control of large swaths of the country. Fieldwork ended just 13 days before the fall of the capital, Kabul.

The period from 2020 through 2021 was a watershed for Afghanistan, as rising insecurity, Taliban military dominance, failed peace talks, and the withdrawal of the United States and International Military Forces (IMF) led to the collapse of the Afghan government and the total disintegration of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).

Security conditions in Afghanistan remained weak, and the government and the ANDSF struggled to implement a robust security plan. Despite the U.S.-Taliban agreement in Doha and the ongoing peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, there was no letup in violence. In fact, violence increased after the signing of the Doha agreement in February 2020, and more civilians were killed and injured from October to December than in any other quarter of that year.¹ The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan reported that civilian casualties in the first quarter of 2021 were at 2019 levels.² Short-term ceasefires during Eid provided some respite,³ but calls by the Afghan government, international actors, and foreign missions for a more comprehensive ceasefire were disregarded by the Taliban.^{4,5}

Despite deteriorating security and little progress in intra-Afghan talks, the United States withdrew their troops unconditionally on August 30, 2021, in a chaotic exit that left the Afghan government and the ANDSF vulnerable. Many observers warned that the unconditional withdrawal would embolden the Taliban and undermine the position of the United States and the Afghan government in the peace

talks. These warnings were prophetic. The Taliban honored their agreement with the United States not to attack their departing forces, but they increased their attacks on Afghans.⁶ With the diminishing threat of U.S. airstrikes, the Taliban were able to gather in larger groups free from aerial attack. Under these circumstances, the Taliban were able to pursue a strategy that Afghan officials had often feared and simply “run out the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,”⁷ pressing home their military advantage once the withdrawal was underway. The Taliban did not wait for a complete withdrawal of U.S. and IMF forces to step up their attacks on large population centers.

Afghanistan’s collapse was due to a number of factors: since the end of the U.S. and NATO combat mission in 2015, the government of Afghanistan had steadily lost control of territory,^{8,9} and despite more than \$88 billion of U.S. investment in training and equipping the ANDSF, they were unable to hold territory and repel Taliban assaults unassisted.¹⁰ The ANDSF’s ability to secure Afghanistan was further undermined by the loss of key U.S. assets and logistical support. Internal issues that had dogged them for years, such as lack of leadership, poor recruitment, high casualty rates, and corruption, also became more exposed as U.S. military support waned. The ANDSF had consistently struggled with logistics and resupplying its positions.¹¹ They relied heavily on contractors to maintain vehicles and airframes.¹² ANDSF troops seemed demoralized and frustrated by the U.S. troop withdrawal and the Afghan government’s passive approach to dealing with the Taliban. There were frequent reports of government mismanagement of military strategy, lack of coordination, lack of leadership, and persistent problems with resupply and support of the ANDSF. Quick turnover of senior personnel in key security positions hindered the development of a coherent strategy.

Since the end of the U.S. and NATO combat mission in 2015, the government of Afghanistan had steadily lost control of territory, and despite more than \$88 billion of U.S. investment in training and equipping the ANDSF, they were unable to hold territory and repel Taliban assaults unassisted.

In some respects, the Taliban took advantage of a perfect storm of opportunity. The Afghan government appeared unprepared to deal with a post-U.S. security environment and tried to allay fears about the impact of the U.S. withdrawal while at the same time appealing for the mobilization of “public uprising forces” to try and stem Taliban offensives.¹³ Vague government announcements of a new strategy to defeat the Taliban¹⁴ appeared to be without substance. Many commentators inferred that the Afghan government never expected the United States and the IMF to withdraw and seemed to have no plans for this contingency. Despite being told in February 2020 that they would be leaving, the Afghan government seemed shocked that the United States was going ahead with the withdrawal—indeed, as the withdrawal proceeded one Afghan government official expressed “shock” at the pace.¹⁵ Security

strategy aside, there was no unified approach among government or political actors that could have acted as a counterweight to Taliban dominance. The government appeared detached from reality, projecting an air of business as usual as much of the ANDSF and local governmental infrastructure was crumbling before their eyes.

At the same time, the Taliban made diplomatic visits to numerous regional capitals, further undermining Afghan government authority by positioning themselves as a government-in-waiting.¹⁶

Intelligence reports offered varying estimates—from six months to two years—of the time the Afghan government and ANDSF could survive after a U.S. withdrawal.¹⁷ Addressing a U.S. intelligence prediction, during his last U.S. trip, that the Afghan government would fall within six months of a U.S. withdrawal, President Ghani stated, “there have been many such predictions and they have all proven, turned out, false.”¹⁸ Less than two months after this visit, the bulk of the Afghan government had fled the country, a highly trained and expensively equipped military had vanished, and the Taliban were taking their place in the presidential palace. The collapse of the government and the ANDSF and the Taliban’s return to power occurred almost 20 years after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.

Given increased Taliban territorial control, the *Survey* also looks at service delivery in Taliban-controlled areas and finds that public awareness of and provision of services is negligible, suggesting the Taliban will need to focus on this area as they seek to become a legitimate government.

2.1 PERCEPTIONS OF AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-17.** *Which group would you say is most responsible for providing security in this village/ gozar? And the second most?*
- Q-18.** *Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference? (a) ANA. (b) ANP.*
- Q-19.** *Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (a) ANA. (b) ANP.*
- Q-20.** *I’m going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read statement, wait for response, and then ask) Would you say strongly or somewhat? a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. c) The ANA protects civilians.*

- Q-21.** *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response, and then ask) Would you say strongly or somewhat? a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan c) The ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes.*
- Q-22a.** *Would you agree or disagree with a family member's decision to join the Afghan National Police?*
- Q-22b.** *(If Q-22a answer is "disagree" or refused to answer.) Why would you disagree with their decision?*
- Q-24.** *In your view, does any group currently pose a threat to the security of this local area?*
- Q-25.** *(If Q-24 answer is yes.) Who do you think poses a threat to the security of this local area? (Ask open-ended, record up to two mentions.)*
- Q-26.** *(Ask all.) Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year?*
- Q-27.** *(If Q-26 answer is yes.) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*
- Q-28.** *(If Q-26 answer is yes.) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family or not?*
- Q-29.** *(If Q-28 answer is yes.) Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else?*
- Q-30.** *(Ask all.) If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcement organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?*
- Q-31.** *Do you think the international military forces' withdrawal will have a mostly positive effect, a mostly negative effect, or no effect on Afghanistan?*
- Q-32A.** *(If Q-31 answer is "mostly positive.") What is the main reason you think it will have a positive effect?*
- Q-32B.** *(If Q-31 answer is "mostly negative.") What is the main reason you think it will have a negative effect?*
- Q-33.** *In some areas, the Taliban are known to provide service delivery. Have you heard of the following services being provided by the Taliban, either in your local area, or in other nearby local areas? A) Healthcare. B) Justice or dispute resolution. C) Education services including schools. D) Water. E) Food. F) Electricity. G) Media (Radio). H) Development projects. I) Employment opportunities. J) Other: _____ (please specify).*
- Q-34.** *(If yes at Q-33) have you or anyone in your household accessed these services?*

- Q-35.** *(If yes at Q-34) If yes have accessed services, were/are you satisfied with the service?*
- Q-48** *Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (d) Encountering ANP. (e) Encountering ANA. (f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country. (h) Encountering the Taliban. (i) Encountering ISIS/Daesh.*

The Afghan National Police (ANP) were the most frequently cited (56.9%) when respondents were asked who is most responsible for providing security in their village/gozar. The figure represents a significant decline from 2018, however, when 68.9% cited the ANP. Two-fifths (40.4%) cited the Afghan National Army (ANA), slightly more than in 2019 (38.4%). Fewer than a quarter (22.9%) cited local police. Just 8.9% said that no one was responsible for providing security. When dissected by region, only in the East did a majority of respondents (69.7%) cite the ANA as the preeminent provider of security in their village/gozar. People themselves are the top choice in Central/Highlands (74.8%) and West (46.8%). Urbanites (68.4%) were significantly more likely than rural dwellers (52.4%) to cite the ANP, while rural respondents were more likely than urban to cite the ANA (rural 41.5% vs. urban 37.7%).

There is general concern among respondents over the performance and capability of the ANP. A third (32.9%) claimed that the ANP had gotten better at providing security, while 37.8% said they had gotten worse. The percentage who said that ANP performance had gotten better is 11 percentage points lower than 2019 (44.4%) and the percentage who said they had gotten worse is 11 percentage points higher than 2019 (27.0%) and almost 15 percentage points higher than 2017 (23.2%). Both figures reflect concerns over ANP capability. When dissected by strata, respondents in rural areas were more likely to say that the ANP had gotten better, while urbanites were more likely to say they had gotten worse.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE PROVIDING SECURITY




Fig.2.1: Q-18. Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference? (b) ANP.

Perceptions of the ANP vary widely across the provinces. Over two-thirds of interviewees in Samangan (68.5%) and Nangarhar (71.1%) stated that the ANP had gotten better at providing security, while just 9.1% thought so in Panjshir. Over half of respondents in Kunduz (50.5%), Herat (54.3%), and Farah (50.1%) stated that the ANP had gotten worse at providing security.

The percentage who strongly agree that the ANP is honest and fair (38.9%) is the lowest in *Survey* history except for 2016 (37.1%). Across strata, no discernible differences are noted in perceptions of the ANP as honest and fair. By region however, significant variations are observed. Almost three-fifths of respondents in Central/Highland (58.2%) and the East (58.5%) strongly agreed that the ANP is honest and fair, while fewer than half said so in all other regions. Over a third of those interviewed in the South West either somewhat disagreed (24.2%) or strongly disagreed (12.6%) that the ANP is honest and fair. There is significant variation by province. For example, 98.4% in Samangan and 98.3% in Kunar strongly or somewhat agree the ANP is honest and fair, while the lowest agreement is in Zabul with 46.3% who strongly or somewhat agree.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE




Fig.2.2: Q-21. *I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read statement, wait for response, and then ask) a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people b) ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan c) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat? (Percent who strongly agree.)*

Just 36.1% of those interviewed strongly agreed that the ANP improves security, a small drop from 2019 (36.4%), and the lowest in *Survey* history—13 points below the high of 48.7% recorded in 2007. Females (38.5%) are more likely than males (33.7%) to strongly agree that the ANP improves security.

Seventy-one percent of respondents said they strongly agree (31.9%) or somewhat agree (39.4%) that the ANP is efficient in arresting those who have committed crimes. Females are more likely to agree than males. By region, less than a fifth in the South West (18.4%) strongly agreed that the ANP is efficient, while almost half thought so in Central/Highlands (48.8%). Over two-fifths of those in the South West either disagreed somewhat (24.1%) or disagreed strongly (20.1%) that the ANP is efficient in arresting those who have committed crimes. Respondents in Zabul display high levels of skepticism over ANP

efficiency, with over half stating they somewhat disagree (11.1%) or strongly disagree (39.7%) that the ANP is efficient. Over 90% in Samangan (47.5% strongly and 46.3% somewhat) agree that the ANP is efficient at arresting criminals, followed by Bamyan (45.5% strongly and 47.5% somewhat) and Nangarhar (strongly 54.1% and somewhat 38.8%).

Almost four-fifths of respondents either strongly agree (39.8%) or somewhat agree (38.8%) that the ANP needs foreign support to do their job properly, reflecting concerns over the ANP's ability to perform after a U.S./IMF withdrawal. Over four-fifths of respondents said they either strongly agree (43.6%) or somewhat agree (39.7%) that the ANA needs foreign support to do their job properly. In some respects this figure may be considered low, given that fieldwork was conducted as the IMF withdrawal was fully underway and there were visible signs that the ANA was struggling to counter Taliban offensives without IMF support. It does reflect, however, that the ANA is more dependent on foreign support than the ANP.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY




Fig.2.3: Q-20. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read statement, wait for response, and then ask) a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. b) The ANA helps improve security in Afghanistan. c) The ANA protects civilians. Would you say strongly or somewhat? (Percent who strongly agree.)

Ninety percent of respondents stated that they either strongly agree (56.4%) or somewhat agree (33.1%) that the ANA is honest and fair. These findings are generally in line with historical trends. By region, there are noticeable variations in this perception. For example, three-quarters of respondents in the East (74.9%) strongly agreed that the ANA is honest and fair, while just over a third thought so in the South West (36.2%) and a quarter (24.3%) somewhat disagreed, a figure that stands at less than 10% across all other regions.

Looking at the results by province, 100% of respondents in Panjshir said they either strongly agree (81.1%) or somewhat agree (18.9%) that the ANA is honest and fair. In Helmand province, however, more people said they somewhat disagree that the ANA is honest and fair (33.0%) than said they strongly agree (28.3%) or somewhat agree (29.3%). The figures from both Panjshir and Helmand reflect the

nature of the conflict. In Panjshir, where conflict activity has historically been limited, perceptions of the ANA are highly favorable. In the more volatile and Taliban-populated Helmand Province, perceptions of the ANA are more mixed. Similar contrasts can be seen between the relatively peaceful provinces of Bamyan and Daikundi and other, more volatile provinces such as Kandahar and Zabul.

PERCEPTION THAT THE ANA AND ANP NEED FOREIGN SUPPORT




Fig. 2.4: Q-19. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? a) Afghan National Army b) Afghan National Police (Percent who say strongly or somewhat agree.)

Half of those surveyed (50.3%) said they strongly agree that the ANA helps to improve security in Afghanistan. This is lower than previous years, exceeding only 2016 (49.5%). Fourteen percent of respondents either somewhat disagreed (11.2%) or strongly disagreed (2.8%) that the ANA helps to improve security. Because much of the conflict activity in Afghanistan is in rural areas, it is no surprise

to see that a higher percentage of urbanites (57.7%) than rural dwellers (47.4%) strongly agree that the ANA helps improve security. By region, those in the South West (19.1%) and the West (21.3%) are significantly more likely than all other regions (10% or less) to say they disagree somewhat that the ANA helps improve security. In the South West, 12.9% say they strongly disagree that the ANA helps improve security, a figure that is just 2% or less in all other areas. These findings again highlight the generally poor opinion of the ANA.

Just over two-fifths of respondents (42.4%) stated that the ANA is getting better at providing security, a significant drop from 2019 (57.5%) that reflects the growing insecurity in much of Afghanistan and the widely publicized difficulties that the ANA has faced in maintaining security.

Across the regions there are noticeable differences in perception of the ANA's ability to provide security. In the East, almost three-quarters of respondents (73.2%) stated that the ANA is getting better, but just a quarter thought so in Central/Highland (25.0%). When dissected by province, those in the Eastern provinces of Nangarhar (80.3%), Kunar (68.4%), Khost (62.1%), and Paktika (62.8%) are the most likely to say that the ANA is getting better, while those in Central/Highlands provinces of Daikundi (26.5%), Bamyán (23.6%), and Panjshir (7.7%) in Central/Kabul are significantly less likely to say that the ANA is getting better at providing security. Other noticeable variations are observed in the West, where 72.8% of respondents in Badghis said the ANA is getting better, while just 20.6% thought so in the neighboring province of Herat, Zabul (23.0%), and Sar-e Pul (18.5%).

Fewer than half of respondents (48.0%) strongly agreed that the ANA protects civilians. This figure is the lowest on record—10 percentage points lower than 2014 (58.0%) and almost four percentage points lower than 2019 (51.8%). Over 15% said they either somewhat disagree (11.7%) or strongly disagree (4.2%) that the ANA protects civilians. Urban respondents were more likely to strongly agree that the ANA protects civilians than rural respondents were (57.1% vs. 44.4%).

The greatest skepticism about the ANA's ability to protect civilians is observed in the South West, where over a quarter of respondents (27.1%) strongly agree that the ANA protects civilians, compared to a third or more in the South East, West, North East, and North West and over half in Central/Kabul, Central/Highland, and the East. By province, less than a fifth (16.5%) in Helmand and just a quarter (24.1%) in Wardak said they strongly agree. Almost three-quarters in Parwan (72.9%) and Khost (72.1%) said they strongly agree. By a substantial margin, respondents in Helmand (24.2%) and Zabul (35.8%) are most likely to strongly disagree that the ANA protects civilians. Given that both Qalat City in Zabul and Lashkargah in Helmand remained highly vulnerable to Taliban takeover during the mid-to-late part of 2021, these findings may reflect the fears of people in those areas.

2.2 FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY

Fear for one's own or one's family's personal safety is at its highest level since the *Survey* began, with 84.8% reporting that they fear for their family's safety always, often, or sometimes, up from 62.5% in 2013 and 74.5% in 2019. The percentage of respondents who said they *always* fear for their personal safety (27.7%) is double that recorded in 2019 (13.2%). Much of this increase can be attributed to a demonstrable increase in Taliban presence and activity across the country throughout 2020–21 and to the fact that fieldwork was conducted during a time of significant Taliban territorial gains and mass defections from the ANDSF. Fear was also likely further exacerbated by the observable impact of the international military withdrawal on the ability of the ANDSF to hold ground and ward off Taliban offensives.

Fear for one's own or one's family's personal safety
is at its highest level since the *Survey* began.

FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY




Fig.2.5: Q-23. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety? (Percent who say always, often or sometimes.)

Urbanites (89.0%) are more likely than rural dwellers (83.2%) to fear for their personal safety. Over half of respondents in Kabul (51.0%) and Parwan (51.7%) reported that they always fear for their personal safety, while among respondents in traditionally peaceful Panjshir Province just 1.6% said they always fear. Correspondingly, over two-thirds of those in Panjshir (66.8%) reported that they never fear for their personal safety. Considering the data by region, over two-fifths of respondents in Central/Kabul (43.4%) reported that they always fear for personal safety, compared to just 13.3% of respondents in Central/Highlands.

Females are most likely to say they always fear for their personal safety (33.3%), while males are most likely to say often (30.6%) or sometimes (29.0%).

FEAR FOR PERSONAL SAFETY, BY PROVINCE




Fig. 2.6: Q-23. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family’s safety? ((Percent who say always, often or sometimes.)

The percentage of people who report a lot of fear when encountering the ANP stands at 14.0%. By region the highest reported are among participants in the South West (22.4%) and the lowest in Central/Highlands (4.1%).

While the difference is only marginal, a lower percentage of respondents (12.7%) reported a lot of fear when encountering the ANA than when encountering the ANP. Respondents in the South West (19.0%) and West (21.8%) are most likely to report a lot of fear when encountering the ANA.

With the Taliban in control of significant portions of Afghanistan's road network,¹⁹ and with an ever-present risk from roadside improvised explosive devices, Taliban-operated vehicle checkpoints, and general levels of criminal activity, it is no surprise that over two-fifths (41.1%) of respondents say they have a lot of fear when traveling to another part of the country. This proportion is the highest in *Survey* records and represents an eight percentage point increase over 2019 (33.3%). Over half of those in Central/Highlands (52.1%) reported a lot of fear when traveling.

Some 70.9% of respondents reported a lot of fear when encountering the Taliban, which surprisingly is the lowest figure on record. Ninety percent of respondents in Central/Highland (90.8%) claimed to have a lot of fear when encountering the Taliban.

Fear when encountering Daesh/ISIS is universally higher than for the Taliban, with 81.6% saying that they feel a lot of fear. The Central/Highland region again stands out, with 92.7% of respondents acknowledging fear.

FEAR DURING VARIOUS ACTIVITIES




Fig.2.7: Q-48. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (d) Encountering ANP. (e) Encountering ANA. (f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country. (g) Encountering international forces (Western military only). (h) Encountering the Taliban. (i) Encountering ISIS/ Daesh. (Percent who say some or a lot of fear).

2.3 CRIME AND VIOLENCE




Fig.2.8: Q-25. (If Q-24 answer is yes.) Who do you think poses a threat to the security of this local area? (Ask open-ended, record up to two mentions.)

Some 45.9% of respondents reported that a group posed a threat to the security of their local area. This represents a significant increase from 2018 (35.8%) and 2019 (36.4%) and reflects the growing insecurity across Afghanistan during much of 2021. Just over half of rural dwellers (50.7%) and just over a third of urbanites (33.9%) said that a group posed a threat to local security. Two-thirds of respondents in the South East (67.6%), almost two-thirds in the South West (62.1%), and more than half in the North East (58.5%) reported that a group posed a threat, while the proportion is less than half in all other regions and just a quarter in Central/Highland (26.0%). Reflecting its relatively benign security environment, 100% of those in Panjshir claimed that no group posed a threat to security in their area. In Paktia, by way of contrast, 88.1% claimed that a group posed a threat.

Of those who reported that groups posed a threat to the security of their local area, 76.0% cited the Taliban as the threatening group, an increase from 68.2% in 2018 and 68.9% in 2019. The proportion of respondents citing ISIS/Daesh as a threat (9.6%) is significantly lower than in 2018 (16.4%). Almost two-fifths (38.3%) identified criminals/thieves as a local threat to security.

Given the Taliban's largely rural footprint, it is no surprise that four-fifths (80.5%) of rural dwellers cited the Taliban, compared to three-fifths (59.1%) of urbanites. Criminals/thieves, however, were significantly more likely to be cited by urbanites (50.7%) than by respondents in rural areas (35.0%).

As a result of increased Taliban focus on operations in northern Afghanistan, and the ease with which they took control of a number of districts across the once staunchly anti-Taliban northern provinces,²⁰ it is not surprising to see them named as the top local security threat by an overwhelming majority in the North East (92.9%). In all other regions the proportion is 70% or higher except for Kabul/Central, where it is less than half (47.3%).

The same holds true of the large ISIS/Daesh footprint in the East, where almost one-third (31.6%) cited ISIS/Daesh as a local threat.

Less than a fifth of respondents (18.5%) claimed that they or anyone in their family had been a victim of violence in the past year, and this finding is largely consistent with previous years. Those in the South East (31.4%) and the South West (30.9%) were most likely to report that someone had been a victim of violence, while less than a fifth of respondents in all other regions said so, and just 3.3% in Central/Highlands. Just over two-fifths of those interviewed in Helmand province (40.1%) claimed they or someone in their family had been a victim of violence, while less than 5% said so in the provinces of Parwan (2.5%), Baghlan (4.7%), Bamyan (2.1%) and Daikundi (4.5%).

Consistent with previous surveys, physical beatings or attacks (39.8%) were the most-cited type of violence or crime that had affected respondents or their family members in the previous 12 months. Three-fifths (59.8%) claimed to have reported the crime or violent act to someone outside their family, which is almost similar to previous years.

TYPES OF CRIME OR VIOLENCE, BY STRATA




Fig.2.9: Q-26. (Ask all.) Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year? **Q-27.** (If Q-26 answer is yes.) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

A majority of the 18.5% who had experienced a crime or violence and had reported the crime to someone outside the family stated that they reported the crime or act of violence to the Afghan National Police (54.6%). This is the highest figure on record and over eight percentage points higher than when the question was first asked in 2014 (46.3%). The percentage of those who say they reported the act to a shura/elder is the lowest on record (31.6%), while the number who say they reported to a tribal leader or malik is at its highest (27.7%). Confidence in reporting such an act to the Afghan National Army

(13.0%), district governor (9.5%), or provincial authority (6.6%) are also at their lowest levels. Males are more likely to report to the ANP, shura/elders, tribal leader/malik, the ANA, or the district governor, while females are more likely to report to a mullah saheeb, a provincial authority, or just their family.

Just 9.7% of respondents had a lot of faith that government law enforcement and judicial systems would punish the guilty party if the respondent were the victim of a crime or act of violence. This represents a drop of more than 50 percent from 2011 (19.7%) and suggests a lack of faith in the organs of government to effectively pursue criminals and other nefarious actors. Such lack of faith has been seized upon by the Taliban as they seek to portray themselves as uncorrupted. Just over two-fifths (41.4%) said they had some faith, a six percentage point decrease from 2019 (47.4%), but the 2021 figures are largely consistent with previous findings of 41.4% and 40.4% in 2018 and 2017 respectively.

Over half of respondents in Central/Kabul stated they had either no faith at all (23.6%) or a little faith (29.2%) in government to punish guilty parties. Faith in the government to punish the guilty is highest in the North West, where almost three-fifths said they either have a lot of faith (7.9%) or some faith (50.2%). The percentage expressing this faith in government is highest by a substantial margin in Badghis (21.3%) and Zabul (31.9%). Almost two-thirds of respondents in Herat Province claim to have a little faith (43.1%) or no faith at all (21.2%). There are no significant differences by gender.

Afghans expressed great concern about the potential effects on the country of the international military withdrawal. Some 45.8% of those interviewed said that the effects would be mostly negative. A fifth (20.2%) said there would be no effect, while less than a fifth (16.3%) said there would be positive effects. Given the subsequent total collapse of the Afghan government and the disintegration of the ANDSF, Afghans were right to be concerned.

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES' WITHDRAWAL, BY STRATA




Fig.2.10: Q-31. Do you think the international military forces' withdrawal will have a mostly positive effect, a mostly negative effect, or no effect on Afghanistan?

Some interesting variations in opinion are noted by region. Over half of those interviewed in Central/Kabul (54.1%), the West (54.2%), and Central/Highlands (53.5%) believed the withdrawal would have a negative effect, compared to 44% or fewer in all other regions.

Of those who stated that the effects would be positive, the most common answers were interrelated: 27.5% said there would be increased security, and 23.2% said the withdrawal would lead to less fighting. Conversely, of those who said that the effects would be mostly negative, 30.5% said the security situation would worsen, and 28.5% said fighting would increase.

Two-thirds of respondents (66.5%) said they would agree with a family member's decision to join the ANP. This figure is a seven percentage point decrease from 2019 (73.4%). Males (71.6%) are more likely than females (61.4%) to agree with a family member's decision to join the ANP. A massive 85.2% of those interviewed in the East, but just 51.7% in the South West, would agree with this decision. Over half of respondents in Zabul province (50.9%) would disagree with a family member's

decision to join the ANP. The strongest support is observed in the provinces of Badghis (87.6%), Nangarhar (89.9%), Kunar (85.4%), and Parwan (80.5%).

Of those who would disagree with a family member's decision to join the ANP, the most common reason (34.1%) is the high death toll. Interestingly, the proportion citing the death toll was almost 10 percentage points higher in 2019 (43.5%), revealing a downward trend that is at odds with a general perception that casualty figures in the ANDSF were excessively high and underreported. A quarter cited insecurity (25.0%), and just under a quarter (23.0%) mentioned the lack of good leadership/government.

Shadow governments and provision of basic services to areas under their influence have long been a supposed feature of the Taliban's presence. Multiple studies have noted the emergence of the Taliban as a governance actor and examined what it's like living in areas they govern or control.^{21,22} In recent years, the group has developed policies around key areas of service delivery such as healthcare and education.²³ Some studies have shown that in areas where there has been Taliban service delivery it has not been wholly dissimilar to service levels delivered by the government. Given the expansion of Taliban territorial control through 2020 and 2021, the *Survey* this year asked respondents about their knowledge of and experiences with Taliban service delivery. The findings showed that despite media commentary and studies indicating the presence of Taliban shadow structures and service provision in areas under their control, awareness of these services among the general population is extremely limited and in some cases almost negligible. Where there is awareness of Taliban service delivery, it is highest among respondents in Kunduz Province.

The provision of justice or dispute resolution has become increasingly widespread in areas under Taliban control. Sometimes dispensed by courts or shuras, Taliban justice mechanisms are often seen as more accessible, more impartial, and less corrupt²⁵ than the mechanisms of the state. Despite this perception however, just 9.5% of respondents said they had heard of Taliban justice or dispute resolution services. Unsurprisingly, more rural dwellers (10.9%) reported having heard of this than urbanites (5.9%). By both region and province there are significant variations in the overall findings. For example, 21.0% of those interviewed in the West said they had heard of this Taliban service, compared to a negligible 0.7% in Central/Highland. Over half (56.0%) had heard of this service in Kunduz Province, but just 1.0% or fewer in Kapisa, Parwan, Nangarhar, Bamyan, Panjshir, and Daikundi. Just over two-fifths of those who were aware of Taliban justice or dispute resolution services (42.5%) said they or someone in their household had used them. The high level of awareness in Kunduz may be due to the acknowledged presence of Taliban shadow administrations in much of the province. Among those who had used these services, levels of satisfaction were high (78.1%).

Just 1.9% of those surveyed said they were aware of the Taliban providing healthcare services in either their local area or a nearby area. When dissected by strata, gender, age, and education, the results are in line with overall findings. Of those who said they had heard of Taliban healthcare services, the majority

(57.8%) said they had not accessed them. Of those who had accessed them, almost three-quarters (72.6%) said they were satisfied with the service provided.

Just 1.9% of those surveyed reported that they had heard of the Taliban providing education services in their local area or a nearby area. Amidst much confusion over Taliban policy on schooling, particularly for females, this figure is not overly surprising. Indeed, where the Taliban has enforced an education policy, it has generally been only in existing schools: the group does not open new schools in areas under its control, which may contribute to the low awareness of Taliban education services.²⁷

Afghan public awareness of Taliban services in other service delivery categories is almost negligible, which is surprising given the growing territory controlled by the group in 2020 and 2021. For example, just 1.2% of respondents were aware of the provision of water by the Taliban, 1.3% mentioned the provision of electricity, and 1.4% knew of Taliban media services. In an open-ended question on Taliban service delivery, even services likely to be a Taliban forte, such as security services or religious studies, were largely unfamiliar to respondents. As the group transforms itself from an insurgency to a government responsible to the whole country, the lack of capability for service delivery and governance identified in the *Survey* will need to be seriously addressed if the Taliban government is to be taken seriously by Afghans.

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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Afghan economy steadily improved with the influx of billions of dollars of international assistance and the development of new trade routes.¹ Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from \$4 billion in 2002 to \$19.8 billion in 2020, driven principally by foreign aid. Per capita GDP rose from \$21.80 in 2002 to \$647.00 in 2018—an increase of nearly 3,000%.² Economic growth subsequently slowed, however, with the deterioration of the security situation,³ and in 2017 and early 2018 Afghanistan was stricken by severe drought, which depressed agricultural production.⁴ From early 2020 to the time of this writing, Afghanistan also suffered three waves of Covid-19, which battered the economy and increased the cost of energy and basic household goods, and inflation rose as the Taliban captured key transit points and major border crossings in mid-2021.⁵

In August 2021, when the Taliban returned to power, the United States froze around \$10 billion of Afghanistan's foreign reserves, and other countries followed suit by postponing their development aid to Afghanistan,⁶ a sum comprising roughly 40% of Afghanistan's GDP.⁷

In 2021, the value of the national currency, the afghani, fell 10% against the U.S. dollar, largely due to the uncertain political situation, the dollar's strength, disruptions to international trade, and the suspension of international aid.

Poverty has deepened due to drought, the pandemic, and the contraction of Afghanistan's real GDP since the return of the Taliban. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) predicts that Afghanistan's poverty rate will rise to 97% by mid-2022.⁸

In 2017 and early 2018 Afghanistan was stricken by severe drought, which depressed agricultural production.

The following chapter describes how overall household economic status affects Afghans' perceptions of the economy, employment, household finances, and women's contribution to household income, and it examines self-reported estimates of household assets.

3.1 OVERALL PERCEPTION OF THE ECONOMY

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-3a/b.** (If Q-1 answer is “wrong direction.”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?
- Q-6a/b.** In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next-biggest problem?
- Q-7a/b.** What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today?
- Q-12.** (If Q-12 answer is “some of them” or “none of them.”) Why don’t the children go to school?
- Q-94c.** (If Q-96 answer is yes.) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

The *Survey* data shows that Afghans are deeply concerned about their household economies. Of the 73.0% of Afghans surveyed who believe that the country is going in the wrong direction, 22.0% cite unemployment, 15.9% cite the bad economy, and 3.9% cite high prices. A majority of respondents (77.9%) cite economic difficulties as the biggest problem facing youth.⁹

Of the 73.0% of Afghans surveyed who believe that the country is going in the wrong direction, 22.0% cite unemployment, 15.9% cite the bad economy, and 3.9% cite high prices.

The *Survey* asks respondents why their school-aged children don’t go to school. The most frequent answers reflect economic concerns, such as “they need to work” (16.0% for girls and 40.3% for boys), transportation difficulties (18.9% for girls and 14.1% for boys), and “cannot afford tuition or school supplies” (12.5% for girls and 11.3% for boys). Most of these percentages are higher than in 2019.

Since 2011, the *Survey* has asked Afghans’ about their intentions to leave the country. Insecurity (80.7%), unemployment (43.1%), and the bad economy (23.2%) are the top reasons why Afghans would be willing to migrate to another country if given the opportunity.

Looking at gender differences, 36.1% of women say they would leave the country because of unemployment, and 23.9% of women say they would leave because of the bad economy. Men are more likely to say they would leave because of unemployment (49.8%), but men cite the bad economy in similar proportions (22.5%) to women.

The *Survey* also asks about the main challenges facing Afghan women. Some 39.0% of respondents cite lack of educational opportunities, 36.6% cite the poor economy,¹⁰ and 30.8% cite lack of women's rights.

ECONOMIC CONCERNS

REASONS FOR BEING PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY:	UNEMPLOYMENT 22%, POOR ECONOMY 16% HIGH PRICES 4%
PROBLEMS FACING YOUTH:	UNEMPLOYMENT 69%, POOR ECONOMY 16%
PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN:	UNEMPLOYMENT 26%, POVERTY 11%
REASONS FOR LEAVING THE COUNTRY:	UNEMPLOYMENT 43%, POOR ECONOMY 23%
REASONS FOR CHILDREN NOT GOING TO SCHOOL (GIRLS):	THEY NEED TO WORK 16%, CAN'T AFFORD IT 12%
REASONS FOR CHILDREN NOT GOING TO SCHOOL (BOYS):	THEY NEED TO WORK 40%, CAN'T AFFORD IT 11%

Fig. 3.1: Q-3a/b. (If Q-1 answer is "wrong direction.") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? **Q-6a/b.** In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area? By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next-biggest problem? **Q-7a/b.** What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem? **Q-12.** (If Q-11 answer is "some of them" or "none of them.") Why don't the children go to school? **Q-94c.** (If Q-94a answer is yes.) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

3.2 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

KEY QUESTION

Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (b) Employment opportunities. (c) Availability of products in the market (e.g., rice, wheat, oil). (d) Quality of food in your diet.

To understand Afghans' economic status, the *Survey* asks whether the financial situation of their household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse compared to a year ago. This year,

46.8% of respondents say their financial situation has worsened, significantly higher than 31.1% in 2019. Men are more likely than women to say their financial situation has gotten worse (50.6% vs. 42.9%).

There is significant variation by place of residence: 61.0% of urban residents say the financial situation of their households has gotten worse, compared to 41.2% of rural residents. Worsening household finances are most commonly reported in Herat (72.7%) and Kabul (71.4%). Respondents in Ghor are the least likely to say their financial situation has gotten worse (12.4%).

WORSENING HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION, BY PROVINCE




Fig. 3.2: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (Percent who say “worse.”)

The Survey asks about the availability in the market of basic products such as wheat, rice, and oil. Just 8.2% say that availability has improved in the past 12 months.

WORSENING HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES, BY PROVINCE




Fig. 3.3: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (b) Employment opportunities. (Percent who say “worse.”)

The *Survey* asked whether household employment opportunities have gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse compared to a year ago. However, the *Survey* does not provide an official unemployment rate for the country. This year, 64.4% of respondents say that employment opportunities for their households have worsened, notably higher than 55.0% in 2019. There is some variation by place of residence: 74.6% of urban residents say the employment opportunities for their households have worsened, compared to 60.4% of rural residents.

Across provinces, reports of a worsening employment situation are most common in Panjshir (85.6%), Paktia (82.2%), and Kabul (81.4%), while the fewest such reports are found in Ghor (29.5%), Badghis (33.5%), and Wardak (36.9%).

The *Survey* asks about the availability in the market of basic products such as wheat, rice, and oil. Just 8.2% say that availability has improved in the past 12 months; 39.5% say it has not changed; and 51.5% say it has declined, the highest percentage since the *Survey* first asked the question.

When asked about the quality of food in the household, 10.8% of respondents say it has improved, 44.2% say it has stayed the same, and the same percentage say it has deteriorated.

The *Survey* findings show that the implementation of development projects can predict an improvement in the economic situation of households in the area. When respondents are aware of more development projects in their area, they are also more likely to report an improvement in the economic situation of their household.

EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ON HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION




Fig. 3.4: Q-9. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school opening. (c) New private school opening. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Healthcare (e.g., primary health center, regular visits of doctors). (j) Programs in agriculture. (k) New factories opened. (l) Building new mosques. **Q-8.** Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.

A similar relationship is found between awareness of development projects and better household employment opportunities.




Fig. 3.5: Q-9. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school opening. (c) New private school opening. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Healthcare (e.g., primary health center, regular visits of doctors). (j) Programs in agriculture. (k) New factories opened. (l) Building new mosques. **Q-8.** Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (b) Employment opportunities.

3.3 EMPLOYMENT

KEY QUESTIONS

D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money?

D-4. (If D-3 answer is yes.) What type of activity is that?

The *Survey* asks respondents if they are engaged in any activity that generates money. Overall, 45.7% of respondents in 2021 say they are involved in an activity that generates money.

Rural respondents are slightly more likely to say yes to this question than urban respondents (46.4% vs. 43.8%).

Disaggregating by age, earning income is least common among Afghans 18–25 years old (35.1%) and most common among those 46–55 years old (54.4%).




Fig. 3.6: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.)
D2. How old are you?

The proportion of respondents who report earning an income ranges from 41.8% in the South West to 50.6% in the North West.

Respondents in Farah, Ghor, and Bamyan report the highest levels of income generation (59.6%, 57.2%, and 54.3%, respectively), while Helmand, Panjshir, and Kunar report the lowest (30.9%, 34.8%, and 38.2%, respectively).

PERCENT WHO EARN INCOME, BY PROVINCE




Fig. 3.7: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.)

By gender, the proportion of Afghan women who report involvement in any economic activity to earn income remains dramatically low at 10.3%, compared to 81.1% among men.

A provincial breakdown shows that 4.3% of women earn money in Wardak, 4.2% in Helmand, 4.1% in Nangarhar, and 3.3% in Kunar, the four lowest scores on this question in the *Survey*. Farah, at 27.4%, is the province with the largest proportion of women who report earning an income, followed by Ghor (25.5%) and Kunduz (21.3%).

Respondents with higher educational attainment are more likely to be involved in the economy (72.7%) than Afghans with six years of formal education or less (51.4%) or those with no formal education (30.4%). The data also shows that Islamic madrassas play an important role in employment, as those with some years of madrasa are more likely to be involved in the economy than those with no years of madrasa (54.1% vs. 37.2%).

These findings have been relatively consistent since 2016.




Fig. 3.8: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.) **D-9.** How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa? (Percent who have only madrasa education without a formal education.) **D-10.** What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa? (Percent who have any other education and no madrasa education.)

Survey findings confirm that formal education plays an important role in women’s employment. Female respondents with more than 12 years of formal education are more likely to say that they have an activity that generates money (52.6%) than those with one to six years of formal education (8.6%), seven to nine years (9.3%), or 10 to 12 years (11.9%).

PERCENT OF WOMEN WHO EARN INCOME, BY EDUCATION LEVEL




Fig. 3.9: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? (Percent who say yes.) **D-9.** How many years, if any, have you studied at an Islamic madrasa? (Percent who have only madrasa education without a formal education.) **D-10.** What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed, not including schooling in an Islamic madrasa? (Percent who have any other education and no madrasa education.)

Disaggregating by type of economic activity, 34.1% of rural respondents are involved in farming, either on their own or another's land. Less than one-sixth, 16.1%, are skilled workers or artisans, and just 9.1% are engaged in informal sales or business.¹¹

Among urban respondents, 15.8% are skilled workers or artisans, 13.2% are engaged in informal sales or business, 13.5% are self-employed professionals, and 13.0% are small-business owners.

EMPLOYMENT TYPE, BY GENDER




Fig. 3.10: D-3. Do you yourself do any activity that generates money? **D-4.** (If D-3 answer is yes.) And what type of activity is that?

This year, schoolteacher is the most frequently reported occupation for women, at 31.3%, up from 23.8% in 2019. Skilled worker/artisan is the second-most common job for women, at 22.9%.

The top three occupations for male respondents are farming (29.3%), skilled work (15.1%) and informal sales (11.2%).

Some expected differences also emerge by region: for example, in the Central Highlands, 64.5% of respondents say they work on farms, compared to 15.9% in Central/Kabul.

3.4 WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY

KEY QUESTIONS

D-8. *Do female members of the family contribute to this household's income, or not?*

Q-85. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion on this?*

Afghan women continue to face economic problems. When Afghans are asked to name the two biggest problems facing women in their local area, some of the top responses are unemployment (25.8%), domestic violence (16.9%), forced marriage (12.7%), poverty (11.3%), and lack of women's rights (9.4%).

One-sixth of respondents (16.5%) say that female family members contribute to household income, slightly fewer than 18.6% a year earlier. By place of residence, 16.7% of rural respondents and 15.9% of urban respondents say female members of the family contribute to household income.

At the provincial level, women are least likely to contribute to household income in Zabul (3.3%), Paktika (5.4%), and Panjshir (6.9%), and they are most likely to contribute in Nuristan (53.2%), Faryab (50.8%), Bamyan (41.9%), and Daikundi (41.3%).

The *Survey* also asks respondents whether they think women should be allowed to work outside the home. This year, 77.7% of respondents say women should be allowed to work outside the home, similar to 76.0% in 2019.

3.5 HOUSEHOLD ASSETS

KEY QUESTIONS

D-5. *How many of the following does your household have? (b) Motorcycle. (c) Car. (d) TV. (h) Jeribs of land. (i) Livestock (not poultry).* **D-15c.** *How many members of this household who live here have their own mobile phone?*

Information about household assets and how their ownership is allocated is useful in understanding people's living conditions. This year, 72.8% of respondents say their household owns at least one TV, a number that has slowly increased over the years (for example, from 58.3% in 2014).

Respondents in urban areas are more likely to own a TV than rural respondents (89.2% vs. 66.4%). The rural percentage has gradually increased over the years (for example, from 47.6% in 2014 to 54.0% in 2016 and 61.6% in 2018).

Afghans are also asked whether they own a motorcycle. A motorcycle for transportation is more common among rural than urban residents. Some 46.2% of respondents overall own a motorcycle—53.1% of rural residents and 28.7% of urban dwellers.

More than a quarter of respondents (26.1%) own at least one car. Rates of car ownership differ only slightly between urban respondents (25.3%) and rural respondents (26.4%).

Mobile-phone ownership has continued to increase among households, with 94.0% of respondents saying at least one member of their household owns a mobile phone, up from 91.4% in 2019. More than half (57.7%) have a mobile phone that can access the internet, a percentage that has grown rapidly from 25.5% in 2015 when the question was first asked.

Land is another important asset of respondents: 38.3% say their household owns one to five jeribs of land, 8.4% say they own six to 10, and 5.0% say they own more than 10 jeribs of land.¹²

PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT OWN LAND

JERIBS	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
0	36	79	48
1-5 JERIBS	47	17	38
6-10 JERIBS	11	2	8
11-20 JERIBS	4	1	3
OVER 20 JERIBS	2	1	2

Fig. 3.11: D-5. How many of the following does your household have? (h) Jeribs of land.

The *Survey* asks respondents if they have experienced a dispute in the last two years and, in a follow-up, what type of dispute it was. In 2021, 19.6% of respondents say they had a dispute. Disputes over property are the most common: 39.6% were said to be over land, 11.9% concerned other kinds of property, and 11.6% involved business issues.

By place of residence, land disputes are more frequent in rural areas (41.8%) than in urban areas (29.8%).

Livestock is an important asset for rural residents. The *Survey* asks how much livestock (other than poultry) the household owns. There has been a significant decrease in livestock ownership this year, from 56.8% in 2019 to 46.6% in 2021.

Livestock ownership is also more common in rural settings than urban, with 59.7% of rural respondents but just 14.4% of urban respondents saying they own livestock.

Across the provinces, livestock ownership is highest in Wardak (96.7%), Nuristan (94.2%), Kunar (89.3%), and Khost (88.6%).

3.6 HOUSEHOLD INCOME

KEY QUESTION

D-6. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

The *Survey* asks respondents to estimate their monthly household income. In 2021, 24.9% report an income of less than AFN 5,000 per month, 65.8% have an income of AFN 5,001–20,000 per month, and 8.0% have an income greater than AFN 20,000 per month.




Fig. 3.12: D-6. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?

The region with the highest proportion of respondents in the lowest income group is the Central Highlands, where 62.9% report a monthly income below AFN 5,000. The majority of respondents in all other regions report a monthly income between AFN 5,000 and AFN 20,000, while the South East has the highest proportion of respondents earning more than AFN 20,000, at 35.0%.




Fig. 3.13: D-6. For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income? **D-7.** (If D-6 answer is “refused” or “don’t know.”) If you are unsure of the actual monthly amount, what’s the general range? Again, this is for your whole household.

3.7 WEALTH AND HAPPINESS

KEY QUESTIONS

- D-6.** *For statistical purposes only, can you estimate your average monthly household income?*
- D-16.** *In general in your life, would you say you are very happy, somewhat happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?*
- Q-8.** *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.*

The *Survey* further asks respondents how happy they are in their lives. Overall, 74.8% say they are happy, down from 81.4% in 2019.

There is a positive correlation between the economic performance of a household and the level of happiness. Those who say their household's economic situation has improved are more likely to say they are happy (84.7%), while those who say their household situation has worsened are less likely (71.4%). Those who say their employment situation has improved are also more likely to say they are happy than those who say it has gotten worse (84.2% vs. 73.3%).

ENDNOTES

- 1 Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline: The U.S. War in Afghanistan,” CFR website, accessed Nov. 17, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan>.
- 2 USAID, “Afghanistan: Economic Growth,” USAID website, accessed Nov. 17, 2021, <https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/economic-growth>.
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- 4 Danish Refugee Council (2021), “Drought Crisis in Afghanistan intensifies risk of displacement,” DRC website, July 8, https://drc.ngo/about-us/for-the-media/press-releases/2021/7/drought-crisis-in-afghanistan-intensifies-risk-of-displacement/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIVuWhxpbw8wIVuBoGAB3SRgAsEAAAYASAAEgIrvD_BwE.
- 5 Al Jazeera (2021), “Taliban claims capturing key Afghan border crossing with Pakistan,” *Al Jazeera*, July 14, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/14/taliban-claims-capturing-key-afghan-border-crossing-with-pakistan>; Save the Children (2021), “Afghanistan price hikes push food out of reach for millions of children,” news release, Aug. 26, <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/afghanistan-price-hikes-push-food-out-reach-millions-children>; *Al Jazeera* (2021), “Afghanistan faces vaccine delay as it battles Covid surge,” *Al Jazeera*, Jun. 5, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/5/amid-brutal-case-surge-afghanistan-hit-by-a-vaccine-delay>.
- 6 DW (2021), “Germany suspends development aid to Afghanistan,” DW, Aug. 17, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-suspends-development-aid-to-afghanistan/a-58889002>; Saleha Mohsin (2021), “U.S. Freezes nearly \$9.5 Billion Afghanistan Central Bank Assets,” Bloomberg, Aug. 17, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-17/u-s-freezes-nearly-9-5-billion-afghanistan-central-bank-assets>.
- 7 Inbar Pe’er (2021), “Afghanistan’s economy under the Taliban: the challenges ahead,” Atlantic Council blog, Sep. 9, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/afghanistans-economy-under-the-taliban-the-challenges-ahead/>.
- 8 UNDP (2021), “97 percent of Afghans could plunge into poverty by mid 2022, says UNDP,” UNDP website, Sep. 9, <https://www.undp.org/press-releases/97-percent-afghans-could-plunge-poverty-mid-2022-says-undp>.
- 9 This figure represents a combination of multiple responses: lack of employment, poor economy, costly marriages, high cost of living, and joining anti-government elements due to unemployment.
- 10 This figure represents a combination of multiple responses: lack of employment, poverty, not given share of inheritance, and lack of market for crafts.
- 11 A form of economic activity that is unregistered or unregulated by the state.
- 12 One jerib is equal to 2,000 square meters.

DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Afghanistan endured multiple financial and economic shocks in 2021, and Afghans faced many economic challenges. Even before the Taliban takeover, almost half of Afghans reportedly lived below the poverty line, a third lived on less than two dollars per day, and unemployment at the time of the *Survey* was over 10%.¹ Around half of the population needed humanitarian aid in 2021, double the figure for 2020, due to the health consequences and socioeconomic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.² The World Bank reports that economic growth was weak throughout 2021, due to some extent to deteriorating security and to drought conditions that hampered agricultural production.³ Further contributing to the nation's economic woes was a third wave of Covid-19.⁴ In the first half of 2021, energy prices are reported to have increased by as much as 12%, and prices for basic household goods increased as the Taliban captured border posts and key transit hubs.⁵ The Asian Development Bank notes that food price inflation in 2020 was estimated at 10%.⁶ Also contributing to the weakened economy was a substantial reduction in international aid.⁷ The *Survey* reflects Afghans' economic distress, with a record proportion of respondents reporting financial woes, employment issues, rising food prices, a reduction in the quality of food, and diminished access to basic household items.

Even before the Taliban takeover, almost half of Afghans reportedly lived below the poverty line.

Related to poor economic conditions and deteriorating security across Afghanistan, the *Survey* also found decreasing levels of awareness of project implementation across a number of development areas including reconstruction/building of roads, drinking water projects, irrigation projects, healthcare, and agriculture, and uneven access to services.

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-8.** *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household. (b) Employment opportunities. (c) Availability of products in the market (e.g., rice, wheat, oil). (d) Quality of food in your diet. (e) Physical condition of your house/dwelling. (f) Health/well-being of your family members. (g) Electricity supply, (h) Quality of school services (teachers and curriculum). (i) Access to roads. (j) Access to clean drinking water. (k) Access to irrigation facilities.*
- Q-9.** *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school opening. (c) New private school opening. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government supplied electricity. (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.). (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements. (j) Programs in agriculture. (k) New factories opened. (l) Building new mosques.*
- Q-13.** *(Ask all.) In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household visited a public hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?*
- Q-14.** *(If Q-13 answer is yes.) What type of services did you receive at the public hospital or clinic?*
- Q-15.** *(Ask all.) In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household visited a private hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?*
- Q-16.** *(If Q-15 answer is yes.) What type of services did you receive at the private hospital or clinic?*

4.1 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

Almost half of Afghans (46.8%) stated that the financial situation of their household had gotten worse in the past 12 months. This figure is the highest recorded over the years of the *Survey*, and it is indicative of the economic difficulties facing Afghans. It is also significantly higher than the figure recorded in the last full *Survey of the Afghan People* in 2019 (31.1%). Just 13.2% of those surveyed reported that the financial situation of their household had gotten better, which is also the lowest ever recorded by the *Survey*.




Fig. 4.1: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.

When disaggregated by region, those in Central/Kabul are most likely to say their financial situation has gotten worse.

When disaggregated by region, those in Central/Kabul are most likely to say their financial situation has gotten worse (60.1%), while respondents in the South West are the least likely (33.5%). Respondents in the East (20.3%) are most likely to say their financial situation has gotten better, and those in Central/Highlands are the least likely (5.1%).

HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SITUATION: WORSE




Fig. 4.2: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (a) Financial situation of your household.

By a substantial margin, urbanites (61.0%) are more likely than rural dwellers (41.2%) to say that their financial situation has gotten worse.

Almost two-thirds of respondents (64.4%) report that employment opportunities worsened in 2021. Just 5.9% say that they improved, the lowest figure in *Survey* records.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR HOUSEHOLD




Fig. 4.3: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (b) Employment opportunities.

For the first time in the *Survey*, over half of respondents (51.5%) report that the availability of products in the market (e.g., rice, wheat, oil) got worse in the past year. With border crossings closed or disrupted periodically throughout 2021 due to insecurity and Covid-19 restrictions, this is no surprise.

Respondents in Central/Highlands are most likely to say that the availability of such products has worsened (69.5%), while those in the North East are least likely (44.2%). In a sign of the problems facing respondents in Central/Highlands, just 2.2% report that the availability of products improved.

Reflecting a downward trend in the availability of products, more than two-fifths of Afghans (44.2%) report that the quality of food in their diet got worse in the past year, representing a significant increase from 2019, when just 29.7% said so. Urbanites (52.0%) are more likely to say that the food in their diet got worse than those in rural areas (41.2%).

The percentage reporting that the physical conditions of their house/dwelling worsened in the past 12 months is at its highest (33.5%) and is almost double the figure in 2007 (17.7%), when the question was first asked.

Over a third of Afghans (37.6%) say that the health and well-being of family members has gotten worse in the past 12 months. This figure is the highest in *Survey* records and represents a 13 percentage point

increase over 2019 (24.6%) and a huge increase overall in 2007 (11.2%). Less than a fifth (16.0%) report that the health and well-being of family members improved in the past 12 months, the lowest figure since the question was first asked.




Fig. 4.4: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (f) Health/well-being of your family members.

Health and well-being concerns are widespread but appear most pronounced in the Central/Highlands region, where just 5.5% of respondents report that the health and well-being of family members improved in the past 12 months, and almost half (48.7%) claim it has gotten worse.

PERCEPTIONS OF HOUSEHOLD HEALTH/WELL-BEING: WORSE




Fig. 4.5: Q-8. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? (f) Health/well-being of your family members.

Overreliance on the importation of electricity renders Afghanistan prone to power outages, which afflict much of the population. Despite significant investment in power infrastructure, only 30% of the population has access to grid-based power.⁸ Access to electricity is further hampered by frequent insurgent attacks targeting Afghanistan's power infrastructure,⁹ resulting in additional outages. Almost half of respondents (47.5%) report that access to electricity worsened in the past 12 months. This figure is the second highest recorded in *Survey* history after 2008 (49.2%), and it shows that significant investment in power infrastructure has not translated into sustained gains.¹⁰ Such findings may be the result of a general shift in U.S. reconstruction efforts away from large, capital-intensive projects and towards smaller scale projects.¹¹

Despite the generally negative outlook for access to electricity, more than a third of respondents in the North East (36.8%) and just over a fifth (21.5%) in the North West reported that access to electricity improved in the past 12 months.

Just over a fifth (21.3%) of respondents said that access to roads had improved, while a third (32.6%) said it had worsened. These findings are generally commensurate with findings from previous years. Respondents in the West (40.7%) are most likely to state that access to roads got worse, while the least likely are those in the South East (26.4%).

Almost two-fifths of respondents (38.8%) said access to clean drinking water had worsened, a 10 percentage point increase over 2019 (27.9%). Worsening access to clean drinking water is highest among those in Central/Highlands (57.0%) and lowest, by a large margin, in the South East (22.7%).

Over two-fifths (42.1%) said that access to irrigation facilities worsened in the past 12 months, a sizeable increase over 2019 (26.2%). There are no discernible differences when the results are dissected by region. Over three-fifths of those in Central/Highlands (62.4%) report worsening access to irrigation facilities.

4.2 AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Just over a third of respondents (36.4%) report that there has been a project involving the reconstruction/building of roads or bridges implemented in their area in the past 12 months. This figure continues the general downward trend since 2013. By a large margin, those in Central/Highlands are most likely to report that there is no such project (82.9%), while those in Central/Kabul are least likely to report no such project (56.1%).

AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS




Fig. 4.6: Q-9. I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months. (a) Reconstruction/building of roads or bridges. (b) New government school opening. (c) New private school opening. (d) New private university. (e) Drinking water project (e.g., new wells, hand pumps, tank system, reservoir). (f) Irrigation project. (g) Government-supplied electricity. (h) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.). (i) Reconciliation with antigovernment elements. (j) Programs in agriculture. (k) New factories opened. (l) Building new mosques.

Less than a fifth of those surveyed (17.3%) report that a new government school opened in their area in the past 12 months. This figure is broadly similar to trends observed since 2014. Interestingly, those in rural areas (18.4%) are more likely to report new government schools opening than are urban residents (14.6%). By region, fewer than 10% of respondents in Central/Highlands (6.3%) and the North East (9.3%) reported a new government school opening.

Figures are broadly comparable for new private schools: 19.2% say that a new private school opened in their area in the past year. This percentage, however, is the highest since the question first appeared in

the *Survey*. In contrast to findings for government schools, however, urbanites (32.9%) are significantly more likely than rural dwellers (13.8%) to report a private school opening. Just 2.4% of those in Central/Highlands report a new private school opening in their area.

Despite much-publicized issues surrounding the electricity supply, the number of respondents reporting a government-supplied electricity project in their area (21.8%) is the highest since the question was first asked. Those in the North East (44.1%) are most likely to report such an initiative, while those in the Central/Highlands region are the least (4.3%).

Just a fifth of those interviewed (21.4%) stated that there has been a healthcare project (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) implemented in their area in the past 12 months. This figure represents a continuing decline from 2019 (24.6%) and 2018 (25.7%) and a significant decline from 2011 (44.4%) and 2007 (44.6%). Such findings are indicative of a general longitudinal decrease in the government's ability to provide development projects and services, which in this case is likely further exacerbated by observable barriers to accessing public-health resources, lack of government capacity, and frequent security-related closures of healthcare facilities.¹²

Fewer than 10% of those interviewed (8.9%) report that a project related to reconciliation with antigovernment elements has been implemented in their area in the past 12 months. Given the generally rural nature of the insurgent presence, it is no surprise that reconciliation efforts are more frequently reported in rural areas (10.2%) than in urban areas (5.8%).

Although licit agriculture is a foundation of Afghanistan's formal economy and a primary source of exports,¹³ employing 40% of the country's labor force and directly or indirectly supporting an estimated 80% of the total population,¹⁴ less than a fifth of respondents (19.1%) reported the implementation of programs in agriculture in their area in the past 12 months, representing a 6 percentage point decrease since 2019 (25.5%).

Of all the projects implemented in areas of Afghanistan, the building of a mosque (28.4%) is the most likely to be reported. Almost half of those in the South East (48.7%) report a mosque being built in the past 12 months. Respondents in Central/Highlands are least likely to report a mosque being built (8.2%).

Awareness of development projects is positively correlated with optimism. Respondents who are aware of seven or more development projects are notably more likely to express optimism than Afghans who are unaware of any projects (48.9% vs.13.0%).

4.3 ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

More than half of those surveyed (56.8%) reported that they had visited a public hospital or clinic for medical treatment or some health-related reason in the past 12 months. Three-fifths of rural dwellers (60.2%) report accessing a public hospital or clinic, compared to less than half of urbanites (48.2%). The top reasons for visiting are to access good-quality medicine (42.1%) and for better medical examinations (28.5%). Despite a third wave of Covid-19 in Afghanistan, just 6.5% report accessing Covid-19 treatment at a public hospital or clinic.

Despite a third wave of Covid-19 in Afghanistan, just 6.5% report accessing Covid-19 treatment at a public hospital or clinic.

When asked the same question, but for private hospital or clinic, fewer than half of respondents (43.3%) report utilizing such a facility. This is a small increase over 2019 (41.0%), and a somewhat larger increase over 2018 (39.2%). Access to good-quality medicine (43.8%) and getting a better medical examination (29.8%) are again the most-cited answers.

ENDNOTES

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- 4 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (see note 2).
- 5 Ibid.
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- 7 Forde, “What will happen” (see note 1).
- 8 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (see note 2).
- 9 Ruchi Kumar (2021), “Taliban targeting Afghanistan’s crucial power, IT infrastructure,” *Al Jazeera*, July 15, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power>.
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- 13 SIGAR (2021), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, SIGAR, July 30, <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-07-30qr.pdf>.
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GOVERNANCE

According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Afghanistan ranked close to the bottom— 174th out of 180 countries—in perceived level of corruption in 2021. The index is a global indicator of perceptions of public-sector corruption, and Afghanistan’s 2021 rating marked a sharp decline from the nation’s previous ranking of 165th in 2020.¹ In fact, many have blamed ongoing high levels of corruption in the country and dissatisfaction with governance, among other factors, for the sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban takeover.² This corruption undermines the provision of basic services, further exacerbating instability and vice versa in a vicious cycle.³ For example, a month before the Taliban takeover, protesters in the northern province of Badakhshan were fired upon when demonstrating for the government to deliver security, electricity, and drinking water. The violent reaction by the government resulted in the deaths of five protestors and over 40 wounded, fueling resentment and further protests.⁴ Meanwhile, as the government forces and protesters were clashing, Taliban fighters managed to reach the gates of the provincial capital, Faizabad.⁵

In fact, many have blamed ongoing high levels of corruption in the country and dissatisfaction with governance among other factors for the sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban takeover.

Persistent insecurity, active violence, poor service delivery, and corruption are potential contributors to the increasingly negative perceptions of governance in Afghanistan.

Using data collected just as the Taliban were sweeping the country, this chapter explores attitudes on governance in Afghanistan, including perceived corruption, dispute-resolution mechanisms, local justice, and confidence in government institutions.

5.1 SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-52. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) Central government. (b) Provincial government. (c) Municipal authorities (urban residents only). (d) District government (rural residents only).*

Q-99. *How successful do you think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people living in your area: a lot, a little, or not at all?*

Satisfaction with the performance of all levels of Afghan government increased continuously from 2016 to 2019. However, in 2021, this upward trend reversed, and satisfaction with the central government, provincial governments, district governments, and municipal authorities dropped.

In 2021, 63.9% of Afghans said the central government was doing a good job (18.6% very good and 45.3% somewhat good). This is a notable decrease from the 79.8% recorded in 2007 (24.8% very good and 55.0% somewhat good). While the percentage saying the central government is doing a very good job (18.6%) is low, the overall figure of “very good” and somewhat good” remains high at 63.9%. Given the timing of fieldwork amid the collapse of the Afghan government, this may be attributed to overall low expectations of the government, or general social desirability where participants respond with answers they believe may be deemed more favorable.

Regionally, the highest levels of satisfaction with government performance were found in the East, with 85.6%, and the South East, with 79.3%. The lowest levels of satisfaction with central government performance were found among respondents in Central/Highlands (56.0%) and the West (56.8%).

Rural respondents were more likely to say that the central government was doing a good job than urban respondents (65.0% rural vs. 61.0% urban). There are negligible differences by gender (63.7% men vs. 64.1% women).

SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2021
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	80	68	71	73	73	75	74	75	58	49	56	60	66	64
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	79	74	75	78	80	80	68	68	57	53	57	61	65	60
MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES	58	50	58	53	63	65	59	58	47	42	43	52	60	57
DISTRICT GOVERNMENT		67	69	61	68	66	65	57	53	51	55	54	59	57

Fig. 5.1: Q-52. *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? (a) Central government. (b) Provincial government. (c) Municipal authorities (urban residents only). (d) District government (rural residents only). (Percent who say “very good job” or “somewhat good job.”)*

Along with Afghans’ satisfaction with government, the perception that the government had improved (by a lot or a little) the living conditions in their local area also fell, from 69.3% in 2019 to 66.0% in 2021. This marks a reversal of a gradual upward trend in 2017 and 2018, when the perception that government had improved local living conditions rose from 63.0% of respondents (2017) to 65.0% (2018).

Regionally, respondents in the East (81.9%) and the South East (74.5%) were most likely to say the government had improved the living conditions of people in their area, compared to just 56.7% of respondents in Central/Kabul and 57.6% in Central/Highlands.

Rural respondents were more likely than urban respondents to say that the government had improved the living conditions of people in their area (68.2% vs. 60.4%), while differences by gender were negligible (66.3% men vs. 65.6% women).

5.2 CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

KEY QUESTION

Q-51. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? (a) Central government. (b) Provincial government. (c) Independent Election Commission. (d) Community development councils. (e) Community shuras/jirgas. (f) Government ministers. (g) International NGOs. (h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV. (i) National NGOs. (j) Parliament as a whole. (k) Provincial councils. (l) Religious leaders. (m) Your member of parliament.*

The *Survey* asked respondents to rate their level of confidence in different officials, institutions and organizations.

Afghans continued to have the most confidence in the media (65.1%), community shuras/jirgas (61.1%), and religious leaders (61.3%). They had the least confidence in government ministers (39.1%), the Independent Election Commission (39.7%), and parliament as a whole (41.1%).

Confidence in all officials, institutions, and organizations declined from 2019 to 2021. In fact, in some instances, confidence reached the lowest levels since the question was first asked. For example, confidence in provincial governments fell to 53.8%; community shuras/jirgas, 61.1%; national NGOs, 45.6%; provincial councils, 46.8%; and religious leaders, 61.3%. It's of note that confidence in community shuras/jirgas is generally relatively high and here it decreased from 66.7% in 2019 to an all-time low of 61.1% in 2021.

CONFIDENCE IN OFFICIALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2021
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT														59
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT					67	65	59							54
INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION		57	67	54	59	60		66	36	34	38	43	42	40
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	64	65	64	61	68	66	63	65	61	53	58	58	60	56

COMMUNITY SHURAS/ JIRGAS	72	69	67	66	70	68	65	69	64	62	66	65	67	61
GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	57	51	53	54	56	55	45	47	42	36	36	38	44	39
INTERNATIONAL NGOS	64	64	66	54	56	53	51	53	44	44	42	42	47	45
MEDIA SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TV	62	63	62	57	69	71	68	73	67	65	66	67	69	65
NATIONAL NGOS	60	62	61	55	54	54	51	57	50	48	49	48	53	46
PARLIAMENT AS A WHOLE				59	62	62	50	51	42	37	37	40	47	41
PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	70	65	62	62	67	66	58	58	52	47	48	51	56	47
RELIGIOUS LEADERS					74	73	65	70	64	66	67	69	71	61
YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT							47	52	43	35	35	42	53	42

Fig. 5.2: Q-51. *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? (a) Central government. (b) Provincial government. (c) Independent Election Commission. (d) Community development councils. (e) Community shuras/jirgas. (f) Government ministers. (g) International NGOs. (h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV. (i) National NGOs. (j) Parliament as a whole. (k) Provincial councils. (l) Religious leaders. (m) Your member of parliament. (Percent who say “some” or “a lot of” confidence.) (Note: blanks represent years the question was not asked.)*

5.3 CORRUPTION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-44. *Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (a) Officials in the municipality/district office. (b) Provincial governor’s office. (c) Customs office. (d) Afghan National Police. (e) Afghan National Army. (f) Judiciary/courts. (g) Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (state*

electric supply). (h) Hospitals/clinics. (i) When applying for a job. (j) Admissions to schools/university. (k) When receiving official documents from schools/university.

Q-45. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (a) In your daily life. (b) In Afghanistan as a whole.

Since the *Survey* first asked about corruption as a problem in the country as a whole, respondents have consistently expressed that it is a serious problem. In 2021, respondents were asked how often they encountered corruption among various authorities and institutions, and depending on the institution, experiences of corruption varied. Overall, however, reported experiences of corruption decreased from 2019 to 2021. Reasons for the decrease may include limited interactions due to pandemic restrictions, poor economic conditions, or fear of sharing experiences of corruption.

Respondents were most likely to cite experiences of corruption (in all cases, in most cases, or in some cases) when interacting with officials in the municipality/district office (46.1%) or the judiciary/courts (46.1%).

Since the *Survey* first asked about corruption as a problem in the country as a whole, respondents have consistently expressed that it is a serious problem.

Regionally, respondents were most likely to say they experienced corruption in the municipality/district office in the North East (62.1%) and the South East (58.4%), and least likely in Central/Highlands (23.2%) and Central/Kabul (26.9%). Men (47.8%) were somewhat more likely than women (43.2%) to experience corruption in the municipality/district office.

By education level, Afghans with more than 12 years of formal education were less likely to experience corruption in the municipality/district office (40.2%) than respondents with 1–6 years (49.3%) or 7–9 years (49.7%) of formal education.

EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

	2018	2019	2021
	%	%	%
MUNICIPALITY/DISTRICT OFFICE	48	50	46
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	46	48	40
CUSTOMS OFFICE	49	50	44
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	39	42	35
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	30	31	28
JUDICIARY/COURTS	53	53	46
STATE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY BRESHNA SHIRKAT	41	41	38
HOSPITALS/CLINICS	36	39	35
WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	43	48	42
ADMISSION TO SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY	31	31	30
WHEN RECEIVING OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FROM SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY	35	37	33

Fig. 5.3: Q-44: Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations. Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (a) Officials in the municipality/district office. (b) Provincial governor's office. (c) Customs office. (d) Afghan National Police. (e) Afghan National Army. (f) Judiciary/courts. (g) Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (state electric supply). (h) Hospitals/clinics. (i) When applying for a job. (j) Admissions to schools/university. (k) When receiving official documents from schools/university.

Since 2006, the *Survey* has asked Afghans whether corruption in Afghanistan as a whole and in their daily life is a major problem, a minor problem or no problem at all. In 2021, Afghans' perceptions of corruption as a major problem remained high and held steady at 2018 and 2019 levels: 81.3% said corruption is a major problem in the country.

By strata, urban dwellers were more likely to say corruption is a major problem in the country (86.9%) than rural dwellers (79.1%). Regionally, respondents in Central/Highlands were the most likely to say corruption is a major problem (92.0%), and respondents in the South West were the least (72.9%). Men were slightly more likely than women to say corruption is a major problem (82.1% vs. 80.6%).




Fig. 5.4: Q-45. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (b) In Afghanistan as a whole.

When asked about perceptions of corruption in their daily lives, the proportion of Afghans who said it was a major problem reached an all time high in 2021 of 72.1%. Urban dwellers were more likely to cite corruption as a major problem in their daily life than rural dwellers (76.3% vs. 70.4%).

Corruption in their daily lives was cited most frequently among respondents in the East (80.1%) and West (79.4%) and least frequently in the North West (62.7%) and North East (63.6%).

Men were more likely to call corruption a major problem in their daily lives than women (74.7% vs. 69.4%).

CORRUPTION IS A PROBLEM IN DAILY LIFE




Fig. 5.5: Q-45. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (a) In your daily life.

5.4 JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-36.** How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the available dispute-resolution services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?
- Q-37.** In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the state court, Huquq Department, or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?
- Q-38.** (Ask if Q-37 answer is yes.) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single response. If more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one.)
- Q-39.** (Ask if Q-37 answer is yes.) Were you fully satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings?
- Q-40.** (Ask if Q-37 answer is yes.) Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Allow more than one response.)

- Q-41.** (Ask if Q-40 answer is "Huquq Department.") And now let's turn to the local Huquq Department. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department? (a) Local huquqs are fair and trusted. (b) Local huquqs follow the local norms and values of our people. (c) Local huquqs are effective at delivering justice. (d) Local huquqs resolve cases quickly and efficiently. (e) Local huquqs treat men and women equally.
- Q-42.** (Ask if Q-40 answer is "state courts.") Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts? (a) State courts are fair and trusted. (b) State courts follow the local norms and values of our people. (c) State courts are effective at delivering justice. (d) State courts resolve cases quickly and efficiently. (e) State courts treat men and women equally.
- Q-43.** (Ask if Q-40 answer is "shura/jirga.") And now let's turn to village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas? (a) Local shuras/jirgas are fair and trusted. (b) Local shuras/jirgas follow the local norms and values of our people. (c) Local shuras/jirgas are effective at delivering justice. (d) Local shuras/jirgas resolve cases quickly and efficiently. (e) There should be local women's shuras/jirgas.

The *Survey* asked Afghans about their level of satisfaction with available dispute-resolution services. In 2021, 14.9% of respondents said they were very satisfied, and 48.2% said they were somewhat satisfied, both lower than 2019 (16.6% very satisfied and 52.3% somewhat satisfied).

SATISFACTION WITH DISPUTE-RESOLUTION SERVICES IN AREA




Fig. 5.6: Q-36. (Ask all.) How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the available dispute-resolution services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

The percentage of Afghans who had a dispute or a formal case that could not be settled with the other party and thus had to go to the state court, Huquq Department, or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it decreased compared to 2019, from 20.6% to 19.6%.

USE OF STATE COURT, HUQUQ, OR SHURA/JIRGA TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE




Fig.5.7: Q-37. *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the state court, Huquq Department, or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not? (Percent who say yes.) (Note: question was not asked every year.)*

The use of state court, huquq, or shura/jirga for dispute resolution was highest in the South East (30.8%) and the South West (30.2%) and lowest in Central/Kabul (10.8%) and Central/Highlands (9.2%).

A separate question gauges Afghans' perceptions of available dispute-resolution mechanisms and whether they are fair and trusted, follow the norms of the people, are effective at delivering justice, resolve cases in a prompt and timely manner, and treat women equally (and for shuras/jirgas, whether there should be a local women's jirga). Interestingly, when asked about the Huquq Department and the state courts, overall perceptions took a downward turn after 2019 (see figure below). For example, 72.8% of Afghans in 2019 said the Huquq Department is fair and trusted. This fell to 69.4% in 2021. When asked about the state courts, 66.1% in 2019 said they were fair and trusted, but just 59.5% in 2021.

While the Huquq Department and the state courts declined in respondents' estimation overall, local shuras/jirgas received mixed reviews. The percentage of Afghans who said the local shura/jirga follows the norms of the people rose from 74.4% in 2019 to 76.7% in 2021, yet those who said they resolve cases quickly and efficiently fell from 73.2% in 2019 to 70.8% in 2021.

OPINIONS ABOUT DISPUTE-RESOLUTION INSTITUTIONS

	HUQUQ DEPARTMENT		STATE COURT		LOCAL SHURA/JIRGA	
	2019	2021	2019	2021	2019	2021
	%	%	%	%	%	%
FAIR AND TRUSTED	73	69	66	59	81	82
FOLLOWS NORMS OF THE PEOPLE	63	60	57	52	74	77
EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	62	58	53	52	74	75
RESOLVES CASES QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY	54	52	47	41	73	71
TREATS MEN AND WOMEN EQUALLY (Q-43 LOCAL SHURA/JIRGA: THERE SHOULD BE LOCAL WOMEN'S SHURAS AND JIRGAS)	61	58	54	49	68	69

Fig. 5.8: Q-41 to Q-43. *And now let's turn to the [insert item]. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the [institution]? (a) It is fair and trusted. (b) It follows the norms and values of our people. (c) It is effective at delivering justice. (d) It resolves cases quickly and efficiently. (e) It treats men and women equally. (Percent who strongly agree or somewhat agree for the institution in question.)*

Among the 19.6% of Afghans who did bring a case to the Huquq Department, a state court, or a village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga for resolution, the types of cases varied. Overall, the most common types of cases were disputes over land (39.6%), family problems (19.9%), other property disputes (11.9%), commercial disputes (11.6%), and traffic accidents (10.4%).

Men were more likely than women to pursue disputes over land (40.6% men vs. 38.5% women), while women were more likely to pursue family disputes (23.1% women vs. 17.1% men). Interestingly, women were almost twice as likely as men to take divorce cases to dispute resolution (4.6% vs. 2.8%).

TYPES OF CASES TAKEN TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION, BY GENDER

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
	%	%	%
DISPUTE OVER LAND	41	39	40
FAMILY PROBLEMS	17	23	20
OTHER PROPERTY DISPUTE, NOT LAND	12	11	12
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE	13	10	12
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT	11	10	10
DIVORCE	3	5	4
MURDER	1	1	1

Fig. 5.9: Q-38. (Ask if Q-37 answer is yes.) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single response. If more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one.)

ENDNOTES

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

There is considerable academic discourse on the topic of whether politics and religion can or should be kept separate, and the *Survey* reflects how beliefs have changed over time in Afghanistan. With the installation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021, the integration of religion into politics has moved once again to the forefront—for example, in the interpretation of Sharia law and women’s rights.

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-46.** *Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?*
- Q-47.** *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*
- Q-48.** *Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear? (a) Voting in a national/provincial election. (b) Participating in a peaceful demonstration. (c) Running for public office.*

6.1 POLITICS AND RELIGION

In 2021, before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, 56.2% of respondents said that religious leaders should be consulted or involved in politics. This figure is the lowest on record in the history of the *Survey* and more than 13 percentage points lower than the high of 69.5% in 2011.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN POLITICS




Fig. 6.1: Q-46. *Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?*

There is no difference in this view when dissected by gender. By strata, however, significant variation is observed. Just 49.9% of urbanites say that religion and politics should mix, compared to 58.7% of rural dwellers.

By region, less than half of those in the North West (45.5%) say that religious leaders should be consulted/involved in politics, while almost two-thirds (65.8%) say so in the North East. By province, significant variations are apparent. A huge majority of those in Panjshir (93.1%) said that religious leaders should be involved in politics, compared to just 31.0% in Sar-e Pol.

6.2 EXERCISING BASIC POLITICAL FREEDOMS

The percentage of respondents reporting a lot of fear when voting in a national or provincial election (20.8%) was the highest on record at the time of this *Survey*. The disputed nature of the 2019 elections,¹ and the violence surrounding them,² may have been fresh in the minds of many Afghans when answering this question. Correspondingly, the percentage professing no fear was the lowest on record (36.1%), some 21 percentage points lower than the high recorded in 2006 (57.0%). Females (23.7%) are more likely to report a lot of fear than males (17.8%).

The percentage of respondents reporting a lot of fear when voting in a national or provincial election was the highest on record.

Almost three-quarters of those in Central/Highlands (73.5%) report no fear when voting in a national or provincial election, suggesting overall satisfaction with levels of security in the region.

Some 34.5% say they have a lot of fear when participating in a peaceful demonstration, and this is the highest proportion on record. Females (41.1%) are significantly more likely than males (27.9%) to report a lot of fear. This percentage is just 15.4% of those in Central/Highlands who report a lot of fear, compared to 29% or more in all other regions.

Thirty percent of respondents (29.8%) report a lot of fear when considering running for public office. Given that almost a third of males (34.4%) but only a fourth of females (25.2%) report a lot of fear, this figure may be representative of the greater presence of males in public office

6.3 DEMOCRACY

The percentage of respondents who say they are satisfied with democracy dropped from 65.1% in 2019 to 60.6% in 2021. Three-fifths of those surveyed say they are either very satisfied (15.5%) or somewhat satisfied (45.1%) with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. The figure is generally in line with trends observed in previous years, but it is significantly lower than in 2006 (21.4% very satisfied; 55.3% somewhat satisfied), 2007 (17.8% very satisfied; 54.7% somewhat satisfied), and 2014 (22.6% very satisfied; 50.5% somewhat satisfied). There is no discernible difference by gender. Urbanites are more likely to be either very satisfied (18.3%) or very dissatisfied (15.1%) than are rural dwellers.

Almost three-quarters of those in Central/Highlands (73.5%) report no fear when voting in a national or provincial election, suggesting overall satisfaction with levels of security in the region.

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Thirty percent of respondents (29.8%) report a lot of fear when considering running for public office. Given that almost a third of males (34.5%) but only a fourth of females (25.2%) report a lot of fear, this figure may be representative of the greater presence of males in public office




Fig. 6.2: Q-47. *On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan? By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (Percent who are very or somewhat satisfied.)*

There are no significant differences by gender: 15.0% of men and 16.1% of women were very satisfied with the way democracy worked at the time of the survey.

Respondents with more than 12 years of education are more likely to be very satisfied with democracy than those with no formal education.

There are some interesting trends related to educational attainment. Respondents with more than 12 years of education are more likely to be very satisfied with democracy (19.8%) than those with no formal education (14.8%).

Differences can also be seen by region. Respondents in Central/Highlands are most likely to say they are very satisfied (23.9%), while those in the West are least likely (10.0%).

There is a positive relation between economic situation and confidence in democracy: Afghans who say the financial household situation has gotten better are slightly more likely to be satisfied with democracy.

Additionally, there is a positive relation between economic situation and confidence in democracy. Afghans who say their financial household situation has gotten better are slightly more likely to be satisfied with democracy (67.5%) compared to those who say it has gotten worse (58.1%).

Afghans who always, often, or sometimes fear for their personal safety are also less likely to be satisfied with democracy (60.6% compared to 65.1% who never never fear for personal safety).

ENDNOTES

- 1 Tameem Akhgar and Rahim Faiez (2020), “It’s Official: Afghanistan Election Commission Says President Ghani Wins 2nd Term,” *The Diplomat*, Feb. 19, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/its-official-afghanistan-election-commission-says-president-ghani-wins-2nd-term/>.
- 2 United Nations (2019), “Election-related violence claims 85 lives in Afghanistan: UN report,” *UN News*, Oct. 15, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1049291>.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Access to information is critical for people to participate as productive citizens, to exercise their voice, to effectively monitor and hold government to account, and to enter into informed dialogue about decisions that affect their lives.¹ Internet usage continues to grow in Afghanistan, and while this year's *Survey* shows television usage at its highest level yet since the *Survey* began, family and friends are still the source of choice for receiving information, albeit at a lower level than the last time the *Survey* was conducted, as other sources increase in popularity.

Information can change the way people see the world, understand their place in it, and adjust their lives to maximize the benefits available through local resources.² The internet is now a principal means of gaining access to information, especially during the pandemic, offering the opportunity to exchange ideas, participate in activities and discussions on a range of topics,³ and exercise civil liberties. The following chapter looks at Afghans' access to information through a variety of media including the internet, radio, television, and others.

KEY QUESTION

Q-80. Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television set. (c) The internet. (d) Mosque. (e) Community shuras. (f) Friends and family.

7.1 SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION

The *Survey* asked respondents which channels they use to get news and information. Family and friends are the most-cited source for news and information, while the internet is the least cited.

SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION




Fig 7.1: Q-80. Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information? (a) Radio. (b) Television set. (d) The internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.

RADIO

More than half of respondents (55.0%) say they use the radio to get news and information. This is a drop from previous years, the highest percentage being 80.4% in 2013 when the question was first asked. The use of radio to get news and information is more common among rural dwellers than urbanites (60.3% vs. 41.4%). Men are more likely to say they use the radio as a source of news and information than women (58.0% vs. 52.0%). Respondents in Central/Highlands are least likely to say they listen to the radio for news and information (28.1%).

TELEVISION

More than two-thirds of respondents say they use television to get news and information (69.4%), an increase from 54.6% in 2013. Urban respondents are more likely than rural respondents to say they use television for news and information (86.5% vs. 62.8%). There are no discernable differences among men and women.

Television as a source of news and information is more frequently cited by respondents in the North West (82.9%) and Central/Kabul (80.7%).

Greater educational attainment is correlated with more television use. For example, respondents with 12-plus years of formal education are far more likely to use television as a source of news and information (84.1%) than respondents with no formal education (60.0%).

These findings are notable, considering that television ownership was at its highest recorded level (72.9%) in this edition of the *Survey*.



Fig 7.2: D-5. How many of the following does your household have? (c) TV. **7.2-1b.** Do you own any of the following here in your household in functioning order? (Television set.) Note wording change: X1b used from 2007–2012; D5 used from 2014–2021.

INTERNET

Internet usage continues to grow in Afghanistan, with one-fourth of respondents citing the internet as a source of news and information (24.9%), compared to just 3.3% in 2013.

Almost two-fifths of urbanites use the internet for news and information (39.3%), while just one-fifth for rural dwellers do so (19.2%).

Men are twice as likely as women to say they use the internet to get news and information (34.7% vs. 15.1%).

Internet use is more frequently cited by respondents in Central/Kabul (35.7%).

MOSQUE

The *Survey* indicates that fewer than half of respondents get their news and information from the mosque (40.1%). This percentage has fluctuated marginally over the years and is now at the lowest level since 2014 (46.9%). By gender, more than three-fifths of male respondents use the mosque as a source of news and information (63.7%); however, this figure is less than one-fifth for females (16.5%).

COMMUNITY SHURAS

Community shuras as a source of news and information are cited by almost one-third of respondents (32.0%), the lowest figure since 2014 (36.4%). Community shuras are more likely to be cited as a source of news and information in rural than in urban areas (34.1% vs. 26.9%).

Men (48.7%) are more likely than women (15.3%) to use community shuras as a source of news and information. The use of community shuras as a source of news and information is most prevalent among respondents in Central/Highlands (59.4%).

SOURCE OF NEWS AND INFORMATION, BY GENDER AND STRATA




Fig 7.3: Q-80. (Ask all.) Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information? (a) Radio. (b) TV set. (d) The internet. (e) Mosque. (f) Community shuras. (g) Friends and family.

FRIENDS AND FAMILY

Friends and family were still the most common source of news and information at the time of this research, the choice of 81.7% of respondents; however, this figure is 5 percentage points lower than the 86.7% who relied on friends and family in 2019. Men are more likely than women to say they use family and friends as a source of news and information (84.2% men vs. 79.1% women).

Family and friends are the most-cited source for news and information; while more than two-thirds of respondents say they use television to get news and information.

In a separate series of questions, Afghans were asked whether they generally listen to the radio, watch television, or have access to the internet.

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-72.** Do you listen to radio programs?
- Q-73.** (If Q-72 answer is yes.) You said you listen to the radio. How many hours do you listen to it on an average day every time when you listen to the radio?
- Q-74.** Do you watch television programs?
- Q-75.** (If Q-74 answer is yes.) You said that you watch television. How many hours do you watch it on an average day every time when you watch television?
- Q-76.** (If Q-74 answer is yes.) Which TV show/program do you watch most often?
- Q-77.** (Ask all.) Do people in this area have access to the internet, either through a cable connection, a wireless/wi-fi connection, or cellular data (e.g., 2G, 3G, or 4G)?
- Q-78.** (If Q-77 answer is yes.) Do you personally have access to the internet?
- Q-79.** (If Q-78 answer is yes.) Why do you use the internet? Anything else? (Record up to two mentions.)

RADIO

More than half of respondents (53.7%) say they listen to radio programs. Listening to the radio has significantly decreased over the years, and 2021 has the lowest figure since the question was first included in the *Survey*.

Respondents in urban areas are less likely to say they use the radio than those in rural areas (40.6% vs. 58.8%). By region, those from Central/Highlands are least likely to say they listen to the radio (27.3%), while those in the South East are the most likely to say so (81.3%).

Of the respondents who say they listen to radio programs, 71.9% do so for roughly 30 minutes to two hours per day.

TELEVISION

On the other hand, the number of respondents who say they watch television programs has significantly increased. More than two-thirds (68.7%) watch television, substantially more than the low of 40.5% in 2010 when this question was first included in the *Survey*. Unlike radio, television use is more common among urban respondents than in rural areas (86.1% vs. 61.8%).

Interestingly, there are no discernable differences by gender. By region, however, differences emerge. Respondents are least likely to watch television in the South West (46.8%), South East (47.0%) and East (47.5%), while the percentage of TV watchers is highest in the North West (82.4%) and Central/Kabul (80.4%).

Educated respondents are more likely than uneducated or less educated respondents to say they are television watchers. In fact, 83.4% of those with over 12 years of formal education say they watch TV, compared to just 59.4% of those with no formal education.

Of the respondents who watch television, 63.8% say they do so for 30 minutes to two hours. Female respondents (34.0%) are more likely to say they watch TV for more than two hours than male respondents (26.2%).

When asked which TV programs they watch the most, the greatest proportion of respondents (38.3%) cited the news at 6:00 p.m., followed by television serials (11.9%).

7.2 THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA

In 2021, 56.1% of respondents say that people in their area have access to the internet, the highest percentage recorded, and substantially higher than 40.0% in 2016 when the question was first asked.

In 2021, 56.1% of respondents say that people in their area have access to the internet, the highest percentage recorded, and substantially higher than 40.0% in 2016 when the question was first asked.

Two-thirds of urban respondents (66.9%) and slightly more than half of rural respondents (51.9%) say that people in their area have access to the internet. Male respondents are more likely than female respondents to say there is internet access in their area (60.0% vs. 52.3%).

Respondents in the West are the least likely to say that people in their area have access to the internet (32.6%), while those in the South East are the most likely (84.6%).

Respondents with more education are more likely to say that people in their area have access to the internet than those with less or no formal education (more than 12 years of education, 76.9%; seven to nine years of education, 57.4%; no education, 45.2%).

Among respondents who say people in their area have access to the internet, more than one-third say they personally have internet access (38.3%).

PERSONAL ACCESS TO INTERNET




Fig 7.4: Q-78. (If Q-77 answer is yes.) Do you personally have access to the internet?

By strata, urban respondents are more likely than rural respondents to say they personally have access to the internet (48.5% vs. 33.1%). Male respondents are twice as likely as females to have personal access to the internet (51.5% vs. 23.1%).

Among respondents with personal access to the internet, 68.7% say they use it for Facebook and other social media sites, followed by getting news (44.7%), watching videos (27.4%), listening to music (12.2%), and for work purposes (11.3%).

There is a positive correlation between respondents' personal access to the internet and their level of education. Respondents with the highest level of education are more likely to say they have access to the internet than those with less or no education (over 12 years of education, 71.9%; seven to nine years of education, 41.1%; no education, 15.8%).

Unsurprisingly, the *Survey* found a negative correlation between respondents' age and their personal access to the internet. As respondents age increases, they are less likely to say they personally have access to the internet (18 to 25 years, 50.8%; 36 to 45 years, 30.6%; 55+ years, 22.8%).

Among respondents with personal access to the internet, 68.7% say they use it for Facebook and other social media sites, followed by getting news (44.7%), watching videos (27.4%), listening to music (12.2%), and for work purposes (11.3%).

Use of the internet for Facebook and other social media sites has marginally decreased from 2019 (70.6%). On the other hand, use of the internet for getting news has marginally increased from 2019 (41.1%).

INTERNET USE, BY YEAR




Fig 7.5: Q-79. (If Q-78 answer is yes.) Why do you use the internet? Anything else? (Record up to two mentions.)

Male respondents are more likely than females to use the internet for Facebook (71.5% vs. 61.7%) and getting news (48.0% vs. 36.2%). But female respondents are more likely to use the internet to listen to music than male respondents (16.6% vs. 10.6%).

INTERNET USE, BY GENDER




Fig 7.6: Q-79. (If Q-78 answer is yes.) Why do you use the internet? Anything else? (Record up to two mentions.)

ENDNOTES

- 1 Huma Haider, Claire Mcloughlin, and Zoë Scott (2011), “Access to Information—and Its Constraints,” in “Communication and Governance,” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre website, <https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/CommGAP2.pdf>.
- 2 UNESCO (2016), “Access to Information,” in “World Press Freedom Day 2016,” UNESCO website, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/prizes-and-celebrations/celebrations/international-days/world-press-freedom-day/previous-celebrations/worldpressfreedomday2009001/themes/access-to-information/>.
- 3 European Court of Human Rights (2021), “Factsheet – Access to Internet and freedom to receive and impart information and ideas,” European Court of Human Rights website, March, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Access_Internet_ENG.pdf#:~:text=the%20importance%20of%20Internet%20sites%20in%20the%20exercise,and%20facilitating%20the%20dissemination%20of%20information%20in%20general%E2%80%99.

WOMEN IN SOCIETY

In the past 20 years, Afghan women made incremental, hard-won gains in the areas of rights, representation, the workplace, and home. But progress was often elusive. The return of Taliban rule in August 2021 dealt a crushing blow to the role of women in Afghanistan. The subsequent closing of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs,¹ and the introduction of new government restrictions on women in public life, have increased fear and tensions, especially among women.

There are no women cabinet members in the new government—a stark contrast to the preferences expressed in this year’s *Survey*, which found that more than half of Afghans (56.4%) strongly or somewhat agree that it is acceptable for women to become government ministers or members of the cabinet.

According to the new government, Afghan girls can go to school, but their schools must be “consistent with Islamic law.” No further clarification has been provided in this regard, except that education must be single-sex and that girls can only have female teachers.”² Afghan women are not only facing restrictions on their education, but they have been ordered to stay home and prohibited from returning to work.³ Only women such as female healthcare workers, whose jobs cannot be done by men, are allowed to come to work.⁴ According to reports, some 120,000 female educators and nearly 14,000 female healthcare workers have not been paid their salaries for several months.⁵

The recent changes in the country have led to a flood of evacuations, creating a braindrain as female journalists, judges, attorneys and activists have fled the country, or are desperately seeking ways to leave.

The recent changes in the country have led to a flood of evacuations, creating a braindrain as female journalists, judges, attorneys and activists have fled the country, or are desperately seeking ways to leave. Further, since many of projects and organizations working to provide support for women have been closed, there is an increase in women’s exposure to violence. The forced closing of shelters and safe houses for female victims of violence has forced women to return home or face arrest. Immediately preceding the Taliban takeover, the desire to leave if given the opportunity reached its highest in 2021 with 42.0% of Afghans saying they would leave, in consistent proportions among men (42.8%) and women (41.3%).

The government has decreed a specific Islamic dress code for women: female students must wear an abaya (a veil covering their whole body) with a niqab, which only shows their eyes. The new dress code is a principal reason that Afghan women have been banned from sports.

The Taliban have imposed severe mobility restrictions on women. They may not leave their homes without a male escort (*mabram*), and violations of this rule can have consequences as serious as death.⁸ New rules have restricted women's access to essential services such as healthcare, which is now limited due to a shortage of female medical staff to treat them. A recent report found that only about 50% of pregnant women in Afghanistan deliver their children in a healthcare facility with a professional attendant, compared to 70–80% in other low-income countries.⁹

This chapter examines Afghans' perceptions about women's rights and their role in society, including women's access to justice, their right to political participation, educational opportunities, economic advancement, and women's experience of violence and crime.

8.1 WOMEN'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-81.** *In your area, is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?*
- Q-82.** *(Ask if Q-81 answer is yes.) What organization, institution, or authority is that?*

In the past 20 years, several organizations and institutions were established to empower women and to reduce domestic and gender-based violence. While the services provided by these organizations were not sufficient, they have been further limited under Taliban rule.¹⁰ While some women take their problems (typically inheritance problems and property disputes) to Taliban courts, women and girls who are victims of violence find it difficult to obtain justice or even register such a case in the Taliban courts.¹¹ The existence of organizations where women can resolve their problems is therefore very important.

Each year the *Survey* asks respondents if they are aware of any organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problems resolved. In 2021, more than one-fourth of respondents (26.5%) said yes to this question, the highest percentage since the question was first asked in 2011 (19.3%). There are no significant differences in the awareness of men (26.9%) and women (26.1%) of the existence of such institutions. Rural residents (29.4%) are more likely to say they know of such a resource than urban residents (19.2%). By region, the South East had the highest percentage of respondents who said yes (42.6%), while Central/Highlands had the lowest percentage (10.0%).

Among respondents who reported the existence of an organization in their area where women can go to have their problems resolved, 47.4% identified the Directorate of Women Affairs (DOWA)—the provincial arm of the former Ministry of Women's Affairs—followed by a women's shura (9.8%), the Human Rights Council (8.0%), the district office (5.5%), the police or the chief of police (5.0%), a safe house (2.6%), a village shura (2.1%), the court (2.1%), and Qawm [tribal] elders (2.0%).

More rural residents (48.6%) cite the DOWA as such an organization than urban residents (42.6%). At the regional level, the DOWA was cited more often by respondents in the South West (59.1%), the North West (55.3%), the North East (54.7%), the South East (46.5%), Central/Kabul (43.6%), and the East (43.3%) than respondents in Central/Highlands (15.0%) and the West (27.9%).

8.2 CUSTOMS AND TRIBAL PRACTICES

KEY QUESTION

Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (1) Burka. (2) Niqab. (3) Chador. (4) Form-fitting hijab. (5) Loose hijab. (6) No head covering.*

Since 2014 the *Survey* has asked respondents to look at an image of six women wearing different garments and choose which is most appropriate as public dress.




Fig. 8.1: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture.*

In 2021, approval of the burka as the most appropriate dress for women in public places is the lowest since the question was first asked (26.6%).

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY YEAR




Fig. 8.2: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (1) Burka. (2) Niqab. (3) Chador. (4) Form-fitting hijab. (5) Loose hijab. (6) No head covering.*

Men are more likely to choose the burka (30.1%) and the niqab (32.6%) than women (23.1% and 29.5%, respectively). Women are more likely to choose chador (16.4%), the form-fitting hijab (18.8%), or the loose hijab (10.2%) than men (14.1%, 14.0%, and 6.9%, respectively). Opinions differ between urban and rural residents. The burka is the most popular choice among rural residents (31.0%) but not urban residents (15.5%). Urban residents favor the form-fitting hijab (21.5%) and the loose hijab (14.6%) far more than rural respondents (14.4% and 6.2%, respectively).

Opinions also vary by region. The highest percentage of respondents who chose the burka as the appropriate dress for women in public places was recorded in the South West (56.4%), followed by the East (48.7%) and the South East (45.1%). The proportion of respondents who preferred the niqab was highest in the North East (43.2%), and the percentage who chose the chador was highest in the West (26.1%).

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY REGION




Fig. 8.3: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (1) Burka. (2) Niqab. (3) Chador. (4) Form-fitting hijab. (5) Loose hijab. (6) No head covering.*

Educational attainment is correlated with preference for the burka as public dress for women: as the level of education increases, the preference for the burka decreases. However, there is no significant relationship between respondents' level of education and their preference for the niqab, the chador, the form-fitting hijab, the loose hijab, or no head covering at all.

APPROPRIATE DRESS FOR WOMEN IN PUBLIC, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION




Fig. 8.4: Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (1) Burka. (2) Niqab. (3) Chador. (4) Form-fitting hijab. (5) Loose hijab. (6) No head covering*

Women’s political participation in Afghanistan was already limited before the Taliban’s return; however, there were laws and policies that supported women’s rights and encouraged their political participation.

8.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-88.** *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a Community Development Council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for president of Afghanistan.*
- Q-89.** *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the National Parliament?*
- Q-91.** *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or should leadership positions be open to anyone, based on merit?*
- Q-92.** *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?*
- Q-93.** *(Ask all.) If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for?*

Women's political participation in Afghanistan was already limited before the Taliban's return; however, there were laws and policies that supported women's rights and encouraged their political participation. But with the new government, the situation has changed, and the announcement of an all-male cabinet in September 2021 suggests that the Taliban see no place for women in politics or decision-making positions. Meanwhile, the *Survey* shows significant support among ordinary Afghans for women in leadership positions.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY YEAR

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2021
	%	%	%	%	%	%
MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	74	70	70	68	71	72
GOVERNOR OF A PROVINCE	58	55	55	53	55	57
CEO OF A LARGE COMPANY	56	54	55	52	57	58
MINISTER OR CABINET MEMBER	58	55	56	53	56	56
RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN	52	49	48	46	49	47

Fig. 8.5: Q-88. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a Community Development Council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for president of Afghanistan. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)*

Overall, support for women becoming members of a Community Development Council was high compared to other hypothetical positions, with nearly three-fourths of respondents (71.5%) agreeing strongly or somewhat that a woman may become a member of a Community Development Council (CDC), and roughly half agreeing that a woman can be the CEO of large company (58.4%), the governor of a province (57.1%), a minister or cabinet member (56.4%), or a candidate for president of Afghanistan (47.3%).

In all cases, women are more supportive of women’s access to leadership positions than men. Urban residents are more likely to support women’s access to leadership positions than rural residents, and findings also vary by region.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	81	74	54	41	75	74	96	80
GOVERNOR OF A PROVINCE	70	58	39	29	53	55	93	65
CEO OF A LARGE COMPANY	73	55	38	29	56	59	92	66
MINISTER OR CABINET MEMBER	70	54	44	28	51	55	91	66
RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN	52	52	47	32	45	35	85	53

Fig. 8.6: Q-88. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? Strongly or somewhat? (a) Member of a Community Development Council. (b) Governor of a province. (c) CEO of a large company. (d) Minister or cabinet member. (e) Running for president of Afghanistan. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)*

To better understand Afghans’ opinions about women in politics, the *Survey* asked respondents if they would prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the National Parliament. At the national level, 41.6% said they would prefer to be represented by a man, 20.0% said a woman, and 37.4% said it makes no difference. There is a two percentage point decrease since 2019 in the proportion of respondents who would prefer to be represented by a man (43.6% in 2019, 41.6% in 2021). There is a parallel increase in those who would prefer to be represented by a woman (17.5% in 2019, 20.0% in

2021). Significant differences are visible between men and women: men are more likely than women to prefer a man for political representation (58.8% of men vs. 24.4% of women), and women are more likely to prefer a woman (33.7% of women vs. 6.3% of men) or to say that gender makes no difference to them (40.7% of women vs. 34.1% of men).

There are also differences between rural and urban respondents: 43.6% of urban residents said it makes no difference whether they are represented by a man or a woman, 33.3% preferred a man, and 22.1% preferred a woman. Among rural residents, however, 35.0% said it makes no difference, 44.9% said they would prefer a man, and 19.1% preferred a woman. Regionally, respondents in the South East (59.8%), followed by the South West (57.1%) and the East (53.9%), were more likely to prefer being represented by a man in the National Parliament than respondents in other regions (Central/Highlands 20.2%, North West 29.1%, Central/Kabul 34.3%, North East 38.5%, and West 41.5%).

GENDER PREFERENCE FOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, BY REGION




Fig. 8.7: Q-89. *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the National Parliament?*

In a related question, Afghans were asked whether they think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men or mostly for women, that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or that leadership positions should be open to anyone, based on merit. Overall, 34.4% chose “mostly for men” (down from 38.7% in 2019), 29.0% chose “both men and women” (down from 31.7% in 2019), 26.0% chose “anyone, based on merit” (up from 19.7% in 2019), and just 10.3% chose mostly for women (little changed from 9.5% in 2019).

GENDER PREFERENCE FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY YEAR




Fig. 8.8: Q-91. Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or should leadership positions be open to anyone, based on merit?

Males (46.9%) were more likely than females (21.9%) to choose “mostly for men.” Females (14.7%) were more likely than males (5.8%) to choose “mostly for women.” Females (36.2%) were also more likely than males (21.8%) to choose “both men and women” or to say “anyone, based on merit” (female 26.8%, male 25.2%).

Interestingly, the proportion of male respondents who chose “mostly for men” fell from 52.9% in 2019 to 46.9% in 2021, and the proportion of males who chose “anyone, based on merit” rose from 18.9% in 2019 to 25.2% in 2021. Among female respondents, “mostly for men” fell from 24.6% in 2019 to 21.9% in 2021, and “both men and women” fell from 40.3% in 2019 to 36.2% in 2021, but the percentage of women choosing “anyone, based on merit” rose from 20.5% to 26.8%.

By strata, rural residents are more likely than urban residents to say political leadership positions should be mostly for men (rural 38.2%, urban 24.9%) or should be mostly for women (rural 11.0%, urban 8.4%), whereas urban respondent were more likely to say political leadership positions should be for both men and women equally (urban 33.5%, rural 27.3%) or for anyone, based on merit (urban 32.9%, rural 23.3%).

GENDER PREFERENCE FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY STRATA




Fig. 8.9: Q-91. Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or should leadership positions be open to anyone, based on merit?

Disaggregating by region, respondents were more likely to choose “mostly for men” in the South West (55.2%), the South East (47.4%), and the East (46.4%). Respondents in Central/Highlands were the most likely to choose “anyone, based on merit” (48.3%) or “both men and women” (36.0%).

Afghans were also asked if they think women should be allowed to vote in elections. A majority said yes (87.3%), but this was two percentage points fewer than 2019 (89.3%). Women were slightly more likely to say yes to this question than men (89.3% vs. 85.3%). More urban respondents said yes than rural residents (urban 92.5%, rural 85.2%). Support for women’s vote is highest in Central/Highlands (96.9%), followed by Central/Kabul (93.8%), the East (92.5%), the North West (92.2%), the North

East (92.2%), and the South East (91.1%). It is lower in the West (87.3%), and notably lower the South West (57.0%). Support for women’s right to vote is correlated with respondents’ level of education: of those with more than 12 years of formal education, 93.6% support women’s right to vote, compared to 10–12 years of education (89.9%), 7–9 years (89.8%), 1–6 years (85.3%), and no formal education (84.5%).

In a related matter, respondents were asked how women should decide who to vote for: should they decide for themselves, should men decide for them, or should women decide in consultation with men? More than half of Afghans (56.8%) believe that women should decide for themselves, 19.8% think men should decide for women, and 22.5% said women should decide in consultation with men.

HOW WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE WHO TO VOTE FOR




Fig. 8.10: Q-93. (Ask all.) If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

There is some variation by gender. More females than males think women should decide for themselves who to vote for (female 59.3%, male 54.3%), while more men than women believe that men should decide for women (male 21.4%, female 18.2%) or that women should decide but in consultation with men (male 23.2%, female 21.8%).

HOW WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE WHO TO VOTE FOR, BY STRATA




Fig. 8.11: Q-93. (Ask all.) If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

At the regional level, most respondents in each region believe that women should decide for themselves who to vote for, except for respondents in the South West region, where most believe that men should decide for women.

HOW WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE WHO TO VOTE FOR, BY REGION




Fig. 8.12: Q-93. (Ask all.) If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

Respondents with no formal education (52.0%) are less likely to think women should decide for themselves than respondents with 1–6 years of formal education (55.2%), 7–9 years (60.5%), 10–12 years (60.8%), or more than 12 years (66.2%).

8.4 EDUCATION

KEY QUESTIONS

Q-83. Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat?

Q-84. And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat? (a) Islamic madrasa education. (b) Primary school. (c) High school. (d) University in your province. (e) Studying in another province. (f) Studying abroad on scholarship.

Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed that women should have the same opportunities for education as men. In 2021, a majority of respondents (82.9%) strongly or somewhat agreed that they should, fewer than in 2019 (86.6%), and even fewer than in 2006 (91.5%).

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN EDUCATION, BY YEAR




Fig. 8.13: Q-83. (Ask all.) *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat? (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)*

Support for gender equality in education is higher among women (86.3%) than men (79.5%), and higher among urban residents (89.7%) than rural residents (80.2%). By region, it is highest in Central/Highlands (95.9%), followed by Central/Kabul (89.1%), the North West (87.8%), the South East (85.9%), the North East (85.2%), and the East (82.4%). The lowest level of support is found in the South West (64.9%) and the West (77.8%).

Respondents with over 12 years of formal education are more supportive of gender equality in education (87.8%) than respondents with lower levels of education (10–12 years, 83.9%; 7–9 years, 83.6%; and 1–6 years, 80.8%).

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN EDUCATION, BY REGION




Fig. 8.14: Q-83. (Ask all.) Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat? (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)

Relatedly, Afghans were asked if they strongly or somewhat agreed or disagreed with gender equality for specific types and levels of education, including Islamic madrasa education, primary school, high school, a university in their province, studying in another province, and studying abroad on scholarship. Overall, 93.0% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree with gender equality in Islamic madrasa education, 87.8% agree with gender equality in primary school, 85.1% in high school, and 75.7% in a university in their province. There is less support for equal opportunity to study in another province (53.3%) or to study abroad on scholarship (42.3%). A similar distribution of views has been recorded in previous years.

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EDUCATION, BY YEAR




Fig.8.15: Q-84. *And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat? (a) Islamic madrasa education. (b) Primary school. (c) High school. (d) University in your province. (e) Studying in another province. (f) Studying abroad on scholarship. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)*

For all levels of education except Islamic madrasas, women are more likely than men to support equal opportunities for males and females, men (93.2%) are only marginally more likely than women (92.8%) to support equal opportunity in Islamic madrasas. Urban residents are more likely to support gender equality at all levels of education than rural residents, and these differences become more pronounced for higher levels of education. Thus, the urban/rural difference is less than three percentage points for Islamic madrasas (urban 94.8%, rural 92.3%) and primary school (urban 89.5%, rural 87.1%), compared to high school (urban 90.8%, rural 82.8%), university in one’s own province (urban 86.9%, rural 71.3%), studying in another province (urban 64.4%, rural 48.9%), and studying abroad on scholarship (urban 56.9%, rural 36.6%).

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EDUCATION, BY

SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EDUCATION, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
ISLAMIC MADRASA EDUCATION	96	97	95	83	90	96	97	90
PRIMARY SCHOOL	92	94	87	74	85	92	95	87
HIGH SCHOOL	93	91	79	64	78	90	96	89
UNIVERSITY IN YOUR PROVINCE	88	80	64	43	71	81	96	82
STUDYING IN ANOTHER PROVINCE	62	50	46	22	49	59	90	66
STUDYING ABROAD ON SCHOLARSHIP	53	34	34	16	37	44	83	53

Fig. 8.16 Q-84. *And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat? (a) Islamic madrasa education. (b) Primary school. (c) High school. (d) University in your province. (e) Studying in another province. (f) Studying abroad on scholarship. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)*

8.5 ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-85.** *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?*
- Q-86.** *(Ask if Q-85 answer is “women should not be allowed to work outside the home.”) Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?*
- Q-87.** *(Ask all.) And thinking about where women can work, for each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernment organizations (NGOs). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room.*
- D-8.** *Do female members of the family contribute to this household’s income, or not?*

Since 2006, the *Survey* has asked respondents whether women should be allowed to work outside the home. In 2021, more than three fourths of respondents (77.7%) said that women should be allowed to work outside the home, the highest percentage of respondents in the history of the *Survey*.




Fig: 8.17: Q-85. *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this? (Percent who say women should be allowed to work outside the home.)*

In 2021, 77.7% of all respondents said they thought women should be allowed to work outside the home. Women (84.4%) are significantly more likely than men (71.0%) to think women should be allowed to work outside the home, and urban respondents are 12 percentage points more likely than rural residents to hold this view (urban 86.3%, rural 74.4%). At the regional level, respondents in Central/Highlands (95.9%) and the North West (89.0%) are the most likely to support women working outside the home, and respondents in the South West (54.5%) and South East (61.7%) are the least likely compared to respondents in other regions (Central/Kabul 83.8%, East 80.7%, West 80.2%, and North East 78.1%). Respondents with more education are more likely to think women should be allowed to work outside the home than respondents with less or no formal education.

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION




Fig: 8.18: Q-85. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this? (Percent who say women should be allowed to work outside the home.)

In a follow-up question, respondents who thought women should not be allowed to work outside the home were asked why. Their answers are shown in the table below.

WHY SHOULDN'T WOMEN WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME, BY YEAR

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2021
	%	%	%	%	%
IT'S AGAINST ISLAMIC LAW	24	19	18	17	18
UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS	17	24	24	23	17
BAD SECURITY	12	12	14	11	16
THEY ARE NOT NEEDED OUTSIDE THE HOME	11	12	13	19	14
DON'T KNOW	7	6	5	7	8
WOMEN SHOULD NOT WORK ALONGSIDE MEN	4	4	5	2	6
IT PREVENTS MORAL CORRUPTION	6	4	5	6	6
IT'S CONSIDERED A SHAME	1	2	3	3	4
THE FAMILY DOES NOT ALLOW THEM	11	9	6	5	3
CRIMINALS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THEM	1	1	2	2	2
THEY NEED TO HELP WITH KIDS	2	2	1	1	2
THEY DON'T RESPECT HIJAB	0	2	1	1	1
FEAR OF TALIBAN/ISIS	0	0	2	1	1
LACK OF EXPERIENCE	1	1	1	1	0

Fig. 8.19: Q-86. (Ask if Q-85 answer is "women should not be allowed to work outside the home.")
Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?

Respondents were asked about acceptable places for women to work and presented with the list of alternatives shown in the next table. As in previous years, the greatest support was for female-only schools (86.4%), hospitals or clinics (86.0%), and government offices (72.5%). Co-ed schools (67.4%), NGOs (57.0%), a female-only private company (55.4%), the army or police (41.7%), and a co-ed private company (39.7%) received much less support.

ACCEPTABLE PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN, BY YEAR

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2021
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS		86	86	86	86	89	86
HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	81	84	84	84	84	88	86
GOVERNMENT OFFICES	70	71	68	68	68	71	72
CO-ED SCHOOLS		67	67	67	64	69	67
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)	41	44	46	47	47	52	57
FEMALE-ONLY PRIVATE COMPANY		48	45	46	45	53	55
ARMY/POLICE	42	41	36	36	34	39	42
CO-ED PRIVATE COMPANY		35	33	36	34	39	40

Fig. 8.20: Q-87. (Ask all.) And thinking about where women can work, for each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)

For each hypothetical workplace, women were more likely than men to agree that it is an acceptable place for women to work, and this gender difference is greatest for government offices (female 78.5%, male 66.4%), NGOs (female 65.0%, male 48.9%), co-ed schools (female 71.9%, male 62.9%), a female-only private company (female 59.2%, male 51.6%), and a co-ed private company (female 45.4%, male 33.9%). The difference by gender is less dramatic for the army or police (female 43.8%, male 39.6%), female-only schools (female 88.1%, male 84.7%), and hospitals or clinics (female 87.7%, male 84.2%).

As shown in the next figure, urban residents are more likely than rural to agree (strongly or somewhat) to every hypothetical workplace for women.

ACCEPTABLE PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN, BY STRATA




Fig. 8.21: Q-87. (Ask all.) And thinking about where women can work, for each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)

Disaggregated by region, respondents in Central/Highlands are the most likely to support women working outside the home in every hypothetical job, while respondents in the South West are the least likely.

ACCEPTABLE PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN, BY REGION

	CENTRAL/ KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL/ HIGHLANDS	NORTH WEST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
GOVERNMENT OFFICES	82	79	62	43	71	73	95	79
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)	64	57	47	33	60	56	88	64
HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	95	89	81	74	78	87	97	85
FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS	96	89	83	66	83	88	98	88
CO-ED SCHOOLS	80	59	55	36	64	77	92	75
ARMY/POLICE	55	44	28	17	41	41	59	44
FEMALE-ONLY PRIVATE COMPANY	71	44	49	27	50	53	88	65
CO-ED PRIVATE COMPANY	52	32	34	16	36	35	80	47

Fig. 8.22: Q-87. (Ask all.) And thinking about where women can work, for each of these places, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work in these places? (a) Government offices. (b) Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). (c) Hospitals or clinics. (d) Female-only schools. (e) Co-ed schools. (f) Army/police. (g) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) with female employees only. (h) A private company outside the home (factory, shop, business) where male and female employees work in the same room. (Percent who strongly or somewhat agree.)

When the *Survey* asked respondents if female members of their family contribute to their household income, 16.5% said yes, two percentage points lower than 2019 (18.6%). There is no significant difference between rural and urban respondents (rural 16.7%, urban 15.9%). Females contribute to household income in 41.6% of Central/Highlands households surveyed, but in other regions just 22% or less—considerably less in the South East, where female contributors to household income have fallen from 29.4% of households in 2019 to 9.6% in 2021.

WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTION TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BY REGION




Fig. 8.23: D-8. Do female members of the family contribute to this household's income, or not? (Percent who say yes.)

8.6 EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE OR CRIME

Each year respondents are asked if they or a family member have experienced violence or a criminal act in the past year, and if so what kind of crime or violence it was. Some 18.5% of Afghans in 2021 reported experiencing violence or a criminal act in the past year, the most frequent being a physical attack or beating, pickpocketing, extortion, burglary/looting, livestock stolen, murder, and kidnapping. There is no significant difference by gender in the type of violence or crime experienced.

EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE OR CRIME, BY GENDER

	MALE	FEMALE
	%	%
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	41	39
PICKPOCKETING	26	28
RACKETEERING/EXTORTION	24	23
BURGLARY/LOOTING	14	14
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	13	12
MURDER	10	10
KIDNAPPING	10	8
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT / PROPERTY TAKEN FROM VEHICLE	9	8
SUICIDE ATTACKS	5	8
SMUGGLING	5	5
MILITANTS / INSURGENT ACTIONS	5	5
POLICE ACTIONS	4	5
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	2	1
FOREIGN FORCES ACTIONS (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	1	1
ARMY ACTIONS	1	1

Fig. 8.24: Q-26. (Ask all.) Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year? Q-27. (Ask if Q-26 answer is yes.) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

When the *Survey* asked respondents to name the two biggest problems facing women in their area, the most commonly cited problem was lack of educational opportunities (39.0%), followed by lack of rights/participation/justice (30.8%), lack of employment opportunities (26.1%), violence (18.2%), economic concerns (12.8%), lack of services/infrastructure (11.5%), and security (7.2%). There are no significant differences in the perceptions of male and female respondents in this regard.

BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN, BY GENDER




Fig.8.25: Q-27. (Ask all.) What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today? What is the next-biggest problem?

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MIGRATION

Afghanistan generates a significant number of the world's refugees. Many migrate to Afghanistan's closest neighboring countries, Pakistan and Iran, where there are reportedly 2.2 million documented Afghan refugees and asylum seekers.¹ Afghans reportedly make up the second-largest migrant community in Turkey.² Factors driving immigration for Afghans include the poor economy, insecurity, political instability,³ and drought. There is also a significant population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Afghanistan, possibly as many as 3.5 million. Indicative of the scale of IDP movement, as many as half a million⁴ Afghans were displaced internally in the first eight months of 2021, 80% of them women and children.⁵ During mid-to-late 2021, many IDPs migrated towards the generally more stable provincial capitals.⁶

As many as half a million Afghans were displaced internally in the first eight months of 2021, 80% of them women and children.

This chapter will seek to improve understanding of the push and pull factors that influence any decision to leave or stay in Afghanistan, and how perceptions may be influenced by conditions within the country. Findings in 2021 show that more Afghans would leave the country if given the opportunity, and that insecurity is the principal reason.

9.1 WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE

KEY QUESTIONS

- Q-94a.** *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?*
- Q-94b.** *[If "no" in Q-94a] Why would you stay in Afghanistan? (2 responses)*
- Q-94c.** *[If "yes" in Q-94a] Why would you leave Afghanistan? (2 responses)*
- Q-94d.** *[If "yes" in Q-94a] Where would you want to live?*
- Q-94e.** *[If "yes" in Q-94a] What, if anything, could the government do to make you want to stay in Afghanistan?*
- Q-95.** *Do you have a family member or close relative that lives abroad?*
- Q-96a.** *[If "yes" in Q-95] In what countries do they live? (List up to 2 countries.)*

- Q-96b.** *[If “yes” in Q-95] Have these relatives helped you financially, such as sending money?*
- Q-97.** *In the last 12 months has anyone in your family moved from Afghanistan to another country for any reason?*
- Q-98a.** *[If “yes” in Q-97] Which country do they live in now? (Record first mention.)*
- Q-98b.** *[If “yes” in Q-97] What was their main reason for leaving Afghanistan?*
- Q-99.** *How successful do you think the government has been in improving the living condition of people living in your area—a lot, a little, or not at all?*

Two-fifths of Afghans surveyed (42.0%) said they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This is the highest figure in *Survey* records, 4 percentage points higher than 2019 (37.9%) and 12 percentage points higher than 2016 (29.6%). The increase in the percentage of Afghans wanting to leave reflects the turbulent political, economic, and security environment.

Two-fifths of Afghans surveyed said they would leave Afghanistan if given the opportunity. This is the highest figure in *Survey* records.

At the same time, over half of those interviewed (52.4%) said they would not leave. Urban dwellers (49.8%) are more likely than rural (39.0%) to express willingness to leave. There are no discernible differences by gender.

DESIRE TO LEAVE




Fig. 9.1: Q-94a. *Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percentage who say yes)*

By region, findings are generally in line with this year's trend. However, less than a quarter of those in the South West (23.2%) said they would leave if given the opportunity.

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY REGION




Fig. 9.2: Q-94a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percentage who say yes.)

By province, interesting variations are observed. Almost 90% in Helmand province (87.9%) said they would not leave, while 65.1% in Kunduz said they would.

Those aged 18–25 are the most likely of all age groups (46.8%) to say they would leave.

9.2 REASONS FOR LEAVING

Of those who said they would not leave Afghanistan given the opportunity, the most-cited reasons were “I love my country” (48.3%) and “it is my country” (46.6%), suggesting a strong emotional tie to the country in spite of the many issues its citizens face. The number who state “it is my country” is 11 percentage points lower than in 2017 (58.3%). Just over 10% (11.4%) cited not having the ability to leave as a reason to stay. Urban residents appear to have a slightly stronger connection to the country, with 49.8% saying they would not leave the country because “it is my country,” compared to 45.5% of rural residents.

MOST-CITED REASONS FOR LEAVING, BY YEAR




Fig. 9.3: Q-94c. [If “yes” in Q-94a] Why would you leave Afghanistan?

Some 84.3% of Afghans cite insecurity as the reason they would leave. This figure is the highest on record and 11 percentage points higher than 2016 (73.7%), suggesting a correlation between sustained levels of insecurity across the country and the desire to leave. Despite high and increasing levels of unemployment,⁷ the number of respondents citing unemployment as a reason to leave (43.2%) is nine percentage points lower than 2019 (51.7%). A quarter (23.2%) cited the bad economy as a reason for leaving.

Insecurity (88.2%) and unemployment (47.1%) compared to rural respondents (82.3%) and (41.3%) are cited most by urbanites as reasons to leave.

Respondents who have access to the internet as a source of news and information are more likely to say they would leave the country if given the opportunity (52.5%) than Afghans who do not (38.5%).

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY ACCESS TO MEDIA




Fig. 9.4: Q-94a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percentage who say yes.) Q-80. Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information: (a) radio, (b) television set, (d) the internet, (e) mosque, (f) community shuras, (g) friends and family?

There is an increase in the percentage of educated respondents who would leave the country if given the opportunity, up from 35.5% in 2016 to 41.1% in 2019 and 46.2% in 2021.

DESIRE TO LEAVE, BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT




Fig. 9.5: Q-94a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not? (Percentage who say yes.)

Afghans who have no sympathy at all with armed opposition groups are more likely to leave Afghanistan than those with some or a little sympathy. When Afghans were asked where they would go if given the opportunity, Turkey was the most favored destination (38.1%), while Iran was second (37.6%). Despite its closeness and its population of 1.5 million Afghan refugees,⁸ fewer than 10% chose Pakistan as a prospective destination (9.7%). Germany was the most cited European destination, at 20.6%.

9.3 PROMOTING THE DECISION TO STAY

When those who stated that they would leave were asked what the government could do to make them stay, the most cited answer was “maintain security” (79.8%). Despite high levels of unemployment, fewer than half of respondents cite improve opportunities for participation (51.6%), and better employment opportunities, and improve the economy (12.1%) would make them stay.

9.4 RELATIVES LIVING ABROAD

Almost two-fifths of respondents (39.5%) said they have a close relative or family member living abroad. This figure is generally consistent with findings from previous years. By strata, urbanites (49.7%) are far more likely than rural dwellers (35.5%) to say they have a family member or relative living abroad. Half of those in Central/Kabul (50.3%) said a family member or relative lived abroad. By province, over three-fifths of those in Takhar (61.0%) said yes to this question, while just 11.2% in Uruzgan and 11.8% in Badghis said yes.

When respondents were asked in what countries their close relative or family member lived, Iran was the most common answer (40.5%), followed by “don’t know” (36.0%) and Turkey (26.3%). These findings generally correlate with findings regarding which countries Afghans wish to move to. When disaggregated by region of Afghanistan, 79.8% of respondents in the West, which borders Iran, identified Iran as the country in which their family member or relative lives. Similarly, 40.1% of respondents in the South West, near the Chaman-Spin Boldak border crossing to Pakistan, gave Pakistan as an answer.

Remittances sent from Afghans living outside the country to their families in the country are crucial to the financial stability of many households and to the wider economy.⁹ Indeed, nearly one in every 10 Afghan households reports receiving remittances from abroad.¹⁰ Almost a third of those with relatives living abroad (32.3%) stated that these relatives helped them financially. This figure represents a five percentage point decrease from 2016 (37.3%) and a four percentage point decrease from 2019 (36.7%). By strata, rural dwellers (35.2%) are more likely than urbanites (26.9%) to say they receive financial assistance. Three-fifths of those in the South East (60.1%) said they received assistance from a relative, compared to around two-fifths or fewer in all other regions. Given the high figure for the South East, it is unsurprising to see that when disaggregated by province, the southeastern provinces of Paktia (66.3%) and Paktika (73.3%) are most likely to report receiving assistance. Less than 10% in Bamyan (9.6%) say they receive financial assistance from a relative.

Less than a fifth of all respondents (18.7%) stated that a family member had moved abroad in the past 12 months. Of those who did, over two-fifths (42.9%) said that the relative now lived in Iran, while a quarter (24.7%) said Turkey. The closeness of Iran and difficulties getting to Turkey are likely strong factors in this, as findings earlier in this *Survey* suggest that Turkey is, in fact, the preferred destination for Afghans seeking to leave. The bad economic situation in Afghanistan was the most cited reason for leaving (36.7%), while the security situation (32.7%) was the next most cited.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DESIRE TO LEAVE

AFGHANS WILLING TO LEAVE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE:	AFGHANS UNWILLING TO LEAVE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE:
MALE	FEMALE
URBAN	RURAL
YOUNGER	OLDER
SINGLE	MARRIED
INTERNET AND TV USER	RADIO USER
UNHAPPY	HAPPY
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY	OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT RECONCILIATION	OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RECONCILIATION
FEARFUL FOR PERSONAL SAFETY	NOT FEARFUL FOR PERSONAL SAFETY
MORE SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS	LESS SUPPORTIVE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS

ENDNOTES

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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The Asia Foundation's *Survey of the Afghan People* is the longest-running nationwide survey of the attitudes and opinions of adult Afghans. Since 2004, over 148,100 Afghan men and women have taken the survey, representing more than 400 districts, city nahias (municipal districts), and towns and villages across the country.

In 2020, due to the pandemic, fieldwork was impossible, so the Foundation conducted mobile phone *Flash Surveys*. In 2021, from July 10-August 2, *Survey* enumerators fanned out across Afghanistan and interviewed 18,362 men and women representing all major and most minor ethnic groups from 33 provinces on security, economic growth, employment, development, governance, political participation, access to information, migration, and women's issues. The 34th province, Ghazni, was not included, because heavy fighting in and around Ghazni City prevented training from being held.

Given the importance of peace, reconciliation, and the withdrawal of international military forces, questions were added to the *Survey* to explore Afghan attitudes towards these matters. The data was collected just prior to Kabul's fall to the Taliban, and it remains the single tool available to assess and measure broad public opinion at this historical moment.

As in previous waves of the *Survey*, The Asia Foundation added additional quality-control measures through independent, third-party monitoring of the central training, provincial trainings, and fieldwork of the interviewing teams. . All figures in this methodology report refer to the unweighted data unless otherwise noted.

Unlike in previous installments of the survey, the sample was fielded entirely via face-to-face random selection, and no intercept interviews were conducted. The 2020–2021 population estimates provided by the National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA), formerly the Afghan Central Statistics Office (CSO), provided accurate estimates for urban and rural populations at the district level of Afghanistan. Respondents were age 18 and older, 49% male, and 51% female. The final, unweighted sample consisted of 30% urban households and 70% rural households. Interviews ranged from 15 to 120 minutes, with the average PAPI (paper) interview taking 43 minutes, and the average CAPI (tablet) interview taking 40 minutes.

In addition to the Main Sample of 15,832 respondents, two oversamples were fielded, and they are included in this year's data. One was fielded in eight districts of interest around the country (10 had been planned, but two became inaccessible during the course of fieldwork), with an emphasis on local cooperation, reconciliation, and prospects for a peace agreement, referred to as the "CC Oversample" elsewhere in this report; the other was concentrated in six districts of interest in the north of the country.

The sample had initially been planned for 19 districts, but plans for fieldwork were abandoned in most because the North was the initial focal point of the Taliban offensive and suffered especially severely from fighting and violence. The sample is referred to as the “Northern Oversample” in the dataset and in this report. The sample size for the CC Oversample was 1,634 respondents, while the sample size for the Northern Oversample was 896 respondents. All respondents in all three samples received the main substantive portion of the questionnaire, but respondents in CC and Northern target districts received additional modules of questions. Because different donors specified different districts for oversampling (one sponsored the CC Oversample, while another sponsored the Northern Oversample) no district received both oversample questionnaires, and no respondent was asked both oversample modules.

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The sample design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience are summarized in this methodology report. Some highlights are presented below.

1. *The Survey of the Afghan People 2021* includes a sample of 18,362 men and women, 18 years of age and older, residing in 33 of 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Of these, 1,459 men and women in Balkh, Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar, Parwan, and Bamyan provinces were interviewed using mobile devices loaded with Research Control Solutions (RCS) survey software, while the remaining 16,903 respondents were interviewed using paper questionnaires.
2. The Main Sample was stratified by province and urban/rural status using population data released by the NSIA (2020–2021 estimates). Sampling points that were inaccessible were replaced from within the same strata (same province and urban/rural designation) where possible. Due to the sharply deteriorating security situation during the fieldwork period, four out of 65 strata were totally inaccessible, and many provinces only had one or two accessible districts.
3. Considering the survey design of disproportionate stratification and two levels of clustering—district and sampling point—the complex design and weighting should be taken into account when determining the margin of error (MOE). For the binomial question, “Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” the estimated design effect is 2.285.¹ Using this estimate of design effect, the complex MOE at the 95% C.I. with $p=.5$ is $\pm 1.1\%$ for the probability sample.²
4. Disposition outcomes for all interviews were tracked using the *American Association for Public Opinion Research’s* (AAPOR) standard codes, which have been adapted to the Afghan context. For this sample, the *response rate 3* is 78.02%, the *cooperation rate 3* is 93.35%, the *refusal rate 2* is 4.45%, and the *contact rate 2* is 86.09%. However, there were 171 sampling points (out of

3,298 total) for which the contact sheets were permanently lost and thus could not be included in either the response-, contact-, and refusal-rate calculations or the nonresponse weighting.

5. There were provinces where security, transportation, and other factors affected fieldwork. They are described in this report. These types of factors are common in Afghanistan, and the safety of field teams is always a primary concern. This concern was especially acute this year, as heavy fighting and rapid Taliban advances put many districts out of reach.
6. Fieldwork was conducted from July 10 to August 2, 2021. The field team consisted of 1,347 trained interviewers and 34 supervisors.
7. Various quality-control procedures were employed throughout the project.
 - a. During fieldwork, interviewers were observed by supervisors or by a third-party validator. Field supervisors and third-party validators also conducted back-checks of interviews. In total, 35% of interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control.
 - b. During data entry, six cases were removed because they were incomplete due to missing or misprinted pages.
 - c. During the data cleaning phase, D3's *Hunter* program was used to search for patterns or anomalies in the data that might indicate an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer. For this survey, no cases were deleted for having high overall similarity to other cases done by the same interviewer (i.e., failing the equality test), 458 cases were deleted from the data set for having responses over 95% similar to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test), and none were deleted from the data set for having a high nonresponse rate (over 50% "don't know" or refused).
 - d. Subsequently, a further 759 cases were deleted through further logic checks, and 44 were deleted as a result of other quality-control measures. A total of 1,278 cases were deleted at all stages of cleaning and quality control.
 - e. Additional quality-control checks were also conducted, the results of which are detailed in a separate report. These checks included:
 - i. Duplicate interviews: interviews with high overall similarity
 - ii. Pattern responses: interviewers with a high percentage of cases with identical responses across a battery of items
 - iii. Substantive response bias: high overall similarity across an interviewer's cases
 - iv. High nonresponse (refused or "don't know")

- v. Productivity in field: unusually high or low interview length or number of complete interviews per day
8. To verify that fieldwork was conducted at the correct locations as specified in the sampling plan, interviewers collected GPS coordinates for 2,376 sampling points in 27 provinces (2,048 in the paper sample and 248 in the RCS/CAPI sample). These were compared to GPS coordinates for selected villages drawn from NSIA lists.
9. The questionnaire addresses the overall situation in the country, negotiations with the Taliban, reconciliation, infrastructure and development, service provision, rule of law, governance, security, corruption, elections, women's issues, and social issues. The survey also includes one conjoint experiment question, in which respondents were asked different versions of a statement about the parameters of a possible peace deal to end the fighting, and a series of endorsement experiments. The questionnaire included 33 management questions, 20 demographics questions, and 152 substantive questions. Of the substantive questions, 26 were new, and seven were modified from a previous wave. The Northern Oversample included 33 questions, while the CC Oversample included 41 questions.
10. The average interview length for paper/PAPI interviews was 43 minutes, while the average length for tablet/CAPI interviews was 40 minutes. Interviews ranged in length from 15 to 120 minutes.
11. Approximately two weeks after the completion of fieldwork, Kabul fell to the Taliban, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed and was replaced by the Taliban-dominated Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Due to the drastically changed situation on the ground in Afghanistan, in-person, face-to-face surveys are not currently possible. However, survey research in Afghanistan via phone remains a possibility.

2 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

Each year, The Asia Foundation's staff reviews the questionnaire using statistical and cognitive testing, and questions yielding less analytical value are removed from the questionnaire. Questions were reviewed to ensure that they met international standards, which included ensuring that questions were not double-barreled or overly complex, did not contain double negatives, and were not threatening or leading, and that response scales matched question wording. In total, the questionnaire went through nine iterations before being approved for translation.

The questionnaire included two types of experimental questions: a conjoint experiment, in which eight different statements about possible dimensions of a peace deal with the Taliban were read prior to asking the respondent whether they would accept such an agreement, and an endorsement experiment, in which four different policies were attributed to either the government, the Taliban, or to no one, to see if there was any significant difference in support for them. This required 56 versions of the questionnaire to be printed and organized into sampling pack envelopes, because the survey consisted of:

- eight versions of the printed questionnaire
- three samples (Main, Northern, and CC)
- two languages

The different versions of the survey rotated in the sampling plan, with each paper sampling point assigned a starting version of the questionnaire. Six of eight versions of the questionnaire were asked in each sampling point in order to avoid biasing the experiments. Using standard practices, questions were counted as follows:

- (1) Each item in a battery equals a third of a question.
- (2) A question preceding a question with the same response option is counted as a third of a question.
- (3) All open-ended questions are considered one full question.

Using this method, this year's *Survey* consisted of 152 substantive questions and 20 demographic questions, as well as 33 survey-management and quality-control questions. Of these questions, 26 substantive questions were considered new questions, and seven questions were modified from questions fielded in previous waves of the survey. The demographics section did not contain any new questions.

3 SAMPLE DESIGN

The sample was allocated disproportionately by strata and was drawn using a multistage systematic sampling approach. This draw used 2020–2021 updated figures provided by the NSIA.

Numerous adjustments had to be made to the sampling approach owing to heavy fighting and the deteriorating security situation during the fieldwork period. Both oversamples, but particularly the Northern Oversample, were smaller than originally planned. The North was the initial focal point of the Taliban offensive that eventually toppled the government, and by the time fieldwork took place, only six of the 20 planned districts were accessible. Accessibility for the CC Oversample also suffered, with just eight of 10 planned districts accessible during fieldwork. For the Main Sample, fieldwork was not conducted in Ghazni, because training could not be held and fieldwork could not be conducted due to heavy fighting. Additionally, some sampling points in Helmand, Kandahar, and elsewhere had to be dropped, because sampled districts became inaccessible too late in the fieldwork period for them to be replaced without unacceptable delays.

TARGET POPULATION:	AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES
TARGET SAMPLE	<p>22,200 TOTAL AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAIN SAMPLE: 17,000 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 34 PROVINCES • CC OVERSAMPLE: 2,000 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 12 TARGET DISTRICTS • NORTHERN OVERSAMPLE: 3,200 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 10 TARGET DISTRICTS
ACHIEVED SAMPLE	<p>18,362 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 33 PROVINCES³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAIN SAMPLE: 15,832 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 33 PROVINCES • CC OVERSAMPLE: 1,634 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 8 TARGET DISTRICTS • NORTHERN OVERSAMPLE: 896 AFGHAN ADULTS IN 6 TARGET DISTRICTS

STEP 1: For the Main Sample, a base sample was first stratified disproportionately by province, desired margin of error, and power estimates. A minimum of 360 interviews were carried out in each province. Each Northern Oversample district received 180 interviews in addition to any allocated from the main draw, while each CC district received 200 interviews in addition to any from the main draw. In a key departure from previous waves of the study, due to limited accessibility across the country, oversample districts were not removed from the main draw and treated as separate strata. Within each province, the sample was then stratified by urban and rural population figures from the 2020–2021 NSIA estimates.

Each of the 61 accessible strata³ was allocated at least one primary sampling unit (PSU) to ensure that the entire target population had a probability of selection. After the urban and rural strata of each province received a cluster, the remainder of the province’s sample was allocated proportionally.

In previous waves of the study, each oversample district was treated as its own stratum. However, that was not possible in this wave because of sharply limited accessibility.

STEP 2: Districts were selected via probability proportional to size (PPS) systematic sampling. Districts serve as the PSU. Each PSU contains at least two sampling points, one of male respondents and one of female respondents. This is done to allow for gender-matched interviewing, which is a cultural requirement of working in Afghanistan. Each PSU is chosen via PPS sampling within its stratum.

- a. In another difference from previous waves of the study, to meet analytical requirements, no intercept interviews were conducted.
- b. Numerous districts became inaccessible during fieldwork, which required inaccessible districts to be replaced with accessible ones, requiring statisticians to redraw certain strata multiple times. A total of 14 iterations of the sampling plan were produced prior to the end of fieldwork. Near the end of fieldwork, inaccessible districts and strata were dropped from the sample without replacement.

STEP 3: The **settlements** within districts were selected by simple random sampling. These serve as the

secondary sampling unit (SSU). Within urban strata, we use neighborhoods (called “nahias” in cities and metros) and towns, while in rural strata we use villages. As population data for settlement sizes does not exist, a simple random selection amongst all known settlements was used to select locations. In this survey, six interviews were done per sampling point.

- a. The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces could cause a sampling point to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence.
 - i. For the Main Sample, a total of two replicate draws were provided to the field team prior to the launch of fieldwork. If the replicates were exhausted, settlement/nahia-level replacements were made in the field by supervisors. Neighboring accessible settlements were chosen as replacements whenever possible.
- b. In compliance with Afghan culture, interviewing was gender-specific, with female interviewers interviewing only females and males interviewing only males.
- c. Depending on conditions, some districts with significant insurgent activity, military operations, or lack of transportation had male-only samples. In cases where a sampling point designated for female interviews was inaccessible for interviewing, it was replaced with a sampling point from within the same strata (same province and same urban/rural status). At the outset of fieldwork, inaccessible strata were replaced with accessible ones from the same province. Where this was not possible, the strata were dropped. Therefore, no interviews were conducted in rural Kunduz, rural Faryab, or in either stratum of Ghazni..

STEP 4: Field managers then used maps generated from several sources to select starting points within each SSU..

- a. In rural areas, we used a system that requires interviewers to start in one of five randomly selected locations: the northern, southern, eastern, or western edge or the center of the rural settlement..
- b. In urban areas, because it is more difficult to differentiate neighborhood borders, a random location (northern, southern, eastern, western, or center) was provided to the interviewer, who was to start from an identifiable landmark in the vicinity (e.g., a school, a mosque, etc.)

STEP 5: To bolster the randomization process, each sampling point was also randomly assigned a different first-contacted house: either the first, second, or third house the interviewer arrived at following the start of the random walk. After approaching the first contacted house, the interviewer then followed a set interval to select all other households for inclusion in the sample. For example, selecting every third house on the right in rural areas and every fifth house on the right in urban areas.

STEP 6: After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a **Kish grid** for randomizing the target respondent within the household.⁴ Members of the household were listed by name in order of descending age, and then the respondent was selected according the rules of the Kish grid.

WEIGHTING

Five weights were created for the *Survey of the Afghan People 2021*. Each is calibrated to strata and gender targets. These include a final weight post-stratified to gender and strata, and two weights each for the Northern Oversample and CC Oversample.

An adjustment for response rates according to AAPOR's Response Rate 3 (RR3) was planned; however, 171 contact sheets were lost during the chaos following the fall of Kabul, so the planned nonresponse adjustment could not be made.

BASE WEIGHT

The base weight, also referred to as the design weight, is computed simply as the inverse of the probability of selection for each respondent. However, a few assumptions were made in the sampling design that resulted in treating the sample as approximately EPSEM (equal probability of selection method).

Assumptions are as follows:

1. **ALL SETTLEMENTS ARE OF EQUAL SIZE.** Since population estimates at the settlement level are unavailable or unreliable, the sample design drew settlements using a simple random sample (SRS). With the assumption that the settlements are of equal size, the SRS condition of equal probability of selection holds true.
2. **THE RANDOM ROUTE PROCEDURE IS EQUIVALENT TO AN SRS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND RESPONDENTS.** Household enumeration is too dangerous, time-consuming, and cost-prohibitive to be performed in Afghanistan. Random route and Kish grid procedures are used instead to select respondents. We assume that these procedures are equivalent to performing an SRS of households and respondents at the settlement level.

POST-STRATIFICATION

A post-stratification adjustment was performed on the resulting adjusted base weight to match the target population's geographic distribution in Afghanistan. The only targets used for the raking were province by urban/rural status⁵ and gender.

4 PROVINCIAL POPULATION

Below are the population percentages for each province as supplied by the NSIA, the unweighted sample, and the weighted sample.

PROVINCIAL POPULATION

	PERCENTAGE IN POPULATION	PERCENTAGE IN UNWEIGHTED SAMPLE (INCLUDES OVERSAMPLE)	PERCENTAGE IN WEIGHTED SAMPLE (FINALWGT) ⁶
BADAKHSHAN	3.5	2.8	3.7
BADGHIS	1.8	1.9	1.9
BAGHLAN	3.3	3.6	3.6
BALKH	4.9	5.6	5.3
BAMYAN	1.5	2.1	1.8
DAIKUNDI	1.7	3.2	1.8
FARAH	1.9	1.9	2.0
FARYAB	3.7	4.5	0.5
GHAZNI	4.5	0.0	0.0
GHOR	2.5	2.2	2.7
HELMAND	3.4	3.3	5.1
HERAT	6.9	5.5	7.6
JAWZJAN	2.0	3.1	2.1
KABUL	16.1	11.8	18.4
KANDAHAR	4.5	2.6	5.0
KAPISA	1.6	2.0	1.7
KHOST	2.1	2.0	2.3
KUNAR	1.7	2.0	1.8
KUNDUZ	4.3	1.9	1.1
LAGHMAN	1.6	1.9	1.7
LOGAR	1.4	2.9	1.5
NANGARHAR	5.6	6.8	6.0
NIMROZ	0.6	2.1	0.7
NURISTAN	0.5	2.0	0.6
PAKTIA	2.0	2.0	2.2
PAKTIKA	1.6	1.8	2.7
PANJSHIR	0.6	2.0	0.6
PARWAN	2.4	1.0	2.6
SAMANGAN	1.4	2.8	1.5
SAR-E-PUL	2.1	1.8	2.2
TAKHAR	3.6	2.8	3.9
URUZGAN	1.3	1.9	1.5
WARDAK	2.2	4.1	2.3
ZABUL	1.1	2.1	1.4
TOTAL	100	100.0	100.0

5 MARGIN OF ERROR AND DESIGN EFFECT

Focusing on the portion of the sample that is probability based (excluding intercept interviews), the added variance from a multistage stratified cluster design can be estimated via design effect estimates for the survey's variables and in turn used to estimate the complex margin of sampling error. Design effect estimates provided in this section account for both the complex sample design and the weights.

- The sample was stratified by urban/rural status and province with two stages of clustering: district and settlement. For purposes of design effect estimation, only one stage of clustering was specified. Most of the additional variance was accounted for in the initial stage of clustering, resulting in a negligible increase in design effect when two stages were defined.
- The design effect, for reporting purposes, was estimated for a key question of interest: “In your opinion, are things in our country generally going in the right direction or the wrong direction?” In the following table, we provide design effect estimates for each response category of this key variable through the survey package in R.
- In an effort to provide a survey-wide design effect, a “weighted mean” design effect is calculated as the average across each response category of the variable when weighted by frequency of response.

DESIGN-EFFECT ESTIMATION USING Q1

	PROPORTION	COMPLEX SE	DESIGN EFFECT	SRS BOOTSTRAPPED SE
RIGHT DIRECTION	21.12%	0.4668%	2.4015	0.3006%
WRONG DIRECTION	72.98%	0.4924%	2.2578	0.3347%
REFUSED	0.88%	0.1138%	2.7159	0.0685%
DON'T KNOW	5.01%	0.2341%	2.1135	0.1588%
WEIGHTED MEAN			2.2849	

Assuming a simple random sample with $n=18,362$, $p=.5$, and a 95% CI level, the margin of error for the survey is 0.7%. However, when accounting for the complex design through the design effect estimate of 2.285, $p=.5$, and a 95% CI level, the complex MOE is 1.1%.

In addition to this conservative estimate of MOE,⁶ statistic-specific standard errors are provided using bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is a resampling method that does not rely on assumptions about the distribution of the variable of interest. These estimates are calculated with the weighted data, and can be multiplied by the square root of the design effect in order to achieve a standard error that takes the design into consideration. These estimates take the actual responses into consideration during calculation (as opposed to the conservative setting at $p=.5$).

6 FIELD IMPLEMENTATION

FIELD TEAM

A description of field team composition by gender is shown in the table below.

DESCRIPTION OF FIELD TEAM AND GENDER OF INTERVIEWERS, BY PROVINCE

	NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS	NUMBER OF FEMALE INTERVIEWERS	NUMBER OF MALE INTERVIEWERS	TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWERS
BADAKHSHAN	1	13	17	30
BADGHIS	1	18	20	38
BAGHLAN	1	17	19	36
BALKH	1	28	29	57
BAMYAN	1	10	10	20
DAIKUNDI	1	24	20	44
FARAH	1	15	16	31
FARYAB	1	23	25	48
GHOR	1	21	19	40
HELMAND	1	20	21	41
HERAT	1	24	24	48
JAWZJAN	1	18	18	36
KABUL	1	59	62	121
KANDAHAR	1	20	20	40
KAPISA	1	24	20	44
KHOST	1	17	17	34
KUNAR	1	18	19	37
KUNDUZ	1	16	20	36
LAGHMAN	1	25	26	51
LOGAR	1	21	21	42
NANGARHAR	1	35	37	72
NIMROZ	1	18	20	38
NURISTAN	2	12	18	30
PAKTIA	1	14	14	28
PAKTIKA	1	11	21	32
PANJSHIR	1	16	19	35
PARWAN	1	8	11	19
SAMANGAN	1	16	17	33

	NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS	NUMBER OF FEMALE INTERVIEWERS	NUMBER OF MALE INTERVIEWERS	TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWERS
SAR-E-PUL	1	15	15	30
TAKHAR	1	20	22	42
URUZGAN	1	15	17	32
WARDAK	1	29	29	58
ZABUL	1	15	19	34
TOTAL	34	646	701	1347

TRAINING

The central training for provincial supervisors was held in two phases in Kabul on July 8–10 and July 11–12. The Foundation’s director of policy and research, Dr. Tabasum Akseer, and analysts also attended the training virtually. Representatives of Sayara Research attended the training as well.

Topics covered during the training included:

1. Proper household and respondent selection, including random walk procedure to select households and correct use of the Kish grid to select respondents.
2. Correct use of the contact sheet to record the result of all contact attempts.
3. Full review of the questionnaire content.
4. Proper recording of questions.
5. Appropriate interviewing techniques.
6. Mock interviews, to get a better understanding of the logic and concept of the questions.
7. Validation protocols.
8. Back-check and quality-control procedures.
9. GPS coordinates and devices.
10. Administering the survey using both paper questionnaires and on a computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) platform

Provincial supervisors were tested to confirm their understanding of correct procedures for the random walk, the contact sheet, and the Kish grid. Following the Kabul training, provincial trainings were led by the supervisors in their respective provinces. Third-party monitors attended the trainings in order to ensure that they met the standards of The Asia Foundation.

The supervisors then returned to their respective provinces and conducted the interviewer trainings. Most provincial trainings were observed by Sayara Research, a third-party validator.

VILLAGE REPLACEMENTS

In studies prior to 2014, if a sampling point was inaccessible, the replacement of this sampling point was left to the discretion of field supervisors and managers. Realizing the need to limit any systematic bias from field supervisors selecting replacement sampling points, in 2013 the system for assigning replacements for inaccessible sampling points was updated to provide two replicate sample draws to the field team prior to the launch of fieldwork.

For this wave of the *Survey of the Afghan People*, this replacement protocol was used. The first draw serves as the initial list of sampling points where fieldwork is to be conducted. If a sampling point is inaccessible, field supervisors inform the central office of the reason for inaccessibility. The field supervisor then uses the first preassigned replicate, which is always a different village within the same district. If this village is also inaccessible, the process is repeated, and the second preassigned replicate is attempted. If the second replicate is also inaccessible, the next selected village is left to the discretion of the field managers and supervisors. In cases where settlement/nahia-level replacements are done in the field by supervisors, neighboring accessible settlements are chosen as replacements whenever possible.

As of July 2021, 47% of the population of Afghanistan lived in districts accessible to the field team (compared to 66% for the 2019 study), while 4% lived in districts accessible only to male interviewers, and 49% lived in totally inaccessible districts. This means that, in total, 53% of women and 49% of men were inaccessible to random walk interviewing. Of 3,302 sampling points selected, a total of 1,283 villages from the main draw had to be replaced for a variety of reasons. This represents a total replacement rate of 38.9% of original sampling points.

In the Main Sample, 1,136 sampling points out of 2,834 were replaced (40.1%). In the Northern Oversample, 80 sampling points out of 180 were replaced (44.4%). In the CC Oversample, 67 out of 288 sampling points were replaced (23.3%).

REPLACEMENT RATE BY YEAR

YEAR	NUMBER OF SAMPLING POINTS (TOTAL)	NUMBER OF REPLACED SAMPLING POINTS	REPLACEMENT RATE
2008	762	52	6.8%
2009	961	208	21.6%
2010	825	214	25.9%
2011	825	166	20.1%
2012	1,436	341	23.7%
2013	1,568	267	17.0%
2014	1,628	460	28.3%
2015	1,684	482	28.6%
2016	2,262	800	35.4%
2017	1,728	668	38.7%
2018	2,614	950	36.3%
2019	3,074	1,006	32.7%
2021	3,302	1,283	38.9%

Of the 1,283 villages replaced in the first draw, 1,136 were in the Main Sample, which had two full replicate draws. Only one replicate draw was provided for the CC and Northern Oversamples, because of a limited number of settlements (neighborhoods or villages) in some target districts relative to the sample size.

Reasons for replacement were provided for the Main Sample but not for the oversamples. In the Main Sample, a total of 1,136 sampling points were replaced in the first draw, 361 (32%) were replaced in the second draw, 259 (23%) were replaced in the third draw, and 516 (45%) were replaced by the supervisor. The primary reason for replacement was Taliban presence in the village, military operations, or other security issues.

Reasons for all replacements are summarized in the table below.

VILLAGE REPLACEMENTS

REASON	INITIAL DRAW		SECOND DRAW		THIRD DRAW	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / TALIBAN	923	81.3	615	79.4	408	79.1
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	87	7.7	75	9.7	54	10.5
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	71	6.3	41	5.3	31	6.0
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	27	2.4	16	2.1	13	2.5
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	4	0.4	4	0.5	1	0.2
OTHER	24	2.1	24	3.1	9	1.7
TOTAL	1,136	100	775	100	516	100

Female sampling points had a slightly higher rate of replacement, but the difference was very slight: 41.1% of female sampling points (593 out of 1,442) were replaced, compared with 39.0% of male sampling points (543 out of 1,392).

Comparisons with previous years are provided in the following table.

REASONS FOR VILLAGE REPLACEMENTS, BY YEAR

REASON	2008		2009		2010		2011	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / AOGS	17	32.7	104	50.0	140	65.4	99	59.6
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	10	19.2	45	21.6	40	18.7	29	17.5
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	23	44.2	53	25.5	34	15.9	31	18.7
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	0	0.0	5	2.4	0	0.0	7	4.2
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	2	3.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
NOT SPECIFIED / OTHER	0	0.0	1	0.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
TOTAL	52	100	208	100	214	100	166	100

REASON	2012		2013		2014		2015	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / AOGS	191	56.0	144	53.9	298	64.8	332	68.9
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	96	28.2	61	22.8	113	24.6	110	22.8
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	39	11.4	45	16.9	46	10.0	35	7.3
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	9	2.6	13	4.9	3	0.7	2	0.4
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	6	1.8	4	1.5	0	0.0	3	0.6
NOT SPECIFIED / OTHER	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
TOTAL	341	100	267	100	460	100	482	100

REASON	2016		2017		2018		2019	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / AOGS	561	70.1	491	73.5	611	64.3	702	69.8
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	178	22.3	105	15.7	176	18.5	158	15.7
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	42	5.3	60	9.0	122	12.8	92	9.1
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	11	1.4	9	1.3	24	2.5	35	3.5
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	4	0.5	3	0.4	4	0.4	5	0.5
NOT SPECIFIED / OTHER	4	0.5	0	0.0	13	1.4	14	1.4
TOTAL	800	100%	668	100%	950	100%	1006	100%

REASON	2021	
	#	%
SECURITY ISSUES / AOGS	923	81.3
ACCESSIBILITY/WEATHER	87	7.7
VILLAGE ABANDONED / COULD NOT BE FOUND	71	6.3
VILLAGE-LEVEL REFUSAL	27	2.4
VILLAGE IN WRONG DISTRICT	4	0.4
NOT SPECIFIED / OTHER	24	2.1
TOTAL	1,136	100

CONTACT PROCEDURES

After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed by name in order of descending age. The Kish grid provides a random selection criterion based on which visit the household represents in the random walk and the number of inhabitants in the household. Column numbers in

the Kish grid that accompanies the questionnaire are precoded to prevent fraud or convenience selection based on available people.

Under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute another member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after three callbacks, the interviewer then moved on to the next household in the random walk.

Typically, interviewers were required to make two callbacks before replacing the household. These callbacks are made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period in order to find a more flexible schedule to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force has had difficulty in many rural areas meeting the requirement of two callbacks prior to substitution.

In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some callbacks, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt:

- First contact 98.2%
- Second contact 1.4%
- Third contact 0.4%

Due to the high rate of unemployment in Afghanistan, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt has been common.

SAMPLE DISPOSITION

The AAPOR publishes four different types of rate calculations used in AAPOR reporting: response rate, contact rate, cooperation rate, and refusal rate. The Survey uses AAPOR's Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 3, Refusal Rate 2, and Contact Rate 2 as their standards.

Abbreviations used in the formulas:

I	=	Complete interview
P	=	Partial interview
R	=	Refusal and break-off
NC	=	Noncontact
O	=	Other
UH	=	Unknown if household/occupied household unit
UO	=	Unknown, other
e	=	Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible

$$\text{Response Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Cooperation Rate 3} = \frac{I}{I}$$

$$\text{Refusal Rate 2} = \frac{(I + P) + R}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Contact Rate 2} = \frac{(I + P) + R + O}{(I + P) + R + O + NC + e(UH + UO)}$$

7 FIELD OUTCOMES

Supervisors noted any political, social, or other newsworthy events during the field period that may have affected the survey. Due to the timing of this year’s survey, numerous security incidents delayed or prevented fieldwork in much of the country, and transport of the questionnaire packs to and from Kabul was more of a challenge than in previous years. The events leading up to the fall of the Afghan government to the Taliban have been well documented and do not need to be recounted here, but they had a very large impact on this year’s fieldwork and outcomes.

Despite the exceptional difficulty, fieldwork and data processing were successfully completed.

QUALITY CONTROL

FIELD LEVEL

Thirty-four supervisors observed interviewers’ work in the field. Approximately 35% of the interviews were subject to some form of back-check.

The back-checks consisted of:

- Direct observation during the interview—1,000 interviews (5.4%).
- A return visit by the supervisor to the residence where an interview took place—3,970 interviews (21.6%).
- Back-check from the central office—17 interviews (0.1%).
- Quality control by an external validator—1,467 interviews (8.0%).

As with previous studies since 2014, the *Survey of the Afghan People 2021* included third-party validation. Field supervisors provided the fieldwork schedule to the validation team after the training briefings. Asia Foundation personnel also participated in validation for some sampling points. Validators and/or Asia Foundation personnel met with ACSOR interviewers during the field period and observed fieldwork to confirm the correct administration of the survey, including the starting point, the random

walk, and the use of the Kish grid to select respondents in 216 sampling points. They also conducted back-checks of selected interviews.

GPS COORDINATES

In order to improve accuracy and verify fieldwork, interviewers in 2,376 out of 3,302 sampling points (72%) collected GPS data using phones. GPS coordinates were collected in 27 of 34 provinces, but many could not be collected due to security concerns. As an extra level of verification, GPS coordinates were then compared to village GPS coordinates provided by the NSIA.

CODING, DATA ENTRY, AND DATA CLEANING

When the questionnaires were returned to Kabul, they were sorted, and open-ended questions were coded by a team of coders familiar with international standards for creating typologies for codes. During data entry, five cases were removed because of missing or misprinted pages, and 44 cases were removed for other quality-control concerns.

All questionnaires were keypunched on site to protect the data and closely control the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the keypunching team used logic checks and identified and corrected any inadvertent errors by the interviewers.

REVIEW AND CLEANING

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, a program called *Valkyrie* was used to search for additional patterns and duplicates that might indicate that an interview was improperly conducted. A total of 458 cases were removed at this stage of data cleaning.

The *Valkyrie* program includes three tests:

1. Equality test. Compares interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling point, province, or any other variable. Typically, interviews with an average interviewer similarity of 90% or higher are flagged for further investigation.
2. Nonresponse test. Determines the percentage of “don’t know” answers and refusals for each interviewer’s cases. Typically, interviews with 50% or more DK responses are flagged for further investigation.
3. Duplicates test. Compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Typically, any cases that have a similarity of 95% or higher are flagged for further investigation.

Any interview that does not pass *Valkyrie* is pulled out for additional screening. If the interview does not pass screening, it is removed from the final database before delivery.

For the 2021 survey, no cases were deleted for having an average interviewer similarity of over 90% of responses (i.e., failing the equality test), 458 cases were deleted for being over 95% similar in substantive responses to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test), and no cases were deleted for having over 50% refused or “don’t know” responses (i.e., failing the nonresponse test).

As a final layer of quality control, The Asia Foundation ran a series of logic checks to test data for interviewer errors, for logical consistency, and to detect any possible patterns of falsification or poor performance.

Based on the results of these tests, a total of 759 cases were removed from the data set for failing more than two logic tests across multiple interviews, particularly in areas where field validation noted suspected problems with fieldwork. If an interviewer was flagged multiple times, all interviews conducted by this interviewer were then removed from the data.

In total, 6.5% of all successful interviews (those in the initial data file prior to quality control) were removed at some stage of the quality-control process.

SUMMARY OF REMOVED CASES

	N-SIZE AT EACH STAGE OF QC	TOTAL REMOVED	PERCENTAGE REMOVED AT EACH STAGE
TOTAL SUCCESSFUL INTERVIEWS	19,640	--	NA
N-SIZE AFTER ACSOR QC	19,121	519	2.6%
N-SIZE AFTER ASIA FOUNDATION QC	18,362	759	3.9%

ENDNOTES

- 1 The design effect estimate is a weighted average across individual response option design effects for this key question of interest.
- 2 The probability sample excludes intercept interviews from variance estimation.
- 3 Rural Faryab, urban Ghazni, rural Ghazni, and rural Kunduz were totally inaccessible throughout the fieldwork period.
- 4 Interviewers were not allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the respondent selected by the Kish grid. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, the interviewer was to move on to the next household according to the random route.
- 5 The urban centers of some of the more rural provinces were included as their own strata and represent very small segments of the target population. As a result, cases from these strata have very small weights. The sample within these strata was allocated to ensure that everyone who was part of the target population had a probability of being selected. Trimming was not done with these small weights, in order to maintain a proportional-to-population-estimates-by-strata weighted sample.
- 6 The margin of error for a binary response is maximized when the proportions are set equal to each other ($p=.5$)

APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

M-4. Region

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
CENTRAL/KABUL	27%
EAST	10%
SOUTH EAST	7%
SOUTH WEST	14%
WEST	14%
NORTH EAST	12%
CENTRAL/HIGHLANDS	4%
NORTH WEST	12%

M-6b. Geographic code

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
RURAL	72%
URBAN	28%

M-7. Province

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
KABUL	18%
KAPISA	2%
PARWAN	3%
WARDAK	2%
LOGAR	2%
PAKTIA	2%
PAKTIKA	3%
KHOST	2%
NANGARHAR	6%
LAGHMAN	2%
KUNAR	2%
NURISTAN	1%
BADAKHSHAN	4%
TAKHAR	4%
BAGHLAN	4%

KUNDUZ	1%
BALKH	5%
SAMANGAN	2%
JAWZJAN	2%
SAR-E-PUL	2%
FARYAB	1%
BADGHIS	2%
HERAT	8%
FARAH	2%
NIMROZ	1%
HELMAND	5%
KANDAHAR	5%
ZABUL	1%
URUZGAN	2%
GHOR	3%
BAMYAN	2%
PANJSHIR	1%
DAIKUNDI	2%

D-1. Gender

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
MALE	50%
FEMALE	50%

D-2. How old are you?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
18–25	26%
26–35	30%
36–45	24%
46–55	13%
55+	8%

D-9. Total years of education

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
NO FORMAL EDUCATION	42%
1–6 YEARS	15%
7–9 YEARS	9%
10–12 YEARS	22%
OVER 12 YEARS	11%
REFUSED	0%
DON'T KNOW	1%

D-14. Which ethnic group do you belong to?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
PASHTUN	40%
TAJIK	39%
HAZARA	11%
UZBEK	5%
SADAT	1%
AIMAK	1%
TURKMEN	1%
NURISTANI	1%
ARAB	<0.5%
BALOCH	<0.5%
PASHAYE	<0.5%
QEZELBASH	<0.5%
BAYAT	<0.5%
TEMORI	<0.5%
STANIKZAI	<0.5%
JAMSHIDI	<0.5%
ALOKOZAY	<0.5%
KIRGHIZ	<0.5%
WAKHI	<0.5%
NOORZIAYE	<0.5%
KHAJA	<0.5%
GUJAR	<0.5%
AFGHAN	<0.5%
TATAR	<0.5%

APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

MAIN SURVEY QUESTIONS

Q-1. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
RIGHT DIRECTION	21%
WRONG DIRECTION	73%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	1%

Q-2. (Ask if answer to Q-1 is "right direction.") What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q-2a. First mention _____

Q-2b. Second mention _____

BASE: RIGHT DIRECTION	3,739
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	28%
PEACE / END OF THE WAR	27%
GOOD SECURITY	17%
DON'T KNOW	17%
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION SYSTEM	11%
GOOD GOVERNMENT	8%
FOREIGN FORCES LEAVING AFGHANISTAN	7%
ECONOMIC REVIVAL	7%
HAVING ACTIVE ANA AND ANP	7%
ROAD RECONSTRUCTION	6%
REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	5%
SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS HAVE OPENED	5%
MORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY THAN BEFORE	4%
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE	4%
MORE JOB OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE	3%
REMOVING THE TALIBAN	3%
DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE SYSTEM	3%

CLEAN DRINKING WATER	3%
NATIONAL UNITY	2%
WOMEN CAN NOW WORK	2%
HIGH JIRGA/SHURA FOR ESTABLISHING PEACE	2%
FREEDOM / FREE SPEECH	2%
HAVING LEGAL CONSTITUTION	1%
CREATION OF ARBAKIES	1%
CLINICS HAVE BEEN BUILT	1%
IMPROVED JUSTICE	1%
RESPECTING WOMEN'S RIGHTS	1%
WATER DAMS HAVE BEEN BUILT	1%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS	1%
MORE FACTORIES	1%
HAVING BETTER RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES	1%
WOMEN HAVE MORE FREEDOM	1%
DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IN GENERAL	1%
PREVENTION / ELIMINATION OF CRIME	1%
DECREASE IN CRIME	1%
DEMOCRACY / ELECTIONS	1%
REMOVING TERRORISM	1%
PEOPLE COOPERATE WITH GOVERNMENT	1%
PREVENTING THE INTERVENTION OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES	1%
HAVING PARLIAMENT	1%
NEW TECHNOLOGY IS AVAILABLE	1%
AIR FORCE HAS IMPROVED	1%
PREVENTION / ELIMINATION OF SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-3. (Ask if answer to Q-1 is “wrong direction.”) What are two reasons you think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Q-3a. First mention _____

Q-3b. Second mention _____

BASE: WRONG DIRECTION	13,511
INSECURITY	65%
THERE IS UNEMPLOYMENT	22%
BAD ECONOMY	16%
DON'T KNOW	11%
CORRUPTION	8%
BAD GOVERNMENT	7%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	7%
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION	5%
POOR LEADERSHIP	5%
HIGH PRICES	4%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	4%
INCREASE IN LEVEL OF DRUG TRADE	3%
LOST CONTROL OF DISTRICTS	3%
INJUSTICE IN THE COUNTRY	3%
INCREASE IN CRIME	3%
NO RECONSTRUCTION HAS HAPPENED	2%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	2%
POOR EDUCATION SYSTEM	2%
PROBABILITY OF WAR	2%
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CAUSE PROBLEMS	2%
LACK OF UNITY	2%
MIGRATION	1%
TOO MANY FOREIGNERS ARE GETTING INVOLVED	1%
KIDNAPPING OF CHILDREN	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES	1%
LACK OF SHELTER	1%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	1%
PRESENCE / INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGNERS	1%
LACK OF AID / NO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	1%
LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW	1%
FOREIGN AID CAUSES PROBLEMS	1%

DON'T HAVE TRUST IN PEACE PROCESS	1%
INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGNERS IN COUNTRY'S MILITARY MATTERS	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-4. (Ask all.) In your view, what is going well in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)

Q-4a. First mention _____

Q-4b. Second mention _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
DON'T KNOW	29%
NOTHING	22%
BUILDING ROADS AND BRIDGES	18%
DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE / IRRIGATION / LIVESTOCK	17%
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION	14%
DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY	10%
AVAILABILITY OF DRINKING WATER	9%
BUILDING WATER DAMNS	8%
BUILDING CLINICS	7%
GOOD SECURITY	7%
UNITY AMONG PEOPLE	5%
BUILDING MOSQUES	4%
TRADING AND BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT	3%
AVAILABILITY OF JOBS	3%
BETTER ECONOMY	1%
CLEANER ENVIRONMENT	1%
AVAILABILITY OF VOCATIONAL TRAININGS	1%
REFUSED	1%
PUBLIC SERVICES	1%
FIGHTING CORRUPTION	1%
ESTABLISHMENT OF PEOPLE'S COUNCIL	1%
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND ORDER	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-5. (Ask all.) In your view what are the biggest problems in your local area? (Write down answers; allow up to two mentions.)

Q-5a. First mention _____

Q-5b. Second mention _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
SECURITY ISSUES / ATTACKS / VIOLENCE	34%
UNEMPLOYMENT	31%
ELECTRICITY	18%
DON'T KNOW	11%
POOR ECONOMY	10%
ROADS	10%
WATER	9%
HIGH PRICES	9%
EDUCATION / SCHOOLS / LITERACY	8%
DRINKING WATER	6%
HEALTHCARE / CLINICS / HOSPITALS	6%
POVERTY	6%
CRIME	5%
CORRUPTION	4%
WATER FOR IRRIGATION	3%
TALIBAN	2%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	2%
THEFT	2%
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	2%
INJUSTICE	1%
LACK OF FOOD	1%
GOVERNMENT / WEAK GOVERNMENT / CENTRAL AUTHORITY	1%
NO PROBLEMS AT ALL	1%
POLLUTION	1%
DRUGS SMUGGLING	1%
INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED	1%
LACK OF (PROPER) SHELTER	1%
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS	1%
PRESENCE OF WARLORDS	1%
ADDICTION TO DRUGS	1%
DROUGHT	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-6. (Ask all.) In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing youth in your area?
By youth, I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24. What is the next-biggest problem?

Q-6a. First mention _____

Q-6b. Second mention _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
UNEMPLOYMENT	69%
ILLITERACY	29%
DON'T KNOW	17%
POOR ECONOMY	16%
BECOMING DRUG ADDICTS	15%
INSECURITY	10%
NO HIGHER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH	6%
ABANDONING COUNTRY	4%
TAKING REFUGE IN IRAN	2%
INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMES	2%
COSTLY MARRIAGES	2%
LACK OF SCHOOLS	2%
LACK OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE	2%
HIGH COST OF LIVING	2%
LACK OF VOCATIONAL TRAININGS	1%
NO PROBLEM	1%
CORRUPTION	1%
LACK OF YOUTH RIGHTS	1%
INJUSTICE	1%
KILLING THE YOUTH	1%
TRIBAL PROBLEMS	1%
LACK OF SPORTS FIELDS	1%
CAMPAIGN AMONG YOUTH FOR TALIBAN ENROLLMENT	1%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	1%
LACK OF ATTENTION TO AGRICULTURE	1%
FORCED MARRIAGES	1%
LACK OF EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS	1%
MORAL CORRUPTION	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-7. (Ask all.) What, if anything, is the biggest problem facing women in this area today?
What is the next-biggest problem? (Write down top two answers.)

Q-7a. First mention _____

Q-7b. Second mention _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
EDUCATION / ILLITERACY	30%
DON'T KNOW	26%
UNEMPLOYMENT / LACK OF JOBS	26%
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	17%
FORCED MARRIAGES / DOWRY	13%
POVERTY	11%
LACK OF RIGHTS / WOMEN'S RIGHTS	9%
NO HOSPITALS / CLINICS	6%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL COURSES	6%
SECURITY	6%
NOTHING	5%
LACK OF SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS	2%
DISTURBANCE TO WOMEN	2%
BAAD	2%
NOT LETTING WOMEN GET HIGHER EDUCATION	2%
NOT RECEIVING THEIR SHARE OF INHERITANCE	2%
UNDER CONTROL OF MEN / MEN HAVE POWER	2%
BADAL	2%
PROBLEMS IN FAMILY PLANNING	1%
CAN'T LEAVE HOMES	1%
HEALTHCARE (IN GENERAL)	1%
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	1%
LACK OF RESPECT TOWARDS WOMEN	1%
LACK OF FEMALE DOCTORS	1%
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY	1%
INJUSTICE	1%
PREGNANCY-RELATED HEALTHCARE	1%
LACK OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER	1%
REFUSED	1%
FORCING WOMEN TO WORK	1%
GOVERNMENT NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO WOMEN	1%
HIGH PRICES	1%

LACK OF SHELTER	1%
LACK OF PROFESSIONAL DOCTORS	1%
RAPE	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
CRIME	0%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

SERVICES AND HEALTH

Q-8. *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	BETTER	THE SAME	WORSE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD	13%	40%	47%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	6%	29%	64%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) AVAILABILITY OF PRODUCTS IN THE MARKET	8%	40%	51%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) QUALITY OF FOOD IN YOUR DIET	11%	44%	44%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF YOUR HOUSE / DWELLING	12%	53%	34%	1%	<0.5%
F) HEALTH / WELL-BEING OF YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS	16%	46%	38%	<0.5%	<0.5%
G) ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	14%	37%	48%	1%	1%
H) QUALITY OF SCHOOL SERVICES	14%	45%	40%	1%	<0.5%
I) ACCESS TO ROADS	21%	46%	33%	<0.5%	<0.5%
J) ACCESS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER	18%	43%	39%	<0.5%	<0.5%
K) ACCESS TO IRRIGATION FACILITIES	10%	45%	42%	3%	1%

Q-9. *I am going to read a list of projects that may or may not have been implemented in your area. Please tell me if there has been this type of project in your area in the last 12 months.*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW / REFUSED
A) RECONSTRUCTION / BUILDING OF ROADS OR BRIDGES	36%	63%	<0.5%
B) NEW GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OPENING	17%	82%	<0.5%
C) NEW PRIVATE SCHOOL OPENING	19%	80%	1%
D) NEW PRIVATE UNIVERSITY	9%	90%	1%
E) DRINKING WATER PROJECT	27%	73%	1%
F) IRRIGATION PROJECT	19%	79%	1%

G) GOVERNMENT-SUPPLIED ELECTRICITY	22%	77%	1%
H) HEALTHCARE	21%	78%	1%
I) RECONCILIATION WITH ANTIGOVERNMENT ELEMENTS	9%	90%	1%
J) PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE	19%	80%	1%
K) NEW FACTORIES OPENED	7%	93%	1%
L) BUILDING NEW MOSQUES	28%	71%	1%

Q-10. *How many school-age children are there in this household? How many are boys and how many girls? (Write number.)*

Q-10a. *(Girls)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
0	24%
1	25%
2	28%
3	14%
4	5%
5	2%
6	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-10b. *(Boys)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
0	20%
1	25%
2	28%
3	15%
4	7%
5	2%
6	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-11. (Ask if Q-10 answer is one or more.) Do all of them, some of them, or none of them attend school? (Write number.)

Q-11a. (Girls)

BASE: HAVE SCHOOL-AGE GIRL	14,278
ALL OF THEM	73%
SOME OF THEM	13%
NONE OF THEM	13%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	0%

Q-11b. (Boys)

BASE: HAVE SCHOOL-AGE BOY	14,953
ALL OF THEM	83%
SOME OF THEM	11%
NONE OF THEM	4%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q-12. (Ask if Q-11 answer is "some of them" or "none of them.") Why don't the children go to school?

Q-12a. (Girls)

Response _____

BASE: GIRLS DO NOT GO TO SCHOOL	3,739
TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES	19%
THEY NEED TO WORK	16%
GIRLS DO NOT NEED EDUCATION	15%
QUALITY OF EDUCATION IS BAD	13%
CANNOT AFFORD TUITION AND / OR SCHOOL SUPPLIES	12%
DON'T SEE THE POINT IN EDUCATION	7%
DON'T KNOW	5%
SCHOOL TEACHES IMMORAL THINGS	4%
THERE IS NO SCHOOL IN OUR AREA	3%
INSECURITY	2%
NOT YET OF SCHOOL AGE	1%
FAMILY DOES NOT ALLOW THEM	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-12b. (Boys)

Response _____

BASE: BOYS DO NOT GO TO SCHOOL	2,317
THEY NEED TO WORK	40%
TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES	14%
QUALITY OF EDUCATION IS BAD	14%
CANNOT AFFORD TUITION AND / OR SCHOOL SUPPLIES	11%
DON'T KNOW	6%
DON'T SEE THE POINT IN EDUCATION	4%
NOT YET OF SCHOOL AGE	2%
SCHOOL TEACHES IMMORAL THINGS	2%
INSECURITY	1%
THERE IS NO SCHOOL IN OUR AREA	1%
THEY DO NOT NEED EDUCATION	1%
BECAUSE OF SICKNESS	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-13. *In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household visited a public hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	57%
NO	43%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-14. *(Ask if Q-13 answer is yes.) What type of services did you receive at the public hospital or clinic?*

Q-14a. *First mention* _____**Q-14b.** *Second mention* _____

BASE: VISITED PUBLIC HOSPITAL OR CLINIC	10,613
GOOD QUALITY MEDICINE	42%
BETTER EXAMINATION	29%
DON'T KNOW	22%
VACCINATION	14%

HEALTH SERVICES	12%
BLOOD PRESSURE CHECK AND TREATMENT	7%
COVID-19 TREATMENT	6%
GENERAL SURGERY	6%
LABORATORY TESTS	5%
HOSPITALIZED	5%
BETTER ATTENTION FROM DOCTORS	4%
FEMALE HEALTH SERVICES	3%
NONE	3%
GENERAL EXAMINATION	3%
MIDWIFE ADVISORY	3%
GASTRIC TREATMENT	2%
X-RAY	2%
GETTING A PRESCRIPTION	2%
TREATMENT OF ENT (EAR, NOSE, AND THROAT)	2%
ULTRASOUND	2%
DENTIST SERVICES	2%
TREATMENT OF EYE DISEASES	2%
ORTHOPEDICS	2%
TREATMENT OF ANEMIA	1%
TREATMENT OF HEART DISEASE	1%
KIDNEY TREATMENT (POLLEN CENTER FOR KIDNEY TREATMENT)	1%
TREATMENT OF DIABETES	1%
TREATMENT OF MENTAL PROBLEMS	1%
TREATMENT OF MALARIA	1%
TREATMENT OF DIARRHEA	1%
TREATMENT OF PNEUMONIA	1%
GETTING OXYGEN	1%
BACK TREATMENT	1%
PEDIATRICS	1%
TREATMENT OF CHOLESTEROL	1%
TREATMENT OF SKIN DISEASES	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-15. (Ask all.) In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household visited a private hospital or clinic for any health-related reasons or medical treatment?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	43%
NO	57%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	0%

Q-16. (Ask if Q-15 answer is yes.) What type of services did you receive at the private hospital or clinic?

Q-16a. First mention _____

Q-16b. Second mention _____

BASE: VISITED PRIVATE HOSPITAL OR CLINIC	7,661
GOOD QUALITY MEDICINE	44%
BETTER EXAMINATION	30%
DON'T KNOW	20%
HEALTH SERVICES	10%
LABORATORY TESTS	9%
GENERAL SURGERY	8%
VACCINATION	6%
BLOOD PRESSURE CHECK AND TREATMENT	6%
COVID-19 TREATMENT	6%
X-RAY	4%
ULTRASOUND	4%
HOSPITALIZED	4%
BETTER ATTENTION FROM DOCTORS	4%
GENERAL EXAMINATION	3%
DENTIST SERVICES	3%
GASTRIC TREATMENT	3%
TREATMENT OF ENT (EAR, NOSE AND THROAT)	2%
GETTING A PRESCRIPTION	2%
MIDWIFE ADVISORY	2%
TREATMENT OF HEART DISEASE	2%
TREATMENT OF DIABETES	2%
FEMALE HEALTH SERVICES	2%
TREATMENT OF EYE DISEASES	2%

ORTHOPEDICS	2%
TREATMENT OF ANEMIA	2%
KIDNEY TREATMENT (POLLEN CENTER FOR KIDNEY TREATMENT)	1%
NONE	1%
TREATMENT OF MENTAL PROBLEMS	1%
TREATMENT OF MALARIA	1%
PEDIATRICS	1%
BACK TREATMENT	1%
PHYSIOTHERAPY	1%
TREATMENT OF CHOLESTEROL	1%
TREATMENT OF DIARRHEA	1%
TREATMENT OF PNEUMONIA	1%
GETTING OXYGEN	1%
TREATMENT OF SKIN DISEASES	1%
SONOGRAM	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

SECURITY

Q-17. Which group would you say is most responsible for providing security in this village/ gozar? And the second-most? (Do not read out pre-codes.)

Q-17a. First mention _____

Q-17b. Second mention _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
NATIONAL POLICE	57%
NATIONAL ARMY	40%
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES	35%
LOCAL POLICE	23%
DON'T KNOW	15%
NO ONE	9%
LOCAL COMMANDERS	8%
ARBAKAI	6%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY–TERRITORIAL FORCE (ANA–TF)	3%
TALIBAN	2%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-18. Compared with last year, do you think the [insert item] are getting better at providing security, getting worse, or is there no difference?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	GETTING BETTER	GETTING WORSE	NO DIFFERENCE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) ANA	42%	32%	25%	1%	0.0%
B) ANP	33%	38%	28%	1%	<0.5%

Q-19. Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) ANA	44%	40%	11%	5%	1%	<0.5%
B) ANP	40%	39%	14%	6%	1%	<0.5%

Q-20. I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response, and then ask) Would you say strongly or somewhat?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) THE ANA IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE	56%	33%	8%	2%	0.5%	<0.5%
B) THE ANA HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN	50%	35%	11%	3%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) THE ANA PROTECTS CIVILIANS	48%	35%	12%	4%	1%	<0.5%

Q-21. I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask) Would you say strongly or somewhat?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) ANP IS HONEST AND FAIR WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE	39%	42%	14%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) ANP HELPS IMPROVE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN	36%	42%	16%	5%	<0.5%	0%
C) THE ANP IS EFFICIENT AT ARRESTING THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES	32%	39%	19%	9%	1%	<0.5%

Q-22a. *Would you agree or disagree with a family member's decision to join the Afghan National Police?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
AGREE	66%
DISAGREE	30%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	1%

Q-22b. *(Ask if Q-22a answer is "disagree" or "don't know.") Why would you disagree with their decision?*

Q-22b_a. *First mention* _____

Q-22b_b. *Second mention* _____

BASE: RESPONDENTS WHO DISAGREE OR DON'T KNOW	5,263
THE DEATH TOLL IS HIGH	34%
DON'T KNOW	31%
INSECURITY	25%
LACK GOOD LEADER / GOVERNMENT	23%
LOW SALARY	20%
FEAR OF TALIBAN / AL QAEDA	12%
THERE IS CORRUPTION	11%
IT'S A HARD JOB	7%
LACK OF EQUIPMENT FOR WOMEN	7%
NOT INTERESTED	5%
CONDITIONS ARE NOT GOOD	3%
THE FAMILY DOESN'T ALLOW IT	3%
LACK OF RULE OF LAW	2%
LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG ANDSF	1%
LACK OF RESPECT TOWARDS PEOPLE	1%
LACK OF TRAINING	1%
ALREADY HAVE A JOB	1%
THEY ARE ADDICTS	1%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%
FEAR OF ENMITY	1%
REFUSED	1%
NO REASON	1%

EXISTENCE OF FOREIGNERS	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-23. *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
ALWAYS	28%
OFTEN	30%
SOMETIMES	27%
RARELY	10%
NEVER	5%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%

Q-24. *In your view, does any group currently pose a threat to the security of this local area?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	46%
NO	52%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-25. *(Ask if Q-24 answer is yes.) Who do you think poses a threat to the security of this local area? (Ask open-ended, record up to two mentions.)*

Q-25a. *First mention* _____

Q-25b. *Second mention* _____

BASE: THOSE WHO SEE A THREAT TO SECURITY	8,643
TALIBAN	76%
CRIMINALS / THIEVES	38%
DON'T KNOW	29%
IRRESPONSIBLE ARMED MEN	11%
DAESH / ISIS	10%
ANTIGOVERNMENT ELEMENTS	8%
WARLORDS	4%
UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE	3%
LOCAL MILITIA	3%
AL QAEDA	3%
SMUGGLERS	2%

PAKISTAN	2%
POLICE	2%
DRUG ADDICTS / USERS	2%
NO ONE	1%
GOVERNMENT	1%
HAQQANI NETWORK / GROUP	1%
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES	1%
COMMANDERS	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-26. (Ask all.) Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or some criminal act in the past year?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	19%
NO	81%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-27. (Ask is Q-26 answer is yes.) If it is ok to ask, what kinds of violence or crimes did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (Do not read out list.)

Q-27a. First mention _____

Q-27b. Second mention _____

BASE: EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE	3,295
PHYSICAL ATTACK OR BEATING	40%
DON'T KNOW	28%
PICKPOCKETING	27%
RACKETEERING / EXTORTION	23%
BURGLARY / LOOTING	14%
LIVESTOCK STOLEN	13%
MURDER	10%
KIDNAPPING	9%
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT, PROPERTY TAKEN FROM VEHICLE, OR PARTS OF THE VEHICLE STOLEN	9%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	7%
SMUGGLING	5%
MILITANTS / INSURGENT ACTIONS	5%
POLICE ACTIONS	5%

SEXUAL VIOLENCE	2%
FOREIGN-FORCE ACTIONS (NIGHT RAIDS, DRONE ATTACKS, ETC.)	1%
ARMY ACTIONS	1%
REFUSED	0%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-28. (Ask if Q-26 answer is yes.) Were the crimes or violent acts reported to anybody outside your family, or not?

BASE: SUFFERED FROM CRIME AND VIOLENCE	3,295
YES	60%
NO	40%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-29. (Ask if Q-28 answer is yes.) Who did you report the crime to? Anyone else? (Do not read out list.)

Q-29a. First mention _____

Q-29b. Second mention _____

BASE: RESPONDENTS WHO REPORTED THE CRIME	2,014
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	55%
SHURA / ELDERS	32%
TRIBAL LEADER / MALIK	28%
DON'T KNOW	19%
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	13%
MULLAH SAHEB	11%
DISTRICT GOVERNOR / WOLESWAL	10%
JUST MY FAMILY	7%
PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY	7%
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR	5%
COURTS	4%
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	3%
LOCAL MILITIA (ARBAKAI)	2%
TALIBAN	2%
LOCAL COMMANDER OR WARLORD	2%
REFUSED	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-30. (Ask all.) If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that government law-enforcement organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
A LOT OF CONFIDENCE	10%
SOME CONFIDENCE	41%
A LITTLE CONFIDENCE	30%
NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	17%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-31. Do you think the international military forces' withdrawal will have a mostly positive effect, a mostly negative effect, or no effect on Afghanistan?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
MOSTLY POSITIVE EFFECT	16%
MOSTLY NEGATIVE EFFECT	46%
NO EFFECT	20%
BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE	16%
DON'T KNOW	2%

Q-32a. (Ask if Q-31 answer is "mostly positive.") What is the main reason you think it will have a positive effect?

BASE: THOSE WHO SAY POSITIVE EFFECT	3,009
IMPROVED SECURITY	28%
DECREASED FIGHTING	23%
PROGRESS IN PEACE TALKS	16%
STRONGER COMMITMENT TO PEACE	12%
CORRUPTION WILL DECREASE	11%
STRONGER AFGHANISTAN LEADERSHIP	9%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-32b. (Ask if Q-31 answer is “mostly negative.”) What is the main reason you think it will have a negative effect?

BASE: THOSE WHO SAY NEGATIVE EFFECT	8,345
SECURITY SITUATION WILL WORSEN	30%
INCREASED FIGHTING	29%
THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE WEAKENED	14%
TALIBAN WILL TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY	8%
IT WILL HARM THE ECONOMY	8%
WOMEN’S RIGHTS WILL WORSEN	6%
CORRUPTION WILL INCREASE	4%
DON’T KNOW	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-33. In some areas, the Taliban are known to provide service delivery. Have you heard of the following services being provided by the Taliban, either in your local area or in other, nearby local areas?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	YES	NO	DON’T KNOW	REFUSED
A. HEALTHCARE	2%	98%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B. JUSTICE OR DISPUTE RESOLUTION	10%	90%	<0.5%	0%
C. EDUCATION SERVICES INCLUDING SCHOOLS	2%	98%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D. WATER	1%	99%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E. FOOD	1%	99%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F. ELECTRICITY	1%	98%	<0.5%	<0.5%
G. MEDIA (RADIO)	1%	98%	<0.5%	<0.5%
H. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	1%	99%	<0.5%	<0.5%
I. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	<0.5%	99%	<0.5%	<0.5%
J. OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) _____	<0.5%	77%	22%	<0.5%

Q-34. (Ask if Q-33 answer is yes.) Have you or anyone in your household accessed these services?

A. HEALTHCARE

BASE: HEARD OF HEALTHCARE	370
YES	38%
NO	58%
DON’T KNOW	4%

B. JUSTICE OR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

BASE: HEARD OF HEALTHCARE	370
YES	42%
NO	55%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

C. EDUCATION SERVICES INCLUDING SCHOOLS

BASE: HEARD OF EDUCATION SERVICES INCLUDING SCHOOLS	389
YES	47%
NO	52%
DON'T KNOW	1%

D. WATER

BASE: HEARD OF WATER	240
YES	56%
NO	40%
DON'T KNOW	4%

E. FOOD

BASE: HEARD OF FOOD	171
YES	49%
NO	46%
DON'T KNOW	5%

F. ELECTRICITY

BASE: HEARD OF ELECTRICITY	288
YES	64%
NO	35%
DON'T KNOW	2%

G. MEDIA (RADIO)

BASE: HEARD OF MEDIA (RADIO)	310
YES	42%
NO	54%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	1%

H. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

BASE: HEARD OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	86
YES	43%
NO	50%
DON'T KNOW	8%

I. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

BASE: HEARD OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY	100
YES	32%
NO	66%
DON'T KNOW	2%

J. OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY)

BASE: HEARD OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	24
YES	50%
NO	40%
DON'T KNOW	10%

Q-35. (Ask if Q-34 answer is yes.) If yes have accessed services, were/are you satisfied with the service?

A. HEALTHCARE

BASE: ACCESSED HEALTHCARE	136
YES	73%
NO	27%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%

B. JUSTICE OR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

BASE: ACCESSED JUSTICE OR DISPUTE RESOLUTION	812
YES	78%
NO	21%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

C. EDUCATION SERVICES INCLUDING SCHOOLS

BASE: ACCESSED EDUCATION SERVICES INCLUDING SCHOOLS	184
YES	78%
NO	21%
DON'T KNOW	1%

D. WATER

BASE: ACCESSED WATER	135
YES	75%
NO	23%
DON'T KNOW	2%

E. FOOD

BASE: ACCESSED FOOD	83
YES	60%
NO	38%
DON'T KNOW	1%

F. ELECTRICITY

BASE: ACCESSED ELECTRICITY	178
YES	81%
NO	18%
DON'T KNOW	2%

G. MEDIA (RADIO)

BASE: ACCESSED MEDIA (RADIO)	118
YES	66%
NO	33%
DON'T KNOW	1%

H. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

BASE: ACCESSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	40
YES	68%
NO	32%

I. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

BASE: ACCESSED EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY	29
YES	66%
NO	34%

J. OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY)

BASE: ACCESSED OTHER	12
YES	91%
NO	9%

JUSTICE

Q-36. *(Ask all.) How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the available dispute resolution services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
VERY SATISFIED	15%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	48%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	24%
VERY DISSATISFIED	10%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-37. *In the past two years, have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the state court, the Huquq Department, or a village- or neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	20%
NO	80%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-38. *(Ask if Q-37 answer is yes.) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single response: if there is more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent.)*

BASE: HAD DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	3,681
DISPUTE OVER LAND	40%
FAMILY PROBLEMS	20%
OTHER PROPERTY DISPUTE, NOT LAND	12%
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE	12%
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT	10%
DIVORCE	4%
MURDER	1%
ROBBERY / BURGLARY	1%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-39. *(Ask if Q-37 answer is yes.) Were you fully satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings?*

BASE: HAD DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	3,681
FULLY SATISFIED	20%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	45%
NOT SATISFIED	24%
NOT FINISHED YET	10%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-40. (Ask if Q-37 answer is yes.) Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Allow more than one mention; include all used.)

BASE: HAD DISPUTE OR FORMAL CASE	3,659
STATE COURT	40%
VILLAGE- OR NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED SHURA / JIRGA	39%
HUQUQ DEPARTMENT	29%
DON'T KNOW	6%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-41. (Ask if Q-40 answer is "Huquq Department.") And now let's turn to the local Huquq Department. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO HUQUQ DEPARTMENT (996)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A. LOCAL HUQUQ DEPT. IS FAIR AND TRUSTED	25%	44%	20%	10%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B. LOCAL HUQUQ DEPT. FOLLOWS THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	23%	38%	26%	13%	1%	0%
C. LOCAL HUQUQ DEPT. IS EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	23%	35%	28%	13%	1%	<0.5%
D. LOCAL HUQUQ DEPT. RESOLVES CASES QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY	18%	34%	28%	19%	1%	<0.5%
E. LOCAL HUQUQ DEPT. TREATS MEN AND WOMEN EQUALLY	18%	39%	26%	15%	1%	1%

Q-42. (Ask if Q-40 answer is "state courts.") Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO STATE COURTS (1,448)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) STATE COURTS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	18%	42%	23%	16%	1%	<0.5%
B) STATE COURTS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	18%	34%	29%	18%	1%	<0.5%
C) STATE COURTS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	17%	35%	24%	23%	1%	<0.5%

D) STATE COURTS RESOLVE CASES PROMPTLY AND IN A TIMELY MANNER	12%	29%	32%	26%	1%	<0.5%
E) STATE COURTS TREAT MEN AND WOMEN EQUALLY	15%	34%	28%	21%	2%	0%

Q-43. (Ask if Q-40 answer is "shura/jirga.") And now, let's turn to village- or neighborhood-based jirgas and shuras. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village- or neighborhood-based jirgas/ shuras?

BASE: REFERRED A CASE TO A SHURA/JIRGA (1,454)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS ARE FAIR AND TRUSTED	30%	52%	15%	2%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS FOLLOW THE LOCAL NORMS AND VALUES OF OUR PEOPLE	34%	42%	18%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS ARE EFFECTIVE AT DELIVERING JUSTICE	30%	45%	18%	6%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) LOCAL JIRGAS, SHURAS RESOLVE CASES PROMPTLY AND IN A TIMELY MANNER	27%	44%	21%	8%	<0.5%	0%
E) THERE SHOULD BE LOCAL WOMEN'S JIRGAS AND SHURAS	30%	39%	20%	10%	1%	<0.5%

CORRUPTION

Q-44. Next, I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money or a gift or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it in all cases, in most cases, in some cases, or in no cases? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. (Rotate items in the list.)

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	IN ALL CASES	IN MOST CASES	IN SOME CASES	IN NO CASES	HAD NO CONTACT	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) OFFICIALS IN THE MUNICIPALITY / DISTRICT OFFICE	2%	8%	11%	24%	54%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	2%	6%	9%	25%	57%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) CUSTOMS OFFICE	3%	5%	8%	18%	66%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	2%	6%	12%	36%	44%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	1%	4%	8%	35%	51%	1%	<0.5%

F) JUDICIARY / COURTS	3%	7%	12%	24%	54%	1%	<0.5%
G) DA AFGHANISTAN BRESHNA SHERKAT (STATE ELECTRIC SUPPLY)	2%	6%	12%	32%	48%	<0.5%	<0.5%
H) HOSPITALS / CLINICS	2%	8%	15%	47%	26%	<0.5%	<0.5%
I) WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	3%	7%	11%	28%	50%	<0.5%	<0.5%
J) ADMISSIONS TO SCHOOLS / UNIVERSITY	1%	5%	10%	37%	46%	<0.5%	<0.5%
K) WHEN RECEIVING OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FROM SCHOOLS / UNIVERSITY	1%	5%	10%	33%	50%	<0.5%	<0.5%

Q-45. Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas.

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	MAJOR PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	NOT A PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) IN YOUR DAILY LIFE	72%	20%	7%	1%	<0.5%
B) IN AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE	81%	14%	4%	1%	<0.5%

SECTION 6.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Q-46. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed. Other people say politics and religion should not mix. For example, some say religious scholars should only manage religion and should not take part in politics. Which is closer to your view?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD BE CONSULTED / INVOLVED	56%
POLITICS AND RELIGION SHOULD NOT MIX / RELIGIOUS LEADERS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED	40%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-47. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. By democracy, we mean choosing the president and parliament by voting, rather than appointment or selection by some leaders. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
VERY SATISFIED	16%
SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	45%
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	25%

VERY DISSATISFIED	13%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-48. Please tell me how you would respond to the following activities or groups. Would you respond with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	NO FEAR	SOME FEAR	A LOT OF FEAR	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) VOTING IN A NATIONAL / PROVINCIAL ELECTION	36%	43%	21%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	26%	39%	34%	1%	<0.5%
C) RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	27%	40%	30%	2%	1%
D) ENCOUNTERING ANP	57%	28%	14%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) ENCOUNTERING ANA	60%	27%	13%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	18%	40%	41%	<0.5%	<0.5%
G) ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES (WESTERN MILITARY ONLY)	21%	43%	34%	1%	<0.5%
H) ENCOUNTERING THE TALIBAN	6%	22%	71%	1%	<0.5%
I) ENCOUNTERING ISIS / DAESH	3%	13%	82%	1%	1%

Q-49. In some countries people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government, while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. Thinking back to a year ago, how safe did you feel expressing your opinions about the government in public?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
VERY SAFE	10%
SOMEWHAT SAFE	40%
SOMEWHAT UNSAFE	33%
VERY UNSAFE	15%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-50. How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions—a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
A LOT	8%
SOME	37%
VERY LITTLE	28%
NONE AT ALL	25%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

GOVERNANCE

Q-51. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. (Interviewer: use code 99, "don't know," if they have no opinion.)

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	A LOT OF CONFIDENCE	SOME CONFIDENCE	NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE	NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	19%	40%	26%	14%	1%	<0.5%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	15%	39%	30%	15%	1%	<0.5%
C) INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION	11%	28%	32%	27%	2%	<0.5%
D) COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS	18%	38%	28%	14%	2%	<0.5%
E) COMMUNITY SHURAS / JIRGAS	23%	38%	25%	12%	1%	<0.5%
F) GOVERNMENT MINISTERS	9%	30%	36%	23%	2%	<0.5%
G) INTERNATIONAL NGOS	12%	33%	32%	20%	3%	<0.5%
H) MEDIA SUCH AS NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TV	27%	38%	23%	11%	1%	<0.5%
I) NATIONAL NGOS	11%	35%	34%	17%	2%	<0.5%
J) PARLIAMENT AS A WHOLE	11%	30%	34%	23%	2%	<0.5%
K) PROVINCIAL COUNCILS	12%	35%	32%	20%	2%	<0.5%
L) RELIGIOUS LEADERS	26%	35%	23%	14%	1%	<0.5%
M) YOUR MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT	11%	31%	33%	24%	1%	<0.5%

Q-52. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item] is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	VERY GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT GOOD JOB	SOMEWHAT BAD JOB	VERY BAD JOB	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	19%	45%	22%	13%	1%	<0.5%
B) PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT	15%	45%	27%	12%	1%	<0.5%
C) MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES (ASK URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY: n = 5,485)	13%	44%	26%	15%	2%	<0.5%
D) DISTRICT GOVERNMENT (ASK RURAL RESIDENTS ONLY: n = 12,877)	12%	46%	31%	6%	6%	<0.5%

RECONCILIATION

Q-53. Do you think reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is possible or impossible?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
POSSIBLE	56%
IMPOSSIBLE	38%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-54. In your opinion, what is the main reason why the Taliban is fighting against the Afghan government? (Open ended—write down first answer.)
Write response _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
TO GAIN POWER	44%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY PAKISTAN	11%
DON'T KNOW	9%
TO SUPPORT ISLAM	5%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS / INTERNATIONAL FORCE	4%
FOR MONEY	3%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED / MOTIVATED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	3%
FOR THEIR PERSONAL BENEFIT	2%
TOO MUCH CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT	2%
TO CREATE INSECURITY	2%

THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY WANT TO OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN	1%
KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE	1%
TO DESTROY OUR COUNTRY	1%
REFUSED	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST ISLAM	1%
TO FORCE FOREIGN FORCES TO WITHDRAW	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST DEMOCRACY	1%
SUPPORT FROM IRAN	1%
ILLITERACY	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-55. *Are you aware of any efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	72%
NO	27%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-56a. *(Ask if Q-55 answer is yes.) Are you aware that there are ongoing talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar?*

BASE: RESPONDENTS AWARE OF PEACE NEGOTIATION	13,213
YES	92%
NO	8%
DON'T KNOW	0%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-57. *(Ask all.) Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
STRONGLY SUPPORT	48%
SOMEWHAT SUPPORT	37%
SOMEWHAT OPPOSE	7%
STRONGLY OPPOSE	6%
DON'T KNOW	2%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-58. (Ask if Q-57 answer is “somewhat oppose” or “strongly oppose.”) Why are you opposed to efforts to negotiate with the Taliban? (Open ended—allow two responses.)

Q-58a. First response _____

Q-58b. Second response _____

BASE: THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS	2,554
DON'T KNOW	35%
TALIBAN DO NOT WANT PEACE	24%
WAR WILL INCREASE AND WORSEN	20%
MORE PEOPLE WILL DIE	17%
TALIBAN ARE CRUEL	16%
IT'S USELESS	15%
PAKISTAN DOES NOT WANT PEACE	13%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST THE COUNTRY	8%
TALIBAN ARE CORRUPT	6%
BECAUSE OF U.S. INTERFERENCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS	5%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S RIGHTS	5%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	4%
TALIBAN ARE NOT LOYAL AND JUST	3%
TALIBAN ARE SPIES	3%
TALIBAN DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY	3%
NOT USEFUL FOR PEOPLE	3%
TALIBAN ARE NOT AFGHANS	3%
TALIBAN ARE NOT MUSLIMS	2%
TALIBAN WILL CLOSE THE SCHOOLS	2%
TALIBAN SHOULD BE PUNISHED	2%
BECAUSE TALIBAN WANT ALL AFGHANISTAN	1%
TALIBAN WILL NOT BECOME GOOD PEOPLE	1%
TALIBAN ARE WORKING FOR THE BENEFIT OF IRAN	1%
TALIBAN ARE AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS	1%
REFUSED	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-59. (Ask all.) Do you feel people like you are sufficiently represented in efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	44%
NO	50%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-60. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that antigovernment elements who lay down their arms and express willingness to reintegrate into society should be provided with government assistance, jobs, and housing?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
STRONGLY AGREE	26%
SOMEWHAT AGREE	47%
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	18%
STRONGLY DISAGREE	7%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-61a. Thinking about the reasons why the Taliban have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the Taliban?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
A LOT OF SYMPATHY	2%
A LITTLE SYMPATHY	7%
NO SYMPATHY AT ALL	88%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	1%

Q-61b. (Ask if Q-61a answer is “a lot of sympathy” or “a little sympathy.”) You said that you have sympathy. Why do you say that?

BASE: THOSE WHO HAVE A LITTLE OR A LOT OF SYMPATHY FOR THE TALIBAN	1,780
THEY ARE AFGHANS	36%
THEY ARE MUSLIM	32%
DON'T KNOW	10%
PEOPLE WANT PEACE	5%
IMPLEMENT ISLAMIC LAW	2%
REMOVING MORAL CORRUPTION	2%
ELIMINATING WAR	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN FORCES	1%
THEY HAVE BEEN DECEIVED	1%
THEY ARE BEING KILLED IN WAR WITH THE GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY ARE GOOD PEOPLE	1%
REFUSED	1%
THEY EARN MONEY THROUGH ISLAMIC WAYS	1%
INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE BEING KILLED	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-62. (Ask all.) It is likely that to reach a successful peace agreement, all sides will have to make difficult compromises. How important would you say the following things are to protect as part of a peace agreement? Would you say very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	NOT TOO IMPORTANT	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION	50%	31%	13%	5%	1%	<0.5%
B) A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM	39%	31%	20%	9%	1%	<0.5%
C) FREEDOM OF SPEECH	51%	29%	14%	6%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) FREEDOM OF THE PRESS	50%	30%	14%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	52%	28%	14%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) THE CURRENT JUDICIAL AND COURT SYSTEM	38%	32%	19%	9%	1%	<0.5%
G) WOMEN'S RIGHTS	50%	28%	14%	7%	1%	<0.5%

H) EQUALITY AMONG DIFFERENT GROUPS OF PEOPLE (REGARDLESS OF ETHNICITY, CLASS, ETC.)	44%	32%	17%	6%	<0.5%	<0.5%
I) THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN	18%	29%	28%	23%	1%	<0.5%

Q-63. *And how willing would you be to accept a peace agreement that included the following conditions? Would you be very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, or very unwilling to accept a peace agreement in which:*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	VERY WILLING	SOMEWHAT WILLING	SOMEWHAT UNWILLING	VERY UNWILLING	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED FOR TALIBAN FIGHTERS	21%	37%	20%	22%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) BLANKET AMNESTY IS PROVIDED FOR TALIBAN SENIOR LEADERS	15%	31%	26%	27%	1%	<0.5%
C) A ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT IS GIVEN TO THE TALIBAN	14%	33%	25%	26%	1%	<0.5%
D) CONTROL OVER CERTAIN PROVINCES IS CEDED TO THE TALIBAN	7%	20%	28%	43%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) WOMEN MAY NO LONGER WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	16%	23%	24%	35%	1%	<0.5%
F) WOMEN AND GIRLS MAY NO LONGER ATTEND SCHOOL	6%	16%	25%	52%	1%	<0.5%
G) A DECENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED	6%	21%	28%	43%	2%	<0.5%

Q-64. *Currently the government of Afghanistan is talking about a peace process with the Taliban. There are various goals being discussed for this peace process. For example, the new government after the peace process may [allow / not allow] the Taliban to have majority influence over the government. Also, the new government may [reduce / increase] the public role of women in society. It may [include / not include] a requirement that Islamic law is higher than secular law. Lastly, the new government may ask you to [democratically elect your leaders / be an Islamic emirate].*

Would you support a peace deal with these conditions? (1) Yes. (2) No.

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)						
VARIABLE		YES, I WOULD SUPPORT A PEACE DEAL	NO, I WOULD NOT SUPPORT A PEACE DEAL	COEFFICIENT	OR	P-VALUE
CONDITION 1: TALIBAN MAJORITY INFLUENCE OVER GOVERNMENT	A. ALLOW (1)	61.2%	38.8%	-1486407 95% CI (-.2092364, -.088045)	.8618788 95% CI (.8111805, .9157456)	0.000
	B. NOT ALLOW (0)	64.7%	35.3%			
CONDITION 2: ROLE OF WOMEN	A. REDUCE (1)	59.6%	38.8%	-.2841005, 95% CI (-.3449344, -.2232666)	.752691 95% CI (.7082668, .7999015)	0.000
	B. INCREASE (0)	66.3%	35.3%			
CONDITION 3: REQUIREMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW HIGHER THAN SECULAR LAW	A. INCLUDE (1)	65.8%	38.8%	245826 95% CI (.1850858, .3065662)	1.278677 95% CI (1.203322, 1.358751)	0.000
	B. EXCLUDE (0)	60.1%	35.3%			

Q-65a. *A recent proposal calls for strengthening the Independent Election Commission (IEC). The commission has a number of important functions, including monitoring presidential and parliamentary elections for fraud and verifying the identity of candidates for political office. Strengthening the IEC will increase the expense of elections and may delay the announcement of official winners, but it may also prevent corruption and election-day problems. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

Q-65b. *(Ask only in version C, G, or H.) A recent proposal by the Taliban calls for strengthening the Independent Election Commission (IEC). The commission has a number of important functions, including monitoring presidential and parliamentary elections for fraud and verifying the identity of candidates for political office. Strengthening the IEC will increase the expense of elections and may delay the announcement of*

official winners, but it may also prevent corruption and election-day problems. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?

- Q-65c.** *(Ask only in version B, D, or F.) A recent proposal by the government calls for strengthening the Independent Election Commission (IEC). The commission has a number of important functions, including monitoring presidential and parliamentary elections for fraud and verifying the identity of candidates for political office. Strengthening the IEC will increase the expense of elections and may delay the announcement of official winners, but it may also prevent corruption and election-day problems. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*
- Q-66a.** *(Ask only in versions F and H.) It has recently been proposed that the new Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption, which leads investigations into corruption among government and military officials, be strengthened. Specifically, the office's staff should be increased, and its ability to investigate suspected corruption at the highest levels, including among senior officials, should be improved by allowing the office to collect its own information about suspected wrongdoing. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*
- Q-66b.** *(Ask only in version A, B, or D.) It has recently been proposed by the Taliban that the new Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption, which leads investigations into corruption among government and military officials, be strengthened. Specifically, the office's staff should be increased, and its ability to investigate suspected corruption at the highest levels, including among senior officials, should be improved by allowing the office to collect its own information about suspected wrongdoing. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*
- Q-66c.** *(Ask only in version C, E, or G.) It has recently been proposed by the government that the new Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption, which leads investigations into corruption among government and military officials, be strengthened. Specifically, the office's staff should be increased, and its ability to investigate suspected corruption at the highest levels, including among senior officials, should be improved by allowing the office to collect its own information about suspected wrongdoing. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*
- Q-67.** *For CAPI: RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A, B, or C. For PAPI: please refer to versions below.*
- Q-67a.** *(Ask only in version D or G.) A recent proposal calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to*

help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?

Q-67b. *(Ask only in versions B, E, and H.) A recent proposal by the Taliban calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

Q-67c. *(Ask only in versions A, C, and F.) A recent proposal by the government calls for the sweeping reform of the Afghan prison system, including the construction of new prisons in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing facilities. Though expensive, new programs for inmates would also be offered, and new judges and prosecutors would be trained. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

Q-68. *For CAPI: RCS TO RANDOMLY SELECT A, B, or C . For PAPI: please refer to versions below.*

Q68a. *(Ask only in version B or C.) It has been proposed to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under the Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government and its responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. They would also permit local people to actively participate in local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacies for office in these district councils. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

Q-68b. *(Ask only in versions A, F, and G.) It has been proposed by the Taliban to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under the Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government and its responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. They would also permit local people to actively participate in local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacies for office in these district councils. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?*

Q-68c. *(Ask only in versions D, E, and H.) It has been proposed by the government to allow Afghans to vote in direct elections when selecting leaders for district councils. Provided for under the Electoral Law, these direct elections would increase the transparency of local government and its responsiveness to the needs and priorities of the Afghan people. They would also permit local people to actively participate in*

local administration through voting and by advancing their own candidacies for office in these district councils. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this proposal?

	AGREE	DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW / REFUSED
Q-65a	79.6%	18.5%	1.9%
Q-65b	71.2%	27.0%	1.8%
Q-65c	79.3%	19.3%	1.4%
Q-66a	78.9%	19.1%	2.1%
Q-66b	69.3%	28.5%	2.2%
Q-66c	82.0%	16.7%	1.3%
Q-67a	73.2%	24.2%	2.6%
Q-67b	64.8%	32.9%	2.3%
Q-67c	75.2%	22.9%	1.9%
Q-68a	78.4%	19.6%	2.0%
Q-68b	69.6%	28.1%	2.2%
Q-68c	79.6%	18.8%	1.6%

Q-69. *If formal peace negotiations begin, who do you believe must be most trusted to defend your needs and interests at the negotiating table? (Record up to two responses. Do not read out pre-codes.)*

Q-69a. *First mention* _____

Q-69b. *Second mention* _____

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT	31%
ASHRAF GHANI	31%
HAMID KARZAI	23%
ABDULLAH ABDULLAH	18%
RELIGIOUS LEADERS	17%
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT	15%
DON'T KNOW	12%
THE UNITED NATIONS	11%
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	10%
ZALMAY KHALILZAD	4%
QATAR	4%
TALIBAN	3%

SAUDI ARABIA	3%
NATO	3%
AMERICA	3%
NO ONE	1%
RUSSIA	1%
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES	1%
A GOOD PERSON	1%
POLITICAL PARTIES	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-70. *In your opinion, what is the main reason why ISIS/Daesh is fighting against the Afghan government? (Open ended—write down first answer.)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
TO GAIN POWER	21%
DON'T KNOW	19%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED / MOTIVATED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES	7%
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY PAKISTAN	7%
PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS / INTERNATIONAL FORCE	5%
FOR MONEY	5%
KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE	4%
TO CREATE INSECURITY	4%
THEY ARE AGAINST ISLAM	3%
FOR THEIR PERSONAL BENEFIT	3%
TO DESTROY OUR COUNTRY	2%
TO SUPPORT ISLAM	2%
REFUSED	2%
TOO MUCH CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT	1%
SUPPORT FROM IRAN	1%
THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY WANT TO OCCUPY AFGHANISTAN	1%
ISIS	1%
INTERFERENCE OF RUSSIA	1%
THEY ARE SLAVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES	1%
THEY ARE BRUTAL / CRUEL	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-71a. Thinking about the reasons why Daesh have been fighting during the past year, in general would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for Daesh?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
A LOT OF SYMPATHY	<0.5%
A LITTLE SYMPATHY	1%
NO SYMPATHY AT ALL	97%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-71b. (Ask if Q-71a answer is "a lot of sympathy" or "a little sympathy.") You said that you have sympathy. Why do you say that?

BASE: THOSE WHO HAVE A LITTLE OR A LOT OF SYMPATHY FOR DAESH	239
DON'T KNOW	31%
THEY ARE MUSLIM	22%
THEY ARE AFGHANS	14%
REFUSED	4%
PEOPLE WANT PEACE	4%
THEY FIGHT AGAINST FOREIGN FORCES	3%
THEY IMPLEMENT ISLAMIC LAW	3%
THEY EARN MONEY THROUGH ISLAMIC WAYS	3%
INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE BEING KILLED	2%
THEY ARE GOOD PEOPLE	2%
THEY WORK WITH THE TALIBAN	2%
THEY HAVE BEEN DECEIVED	2%
THEY WORK FOR PAKISTAN	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S RIGHTS	1%
THE GOVERNMENT MISTREATS THE PEOPLE	1%
JUST HAVE A LOT OF SYMPATHY	1%
THEY ARE AGAINST WOMEN'S EDUCATION	1%
BECAUSE THEY ARE BEING KILLED IN WAR WITH GOVERNMENT	1%
THEY ARE ILLITERATE	1%
BECAUSE OF OPPRESSION / THEY ARE BEING OPPRESSED	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE MEDIA

Q-72. *Do you listen to radio programs?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	54%
NO	46%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-73. *(Ask if Q-72 answer is yes.) You said you listen to the radio. How many hours do you listen to it on an average day every time when you listen to the radio?*

BASE: LISTEN TO RADIO	9,843
LESS THAN 30 MINUTES	16%
31 MINS TO 1 HOUR	39%
1 HOUR TO 2 HRS	33%
MORE THAN 2 HOURS A DAY	12%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%

Q-74. *(Ask all.) Do you watch television programs?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	69%
NO	31%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-75. *(Ask if Q-74 answer is yes.) You said that you watch television. How many hours do you watch it on an average day every time when you watch television?*

BASE: WATCH TV	12,301
LESS THAN 30 MINUTES	6%
31 MINS TO 1 HOUR	25%
1 HOUR TO 2 HOURS	38%
MORE THAN 2 HOURS A DAY	30%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-76. (Ask if Q-74 answer is yes.) Which TV show/program do you watch most often?

BASE: WATCH TV	12,301
NEWS AT 6	38%
SERIALS	12%
SHABAKA-E-KHANDA	5%
RO DAR RO	4%
COMEDY SHOWS	4%
DON'T KNOW	3%
SPORTS	3%
BAMDAD KHOSH	3%
RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS	2%
SONGS ON DEMAND	2%
POLITICAL SHOWS	2%
SARACHA PROGRAM	1%
TAWDE KHABARE	1%
LEMAR MAKHAM	1%
ZULAIKHA SERIAL	1%
USMAN SERIAL	1%
COOKING SHOW	1%
REHAN SERIAL	1%
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS	1%
FARHANG WA TAMADOM	1%
POL SIA	1%
HEALTH PROGRAMS	1%
DERA	1%
ALAUDDIN DRAMA	1%
MOVIES IN GENERAL	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-77. (Ask all.) Do people in this area have access to the internet, either through a cable connection, wireless/wi-fi connection, or cellular data (e.g., 2G, 3G, or 4G)?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	56%
NO	41%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-78. (Ask if Q-77 answer is yes.) Do you personally have access to the internet?

BASE: HAVE ACCESS TO INTERNET IN THE LOCAL AREA	9,881
YES	38%
NO	61%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%

Q-79. (Ask if Q-78 answer is yes.) Why do you use the internet? Anything else? (Record up to two mentions. Do not read out pre-codes.)

Q-79a. First mention _____

Q-79b. Second mention _____

USE FACEBOOK OR OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA SITES	69%
FOLLOW NEWS	45%
WATCH VIDEOS	27%
LISTEN TO MUSIC	12%
FOR WORK	11%
SEND AND RECEIVE EMAIL	10%
DON'T KNOW	7%
ACCESS RELIGIOUS CONTENT (LISTEN TO SERMONS OR QU'RAN RECITATION, READ QU'RAN, ETC.)	7%
CONTACT FRIENDS	4%
USE WHATSAPP	3%
ONLINE SHOPPING	2%
USE GOOGLE	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-80. (Ask all.) Do you use any of the following for obtaining news and information?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) RADIO	55%	45%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) TV SET	69%	30%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) THE INTERNET	25%	75%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) MOSQUE	40%	60%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) COMMUNITY SHURAS	32%	67%	1%	<0.5%
G) FRIENDS AND FAMILY	82%	18%	1%	<0.5%

WOMEN'S ISSUES

Q-81. *In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	27%
NO	71%
DON'T KNOW	3%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-82. *(Ask if Q-81 answer is yes.) What organization, institution, or authority is that?*

Write response _____

BASE: KNOWS AN ORGANIZATION, INSTITUTION, OR AUTHORITY	5,122
DIRECTORATE OF WOMEN AFFAIRS	47%
WOMEN'S SHURA	10%
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL	8%
DISTRICT OFFICE	6%
DON'T KNOW	3%
CHIEF OF POLICE	3%
SAFE HOUSE	3%
POLICE	2%
VILLAGE SHURA / ELDERS SHURA	2%
THE COURT	2%
QAWM ELDERS	2%
NEDA-E-ZAN ORGANIZATION	2%
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL	2%
HUMAN RIGHTS (NOT FURTHER SPECIFIED)	1%
PROVINCIAL OFFICE	1%
RELIGIOUS ULEMA	1%
LOCAL COUNCIL	1%
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN GENERAL	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-83. (Ask all.) Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
AGREE STRONGLY	44%
AGREE SOMEWHAT	39%
DISAGREE SOMEWHAT	13%
DISAGREE STRONGLY	3%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-84. And for each of the following levels of education, do you agree or disagree with the opinion that men and women should have equal opportunities for education? Is that strongly or somewhat

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) ISLAMIC MADRASA EDUCATION	69%	24%	5%	1%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) PRIMARY SCHOOL	63%	25%	8%	4%	<0.5%	<0.5%
C) HIGH SCHOOL	61%	24%	9%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) UNIVERSITY IN YOUR PROVINCE	50%	26%	15%	10%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) STUDYING IN ANOTHER PROVINCE	25%	28%	24%	22%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) STUDYING ABROAD ON SCHOLARSHIP	21%	22%	25%	32%	1%	<0.5%

Q-85. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
WOMEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE	78%
WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE	21%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-86. (Ask if Q-85 answer is “women should not be allowed to work outside the home.”)
Why do you say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home?

BASE: WOMEN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME	3,656
ITS AGAINST ISLAMIC LAW	18%
UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS	17%
BAD SECURITY	16%
THEY ARE NOT NEEDED OUTSIDE THE HOME	14%
DON'T KNOW	8%
WOMEN SHOULD NOT WORK ALONGSIDE MEN	6%
IT PREVENTS MORAL CORRUPTION	6%
IT'S CONSIDERED SHAMEFUL	4%
THE FAMILY DOESN'T ALLOW	3%
CRIMINALS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THEM	2%
THEY NEED TO HELP WITH KIDS	2%
THEY DON'T RESPECT HIJAB	1%
FEAR OF TALIBAN / ISIS	1%
REFUSED	1%
LACK OF EXPERIENCE	<0.5%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-87. (Ask all.) And thinking about where women can work, for each of these places do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to work there? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) GOVERNMENT OFFICES	42%	31%	16%	11%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs)	27%	30%	24%	18%	1%	<0.5%
C) HOSPITALS OR CLINICS	65%	21%	9%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
D) FEMALE-ONLY SCHOOLS	67%	20%	8%	5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
E) CO-ED SCHOOLS	37%	30%	19%	13%	<0.5%	<0.5%
F) ARMY / POLICE	18%	24%	28%	29%	1%	<0.5%
G) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) WITH FEMALE EMPLOYEES ONLY	28%	27%	22%	22%	<0.5%	<0.5%
H) A PRIVATE COMPANY OUTSIDE THE HOME (FACTORY, SHOP, BUSINESS) WHERE MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES WORK IN THE SAME ROOM	16%	24%	27%	32%	1%	<0.5%

Q-88. *And thinking about women in leadership positions, please tell me, do you agree or disagree that it is acceptable for women to have access to these leadership roles? (Wait for response and then ask) Strongly or somewhat?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS (18,362)	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DON'T KNOW	REFUSED
A) MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL	35%	37%	16%	12%	<0.5%	<0.5%
B) GOVERNOR OF A PROVINCE	28%	30%	25%	18%	1%	<0.5%
C) CEO OF A LARGE COMPANY	29%	30%	23%	18%	1%	<0.5%
D) MINISTER OR CABINET MEMBER	26%	30%	23%	19%	1%	<0.5%
E) RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN	21%	26%	25%	27%	1%	<0.5%

Q-89. *Would you prefer to be represented by a man or a woman in the National Parliament?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
A MAN	42%
A WOMAN	20%
NO DIFFERENCE	37%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-90. *In your view, which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just point to one picture. (Show respondent the card and circle the number that corresponds to the picture the respondent pointed to.)*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
WOMAN 1 (BURKA)	27%
WOMAN 2 (NIQAB)	31%
WOMAN 3 (CHADOR)	15%
WOMAN 4 (FORM-FITTING HIJAB)	16%
WOMAN 5 (LOOSE HIJAB)	9%
WOMAN 6 (NO HEAD COVERING)	1%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	0%

Q-91. *Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership, or should leadership positions be open to anyone, based on merit?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
MOSTLY FOR MEN	34%
MOSTLY FOR WOMEN	10%
EQUAL FOR BOTH MEN AND WOMEN	29%
ANYONE, BASED ON MERIT	26%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	0%

Q-92. *Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	87%
NO	12%
DON'T KNOW	0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-93. *(Ask all.) If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves, or should men decide for women who they should vote for?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES	57%
MEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR WOMEN	20%
WOMEN SHOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES BUT IN CONSULTATION WITH MEN	22%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

MIGRATION

Q-94a. Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	42%
NO	52%
DON'T KNOW	5%
REFUSED	1%

Q-94b. (Ask if Q-94a answer is no.) Why would you stay in Afghanistan?

Q-94b_1. First mention _____

Q-94b_2. Second mention _____

BASE: WOULD STAY IN AFGHANISTAN	9,859
I LOVE MY COUNTRY	48%
IT IS MY COUNTRY	47%
DON'T KNOW	31%
I DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO LEAVE	11%
I FEEL COMFORTABLE HERE	10%
MY FAMILY DOES NOT ALLOW ME	7%
FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY	5%
DON'T WANT TO LIVE AWAY FROM MY FAMILY	4%
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE COUNTRY	4%
OTHER COUNTRIES DO NOT ACCEPT REFUGEES	4%
TO SERVE PEOPLE	3%
OUR PEOPLE LIVE HERE	3%
THERE ARE NO EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	3%
DON'T LIKE LIVING ABROAD	3%
I WILL STAY DUE TO MY LANDS	2%
GOING THERE IS A RISK	2%
THIS IS AN ISLAMIC COUNTRY	2%
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON	1%
DON'T HAVE ANYONE ABROAD TO INVITE OR SPONSOR ME	1%
PEOPLE RESPECT ME IN MY COUNTRY	1%
LIVING ABROAD IS DIFFICULT	1%
TO DEVELOP EDUCATION	1%
REFUSED	1%

BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN TRADITION	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-94c. (Ask if Q-94a answer is yes.) Why would you leave Afghanistan?

Q-94c_1. First mention _____

Q-94c_2. Second mention _____

BASE: WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN	7,764
INSECURITY	81%
UNEMPLOYMENT	43%
BAD ECONOMY	23%
DON'T KNOW	20%
TALIBAN ARE KILLING PEOPLE	4%
CORRUPTION	4%
UNCERTAIN FUTURE	3%
FOR EDUCATION	2%
WEAK GOVERNMENT	2%
INJUSTICE	2%
SUICIDE ATTACKS	1%
HIGH PRICES	1%
FOR MY CHILDREN'S BETTER FUTURE	1%
ILLITERACY	1%
LACK OF FREEDOM FOR WOMEN	1%
EXISTENCE OF CRIMINALS	1%
ETHNIC PROBLEMS	1%
MORE FACILITIES	1%
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES INTERFERENCE	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-94d. (Ask if Q-94a answer is yes.) Where would you want to live?

Q-94d_1. First mention _____

Q-94d_2. Second mention _____

BASE: WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN	7,764
TURKEY	38%
IRAN	38%
DON'T KNOW	22%
GERMANY	21%
USA	13%

PAKISTAN	10%
SAUDI ARABIA	7%
CANADA	6%
FRANCE	6%
INDIA	5%
ANY EUROPEAN COUNTRY	4%
TAJIKISTAN	4%
UK	4%
DUBAI	3%
AUSTRALIA	2%
UZBEKISTAN	2%
RUSSIA	2%
SWEDEN	1%
BELGIUM	1%
GREECE	1%
AUSTRIA	1%
SWITZERLAND	1%
HOLLAND	1%
ITALY	1%
JAPAN	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-94e_2. *What, if anything, could the government do to make you want to stay in Afghanistan? Second mention _____*

BASE: WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN	7,764
MAINTAIN SECURITY	76%
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES	49%
DON'T KNOW	27%
GOOD ECONOMY	11%
MAKE PEACE WITH THE TALIBAN	4%
REMOVE CORRUPTION	4%
REMOVE THE TALIBAN AND ISIS	3%
IMPROVE EDUCATION	2%
JUSTICE	2%
BUILD FACTORIES	2%
ASSIST PEOPLE	2%
RECONSTRUCTION	2%
ATTENTION TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS	1%
ARREST THE CRIMINALS	1%

GOVERNMENT DOES NOTHING	1%
LOWER THE PRICES	1%
IMPROVE AGRICULTURE	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-95. *Do you have a family member or close relative who lives abroad?*

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	39%
NO	60%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	0.5%

Q-96a. *(Ask if Q-95 answer is yes.) In what countries do they live? (List up to two countries.)*

Q-96a_1. *First mention* _____

Q-96a_2. *Second mention* _____

BASE: HAVE A FAMILY MEMBER ABROAD	7,172
IRAN	41%
DON'T KNOW	36%
TURKEY	26%
GERMANY	22%
USA	13%
PAKISTAN	9%
FRANCE	6%
SAUDI ARABIA	5%
UK	5%
CANADA	5%
DUBAI (UAE)	3%
INDIA	3%
SWEDEN	3%
AUSTRALIA	2%
RUSSIA	2%
BELGIUM	2%
HOLLAND	2%
AUSTRIA	2%
TAJIKISTAN	2%
REFUSED	1%
NOWHERE	1%

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	1%
ITALY	1%
GREECE	1%
KUWAIT	1%
NORWAY	1%
CHINA	1%
SWITZERLAND	1%
DENMARK	1%
UZBEKISTAN	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-96b. (Ask if Q-95 answer is yes.) Have these relatives helped you financially, such as by sending money?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	32%
NO	67%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-97. (Ask all.) In the last 12 months, has anyone in your family moved from Afghanistan to another country for any reason?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
YES	19%
NO	81%
DON'T KNOW	<0.5%
REFUSED	<0.5%

Q-98a. (Ask if Q-97 answer is yes.) Which country do they live in now? (Record first mention.)
Write response _____

BASE: A FAMILY MEMBER HAS MOVED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY	3,580
IRAN	43%
TURKEY	25%
PAKISTAN	7%
GERMANY	6%
USA	3%
SAUDI ARABIA	2%
DUBAI (UAE)	2%

INDIA	2%
DON'T KNOW	1%
FRANCE	1%
HOLLAND	1%
UK	1%
TAJIKISTAN	1%
GREECE	1%
CANADA	1%
UZBEKISTAN	1%
REMAINING RESPONSES	<0.5% EACH

Q-98b. (Ask if Q-97 answer is yes.) What was their main reason for leaving Afghanistan?
Write response _____

BASE: A FAMILY MEMBER HAS MOVED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY	3,580
BAD ECONOMIC SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN	37%
SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN (IN GENERAL)	33%
EDUCATION	7%
CORRUPTION	5%
RECEIVED EMPLOYMENT OFFER IN ANOTHER COUNTRY	5%
WEAK / POOR GOVERNANCE	5%
FAMILY REUNIFICATION / TO BE WITH FAMILY ABROAD	2%
DON'T KNOW	4%
DISCRIMINATION (ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS ISSUES)	1%
UNEMPLOYMENT	1%
SICKNESS	<0.5%
REFUSED	1%
OTHER (SPECIFY)	<0.5%

Q-99. How successful do you think the government has been in improving the living conditions of people living in your area—a lot, a little, or not at all?

BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS	18,362
A LOT	13%
A LITTLE	53%
NOT AT ALL	33%
DON'T KNOW	1%
REFUSED	<0.5%



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