HOW SUCCESSFUL POLICY REFORMS ARE ACHIEVED

Initial Evidence on the Relevance of 'Development Entrepreneurship' Outside of the Philippines

Lisa Denney, Jaime Faustino, and Rene Sanapo

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LA TROBE UNIVERSITY
Institute for Human Security and Social Change

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Introduction

In 2023, the Coalitions for Change[1] Program in the Philippines partnered with the Institute (now Centre) for Human Security and Social Change at La Trobe University to test a key question that intrigued them for some time: are the principles of 'development entrepreneurship' relevant outside of the Philippines; and, if so, what does this look like? The model of development entrepreneurship – the shorthand for 12 principles that The Asia Foundation use to describe their way of working in Coalitions for Change – has facilitated positive results in the Philippines, having contributed to over one hundred policy reforms as of March 2024. These reforms cover a wide range of areas including electoral reform, gender and disability inclusion, disaster risk reduction, education, mobility, Internet broadband and others (Sidel and Faustino, 2019). More importantly, a number of the reforms have led to significant improvements in the lives of millions of citizens. The development entrepreneurship approach has also built a significant following in international development, as well as in policy reform in the Philippines (Faustino and Booth, 2014 and Green, 2015). Yet there has been an open question about the extent to which this approach to fostering developmental change applies outside of the Philippines and what DE could learn from external experiences. Do the principles of development entrepreneurship apply elsewhere? How might they be different? The answers to these questions are pertinent for the Australian Government's aid program – and other development partners – who are interested in supporting locally-led reforms and increasingly investing in 'leadership' and 'coalitions' as a pathway to positive developmental change.

To this end, the Institute identified and documented three stories of successful policy reform covering environmental and social inclusion issues in the diverse contexts of Kenya, Vanuatu, and Indonesia. The aim was to learn from these stories about how policy reform happened, contrast with the principles of development entrepreneurship, and draw some initial conclusions. In particular, we were interested in the ways of working – unpacking how those involved worked in politically smart, strategic and entrepreneurial ways to forge change, recognising the significant political obstacles and pushback that reformers often face. Looking across the three case studies shows that while development entrepreneurship emerged in the Philippines, its principles may be relevant and useful for donors and leaders in other contexts as well.

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[1] *Coalitions for Change (CfC) is a partnership between the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and The Asia Foundation (TAF) in the Philippines. CfC supports the formulation and implementation of key public policies consistent with the government's agenda on economic growth, improved governance, peace and stability, and social development. The program creates spaces for collaboration, strengthening coalitions and networks, civil society, the private sector, the government, academia, and others to bring about transformative change.*

In this paper we aim to distil the learning from the case studies for those interested in development entrepreneurship and its 'close cousins' of locally led, adaptive development that 'thinks and works politically'. First, we briefly recap the development entrepreneurship approach. Second, we summarise the three case studies undertaken in Kenya, Vanuatu, and Indonesia. Third, we document our emerging learning from the three case studies, before finally setting out some outstanding questions. Overall, these highlight that there are some significant similarities in how developmental reformers operate to achieve policy change in diverse settings, albeit with differences in emphasis largely determined by the personalities of the reformers involved, the nature of the coalitions as well as political contexts in which they were operating and the nature of the reform issues. There also remain some outstanding questions about the limits and potential of policy reform as a way for achieving developmental change and the implications for development partners.

Summary of the Development Entrepreneurship[2]

Development entrepreneurship emerged as a way of describing the practice from the experiences of various Philippine leaders who were involved in some of the most transformative economic policy reforms dating back to the early 1990s. These included the dismantling of monopolies in telecommunications and civil aviation, the introduction of competition in sea transport, the significant increases in tobacco and alcohol tax to fund universal health care, the introduction of simple procedures to significant increase the number of land titles, and other areas. Based on those experiences, individual leaders who worked on those reforms contributed to an edited volume, *Built on Dreams, Grounded in Reality: Economic Policy in the Philippines* (Faustino and Fabella, 2011). It was during the drafting of that volume that the term 'development entrepreneurship' was coined. Around the same time, some, including the Governance Advisor at the Australian embassy, wondered if the model was applicable to other types of development challenges. Out of those discussions, two developments emerged. One was the incorporation of some of the concepts of development entrepreneurship into AusAID's initial design of its Coalitions for Change Program (2011-2018). The second was the publication of Room for Maneuver: Social Sector Policy Reform in the Philippines. Led by one of the principal proponents of developmental leadership, Adrian Leftwich, the volume documented the technical and political dimensions of reform in social sectors and explored the possibility of using the development entrepreneurship model beyond economic policy reform (Fabella et al., 2014).

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[2] *We use the term 'principles' to convey the notion that these are propositions that serve as the foundation for a system of belief, behavior or reasoning.*

To implement the Coalitions for Change program, The Asia Foundation uses the development entrepreneurship model. The model consists of 12 principles organized around three strategic questions summarized below.[3]

Strategic question 1: Which reform will improve development outcomes?
To answer this, the model suggests looking for reforms with these three criteria:

(1) impact	the likelihood the reform will be implemented by changing the incentives and behaviour of stakeholders that will lead to better outcomes for people and society
(2) sustainability	the likelihood the reform will continue beyond the time-bound intervention or without additional donor support by identifying reforms that will be driven and sustained by the interests and incentives of either 1) market forces (firms and consumers) or 2) government driven (agencies and citizens)
(3) political feasibility	the likelihood the reform will be introduced given existing political realities

Strategic question 2: How will the reform be identified and introduced?
To answer this, the model suggests using the five principles of entrepreneurial logic:[4]

(4) just start	the mindset of beginning with who you are, what you have, and who you know and then continue striving to eventually find the specific strategic goal
(5) make small bets to learn by doing	the willingness to test and act to see what might work, adjust based on those tests, then eventually make larger bets based on what is working
(6) expect and exploit surprises	the ability and courage to recognise and act on unexpected opportunities
(7) build coalitions and networks	the ability and willingness to identify and ask individuals and organisations who can help
(8) influence the future with action	a mindset that the future cannot be predicted through analysis but can be influenced through action

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[3] *https://developmententrepreneurship.org/about/.*

[4] *For more information on the academic research community on entrepreneurial logic and principles, visit https://effectuation.org.*

Strategic question 3: Who will do it?
To answer this, the model suggests collaborating with leaders who practice four behaviours:

(9) grit	the willingness to persevere with limited resources
(10) confidence	the willingness and courage to tackle large societal problems
(11) humility	the willingness to listen to others, to be challenged, to admit mistakes, and to let others take credit
(12) autonomy	the strong desire to be self-directed, take initiative, and change the status quo

It should be noted, however, that the language of 'models' and 'principles' is used as an imperfect shorthand that suggests a degree of certainty that we are not entirely comfortable with. More appropriate (but more unwieldy) may be 'heuristics' and 'rules of thumb,' that convey the nature of what is being proposed. That is, a guide and set of practices with what we have found to be useful in identifying and pursuing successful policy reform that appear to reoccur across reform efforts. They are not intended as a final, complete checklist of ingredients required in all times and places.

Summary of the cases

Potential case studies of successful policy reforms that demonstrated some similarities with development entrepreneurship outside of the Philippines were identified through an initial literature scan and key informant interviews with international development experts to longlist examples. We were looking for examples of policy reforms that were locally led, achieved demonstrable impact and showed strategic, politically savvy ways of working. To that end, we borrowed significantly from literatures and experts on locally led development, adaptive programming and 'thinking and working politically.' These schools of thought were identified as 'close cousins' of DE and provided fertile ground for identifying reforms that had broad similarity to development entrepreneurship. The Western-centric make up of those involved in these communities of practice and scholarly fields, did bias the case studies that showed up in the literature surveyed. For this reason, we sought to also undertake literature reviews that covered policy reforms within wider public policy and social change literatures that were not recipients of international aid support.

From an initial longlist, the cases were interrogated further through literature review and a small number of interviews and then discussed with CfC. Ultimately, three reform stories were selected for deeper exploration and development into case studies: banning single-use plastic bags in Kenya, securing reserved seats for women in Vanuatu's municipal councils and passing of the Disability Law in Indonesia. These were selected based on their apparent fit with our criteria or locally led reforms that achieved real-world impact and were characterised by politically savvy ways of working that bore some resemblance to the DE model. The stories were therefore sought out specifically for their similarity to development entrepreneurship – they are not necessarily representative of how policy reform happens generally or in all cases. They were selected to demonstrate the potential relevance of development entrepreneurship beyond the Philippines – showing that similar ways of working are indeed apparent elsewhere.

The three cases are briefly summarised below and are publicly available as full reports (Cummings and Oremo, 2023; Illingworth and Faerua, 2023; Yulianto et al., 2023). Each case study tells the story of the reform process, largely from the point of view of the key reform leaders/coalitions. Alternative voices and dissenting views are also captured to ensure rigour and the contested nature of developmental change, but the intention is primarily to understand ways of working from the perspective of those involved in undertaking the reform.

Banning single-use plastics in Kenya

In 2017, a ban on thin plastic bags was introduced in Kenya – helping to address a key environmental challenge in the country, where plastic bags were clogging waterways and being consumed by livestock. Interventions in 2005, 2007 and 2011 had failed to achieve the intended reduction in plastic pollution. Despite being highly controversial given the power of the manufacturing sector in Kenya, the Cabinet Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources pursued reform in a politically savvy and pragmatic manner, quietly building support for change amongst political leaders behind the scenes, tapping into international competition and reputational issues and using a two-step, regulatory change. The 2017 ban has been controversial and was fiercely resisted when first introduced. Yet it has endured despite significant legal challenges. While thicker plastic bags imported from China remain a problem and smuggling of thin plastic bags has emerged, the ban has resulted in a reduction of between 80-93% of the thinnest plastic bags (see Cummings and Oremo, 2023).

Improving women's political representation in Vanuatu

In 2013, Vanuatu passed an amendment to the Municipalities Act which put in place Temporary Special Measures (TSMs) supporting women's representation within municipal councils. The TSMs were a first for Vanuatu, where women's representation and participation at both national and local levels had been non-existent. The legislation required that 30-34% of seats be set aside for women candidates contesting municipal elections in Vanuatu for the next four electoral terms (16 years). It was the result of efforts by the Director of Women's Affairs to take government action on an issue that civil society had long sought to change. By working to build political support amongst key male allies and taking a pragmatic approach to what change was possible, the TSMs were passed. As a result, the number of women elected to the three municipal councils in Vanuatu increased from 1 woman (3.7%) in 2011 to 11 women (25.6%) in 2021. The shift in women's participation has opened up debate about similar reforms at a national level to implement reserved seats for women and challenged Vanuatu's patriarchal political environment (see Illingworth and Faerua, 2023).

Securing legal recognition for the rights of persons with disabilities in Indonesia

In 2016, Indonesia introduced Law No. 8/2016 on Persons with Disabilities. The law was the result of sustained campaigning by disability activists and Organizations of Persons with Disabilities who tapped into changing global norms, drew on personal networks and lobbied key parliamentarians to build support. The law represents a significant shift in how persons with disabilities are treated under Indonesian law: from an approach that focuses on disability as a medical impairment and sees persons with disabilities as objects of charity to a social and human rights-based paradigm that sees them as rightsholders. It provides a legal basis for holding government to account for inclusive employment, healthcare, education, access to justice and protection from violence and discrimination and is already being used to challenge discriminatory practices in government employment. It has also opened up space for disability activists to engage in policy discussions, resulting in 20% of subnational governments putting in place new regulations guaranteeing disability rights (see Yulianto et al., 2023).

What have we learned?

The Development Entrepreneurship principles seem broadly applicable

Across the three case studies there was generally good alignment with reformers' ways of working and the development entrepreneurship principles. None of the reformers were familiar with the development entrepreneurship model but its 12 broad principles are nonetheless apparent in the ways that change was pursued. Some of the principles stood out more strongly across the cases than others. Political feasibility, use of coalitions and networks, being opportunistic with surprises and perseverance or grit were notable features across all three cases. The table below summarises how each DE principle can be demonstrated in the three case studies.

Many of those centrally involved in the reforms in the three case studies also saw affinity with the DE model when it was described to them in interviews. Although some of the language was new, they felt that the key principles resonated with their ways of working. In some cases, those involved indicated some additional ways of working that they believe are also useful in describing their approach, beyond the DE model. In Kenya, for instance, Wakhungu spoke of the importance of 'working quietly' and below the radar so that her strategy for change was not revealed before the plastics ban had been achieved (Interview with Judi Wakhungu, 12 April 2023). This kind of quiet activism has also been documented in processes of change in the Pacific (Spark et al 2021). It bears similarities to instances of development entrepreneurs supported by CfC in the Philippines where a 'ninja' approach has been described as politically useful by some reformers.

In Vanuatu, Kenneth-Watson described the importance of trying something new and unexpected – captured in the saying she coined: 'If you want to have something you have never had, you have to do something you have never done' (Kenneth-Watson cited in Illingworth and Faerua 2023: 22). This might be considered as aligning with the 'small bets' principle of DE, emphasising the importance of experimentation and learning by doing.

The case studies thus suggest that the development entrepreneurship principles seem broadly applicable in contexts outside of the Philippines and have been used, albeit in different ways, to achieve policy reforms across a range of social and environmental issues. This is not to suggest that development entrepreneurship therefore gives us a template for how to achieve policy reform that can be universally rolled out. Rather, it suggests that there are important similarities in the ways that astute reformers across different contexts navigate their political environments to secure policy change and that these lend themselves to greater examination to understand what role – if any – external actors might play in supporting or enabling such processes. Beyond the general applicability of the development entrepreneurship principles, additional insights emerge from the three case studies that might deepen or flesh out the DE model.

These include: the importance of personal influences in motivating reformers; the ways in which political context and nature of the reform issue influence the form that coalitions or networks take; the critical role of 'insiders'; the limits of policy reform and how this segues with other approaches to change; and the limited role of external actors. These are set out in turn below – drawing out key messages from the three case studies that may offer useful learning or points of distinction from the DE approach.

Table 1: Summary of relevance of Development Entrepreneurship principles to case studies

Development Entrepreneurship Principle	Kenya case study	Vanuatu case study	Indonesia case study
Three criteria of a transformative reform that will improve outcomes			
Impact	Ban has seen 80-93% reduction in the use of thinnest plastic bags. Trees and roads are noticeably freer of plastic bags. Decrease in livestock found to have plastic bags in their stomachs, dropping from 6 in 10 to 1 in 10.	Impact of the TSM legislation visible in the short term but has also been instrumental in provoking debate for introducing similar reforms at provincial and national levels.	New law provides a comprehensive legal basis on which persons with disabilities can claim their rights and is having tangible impacts on access and inclusion across a range of sectors.
Sustainability	Ban has withstood over 200 legal challenges and initial concerns from Parliament. Introduction of comprehensive extended producer responsibility scheme, regional trends and bill within the East African Legislative Assembly make it unlikely the regulation will change.	Reform lead worked diligently to ensure that reforms would endure. By integrating the reform into a legislative framework, the reform would continue for a period of 16-years. Sustainability was also secured due to the coalition being locally led, including key government figures, ensuring legitimacy and buy-in.	Disability activists saw the enactment of a law which took a rights-based approach as a critical foundation for achieving sustainable change in the way persons with disabilities are treated under Indonesian law and as a basis on which they could advocate for practical changes.
Political feasibility	Focus of reform was made more modest to circumvent opposition. Regional and global attention to plastic pollution leveraged to incentivise Kenyan government to uphold ban.	Feasibility of reforms were carefully assessed, with concessions made in relation to the level at which reserved seats would be introduced (municipal, rather than provincial and national).	Political feasibility was signalled by Indonesia's signing and ratification of the UNCRPD and reinforced by campaign promises of major political parties, and successful presidential candidate Joko Widodo. Political feasibility was further ensured by developing relationships with sympathetic parliamentarians to ensure the law passed.
Five entrepreneurial principles to identify and introduce the reform			
Just start	Reform lead began working through existing policy processes. Was not fazed by earlier failed attempts by predecessors but decided to just 'have a go'.	Despite limited resources, reform leader began with a vision and leveraged her existing knowledge and connections to build from there.	Throughout the campaign, activists started with who they knew, drawing on personal connections with politicians across political parties to secure support for the law.
Small bets and learning by doing	Previous attempts at bans in 2005, 2007, 2011 thwarted by Kenyan Association of Manufacturers. Initial reform plans to ban wider plastics through existing policy processes found to be deadend. Learnt through action to arrive at regulatory reform.	Reform leader adopted a practical approach, consulting with people on her ideas and building different coalitions to help take the issue forward. She learned from unsuccessful earlier attempts by civil society to get reserved seats passed and factored these into her planning. When roadblocks appeared, she was able to recalibrate and find alternative routes.	Experience of the 1997 Disability Law provided a valuable lesson about the need for disability activists to have skills in engaging in policy and legislative processes. In the campaign for the new law, activists built links with legal drafting experts to fill these gaps.

Development Entrepreneurship Principle	Kenya case study	Vanuatu case study	Indonesia case study
Expect and exploit surprises	Reformer strategically used opportunities afforded by Constitution and other laws, regional competition with Rwanda and international environment concerns. Strategically considered when to publish regulatory change to avoid possibility of it being overturned. Sought legal advice and worked closely with judiciary in anticipation of lawsuits contesting the ban.	Reform leader recognized that the future was unpredictable and remained vigilant for unexpected opportunities. She adapted her plans to leverage favourable circumstances – such as changes in government - to maximise the chances for successful reform.	Activists understood the need to adjust to unexpected changes. When the law was not passed before the end of the 2009-2014 parliament's term, they developed a new strategy, identifying champions within the new parliament. When reform stalled, activists changed tactics, taking to the streets and petitioning parliament to show the draft law had significant public support.
Build coalitions and networks	Worked with Parliamentary committee to get initial legal amendment passed. Ensured support of President and most of Executive and National Assembly before announcing ban. Collaborated with UNEP to ensure Kenya would receive international praise for ban. Worked with colleagues across government to ensure necessary authorities supported implementation. Supportive of civil society advocates but not in direct collaboration.	The reform leader understood the power of collaboration and actively built coalitions. This included a technical coalition to progress the reform and ensure its soundness, as well as a political coalition to sell the reform and make it politically feasible. She drew extensively on her personal networks, including professional and kinship relationships.	Disability activists and organisations of persons with disability strategically built broad reform coalition involving national and local organisations, members of parliament and government agencies. Members of the coalition brought different skills including technical skills and political knowledge and networks.
Future can be influenced with action	While realistic about what was feasible in the political environment, reformer dedicated themselves to finding a way to leave a lasting legacy of better environmental management, rather than accepting that reforms would likely fail.	The reform leader understood the challenge of securing reserved seats for women but was convinced that a path could be charted within Vanuatu's political context to achieve change.	Key coalition members firmly believed that change to the law required them to act. They made educated guesses –drawing on their practical experience – about what approaches might work and adapted what they did in response to what they were learning.
Four behaviours leaders practice			
Grit	Reformer's actions came at personal cost – facing numerous legal actions. She persevered in the face of significant pressure and was not deterred by angry parliamentarians and manufacturers. Reformer was results-oriented, prepared to take personal risks and to work quietly, without fanfare, in order to effect change.	Reform leader demonstrated unwavering grit and resilience. She faced numerous challenges and setbacks but remained steadfast in her pursuit of change. Her perseverance in the face of adversity propelled her forward and inspired others to join the push for change.	Disability activists demonstrated strong commitment over more than a 10-year period to achieving their vision for a new disability law. When progress stalled, activists demonstrated resilience, working diligently to build new relationships and adapt strategies to continue the push for change.

Development Entrepreneurship Principle	Kenya case study	Vanuatu case study	Indonesia case study
Autonomy	The reform lead's position gave her the ability to make decisions and she negotiated her political space to do so. Amending the Environmental Management Coordination Act granted her legal power to ban plastic bags without parliamentary approval. However, she required the President's backing and support across government.	While the reform leader valued collaboration and sought support from others, she understood the importance of personal responsibility. This empowered her to make independent decisions, take risks, and chart her own course towards achieving her goals, even when this was unpopular or controversial.	Disability activists acted on their own initiative to change the status quo, pursuing change in the direction that they envisioned and in ways they saw as most effective.
Confidence	Reform leader was confident in her diplomatic skills, the support of the President and her understanding of environmental issues. Without confidence in herself, her colleagues, and the necessity of the ban, it would not have been possible to enforce such a controversial measure. Her colleagues noted her confidence and grit as key characteristics enabling her success.	Reform leader exuded confidence in her abilities and her vision. Her ability to sell her vision to close key contacts helped attract supporters and collaborators. This confidence allowed her to overcome obstacles, make bold decisions, and inspire others.	Disability activists' confidence grew over the course of the reform as they developed greater advocacy experience. Broader shifts in global discourse on disability and in Indonesia's political environment gave them courage to take on a significant legal reform.
Humility	Reform leader demonstrated humility in her determination to work quietly, without seeking public attention to develop a strategy that would avoid an 'all-out war' with the manufacturers. Maintaining the profile of a technocrat allowed her to develop a clever plan and surprise her opposition.	Reform leader remained humble and open to learning from others. She recognized that she did not have all the answers and actively sought input and feedback. Her humility enabled her to continuously grow, adapt, and refine her approach, leading to greater impact and success.	The reform leaders recognised the importance of listening to persons with disabilities at both national and local levels. They listened and were willing to be challenged by others. Parliamentarians who championed the law acknowledged the expertise that disability activists and others brought to the substance of the law.

Reformers are highly motivated by mostly personal influences

Across the three cases, those centrally involved in the reform efforts were all highly motivated by different personal influences – from religion to professional and personal commitments and the desire to leave behind a legacy. In Vanuatu, strong Christian spirituality on the part of Dorosday Kenneth-Watson drove her. Kenneth-Watson prayed, asking God for guidance on what she should do in her new role as Director of Women's Affairs. She spoke of a dream she had in which a mother was calling out for something to transform the lives of women and children that 'left a lasting impression in my heart and gave me conviction on the purpose for my new appointment' (Dorosday Kenneth-Watson in Illingworth and Faerua 2023:22). It was these spiritual influences that Kenneth-Watson pointed to as inspiring her reform effort to improve women's political representation in Vanuatu. Religious influence is also apparent in the Indonesia case, where Member of Parliament Ledia Hanifa – coming from the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) – recounted thinking that "Allah must have a purpose for me here [in the Parliament]" (in Yulianto et al., 2023: 9).

Personal experiences of the reform issues also drove some of those involved in driving change. For Hanifa in Indonesia, experience of disability within her family and wider social circle, including growing up with a cousin with a vision impairment, meant disability issues were deeply personal, as well as political. This was true for many of the disability activists involved in the Indonesian case – whose personal experiences of exclusion and marginalisation drove them to pursue change. Similarly, in the Kenya case, photojournalist James Wakibia's commitment to environmental issues grew out of his anger at seeing the famous lake of his hometown, Nakuru, polluted with plastics. Such personal drivers were notably important in sustaining people's commitment to reforms in the face of resistance and stalled progress. This is also captured in wider literature on coalitions to change gender norms – which point to the importance of formative events in shaping how and why a coalition emerges (Fletcher et al., 2016). In Vanuatu, Kenneth-Watson, while new to working on gender issues, explained how her firsthand experience fuelled her desire for change:

> " *I came to the Department of Women's Affairs after being the first female Director of the male-dominated Departments of Fisheries, Agriculture and Rural Development for more than a decade. This also gave me confidence of introducing change – because I have been visible, walked and experienced this change agenda ... This helped drive my determination and commitment to my agenda despite all odds and challenges within the Department and from partners as well. (Kenneth-Watson in Illingworth and Faerua, 2023: 23).*

Professional commitment to the reform issue was also apparent. In Kenya, Wakhungu had worked for many years on environmental policy outside of government. She was described by a peer at the University of Nairobi as 'very passionate, thoughtful, and forward looking about ... environmental policy issues' (in Cummings and Oremo, 2023: 5). When appointed as Cabinet Secretary for Environment, Water and Natural Resources, she was able to bring this professional commitment to bear on government policy.

Finally, in all three cases, those centrally involved in the reforms sought to make a mark and leave behind a legacy. In some ways – this motivation was spurred by those set out above. But for those involved, securing a recognised change was itself a motivation – beyond just contributing to an ongoing process. Wakhungu describes this focus well in the Kenya case study: 'I don't like to make pronouncements unless I have delivered [...] I am results oriented ... I may be quiet [...] but I'm very good at following up, and I'm very good at closing deals' (cited in Cummings and Oremo, 2023: 22). In a similar vein, Kenneth-Watson notes in the Vanuatu case that upon taking on the role of Director of Women's Affairs she asked herself: 'what is it that I wanted to deliver... this is the role of a leader which is having a plan and a vision to deliver' (cited in Illingworth and Faerua, 2023: 8).

These personal influences matter because there is often a tendency to treat policy reform as a largely technical matter, with focus on data and evidence. Data and evidence are of course important, even though evidence-based policy making is in short supply everywhere in practice. What emerges from the three case studies is that it is the more personal influences of spirituality, firsthand experiences of issues, individual expertise and personal legacy that drive reformers and their ability to bring others on board. This is in keeping with wider research on the emergence of developmental leaders (DLP, 2023: 18-21). It also has echoes of some of the thinking that informed the development of the DE model in the Philippines – which is agnostic in terms of where motivation derives from but drew inspiration from literature

on fundraising that identifies different motivations for giving (File and Prince, 1994). Some of these cohere with the personal motivations identified here – such as religious motivation. Others are a better fit with research on how collective action occurs to achieve developmental change (DLP, 2023: 24-26; Nazneen, 2019). Given significant donor investments in 'leadership' and 'coalitions' internationally, the case studies suggest there may be value in paying attention to the role of personal motivations in identifying reformers and coalitions to help drive policy change. At the same time, while some of the individuals centrally involved in the reforms were formidable – they also were not islands. All of them pointed to the importance of networks and coalitions in driving change.

Coalitions and working through networks emerge as central but their forms differ by context

Coalitions and working through networks were also a key feature of all the reform case studies, albeit manifesting in quite different ways. A coalition can be understood as 'a tactical alliance of groups and individuals pursuing a tangible social or political change that they cannot achieve by working individually. The coalition is a mechanism that leverages collective competencies and energy' (The Asia Foundation, 2023: 9). Coalitions have been recognised as 'key mechanisms' for driving change and addressing challenges in international development (Wheeler and Leftwich, 2012).

In some cases, in our three country studies, the coalitions were more formal and explicit. For instance, organisations for people with disabilities (OPDs) became part of a formalised Working Group with Parliament in Indonesia. In other cases, the coalitions were more informal and ad hoc. In Vanuatu, Kenneth-Watson's use of two coalitions – Women in Shared Decision Making (WISDM) to improve public understanding of the issue of women's political participation and the Temporary Special Measures Taskforce to work on getting legislation approved – was much less visible. Some of the members of those coalitions were not even aware they were part of a coalition, as Kenneth-Watson tended to meet with them one-on-one, rather than as a group (Illingworth and Faerua, 2023). Importantly, Kenneth-Watson's 'coalition' was built through a reliance on personal, professional and kinship relationships – showing how reform leaders wear many different hats in building coalitions and support (Denney and McLaren, 2016; DLP, 2023: 25). In Kenya, Wakhungu similarly worked through a coalition that she pieced together through personal and professional relationships and managed one-on-one (Cummings and Oremo, 2023). In some cases, reformers were working with knowledge and recognition of each other's contributions, but not cooperating. This was the case for Wakhungu and Wakibia in Kenya, for instance, where both saw each other as allies for the same cause but using their different positions to push for change via the means available to them. 'Coalitions' – or collective action – can thus come in different forms, as suits the environment and the individuals involved.

The Kenya and Vanuatu cases more clearly had a 'reform leader,' who played a key role in driving the reform and being 'the face' of the reform effort. By contrast, the Indonesia case study provides an account of a coalition movement. This points to different ways in which change can be achieved even within the DE model. While sometimes developmental change is seen as the result of enlightened leaders using their power to usher in reform; in other cases, it is viewed as being driven by collectives that pool their limited power to push against entrenched structures to break the status quo. The case studies suggest that both approaches to change are possible, even as part of the same wider reform process at different times (Fletcher et al., 2016). The challenge is not about deciding which approach to change is the 'right' one, but rather developing an understanding of which is most likely to deliver results on a given issue and in a particular political environment at a given time. How change happens is therefore an empirical question – not a normative one – based on the opportunities and constraints of the wider political economy.

This is in keeping with research that looks at the influence of political settlements on development trajectories, which highlights the importance of the local political context in shaping the nature of coalitions (Hickey and Kelsall 2020). Here, the nature of the political settlement matters because it influences the type of coalition required to achieve success (Hickey and Kelsall, 2020). This analysis can help to explain the different types of successful coalition in the case studies (see also Kelsall, 2018). In Vanuatu, coalition-based pressure for change from women's organisations had been long-standing and yet failed to deliver results, with change instead

emerging from a coalition that relied on tighter networks between the reform leader and political leaders. By contrast, in Indonesia, while a number of political leaders were key in securing legislative change, they depended on the mobilisation of organisations of persons with disabilities (OPDs) to build pressure for change and secure the buy-in of those directly affected. And in Kenya, similar to Vanuatu, there was a more individual network-based coalition that connected reformers to political leaders. The difference in approach is partly explicable because of the different political settlements at play in Indonesia, Vanuatu and Kenya. In Vanuatu, political leaders must constantly negotiate their power and strike bargains with others within parliament and the private sector to remain in power and are oriented to serving the interests of only a small part of the population. This results in a political settlement in which policy change relies on the buy in of multiple parts of the political elite and only a small section of society. This was apparent in Kenneth-Watson's use of personal networks across the two main political parties to secure elite support. In Kenya, political power is more concentrated within the Executive and this goes some way to explaining how Wakhungu's networking with the President and some Cabinet Ministers was key to the success of environmental reforms, even when challenged by Parliamentarians and the powerful manufacturing lobby. By contrast, in Indonesia, the political settlement has a wider social foundation and political power is less concentrated – making governments more inclined (relatively speaking) to deliver for constituents despite often falling back on clientelism. In such a context, broad-based movements that seek to build parliamentary consensus on particular issues are likely to

be more effective, offering some indication of why the coalition of OPDs was able to be effective in this setting.

Others have pointed to the nature of reform issues as playing an influential role in determining the kind of coalition required to achieve change. In relation to gender reforms, Htun and Weldon note that reforms that challenge religious or cultural doctrine (such as relating to issues of divorce, abortion and family planning) will require different types of coalition than those that do not (such as workplace equality, violence against women and parental leave) (2014: 15-17). Moreover, those gender reforms that address wider class inequities also lend themselves to particular coalition processes, different from those that do not (Htun and Weldon, 2014: 15-17). As a result, the type of issue being pursued in reform will also shape whether individual leaders or coalitions of different profiles/backgrounds are likely to be more effective. In Kenya and Vanuatu, the use of technical, regulatory amendments to get environmental and gender equality reforms over the line meant that more elite coalitions were appropriate – bringing together key decision-makers who would need to lend their support. By contrast, in Indonesia, the drafting and debating of a new law on disability rights and inclusion, required a broader, popular movement that drew on the personal experience of persons with disabilities to inform the law, demonstrated wide public support, and lobbied across government departments and parliamentarians. The different reform issues and change processes pursued thus informed the type of coalition developed.

The difference in the coalition-led versus leader-led reforms also has interesting implications for how some of the other development entrepreneurship principles emerge. In the Philippines development entrepreneurship version, there is a focus, for instance, on leader attributes of grit, autonomy, confidence and humility. These are easily applicable to the leaders in the Kenya and Vanuatu cases. They are also applicable in the Indonesia case but manifest differently because of the coalition approach to reform there, whereby there was not a clear, identifiable leader possessing those traits – but rather a group of individuals and organisations that collectively demonstrated them. The CfC experience has found that in all successful reforms there has been a core group of individuals who lead the process but that draws on others in their network. This has been likened to a conductor and their role in leading the wider orchestra. The Indonesia case suggests that more coalition-based policy reform processes that do not have clear leaders may challenge the development entrepreneurship model's focus on individual leaders. In such cases, the behaviors might more accurately describe a movement – with shifting individual membership over time. might more accurately describe a movement – with shifting individual membership over time.

This is important because it has implications for who those supporting a policy reform process engage with or see as relevant stakeholders and ways of working. Supporting leadership for policy reform will necessarily look different if you are thinking of reforms as led by individual leaders or a small core group, versus if you are thinking of reform as a more collectively led process. The potential success of these different coalition types is heavily informed by the nature of the political settlement at play in the context where reform is being pursued (Barbara and Haley, 2014). Understanding what strategies for change are best suited to the political settlement is thus key. Recognising that coalitions are pulled together through personal, professional and kinship networks require external actors to view such relationships as relevant and legitimate ways of pursuing reform, even where these may appear like preferential treatment or even nepotism in some cases. Understanding how coalitions operate in different ways will also assist those wanting to support reforms to see collective action in play, even when it is not by way of explicit, formal coalition. Such an understanding of the diverse forms of leaders and collective action can open up wider means of support to reform efforts that may target particular leaders, bring together coalition members or facilitate on-one-one meetings, provide research or data to support reform efforts, fund advocacy or provide requested technical support to help move reforms along.

'Insiders' are critical

Across the three cases, the role of political 'insiders' emerge as critically important to achieving change. Insiders are people within the system that itself requires change, who act as connectors, providers of information and play an insider/outsider role. They are indispensable in understanding and navigating the political environment and building political support. In the Indonesia case, insider roles were played by Hanifa and other like-minded Members of Parliament to shepherd the draft law through the legislative process

and help overcome blockages when they emerged. In Vanuatu, Kenneth-Watson, as the Director of Women's Affairs, was herself and internal reformer but worked with male 'insiders' across the two main political parties, including the Prime Minister and key MPs, helping to secure political support from the overwhelmingly male MPs. In Kenya, Wakhungu was also a reformer on the inside, and drew on other insiders in Parliamentary Committees, as well as within the Executive to strengthen support for the plastics ban.

The importance of this 'insider' role is borne out in CfC's experience in the Philippines. One of CfC's management tools is team composition, with four identified roles: team leader, technical experts, political networkers, and 'insider.' The 'insider' designation is a relatively unique role in development practice. It is an effort to highlight the importance of understanding the inner workings and logic of the sector or agency. That insider understanding is essential for identifying and introducing a policy reform that likely to lead to significant change. One practitioner likened the insider to a "white hat hacker" who "[u]nder the owner's consent, white-hat hackers aim to identify any vulnerabilities or security issues the current system has."[5] The 'insider' is also likely to be the most difficult to fill because of the unique set of skills and knowledge required and the willingness to use those. Across their reform experiences, CfC have found that all four roles are required. This approach is also evident in Asia Foundation reform support elsewhere in Asia – where 'insiders' were seen as key to achieving policy reforms in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mongolia (Harris, 2016;

Denney, 2016). The role of including 'top officials' in coalitions has also been recognised in wider literature as often playing a critical role (see Pfeiffer cited in Wheeler and Leftwich, 2012: 18). In other cases, key figures involved in reforms have been described as 'boundary spanners' – insiders who also work outside or local people who have international experiences of links that can be brought to bear (Spark et al., 2018).

For those looking to support policy change, this suggests that building a nuanced understanding of the government and public service bureaucracies is key to identifying individuals who can assist in progressing reforms. Importantly, 'insiders' may well not be official counterparts, secretaries or ministers, but can exist at any level of the bureaucracy. Finding them thus requires astute navigation of both the political and bureaucratic environment. This is markedly different to the general approach of much development practice that treats 'ownership' as formal government counterparts professing support for donor plans and signing agreements in grand public ceremonies. Rather, finding insiders is about identifying individuals genuinely committed to achieving reform and understanding how the politics of their own organisations operate to create opportunities and constraints for so doing. This speaks to the value of strong political economy foundations more broadly – but ensuring that these go beyond a good understanding of the higher-level political settlement to understanding the personal power, interests and relationships that may open up opportunities for engagement (see also Hudson et al., 2016).

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[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_hat_(computer_security)

Recognise that change is likely to be incremental and plan for measuring this

Across all three cases, reforms were adapted to be more politically possible and less controversial in the environments that reformers were working in. In Kenya, this included making the reform more limited in focus to the thinnest plastic bags – rather than the initially envisaged comprehensive and total ban on all single-use plastics, given the opposition from the politically influential manufacturing lobby. In Vanuatu, it included focusing reform efforts on securing reserved seats for women at the lowest political level of Municipal Councils, rather than the more politically contentious Provincial and national levels, as well as making the reserved seats time-bound, rather than indefinite. In Indonesia, the process of securing legal recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities went through several iterations and was ultimately watered down to some extent in the legal drafting process.

These adaptations of the reforms likely made them less impactful than they were initially envisaged to be – but were key to any change being realised given their respective political environments. Impact would have been stronger if Kenya banned all single use plastics; women's participation in Vanuatu would have been improved if reserved seats were achieved at national and provincial levels; and disability rights in Indonesia could have stronger legal force. But reformers judged that these more thoroughgoing changes were not politically possible, and compromise was necessary to achieve reforms that delivered some impact. This speaks to the incrementalism of policy change. Working 'with the grain' – as these reforms do to achieve policy change – means accepting that the most desirable result may not be possible and being pragmatic in opting for a partial result (Levy, 2014). In CfC, the team speak about having to pursue second- and third-best solutions in a similar vein. Indeed, one of CfC's development entrepreneurs has described himself and his team as 'raging incrementalists.' In all three cases, the impact of policy reform is notable but also contested, as each of the case studies details. For those looking to support developmental leaders and coalitions working towards policy change, accepting that this delivers incremental change is important in being clear and moderating expectations about what success looks like. It also requires setting up appropriately tailored monitoring and evaluation matrices at the outset that can capture stories of incremental change, so that partial success that is realistic given the context does not look like failure. As Wakhungu explains in the Kenya case study: 'My style was always to [ask for] everything so that even if they strip off half, we are still going home with something … [I]f you want three, come with ten' (cited in Cummings and Oremo, 2023: 5). But this incrementalism should not discount the value and impact that policy reform can have. As Chair of the Working Group on the Drafting of the Disability Law in Indonesia, Ariani Soekanwo, explained:

> *The law is a resource we can use to campaign. For example, in relation to the accessibility of housing for wheelchair users. Before, if we said the door needs to be wider or this room is too narrow, we were told we're too demanding. But now we can say, "Here are the regulations. The door needs to be this wide" and so on. So it's not the person with a disability asking for something, it's in the regulations. You're speaking with the power of the law. And when the law speaks, there's nothing they can say. (Cited in Yulianto et al., 2023: 19).*

Role of external actors is important but limited

The three cases covered in our research were all locally led initiatives, with donors and external actors providing important but limited support. None of them were donor projects.

In Kenya, the United National Environment Program provided research and international attention that was strategically used to raise the profile of the plastic pollution problem, increase the stakes for Kenya in regional competition and provide opportunities for showcasing reforms internationally. In Vanuatu, Kenneth-Watson's coalition received support from the Australian Aid funded Pacific Leadership Program (PLP), that provided financial support for coalition members to attend trainings and meetings, enabling Kenneth-Watson to push reform efforts along and lobby key individuals. In addition, PLP staff acted as important sounding boards for Kenneth-Watson's reform effort. And in Indonesia, OPDs were connected to a range of international non-governmental organisations and movements that contributed to the thinking underpinning the new Disability Law. In addition, some international funding was also used to support some technical parts of the reform – for instance to support legal drafting. These contributions were strategically important across all three cases, but in none was the role of donors or external actors central.

This 'backseat' or 'arm's length' role of donors or external actors is in keeping with wider literature and experience of locally led development (Booth and Unsworth, 2014; Faustino and Booth, 2014; Denney and McLaren, 2016; The Asia Foundation, 2023). This recognises that the key protagonists in developmental change and policy reforms are local people with deep knowledge of the context, awareness of the politics and developed networks to draw on (Andrews et al., 2017). External actors, by contrast, often have insufficient 'skin in the game' and lack the knowledge and networks to make change happen. Their roles, therefore, are best limited to convening, funding, supporting technical or knowledge gaps or acting as a critical friend or advisor for reformers to draw on as required. These roles are not unimportant – and can provide 'catalytic' support. But they are not the protagonists.

This role does create challenges for donors, however, in being able to credibly claim involvement and impact. Donor-funded projects are increasingly under pressure to demonstrate contribution to change and, wherever possible, to profile this in monitoring and evaluation frameworks, social media and other reporting. There is a 'naming and claiming' element to this that projects are often incentivised to undertake to demonstrate value for money and results. Yet this becomes complicated when experience tells that that the role of donors is not to sit in the driver's seat but rather to accompany, facilitate, nudge or support from the sidelines.

How, then, to both live up to good practice in supporting locally led development while also delivering on pressures to claim and report success? CfC developed their 'timeline' tool for precisely this purpose – to keep a record of the below-the-radar activities, such as conversations, meetings, text messages and events, that demonstrate their contribution to a change process. This was prompted by a donor staff in the early years of CfC alleging that the CfC team played no role in the reform because there was no obvious record of it. More broadly, there have been calls for donors to reconceive of their monitoring and evaluation processes to better see and value some of the invisible labour that we increasingly know is intrinsic to supporting developmental change – relationships, motivations, ideas and so on (DLP, 2023: 33).

Outstanding Questions

A number of questions remain about development entrepreneurship and under what circumstances it is likely to be an effective approach to reform.

What are the limits of Development Entrepreneurship's focus on policy reform?

The Development Entrepreneurship principles remain focused on identifying and introducing policy reform. This emerged in the Philippines, middle-income country setting in which policy reform was seen as the most cost-effective development intervention – because, if done properly, it achieves solutions that are self-implementing and enduring. Of course, in practice, we know that in many contexts where development programs operate, policies are not self-implementing – either because of weaknesses on the part of the state to implement or because implementation also relies on changes in mindsets and beliefs. This raises questions about the limits of policy reform.

In the Indonesia, Kenya and Vanuatu cases, for instance, while strong policies were introduced and implementation has occurred to varying degrees, it has nonetheless been hampered by a lack of change in wider mindsets and social norms. In Vanuatu, discriminatory and patriarchal societal beliefs remain widespread and limit women's political representation. In Kenya, de-prioritisation of environmental concerns mean that other single-use plastics continue to be used. And in Indonesia, delivering on the rights outlined in the disability law also requires changes in attitudes. This is in keeping with the limits of legislative and policy change that Htun (2023), for instance, has noted more broadly in relation to women's rights – where impressive gains in legislation on women's quotas, criminalising family violence, strengthening reproductive rights, improving workforce participation and equal pay are limited in impact by entrenched social norms that run counter to policy and legal reforms.

The policies have also run into implementation problems over time due to lack of incentives, significant coordination required and weak enforcement capacity on the part of some government agencies – so enforcement of Kenya's thin plastic bag ban, for instance, is anecdotally seen to have declined over time.

The Coalitions for Change experience suggests that in such cases where policy reforms are not fully implemented, there may be a need to address incentives, interests or ideas that are getting in the way of implementation. In this case, policy reform might still be an effective approach to change, but the original design may have overlooked some of these dynamics that need to be factored in to ensure implementation. Alternatively, the viability of policy reform as a route to change may depend on two further considerations.

The first consideration is whether impact relies on changes in social norms (or informal rules) *as well as* changes in formal rules (policies or laws). The three cases studied all cover reform issues that rely on shifts in social norms and behaviours, as well as legal or policy change for impact to be sustained. In these cases, *informal rules* require change, as well as the formal rules of laws and policies. Where this is the case, these three cases suggest that policy reform offers critically important opportunities for achieving some degree of change; but that reinforcing this with deeper social change may require additional support that targets social norms and ideas within the community at large. It remains to be seen - perhaps under a new iteration of CfC - whether the

development entrepreneurship approach can be used to shift informal, as well as formal, rules. Alternatively, external support for informal norm change may require different approaches, focused on support to civil society, media and others focused on changing ideas and behaviours. Sometimes, these change strategies of policy reform and social norm shifts can intersect. In the Indonesia case study, for instance, when the legislative change process stalled, reformers turned to public activism to raise awareness and push parliament to act on the draft disability law. Similarly, in Kenya, Wakibia's photojournalism kept up pressure on the government to address the plastic pollution problem. These moments were not the key drivers of change but nonetheless demonstrate how different approaches to change can be strategically used to support a policy change process. And moreover, that these forms of public activism and stronger contestation of the status quo might usefully contribute to other change processes that support better implementation of policy change.

The second consideration is that the viability of policy reform as a route to change may depend on whether assumptions about implementation are valid in a given context. Policy change might indeed be the most cost-effective route to change in contexts where policies tend to be implemented, supported by a sufficiently resourced, capable and accountable governance administration that follows through. But it may not be a reliable route to change in contexts in which such assumptions are unfounded. In contexts in which policies and laws frequently go unimplemented – whether due to lack of

resources, capability or incentives and accountabilities to deliver, then policy change might not be an appropriate pathway to change. This relates to the point discussed earlier about the influence of the political settlement on the shape of coalitions – but here goes one step further to ask about the viability of policy reform as a route to change more broadly. The cases covered in our analysis are all democracies, with vibrant civil societies (the latter being less evident in Vanuatu). While the reforms in these settings displayed strong similarities to the DE approach, it remains an open question whether the same principles would be apparent in non-democratic settings and whether other approaches to change may be needed.

Are the Development Entrepreneurship principles too broad?

A question that arises given the relatively easy fit of the development entrepreneurship principles by the three case studies, is whether the principles are too broad. That is, are they so broad that they exclude very little? This is difficult to answer given that our cases specifically sought out the DE principles – and so it is perhaps not surprising that in doing so we found three cases that presented little difficulty in demonstrating the principles. It is also important to note the value of principles, approaches and heuristics – or rules of thumb – rather than more prescriptive models. As Spark et al. (2018: 2) note in regard to 'rules of thumb' of how Pacific women leaders have emerged, these 'are not necessary and sufficient preconditions but they do provide a sense of what thinking and

working politically means for women in high office in the Pacific Context.' In a similar way, the DE model then does not delimit what reformers might need to do in a deterministic way, but rather provides a frame of reference and approximation of what shared ways of working might look like. In this sense, they are necessarily broad – because they are not intended to precisely specify but to inform and help articulate flexible, contextually tailored and politically informed ways of working that resonate broadly.

Importantly, what development entrepreneurship *does* exclude, is dominant ways of working in international development. Those ways of working tend to frontload analysis and specify program objectives and strategies upfront, with implementers then bidding with even more upfront specific about ways of working and personnel, with a heavy emphasis often on technical expertise and solutions. An implementing team is then organised around specific deliverables. It is this approach to supporting developmental change that the development entrepreneurship approach has been developed as an alternative to and seeks to influence and shift. The development entrepreneurship principles thus are necessarily broad so as not to prescribe reforms – but also sufficiently distinct to business as usual in international development that it still excludes many approaches to change. Herein lies both the value of DE and a potential risk. Its value is in providing a succinct and sufficiently generalisable approach that challenges the status quo.

Yet in promoting the DE approach there is a potential risk that it ends up being managerialised or imposed on other contexts in ways that are contradictory to its intended purpose. Similar risks are apparent with international development fads such as adaptive management – which begin life as noble attempts to change mainstream practice but risk ending up as the mainstream themselves in a distorted form.

What does Development Entrepreneurship imply for the role of development partners?

The role of development partners in supporting more locally led, adaptive and experimental approaches to reform, like development entrepreneurship, has been the subject of much debate (see for instance Booth and Unsworth, 2014; Faustino and Booth, 2014; Andrews et al., 2017). It is now broadly accepted (in theory, if not in practice) that the role of international development partners should be a supportive, background role that facilitates rather than leads. DE also underscores the importance of political nous and responsiveness – in keeping with wider development trends of political economy analysis and 'thinking and working politically,' and adaptive management. Much has been written about the challenges that donors face in shifting their ways of working to enable these approaches (see for instance Denney and Roche, 2019; Honig, 2018). Yet in spite of this, there appears to be an ever-greater design-heavy approach to development programming and document-laden inception phases that have increased the due diligence and compliance of aid programs.

This flies in the face of the lessons that programs like Coalitions for Change have documented around what donor ways of working are conducive to enabling change.

So what is to be done? Given the extent of investment, particularly by the Australian government, in programs focused on leadership and coalitions, there remains an outstanding question about whether learning is being sufficiently aggregated across investments to learn about, for instance: how to identify leaders or coalitions and issues that are ripe for change; whether leaders and coalitions can be manufactured or must emerge organically; what ways of working and roles are productive for donors and their implementing partners to play in support of leaders and coalitions. While existing literature has documented elements of this from specific programs, much of this analysis is scattered with little cross-fertilisation. What would, for instance, a more meta-analysis of how donors support leaders and coalitions tell us and would that aggregated body of evidence lend greater weight than individual programs? The answers may assist in developing more broadly applicable guides for donors and their implementing partners than individual program analyses that are easily written off as specific to particular places, individuals or programs.

Conclusion

The principles of 'development entrepreneurship' are clearly visible in the three policy reform case studies, although they manifest differently, and different principles stand out more clearly in each case. For example, the sustainability of the plastic bag ban in Kenya stands out, given it has survived a high number of legal challenges. The behaviours of leaders are more evident in the Vanuatu and Kenya case studies, where specific individuals took on leadership roles to champion the reforms. However, even in the Indonesia case study the role of leaders of the organizations that made up the coalition underscores the importance of human agency. Driven by their experience with people, beliefs and events, the leaders in these three case studies formed different kinds of coalitions, according to their context and needs. Perhaps most clear in the three case studies are the stories of how the leaders and their coalitions maneuvered, demonstrating the five entrepreneurial principles. Does this mean that the development entrepreneurship approach can be useful as a guide for undertaking future policy reform efforts outside the Philippines?

The three case studies were selected because they contained elements that stood out as being closely related to development entrepreneurship thinking. These three case studies, therefore, are not reflective of the ways in which policy reform happens more generally. They also cannot capture the wide variety of conditions surrounding reform efforts across different country contexts. Factors like the level of contestation, democratic space, complexity of civil society experience, and so on all influence what approaches to policy change are possible and the case studies cannot capture all possible reform contexts. In this sense, the development entrepreneurship approach may not be prescribed as a template for policy reform outside the Philippines. It is not – and should not – be seen as a checklist of items that must be present. It is also not a procedure or sequence of steps that must be followed to achieve policy wins.

Nonetheless, it is clear that in some instances, policy reform efforts do employ similar approaches and strategies that have been captured in the development entrepreneurship approach - as is the case in our three case studies, to varying degrees. Given this, development entrepreneurship might usefully be thought of as part of a reform leader's repertoire of tools - a set of principles that a reform-minded leader looking to improve conditions for his or her community through policy change can draw from where there is room to manoeuvre. This need not be limited only to the Philippines. Reform leaders can incorporate or draw on development entrepreneurship as a framework for analysis and action. They can use it for reflection to identify which reform is likely to improve outcomes as well as next steps to take in the ever-changing political context. Or, they can use the principles as a way of interrogating their own experience, so as to find a better way forward when the odds are stacked against change. It is by no means a sure-fire blueprint for success, but rather an increasingly tried and tested set of principles that might assist reform leaders in navigating the complex journey of achieving developmental change.

Development partners, in turn, can use these findings of the potential relevance of development entrepreneurship outside of the Philippines to consider how their support can be adapted to enable their local partners to adopt relevant development entrepreneurship principles in their given context. This likely requires development partners to adjust their own requirements in relation to compliance, monitoring and evaluation, timeframes and branding (to name a few) that may need to change if partners are expected to operate in ways resonant of development entrepreneurship principles – while also being conscious of the potential risks of managerialising DE and undermining its core intention.

The potential and limits of policy reform as a strategy for achieving developmental change remains an area where further research is required. This includes assessing whether development entrepreneurship can lend itself to guiding approaches to change focused on *informal rules*, as well as formal ones. And how policy reform competes with, or complements, other forms of developmental change. These are questions that remain to be explored in the next phase of Coalitions for Change.

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