Community-Based Development in Conflict-Affected Areas of the Philippines

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1. Description:

- **Name of project:** The Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme in Southern Philippines. ACT is phase 4 of Government of Philippines and United Nations Multi-Donor Programme (UNMDP) for peace.
- **Cost:** US$16.2
- **Duration:** 2005-2010
- **Donor:** Governments of Australia, Spain, and New Zealand. The European Commission funded the program’s humanitarian and rehabilitation component.
- **Region(s):** Southern Philippines – Mindanao & Palawan (ARMM, South Central, Western Mindanao, Caraga Region, covering 19 provinces in total).

2. Description Narrative

   a) **Overview:**

   The multi-donor funded Act for Peace (ACT for Peace) Programme emerged as a direct response to the 1996 peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The project was managed by the UNDP and overseen by the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) and ARMM Regional Government. The project provided support to former MNLF combatants and their communities in the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). The project has an explicit peacebuilding and conflict transformation objective and supports institutional capacity building, service delivery (health), community economic development, conflict transformation skill building, and systems and training to support a ‘culture of peace’. The project worked at the community level with Peace and Development Communities (PDC) that serve as the primary unit for sub-project identification and implementation.

   b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

   The theory of change focuses on analyzing and proposing relevant actions towards transformative changes which require flexible think-action logic. Action for Conflict Transformation- ACT has the following basis for change:

   - Conflict prone areas require complementing support to sustain their transformation into peaceful, resilient and developing communities.
   - Working with local actors will strengthen the responsiveness of the involved community and improve local capacities for conflict transformation and peace building.
   - Involving the key institutions leads to broader peace.

   c) **Project Objectives:**

Annex 1: Case Study Summaries of CBD Projects

ACT for PEACE: Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace Programme
The ACT for Peace is a peace building and conflict transformation program, operating in conflict affected areas of Southern Philippines. The objectives are developed in the context of a conflict-sensitive environment in which the program intends to address the complex situation of conflict in Mindanao such as peace building, governance, human security, and conflict management. It aims to achieve the following objectives.

- Helping to transform the Peace & Development Community (PDCs) and conflict-affected/conflict-vulnerable areas through peace building initiative.
- Aiming for strengthening of Peace building and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions.
- Development and strengthening of critical partnerships towards an environment of trust, confidence, and collaboration for peace and development.

d) Project Delivery Mechanism:

The Peace and Development Community (PDC) is central to the community based approach of ACT for Peace Programme. The PDC is the basic social unit upon which the whole peace and development framework of the GoP-UNDMP peace building is based. The social and economic transformation takes place in a PDC (which can be a barangay) through capacity building, livelihood rebuilding through sustainable agriculture and micro enterprises, rebuilding infrastructure and forging linkages with local service providers, local government units, NGOs etc. to improve access to basic services.

The PDC serves as a resource centre to ensure the equitable spread and distribution of resources amongst the community members. Such resources may include community organizations, trained development leaders, technicians, education facilities, health centres, household saving pools, a pool of farm production equipment and farm animals etc.

The program was managed by UNDP and implemented through Program Management Office (PMO) under the supervision of the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) and the ARMM regional Government.

e) Counterpart Funding Mechanism:

- The financial counterpart was based on the thrust and priorities of the LGUs.
- Granting of funds was based on the needs of the barangay as stipulated in the Barangay Development Plan (BDP).
- Alignment of the BDP to the thrust and priorities of municipal government comprehensive development is a requirement for funding.
- Endorsement of the MLGU to MinDA and ARMM is a requisite in the granting of funding assistance.

f) Site Selection
The project covered 19 provinces in Southern Philippines -- Palawan and Mindanao (ARMM, South Central, Western Mindanao, and Caraga Region). Site section was based on the following:

- Based on the reports of the UNMDP phases 1 – 3
- CARAGA - Based on the result of the conflict assessment conducted
- ARMM – Based on recommendation of the ARMM government

3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:

a. M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:

Based on the Logical Framework of Analysis (LFA) each outcome is reviewed using both quantitative and qualitative analyses.

b. Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:

- **Social Capital / Social Cohesion for Peace Building:** Improved access to clean water for 28,808 people through installing 97 water supply systems. Created more than 1,000 new jobs. Created more than 400 new community enterprises. Improved access to health services for more than 140,000 people.
- **Social Capital/ Social Cohesion for Peace Building:** 227 PDCs have enhanced abilities to plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and address threats to human security. Increased the number of People’s Organizations (PO) and local social formations (LSF) that were able to undertake and participate in peace based planning process (263 POs and 526 LSFs organized and strengthened in all programs in PDCs).
- **Human Security: Basic Social Services:** Improved community access to integrated health services (102 BHUs) constructed. Addressed the needs of communities affected by armed conflict (70,000 affected families provided with food, medicines and temporary shelter, 300 core shelter units constructed in PDC Macuyon, Sirwai, Zamboanga del Norte).
- **Human Security through Community Economic development:** Enhanced stakeholder awareness and appreciation of community economic development principles, concepts and approaches (438 community economic projects implemented in 238 PDCs). Improved competence among stakeholders (352 of 438 projects are managed by 268 PO.
- **Governance in Conflict Context:** Enhanced local stakeholder appreciation of human security, peace building and culture of peace principles (83 LGUs currently have basic peace promoting capacities, systems, and processes). Improved competence among local stakeholders, Established mechanisms supportive of stakeholder initiatives in promoting or advancing human security and peace building (22 provincial peace resource centres established).
- **Peace Building & Conflict Management:** Enhanced local capacities to practice and promote peace (12 regional and 29 provincial partnerships forged).
4. Case Study Analyses

a. Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:

- Peace building intervention alone is not sufficient in addressing conflict. What is required is a fully integrated, holistic approach to community development. The program should develop capacity-building mechanisms to address the underlying structural inequities that could give rise to another conflict.

- Based on the experience of the program, there is strong evidence that for a peacebuilding intervention to be effective, responsive, adequate, appropriate and relevant, it has to be context-sensitive and conflict-specific. As such, any peacebuilding and development interventions of donors working in, on, or around conflict environs must adopt peace-based approaches which are helpful in promoting peace rather than exacerbating potential or latent conflicts.

- Successful community development projects in conflict context can be useful to communities that are empowered and socially prepared. The control of resources must emanate from the community where they become accountable of their decisions.

- Social development projects must be sensitive to the need to redress ethnic and imbalances and must incorporate indicators to measure the distributional impact of development assistance. From a consolidation perspective, infrastructure projects that create employment must be targeted at the youth in particular.

- There is a need for a flexible project management approaches. Given that subprojects are devised at the community level, there are a wide variety of timetables, capacity levels, levels of access to resources, geographic distances, supporting logistics, and conflict dynamics.

- To achieve a complex objective to support productive subprojects that are community driven, economically viable, and environmentally sound requires substantial investment in local learning and technical support. New processes and clear rules for decision making have to be introduced as building blocks, and this introduction needs to be made over long periods of time.

- The competence of the implementers and staff must be a priority for donors working in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas. Implementer’s efficiency and staff continuity improves program and project practices. In a climate of great influx and insecurity, it is important to have consistency in project personnel. This allows key actors to obtain deeper history and context, which supports the learning and application of better practices throughout a project.

- The relevance of a demand-driven approach in validity of community based approaches when existing institutional capacity is weak and development challenges are enormous. Sustainability of demand-driven projects is greater when local government administrations are involved in planning, appraisal, execution, monitoring and evaluation. Integrated implementation through local government bodies avoids the pitfalls of parallel institutions that have affected many social funds. At the same time, local governments are susceptible to local political influence and often face capacity constraints. National and local ownership of the Programme by government institution is chief to sustainability of interventions as well as gains in peace and development.

- “Sustainability depended on factors such as the participation of local government bodies, national government agencies, NGOs, and other groups; responsiveness to community demands; adequate social capital (or capacity to promote peace building through development at the community level); linkages with other livelihood, financing, and
technical assistance projects; and workable operations and management plans that were fully owned by communities and backed by local governments.

- Donor agencies tend to favor ambitious reforms, but caution is advisable when dealing with peacebuilding and conflict management initiatives in conflict affected areas. Peace building takes time and requires sustained efforts to nurture peace gains. Conflict affected environments with peacebuilding initiative needs sustainable efforts of change which include: personal, relational, structural and cultural transformation.

- Peace building and conflict management effectiveness can be achieved by building strategic partnerships among duty bearers and stakeholders, strengthening the enabling environment which supports the installation of structures and processes of peace infrastructure. Along this line of vertical and horizontal dimensions of peacebuilding from micro, meso and macro analysis, there is a need strong recognition of continuous capacity development of regional and national actors.

- The program strategy of PDC as a framework and a process proved to be a viable community transformation approach for conflict-affected, vulnerable, and post-conflict areas. However, it is viewed as a small scale peacebuilding and conflict management initiative. The PDC emerge from the implementation of experiments with macrosystemic implications, they started small and eventually inspire sufficient confidence among local and national leaders to be widely implemented – and thus to affect the entire systems. Studies show that programs that began large and the programs that started small produced successes; neither approach can be seen as inappropriate in conflict-context.

- Socio-economic projects can be an effective means for building and nurturing social cohesion and social capital. On the other hand, social capital is a vital production input for peace building and economic development.

- In conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas, development initiatives must emphasize participatory and consultative processes in program design and implementation. Consultative and participatory processes associated with community based or driven development initiatives which can facilitate the difficult transition from initial, quick-impact, top-down programs to address dire emergencies to longer-term, bottom-up efforts to promote development and institutional reform.

- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in the conflict-context is still a developing area. The majority of literature focuses on peacebuilding practices and conflict prevention; however, experts have noted that the guidelines and lessons used for peacebuilding are applicable to fragility in general. The international context for M&E is changing, with increasing focus on measuring results and critically analyzing aid effectiveness.

- Peace building is essentially a governance concern. Ultimately, the aim of governance programming is to shape a society’s capacity to manage conflicting interests peacefully. This aim is facilitated through a range of donor activities, including assistance with: electoral process, the development of inclusive institutions, public sector reform, justice sector reform, anti-corruption initiatives, the promotion of civil society, and conflict resolution projects.
1. DESCRIPTION:

- **Name of project**: ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP)
- **Cost**: USD$71.5 million (USD$40.6 million World Bank, JPY2.47 billion JICA)
- **Duration**: May 2003-May 2013
- **Donor**: World Bank (IBRD) and Japan International Cooperation Agency
- **Region(s)**: Mindanao, Philippines - Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and the cities of Lamitan in Basilan and Marawi in Lanao de Sur

2. Description Narrative

a) **Overview**:

The ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP) is a World Bank (and JICA) supported project that works explicitly with the communities and government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to deliver services and institutional capacity strengthening. The project supports community development assistance, regional infrastructure, and institutional strengthening and governance. Within the community development assistance component, the provide uses CDD methods- through People's Organisation supported by Municipal Facilitators and local governments- to deliver community based infrastructure (CBI), learning-livelihood and self sufficiency (LLFS) and a quick response program (QRP). The project works with up to eight barangay per municipality, providing up to 1.5million Pesos per barangay, 80% of which is used for infrastructure and 20% for livelihoods. Under the institutional strengthening, the project explicitly supports the ARMM government and local governments to improve service delivery, transparency and accountability.

b) **Donor Theory of Change**:

The project theories of change are founded on the premises that reducing poverty and providing support mechanisms for peace building will bring about sustainable development in the ARMM, and that improving living conditions will contribute to addressing underlying causes of conflict.

c) **Project Objective**:

Specific program objectives of the ASFP are to provide and/or improve sustained access to social and economic infrastructure and services by the poor and conflict-affected poor communities; provide capacity building for women, out of school youth and other community groups for improving food security, employment opportunities and household incomes; strengthen social cohesion and partnerships between and within communities in the ARMM region; and improve local governance and institutional capacities for implementation in the ARMM Region, with a focus on improved transparency and accountability in the allocation and management of public resources by the participating communities, local government units.
d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

The program has three major components: (i) community development assistance, which aims to provide community-based infrastructure (CBI) and learning-livelihood and food self-sufficiency (LLFS) training for beneficiaries; (ii) strategic regional infrastructure, which seeks to work with the regional government in the repair of critical infrastructure, such as port facilities and government buildings, that was damaged by the 2000 conflict; and (iii) institutional strengthening and governance.

To deliver the first component, People’s Organizations (POs) were formed in each barangay. Each PO, with the support of the LGU, was responsible for preparing investment plans for priority subprojects and beneficiaries complete with procurement and field appraisals. These proposals were submitted during Multi-Stakeholders’ Meeting, and once approved, were implemented by the POs themselves. POs were provided with community block grants to support their activities once funds from the WB and JICA were coursed through the DSWD-ARMM regional office and Provincial Social Welfare Office (PSWO). PO committee members were extensively trained on subproject implementation and management, which integrated capacity building into the subproject. For projects related to community infrastructure, POs were responsible for mobilizing officers and committees for specific tasks to carry out implementation.

e) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

Cost-sharing arrangements for the Community Development Assistance (CDA) component were set at a level of 15%, and included provision for cash and in-kind contributions to be shared 10% by the LGU and 5% by the community. The same counterpart scheme is also applied for regional infrastructure projects.

f) **Site Selection:**

Sites were selected to prioritize highly populated, conflict-affected, remote, and poor barangays, which are rarely reached by government services. To identify these sites, beneficiary barangays were chosen based on their compatibility with specific weighed criteria: Poverty (40%), Conflict-Affected/Conflict Influenced (20%), Population (20%), Distance and Means of Accessibility (20%). Selected barangays with a population of 1,000 or more are entitled to a P1.5 million grant. If the population is less than 1,000, the grant amount is P1,500 per barangay resident but no less than P500,000 for the entire barangay. The bulk of the funds are used for the construction of the community-proposed sub-project, with around 20% (or P300,000 from a total of P1.5M) allotted for LLFS subprojects.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

The key indicators measuring project performance, inputs, outputs, and outcomes are as follows:
• proportion of households in participating communities with improved access to basic infrastructure and social services;
• number of completed strategic regional infrastructure subprojects that are well operated and maintained;
• proportion of women, indigenous women, and youth groups with improved financial management and entrepreneurial skills and access to livelihood activities;
• proportion of ARMM Regional Government and participating LGUs that have adopted participatory approaches, improved planning, budgeting, and financial management systems; and
• Improved social cohesion and partnership indicators within and between target communities.

b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

AFSP funded the completion of 2,398 community based infrastructure sub-projects which benefited around 14.5 percent of the total population in ARMM. Among these projects, community infrastructure subprojects contributed to the reduction of vulnerability, indicating either an increase in income and/or better access to food. For food sufficiency initiatives under LLFS, the number of people who eat three full meals a day increased by 76 percent. Social and educational facilities, such as school building and learning centers, provided physical spaces for community activities such as training, particularly for women and youth. In fact, functional literacy training was provided to 29,419 people. For women in particular, being able to read and write opened opportunities to engage in livelihood activities. Two batches of Early Childhood Education classes were conducted in each barangay, reaching out to a total of 1,991 pre-school children. Children who completed the ECE program had relatively higher academic performance when they proceeded to the subsequent grade levels. The program also had a positive effect in improving the institutional capacity of local communities. A total of 1315 POs were formed to plan and operate their respective community based infrastructure. PO participants thus acquired skills in community based development planning, financial management, procurement, and environmental and social management planning.

4. **Case Study Analyses**

a. **Description of Conflict**

The project was designed to provide assistance to the conflict-affected areas of the ARMM where, in 2000, escalated armed conflict had displaced over 400,000 people in the central parts of Mindanao, and an additional 100,000 in the island provinces of Basilan and Sulu. The number of displaced persons later decreased, but at the time the ASFP was formulated, many people were still unwilling to return to their communities because of the tenuous peace situation. The ARMM is characterized by high poverty incidence and unstable political environment challenged by a history of weak governance. The region has the second highest poverty incidence in the country, and four of its provinces belong to the country’s poorest 44 provinces.

However, the current types of conflict that occur in the ASFP beneficiary communities are often of the domestic type, or involving clan conflict. These conflicts are usually managed or settled by community elders or religious leaders. The barangays visited for purposes of this study, particularly those in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur are no longer directly affected by armed
conflict. Military detachments were noted on the way to some sites (e.g. Malabang), but no roaming personnel were seen. Residents, usually a mix of Muslims and Christians, claimed there have been no recent violent encounters in their area, and that their barangay is “peaceful”. It is noted though, that one subproject in Brgy. Kamasi, Ampatuan, Maguindanao, still served as an evacuation center for residents seeking refuge from conflict that happened in an adjacent barangay. In general, the areas visited were still affected by the tensions between GPH and MILF, and land based conflicts manifested through rido are common in the areas.

b. **Key Lessons Learned:**

- Introducing change is especially difficult when the participation of ordinary citizens in barangay processes challenges existing leadership structures.
- The key to fostering understanding and cooperation with LGUs lies in being transparent and consultative, particularly in money matters.
- The importance of consistent promulgation of criteria in the choosing of barangays and beneficiaries in order to avoid LGUs and communities from selectively applying the criteria.
- As a result of the number of years implementing ASFP and learning from their experiences, the PMO is instituting a number of changes to improve program implementation under its additional financing phase.
- A baseline survey is being conducted to serve as a reference to measure actual outcomes at the end of the program life. Furthermore, the household survey conducted in each beneficiary barangay now contains questions pertaining to the level of conflict in the barangay, whether violence has intensified over the recent period, the type of conflict, how they are resolved and if respondents were involved in the resolution of conflicts.
- Orientations on the project will be done at the provincial level and will involve line agencies (DTI, DENR, and DILG) and municipal mayors to allow interaction with barangay level stakeholders. This is important in view of the role that provincial governments play in providing budgetary support for municipalities which in turn provide technical support for subprojects.
- DILG is being engaged to play a more active role in the formulation of Barangay Development Plans/Community Investment Plans, particularly even in the conduct of the household survey which yields essential information to support the selection of beneficiaries and prioritization of subprojects. Involvement of the DILG will also help activate or strengthen the barangay development councils so that they continue to support subprojects at the post turnover stage. Moreover, it is hoped that the partnership with DILG will help manage possible perceptions that program processes enable community residents to usurp power from existing BLGU leadership.
- DTI will provide technical advice to help make livelihood projects more sustainable and profitable.
- DENR, aside from safeguarding environmental concerns, will support community based tree planting as an activity of the POs. Tree planting is viewed as one way to go beyond mere project compliance and to contribute more proactively to improving the environment. The PMO is also advocating that the DENR accredit existing ASFP-assisted POs to be considered for “greening” and other environmental initiatives of the agency.
- Having realized the importance of competitive and careful recruitment of project staff, the PMO has introduced new ways to screen and review the performance of Municipal Facilitators. For new applicants, educational attainment and related qualifications are assessed, after which he/she undergoes a qualifying exam administered in partnership with
the academe. The third step involves being interviewed by a panel composed of DSWD and PMO staff. Finally, prospective Municipal Facilitators now undergo “pre service training” where evaluation of learning and exams are part of their day to day training. Existing MFs also undergo the training as a refresher course. Since the facilitators play a pivotal role in ensuring genuine community participation, this is a crucial intervention on the part of the PMO to ensure that project processes are true to the community-driven approach.

✓ The grievance redress system of the project, which provides a mechanism for community members to share feedback and problems related to the subprojects, will be operationalized and incorporated in the MIS during the current additional financing phase. This will allow the program to track sources (or possible sources) of conflict at the community level.

✓ Spot checking of subprojects will be conducted by a third independent party to ensure that subprojects are located in the right areas.

✓ Peace and conflict impact assessment will be included as a topic in barangay level planning. Catholic Relief Services, through its Peace, Justice and Reconciliation Team, has provided ASPF with training materials incorporating peace and conflict mapping in the barangay development planning process. The materials highlight the need to: a) look into the context of the community, b) analyze the root causes and manifestations of conflict; c) analyze relationships among residents and other stakeholders, d) consider facilitating and hindering factors for peace, and e) map peace resources in the barangay.

✓ The program is advocating for the strengthening of Barangay Dispute Mediator Councils (or LupongTagapamayapa) which play a role in conflict resolution, as well as the reactivation of peace keeping forces as a first level mechanism for maintaining community peace and order.

✓ Possible cooperation and convergence with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)’s Payapa at MasaganangPamayanan (PAMANA) Project is being explored.

Key recommendations:

✓ Communicate ASPF more strongly and more purposively as a peace building program in addition to being a poverty alleviation program. This gains importance in the light of the current fragile status of the peace talks between the GPH and the MILF, because a critical mass that is oriented on peace and supportive of peace at the community level will have stronger resolve to adhere to peaceful ways of change.

✓ In relation to the above, it would be beneficial for the PMO, together with its funders to level off on a program-wide or institutional definition of peace building, and from there, include specific peace building indicators in its program framework or logical framework. This is to ensure a strong and clear link between project outcomes and the program’s goal of contributing to the promotion of a peaceful and safe environment in the conflict-affected areas of the ARMM. In this manner, program processes will be more deliberate and purposive towards achieving these peace building indicators.

✓ To support the program objective of strengthening social cohesion and providing an environment supportive of conflict reduction, deliberate and explicit conflict resolution activities should be incorporated as part of the assistance to the communities to complement the CDD project cycle. For example, local residents and members of the Barangay Dispute Mediator Councils would benefit from capacity-building initiatives on dispute resolution and legal awareness (Stephens 2009).
✓ On a program wide level, POs, LGUs and other stakeholders should be trained on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity to enable them to incorporate a peace lens in the barangay development planning and community investment planning process.

✓ Strengthen social preparation processes to ensure identification of priority subprojects that truly address community needs and which are maximized in terms of utilization frequency. Social preparation should also focus on further reaching out to residents of the barangay who are “invisible” in community affairs, but whose voices, nonetheless, are as important and relevant. Fair selection of beneficiaries and PO members should be continued and strengthened.

✓ Consider follow through training for POs to improve sustainability of the POs themselves and the subprojects that they manage. Involve LGUs in monitoring of subprojects after they are turned over to the PO, and strengthen mechanisms that ensure the BLGUs continue to provide funding and technical assistance for operations and maintenance.

✓ Strengthen internal M&E systems to monitor not just physical outputs or results of interventions, but also outcomes that result from processes by which the program is implemented on the ground. This could be done through the conduct of periodic beneficiary satisfaction surveys that would inform the PMO and program donors of outcomes related to the both physical results and program processes. The PMO is encouraged to continue and systematize reflection sessions to surface learning points that can inform management of areas for improvement, aspects that work well and which should be continued, and appropriate interventions. Such sessions could include a number of LGUs, NGO partners and PO officers. There is also a need to strengthen community based monitoring systems (including PO Monitoring and Evaluation Committees) and link them with the PMO MIS or M&E systems. This is important in the light of limited audit visits to areas that have more fragile peace and order situations. The program could also further explore ways of sharing results of monitoring activities with community members and other stakeholders (i.e. during reflection sessions that have broad based participation).

✓ If the program seeks to scale up the CDD approach in ARMM, this will require regulatory change to make it a standard part of government planning processes. Barangay Development Councils need to be strengthened and energized to support the institutionalization of the community participation in barangay development and planning processes (Stephens 2009) Transparent disclosure of income and expenditures of participating barangays should be mandatory. As the program reaches out to additional barangays under its additional financing phase, this would be a good move to create a critical mass of transparent processes within the ARMM.
BEAM: Basic Education Assistance to Mindanao

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ **Name of project:** Basic Education Assistance to Mindanao (BEAM): Contribution on Conflict Management & Peace Building. The project was undertaken in two stages.

✓ **Cost:** US$52.1 Million

✓ **Duration:** 2000-2009

✓ **Donor:** AusAID.

✓ **Region(s):** Southern Philippines – Mindanao- (Region 11: Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley, Region 12: Sultan Kudarat and Sarangani, ARMM: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and Marawi City)

2. Description Narrative

   a) **Overview:**

   Basic Education Assistance to Mindanao (BEAM) is an 8-year, AUD$53,409,501 AusAID-supported project implemented in partnership with the Department of Education. While not explicitly considered a community based development project, BEAM does utilize participatory methods to ensure that project design and implementation responds to community requirements. BEAM provides education support to vulnerable schools and communities in Mindanao (regions 11, 12 and ARMM), with an emphasis on developing curricula that reflect the needs and concerns of indigenous peoples, multicultural communities, and Muslim communities.

   b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

   BEAM theory of change is aimed at linking better learning and higher education with the establishment of peace and development in Mindanao.

   c) **Project Objective:**

   BEAM’s goal under Stage 1 was to improve the access to, and quality of, basic education in Southern and Central Mindanao. Its purpose was to improve the quality of the management of basic education in Regions 11, 12, and ARMM, and to respond to local educational needs of minority and isolated communities in these regions.

   For Stage 2, the primary goal was to improve the quality of, and access to, basic education in Mindanao to aid in the achievement of peace and development in the Southern Philippines. The project’s purpose was to improve the quality of teaching and learning in basic education in Regions 11, 12, and ARMM and to implement strategies that will provide opportunities for all children to access quality education and develop key life skills.

   Learning and developing capacities to improve educational outcomes were the common thread for both stages.
d) **Site selection:**

Various reasons have contributed to the selection of Mindanao for BEAM. Mindanao is home to six of the 10 poorest provinces based on survey results released by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) in 2000. Although rich in natural resources, economic development is constrained by low investments, political instability and civil unrest. DepEd’s Education for All (EFA) 2015 program has flagged Mindanao, particularly the ARMM, as having a functional literacy of 62.9% that is significantly below the national rate of 84.1%. This is a consequence of civil and political unrest that disrupt the lives and education of people and children in conflict-affected areas. Similarly limited economic opportunities have increased child labour incidence with seven out of 10 Mindanao households having working children within the ages of five to 17 years old. These factors have contributed to low levels of educational achievement compounded by difficult access to schools.

Diversity of cultures in Mindanao has also hindered the full implementation of a standard basic education curriculum required by DepEd. Predominantly influenced by western counterparts, the required curriculum lacks cultural sensitivity for students who come from Muslim and indigenous communities.

The BEAM project targeted vulnerable communities of 5,822 public schools spread across 29 divisions in regions 11, 12, and ARMM. Although its target communities were mostly DepEd teachers and managers, the ultimate beneficiaries were the students from diverse cultures whose literacy rates needed improvement. For the BEAM project, the target beneficiaries were:

- Managers at the division and regional levels.
- Teachers and principals within the public school system.
- Teachers and facilitators in formal and non-formal schools, including those who teach in Madaris schools.
- Teacher educators in teacher education institutions (TEIs).
- Personnel who can develop learning materials for the target communities.
- Students and vulnerable groups (IPs and Muslims).

e) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

BEAM was a bilateral project jointly managed by pre-identified implementing agencies for the Australian and the Philippine governments. For the Philippines, the main implementing agency was DepEd through the Educational Development Project Implementing Task Force (EDPITAF) and the Regional offices in Regions 11, 12, and ARMM. AusAID was the implementing agency for the Australian aid program to the Philippines, of which BEAM was one of the projects under its management. On the ground, BEAM was managed through a Project Management Office (PMO) contracted by AusAID to lead and provide strategic directions during project implementation. The PMO was in charge of managing and ensuring that project deliverables were done in an efficient manner and achieved on time. Several consultation and coordination mechanisms were also put in place by the project.
The learning development and capacity building have been done through training of teachers and principals of public school system at division and regional level, teachers and facilitators in formal and informal schools, trainers and curriculum developers, students, and IP groups.

3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:

a. Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:

✓ During the course of its implementation, the BEAM project introduced several reforms that contributed to DepEd’s goal of providing access to quality of basic education nationwide. These were (1) Revised basic education curriculum that included indigenous and Muslim into the standard curriculum; (2) School Governing Councils; and a (3) Capacity development program for managers and teachers.

✓ Its impact may be classified into three: (1) learning outcomes of students, (2) the approach to learning; and (3) school planning and management.

✓ Through capacity development trainings, a paradigm shift was introduced in teaching methods. From a teacher-centric approach, alternative methods to increase student participation in the classroom have been introduced. This was achieved through several capacity building trainings for school heads and teachers.

✓ Economic Development: To help achieve its goals in Stage 2, BEAM provided parents with functional literacy and livelihood skills training. By the end of the project, 226 livelihood projects were established to generate additional income to support their children.

✓ Governance: BEAM provided a vehicle for local governments to enhance service delivery. Political will of the local chief executives are demonstrated through the release of Special Education Funds meant for school-related activities. To date, DepEd has partnered with a total of 164 local government units for its Access component, and has resulted in increased education budgets in the three regions.

✓ Social Capital: The project has a perceived impact on social cohesion. Horizontally, communities are brought closer together due to the inclusion of cultural awareness and gender sensitivity. At the vertical level, the presence of SGCs (School Governing Councils) has contributed in better relationships between the community, school officials, and the local government.

✓ Community Empowerment: BEAM has set an example that developing local ownership and project management capability is possible by decentralizing project management which also empowered the DepEd community as a whole.

✓ Peace Building and Conflict Management: To achieve its peace building goal in stage 2, learning guides that introduced cultural awareness, gender sensitivity and conflict resolution were created. Supporting Muslim education through the Standard Madrassah Curriculum was one of the activities that supported peace building initiatives of the government.
4. Case Study Analyses

Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:

Peace-building
BEAM was not designed to be a peace building program. Although this was part of its goal, its efforts focused on strengthening the institution and improving access to quality education. However, in more ways than one, BEAM’s achievements in these areas have also contributed to peace building efforts of the government. It has succeeded in increasing the government’s visibility to communities in remote and hard to reach areas.

CCD Approach
BEAM was not a CDD (Community Driven Development) project. However, stakeholder ownership and participation were visible factors that increased the faith of DepEd personnel in their institution, and the community in DepEd. Having Muslims and indigenous communities participate in crafting learning guides have not only given them a sense of cultural pride, it has also given them initiative to share their belief systems to a larger audience. Implementing the curriculum and using the learning guides have fostered better understanding and appreciation of each other’s uniqueness in schools that have mixed student populations. BEAM was also able to harness the combined strength of local governments, donors, grassroots organizations, and other private organizations to enhance the delivery of basic services, particularly on increasing access to education.

Governance
Working within the government’s framework and through a national government agency allowed BEAM to expand to several regions and reach remote communities that needed this project the most. Not only has it strengthened the institution, but it has contributed to the government’s goals as well. DepEd managers stated that they continue to look forward to more projects that are similar in scope and implementation.

Cohesion
Having a holistic appreciation of the dynamics within and outside the education system provided BEAM with the opportunity to utilize the project management team’s experiences and lessons learned into constructive engagement with various stakeholders. By keeping targets realistic, BEAM was able to identify specific targets for intervention and provide strategies to address these. At a glance, the provision of functional literacy and livelihood programs to parents may seem disconnected to the goal, but activities like these provide income opportunities and incentives for parents to keep their children in school.
Convenio

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ **Name of project:** Desarrollo Integral y Sostenible de Comunidades Rurales de Bicol y Caraga (Mindanao), con Especial Atencion a la Mujer a Traves de la Articulacion y El Fortalecimiento del Tejido Productivo y Social, Desde la Participacion Comunitaria, Filipinas (Integral and sustainable development of rural communities in Bicol and Caraga (Mindanao), with special focus on women, through the articulation and strengthening of the productive and social structures, through community participation, Philippines). Also known as Convenio.

✓ **Cost:** 4,377,439 Euro

✓ **Duration:** 2008-2012

✓ **Donor:** Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)

✓ **Region(s):** Caraga Region (Agusan and Surigao provinces) and Bicol Region

2. Description Narrative

a) **Overview:**

The AECID (Spanish) funded Convenio with is a 4,377,439 euro) integrated area development project that works with selected barangays in Caraga (18 barangays) and Bicol (12 barangays). The project, implemented by Fundacion InteRed, operates through a network of Filipino NGOs who work with local people's organisations to implement activities in health, education, environmental/disaster issues and livelihood support (primarily in agriculture). The project also supports institutional strengthening for local governments and people's organisations. Each community may receive up to 7.5M pesos of investment that is managed through cooperation between the local NGO and people's organisation.

b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

Rural poverty in the Philippines, according to Fundacion InteRed, often breeds a host of other problems like malnutrition, illness, poor access to quality education, and degradation of the environment. Among the rural poor the need for food often competes with other family needs, thus children are left undernourished and their education are listed last in the family’s order of priorities. Malnutrition and exposure to extended hours of manual labor are surefire prescription for poor health and oftentimes illness.

To effectively address rural poverty, Fundacion InteRed thought it would require a strategy that not only meets the immediate needs of farmers but also transforms structures so as to act on the causes of poverty. InteRed opted for a strategy that will promote comprehensive development, at all levels and areas—social, economic, and political, because if one chooses only one component, the sustainability of other initiatives is jeopardized (Fundacion InteRed, 2008).

The project of InteRed does not explicitly address peacebuilding but supports a comprehensive development strategy that addresses rural poverty through interventions in social, political and economic spheres. Having opted to work in conflict affected areas of Mindanao, it is fair to assume that the project reflects AECID's larger theory of change that attributes the conflict to "exclusion of
ethnic and religious minorities, historical negligence by government, political indifference at the local level and breach in the maintenance of law and order." (AECID 2005)

c) **Project Objectives:**

The project aims to improve the quality of life of the residents of the chosen region and reduce the poverty level in the rural communities of Caraga and Bicol by achieving the following.

- Use capacity building and community mobilization for improving social structures of local governments and local participation in 12 rural barangays in Bicol and 16 barangays in Caraga.
- Provide capacity building advice and financial support in production, processing, and marketing by improving the production process of 28 communities and strengthen their capacity for income generation.
- Contribute to the preservation of the ecosystems of 16 communities of Caraga through awareness building, community mobilization, ecological conservation and rehabilitation activities.
- Contribute to the improvement of the education conditions of 28 communities through the involvement of teachers, parents, and the local authorities in education planning, through capacity building of the education community and improvement in educational infrastructure and equipment.
- Improve the sanitation in 28 communities through a) commitment and involvement of local authorities b) people’s organizations. c) Training and education of local health workers d) Provision of sanitary installations and health and sanitary equipment.
- Prepare and equip 12 communities in Bicol to respond to natural calamities through the disaster management committees, advice to the local authorities and the promotion of household resettlement and construction of infrastructure.

d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

Fundacion InteRed and its partner NGOs implement the Convenio in three main phases:

**Identification:** This phase involved data collection and analysis, establishment of Convenio database, selection of communities, and identification of specific interventions needed by the communities. This phase was done with prospective partner NGOs using participatory methodologies.

**Implementation:** Community consultations and trainings are done to strengthen individual and organization capacities. Micro-projects and demonstration farms are established to generate income for the communities. Health centres and sanitary installations are constructed and education material is provided to the schools along with training and capacity building. The communities are trained to sustain the gains from the project including integration into local government processes. Community organizations are taught ways to manage organizations, community affairs, farms and livelihood management skills.

**Transfer Phase:** In this phase, the POs learn to assume responsibility in managing their organization, their farms and livelihoods, and social services, working closely with their local governments. This phase will also ensure that community priorities are integrated into the development plans of the local governments and funded in the investment plans and budgets.
e) **Counterpart:** Funding is provided by Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID). The Fundacion InteRed is the program implementer, in collaboration with PhilDHRRRA (Philippine Partnership for Development of Human Resources in Rural Area), GASA (Group of Advocates for sustainable Agriculture), REACH Foundation (Rural Enterprise Assistance Centre Foundation Inc), HEED (Human Economic & Ecological Department), and Ateneo de Naga University.

f) **Site Selection:** The regions of Caraga (Agusan & Surigao provinces) along with the rest of the region earmarked for this project were selected as their per capita income was the 2nd lowest not just in Mindanao but in the entire Philippines. Also the regions of Caraga and Bicol have been identified as the breeding ground for NPA (New people’s Army) insurgency.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

a. **M & E Framework - What do they measure/Not measure:**

- A participatory monitoring system involving all stakeholders of the Convenio was put in place. The indicators measured the results of the activities as well as their effect on communities. The appropriateness of the methods and processes is also examined.
- InteRed initiates assessment meetings with NGOs per region which results in knowledge sharing and cross pollination of good practices.
- InteRed’s Coordinator of projects also travels regularly to the region to meet with NGOs and communities to gather first hand information.

b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

i. **Material Changes – Social & Economic Impact:**

- The communities of the 28 barangays now have access to health centres and related equipment, school repairs, education materials, water pumps, sanitary toilets, loans, scholarship, livestock, seedlings, sustainable agriculture technology, and market linkage.
- Members in more than 109 Peoples Organizations in Caraga have received agricultural inputs and trainings under the program. Two health centres and five pharmacies [Botika sa Barangays (BsBs)] have been completed in six Caraga communities. Ten health centres have been provided with basic equipment. According to community residents, the BsBs made cheap medicines more accessible.
- To address malnutrition among school children in Caraga, supplemental feeding was conducted in 9 communities, covering 439 children. Books and audio visual equipment have been provided to the schools. Teachers were trained on new teaching methods. The scholarships grant for 228 children was provided at the schools.
- In Bicol, 437 malnourished children were given special care. Four health centres were provided with basic equipment and two BsBs were provided with medicines. Of 100 families targeted, 35 families were provided with sanitary toilets. Eight water systems provided clean water to 112 families.
- The Convenio supports 40 scholars (20 in high school and 20 in elementary) in San Isidro. They were chosen in 2009 and will be supported by the Convenio for four years. Scholars receive school supplies and their school fees are paid by the Convenio.
PO members also benefited from the trainings conducted by Group of Advocates for Sustainable Agriculture which include leadership and local governance, organic farming, herbal medicine preparation etc.

In Sta. Juana, Tagbina, Surigao Sur, a health centre provided immunization, pre-natal consultations, and birth facilities. The centre improved the delivery of health services by the local governments.

Under the productive systems development component, the project provided trainings in sustainable agriculture. The PO members crafted farm and business plans, which were used as basis for borrowing a loan.

ii. Political Changes

In many communities, the POs (People’s organizations) became important players in their communities by acting as training grounds and as a source of new leaders. In many cases, challenging the positions of local governments on issues like mining as in the case of Sta. Juana, Tagbina, Surigao. In many barangays, the Convenio also led to the election of former PO leaders as barangay officials.

The BDCs (Barangay Development Council) have been involved in developing the barangay’s development plans- BDPs.

The training of barangay officials in participatory local governance along with PO members has provided a venue for both parties to agree on how to run their communities. Participation of women has greatly improved.

Participation in barangay assemblies have also increased. In Sta. Juana, for example, the household participation has gone up to 90% from 50%.

iii. Social Cohesion & Safety and Security

The project did not have a peace building objective but it has been observed that it has helped in strengthening the social cohesion which has led to increased sense of safety and security.

In Bicol, some communities feel safer due to implementation of disaster risk reduction committees. The committees are tasked to warn about impending disasters particularly typhoons and floods. During disasters, they manage evacuations, respond to emergencies, and conduct rescues. They take charge of relief operations like the distribution of food, materials for temporary shelter, and the rehabilitation of damaged houses. DRR have also been drawn.

4. Case Study Analyses

a. Description of Conflict

Bicol and Caraga are affected by the New People’s Army (NPA) insurgency, thus they had also been selected as pilot areas for the government’s PAMANA project, which aims to bring back government to remote communities by ensuring that basic services are delivered and local governments are transparent and accountable. Also piloted for the PAMANA project are Quezon, Mindoro, Cordillera, Negros, Samar, Compostela Valley, ZamBaSulTa, Central Mindanao, and ARMM, all conflict-affected areas.

b. Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:
AECID should ensure that the projects and Convenio they are supporting in Bicol and Caraga are conflict-sensitive and should contribute to peace building since both regions are conflict areas. Contributing to peace building or being conflict-sensitive does not necessarily mean having peace building objectives, as the framework of this study suggests. This can be done simply by asking project and Convenio proponents to conduct conflict analysis, to aim at objectives that will result to material and political changes, and to use processes that empower and promote dialogue.

AECID should consider the development of NGO capacity in conflict analysis and in designing program interventions that are conflict-sensitive and that contribute to positive peace. NGOs have proven to be effective partners in implementing community-based projects because of their familiarity with the areas and their strong background in organizing. The support is especially needed in Bicol, a conflict area, where support to peace building is much less compared to Caraga.

Fundacion InteRed a long-time AECID partner in Bicol and Caraga should explore the possibility of using a peace building lens in the design of its programs. The foundation has been working in some of the poorest communities of Bicol and Caraga. These are communities with experiences of conflict or where conflict is still existing or emerging as in the case of conflicts related to mining. Adopting a peace building approach will increase the effectiveness of the foundation’s programs in conflict areas.

Fundacion InteRed’s program attempts to respond to the pressing needs of the communities in a comprehensive way. The implementation of subprojects, however, should be carefully calibrated so that the capacities of the communities taken in to account without wearing them down with prolonged social preparations.

Working with local NGOs is a strength of the Convenio. NGOs are strong in community work, they charge less in management fees, and most of them have established relations with local governments. Fundacion InteRed, however, should ensure that the NGOs are also selected for competencies related to the project and the Convenio and if they are lacking in these competencies, technical support should be provided to them to compensate for their weaknesses.
EASE-EMGP: Education Awareness Support Effort

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ **Name of project:** The Education Awareness Support Effort (EASE)/Education Matching Grant Program (EMGP). EASE-EMGP is a component of the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) program of the USAID
✓ **Cost:** USD 1.14 million plus an identical sum raised by Parent Teacher Associations (PTA).
✓ **Duration:** 2008-2012
✓ **Donor:** USAID
✓ **Region(s):** ARMM, Western Mindanao, Southern Mindanao, Central Mindanao, Caraga.

2. Description Narrative

a) **Overview:**

The Education Awareness Support Effort (EASE) (also referred to as the Education Matching Grant Program (EMGP)) is part of the larger USAID-funded Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM). GEM provides a range of support to communities in Mindanao. GEM-EASE is a matching grant program that provides in-kind matching support for community investments in education services - meaning that for every computer/desk/book that the community (usually the Parent Teacher Association) purchases for a participating school, the GEM-EASE project will purchase the equivalent number and amount of goods. In this way, the project aims to improve the quality of education facilities and to empower PTAs to take a greater role in providing resources to their schools.

b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

The GEM program implicitly pursues a goal of peace and security, and the GEM-EASE program is seen to support conflict prevention and stabilization through improved access to and quality of education.

c) **Project Objective:**

The objective of the project is to provide peso-for-peso matching grants to the PTAs of participating elementary and high schools. These grants provide resources to match those provided by PTAs for the improvement of the quality of educational resources and/or programs. The value of a grant is determined by the amount raised by the PTA of a qualified school (item-for-item matching).

d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

Generally, there are no stringent and voluminous eligibility requirements thereby making the grant more available, accessible and less prohibitive to the needy schools.
The mechanism followed by the PTA/Schools:
The Parent Teacher Association- PTA just have to pass a minimum of qualification requirements (primarily PTA resolution, MGP- Matching Grant Program Activity Proposal Form and Letter of Understanding) to be able to avail of the grant. There is a general process of application to prepare the interested schools and PTAs. The following process is usually followed for application & preparation for the interested schools/PTA:

1. Attend an EASE Orientation and secure an MGP (Matching Grant Program) Kit  
2. Fill out MGP Activity Proposal Form  
3. Submit completed form to GEM-PMO/EASE-EMGP Team  
4. Verify after 30 days for the status of the application  
5. If approved, a Notice of Approval will be awarded to the qualifying schools  
6. Sign a Letter of Understanding (LOU) with GEM-EASE  
7. Within 60 days after LOU signing, PTA/school to raise the counterpart funds  
8. Submit/validate documents to GEM (official receipts)  
9. GEM to procure counterpart items  
10. GEM to delivery counterpart items  
11. PTA and school officials to formally receive the items/commodities and sign delivery and matching completion documents

Mechanism followed by EASE/EMGP:

Step 1: Delimit choice of schools in the pre-qualified/pre-identified areas (CAAM: ARMM and Kalahi Para sa Kalayaan areas tied up with Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Kalahi Program.

Step 2: Visit/orient DepEd Division Head (courtesy and coordination) to help in identifying the specific schools.

Step 3: Visitation/orientation of pre-identified schools/PTAs.

Step 4: If school/PTA is interested and willing to raise the counterpart funds, generate raw project ideas with the schools/PTAs concerned.

Step 5: Prepare tentative Special Activity Fund (SAF) request for pre-approval and clearing (making sure proposal within the supportable parameters of EASE-EMGP types of projects).

Step 6: If approved through a Letter of Approval, a LOU (Letter of Understanding) signing with PTA and School Principals is made. (If counterpart funds are already available then skip Step 7).

Step 7: PTA/school to begin raising counterpart funds as approved and stipulated in the LOU; funds raised also need to be validated by EASE-EMGP.

Step 8: Delivery of EASE-EMGP counterpart items/commodities (including canvassing, procurement/purchasing and delivery); some items can be delivered even within a month if readily available or easy to procure.

Annex 1: Case Study Summaries of CBD Projects
e) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

Parents Teacher Association raises the funds for the school and the EASE-EMGP matches that figure.

f) **Site Selection:**

The conflict affected extremely poor areas of Mindanao: ARMM, Western Mindanao, Northern Mindanao, Southern Mindanao and Caraga are major focus of this project.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

a. **M & E Framework - What do they measure/Not measure:**

EASE-EMGP has no explicit monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and sustainability plan. The EASE/EMGP Area Coordinators primarily monitor the schools as part of their functions. Those Elementary & High Schools which demonstrate good management and stewardship of the goods/equipment/facilities under the grant are candidates for re-match availment. But there is no formal and clear obligation on how to sustain, maintain, and repair the EASE-EMGP grant items.

b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

Social contribution: The projects’ explicit aim is to help improve education through improved school equipment and facilities.

Economic contribution: The project has an indirect impact by allowing the students to gain employable skills. Also, some purchasing leverage may be achieved because of increased resource capacity through grants matching e.g. a school can get two computers by raising funds for only one unit; the other one provided by the matching grant, thus getting two computers while spending for only one. In some cases, sewing machines and gas range (home economics grants) are also used for small-scale livelihood programs; computer laboratories are also functioning as business centers whose income accrues to the PTA funds for use in school projects.

Social capital and social cohesion: Supporting the schools through the PTAs has allowed an important stakeholder’s participation and commitment in the education sector; tapping on the social capital in the schools (PTAs) makes the schools vibrant (horizontal cohesion). There is no explicit or formally arrangement for vertical cohesion, except in cases where the EASE/EMGP coordinators tap the Local School Boards (LSBs) or the DepEd as a matter of strategy. But in the beginning of the project, the program was presented to the various pertinent government bodies (DepEd divisions, LGUs, etc) as a matter of informative orientation about the matching grants.

Transparency and accountability: During their general assemblies, PTAs are compelled to seriously and regularly come up with financial reports on the use of their funds in the matching grants. On the other hand, there are a few instances where the counterpart goods procured by
the PTAs are not brand-new or are slightly used and what official receipts are produced may not be qualified by the program requirements. This could be an issue of transparency, where the EASE/EMGP may have to address.

Case Study Analyses

Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:

- **Segmenting the schools.** A segmentation scheme of schools might be explored to effectively extend the education assistance to them. As of now, the standard design of the EASE/EMGP significantly benefits the middle and better-off schools. However, the poor schools - which need the assistance most - are unable to significantly avail of the assistance. What is crucial in the segmentation scheme is to establish the capacity of the PTAs to raise funds, and from these amounts, establish a classification system in terms of the school ability to participate in the EASE/EMGP program. The first step is to extract some baseline of the counterpart funds raised by the schools and assess their distribution.

- **Conduct baseline study, anent to the segmentation scheme.** To scale up, USAID needs to establish an empirical baseline profile of the matching-grant schools under the behest of the EASE/EMGP, and generate data in terms of the grant distribution by school and area (what types of grant and how much), as well as measure somehow the effect or impact of the grant commodities to the education performance of the school. This baseline will benefit future matching grants in terms of targeted aid.

- **Calibrate the grant criteria.** Poorer schools and neglected areas (where poor schools are located) will continue to be neglected and under-served because of their (poor schools) incapacity to raise funds and participate in the EASE/EMGP matching grant program. When the same qualification criteria are applied to both poorer schools and better-off schools, the former will be understandably left out by the latter, resulting in some form of social exclusion or elite capture among the recipient schools. In the interest of targeted aid to better serve the poorer schools, the EASE/EMGP program can explore easing-off some rules by differentiating the criteria according to the capacity of the schools.

- **Tap the existing structures, formally.** As part of the strategy, tapping the education stakeholders, most specifically the local governments through the Local School Boards (LSBs in the province and municipal levels), will be very useful in augmenting and sustaining the PTA initiatives to raise counterpart funds for the EASE/EMGP matching grants. Aside from the LGUs/LSBs, there are private sector groups (e.g. Rotary Clubs) or civil society organizations implementing education assistance programs.

- **Invest in sustainability.** At a minimum, this can be included in the Letter of Understanding - LOUs between the EASE/EMGP and the recipient schools, for the latter to maintain and repair the grant items or commodities if necessary, depending on their lifespan (computers may sustain for about 5 years in good condition, but not much can be expected from home economics cooking utensils and the like). Part of the sustainability mechanism is a clear provision on the responsibility of the recipient schools to replace the goods and items on reasons of loss, damage or pilferage within a pre-identified lifespan period.
✓ **Invest in targeted skills enhancement program, especially for the poorer schools.** The matching grant helps alleviate the conditions among the poorer schools with 1 or 2 computers or small sound system, etc in the short term. But they will remain poor and unable to provide quality education to their students because of their sheer financial inadequacy. However, capacitating these schools and their PTAs can be more effective in the long term because of their expected ability to address their inadequacy. The poor schools can specifically benefit from fund-raising and resource mobilization programs, income-generating programs, even linking with government agencies for education assistance.

✓ **Tap the Adopt-a-School program.** The DepEd allows for the schools to be partners of private sector and civic organizations or business groups under the Adopt-a-School program, where the latter provide assistance (like scholarships, books, facilities, construction or repair) to the partner-schools as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR). Good examples are Sukailang Elementary School in Surigao City adopted by the Pacific Cement Corporation and the Nueva Fuerza Elementary School in Tagum City, which also received regular book donations from the Rotary Club.

✓ **Tap alumni graduates.** Alumni graduates or alumni associations are also good sources of assistance for the schools. The Zamboanga City High School in Zamboanga City, Malapatan National High School in Saranggani Province, and Mindanao State University – Center for Education Training and Development (CETD) in General Santos City have shown good work among their alumni which benefit their schools in return.

✓ **Include research and citation ethics in the computer curriculum.** Many schools availed of the matching grants for computer units, and are able to expose their students to computer use (encoding, surfing, research work, etc). But what is happening is that students just ‘copy and paste’ online and encyclopedia materials without conscious regard on proper citation and referencing, making these materials as their own to submit for their assignments and research work. This is giving rise to future plagiarists, a frightening undesirable consequence brought about by the matching grant. An ethics curriculum at this early stage will prevent the future problem of plagiarism among the students of the EASE/EMGP schools. This may again require for a greater complementation and integration with the USAID-EQUALLS as far as school curriculum development is concerned.

✓ **To be able to gauge real impact of the EASE/EMGP assistance to schools, it may be helpful to identify and articulate education indicators for impact.** The current practice of ensuring targeted outcomes is excellent (i.e. # of grants approved; # of computers delivered; # of books purchased, etc) but they serve more meaningful contribution when made consciously attributable to some education impact (literacy rates, cohort rates, enrolment rates, or improvement in education performance, etc). This may require establishing baseline conditions of the schools before the EASE/EMGP assistance (pre-grant), and target end-states after the EASE/EMGP assistance (post-grant).

✓ **Market the program.** Availment of the EASE-EMGP matching program could have been better accepted or availed of through more education and marketing campaigns. Such initiatives can also attract broader support to the schools/PTAs from the LGUs, LSBs and even the Department of Education.
1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ **Name of project:** Expanded Small Farmers Marketing Program (ESFMP)

✓ **Cost:** USD$ 4 million

✓ **Duration:** 2008-2012

✓ **Donor:** Catholic Relief Services (CRS) – under a grant from the US Department of Agriculture’s Food for Progress program

✓ **Region(s):** A total of 158 barangays (covering 20 municipalities and 3 cities) across 4 provinces (Bukidnon, North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat) in Mindanao.

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2. Description Narrative

a) **Overview:**

The **Catholic Relief Services**-funded Expanded Small Farms and Marketing Project (ESFMP) is a relatively small ($4 million over 3 years) agro-enterprise development project that works directly with poor small-scale farmers to provide strategic skills, services and infrastructure to improve their productivity. The project utilizes networks of NGOs to build and work with clusters of farmers (10-15 farmers per cluster) who collaborate to develop and implement small crop based projects relating largely to rice, cocoa and coffee production.

b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

By promoting empowerment processes and appropriate technologies, rural farmers can, working collectively, increase productivity and marketing capacity in order to escape dependence on unscrupulous middlemen. This will eventually lead to poverty reduction and enhanced social capital.

a) **Project Objective:**

The overall goal of ESFMP is to attain food security and sustain livelihoods for small farming households through:

1. Increasing agricultural production through the promotion of low-cost, high-yield crop varieties and cost-efficient production techniques as well as encouraging farmers to cultivate underutilized lands;

2. Providing small scale rural infrastructures such as small irrigation systems, solar dryers, and sorting sheds that will increase productivity, minimize post-harvest losses, and improve the quality and price of farmers’ goods that will be sold to markets; and,

3. Improve access to modern markets by organizing farmers in order to achieve economies of scale and linking farmers to more favorable markets.
b) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

The project is delivered primarily by the three field-level NGO partners who recruit and deploy Municipal Agro-Enterprise Facilitators (MAEFs). The MAEFs utilize an 8-step clustering methodology to assist in the formation of farmer “clusters” (averaging 10-15 farmers per cluster) that function as both production and marketing units. The partner NGOs also organize and conduct Farmer Field Schools that aim to bring the production capabilities of the farmers to a higher level while ensuring adherence to ecological responsibilities.

Each cluster must develop a Detailed Implementation Plan based on standardized participatory tools, namely i) rapid area assessment; ii) product supply assessment; iii) market chain study; and iv) value chain analysis.

Oversight is provided by provincial and municipal level Site Working Groups (SWGs) comprised of relevant local government officials. The SWGs are responsible for providing technical support such as agricultural extension services and financial support such as cost-sharing to infrastructure sub-projects.

c) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

ESFMP requires a 25% counterpart contribution towards the cost of sub-project infrastructure and equipment. This contribution can come from local governments and/or farmer clusters and may include in kind support such as labor or donated land.

d) **Site Selection:**

The project covers a total of 158 barangays (in 20 municipalities and 3 cities) across 4 provinces (Bukidnon, North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat) in Mindanao. Municipalities and barangays are selected primarily on the basis of available poverty data. Additional selection criteria include:

- Production performance in any of the three priority crops (rice, coffee and cacao);
- Presence of available and accessible agricultural production extension services;
- Willingness of the local political and community leaders to participate in the Program;
- Concentration of small farmers who are the actual tillers of land. (ESFMP targets at least 100 farmers per barangay, who form anywhere between four to ten clusters.)

In terms of beneficiary selection, CRS concentrates on the poorest of the poor whom they define as small farmers working (as owners or tenants) on plots of land that are less than one hectare in size.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

Facilitators are responsible for collecting and recording M&E data on cluster formation and performance, but the key elements of the M&E framework are run by the clusters themselves.
They are responsible for tracking production and revenue data as well as monitoring overall progress as measured against goals in each cluster’s Detailed Implementation Plan. Cluster-based monitoring results are discussed with the partner NGOs, in SWGs and at the Program Steering Committee so that bottlenecks are addressed promptly, corrective actions taken as necessary and innovations shared.

b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

- Farmer mobilization has been successful with a total of 834 clusters having been formed (averaging 10 clusters/barangay), with a total of 10,409 members. 63% of participants are engaged in rice production, 34% in coffee and the remaining 3% in cacao.

- Farmer income has increased, although composite financial data was not provided. Anecdotal data, however, supported this conclusion. Coffee growers, for instance, were receiving in excess of PP 100/kilo when selling directly to buyers versus PP 60-70 per kilo when selling to a middleman.

- Income improvements have been provided through: i) Post-harvest processing by farmers has increased product quality yielding a better market price; ii) innovative agricultural techniques have improved yields; iii) collective marketing by clusters have enhanced profit margins by cutting out middlemen; and; iv) provision of equipment and machinery (water pumps, thresher, driers, etc.) and improvements to agricultural infrastructure (mainly small scale irrigation systems) have led to improvement in agricultural techniques and enhanced crop yields. In some cases, clusters have rented out equipment to non-members further increasing group income. Additional processing opportunities have added to farmer income. For example, *tiki-tiki*, a by-product of rice, is now collected by the farmers after milling and sold as animal feeds. This was not the previous practice with traders, but income from this by-product is now covering almost 50% of farmers’ production costs in some clusters. Participating farmers expressed a high level of satisfaction with project outcomes.

- Social impact also appears to have been positive having yielded stronger community cohesion as a result of the participatory practices introduced and used throughout the project. The introduction of the SWG (Site Working Group) provided an important link to BLGU and MLGUs, strengthening vertical relations and enhancing local governance. This mechanism enabled the clusters and the LGUs to discuss and generate options that will effectively address the needs identified by the farmers to achieve their marketing objectives. Cluster members gained confidence to bring their concerns directly to local authorities. In turn this helps influence the investment plans of the LGUs for agriculture.

**Case Study Analysis:**

a) **Key Lessons Learned:**

- The ability to carry out collective marketing was the single most important factor in enabling farmers to free themselves from the grip of often unscrupulous traders and middlemen.
The introduction of Natural Farming Technology Systems (NFTS) did not, in itself, improve crop yields, but farmers found that production expenses were substantially reduced ultimately increasing their net income.

Even when some clusters experienced net losses; they demonstrated a high degree of resiliency. They generally proved able to analyse the reason behind losses and develop solutions for subsequent rounds of production and marketing.

Participatory processes used throughout the project resulted in a changing mindset among participants, eventually leading to critical behavioural change. In the past, farmers sold their produce whatever form that made money immediately, even if this meant getting a raw deal from exploitative traders. ESFMP has helped them think in terms of risks, costs and returns and negotiate crop variety, volume and price with identified buyers. The project consistently placed a high premium on making business decisions through participatory processes.

In ethnically heterogeneous communities, relationships between adversarial groups can be strengthened through participation in economic associations, instead of directly and separately engaging in the markets.

The clustering methodology, consistent use of participatory techniques and a “learning by doing” approach established a high degree of mutual trust and confidence within clusters that was critical to overall success. The adherence to key principles of transparency and accountability reinforced group trust and reciprocity.

b) Recommendations:

A stronger focus on formally establishing the clusters may, in the long run, prove crucial to longer term sustainability beyond the project intervention. Midway through ESFMP implementation, only half of the 834 clusters have complied with the basic tenets of organization building (ie. having written policies and a formal management structure).

While natural farming technologies were intensively introduced to the farmers, ecological sustainability took a backseat to market orientation. In the future it may be necessary to put a greater emphasis on NFTS so as to ensure environmental sustainability.

Future initiatives of this nature may want to consider intensifying efforts to introduce a more extensive application of conflict analysis with a view to strengthening the individual and organizational competencies of the cluster, including their capacity in conflict management.

Similarly, a more focused effort that would better integrate the gender equality principles into the project framework is required.

Finally, there is a need for more pro-active advocacy work on agricultural policy reforms in order to influence the enactment of local and national policies and regulatory frameworks that are supportive of community agro-enterprise development.
KALAHI-CIDSS: Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ **Name of project:** KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB (The Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan- Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services: Kapangyarihan at Kaunlaran sa Barangay).

✓ **Cost:** US$182.4 Million (USD 100 Million – World Bank; USD 31.4 Million – National Government; USD 51 Million – Local Governments)

✓ **Duration:** Dec 2002- June 2009

✓ **Donor:** World Bank.

✓ **Region(s):** The program has national scope but does not cover the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

2. **Description Narrative**

a) **Overview:**

The KALAHI-CIDSS program is a $185million national CDD poverty alleviation program supported through the World Bank, the national government ($31.4million) and local governments/communities ($51million). The KALAHI- CIDSS project operates as a classic community driven development (CDD) project, providing communities with access to an extensive facilitated project preparation process to identify and implement community infrastructure projects funded through block grants. The block grants are provided in 3 annual cycles to allow for institution strengthening. KALAHI-CIDSS operates within conflict affected areas but does not have specific peace building objectives. KALAHI MT was an extension of KALAHI-CIDSS. It provided additional grants to local governments/communities which performed well in the first cycles of KALAHI-CIDSS. In this phase, the local governments were given greater roles

b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

The theory of change incorporates the dual need to (i) empower communities with skills, institutions and experience to define, prioritize and implement their development priorities and (ii) addressing poverty through improvement of community level infrastructure and livelihoods. The repeated cycles are intended to allow communities to learn and familiarize themselves with the concepts and processes of participatory governance.

c) **Project Objective:**

The main objective of the project is to empower communities through enhanced participation in barangay (village) governance and involvement in the design, implementation and management of development activities that reduce poverty. This is anchored on three important goals:
1) Restoring the sense of responsibility and human dignity of communities by empowering them to manage their assets, lives and livelihoods;

2) Linking communities and social networks into the policy and administrative structure of the state by strengthening the link between the community and their local government units;

3) Establishing a development model that uses investment programs as a platform to promote representation, accountability and poverty reduction.

The program emphasizes strong community participation and accountability at the local government level in addressing poverty. The key activities of KALAHI-CIDSS are expected to empower communities, improve local governance and help reduce poverty by provision of grants for community investment programs. The program expects immediate and long-term contributions in alleviating poverty. The immediate benefits include construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure and delivery of basic services at a lesser cost to government due to higher community contributions. The long-term benefit is sustainable poverty reduction through improvement in governance by empowering local communities to influence local government structures.

d) Site selection:

KALAHI-CIDSS targets the poorest communities. It is national in scope but excludes the areas covered by the ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP). The program has a systematic way of identifying the targeted beneficiaries. The provinces with poverty incidence above national average of 33.7% based on the computation of the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) were selected. Forty provinces with an estimated 5,378 barangays in 193 municipalities fall under this list. From this, the poorest quartile of municipalities were chosen using a poverty ranking methodology supported by rapid appraisals, household/barangay official interviews, and the extensive use of secondary data.

Coverage will be expanded to include poor urban areas for the second cycle of KALAHI-CIDSS through the US Government funded Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant. The cities identified by DSWD for the piloting of urbanized KALAHI-CIDSS are Zamboanga, Davao, Koronadal, Cagayan de Oro, and Butuan.

As of 2011, the KALAHI-CIDSS program covered 12 regions with 42 participating provinces. From these provinces, 4,841 barangays in 214 municipalities are recipients of KALAHI-CIDSS projects. These involves 1,014,489 households with an average household size of 5.2. The average poverty incidence of LGUs with KALAHI-CIDSS projects is 53%.

e) Project Delivery Mechanism:

The KALAHI-CIDSS program is implemented following 16 detailed steps:

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<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Steps</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. Social preparation</td>
<td>1. Municipal Orientation</td>
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<td>2. Brgy Orientation</td>
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<td>3. Participatory Situation Analysis (PSA)</td>
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f) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

The Philippine National Government along with Barangay members and Local Governments are the counterpart contributors to the KALAHI-CIDSS.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

   a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

   ✓ The KALAHI-CIDSS program has a robust monitoring and evaluation system. The community monitoring system trained the community to monitor and track the infrastructure projects. The program also has its internal monitoring system and an external monitoring system done by NGOs. For example, local NGOs in the municipalities of Magpet (North Cotabato) and Lake Sebu (South Cotabato) participated in the monitoring and evaluation of the KALAHI-CIDSS implementation in those communities. One published evaluation was done by the Center for Policy and executive Development of the National College of Public Administration of the University of the Philippines.

   ✓ A baseline survey for proper monitoring and evaluation of the KALAHI-CIDSS project was conducted in 2003 to capture information on household and barangay conditions in intervention and comparison communities. It served as the first round of a panel survey that will track 2,400 households and 132 barangays before, during, and after project implementation. It will be used to evaluate the impact of the program on poverty reduction, social capital, empowerment and governance. It was also used as guide in management decisions. A midterm evaluation was done in 2006 and final evaluation in 2008.

   **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

   **A. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN MATERIAL BASIS**

   ✓ The KALAHI-CIDSS projects created temporary employment for the members of the community. While the community members volunteered some of their time as a part of their counterpart in
The cost of the projects, community members also get paid for a portion of the work they’ve provided.

- The projects also contributed to the creation of new economic activities in the community. In Barangay Luhib in Lake Sebu, in South Cotabato, the electrification project allowed members of the community to set up sari-sari stores.
- Road projects connected the distant communities to the town center. Footpaths improve their mobility.
- The upgrading of irrigation systems in the barangays of Sadanga improved crop production. Water systems provided safe drinking water to the community and helped women and children saved time from accessing water supply especially in the mountainous areas.
- Day care centers provided safe place for toddlers and young children to learn. School buildings help improve access to education and condition of learning.
- It was also able to compliment the increase in the number of enrollees due to the conditional cash transfer program.
- The establishment of health center in the barangay improved the access of Barangay Embarcadero in Juban, Sorsogon to health services. Now, health workers regularly visit the community. The facility is used for maternity needs, for administering immunizations and for checking up on the health of the community members.
- The construction of sea walls prevented shore erosion and at the same time protected communities from rising sea level.

B. SUBSTANTIAL OR SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CHANGE

1. GOVERNANCE

- The KALAHI-CIDSS projects provided opportunity for new community leaders to emerge. Some of the KALAHI-CIDSS volunteers were elected as members of the barangay councils in the communities visited. Some volunteers were hired to work as barangay secretaries and treasurers.
- The community members interviewed for this project are more aware about accountability, transparency and participatory process. They are more aware about the concept of the barangay development council, barangay development plan, participation in the planning, and implementation process of local projects.
- There was increased faith in governance because of the completed projects. Some communities shared that they entertained doubts about the KALAHI-CIDSS projects. They did not believe that it was possible to complete the projects. The completion of the projects and the participatory nature of the process renewed their trust in governance. Because of this, the participation of community members in barangay assemblies improved.
- The communities also saw the KALAHI-CIDSS process as an alternative way for the government in providing infrastructure. For the communities, this is a better way of providing infrastructure compared to the traditional way of hiring contractors.
- The projects also provided an opportunity for the local officials and the community members, particularly the volunteers, to work together. Local officials saw this as an opportunity to exercise leadership with the community. Even if barangay officials were not allowed to take on bigger roles in the implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS, they still volunteered in the construction of the sub-projects and mobilization of volunteers. These initiatives renewed the faith of the community to the barangay leadership.
2. SOCIAL CAPITAL

- The KALAHI-CIDSS projects strengthened social capital in the communities. One of the critical stages of the program is community organizing. This brought together the community members to work together, identify community problems and help find solution to these problems. Furthermore, community members were organized to form peoples’ organizations.
- The program improved the relationship of the members of the community. It provided an opportunity for the community to work together, go beyond their differences and revived the spirit of volunteerism for the gain of the community.
- The projects also improved the relationship of the community and the barangay government officials because they were given the opportunity to work together.

3. COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT

- With respect to community empowerment, the program provided capability building to the community. The capacity building activities provided by KALAHI-CIDSS improved the skills and confidence of community members.
- The project also provided mechanism to ensure the participation of the marginalized in the community, particularly women and indigenous people. The participation of women is very apparent in the communities visited.
- The program also ensures the participation of indigenous communities. Some noted that this is the first time for IP communities to receive a grant from the national government and participate in governance.
- The KALAHI-CIDSS program has a mechanism to minimize elite capture by actively monitoring the participation of women and IPs in the community. However, to some extent, there is a limitation. Some community members are discouraged to participate because of low level of literacy.

B. PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

- This research suggests that a community based approach to development may contribute to peace building through the convergence of participatory processes that empowers the stakeholders of the project and the outcomes that result to significant political changes and access to material and non-material resources. Substantial or significant political changes include reform or building of institutions that address grievances or governance issues, improved transparency, and create initiatives for working on peace.
- The implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS was able to facilitate resolutions of internal conflicts in communities. It improved the relationship of community members allowing them easily discuss and resolve conflict between households. In some cases, it was able to resolve issues between barangays/tribes.
- The KALAHI-CIDSS project was able to implement in areas where private armies and conflict between traditional politicians exist but the project did not contribute to the management or prevention of this type of conflict.

4. Case Study Analyses

  a) **Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:**
KALAHI-CIDSS program empowered the communities through its participatory process. It did have an impact on the material needs of the communities. However, this impact is still not significant enough to alleviate the communities from poverty.

The program introduced both the communities and the local politicians to participatory governance. The program allowed new leaders in the communities to emerge. However, questions remain about whether these political changes are significant and sustainable even after the grants have ended.

For the communities interviewed in this research, no communities have acknowledged that it is possible to continue doing the participatory planning and budgeting in the community given the existing community budget. The communities have associated the KALAHI-CIDSS approach to doing projects with grants. The local officials interviewed for this project explained that the budget of the local governments is not enough to implement projects using the KALAHI-process.

There are some serious concerns about the sustainability of KALAHI-CIDSS as the local government especially the poor ones do not have sufficient funds for development.

It is also important to point out that, based on the interviews with local executives; KALAHI-CIDSS was able to diminish the ‘agitation point’ of armed groups in the CPP-NPA-NDF areas. This is primarily because the communities finally felt the presence of the national government. Some of these poor communities received grant from the national government for the first time in decades. In a way, KALAHI-CIDSS contributed to the legitimacy of government.

It was also able to improve social cohesion and contribute to conflict management and peace building in conflict areas like Pinabacdao and Sadanga.

KALAHI-CIDSS provided an effective delivery of infrastructure and services in poor communities. It empowered communities, improved community relationships, and the relationships of communities with their local leaders.

Annex 1: Case Study Summaries of CBD Projects
1. DESCRIPTION:

- **Name of project:** Mindanao Rural Development Program (MRDP)
- **Cost:** $83.75 million- Adaptable Program Loans (APL-2 only)
- **Duration:** 2007 – 2012
- **Donor:** World Bank
- **Region(s):** 225 municipalities and cities in the 26 provinces of Mindanao

2. Description Narrative

   a) **Overview:**

   The Mindanao Rural Development Program (MRDP) has been supported by the World Bank since 1998. The project that was reviewed was the second APL commencing in 2007 and consisting of an $83.75 million loan. The MRDP covers 225 municipalities and cities in the 26 provinces of Mindanao. The project supports rural infrastructure (72.8% of total project), a community fund for agricultural development (CFAD, which is 19.3% of total project), a natural resources management component (3.5%) and an institutional strengthening component (3.5%). The CFAD component, which supports agricultural communities to identify and implement livelihood projects and small infrastructure to meet food security and support agribusiness, was the component reviewed most closely for the purposes of this study. The CFAD component aims to integrate local governments through the Barangay Development Plan (BDP) and through counterpart funding requirements, although funds and project implementation is managed by Peoples Organizations (PO) directly.

   b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

   The program’s theory of change lies in the belief that rural development will contribute to poverty alleviation. More particularly, the provision of “social” projects (e.g., water systems), if they address real community needs, is believed to contribute to poverty alleviation.

   c) **Project Objective:**

   The long-term objective of MRDP is to reduce rural poverty in Mindanao particularly by improving incomes and food security through agri-fisheries infrastructure, livelihood enterprise, and biodiversity conservation projects (MRDP website 2011). The program focuses on strengthening rural public investment programs, reinforcing the Local Government Code framework, while ensuring close involvement of rural communities in the design and implementation of public investment programs intended to improve productivity and livelihoods (Project Appraisal Document 2007). Although the project does not have an explicit peacebuilding objective, the program is envisioned to support the broader goal of "advancing
the peace initiative in Mindanao through the provision of greater economic opportunities and integration, particularly to indigenous communities and other disadvantaged groups”.

d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

MRDP was designed as a series of four Adaptable Program Loans (APL) implemented over a span of 15 years. The MRDP supports four components: rural infrastructure (72.8% of total project), a community fund for agricultural development (CFAD, which is 19.3% of total project), a natural resources management component (3.5%) and an institutional strengthening component (3.5%).

The CFAD component adheres to the concept of social participation, whereby local communities are empowered and capacitated to serve as the designers, monitors, evaluators, and beneficiaries of the project activities. The community driven development (CDD) cycle of the CFAD component follows five general stages or steps: a) pre implementation/pre-project; b) proposal preparation; c) appraisal and verification; d) implementation; and e) post project (CFAD Manual 2011). In general, projects implemented through the CDD process are expected to be completed within a timeframe of 12 months.

e) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

For the CFDA component the Peoples Organizations (PO) are asked to put up equity or counterpart funds: 10% of the project cost for small support infrastructure and food security intervention, and 25% for income generating projects. The bigger equity is justified for the latter because the (PO) is expected to earn from the assistance from MRDP. Examples of counterparts include provision of the lot/land and post planting maintenance for crop production.

f) **Site Selection:**

During the 1990s Mindanao contained over three quarters of the Philippines poorest provinces. This was the main justification for starting a Rural Development Program in Mindanao. There is no sub-provincial selection process as MRDP covers all 225 municipalities. It is important to note that even though all municipalities are covered, the provincial government, through a set of criteria, prioritizes municipalities to be enrolled in the MRDP. Criteria include, among others, agri-fishery potential, presence of Barangay Development Plans, poverty incidence, and absence of foreign-assisted projects.

3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:

a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

The M&E framework that was investigated relates to the CFAD component.

1) **Community Based Monitoring**

Peoples Organizations are supposed to have a monitoring and evaluation committee to track how operations and maintenance plans are being followed and implemented. However, the
monitoring activities of these committees tend to be for purposes of record keeping. It is unclear how records are being discussed to improve project implementation, maintenance, and sustainability.

2) **Role of Local Government in Monitoring**

Municipal Project Management and Implementation Unit (MPMIU) has M&E responsibilities and is tasked to conduct periodic assessments of the POs’. However, lack of funds at the LGU level limit the number of actual visits that can be done to conduct such assessments. The lack of monitoring has a crucial impact on sustainability of projects. Some problems could be addressed at an early stage if agriculture officers had the budget to travel to the sites and give advice to the POs.

3) **Program Level Monitoring**

Supervision Missions conducted by the World Bank have been occasions to provide feedback to the Program Support Office, the Department of Agriculture, and the Government of the Philippines on the program’s progress and challenges. These missions, however, are conducted in a limited number of sites and are often for good performing projects. It is not clear, however, if the monitoring results or lessons gathered from the visits are shared with LGUs and the community.

b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

The expected CFAD outcomes, at the end of APL2 in December 2012, are as follows:

- ✓ 30% of the community funds allocation are accessed by Indigenous Peoples (IPs), another 30% by women and the remaining 40% to be allocated to other marginalized groups, including the youth sector;
- ✓ At least 80% of participating communities develop, implement, and manage community projects using appropriate and sustainable technologies;
- ✓ At least 50% of participants in agriculture and related economic activities are women; and
- ✓ At least 30% of the participants that actively take part in agriculture and related economic activities in community projects are IPs.

4. **Case Study Analyses**

a. **Key Lessons Learned:**

- ✓ After projects are finished, residents claim that there are less community level quarrels because they are busy with productive endeavours and have less time for gossip. Family conflicts and tensions are also lessened because of better income and petty thefts have been reduced. In mixed communities, projects help lessen feelings of mistrust due to natural interactions brought about by the use of facilities. Members of feuding families whose individual members are not in conflict also interact with each other when using post harvest facilities.
LGUs are of the opinion that the provision of agriculture assistance helps alleviate the community’s poor conditions and discourage residents’ involvement in insurgency (FGD with Mayor Plaza, FGD in Talaingod August 2011). Community members also believe that their new and higher level capacities discourage them from being lured to join rebel groups. As projects contributed to improved earnings, more savings, food security and economic security, involvement in economic activity leads to a stronger resolve to resist being recruited into groups espousing violence or radicalism.

Community based initiatives, because they respond to real needs identified by local residents, have greater chances of being sustainable. However, as discovered in this study, community based initiatives need more than merely grassroots support.

The MDRP projects gave regular community residents the opportunity to interact with vertical actors, particularly with the DA in the province, and with municipal and barangay leaders. Because of the MDRP project, the community plans have been integrated in the regional DA plans. The project also introduced new ideas and participatory practices into the DA bureaucracy and these are gaining appreciation.

The project helps strengthen the presence of LGUs at the community level and helps bring the LGU closer to barangay residents. New bridges and positive interaction were fostered between the community (through the PO) and the BLGU; the PO and the Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO); and the MAO and the BLGU. With the involvement of LGU officials, community members were encouraged to attend meetings and be more participative. The level of trust of community members towards LGU was improved, especially when communities receive assistance for the first time.

The CDD process provided options in the choice of agriculture related assistance. Communities that lacked access to economic opportunities were provided avenues to improve incomes and address their economic grievances.

b. Key recommendations:

The CFAD manual is a comprehensive and detailed guide on the CDD process of MRDP. What needs improvement is the procedural consistency and faithfulness to the letter and spirit of the manual. In particular, the program needs to ensure inclusiveness and representation in selection of beneficiaries and PO officers.

Special attention is also needed to strengthen the sustainability not only of the projects but also of the POs which maintain and operate the projects. This will involve working more closely with LGUs and soliciting their support in monitoring projects and providing post turn over assistance to POs.

Although the program does not have an explicit peace building objective, working in Mindanao necessitates that it strengthen its peace and conflict sensitivity processes. This would ensure that program processes do not introduce unintended conflict or that they do not unintentionally reinforce triggers and sources of conflict.

In relation to this, the program might want to consider developing outcome standards that would help monitor results in terms of how the projects affect the peace and conflict situation in areas served by the program.

Annex 1: Case Study Summaries of CBD Projects
MTF-RDP: Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ Name of project: Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program.
✓ Cost: US$ 50 Million
✓ Duration: March 2007- December 2010
✓ Donor: Multi-Donor fund administered by the World Bank. The main contributors are the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Sweden, and the European Commission.
✓ Region(s): Mindanao- Philippines.

2. Description Narrative

a) Overview:

Mindanao Trust Fund and Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP) was a large World Bank-funded project in areas affected by both GRP-MILF and GRP-MNLF hostilities in Mindanao. Based on the community driven development (CDD) approach, MTF aims to directly address development issues faced by conflict-affected areas by targeting communities with a high percentage of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or rebel returnees. MTF provides community block grants that are intended to help restore key basic community-level services as decided by the communities themselves. It is implemented primarily by the Bangsamoro Development Agency but also seeks collaboration and co-funding assistance from participating local governments.

b) Donor Theory of Change:

The program is based on the theory that enhanced community-level socio-economic development will lead to an improved quality of life that, in turn, will reduce community-based conflict. It is further predicated on the belief that socio-economic recovery efforts in conflict affected areas can help set the stage for a final peace agreement in Mindanao.

c) Project Objective:

The specific objectives of the program are:

a) To strengthen the capacity of communities and other local partners in Mindanao to enable them to participate in the economic and social recovery in the conflict affected areas in Mindanao and to promote inclusive and effective governance processes;
b) To undertake sub-project activities for communities, LGUs and IDPs to assist in their economic and social recovery.

These objectives will be pursued through three interlinked activities:

1) Economic and social recovery is through the provision of assistance to barangays, municipalities, groups of internally displaced people, and local groups for sub-projects, where access to funding will be contingent on compliance with defined sub-project
appraisal criteria requiring socially inclusive planning, equitable access to benefits, counterpart contributions, and observance of technical and safeguard policy standards.

2) Inclusive governance processes are promoted through involvement of key Mindanao stakeholders including barangays and municipalities engaged in participatory planning, implementation, and management of local development activities that are gender-sensitive and culturally appropriate.

3) Effective governance is promoted through the learning process of inclusive multi-stakeholder consultation and decision making at the level of municipalities, and barangays, supplemented by capacity building targeting the implementing agency, municipalities, barangays and community people’s organizations to enhance an inclusive, transparent, and effective planning process regarding the use of project funds supplemented by local contributions whether from MTF-RDP or from other funding sources.

d) Site selection:

Guided by the result of a multi-donor joint need assessment in 2005, the Mindanao Trust Fund was created. The MTF-RDP was designed to support post-conflict reconstruction and assist the economic and social recovery of conflict-affected and vulnerable areas in Mindanao. It aims to “build confidence among the affected communities to strive for peace”. The program was for conflict-affected areas, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and rebel returnees to identify the basic services they need, benefit from the visible restoration of these basic services and for the local government units to sustain these services. The program is implemented in conflict affected areas affected by both GRP-MILF and GRP–MNLF hostilities.

e) Project Delivery Mechanism:

The MTF-RDP is implemented in two phases.

**Phase 1** focuses on capacity-building and provision of technical assistance to the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) – the development arm of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), local government units and community groups. It also includes implementation of community and local sub-projects in conflict-affected communities while the peace process is in progress. **Phase 2** is designed to be a full scale implementation reconstruction programs. With the agreement of the Government, the donors and the Mindanao stakeholders, Phase 2 will be implemented when a peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF is signed. It includes expanded technical assistance and capacity building support for the implementing partners and the implementation of substantial development program through block grants and sub-projects in conflict affected areas. Included in the plan for Phase 2 is the gradual transfer of full program management responsibility to BDA. Aside from the BDA, the other key partners for MTF-RDP are the Office of the President for Peace Process, Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA), the ARMM Regional Government and the local government units where the projects are implemented.

This **six-step process** guided the BDA field workers and the ISP on-site coaches in assisting communities. Priority projects are identified through a participatory process by the members of the community. After the projects are prioritized and selected, municipal staff and project
engineers help with the design. The municipal multi-sectorial committee will then appraise and approve the proposed project for implementation.

**Step 1:** Institutional preparation at the municipal level.
**Step 2:** Social preparation and community planning.
**Step 3:** Sub-project proposal preparation. This step constitutes the basic procedure for the development and submission of a sub-project proposal for the MTF-RDP block grant.
**Step 4:** Sub-project appraisal and approval. The appraisal stage focuses on project quality.
**Step 5:** Sub-project implementation. Once the sub-project proposal is finally approved and endorsed by the BDA Central Management Office, the PO will take the necessary steps to prepare for the sub-project implementation from the downloading of funds, procurement and construction.
**Step 6:** Sub-project completion, operation and maintenance. This is the final step of the CDD implementation. In this stage, the PO is expected to prepare and submit a completion report.

f) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

The fund is jointly funded by the US, Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, and Sweden under the World Bank.

3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:

a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

In the project, the M&E impact to peace building is measured by the number of conflicts resolved by the community. While the program has a peace building objective, staff of the BDA shared that there are no peace building programs/activities under the MTF-RDP except for the VTT (Values transformation trainings). They also shared that their M&E capacity should be strengthened and that the role of the Trust Fund Recipient in M&E should be clarified.

b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

i. **Changes in Material Needs – Social & Economic Impact:**

- As of the end of 2009, MTF-RDP has completed a total of 91 sub-projects in 62 barangays in 53 municipalities in 16 provinces in Mindanao under the regular CDD sub-program.
- The program has completed 38 sub-projects composed of twelve community centres, twelve potable water supply systems, eight post-harvest facilities, four concrete access paths, and two barangay electrification projects. Community Centres include livelihood, trading, learning, and health centres; Concrete Access Paths include the construction of footbridge, tire path, and farmers’ pathway; while Post-Harvest Facilities include solar dryers, warehouses/crop store houses, copra dryers and grills.
- Under the 2009 Annual Work Program the sub-projects benefited a total of 72,446 individuals (35,150 male and 37,296 female)—roughly about 14,490 households across the six regions covered.
- In providing basic services in the communities, MTF-RDP has provided some of the needed basic amenities.
ii. Political Changes

1. Governance Impact:

✓ The communities feel more aware of transparency, accountability and mechanisms which improved participation of people. However, it is difficult to associate this to significant change in governance in MTF-RDP communities. There is no clear way to institutionalize the transparency, accountability and participatory mechanisms that the communities learned from the MTF-RDP program.

✓ The communities noted that there is less corruption with the process like MTF-RDP because of transparency, financial reporting and monitoring. They also stressed that the quality of construction of MTF-RDP projects is better than the usual government funded infrastructure constructed through contractors because there is less corruption through the CDD process.

2. Community Empowerment:

✓ The community recipients of the MTF-RDP projects felt empowered by the project because of the participatory nature of the project. There was a sense of accomplishment for being able to complete the sub-projects.

✓ The trainings improved the capability of the members who participated in the implementation of the program.

✓ The conscious effort of the program to encourage the participation of women and IPs empowered the minority groups and provided them with the opportunity to be part of the decision process.

✓ The communities who were able to interact and work with their community leaders were provided with opportunity to interact and build relationships with their local officials.

iii) Social Cohesion:

✓ Due to limited number of mobilized individuals in the community, the impact on social cohesion is limited.

✓ The establishment of POs in communities was very helpful in providing support to the community.

✓ The projects provided an opportunity for the members of the POs and the barangay LGUs to work together. There is very limited impact on improving the relationship between the community members and the MLGUs because of the limited interaction between them.

iv) Conflict & Peace building:

✓ The MTF-RDP projects implemented in mix communities provided an opportunity for the members of the community and the BDA to work together and change the perception about Muslims and the MILF.

✓ The peace building component of the project is very limited according to BDA staff. Based on the interview, they shared that they have available modules on conflict resolution and gender and peace building but only the VTT was part of the MTF-RDP project. The BDA staff shared that only the volunteers are able to participate in the VTT training (around 20-30 volunteers in each barangay). This is very small relative to the size of the community.
With respect to conflict between households or community members, the BDA staff shared that MTF-RDP has a grievance redress system where the community organizers would facilitate and try to assist community members resolve the problems themselves. The community members were also given a phone number where they can call to report irregularities regarding the project.

The sub-projects of the MTF-RDP were able to bring changes in the material needs of the communities. The communities feel, however, that these sub-projects were still very limited in terms of helping them with their basic needs. Furthermore, concerns were raised on the ability of the POs to sustain the sub-projects without any assistance from the local government.

The impact on political changes was also limited. The program was empowering particularly to women and the IPs. However, because of the limited participation of the LGUs in the program, there was also limited opportunity to affect governance in the communities where the projects were implemented.

4. Case Study Analyses

a. Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:

The sub-projects that MTF implemented helped the community. The participatory nature of the program empowered its members and gave them a sense of accomplishment. The trainings that they underwent improved their confidence. Unfortunately, the MTF program was only able to mobilize 20-30 members of the community to volunteer for the sub-project. Some community members would express hesitation in participation in surveys. This limited the success of the program. It indicated the need to review the social preparation process to further understand the community and formulate strategies to increase participation and improve trust between community members.

MTF-RDP has identified the role of LGUs as a critical element in achieving the end goals of the program. The LGUs were envisioned to help sustain the delivery of basic services in the community. The program identified some entry points for LGU participation. Unfortunately, the actual participation of LGUs in the program was very limited. Except for some LGUs who provided counterparts for the sub-projects, most LGUs do not see themselves as part of the program. The sustainability of the sub-projects depends on the POs organized by program in each community. Even though the communities learned the concepts of participation, accountability and transparency from the trainings and the actual implementation of the sub-projects, there was no opportunity to participate in governance or to improve governance. The program has a limited impact in improving the relationship of the community and the local governments.

The program was able to improve the access of communities to some basic services like water. It provided opportunity to communities to improve their livelihood by providing solar dryers and warehouses. Footpaths connected communities. And the provision of multipurpose buildings provided places for the members of the communities to converge and discuss issues that concern the communities. It contributed to improving their social relations and their quality of life. However, the communities shared that their communities have many needs and one project is not enough to lead to alleviate them from poverty. Some communities shared that they also have to tailor their sub-projects based on the available funds provided by MTF-RDP since the program cannot support their first priority. Furthermore, there is uncertainty on the
sustainability of the projects because of lack of support from LGUs. This also limits the potential social and economic benefits of the sub-projects to the communities. Some communities have empty health centers and no trainings are conducted in their training centers.

✓ The MTF-RDP contributed to peace building. The projects provided an opportunity for Muslims, Christians and IPs to work together and improve tolerance and understanding. To some extent, it changed the perception of Christians involved in the community sub-projects about the MILF and their ability to implement development projects.

✓ MTF-RDP, however, has limited effect in addressing rido. In some ways, the provision of facilities and resources in the community helped reduce potential conflicts between families but the communities feel that to help manage conflicts like rido, key leaders of the communities need to be trained in conflict management.

✓ Overall, MTF-RDP has potentials in contributing to peace building, conflict management and development in Mindanao. Improving social preparation to incorporate conflict analysis, increasing the number of community members participating in the sub-projects to create more venues to build trust between community members, partnering with local officials to provide opportunity to affect governance and improve the relationship of the community and government and longer interventions in the community may help in achieving the outcomes of the program.
PACAP: Philippine- Australia Community Assistance Program

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ **Name of project**: Philippine – Australia Community Assistance Program.
✓ **Cost**: AUS $28.3 million
✓ **Duration**: 2005-2010
✓ **Donor**: AusAID
✓ **Region(s)**: Five provinces: Bohol, Northern Samar in Visayas, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Misamis Occidental during the period covered.

2. Description Narrative

a) **Overview**:

The Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP) is a longstanding small grants initiative started after the “People’s Power” revolution in 1986. Over its 25 year span it has provided more than 2,100 grants to CSOs and NGOs in 60 of the country’s 89 provinces. During the period reviewed (2005-2011), PACAP’s grant-making consisted of two demand-responsive facilities: FOCAS (Focused Community Assistance Scheme) that makes medium-term grants, up to 3 years duration, primarily to NGOs which are intended to implement community-based initiatives in collaboration with local government agencies; and RAS (Responsive Activity Scheme) is a more targeted fund that made short-term, up to 1-year grants to NGOs and CSOs in five conflict-affected provinces in southern Philippines.

b) **Donor Theory of Change**:

In PACAP’s Theory of Change (Kelly & Crawford, p. 12), the PACAP Secretariat was responsible for four major activities: facilitate the community-based development relationships (community engagement); appraise, fund, and monitor partner projects (grant administration); strengthen the capacity of partners (capacity building), and analyse and learn about the drivers of changes and causes of failure (monitoring and evaluation). If these major activities were properly implemented, PACAP would be able to innovate and respond to the community needs, through their RAS, and build collaborative networks of civil society, government, and the private sector so these could meet local priorities and create an enabling environment for further development through the FOCAS. These two schemes would ultimately lead to poor communities across the country empowered to pursue economic growth and achieve better standards of living.

c) **Project Objective**:

The objective of the project was to tap and empower poor communities and local groups by giving them grants, thus enabling them undertake economic and social projects. With these projects, the beneficiaries tackled poverty in their own distinct ways, according to the latitude afforded by their geographical location, social position, religious affiliation and economic situation.
PACAP’s objective is to reduce poverty and improve the standard of living of poor communities through sustainable economic and social development and achieve better living standards of living.

d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

During the period covered, PACAP was coordinated by and Australian managing contractor and consultants. PACAP screened all the proposals submitted by communities and groups, monitored the implementation, and extended trainings and related activities to upgrade the capability of the latter. The committee tasked to do the screening was composed of representatives from AusAID, the Government of the Philippines, NGOs, and the academe. RAS was focused on working with the community-based organizations (those who applied for grants) and this involved the following steps:

1. Proponent organizations sent their expression of interest to the PACAP Coordinator.
2. PACAP Coordinator assisted the organizations to design their proposals, and ensured that necessary actors were mobilized. The LGUs were encouraged to provide both technical and staff assistance. It was also important to align the proposals with the local and provincial development plans, and that stakeholders were involved in the decision-making, implementation and monitoring of the project.
3. PACAP Steering Committee reviewed the proposals. The projects received funding only if it satisfied the criteria.

e) **Site Selection:**

In most communities where FOCAS and RAS projects were implemented, the beneficiaries were characterized as poor. Most of the households in the project areas were living below the poverty line. They depended on subsistence farming, fishing and gathering of forest products. Those who lived in far areas (uplands or on the other side of rivers) had very limited access to education, health services, water and sanitation. Some had their sources of livelihood threatened by floods, pollution, logging and mining activities, land conversion, and industrial activities. Beneficiaries who were engaged in micro-enterprises did not have enough capital, market linkage, proper equipment, appropriate skills and access to information. Unemployment was a common problem, with fewer businesses investing.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

a. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

**Giving Voice and Allowing Participation.** The selection of the projects that were funded under the FOCAS and RAS were based on seven parameters:

a) Socio-Economic Benefits and Technical Soundness. This included the ability of the projects to encourage the creation of new enterprises or increase productivity of the existing enterprises. Projects were validated if these responded to the needs of the
community, if these were consistent with the FOCAS/RAS strategies, and if these possessed appropriate technology and design.

b) Social Impact. This highlighted the types of beneficiaries who should be assisted, social issues and risks that should be addressed, gender issues and other effects on women, and the empowerment impact on communities.

c) Financial Aspects. This covered the requirement and the cost-sharing arrangements, cost-efficiency and financial soundness/viability of the projects.

d) Environment Assessment. This looked into the impact of the project implementation on the environment.

e) Institutional Assessment. This weighed in the capacity and the level of maturity of the NGO/PO partner, the inclusion of the LGUs and the local stakeholders, and the institutional arrangements such as roles, responsibilities and accountabilities.

f) Logical Framework or the M&E System. This ensured that the project had a clear system where indicators and outputs could be measured, and the interventions had clear contribution to the intended outcomes and impact.

g) Sustainability and Exit Plan. This required the project to have a good chance of becoming sustainable or could be self-managed by the beneficiaries or partners once the PACAP support ended.

Building horizontal and vertical relationships. PACAP was able to build horizontal and vertical relationships, with the local government units (LGUs) from the barangay to the provincial levels. LGUs were focused on poverty reduction and PACAP created opportunities for the LGUs to be involved in projects that were largely coming from the beneficiaries themselves (that is, more demand-driven poverty-reduction projects). Secondly, vertical relationships also improved within communities where PACAP projects were implemented, such that residents or local groups acknowledged how strategic it was for them to share resources and expertise.

The PACAP program demonstrated how poor communities took development into their own hands. Community-based development was achieved through the strength of the network of support organizations, program design and execution, and the increasing involvement of the stakeholders in program activities.

Exploring entry points for peace, development and governance. PACAP embedded the participatory processes in its program design, starting from the identification of specific projects until the conduct of monitoring and evaluation activities. PACAP encouraged better stakeholder engagement. The program’s FOCAS scheme necessitated the collaboration between the LGUs, the CSOs (civil society organizations) and the beneficiaries themselves, resulting to projects that were aligned with the LGU plans and strategies. All participating organizations and key people were mobilized according to their mandates, capacities and contributions.

The case of Baba’s Foundation, located in Davao City, generally provided micro-lending services. However, to ensure that the beneficiaries were able to manage the funds they borrowed, the Foundation also provided the cooperatives with training and installed systems in their financial affairs. The training was on the topics of cooperative organizing, micro-credit management, and leadership development. With this approach, Baba grew in terms of financial resources and client base: PhP 3 million in 2004 to PhP 30 million, and they now have a client portfolio of 8,000 customers in 8 branches in Davao City, Davao del Norte, and Compostela Valley.
Generating options through involvement in decision making. The community consultation at regular intervals is critical in generating new ideas, innovations, and in incorporating feedback and recommendations. The beneficiaries and the program partners were able to generate different options on how to overcome barriers to social, economic, and political development.

Another is the provision of “whole package of services” as demonstrated in the support to The Philippine Foundation for Resource Management (PRFM) based in Lanao del Sur. Prior to PACAP, their services were limited to providing farm inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and working animals. The realization of extensive needs of farmer-beneficiaries led to the creation of “chain of agriculture centers” in key farming areas of the province. This approach hinged on “full-scale mechanized farming”, underscoring that the “old method” was no longer feasible due to market and environmental forces. Following consultation with the farmers and the local leaders, the importance of organization was highlighted and addressed through formation of farmers association. Subsequently, the association was provided with capability building support to enable them to manage the centers, where facilities such as hand tractors, rice threshers, rice milling equipment and hauling truck could be used by the farmers for a fee. The PFRM also helped the association set-up a grocery store.

4. Case Study Analyses

a. Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:

Impact on Governance:

✓ Communities developed skills needed to manage local organizations and enterprises, resulting in an increase in their financial resources and expanding linkages with resource agencies. The interaction has also led to awareness of social issues, environmental problems, political matters and governance practices. The newly acquired skill set has been useful in problem analysis and conflict resolution and confidence building.

✓ For indigenous peoples, the acquisition of tenurial instruments (such as Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title or Certificate of Land Ownership Award) has resulted in sense of control with the IPs having rights to the land and income.

✓ The inclusion of the beneficiaries in project activities allowed them to speak their mind leading to a sense of commitment within the community. PACAP contributed to significant improvements in the organizational capacity of the partner CSOs through the 668 capacity-building workshops. The CSOs gained knowledge and skills on proposal preparation, networking, internal systems and process, stronger relationship with LGUs, reinvigorating NGO sectors and building credibility with other donors. With these competencies, the CSOs were able to deliver the services needed by their final beneficiaries and allowed them to maximize the resources provided by PACAP.

Impact on Horizontal Social Cohesion:
✓ The project of TPYO in Carmen, North Cotabato implemented the project entitled “Life Skills for Indigenous Peoples in Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao”. With PACAP resources, the Christian, Muslim and IP youths (Aromanon-Manobos) were provided with leadership and communication skills training improving their chances for employability.

✓ Multi-sectored members of management committee brought diverse experience to Agusan Del Sur. The backgrounds, knowledge, skills and experiences added to the diversity.

Impact on Vertical Social Cohesion:

✓ The involvement of stakeholders has been a critical aspect of the project. For example in Basilan, after a fire razed a rubber plantation and the community did not have any fire-truck to be used, the PACAP partner NGO invited not only the BLGU, the Bureau of Fire Protection, private sector and all those that were living near or had stake at the plantation. They agreed on improving the fire-fighting equipment and the rescue efforts (such as first aid). With resources from PACAP, the LGUs in Lamitan strengthened their relationship by agreeing on a cooperative arrangement in case of forest fires and other fire-related incidences. The direct beneficiaries were actively involved in the process of identification, conceptualization, designing, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This reinforced their sense of belonging (working side-by-side on responding to accidents and calamities).

✓ The Jamiatu Muslim Mindanao, Inc. (JMMI) was prompted to invest in the future of the Muslim in-school youths (ISYs) and out-of-school youths (OSYs) particularly in computer/IT training. The JMMI did not work in a vacuum and involved the Parents-Teachers-Community Association (PTCA), Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Education (DepEd) and the City Government of Marawi City. Relationships were improved as each organization contributed resources to the project: the TESDA with their computer instructors and computer lab technicians, the DSWD with profiling and assessment of the beneficiaries, the PTCA for the policy formulation, DepEd for the monitoring of school curriculum and performance assessment, and the CLGU-Marawi for other networking. Another intervention provided by JMMI was to help build tolerance between Muslim and Christian Youth through dialogue and cultural education.

Economic Condition:

✓ PACAP enabled the beneficiaries to experience improvement in their economic condition. These changes included increase in family income, savings, and capital for livelihood activities improving living standards.

✓ To understand PACAP’s economic impacts, the program conducted a survey of its 99 out of its 189 agricultural projects, which resulted in an increase household’s monthly income (Increase to PhP 5,837 from PhP 3,296 before the project). For enterprises that were implemented by cooperatives, it was also revealed that the average increase in enterprise profit was 135%, leading to an increase of dividends paid to the members valued at PhP 12,000 per member per year.
In Basilan, the PACAP project also supported the needs of the beneficiaries, such as small livelihood activities (farming, backyard gardening, backyard fish pen or fish cages, and fish vending).

The tri-people youth that TPYO assisted were trained to generate their own home-based business, such as organic farming, communal fishing, beads making, and banana-chips making, and baking.

In Lanao del Sur, the farmers had more time to pursue other productive activities, since mechanization had freed them from spending more time and energy on the farms. They were also spending more time with their families. Wives of the farmers were also given training on embroidery and sewing, which brought in extra money for the home expenses.

Peace-building and Conflict Management:

PACAP contributed to the peace-building and conflict management efforts at the community level. One PACAP barangay established policies against carrying firearms into their community, which in turn established itself as a sanctuary for internally displaced persons. On the household level, marital disputes emanating from lack of financial depravity were responded with livelihood projects for women. On the possible conflict related to delinquency, the out-of-school youths were provided with education and employment opportunities. Conflict that would have risen from biases rooted in differences in ethnicity were also addressed by introducing 15 literacy programs incorporating “culture of peace” in the curriculum. Finally, conflicts over resource use were responded to by projects related to conservation of the environment. PACAP saw the establishment of 122 community-based environmental protection groups and enacted 138 new local environmental ordinances.

39 projects were implemented in conflict-affected areas. A total of 192 projects supported efforts to reduce conflict and insecurity. PACAP supported communities of internally-displaced persons, offered livelihood activities to ex-combatants, integrated culture of peace in the curriculum, and facilitated the drafting of local peace agreements of seven Peace and Development Councils. In general, the improvement of livelihood or economic condition convinced the people to renounce conflict.

The project sites of Baba’s Foundation may not extend to the conflict-affected (or conflict-riddled) areas, but a key informant said their beneficiaries experienced conflict that stemmed from poverty. Crimes that resulted from lack of income or livelihood sources such as robberies were gradually addressed. The conflict between spouses as they struggled to meet their financial needs was also lessened now that household income was augmented.

RAS has contributed in building the capacity of CSOs in managing or operating projects. FOCAS, on the other hand, has addressed the development needs of project areas because of the relatively longer presence, more extensive involvement of the stakeholders and expansive response to the prioritized needs of the areas. Under PACAP Phase 2 (between 2005 to mid of 2009), RAS approved 271 grants, which had an average of 12 to 18 months duration, and about 80% of the beneficiaries came from Mindanao. Typical RAS projects were on agriculture, income and employment, and the environment. PACAP also provided training on financial management.
and capacity building (on annual basis) to help the beneficiaries manage and maximize their funds.

**Sustainability:**

- PACAP projects are found to be sustainable because of the involvement of the stakeholders from the project identification to implementation, and monitoring and evaluation phase. The participants have owned the project and have provided counterpart, in terms of time, effort and financial resources. Additionally, the projects were a translation to the development agenda of the community, embedded in the LGU plans and supported by resolution, ordinances and executive orders. Finally, sustainability mechanisms coupled with the commitment of the officers were established, installed and continuously revised while the projects were still managed by the assisting/support organizations (other NGOs and training providers). These mechanisms ranged from reflows of micro-credit, increase in members’ shares, increase in capitalization/investment, and increase in business activities.

- There were projects that earned income and contributions from the users, such as the computer classes provided by the JMMI in Marawi. Parents of the elementary students paid PhP 50 per month for the use of the computers, incorporated in the monthly tuition fees. The OSYs on the other hand, paid Php 2,000 per course on installment basis or PhP 500 per competency modules that were collected prior to taking their module tests. TESDA gave out 40 slots of scholarships for OSYs who enrolled on Computer Hardware Servicing NC II (valued at PhP 6,000 per trainee). These fees and income were plowed back to paying the maintenance and other services. It was also fortunate that with the good performance of the ISYs and the OSYs (some graduates landed work as Internet technical while others found jobs overseas), the enrolment rate of the computer literacy project was growing.

- PACAP appeared to refine the roles of the program stakeholders, shifted their mindsets and sharpened their motivation on community development.
PALS: Philippine – Australia Local Sustainability

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ **Name of project:** Philippine-Australia Local Sustainability
✓ **Cost:** AusAID: $31.4 million; Local Government Units:$5.783 million
✓ **Duration:** 1999 - 2010
✓ **Donor:** AusAID
✓ **Region(s):** Misamis Occidental province

2. Description Narrative

a) **Overview:**

The Philippine-Australia Local Sustainability (PALS) project was an Australian Government supported 11-year integrated community development program. It maintained a concise geographic single-province focus that covered all 14 municipalities (excluding the three major urbanized areas) and all 347 barangays in Misamis Occidental, one of Mindanao's poorest provinces. PALS employed a traditional CBD-type methodology that involved community-based selection of small scale infrastructure and livelihood activities that were implemented in cooperation with local government agencies.

b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

PALS theory of change revolved around joint capacity building of community-based Peoples Organizations and local governments combined with collaborative participatory planning and small project support. These efforts were intended to lead to sustainable livelihoods among beneficiaries and eventually to province-wide poverty reduction.

c) **Project Objective:**

PALS was implemented under the umbrella of poverty reduction. PALS program goal was to strengthen participatory planning processes and local management of resources for the promotion of sustainable community livelihoods. To achieve these goals, PALS created opportunities and provided resources for the local communities, barangays, and the local government units (LGUs) to improve their capacities on participatory planning and development. The other objective was for the PALS to be managed and monitored in a cost effective and efficient manner.
d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

PALS had two main delivery mechanisms organized by the Project Management Office:

- The Program Development Facility which provided extensive capacity building support to LGUs, coupled with funding for the LGUs to make small grants to barangays that identified community livelihood initiatives through a participatory planning process linked to Barangay Development Plans; and,

- The Barangay Special Trust Fund which made grants of PP 1 million per barangay to support development sub-projects formulated by People’s Organizations (POs) that were established in participating barangays.

Typical community activities include agricultural livelihood initiatives and small-scale infrastructure, especially basic water and sanitation. Examples of local government activities include infrastructure such as farm-to-market roads, farm mechanization, and a province-wide groundwater survey.

e) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

Counterpart LGU funding was not a prerequisite although some LGUs did, in fact, make monetary or in-kind contributions or operational support upon sub-project completion.

f) **Site Selection:**

Misamis Occidental placed 7th poorest in the Philippine Poverty Statistics of 2003, 10th poorest in 2006 and eased out of the top 10 poorest list in 2009. The project covered all 14 municipalities (excluding the three major urbanized areas) and all 347 barangays in the province.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

PALS initially used the M&E system developed by NEDA, but this proved to be too complicated. A more simplified system was introduced but it was unclear, based on available project documentation, exactly what was tracked.

b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

- Capacity building was a key dimension where the program made an impact, particularly on the planning processes at the barangay and municipal levels.

- The qualitative approach on the impact of PALS to the communities revealed that indeed the program:
  - Improved living conditions of the beneficiaries;
  - Enhanced knowledge and skills (individual and organisational, which improved productivity and capacity of people’s organisations POs; and
o Led to positive unintended benefits such as social capital formation.

✓ Indirectly, PALS may have contributed to the gradual exclusion of Misamis Occidental from one of the 10 poorest provinces in the country: 7th in 2003; 10th in 2006. Recent data indicate that Misamis Occidental is no longer among the 10 poorest provinces of the country.

✓ From Phase 1 to 2, PALS managed to support 406 community livelihood projects on agricultural production, trading and vending and integrated projects as well as 262 infrastructure projects serving nearly 55,000 households.

✓ The formulation of the Barangay Development Plans in all of the 337 barangays of the 14 municipalities activated or reactivated the Barangay Development Councils, which were composed of people who knew intimately the terrain, culture and the needs of their respective communities. Seeing their proposals brought to life in the executive phase deepened the sense of project ownership among the local officials, leaders and the end-beneficiaries. The stakeholders were conscious of their roles and responsibilities.

✓ The capacity building activities were embedded in the PALS approach. Participants were provided with many opportunities to upscale their knowledge and skills.

4. Case Study Analyses

a. **Description of Conflict**

Misamis Occidental has not been a high conflict area in terms of the armed struggle for autonomy. Localized conflict has been sporadic but had not recently impacted on the areas visited for this study.

At a local scale, the study found that the most common causes of conflict were arguments between spouses, problems with children, relationship with neighbors, violence against women and workplace conflict associated with political affiliation.

b. **Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:**

✓ PALS was successful in empowering the grassroots communities, the LGUs in three levels (barangay, municipal and provincials), and the partner NGOs in the 14 municipalities covered under the program. The interviews and focus groups conducted under this study validated that there were changes in their relationships, there was upward movement on their economic status, and there was better utilization of the people’s newly developed capacities.

✓ The livelihood and capability building activities triggered participants’ desire to be more responsible and responsive to their own needs. As their household income increased and as they gained more understanding of their socio-economic-political environment, they became “content or satisfied”, fueling aspiration for more stability in their community.

✓ PALS’s design was an “open” program menu where it provided the framework in guiding communities on how to respond to their compelling development gap. The real benefits to the community were working out the ‘details’ of each project. If there were divergent opinions that existed prior to the PALS, or if there were apathy toward each other before
PALS came to their communities, there was enough room for flexibility that gave rise to the people’s innovative response to their problems.

✓ To a large extent, PALS has indirectly contributed to managing: (1) household level conflict; (2) community level conflict or conflict between households; (3) inter-community/inter-barangay conflict; (4) political conflict or conflict between feuding political clans; and (5) conflict between the national government and non-state actors.

✓ The PALS program has sufficiently showed that community-driven or community-based processes:
  
  ▪ Encouraged participation and ownership among the community members. When they take part in deciding solutions to improve their condition, they become empowered individually and collectively.
  ▪ Developed empathy and respect, helped people get over their biases and fears and people gained and dispensed trust that were necessary for ensuring stability in their communities. Once they experienced stability, they became absorbed in their economic activities and they tended to shun any elements that could upset this relative peace.
  ▪ In most cases, produced services and products were faster and more transparent than if the projects had of been solely implemented by the Government. These services and products produced additional peace points that could strengthen the economic and social fabric of such tenuous communities.
  ▪ Succeeded in building and strengthening social cohesion and to some extent promoting peace and security within its project sites.
  ▪ Built trust, expanded networks, and reciprocated positive action with the Program Management Office and other partners (government, civil society and business sectors).
  ▪ Developed trust through sharing of resources, skills/expertise and time, as well as through transparency of the processes. Networks were created and facilitated through constant interactions with different individuals and organizations. Reciprocity of action was born out of respect to rules and roles, which carried forward the inclination to share with others their positive experiences.

✓ PALS excluded three cities Oroquieta, Tangub, and Ozamis on the grounds that these were assumed to be “more resource-rich”. The program overlooked that these cities also had their “share of urban poverty and blight” and would have benefited from the program.

✓ Other operation problems of PALS included the large number of training activities for the Community Organising/Community Development, the distant training venues that made it difficult for the trainers to move from one place to the next and the tight schedules.
1. DESCRIPTION:

- **Name of project:** Poder y Prosperidad de la Comunidad Project
- **Cost:** Not stated
- **Duration:** 2005-2012
- **Donor:** Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)
- **Region(s):** 400 Barangays in Caraga, Bicol, and Region IV-A (Aurora Province)

2. Description Narrative

a) **Overview:**

PODER (Poder y Prosperidad de la Comunidad Project) is an ongoing community development program funded by AECID (Spanish Cooperation agency) which started in 2005. PODER is implemented through the Department of Social Welfare and Development and has been implemented in approximately 400 barangays in three regions Caraga, Bicol, and the province of Aurora, in Region IV-A. PODER is modelled after the successful KALAHI-CIDSS community-driven development program, effectively replicating all of the same steps that ultimately provide small-scale infrastructure that is identified by participating communities. Like KALAHI-CIDSS, PODER facilitators use participatory techniques to help target communities establish People’s Organizations that identify, implement, and manage all aspects of their chosen sub-projects.

b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

PODER’s theory of change is to empower communities and, over time, reduce poverty through the provision of small-scale infrastructure. The continued use of participatory processes throughout the sub-project cycle is intended to build social and eventually enhance local-level governance.

c) **Project Objective:**

The project aims to improve the quality of life of the residents of the chosen region and reduce the poverty level in the rural communities of Caraga, Bicol, and the province of Aurora by achieving the following:

- Empower local communities by giving them access to and control over key development decisions and resources.
- Enhance local governance by creating structures and training volunteers in practices that encourage transparency, accountability, and participation, and
- Reduce rural poverty by funding key infrastructures and service facilities in the barangays.
d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

PODER is guided by a four-level implementation and management structure. Comprising the structure are the policy-making bodies, the management bodies, the implementing bodies, and the coordinating bodies.

**Policy-making bodies:** The National Steering Committee (NSC) and the National Technical Working Group (NTWG) are the policy-making bodies of PODER. The NSC is responsible for the resolution of implementation-related issues, the imposition of sanctions to non-complying local governments and the recognition and reward of well-performing ones. Comprising the NSC are the Secretaries of DSWD as convenor, NAPC as co-convenor, DILG, DOF, DBM, and NEDA as members. Civil society is also represented with three members.

**Management bodies:** The management bodies are the National Project Management Team (NPMT) and the Regional Project Management Team (RPMT). Over-all project management is lodged at the NPMT. The NPMT directs and guides PODER’s implementation. Project operations staff and consultants are also included in the team. The Regional Project Management Team oversees the implementation of PODER in the region. DSWD’s Regional Director acts as chairperson of the team.

**Implementing bodies:** DSWD is the implementing agency of PODER. It implements the project through the National Project Management Office (NPMO), the Regional Project Management Office (RPMO) and the Area Coordinating Teams (ACTs). The NPMO looks after the day to day project operations at the national office. A National Project Manager heads the NPMO. The NPMO provides technical assistance to field office through its consultants, technical staff and DSWD personnel. At the regional level, project implementation is managed by the RPMO. It implements national policies, regional directions and strategies. The office also supervises the work of the ACTs and provides technical assistance. It is also the RPMO that manage relations with local governments and other stakeholders. The ACTs are the field implementers of PODER.

**Coordinating bodies:** PODER organizes coordinating bodies both at the provincial and municipal levels. At the former it is the Provincial Inter-Agency Committee (PIAC) and at the latter it is the Municipal Inter-Agency Committee (MIAC). Both bodies are tasked to do the following:

- Provide the technical requirements of the project;
- Facilitate coordination among various agencies;
- Monitor and review implementation; and
- Facilitate resolution of technical concerns.

e) **Site Selection:**

The regions of Caraga, Bicol, and the province of Aurora have been chosen for this project. The reason for their selection was the low per capita income of the region, high rate of poverty, and presence of the NPA (New people’s Army) insurgency.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:

a. M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:

PODER is designed to be a vehicle for learning and continuous improvement thus it involves the communities in monitoring and evaluation. It also enlists the services of independent monitors like NGOs and the media. The M&E component of PODER involves:

a) Participatory monitoring by communities on indicators defined by the communities.

b) Internal monitoring of inputs, processes, and outputs by project management.

c) External monitoring and evaluation by consultants, civil society and the media.

b. Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:

PODER is not a peace building or conflict management project, that said, its design has some of the elements of a peace building project. It attempts to effect changes in the physical life of the communities by funding projects like roads, bridges, and water systems. It also attempts to effect political changes, particularly at the local level by opening avenues for citizens participation in barangay governance and making local governments respond to community needs.

i) Material Changes – Social & Economic Impact:

✓ The implementation design of PODER fosters empowerment of communities and strengthens the relationship of the communities with their local governments. The design of the project ensures that communities participate in the identification, implementation, and maintenance of projects. The communities also get to manage the funds allotted for the project by keeping a community account and being involved in the disbursement and accounting of the funds.

✓ The sub-projects implemented by PODER include road concreting, re-gravelling, water systems, classrooms, day care centers, health centers, flood control dikes, sea wall, drainage, irrigation, school buildings, solar dryers, and bridges. One sub-project each is implemented in one barangay per cycle. Some barangays get two or three projects if chosen in the three cycles of PODER.

✓ According to the reports of PODER, the roads and bridges lowered the cost of transport in the barangays that implemented these sub-projects; the health centre facilitated the delivery of more health programs to the communities; and the number of residents who availed of the programs also increased.

✓ In other communities flooding and damage to property were lessened after the construction of flood controls. Communities that built water systems reported almost a 100% shifted from level 1 to level 2 for their source of potable water. Time to fetch water and the average distance covered were also reduced.

✓ In an evaluation conducted in 2009 to measure the impact of PODER 1-4 on rural poverty, the sample beneficiaries increased their annual income from Php 75,000 to Php 82,000 or

Annex 1: Case Study Summaries of CBD Projects
by 8.7% after the implementation of the sub-projects. The increase was mainly attributed to off-farm income.

- Barangay Baybay in Malinao, Albay, one of the PODER communities visited, constructed a school building and a bridge in two cycles of PODER. The focus group participants think the learning environment of children improved with the construction of the school building. The construction of a bridge made the transport of products possible even on rainy days when the river is inundated.
- Barangay Jonop (also in Malinao, Albay) had road and pathway concreting as projects in two cycles of PODER. Like in Baybay, the concrete road made transporting products easy and served another purpose—that of using it for drying rice.
- In both communities, subprojects also provided temporary employment to some residents of Jonop and Baybay. The PODER projects created temporary employment for the members of the community. While the community members volunteered some of their time as a part of their counterpart in the cost of the projects, community members also get paid for a portion of the work they provided.

Changes in Local Politics and Governance

- An increase in the number of barangay assemblies in PODER communities was noted. Participation of residents in these communities also increased even after the end of PODER cycles. Voluntarism among residents and officials also increased because of the project.
- In the communities where FGDs were conducted, some volunteers were elected as barangay officials and a few were designated as secretary or treasurer.
- The members of barangays and the volunteers agree that they have been educated about transparency, participation, procurement, problem analysis, budget implementation, and project development.

ii) Impact on Peace and Security

- PODER does not have a peace building objective. The project aims at empowering communities, enhancing local governance, and reducing poverty.
- The Mayor of Malinao explained that the project has contributed to peace building by making various remote barangays in his municipality more accessible making it difficult for rebels to recruit people there.

iii) Case Study Analyses

a. Description of Conflict

Bicol and Caraga are affected by the New People’s Army (NPA) insurgency, thus they had also been selected as pilot areas for the government’s PAMANA project, which aims to bring back government to remote communities by ensuring that basic services are delivered and local governments are transparent and accountable. Also piloted for the PAMANA project are Quezon, Mindoro, Cordillera, Negros, Samar, Compostela Valley, ZamBaSulTa, Central Mindanao, and ARMM, all conflict-affected areas.
b. **Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:**

- Organizing of barangay management committees mobilized the community participation in the project. The committee also became the community’s vehicle for establishing a vertical relation with the barangay council.
- The MIBF (Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum) helped harmonize the priorities and budget of the barangays and the municipal government. The MIBF was instrumental in strengthening cohesion among the barangays and with the municipal government.
- The external evaluation conducted on PODER suggests that the project has indeed achieved significant material changes in the communities where the sub-projects were implemented. It has also managed changes in the local political landscape and has improved barangay governance in some ways. Participants of the community focus groups in Jonop and Baybay vouched for these findings.
- Bicol and Caraga are conflict areas, PODER should make sure that its processes and subprojects are conflict-sensitive and contribute to peace building in the region.
- Capacity building for the volunteers, communities, and local governments should be part of trainings pertaining to conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity. This effort is especially needed in Bicol, a conflict area, where donor support to peace building is much lesser compared to Caraga.
SERD-CAAM: Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao - Quick Impact Projects (QIP)

1. DESCRIPTION:
   ✓ **Name of project:** Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao (SERD-CAAM) -- Quick Impact Projects (QIP)
   ✓ **Cost:** Total J-BIRD of assistance is ¥11.29B (Php5.98B). The SERD-CAAM component is ¥684M (Php357.23M).
   ✓ **Duration:** 2007-2009
   ✓ **Donor:** Government of Japan -- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
   ✓ **Region(s):** 11 barangays in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM) specifically in the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, Davao Oriental, Compostela Valley, and Zamboanga del Sur.

2. Narrative
   a) **Overview:**
      Within the larger J-Bird program, JICA supported a 3-year development study called the Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (SERD-CAAM). Quick Impact Projects (QIP) is a component of SERD-CAAM to provide community infrastructure to 11 sites as part of a process to assess project implementation mechanisms. The SERD-CAAM’s QIP is implemented in partnership with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) and Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) along with the implementation support from the JICA Study Team. The project relies on a fairly rigid process of site selection based on specific criteria established by the project steering committee. Procurement of goods and services for selected projects is undertaken by the JICA Study Team and implementation is carried out by external contractors and service providers. Community participation is carried out during the identification of priority projects and social preparation stage.

   b) **Donor Theory of Change:**
      SERD-CAAM Quick Impact Projects’ theory of change is focused on restoring confidence, and appears to be limited to “enable people and the communities in target areas to enjoy the dividends of peace” through the provision of visible infrastructure support in affected communities.

   c) **Project Objective:**
      JICA’s overall priorities in the Philippines fall in three categories: (i) **Sustainable Economic Growth Aimed at Creating Employment Opportunities** (ii) **Poverty Reduction** and (iii) **Peace and Stability in Mindanao**.

      In December 2006, JICA launched the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD) to contribute to the peace process and development in the Conflict-
Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM). The objective of J-BIRD is to enable the people and the communities to enjoy the “dividends of peace” on the basis of “Human Security” principles. Within J-BIRD, JICA supported a 3-year pilot project called Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development of Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (SERD-CAAM).

SERD-CAAM adheres to the following guiding principles and concepts: 1) Sustainable development, 2) People Driven Approach, 3) Participatory Development, 4) Convergence of Strategies towards CAAM Reconstruction and Development, and 5) Transparency in Local Governance.

QIP (or Quick Impact Projects) is a sub-component designed to provide community infrastructure to 11 sites as part of a process to test project implementation mechanisms. The QIPs were intended to serve as a pilot phase to help JICA determine strategies and lessons learned in providing development assistance to Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM). QIPs were implemented to enhance the institutional capacity of partners in implementing development projects by offering the experience of being involved in every phase of a project cycle, from project selection to feasibility study to construction work.

d) Site selection:

The QIP component of SERD-CAAM relied on a fairly rigid process of site selection (based on specific criteria) and project selection (based on proposals from the selected sites). The range of possible sites was covered in a social survey (e.g. In-Depth Barangay Need Assessment and Barangay Profiling) conducted as part of SERD-CAAM. Results of the social survey were analyzed to determine urgent development needs at the community level and which areas requiring assistance and programs of critical development needs.

Due to the budget constraints of the QIP component, only 11 QIPs could be constructed (from nearly 4,000 eligible barangays). Selection guidelines were developed and endorsed by a technical working group in 2008. After that the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) and JICA project undertook a process of developing a shortlist, field validation, evaluation, ranking of projects, and ultimately approval by the Project Steering Committee (co-chaired by OPAPP and BDA).

The 11 QIP’s were widely distributed in CAAM specifically in the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, Davao Oriental, Compostela Valley, and Zamboanga del Sur. Specific projects include: community multi-purpose building, potable water system, post-harvest facility, health centers, and school buildings.

e) Project Delivery Mechanism:

A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was organized and co-chaired by OPAPP and BDA. Its function is to act as decision-making body (at a policy level), provide inputs on overall project direction and strategy, ensure that the conduct of the Study is within the context of supporting the GPH-MILF peace process, and endorse JICA Study Team reports.

A Technical Working Group (TWG) was organized in order to provide the technical support to the PSC and JICA Study Team, provide inputs in the formulation of the Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP), provide inputs in drawing up reports, work in tandem with the JICA Study Team,
collect and consolidate comments and recommendations arising during the course of the Study which will be transmitted to the Study Team for appropriate responses and actions, and recommend and endorse approval of proposed projects. The TWG was co-chaired by NEDA and BDA.

In connection with the selection process there is a five step social preparation process. Social preparation is a series of activities implemented prior to the construction of the physical infrastructure. The activities are tailored to the organizational and technical capabilities of the community so that they are able to ultimately operate, maintain, and sustain the infrastructure. The process is facilitated by a local NGO called the implementation service provider (ISP) that is selected by JICA study team with the endorsement of BDA.

After the sites and particular projects are identified and approved by the PSC, the procurement of goods and services for the community projects is undertaken by the project team (composed of JICA and BDA) and implementation is carried out by local private contractors through a bidding process.

f) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

There was no mandatory financial counterpart from local government in order to implement the projects. There are examples of non monetary counterpart such as the time allotted by the local government engineer in quality monitoring and also the time of the community. It is not clear whether counterpart would be required from the local government beyond the pilot stage or whether plans were being made to integrate the projects into the municipal development plan which the LGU can allocate budget for counterpart to future projects.

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements**

a) **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

The JICA study team and BDA utilized standard post-completion monitoring form to capture critical information from the beneficiaries, assess the project based on its financial and technical sustainability, social impacts, costs and benefits, and inquiries on the challenges and improvement the project had posed. While the primary focus was monitoring the implementation and construction of the QIPs, there appeared to be no systematic capture of outcome data and there was no evidence of evaluation of the project’s impact on conflict. It is not clear whether this would have been added if the QIPs moved beyond pilot stage.

b) **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

**Economic.** One objective of QIP was to provide employment during the construction phase. It was provided in the contract agreement that contractors must hire workers from the community where the project is located. In the implementation of nine QIPs, a total of 6,093 man-days employment was generated with different wage rate per location.

Among the project sites visited, notable economic outcomes have bearing on the type of QIP implemented in the community. In most cases, those QIP’s who have the notion of generating income e.g. postharvest facility, and drinking water systems have the potential for greater economic benefits.
**Governance.** Coordination with the government both at local and national level was the task of OPAPP, and BDA with the MILF structure at the province, municipal and Barangay levels. BDA’s effort in coordinating activities with the MILF political committee gained support from the MILF structure. In most cases, OPAPP is lacking presence during orientation to LGUs. More often, BDA has to do it as carrying two hats at the same time representing BDA and OPAPP. This might be due to the limited number of OPAPP field staff.

At the community level, participation of Barangay LGU as an institution was minimal, however, Barangay officials i.e. chairperson, councilor, treasurer, secretary to name a few participated in the capacity building related activities but in a capacity as a community resident or as private citizen holding positions mostly as members of the board and member of PO. Results of community focus group discussion confirm responses that due to the limited participation of LGU especially at the municipal and provincial level, vertical cohesion was very minimal, to some extent none at all in some LGUs.

**Social Cohesion.** Outcomes on horizontal social cohesion were more attributed to the Values Transformation Training (VTT) component of the social preparation. BDA senior management was able to convince JICA to incorporate social preparation as a component in the implementation strategies wherein VTT is among the major activities.

The series of capacity buildings in the social preparation component further improved horizontal cohesion in the community. During trainings and meetings, Muslim, Christians, and Lumad participate, interact, and learned. Due to limited participation of LGU especially at the municipal and provincial level, vertical social cohesion was very minimal, to some extent none at all in some LGUs.

**Peacebuilding and Conflict Management.** While there appeared to be no systematic capture of outcome data and no evidence of evaluation of the project’s impact on conflict, based on discussions with BDA and the communities, there were stories and anecdotes from beneficiaries that the project improved peace situation of the community through increased social cohesion. These were attributed to social preparation activities, specifically the values transformation training. The projects promoted community cohesion, facing differences in religion, tribe, and clan by anchoring an asset, or public infrastructure, that was utilized by the community constituents.

4. **Key Lessons Learned**

a) **PO Empowerment, Sustainability and Ownership**

Capacity development of the Peoples Organizations was concentrated during the social preparation stage which was a series of activities ensuring capacity of PO is built upon to manage and operationalize the project. However, participation of PO in the construction and monitoring of the progress of construction was at the minimal or none at all in some project sites. In addition, participation of PO was limited to the identification, prioritization, and maintenance of the project; there was a gap in the project cycle which is during construction phase. Some or most of the PO’s are dormant or inactive after the project turn-over and will be reactivated only once BDA or JICA calls for a meeting or there is monitoring visit.
**b) Engagement of LGU at all Levels**

In all of the project sites visited, a majority of the POs indicated that participation of LGU is primarily during project orientation and project turn-over.

The LGU is mandated to provide and deliver basic services to its constituents, thus is equipped with technical skills and resource for that purpose. The utilization of technical skills of the LGU engineer can be among the venue where LGU can assist the PO in the monitoring of the project during construction phase. Time allotted by the LGU engineer in quality monitoring is an example of counterpart; it doesn’t always mean that counterpart is always in monetary form which LGU’s cannot provide easily.

In cases where LGU’s are capable of providing counterpart for the project, this can be formalized through Memorandum of Agreement wherein a terms of reference will be created describing tasks of each party – LGU, BDA, JICA, OPAPP, and PO and to include the contractor. The Memorandum of Agreement will be a binding document that will ensure all parties adhere to the terms and conditions from start of construction to turn-over. It could also contain a provision for a continued technical assistance to the PO after project turn-over for follow through assistance on maintenance of project and sustainability of PO.

c) **Monitoring and Evaluation**

Monitoring was largely concentrated on the construction phase of projects. The “Remote Management and Supervision Strategy” was effective in remote management and supervision for the works and the measures undertaken by project personnel to control the quality of the works, especially in the areas where expatriate engineers and sometimes local QIP engineers may not be able to visit the project site due to security reasons.

As originally planned, QIP is a pilot project implemented while Socio-Economic Development Plan is formulated. There was no systematic monitoring and evaluation system that captures progress and development of QIP that would relate to the larger objectives of SERD-CAAM. Community-level monitoring, particularly after project completion is only conducted whenever a JICA mission is scheduled. The presence of M&E tools that would not only measure physical outputs, but would measure the results from the processes by which the project is implemented in the community (capturing lessons learned, areas of improvement, social cohesion, and immediate outcomes) will be an excellent approach in measuring outcomes of the project.

d) **Peacebuilding and Conflict Management**

As one of the goals of SERD-CAAM is peacebuilding, Values Transformation Training contributed in this aspect as VTT laid the foundations for peaceful coexistence. To further contribute to peacebuilding, an initiative can be explored beyond VTT by introducing conflict prevention, mediation, resolution and management. There have been occasions where the PO resolves community level conflicts brought upon by the project. Skills in conflict prevention will be of high importance should potential triggers of conflict arise in community. Participation of LGU in these trainings is also essential.
STARCMI: Support to Agrarian Reform Communities in Central Mindanao

1. DESCRIPTION:

✓ Name of project: Support to Agrarian Reform Communities in Central Mindanao (STARCMI)
✓ Cost: USD$29.5 million (USD$23.3 European Commission) (USD$6.2 from Department of Agrarian Reform, Local Government Units, and People’s Organizations)
✓ Duration: May 2001- July 2008
✓ Donor: European Commission
✓ Region(s): Central Mindanao, Philippines: Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat

2. Description Narrative

a) Overview:

The European Commission funded (Euro 18.4million) Support to Agrarian Reform in Central Mindanao (STARCMI) project supports integrated rural development through a close alignment with the National Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the government’s agrarian reform program. Operating within the structure of Agrarian Reform Communities (targeting Agrarian Reform Beneficiary households), the project supports infrastructure, agricultural production, and enterprise development; institutional strengthening (people’s organisations and local governments); and rural finance (primarily rural credit). The project works with local government structures and community groups to identify and implement subprojects in infrastructure, enterprise development, and rural finance.

b) Donor Theory of Change:

As an integrated rural development project, STARCMI’s focuses on agrarian reform as a critical means to addressing poverty. A geographic focus in Mindanao- which is recognized as both being conflict affected and suffering from rural poverty- is intended to contribute to the peace process.

c) Project Objective:

The program seeks to support ARCs and improve the livelihoods of farming households by achieving four objectives:
✓ Build support infrastructure (SI) that better supports farmer productivity and social welfare in the ARCs;
✓ Increase agricultural productivity and income of farming households through targeted Agricultural Production & Enterprise Development (APED) subprojects;
✓ Improve the capacity of People’s Organizations (PO) and Local Government Unit (LGU) to plan, implement and manage development project; and
✓ Establish a system of rural micro-financing to increase farmers’ access to credit.
d) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

The two main types of projects delivered in the program were support-infrastructure for communities (SI) and subprojects designed for specific farming enterprises (APED). In SI projects, Participatory Action Planning (PAP) meetings are convened in each ARC to produce a development plan with a list of sub-project proposals. These proposals are reviewed and validated by Municipal/City Implementing Teams (M/CITs) which are formed at the LGU level to supervise and coordinate DAR-STARCM activities. LGU engineers and representatives from relevant government offices, such as the DPWH, prepare technical and feasibility studies for the given project(s). Once the subproject is approved, the PO or LGU is responsible for subproject management, including procurement, hiring of labor, rental of equipment, and/or tendering of contracted work. During implementation, the PO or LGU continues to benefit from the supervision of LGU engineers and/or NIA DPWH officials, who are responsible for submitting monthly accomplishment reports and logbooks to the DAR-STARCM. Once the subproject is completed and passes inspection tests, the M/CIT supervises the PO or LGU in the operation and management of the facility as per the institutional strengthening objective of the program.

The project delivery mechanisms for APED subprojects follow a similar trajectory. After the ARC engages in Agricultural Development Planning, the Barangay Development Council (BDC) or the Barangay Council (BC), with the M/CIT, prioritizes sub-projects based on established criteria. The M/CIT takes the lead in validating the sub-project requests and is required to secure formal commitment and the allocation of resources (mainly technical) from the LGU and/or PO. Monthly accomplishment reports are submitted for each sub-project and upon completion; opportunities for further support in maintenance or operation are identified.

e) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

Counterpart equity depended on the type of project and income class of the LGU. For SI, proponent LGU and/or PO proponents must share at least 30% of the total cost for irrigation projects; 50% for bridges; and 20% for the other types of infrastructure. In the case of feeder road improvements in 4th, 5th or 6th class municipalities, the minimum counterpart set was 10%. For APED sub-projects, proponent organizations must provide a minimum counterpart of 15%.

f) **Site Selection:**

DAR-STARCM targeted all households actively farming in fifty ARCs in the Provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat (i.e. Region X, XII, and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao).

For APED subprojects, projects are prioritized based on the scale of the problem being addressed, the number of participants, the economic status of the participants, and if cost recovery and replication features exist. Beneficiaries of the project must be permanent residents of an ARC, with farming as the main income source. In selecting prospective sites, preference is given to a limited number of projects per ARC with large number of participants rather than several very small diverse projects. Moreover, beneficiaries who did not benefit from similar preceding subprojects are given consideration. At least 20% of farming households in each ARC should be first-in-line or second-in-line participants in APED sub-projects.
3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

   a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

   The project’s monitoring and evaluation system, guided by its log frame, ensured participation of the LGU, POs and CDFs. Progress was tracked through activity monitoring, which actively involved the BMGs and BMTs. Results-based monitoring was also pursued, which was important to determining outcomes of the sub-projects. Impact assessments and benefits monitoring were done with inputs from the beneficiaries through focus group discussions. The project looked at effectiveness efficiency, impact, and sustainability of the sub-projects.

   Since the Log frame was confined to the components of the project, conflict sensitivity was not a strong feature of the project’s planning, monitoring and evaluation cycle, despite working in conflict environments.

   b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

   The project reported having contributed to poverty reduction in the ARCs, citing the increase in the number of rural households living above the poverty threshold in the DAR-STARCm areas from 11,700 in 2002 to 15,600 in 2007.

   A total of 249 SI sub-projects were supported by DAR-STARCm, which included the rehabilitation of 139 km of barangay feeder roads, communal irrigation schemes covering 2,306 hectares, and the construction of 337 meters of bridges and crossings. Construction of social infrastructure included thirty-four barangay health stations, 11 day care centers, two marketing centers, and 13 two-roomed school buildings. These infrastructure sub-projects provided access to drinking water and health-care facilities, eased the movement of people and goods, improved agrarian production yields, and reduced hauling costs and travel time.

   APED subprojects benefited 15,295 households. Around 15,674 farming households benefited from increased incomes due to increased productivity and higher yields, reduced production costs, value addition or higher prices. This was achieved through planting of new crops or providing livestock, and the construction of agrarian infrastructure such as cultivation machinery, rice threshers or corn shelters.

   Simultaneously, the project developed the organizational capacities of LGUs and 437 Interest Group cooperatives, Barangay Water and Sanitation Associations, and Irrigators’ Associations with the help of thirteen NGOs tapped to handle IS interventions. Local government functions were improved with their involvement in the project, and local governance became more responsive to needs identified by the communities through participatory processes.

4. **Case Study Analyses**

   a. **Description of Conflict**

   Some of the sites reflect tensions arising from government resettlement policy between the 1920s and 1950s, when settlers from Luzon and Visayas were able to obtain ownership of
inhabited but un titled lands in Mindanao. This policy changed the population profile of the island and marginalized Mindanaoans from indigenous and Moro communities. In the Tumbras ARC in Midsayap, North Cotabato, a sub-tribe of the Maguindanaoans called Etrasen used to be the main inhabitants of the land. The population profile and consequently, ownership of land changed with the resettlement program bringing in Cebuanos and Ilocanos. In Barangay Bituan, the B’laans were forced to move to higher ground when their land was offered for pre-patent applications.

Various forms of conflict continue to challenge peace and stability in the DAR-STARCM areas. Violent conflicts have been reported between government forces and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), between soldiers and the MILF rebels, between government troops and the New People’s Army (NPA), and between feuding clans (rido). During the period of the Project implementation, armed hostilities between government and the MILF kept recurring, in some cases requiring evacuation of residents from the ARCs with DAR-STARCM presence. The ceasefire agreement that came with the resumption of the peace talks between government and the MILF in July 2003 led to reduction of the violent incidents. Two elections also took place, in 2004 and in 2007, intensifying security threats in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao.

b. **Key Lessons Learned:**

- The pivotal role of the local governments was key to developing vertical relationships, tangible opportunities for resource complementation and integrating initiatives into local development plans.

- The performance of the M/CITs varied across LGUs. In some areas, these were not fully functional, and decisions were solely made by the local chief executive. With the existence of DAR’s MCIT, the project could have strengthened this existing structure. While the MCIT had a broader mandate and the M/CIT was limited to the DAR-STARCM operations, working with the MCIT could have avoided problems of scheduling, overlapping tasks in the ARCs covered by the project, among others.

- Several cases of un-liquidated cash advances and difficulties were encountered in monitoring the implementation.

- While several LGUs saw the opportunity of implementing projects by providing just a portion of the total cost, not all LGUs were able to provide their counterpart, causing delays in the approval of some sub-projects, suspending implementation or jeopardizing the sustainability of some.

- While efforts were taken to support the participation of the LGU staff and complement technical skills lacking with the local government, it was noted that DAR-STARCM had limited interventions in the institutional strengthening of LGUs to address changes in political leadership, resource generation.

- All the DAR senior officers interviewed agreed that having a separate PMO for DAR-STARCM was a good option, since it can move with the pace in its approved workplan and not be encumbered by the bureaucratic maze of the Department.
Having the PMO in the project area, rather than in DAR Central office, was a good decision as it facilitated quick response.

There was no coordination mechanism between DAR-STARCM’s Community Development Facilitators and DAR’s Development Facilitators. Resources could have been invested instead in strengthening the existing organizational and technical capacities of government in agrarian reform and increasing chances of sustainability.

Community organizations as implementers not only provided a forum for dialogue among the citizens around shared objectives but also developed relationships of trust with LGUs and enhanced technical capacities to certain degrees, though not sufficient enough for them to produce the requirements (e.g., proposals) on their own.

Some sub-projects, such as feeder roads and irrigation schemes, required highly technical expertise which was difficult to develop in the area over a short period of time, requiring more time and attention from the STARCM engineers to assist in designing and developing the program of works, causing a slow down in the number of approved sub-projects in the initial phase. Some trainings were given to the LGU engineers and templates were computerized, to try to speed up the process.

The sub-project and approval process was viewed as tedious, given the forms, procedures, and decision authorities stipulated in the DAR-STARCM manuals. The process reflected a keen desire for technical and financial soundness, thus the need for the hands-on facilitation of the CDF or LGU staff, who was themselves not as proficient in the beginning. Therefore, the capacity to prepare proposals for subsequent projects on their own was not thoroughly developed in the community.

What partially accounts for the unsuccessful enterprises is the absence of a clear market orientation of the approved sub-projects. While the APED guidelines stated a preference for proposals with Return on Investment features, emphasis was not given on business planning, technical, or market feasibility studies. Insufficient market research involving detailed product assessment, market, and value chain studies contributed to the livelihood sub-projects with unfavorable outcomes, further increasing the sense of economic vulnerability among the PO members. Weak market orientation jeopardized the sustainability of the livelihood sub-projects.

Implementation was largely dependent on the ability to fund the costs and on the capacity of the POs to withstand the complex challenges of business operations while at the same time keeping the participatory practice. The LGUs do not have adequate resources to shoulder maintenance costs of costly infrastructure sub-projects and not all POs are stable enough to manage the sub-projects on their own.

The strategy of making community organizations as partners in implementation and as sustaining mechanisms is a transformational process in itself. Some of the implementing organizations were not strong enough to deal with the intricacies of business management when left on their own. Social preparation, which could have established the foundation for stronger organizations, was carried out simultaneously instead of with the sub-project development processes.
1. **DESCRIPTION:**

- **Name of project:** World Food Programme’s Food for Asset (FFA) Project
- **Cost:** 6.4 Million Euro
- **Duration:** 2010 - present
- **Donor:** Food Facility Programme of the European Commission and implemented by the World Food Programme of the United Nations.
- **Region(s):** five provinces in Central Mindanao (Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato).

2. **Description Narrative**

   a) **Overview:**

   The European Union-funded Food for Asset Project of the World Food Programme provided community based support, in the form of 10,000 metric tons of food to 194,000 households in five conflict affected provinces of Central Mindanao where food insecurity has been a critical issue. The one year project was implemented by the World Food Programme through local governments in collaboration with local NGOs. The NGOs work with communities to identify community assets (largely relating to agricultural improvement) that could be built utilizing simple tools and local labor. Project beneficiaries received food transfers in exchange for labor on these community projects (Food for Assets: FFA) and also for participation in training (Food for Training: FFT).

   b) **Donor Theory of Change:**

   The program assumes that providing food in exchange for work (or training) makes it possible for the poor and hungry to devote time and energy to taking the first steps out of the hunger trap and increase the food security of their households and communities.

   c) **Project Objective:**

   The primary objective is the immediate reduction of food insecurity amongst vulnerable households, using a design (in collaboration with NGOs and local governments) that is intended to strengthen local institutional capacity. Food securitization is also identified as an entry point for peace building, development, and governance.

   Specifically, the project was envisioned to: ensure the immediate food need of the targeted beneficiaries; promote agricultural production and environmental care; Restore and maintain livelihood and create additional community assets; contribute to the peaceful coexistence amongst the community; assist the government at the national level on better targeting through vulnerability analysis mapping and; establish early warning systems and train key stakeholders in food security data collection and analysis.
d) **Site selection:**

The activities were implemented in five provinces in Central Mindanao (Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and North Cotabato). Geographical targeting was based on selecting municipalities ranked as the poorest as per poverty incidence. The data on poverty was also compared to results from other assessments by other UN agencies, NGOs, and local government units. Consultations at the provincial and municipal level were conducted to prioritize the most food-insecure barangays in the selected municipalities. While the vulnerability selection criteria helped to identify priority areas, implementation also depended on availability of complementary materials for the identified projects and the capacity to implement these.

e) **Project Delivery Mechanism:**

The overall execution of the FFA project is handled by the World Food Programme through its project office in Cotabato City. For the duration of the project, several implementation partners were tapped to facilitate program management.

A National FFA Program Steering Committee focuses on policy and program coordination activities. This committee was composed of the following agencies; namely the Department of Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), World Food Programme (WFP), Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); and the Delegation of the European Union (EU-Del)

The Regional FFA Program Management Committee facilitated project approval, project counseling and signal releases. This committee was composed of the DSWD in coordination with regional counterparts such as the DA, DENR, and the ARMM Regional Government.

The Regional FFA Program Technical Committee was responsible for reviewing proposals for any technical issues and then endorses them as appropriate. The Municipality FFA Program Task Force was composed of those who directly implement the project.

The Cooperating Partners were composed of Non-Government Organizations whose expertise and objectives were aligned with the FFA Program. After entering a tripartite agreement with the WFP and the DSWD, the Cooperating Partner NGOs facilitated the monitoring and reporting of beneficiary targeting, project implementation, and commodity storage and distribution.

The project encouraged the implementation of projects already identified by various local government development plans and those identified by the line ministries such DA and DENR. Identification and development of potential projects were done through the various local governments in collaboration with the DSWD, DA, and DENR. Projects generated at community level were validated against the set criteria and endorsed and approved by the respective committee at provincial and Regional level.
f) **Counterpart Funding Mechanism:**

Partner agencies like DSWD, LGUs even the POs/communities provided counterpart resources but not necessarily in monetary terms (e.g., in the form of labor, equipment, assistance in terms of design and preparation of technical plans, training, etc.).

3. **Project Outcomes/Achievements:**

   a. **M & E Framework- What do they measure/Not measure:**

   WFP monitored the distribution of assistance and outputs through quantitative and qualitative indicators. Quantitative indicators from the progress reports were submitted by implementing and cooperating partners on a monthly and quarterly basis. These progress reports were compared against WFP’s own monitoring data, collected on a regular basis by the WFP Food Monitors.

   WFP also signed a Field Level Agreement with one of their cooperating partners (Community Family Services International) for the purposes of assessing projects, managing food distributions, monitoring and reporting. WFP has put effort into capacitating stakeholders through organizing training sessions in technical and management of projects including effective monitoring.

   While the primary focus was monitoring the implementation on food security as well as the food for assets and food for training activities, there appeared to be no systematic capture of outcome data and there was no evidence of evaluation of the project’s impact on conflict. It is not clear whether this would have been added in subsequent phases.

   b. **Summary of Main Outcomes/Key deliverables:**

   a) **Economic**

   *Reducing Soil Erosion.* The promotion of contour farming and water and soil conservation technology into the communities of Barangay Chua, Pikit, and Libungan has increased community awareness on environmental conservation and ecological nurturance. Among the farmers there is now a growing consciousness on balancing agricultural productivity with environmental conservation and sustainability. Bio intensive gardens were established in 377 barangays on 168 hectares of land.

   *Compost and Vermi-compost Making.* Over 2,000 farmers in 75 barangays participated. A part of the compost produced was utilized at household level by beneficiaries while the other part was sold in nearby villages or markets. About 90 percent of the compost producers were women who later organized themselves into “compost making and marketing groups”.

   *Rehabilitation of Irrigation Structures.* This was intended to increase rice production through rehabilitation of existing irrigation infrastructure. As rice production from
irrigated rice fields accounts for about 76 percent of annual rice production in the country (according to the DA), rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure was one of the major focuses of the FFA project.

**Construction of Post-harvest Facilities.** In this category, farmers were provided with simple and cost effective drying facilities on communal land. The sites were selected so that the activity would work seamlessly with other supported projects such as rehabilitation of irrigation canals and rice production.

**Development and Rehabilitation of Abandoned Rice and Corn Field.** The activities under this project restored production in 191 hectares of rice fields that had been previously abandoned for several reasons such as lack of agricultural inputs and low yields.

**Construction of dug out fish ponds and floating fish cages.** Along the coastal areas, fishing remains an important source of livelihood. In these areas, projects identified and prioritized by beneficiary communities focused on improvement of the coastal ecosystem through mangrove plantation and construction of fish ponds and cages.

**b) Governance**

The FFA’s support for soil and water conservation activities has gained wide support and recognition. During the FGP in Pikit, the mission was informed that said environmental interventions were being endorsed for integration and mainstreaming into the Barangay Development Plan, Municipal Development Plan, and Pikit, Pigcawayan, Aleosan, Libungan Midsayap, Alamada (P-PALMA) Alliance plan and programs.

The government has adopted the food for assets program as an important tool to alleviate poverty. As a result, the government pledged an in-kind contribution of 18,800 metric ton of rice to WFP for purposes of implementing FFA activities in Mindanao. While the utilization of this contribution still depended on the availability of twining funds from other donors, this provided a real opportunity to ultimately scale up FFA activities at a national level.

**c) Social Cohesion**

**Promoting Productive Community Activities** - The communities in Pangasinan, Isulan Sultan Kudarat, it was shared that gambling in the area was substantially minimized if not completely stamped out since the start of the FFA Food for Work project. They disclosed further that the Food for Work activities provided venue for closer interaction of people in the community.

**Growing Awareness of Environmental Conservation** - The FFA has supported a number of projects through food for work for the promotion of contour farming and water and soil conservation technology into the farming systems of the project participants in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat and Pikit and Libungan, Cotabato. The project furthermore paved the way for increased community awareness on environmental conservation and ecological nurturance. There is now a growing consciousness on balancing agricultural
productivity with environmental conservation and sustainability as clearly articulated during the FGD.

**d) Peace building and conflict management**

Coordinated through the EU delegation office in Manila, effort had been made to bring together UN agencies and NGOs to share experiences of projects with similar objectives. In these regards, WFP has established a network and synergy with Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in areas of Farmers Field school projects, post harvest technology and Bio Intensive Vegetable Gardening; and with IFAD in the areas of irrigation agronomy focusing on rehabilitation and management of small scale framers’ cooperative irrigation systems. The FFA-supported FFW and FFT have caught the attention of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for the Peace Process (OPAPP). There were suggestions for WFP to implement FFW/FFT as start-up community activities to launch their pilot programmes.

4. **Case Study Analyses**

a. **Key Lessons Learned & Recommendation:**

- **The use of Letter of Intent (LOI) develops community stake and ownership over the project idea and assets from the very beginning.**

The LOI system was introduced in Lanao del Sur and Norte to encourage a barangay or PO to forward to Community and Family Services International (CFSI) and WFP an idea of a project for possible assistance. The one-page sheet signed and forwarded by the PO head or barangay chairman shows the type of project, location and other offices ready to commit to support the project. The letter is also an invitation to WFP and CFSI to attend the community discussion on the project idea. This document has been one of the attachments to the proposals forwarded to the PRC. The LOI is a practical thought but because it is an easy thing to accomplish, it shouldn’t be a reason to cut the process of community consultation. It should logically come before a proposal is even drafted by an external proponent.

- **FFA has encouraged strong participation of both men and women in all projects and activities. More men participated in building fixed assets, while more women participated in the activities that have opportunities to socialize, tag their children along and that required nurturing touch.**

FFW and FFT projects were partaken by both men and women, in most cases with a balanced gender representation. It is noticeable though that there were more women participants in communal gardens, vermi-composting, nursery establishment and home-based livelihood activities. Most men are enlisted in construction projects and fish cage management.
• **Presence of a local PO facilitates community participation and smooth implementation of projects.** Around 23 of 30 communities under this study have either built a new PO or enhanced their old village organizations. Thirteen of these POs were built intentionally to pursue the approved FFA project and most of them are named after the main FFA activity or asset, ex. Dyora Federation Nursery, Communal Livelihood Garden, or the membership composition, ex. Makirodi Women’s Group Farmers’ Association. While the presence of a structured PO facilitates decision making and realization of plans, some FFA recipients did not attempt to group themselves into a formal structure but instead used the traditional collective aggregations or the barangay. This is true among Muslim communities and culturally-attached groups as leadership and work structures in such communities don’t have to be remade as traditional leaders, elected officials and cultural structures are respected.

4. **Model building: POs helping other POs because of common needs and interests.**

This is apparent in some areas, like the Montai Farmers’ Association (MUFA) in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte which is now providing technical assistance to its neighboring barangays and POs in line with mangrove nursery establishment and coastal resource rehabilitation.
Annex 2: Design Considerations in Conflict-Affected Areas

The following Table provides an overview of some of the key design considerations for CBD projects in conflict-affected areas based on the projects under review and international experience. This is intended as a summary tool to highlight some of the most important issues, but it is not intended to be comprehensive.

Table A-2: Design Considerations for CBD Projects in Conflict-Affected Areas

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBD Procedure</th>
<th>Conflict Related Issues</th>
<th>Possible Design Modification</th>
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<tr>
<td>District and village targeting/Site selection</td>
<td>Conflict can be exacerbated by targeting or beneficiary selection that is improper, biased or uninformed. Areas of risk include: • inadequate/inaccurate data (especially when selection is based on poverty statistics) • selection bias (when partisan parties are involved in selection of districts/villages) • improper situating of sub-project infrastructure (which benefits local elite). • selection of beneficiaries at the village level (eg. who will benefit from livelihood activities)</td>
<td>Targeting and site selection should be flexible enough to adapt to local conflict conditions. Template-driven, rigid targeting protocols should be avoided. Blanket and equal coverage (i.e., all districts, all villages within a district, all people within a target village) can help prevent concerns about unfair distribution of resources in conflict situations, but is often not possible due to resource limitations. When blanket coverage is not possible, selection criteria need to be clear, unbiased, transparent and proactively disseminated in all coverage areas. In longer term projects, rotational coverage (ie. where other districts, villages, neighbourhoods are assured of coverage in subsequent years) may be feasible. High degree of donor oversight and political sensitivity required to ensure those responsible for targeting/site selection remain unbiased. M&amp;E systems should build in mechanism to ensure oversight of village and beneficiary selection.</td>
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<td>Selection of Community</td>
<td>Most CBD programs rely on relatively intensive levels of community-level</td>
<td>Selection of CFs should balance local knowledge and familiarity, with</td>
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<td>CBD Procedure</td>
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| Facilitators (CFs) | facilitation to ensure adequate and fair community participation.  
- Recruitment, training and deployment of a CF contingent is probably the single most important factor for a CBD program’s success.  
- In conflict areas, it is critical that CFs be entirely neutral so as to avoid any possible perception of bias during all stages of program implementation.  
It is also critical, in conflict areas, for CFs to be knowledgeable about local political dynamics, conflict conditions, customs, and cultural norms. CFs must be able to monitor and accurately interpret complex local conditions, in order to avoid scenarios where project assistance could increase tensions, exacerbate conflict. CFs must also be able to establish some degree of trust and acceptance with local communities, which is often difficult for someone unfamiliar with the local conditions. | neutrality and lack of pre-existing ties to the community.  
While knowledge and familiarity are important, in conflict areas it is usually best not to recruit CFs from within the same district where the project is being implemented. This helps ensure neutrality and avoids potential selection of CFs who might be aligned, directly or indirectly, with parties to the conflict.  
While neutrality is important, CFs must be able to gain the trust and acceptance of the local community, and monitor local conditions. To be effective, a CF must have a high level of familiarity and knowledge of local conditions and norms.  
Ideally, CFs will be selected from adjacent non-conflict regions that share the same culture and language where they will be working.  
CF training curriculum should equip CFs with suitable skills in the field of conflict mediation, negotiation, and mitigation. |
| Role of Local Government | Most CBD projects rely on the participation of local government either as a co-implementer or a contributor. Contributions are usually in the form of counterpart funding, or in terms of support (financial and/or technical) that covers ongoing operational or maintenance costs.  
- Where local governments are seen to be party to conflict, they may lack credibility or legitimacy with some groups in the local participation. | In conflict affected areas, program planners should conduct a thorough analysis of the conflict as well as local power dynamics during the design phase.  
They should undertake consultations with local government (and national government counterparts, where applicable) to negotiate a realistic level of LGU participation and contribution.  
Fallback plans should be developed in the event that LGUs are unable or |

Annex 2: Design Considerations in Conflict-Affected Areas
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<td>• Local governments may also be unwilling to meet commitments in areas that are not under government control.</td>
<td>Local government involvement should not be formulaic or necessarily consistent in a conflict-affected area. It will often be necessary to adapt local government involvement based on local conflict and political dynamics.</td>
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<td>• Local governments under the control of local political elite may be similarly unwilling to meet CBD expectations.</td>
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### Choice of Implementing Partners

| Projects face the choice of either establishing a specific project secretariat (often called a Project Management Office) to oversee implementation arrangements or ceding this role to an external state or non-state implementing partner (such as NGOs, national government agencies or non-state entities). |
| Where implementing partners are responsible for selecting CBD sites (or otherwise influencing project implementation), this decision is fraught with the potential to raise tensions. |
| In conflict-affected areas, implementing partners are often in the best position to monitor local conditions, and adapt programs and guidance to facilitators to respond to changing circumstances. |

It is very difficult to avoid some bias (or perception of bias) in site selection, which leads to local resentment or heightened tensions. Development partners must be prepared to manage the consequences of their decision on implementing partners. 

External, professional PMO’s must choose local partners and lines of engagement, which will usually

| A decision to use an external implementing partner must be carefully considered, taking into account the pros and cons in the context of ongoing conflict: |
| • NGOs must be technically competent but also politically astute and ideally politically neutral (though this is rare). |
| • National government agencies will likely be perceived as promoting a pro-government perspective. When this is perceived as part of a wider stabilization effort, it may actually exacerbate conflict. |
| • Any implementing partner that is unfamiliar with local conditions can be more easily manipulated, and will have more challenges adapting programs to local dynamics, increasing the risk of negative impact. |

Understand the political associations of the implementing partner, and find ways to counter-balance their biases through working through other partners. Government and non-government organizations will almost always have affiliations or interests that will affect their perceived neutrality by some segments of the population. Rather than seeking a “neutral” partner, it is best to
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| **Social Accountability Mechanisms**      | Most CBD projects attempt to build in means of holding implementing partners accountable for all aspects of project implementation. This most commonly takes the form of a community feedback or complaints handling mechanism that is ideally overseen by an independent party.  
  - In conflict areas with pre-existing high levels of tension, it is particularly important to ensure that these mechanisms operate properly.  
  - Persistent insecurity and weak rule of law can be a major challenge for social accountability mechanisms, as local people may fear the consequences of raising complaints about more powerful actors. | A failure to put in place social accountability mechanisms or to provide adequate resources that enables investigation and mediation of feedback/complaints can represent a critical shortfall and lead to increased levels of conflict.  
It is critical to ensure maximum anonymity for complaint or feedback mechanisms, to reduce the fear of retaliatory actions by the subject of a complaint.                                                                                                                                                                     |
| **Competitive Selection of Sub-Projects** | Many CBD projects are based on the community selection of activities (sub-projects) that will be implemented by the community itself. Where full coverage of a target area is not possible, CBD planners often introduce an element of competition among sub-project proposals within a district (ie. villages competing against one another) or even within the community.  
  - Competition, while it may reinforce important democratic principles, may lead to increased tension among competing parties.  
  - Competition is likely to favor certain groups or communities, including those that are less | In conflict areas, where tensions may be already high, it is generally desirable to eliminate the competitive aspects of sub-project selection.  
If competition is required, it is important to make sure that the selection includes a balanced mix of groups/communities from all sides of the conflict.                                                                                                                                                                             |
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|               | affected by the conflict, have higher capacity, or are have stronger connections with decision-makers.  
• If competition is perceived to favour a particular ethnic group or political faction, the risk of exacerbating conflict can be high. | | |
| Open vs. Closed Sub-Project Menus | "Open menu" projects give broad scope to communities to select virtually any type of sub-project. A "closed menu" imposes restrictions on the kind of activity that a community can choose for its sub-project. Some projects are limited to certain sectors (such as agriculture). Others do not permit livelihood activities (such as micro-credit or income generating initiatives) usually on the grounds that they generate private assets which benefit only some residents rather than the entire community.  
• There is a heightened risk, particularly in conflict areas, of increasing tension when only a portion of a community enjoys the benefits of a CBD project.  
• Open menu projects may be more prone to abuse or capture by powerful local actors.  
• Open menu projects may also be more adaptable to local needs and challenges. | To reduce potential tensions in conflict-affected areas it may be preferable to invoke a closed menu that limits sub-project selection to activities that produce public assets (usually small scale infrastructure) that benefits as wide a cross section of the community as possible. |
| Village-level Implementing Arrangements  
Formation of People’s Organization | Most CBD projects establish a village-level entity (e.g., People’s Organisations) to oversee sub-project implementation on the ground.  
• In conflict affected areas, where exclusion and injustice may be key issues, there is a need to be | It is critical to understand local power arrangements from the beginning, and adapt project implementation based on local conditions. There may be some circumstances where setting up a new village-level entity may actually destabilize the community, leading to |
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<td></td>
<td>wary of processes that may exacerbate exclusion.</td>
<td>negative transformative outcomes. Project implementation at the village level should not follow a one-size-fits-all, template approach, but should be adaptable to local circumstances.</td>
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<td>• Setting up new village level arrangements does not make the project immune from local power dynamics – powerful local factions will find ways to influence or undermine these new arrangements.</td>
<td>If it is necessary to set up a new village-level committee or entity, there are widely used methods for ensuring that these arrangements are representative of the entire community (including, in particular, vulnerable groups such as women, youth and minorities). It may be useful to set a minimum participation requirement (e.g. x% of households or x% of women must attend project-related meetings) at the community level in order to ensure widespread participation, dissemination of information and/or to avoid social exclusion of key groups.</td>
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<td>• Setting up new village level arrangements may actually undermine pre-existing local institutions that are critical for transforming the conflict conditions.</td>
<td>Setting specific membership criteria for the village-level arrangement (i.e. by gender, age, sub-village/sitio, ethnicity) can help ensure broad-based representation and avoid elite capture.</td>
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<td>In rare cases, pre-existing “organic” networks such as farmer associations can be used for this purpose, but this is the exception to the rule. Pre-existing networks have pros and cons:</td>
<td>Caution is needed in conflict zones where freedom of movement may be restricted, and community members may put themselves at risk by participating in a village committee or entity that challenges the power of a dominant local faction.</td>
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<td>• Organic networks may be more acceptable and legitimate in the beneficiary communities, leading to increased local ownership, improved social capital, and more long term sustainability.</td>
<td>It is often wise to seek active participation of traditional leaders or elders, when feasible.</td>
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<td>• Organic networks are more likely to play a meaningful role in mediating disputes or critical roles in the community.</td>
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<td>• Organic networks may also exclude certain parts of the population (particularly along gender or ethnic lines) leading to concentration of project benefits in some groups at the expense of others.</td>
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<td>There are cases where it is more effective to allow a powerful local leader (or faction) to direct project resources. In cases where there is one dominant faction in a community</td>
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Annex 2: Design Considerations in Conflict-Affected Areas
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<th>CBD Procedure</th>
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| Participation of Community Leaders | There is ongoing debate as to whether or not it is desirable to involve elected or appointed community leaders within village level committees or people’s organizations or elsewhere during sub-project implementation. Many projects restrict the participation of these leaders.  
• While dominance by community leaders raises the risk of elite capture, many leaders are benevolent and many villagers expect and rely on their leaders to represent the village in CBD forums and with local government.  
• Dominant local leaders may be in a better position to ensure security for the project and community participants, or conversely may be in a position to threaten when they are excluded.  
• Some dominant local leaders may have an interest in maximizing the positive outcomes from the project, and more likely to contribute political capital or additional financing to ensure the success of the project. | In conflict affected areas, it is often difficult for elected leaders to avoid being caught up in aspects of conflict. A thorough local-level conflict and political analysis may provide direction to CBD program designers in terms of the appropriate level of community leader involvement.  
It is usually difficult to entirely eliminate their influence; the key lies in managing their participation in such a way that they do not totally dominate selection and placement of sub-project activities, mainly by ensuring that a fully representative PO is in control.  
On this critical issue, project design and implementation at the village level should not follow a rigid, template approach, but should be adaptable to local circumstances. |
<p>| Procurement and Financial Management | CBD projects that aim for full community empowerment typically give full control over financial arrangement and procurement to the communities themselves.                                                                 | Consideration should be given to taking procurement out of the hands of the community in conflict areas (in favor of using an external agency to control procurement arrangements). |</p>
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|               | • In the absence of careful monitoring, however, both procurement and financial management are susceptible to manipulation for political and/or financial gain by unscrupulous individuals or groups, sometimes aligned with local political elite. In conflict areas, the opportunity for such manipulation may be heightened.  
• In addition, the availability of competent suppliers may be limited or their ability to operate in conflict areas may be restricted. | Financial management requires strong oversight, possibly by credible neutral NGOs. Fund flows may need external control in areas where criminal activity or elite capture are high risk. favour of using an external neutral agency. |
| Community Contributions | As a means of strengthening a community's sense of ownership over project resources, it is common to require communities to raise a portion of the resources (typically in the 10-25% range of the overall sub-project) though there is usually flexibility in terms of allowing the contribution to be made in kind (labour and/or materials) instead of in cash.  
• Where conflict has negatively impacted on household livelihoods, it may be difficult to meet community contribution requirements.  
• Security issues or lack of social cohesion may also impinge on the community's ability to mobilize voluntary labor. | It may be necessary to make exceptions or use a sliding scale contribution for communities that have been adversely affected by conflict and/or with large number of IDPs. Similarly, villages in remote areas or under heavy influence by the CPP/NPA may have particular difficulty in contributing to the project at a scale comparable to other areas. Projects may want to make exceptions for these communities as they are the most likely to drop out of the project if the contribution is not waived. |
The points on the map represent the complete coverage of the projects in this review. The field sites visited through this study is a sub-set of these locations (see main report for: Project Descriptions and Sites Visited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Period Covered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act for Peace</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>STARCM</td>
<td>2001-2008</td>
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<td>PACAP</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>ESFMP</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
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<td>KALAHI-CIDSS</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
<td>Convenio</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALS</td>
<td>1999-2010</td>
<td>WFP -FFA</td>
<td>2010-present</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEAM</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
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Annex 3: Maps of CBD Projects
Annex 3: Maps of CBD Projects
Annex 3: Maps of CBD Projects
### Annex 4: Acronyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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