A Decade Later: Lessons from Nepal’s Earthquake Response

Seti Maya is a widow living and working on land managed by a Community Forest User Group when the April 2015 Gorkha earthquake struck. The house she lived in with her three children collapsed, relegating them to a temporary shelter constructed with support from a nongovernmental organization. 

Because she was from a low caste and didn’t own any property, she was still living in temporary housing five years after the disaster. She was finally able to buy land and build a house using USD 1,662 provided by the Nepal Reconstruction Authority. 

Most people were able to rebuild and recover from the earthquake within five years, thanks to a robust government response headed by the Nepal Reconstruction Authority. But Seti Maya represents one of many similar stories The Asia Foundation heard during five rounds of comprehensive research on the response and recovery from the 7.8 and 7.3 magnitude earthquakes that destroyed 20 percent of Nepal’s housing stock.  

Ten years later, most Nepalis have rebuilt, but many still feel the impacts of the 2015 earthquakes that killed some 9,000 people. Lessons from extensive research conducted by The Asia Foundation are still relevant today as the country continues to address longer-term impacts and respond to new disasters such as floods, landslides, and ongoing earthquakes. On this anniversary, and in light of the recent earthquakes in Myanmar, that research and the lessons for disaster preparedness and responses in Nepal and beyond need revisiting. 

Starting with the Right Research: Social Impact Monitoring

The scale of longer-term disaster impacts can only be known if there is a consistent effort to independently document the human impacts of the disaster and the aid provided over 5 to 10 years. This means going beyond tracking progress in reconstruction to collect systematic evidence on social, political, and economic impacts and related coping mechanisms across population and income groups, as well as geographical regions and settlement types. 

In 2015, with support from the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (then DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and in conjunction with local research partners, TAF designed the Independent Impacts and Recovery Monitoring, or IRM, project to understand the degree and nature of recovery and evolving needs—what factors either hinder or enable full recovery. During five research rounds between 2015 and 2019, the project tracked recovery through qualitative research and a large-scale and representative household panel survey.

The approach is based on the World Bank/Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery post-disaster social analysis toolkit “Analyzing the social impacts of disasters,” which provides guidance for effective post-disaster longitudinal mixed methods impacts monitoring. The quantitative data serves to identify trends based on representative samples, while the qualitative data provides more detailed explanations and insights into complex social and governance issues.  

The initial study, just months after the earthquake, highlighted how destructive the earthquakes had been and the immense challenges that would lie ahead. TAF conducted subsequent rounds of data collection in the same areas, assessing how recovery progressed and offering insights to the government of Nepal’s long-term recovery program. Over the five years, TAF offered briefings about research findings to the government agency responsible for earthquake recovery, the Nepal Reconstruction Authority. While they tracked distribution and had their own monitoring, TAF’s research provided an additional, independent data source for decision-makers to triangulate their observations and understand how the grants were being used and gain visibility on overall recovery.  

Sushil Gyawali, then executive director of the Nepal Reconstruction Authority, said the research “provided highly relevant information and validation that significantly influenced our decision-making processes.”  

He and his team used the research findings in high-level policy discussions and forums like the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management National Council. This evidence strengthened the acceptance in policy circles of more data-driven decisions and led to policies focused on locally led leadership and mechanisms for disaster management. 

Nepal’s Initial Response: Generally Effective

With donor support, the Nepal government responded to the crisis with a housing reconstruction scheme that provided conditional cash grants to earthquake-affected households to support rebuilding. The housing grants focused on equal rather than equitable distribution provided in instalments through beneficiary bank accounts. The government deemed some 850,000 households eligible for a housing grant of USD 3,000 and later issued a retrofitting grant of USD 1,500 to approximately 63,000 households.  

The housing grant scheme was largely successful. Research findings demonstrated that by late 2019, almost five years after the earthquake, around 75 percent of people had fully rebuilt their houses, nearly 92 percent were living back in their own houses, and 4 percent still lived in shelters (see graph below). 

Despite the success of the housing grant scheme, vulnerable and poor households struggled to recover and rebuild for a range of reasons that slowly emerged over the years. For example, Saraswoti from the rural Okhaldhunga district lived in a bamboo shelter for almost five years after the earthquake. She could not access the housing reconstruction grant because the land she lived on belonged to her husband, who had disappeared with the first installment of the grant. Similarly, Shiva, a Dalit man in an urban area of Bhaktapur district, still lived in a tiny makeshift shelter in a narrow alleyway because he and his neighbors lacked the financial resources to demolish their partially damaged houses and begin rebuilding.  

In addition, the significant financial burden of rebuilding forced many to sell assets, go into debt, or send family members to work abroad to raise funds for a new house. Others found their newly built houses too small or otherwise inadequate for their families or their cultural and livelihood needs. Therefore, they returned to their old, partially damaged houses, increasing the risk of injury and damage from future earthquakes.  

In dense urban and cultural heritage areas, the significant technical requirements of rebuilding on smaller plots led to higher costs. The government’s approach of equality—same resources offered to all earthquake victims—required revisions over time.  

Longer-Term Findings 

Cash grants work but need continuous monitoring and adaptation 

Giving equal assistance to every affected household through cash grants has proven successful and effective in Nepal, with most people appreciative of the grant and rebuilding with the assistance. Making the grant provision conditional on adhering to building standards also meant that houses were generally rebuilt safer.  

However, challenges emerged at all stages of the grant scheme’s implementation, from beneficiary identification to payouts, technical assistance, and complaints mechanisms. Furthermore, the lack of local government capacity and demands from donors to centralize the reconstruction scheme limited the Nepal Reconstruction Authority’s options. Still, the authority’s willingness to continuously update procedures based on feedback from multiple sources demonstrated that addressing such challenges requires a flexible approach that allows for revisions to the grant procedures, special provisions, and effective coordination between all government levels and aid agencies involved.  

One example is when the Nepal Reconstruction Authority used findings from IRM research to develop new ways for increased outreach and communication to affected communities to clarify the granting mechanism, eligibility, rebuilding criteria, and special provisions. Once local governments were in place, after 2017, they played a facilitative role to support implementation of the national scheme and help identify households and individuals struggling to recover.  

Vulnerable people need to be given special assistance early

While an emphasis on equal rather than equitable distribution is commendable and effective in many ways, Nepal’s vulnerable groups—elderly and single women, Dalits, people with disabilities, undocumented households, the landless and displaced, and the urban poor, among others—fell behind in their post-earthquake recovery. This was due to their lack of documentation, support networks, access to the grant and complaints systems, and financial resources needed to rebuild.  

The Nepal Reconstruction Authority identified a new sector of vulnerable populations—those whose houses were livable but the land was unstable—as eligible for reconstruction grants based on IRM findings. They also initiated special support and grants available for displaced and landless households and top-up grants for vulnerable groups. 

Though top-up grants for vulnerable households were necessary, research findings showed that this assistance arrived late, and those entirely left out of the housing grant process could not access it. That was partly due to a lack of data and maps of vulnerable households to identify those at high risk for prolonged recovery or inability to recover fully. 

Ten years later, many local governments have found ways to map and track vulnerable households through locally initiated surveys and data collection. Such lists were used during the Covid-19 pandemic to identify high-risk households for vaccination programs. Through social protection efforts, those at risk of prolonged impacts can be given the support they need to prevent further vulnerabilities such as debt traps, human trafficking, extreme poverty, and health issues arising from prolonged stays in shelters.

Impact classification based on aggregated damages has limitations

Impediments to the earthquake response included the rugged mountainous terrain, the remoteness of some settlements, and the large number of landslides caused by earthquakes. People in remote areas often recovered more slowly as they found it harder to access the grants and transport construction materials—although core urban and heritage areas faced their own set of distinct challenges, slowing reconstruction there.  

Furthermore, the government divided affected districts into five impact categories, from “severely hit” to “slightly affected,” based on aggregated housing damages at the district level. The housing grant was first rolled out in the more heavily impacted districts, which also received more attention and aid from non-government actors.  

As a result, people in severely hit settlements of districts with less aggregate damage were overlooked and not granted the timely assistance they so needed.  

Given advancements in drone survey and mapping technologies, municipal disaster management committees can identify heavily affected settlement areas rather than relying on aggregated housing numbers at the district or provincial level after future disasters. This helps local and provincial governments channel aid to the specific areas with the highest needs.  

Local governments can look to civic tech organizations and NGOs for partnerships that offer resources like basic training in existing mapping tools and approaches. This will allow them to use data and technology to support more efficient disaster response.

Put more emphasis on repairs and retrofitting

Nepal’s housing reconstruction approach focused on rebuilding rather than repairing. The government later developed a retrofitting grant, but uptake was low, and few people understood the technical requirements for retrofitting. Research findings specified that urban areas had unique challenges for reconstruction, particularly where there were historical and heritage sites—common in the Kathmandu Valley—that involved additional requirements and approvals.  

Retrofitting proved to be a lower-cost option, and interest was strong in urban areas where rebuilding costs are higher and in districts with lesser damage, where houses did not fully collapse. With many of these damaged houses still in use and the risk of future earthquakes looming, there is an ongoing need to train engineers and architects in retrofitting and to design affordable interventions that can also serve as guidance for other parts of the country.  

A renewed focus on developing skills and standards for cost-effective retrofitting would further help preserve vernacular architecture and allow for developing post-disaster responses that focus on salvaging existing buildings and materials where possible.

Coordination among levels of government is essential

Nepal relied on donor support, and the reconstruction process was centralized with the Nepal Reconstruction Authority coordinating the housing grant process. The emergence of local governments after the 2017 local elections has allowed for the devolution of some responsibilities.  

The IRM research found that this greatly facilitated several aspects of the reconstruction process for earthquake-affected people as the local governments brought the grant process closer to them, helping with procedures and grievances and sharing crucial information on changes to procedures and new policies.   

Gyawali noted that the IRM findings about the role of local government changed his thinking about future disaster preparedness and response.  

“The findings of the report were instrumental in informing political negotiations and reinforcing the importance of local governments in addressing local needs and priorities in the DRM sector,” he said. “The subsequent policies, such as the National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2018, recognized the report’s recommendations, devolving more power and responsibilities to local governments for earthquake preparedness, stakeholder coordination, and collaboration.” 

When the Nepal Reconstruction Authority completed its mandate, the government established the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority to coordinate, facilitate, operate, and manage the country’s risk reduction and management activities. Guidelines drafted in 2021 for the new authority further devolved power so those closest to the disaster could have decision-making authority over their response. Now the Nepal Government and respective agencies have a network of emergency operation centers in all 77 districts, and disaster response committees in each of Nepal’s 753 municipalities.  

This gives hope for the future as Nepal’s local governments increasingly take on responsibilities and develop their own disaster response and preparedness plans. This is even more important as Nepal’s Bipad Portal—a government site for tracking hazards across Nepal—shows an increasing number of hazardous incidents each year since 2015. This disturbing trend reinforces the importance of having a well-coordinated disaster response mechanism at all tiers of government.

Other countries in Asia and the Pacific are also vulnerable to such disasters, or have experienced them, and they should study the findings from Nepal. While not all will be relevant due to differences in legal frameworks and governance systems, there are certainly wide-reaching lessons for preparedness and response.  

Furthermore, the macro lesson is that social impact research is critical for shaping long-term response and policy making. IRM’s in-depth, long-term research, both qualitative and quantitative, collected the impacts on those who are often overlooked—those who face extra barriers to rebuild and restart their lives. It offered the government additional information, data, and evidence to make incremental changes and adjust course along the way. Contributions of IRM and impact monitoring extend beyond immediate policy impacts. This type of research provides a solid evidence base for government, donors, NGOs, and other researchers and provides a broader view on the recovery process and lessons learned for future disaster responses.